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Johnson  &  Buel      v.3,pt.l 
Battles  and  leaders  L468439 
of  the  Civil  War 


PUBLIC   LIBRARY 

FORT  WAYNE  AND  ALLEN  COUNTY,  IND. 


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ALLEN  COUNTY   PUBLIC  LIBR^ 


3  1833  01348  0337 


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GENEALOGY 

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^BATTLES  AND 
LEADERS  OF  THE 
CIVIL  WAR 

VOLUME  THREE 


BATTLES^AND 
LEADERS  OF~THE 
CIVIlLWAR 


#rant-ilee€littion 


PART 


BEING  FOR  THE  MOST  PART  CONTRIBUTIONS 
BY  UNION  AND  CONFEDERATE  OFFICERS. 
BASED  UPON  "THE  CENTURY  WAR  SERIES." 
EDITED  BY  ROBERT  UNDERWOOD  |OHN^Q]vl 
AND  CLARENCE  CLOUGH  BUEL,  OF  ThFedI- 

torialstaffof"thecenturymagazine:' 

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Copyright,  1884,  1888, 
By  The  Century  Co. 


CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  THREEJ 

PAGE 

FRONTISPIECE,  "  BETWEEN  THE  LINES  DURING  A  TRUCE."     By  Gilbert  Gaul VI 

LIST  OF  MAPS xvm 

LIST  OF  ARTISTS XIX 

LIST  OF  DRAUGHTSMEN    XIX 

LIST  OF  ENGRAVERS «...    M.  r>.r*  M.  c\.n XIX 


t^  468439 


THE   PERRYVILLE   CAMPAIGN. 

BRAGG'S  INVASION  OF  KENTUCKY GENERAL  JOSEPH  IVHEELER 1 

ILLDSTKATIONS:  lu  the  Van  (W.  Taber)—Ma.^  of  North  Mississippi  and  West  Tennessee  (Jacob  Wells)  — 
Map  of  the  Corinth  and  luka  Region  (reproduction  from  an  official  map)  —  Map  of  Bragg's  Invasion  of 
Kentucky  (Jacob  WeZ/s;  — Brigadier-General  Preston  Smith,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo.— Union  Fort  at  Muu- 
fordville,  from  photo.  (E.  J.  J/ee/rer^  —  Lieutenant-General  E.  Kirby  Smith,  C.  S.  A.,  from  Brady  photo.— 
Lieutenant-General  .Joseph  Wheeler,  C.  S.  A.,  from  Brady  photo.— M:yor-General  B.  F.  Cheatham,  C.  B.  A., 
from  photo.— Spring  near  Terry  ville  which  helped  to  relieve  Bragg's  parched  Army  ;  and  Pear-tree,  One 
Hundred  Years  Old,  at  tlic  T.eft  of  Rousseau's  Position.  Perry  ville,  from  photos,  hy  E.  H.  Fox  (Harry  Fenn) 
—  Corner  of  the  Confederate  Cemetery  at  PerryvlUe,  from  photo,  by  E.  H.  Fox  (Tlarry  Fenn/  — Map  of 
theBattle-fleld  of  Perrj^ville  (Jacob  Wells)  —DeteuBe  of  Cage's  Ford,  on  the  Cumberland  River,  November 
21,  18G2,  from  a  lithograph  of  a  war-time  sketch  by  A.  E.  Mathews,  lent  by  Major  E.  C.  Dawes  (Harry 
Fenn). 


""^.mCTI.o."""-^''  """"^  ™'  '^'"^    }         C^W-^i  BASIL  U'.DUKE 26 

INVASION ) 


THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  PERRYVILLE,  KY.     Composition,  Strength,  and  Losses 29 

rcKKYVILLh ) 

Illustrations  :  On  the  Skinuish  Line  (  W.  Taber)  —  Brevet  Majjor-General  James  B.  Fry,  from  a  photo.— 
Brigadier-General  James  8.  Jackson,  from  a  photo.— Brigadier-General  William  R.  Terrill,  from  photo, 
lent  by  Mrs.  G.  A.  Porterfield. 

ON  THE  FIELD  OF  PERRYVILLE GENERAL  CHARLES  C.  GILBERT 52 

ILLUSTKATIONS:  PcrryviUe,  Kentucky,  looking  South-east  from  the  Mackville  Pike,  from  photo,  by  E. 
H.  Fox  (Harry  Fenn)—  Ridge  on  the  Union  Left  Occupied  by  Stone's  and  Bush's  Batteries  —  the  Scene  of 
Starkweather's  Contest,  and  Tree  near  where  General  James  S.  Jackson  Fell,  from  photos,  by  E.  II.  Fox 
(Harry  Fcnn)—y\GV}  looking  North-east  from  the  Position  of  Loomis's  Battery,  tlu'  Center  of  Rousseau's 
Line ;  and  Position  of  Loomis's  Battery  on  Rousseau's  Line,  looking  across  Doctor's  Creek,  frcmi  photos,  by 
E.  H.  Fox  C//«r/v/ FcM»0—Eiirm-housc  of  H.  P.  Bottom,  from  i)hoto.  by  E.  H.  Fox  (Harry  /^V/ih;- Engjjge- 
ment  of  Starkweather's  Brigade  on  the  Extreme  Union  Left,  from  lithograph  of  a  war-time  sketch 
by  A.  E.  Mathews  (Harry  Fenn). 

NOTES  OF  A  STAFF-OFFICER   AT  PERRYVILLE    .  ..MAJOR  J.  MONTGOMERY  IVRIGHT  GO 

CUMBERLAND  GAP GENERAL  GEORGE  IV.  MORGAN «i2 

ILLDSTRATIONS:  BHgadlor-General  (JeorgoW.  Morgan,  fnuu  photo.  by  Hickcox —  Plan  of  the  Confederate 
Works  at  Cumberland  Gap.  from  a  drawing  by  Captain  W.  F.  Patterson  (Jacob  U>//s;  — View  of  Cumber- 
land (iap  from  the  South,  from  a  lithograph  lent  by  Mrs.  Carrie  Buekner  (E.  J.  Meeker). 

THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  CUMBERLAND  GAP '•'■» 

\  In  order  to  save  much  repetition,  particular  credit  is  here  given  to  tlie  Massachusetts  Couiumndery  of  the 
I^Wal  Legion,  to  Colonel  Arnold  A.  Rand,  (Jeueral  .Mbert  Onlway.  and  Cliarles  B.  Hall  for  the  use  of  ph.itographs 
and  drawings.  War-time  phofograidiers  whose  wmk  is  of  tlu^  greatest  liistoii(  al  value,  and  lias  l)eeu  freely  drawn 
upou  in  the  preparation  of  the  illustrations,  are  M.  B.  Brady,  .\h-xauder  (iardiier,  and  Captain  A.  J.  Russell  in  the 
North;  and  D.  11.  .\nderson  of  Rieliinond.  Va.,  and  Georg.'  S.  Cook  of  Charleston,  S.  C— the  latter,  8iuc«-  th(-  war. 
having  succeeded  to  the  ownership  of  the  Aiuleisoii  negatives. 

ix 


CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  THREE. 


BURNSIDE   AT   FREDERICKSBURG. 

PAGE 

IWl  BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG GENERAL  JAMES  LONGSTREET 70 

iLLirsTRATiONS  :  Confederate  Picket  witli  Blanket-Capote  and  Eaw-liide  Moccasins  (Allen  C.  Redu-ood) 
—  Brigadier-General  Maxcy  Gregg,  C.  8,  A.,  from  Anderson-Cook  photo.—  Map  of  the  Battle  of  Fredericks- 
burg (Jacob  TTcW/,;  —  Front  of  the  Maryo  Mansion,  from  Gardner  photo.  (W.  Taber)—Tlxe  Sunken  Road 
under  Marye's  Hill,  from  photo,  by  Betz  &  Kichards  — House  by  the  Stone  Wall,  in  which  General  Cobb 
died,  from  photo.  (  W.  Taber)  —  Cobb's  and  Kershaw's  Troops  behind  the  Stone  Wall  (Allen  C.  Redwood)  — 
Brigadier  (iciieral  Thomas  R.  R.  Cobb,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo.  —  Confederate  Works  on  Willis's  Hill,  now 
the  Site  of  tlie  National  Cemetery,  from  Brady  photo.  (Harry  Fenn)  — WeUord's  Mill  on  Hazel  Run  and 
the  Telegraph  Road,  from  photo.  (J.  D.  Woodward). 

THE  CONFEDERATE  LEFT  AT  FREDERICKSBURG ..  G£A/£/?^Z,  LAFAYETTE  MCLAIVS 86 

Illustrations:  Barksdale's  Mississippians  Opposing  the  Laying  of  the  Pontoon  Bridges  (A.  C.  Red- 
,<.oofO  —  Fredericksburg  from  the  Foot  of  WilUs's  HiU,  from  Brady  photo.  (E.  J.  Ifecfcer;  —  Brigadier- 
General  Robert  Ransom,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo. 

RANSOM'S  DIVISION  AT  FREDERICKSBURG GENERAL  ROBERT  RANSOM 94 

KERSHAW'S  BRIGADE  AT  FREDERICKSBURG GENERAL  J.  B.  KERSHAIV 95 

A  HOT  DAY  ON  MARYE'S  HEIGHTS LIEUTENANT  IVILLIAM  MILLER  OfVEN  97 

Illustrations  :  The  Washington  Artillery  on  Marye's  Hill  Firing  upon  the  Union  Columns  forming 
for  the  Assault  (A.  C.  Red icood)  — James  A.  Seddon,  Secretary  of  War  to  the  Southern  Confederacy,  from 
photo,  lent  by  James  Blair —  Winter  Sport  in  a  Confederate  Camp  (A.  C.  Redtcood). 

NOTES  OF  A  CONFEDERATE  STAFF-OFFICER MAJOR  IV.  ROY  MASON 100 

Illistkation:  Confederate  Theatricals  (A.  C.  Redwood). 

THE  REMOVAL  OF  M^CLELLAN COLONEL  RICHARD  B.   IRIVIN 102 

Illustration  :  Newspapers  in  Camp  (Edwin  Forbes). 

SUMNER'S  "  RIGHT  GRAND  DIVISION  " GENERAL  DARIUS  N.   COUCH 105 

Illustrations:  Hot  Work  for  Hazard's  Battery  (W.  Tafter^  —  Chatham,  opposite  Fredericksburg,  also 
known  as  the  "  Lacy  House,"  and  The  Phillips  House,  Burnside's  Headquarters,  from  Gardner  photo. 
(W.  rafter;— General  A.  E.  Burnside,  from  photo.,  with  autograph  —  Fredericksburg  from  the  East 
Bank  of  the  Rappahannock  (two  views)  (Jo.seph  I'ennell) —  The  Bomljardment  of  Fredericksburg,  and 
Crossing  the  River  in  Pontoons  to  Dislodge  the  Confederate  Sharp-shooters  (R.  F.  Zogbaum)  —The  Ninth 
Corps  crossing  by  the  Pontoon  Bridge  (R.  F.  Zo()baum )  —  Warehouse  in  Fredericksburg  used  as  a  Hospi- 
tal, from  photo,  lent  by  W.  H.  Whiton  (W.  Taber)— The  Ground  between  Fredericksburg  and  Marye's 
Heights,  from  photo.  (J.  D.  Woodward)  —  Stncb  in  the  Mud  — a  Flank  March  across  Country  (Edivin 
Forbe8)  —  The  Grand  Review  at  Falmouth  during  President  Lincoln's  Visit  (Edwin  Forbes). 

THE  CROSSING  OF  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK  BY  \ 

Tuc       Tu    MAccAruiicuT-rc  i         CAPTAIN  H.   G.   O.   IVEYMOUTH 121 

THE   iqTH   MASSACHUSETTS ) 

THE  PONTONIERS  AT  FREDERICKSBURG   COLONEL  IVESLEY  BRAINERD 121 

IN  FRONT  OF  THE   STONE  WALL  AT  | 

FREDERICKSBURG   } GENERAL  JOHN  IV.   AMES 122 

WHY  BURNSIDE  DID  NOT  RENEW  THE  ATTACK  \ 

AT   FREDERICKSBURC] }  GENERAL   RUSH  C.  HAIVKINS 126 

FRANKLIN'S  "  LEFT  GRAND  DIVISION  "    GENERAL  H^ILLIAM  FARRAR  SMITH   .  128 

li.LUfTUATioNs:  Franklin's  Men  Charging  across  the  Railroad  iW.  Tuber)  —  The  Pontoon  Bridges  at 
Franklin's  Crossing,  from  Gardner  photo.  C//«r/-// Fejiu;- Franklin's  Battle-Held,  as  seen  from  Hamil- 
ton's Crossing  (A.  C.  Retlwood) —  (ieueval  W.  B.  Franklin,  from  photo,  by  De  Lamater,  Avith  autograph  — 
Kuins  of  •'  Mansfield,"  also  known  as  the  "  Bernard  House,"  from  Gardner  photo.  (.L  D.  Woodward)  — A 
.Tack-kuifc  Record  on  the  Htone  Wall  of  the  "Bernard  House"  (A.  C.  iierfjroorf;  — Brigadier-General 
(icorge  1).  Bayard,  from  an  engraving  by  H.  B.  Hall  — Brigadier-General  C.  F.  .lackson,  from  photo., 
with  autograph. 

WITI I  JACKSON  AT  HAMILTON'S  CROSSING /.  H.  MOORE 139 

Illustrations:  Trallic  Between  the  Lines  during  a  Truce  (Edwin  Forftes;  —  Hays's  Brigade  of  Stone- 
wall Jackson's  Corps,  at  Hamilton's  Crossing  (A.  C.  Redwood). 


CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  THREE.  xi 

PAGE 

(     1.   GEORGE  R.   SMITH ) 

IN   THE  RANKS  AT  FREDERICKSBURG \     _^    ORSON  B    CURTIS  \ 

THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  FREDERICKSBURG.     Composition,  Strength,  and  Losses 143 

A  BIT  OF  PARTISAN  SERVICE COLONEL  JOHN  S.  MOSBY 148 

Illcstratioxs  :  Union  Camp  Scene :  A  Quiet  Game  (  Winsloio  Homer j—  Colonel  Joliu  S.  Mosby,  C.  S.  A., 
tiom  plioto.  lent  bj-  James  Blair, 


CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

STONEMAN'S  RAID  IN  THE  CHANCELLORSVILLE  CAMPAIGN 152 

ILLLSTKATION :  Major-Geueral  George  Stonemau,  from  photo,  by  Anthony. 

THE  CHANCELLORSVILLE  CAMPAIGN GENERAL  DARIUS  N.   COUCH 154 

iLLUSTRATioxs :  Coips  Badges  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  under  Hoolier  (H.  A.  Ogden)  —  Outline  Map 
of  the  ChancellorsviUe  Campaign  (Jacob  Wells)  — T\ie  Kight  Wing  of  Hooker's  Army  Crossing  the  Rappa- 
hannock at  Kelly's  Ford  (Edwin  Forbes)  —  Map  of  the  ChancellorsviUe  Campaign  (Jacob  Wells)  —  General 
Joseph  Hooker,  from  Brady  photo.,  with  autograph  —  Hooker's  Headquarters  at  ChancellorsviUe  (Edicin 
J'orftes;— Stampede  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  on  the  Plank  Road  (A.  C.  ieedwoorf;  —  Staying  Jackson's  Ad- 
vance, Saturday  evening.  May  2d,  1863  (Edwin  Forbes)  —The  29th  Pennsylvania  in  the  Trenches  under 
Artillery  Fire,  May  3d,  1863,  from  original  picture  in  possession  of  Capt.  W.  L.  Stork  (W.  L.  Sheppard)  — 
Second  Lineof  Union  Defense  at  the  Junction  of  the  Roads  to  Ely's  and  United  States  Fords  (Edwin  Forbes). 


i  GENERAL  ALFRED  PLEASONTON 172 


THE    SUCCESSES   AND    FAILURES  OF    CHANCEL- 
LORSVILLE  

Illcstratioxs:  Union  Cavalryman's  Hat,  from  photo.  (W.  Tafter)  —  Parade  at  Falmouth  of  the  llOth 
Pcnusylvauia  Volunteers,  from  photo,  lent  by  W.  H.  Whiton  (W.  Tafte/';  —  Abandoning  the  Winter  Camp 
at  Falinouth  (Edwin  Forbes) —Vniou  Troops  Crossing  the  Rapidan  at  Ely's  Ford  (Edicin  Forbesj  —  Miijor- 
(icncral  Hiram  G.  Berry,  from  Brady  photo. ;  Repulse  of  Jackson's  Men  at  Hazel  Grove  by  ArtiUery  under 
General  Pleasonton  (T.  de  T}mlstntp)  —  ^hi}or-Geiieviil  Amiel  W.  Whipple,  from  Brady  photo. 

WHEN  STONEWALL  JACKSON  TURNED  OUR  R\GHT  JOHN  L.   COLLINS 183 

iLLUSTRATioxs :  Major  Peter  Keenan,  from  photo,  lent  by  Samuel  Wilson  —  General  Howard  striving  to 
rally  his  Troops  (R.  F.  Zogbaum). 

)    1.  GEN.   PENNOCK  HUEY 1 S6 

THE  CHARGE  OF  THE  EIGHTH  PENNSYLVANIA  (   ,,   ^^^^^  j    ^^IVARD  CARPENTER.  .  .  .1S7 
CAVALRY ^  ijj   CAPT.  ANDREIV  B.   IVELLS 187 

THE  ARTILLERY  AT  HAZEL  GROVE CAPTAIN  JAMES  F.  HUNTINGTON  ....  188 

THE  ELEVENTH  CORPS  AT  CHANCELLORSVILLE      GENERAL  OLIVER  O.  HO^VARD 189 

Illcstratioxs  :  Race  on  the  Plank  Road  for  Right  of  Way.  between  the  Ninth  Massachusetts  Battery 
and  a  Baggage  Train,  from  a  war-time  sketch  by  C.  W.  Reed  C"'.  Taber)  —  T\w  Old  Chancellor  House, 
from  photo,  lent  by  Theodore  Miller  iC.  A.  Yanderhoof)  —^lap  of  the  Position  of  the  Eleventh  Corps 
(Jacob  Wells)  —  Dowdall's  Tavern,  Howard's  Headquarters,  from  Gardner  photo.  (  W.  Jafter;  —Do wdall's 
TavciTi  in  1884  (Joseph  Penuell)  —  The  Wilderness  Church  and  Hawkins's  Farm,  from  photo,  made  in  188* 
(Hurry  Fenn)— The  Wilderness  Church,  from  photo.  (Thomas  Ho(jan)  —  Tht:  Confederates  Charging 
Howard's  Breastworks  (W.  L.  Sheppard)  —Major-GeneTiil  Carl  Schurz,  from  photo,  by  Brady— Union 
Breastworks  in  the  Woods  between  Dowdall's  Tavern  and  ChancellorsviUe  — Relics  of  the  Dead  in  the 
Woods  near  the  Plank  Road;  and  the  Plank  Road  near  where  Jackson  Fell,  from  war-time  photos. 
(Georye  6i?»s«»0  — Map  of  tlio  Positions  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  and  iiart  of  the  Third  Corps,  covering 
the  ChancellorsviUe  Plateau,  May  2d  and  3d  (Jacob  jr«>//»;  -Rescuing  the  Wounded  on  Sunday,  May  3d. 
from  the  Burning  Woods  (Edicin  Forbes). 

STONEWALL  JACKSONS  LAST  BATTLE REV.  JAMES  POWER  SMITH i'03 

Illcstratioxs:  Stonewall  Jackson's  Cap,  from  photo.  —  Lee  and  Jackson  in  Council  on  the  Night  of 
Jlay  ist  (W.  L.  Sheppard)  —VAC-«hni\e  of  General  Jackson's  Last  letter.  In  possession  of  the  Virginia 
State  Library  — Lieutenant-(;eneral  Thomas  J.  Jackson,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo,  lent  by  Major  Jed.  Hotch- 
klBs  —  Stonewall  Jackson's  "Old  Sorrel,"  from  photo.— Brigadier-General  E.  F.  Paxton,  from  ambrotype 
lent  by  J.  G.  Paxton  — Stonewall  Jackson  Going  Forwanl  on  tlie  Plank  RoatI  in  Advance  of  his  Line  of 
Battle  (A.  C.  ifprfiroof/;- Mi»jor-General  R.  E.  Colston,  C.  S.  A.,  from  Anderson-Cook  photo.— Brigadier- 
General  F.  T.  Nicholls,  C.  S.  A.,  from  Anderson-Cook  photo.— The  New  Chanrellor  House,  from  photo. 
(Harry  Fenn)  —  Stonewall  Jackson's  Grave,  Lexington,  Vu.,  from  photo,  by  M.  Miley  (  W.  Taber  \ 


xii  CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME   THREE. 

PAGE 

HOOKER'S  COMMENTS  ON  CHANCELLORSVILLE  ..SAMUEL  P.  BATES 215 

Illustrations:  Lance  used  by  the  Sixth  Peunsylvania  Cavalry  (Rush's  Lancers),  from  photo.  (G.  R. 
Halm)  —  Retreat  of  the  Union  Army  across  the  Rappahannock  at  United  States  Ford  (Edwin  Forbes)  — 
Foraging  in  the  Wilderness  (W.  H.  Shelton). 

Illustrations  :  Feeling  the  Enemy  (Winslow  Homer)  —'ilm  Stone  Wall  under  Marye's  Heights,  from 
a  photo,  by  Brady  taken  immediately  after  Sedgwick  Carried  the  Position  by  Assault  (W.  Taber)  —  Cap- 
ture of  a  Gun  of  the  Washington  Artillery,  on  Marye's  Heights  (R.  F.  Zogbaum)  — Salem  Church,  from 
photo,  taken  In  188i  (W.  Taber)  —The  Attack  on  Sedgwick  at  Banks's  Ford,  Monday  evening,  May  4th 
(Edumi  Forbes). 

LEE'S  KNOWLEDGE  OF  HOOKER'S  MOVEMENTS  ..GENERAL  R.  E.  COLSTON 233 

THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  IN  THE  CHANCELLORSVILLE  CAMPAIGN.     Composition, 


Strength,  and  Losses . 


■"} 


233 


HOOKER'S  APPOINTMENT  AND  REMOVAL CHARLES  F.  BENJAMIN 239 

Illustrations  :  Breaking  up  the  Union  Camp  at  Falmouth,  from  photo.  (W.  Taftcr;  — Major- General 
George  G.  Meade,  from  Brady  photo. 

GETTYSBURG. 

LEE'S  INVASION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA GENERAL  JAMES  LONGSTREET 244 

Illustrations  :  Union  Cavalry  Scouting  in  Front  of  the  Confederate  Advance  (  W.  Taber)  —  Map  of  the 
Gettysburg  Campaign  (Jacob  17c?;s;  —  Relief  Map  of  the  Gettysburg  Campaign,  from  photo,  of  original 
cast  by  A.  E.  Lehman  — General  Robert  E.  Lee,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo,  taken  after  the  war  — Confederates 
at  a  Ford  (A.  C.  Redioood). 

THE  CONFEDERATE  CAVALRY  IN  THE  »  i  i    COLONEL  JOHN  S.  MOSBY 251 

GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN (   "  '    '    (  ii.   GENERAL  BEVERLY  H.  ROBERTSON .253 

Illustration  :  General  James  Longstreet,  C.  8.  A.,  from  Anderson-Cook  photo.,  with  autograph, 

THE  FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG GENERAL  HENRY  J.  HUNT 255 

Illustrations:  Buford's  Cavalry  Opposing  the  Confederate  Advance  upon  Gettysburg  (W.  Taber)  — 
General  Meade  in  the  Field,  from  photo.— Major-General  John  F.  Reynolds,  from  Brady  photo.— Fifteen 
Maps  Relating  to  the  Campaign  and  Battle  of  Gettysburg,  compiled  by  General  Abner  Doubleday  (Jacob 
Wells)  —  Pennsylvania  College,  Gettysburg,  from  photo,  by  W.  H.  Tipton  (  W.  Taber)  —  The  Lutheran  Semi- 
nary, from  war-time  photo. ;  and  View  of  Seminary  from  Chambersburg  Pike,  from  photo,  by  W.  H.  Tipton 
(W.  rafter^  —  Gettysburg  from  Oak  Hill,  from  photo,  by  W.  H.  Tipton  (W.  Taber)  —  Geneva]  Lee's  Head- 
quarters on  the  Chambersburg  Pike,  from  photo.  (W.  Taber)  —  North-east  Corner  of  the  McPherson  Woods, 
where  General  Reynolds  was  killed,  from  photo,  by  W.  H.  Tipton  (W.  Tuber)  —  Confederate  Dead  on  the 
Field  of  the  First  Day,  from  Gardner  photo.  (W.  Taber)  -Union  Dead  West  of  the  Seminary,  from  Gard- 
ner photo.  (W.  Taber)  — Union  Dead  near  McPherson's  Woods,  from  Gardner  photo.  (W.  Taber)  — John 
L.  Burns,  "  The  Old  Hero  of  Gettysburg,"  from  photo.—  Malor-General  Abner  Doubh^lay,  from  Brady 
photo.— Assault  of  Brockenbrough's  Confederate  Brigade  (Heth's  Division)  upon  the  Stone  Barn  of  the 
McPherson  Farm  (A.  C.  Redwood )— Confederate  Dead  gathered  for  Burial  near  the  McPherson  Woods, 
from  Gardner  photos.  ( W.  Taber)  —  Lieutenant  Bayard  Wilkeson  holding  his  Battery  to  its  Work  in  an 
Exposed  Position  (A.  R.  TTaMcZ^  —  The  Line  of  Defense  at  the  Cemetery  Gate-House,  from  Gardner  photo. 
(W.  Taber). 

INCIDENTS  OF  THE  FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG  .    MAJOR  E.  P.  HALSTEAD 284 

Illustrations:  Counting  the  Scars  in  the  Colors  (W.  L.  SJieppard j  —Qeneral  Wiulield  8.  Hancock, 
from  photo,  by  Gurney  &  Son,  with  autograph. 

HANCOCK  AND  HOWARD  IN  THE  FIRST  DAY'S    ^ 

FIGHT.     Extracts  from  Official  Reports ♦   

CITIZENS  OF  GETTYSBURG  IN  THE  UNION  ARMY  .  ..H.  M.  M.  RICHARDS 289 

THE  SECOND  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG GENERAL  HENRY  J.  HUN r 290 

Illustrations:  Hall's  Battery  on  the  First  Day  resisting  the  Confedcrnto  Advance  on  tue  Chambers- 
burg Road  CTT.  Taber;  —  Relief  Map  of  the  Battle-field  of  Gettysburg,  from  photo,  of  original  cast  by  A.  E. 
Lehman;  General  Meade's  Headquarters  on  the  Taneytown  Road,  from  Gardner  photo.  (W.  Taber)  — 
Miyor-<Jeueral  Daniel  E.  Sickles,  from  photo.— View  frofli  the  Position  of  Ilazlett's  Battery  on  Little 
Round  Top,  from  photo,  by  W.  H.  Tipton  (Hurry  Fenn)  —  Tvfo  Maps  of  Positions  on  July  2d,  compiled  by 


.287 


CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME   THREE.  xlii 

PAGE 

General  Abner  Doubleday  (Jacob  TTeWs^  — Union  Breastworks  on  Little  Round  Top  — Big  Round  Top  in 
the  Distance,  from  Gardner  photos.  (W.  Tafter^  —  Colonel  Edward  E.  Cross,  from  Brady  photo.— Weed's 
Position  on  Little  Round  Top  (C.  W.  Reed)  —  General  G.  K.  Warren  at  the  Signal  Station  on  Little  Round 
Top  (A.  B.  TFawtZ^  — Brigadier-General  Stephen  H.  Weed,  from  Brady  photo.— Brigadier-General  Strong 
Vincent,  from  Brady  photo.—  Trostle's  Barn  and  Trostle's  House,  the  Scene  of  the  Fighting  of  Bigelow's 
Battery,  from  Gardner  photos.  Cl^-  Taftcr^  —  Monument  of  Bigelow's  Ninth  Massachusetts  Battery, 
from  photo,  by  W.  H.  Tipton  ( W.  Taftery  —Colonel  George  L.  Willard,  from  Brady  photo.— Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Samuel  K.  Zook,  from  Brady  photo.— View  of  Gulp's  Hill  from  the  Position  of  the  Batteries  near  the 
Cemetery  Gate,  from  photo,  by  W.  H.  Tipton  CTF.  Ta6er;— Early's  Charge  on  the  evening  of  July  2d,  upon 
East  Cemetery  Hill  (Edwin  Forbes)  —  Confederate  Skirmishers  at  the  Foot  of  Gulp's  Hill  (Edwin  Forbes). 

THE  COUNCIL  OF  WAR  ON  THE  SECOND  DAY.  .  ..GENERAL  JOHN  GIBBON 313 

THE  20TH  MAINE  AT  LITTLE  ROUND  TOP H.  S.  MELCHER 314 

THE  146TH  NEW-YORK  AT  LITTLE  ROUND  lO? .   GENERAL  JAMES  G.  GRINDLAY 315 

Illustration:  Uniform  of  the  146th  New  York  Regiment,  from  photo,  by  Whiteley  &  Co.  (W.  Taber). 

i  CAPTAIN  JESSE  H.  JONES 316 

THE  BREASTWORKS  AT  GULP'S  HILL I  rcKip^ji    rcr^orv   c    r-Dccx,n  o-.^ 

(  GENERAL  GEORGE  S.  GREENE 317 

THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  "ROUND  TOP" GENERAL  E.  M.   LAIV 318 

Illustrations:  At  Close  Quarters  on  the  First  Day  at  Gettysburg  C4.  C.  Redwood)  — Brevet  Ma,jor- 
General  Henry  J.  Hunt,  Chief  of  Artillery  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  from  Brady  photo.— The  Strug- 
gle for  Devil's  Den  (A.  B.  Waud)— The  "Slaughter  Pen"  at  the  Base  and  on  the  Left  Slope  of  Little 
Round  Top,  from  Gardner  photos.  (JV.  Taber)  —Dead  Confederate  Sharp-shooter  in  the  Devil's  Den,  from 
Gardner  photo.  (W.  Tabe/-;  —  Brigadier-General  William  N.  Pendleton,  C.  S.  A.,  Lee's  Chief  of  Artillery, 
from  photo,  by  Tanner  &  Vanness,  lent  by  Commander  John  M.  Brooke  — Major-General  J.  B.  Kershaw, 
C.  S.  A.,  from  photo,  by  G.  W.  Minnus. 

KERSHAW'S  BRIGADE  AT  GETTYSBURG GENERAL  J.  B.  KERSHAIV 331 

Illustrations:  Devil's  Den,  facing  Little  Round  Top  (CW.  Reed)  —Major-General  E.  M.  Law, C.  S.  A., 
from  photo,  by  Lee  —  Major-General  Lafayette  McLaws,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo.— Sickles's  Position  at 
the  Peach  Orchard,  viewed  from  the  Emmitsburg  Road,  looking  South  — The  "Wheat-Field,"  looking 
toward  Kershaw's  Position  in  Front  of  Rose's  House  — The  Peach  Orchard,  viewed  from  Longstreet's 
Extreme  Right  on  the  Emmitsburg  Road  — Sickles's  Angle  at  the  Peach  Orchard,  as  seen  from  the  Road 
leading  from  the  Wheat-Field  to  the  Peach  Orchard,  four  sketches  made  in  1885  (C.  TT.  Reed). 

LEE'S  RIGHT  WING  AT  GETTYSBURG GENERAL  JAMES  LONGSTREET 339 

Illustrations:  The  Last  Confederate  Gun  at  Gettysburg,  on  Longstreet's  Right,  opposite  Round 
Top  (A.  R.  TTaHf/;- Lutheran  Church  on  Chambersburg  Street,  Gettysburg,  used  as  a  Hospital,  from 
photo,  by  W.  H.  Tipton  (W.  Taftcr;  —  Brigadier-General  WiUiam  Barksdale,  C.  S.  A.,  from  Brady  photo. 
—  Brigadier-General  Paul  Semmes,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo.  — Dead  in  the  "  AATieat-Field "  gathered  for 
Burial,  from  Gardner  photos.  CTF.  Taber)  -Map  of  Positions  July  3d,  3:15  to  5 :  30  r.  m.,  compiled  l)y 
GtMieral  Abner  Doubleday  (Jacob  TTeW."})  —  Major-General  William  D.  Pender,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo.— Pro- 
file of  Cemetery  Ridge  as  seen  from  Pickett's  Position  before  the  Charge,  from  sketch  made  in  1884  (C. 
W.  iJecrf;- Brigadier-General  Lewis  A.  Armistead,  C.  8.  A.,  from  photo.— The  Charge  of  Pickett,  Petti- 
grew,  and  Trimble  (Edwin  For&csJ  —  Major-General  George  E.  Pickett,  C.  8.  A.,  from  Anderson-Cook 
photo. 

THE  CHARGE  OF   PICKETT,   PETTIGREW,  AND  »       .    ^    SMITH  354 

TRIMBLE r 

A  REPLY  TO  GENERAL  LONGSTREET COLONEL  IVII.LIAM  ALLAN 355 

THE  GREAT  CHARGE  AND  ARTILLERY  \  ,^^.  ,,,^^„  o_^ 

FIGHTING  AT  GETTYSBURG } ^^^^^^^  ^-  ''•  ^^^'^'"^^^^^ ^^^ 

Illustrations:  Charge  of  Alexander's  Artillery  CTT.  T«&ri-;  — Confederate  Artillerjnnen  at  Dinner 
(A.  C.  AVf/ir«ofO— Confederates  Waiting  for  the  End  of  the  Artillery  Du.l  (1.  C  Jffrftroorfj  —  Migor- 
General  Cadmus  M.  Wilcox,  C.  8.  A.,  from  Anderson-Cook  photo. 

THE  THIRD  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG GENERAL    HEKRY  J.  HUNT 309 

Illustrations:  Hand-to-hand  for  Rieketts's  Guns  on  the  Evening  of  the  Second  Tn\y  (W.  Taber)  — 
Steuart's  Brigade  renewing  the  Confederate  Attack  on  Gulp's  Hill,  Morning  of  the  Third  Day  (A.  C.  Red- 
wood)—The  29tli  Pennsylvania  forming  Line  of  Battle  on  Cnli/s  Hill  at  10  a.  m..  July  3d,  from  artist's 
l)icture  in  possession  of  Captain  W.  L.  Stork  (W.  L.  Slirppard) -Ureyet  Major-GeniTal  George  S.Greene, 
from  ambrotype  lent  by  Captain  F.  V.  Greene  — Gettysburg  from  CuMi's  Hill,  from  photo,  taken  about 
188f.  / E.  J.  .IffrAr;-)  — Monument  of  the  2d  Massachusetts  Infantry,  facing  the  East  Base  of  Gulp's  Hill, 
from  photo,  ( W.  Taber)  —  Slocum's  Headquarters,  Power's  Hill,  from  photo,  by  W.  II.  Tipton  ( W.  Taber)  — 


xiv  CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  THREE. 

FAGl. 

Mencheys  Spring,  between  Gulp's  Hill  and  tbe  Cemetery  Gate ;  and  Spangler's  Spring,  East  of  Gulp's 
HiU,  from  sketches  by  C.  W.  Reed  (W.  Ta&er;  —  Golonel  Eliakim  SlieiTill,  fi-om  photo.—  (Pickett's  Charge, 
I.—  Looking  down  the  Union  Lines  from  the  '•  Climip  of  Trees  " ;  Pickett's  Charge,  II.—  The  Main  Collision 
to  the  Right  of  the  "  Clump  of  Trees  " ;  Pickett's  Charge,  III.  (continuation  of  the  foregoing)  —  three  pic- 
tures, from  photos,  of  the  Gettysburg  Cyclorama)  —  Inside  Evergreen  Cemetery,  Cemetery  Hill  (Edwin 
Forbes)  —  Nine  Maps  [Nos.  21  to  29]  of  the  Confederate  Retreat  from  Gettysburg,  compiled  by  General 
Abner  Doubleday  (Jacob  TFe/?s;  —  Confederate  Prisoners  on  the  Baltimore  Pike  (Edwin  Forbes). 

GENERAL  HANCOCK  AND  THE  ARTILLERY  AT  j    i.  GENER/IL  FRANCIS  A.  WALKER 385 

GETTYSBURG   (  ii.  REJOINDER  BY  GEN.  HENRY  J.  HUNT  .  386 

REPELLING    LEE'S    LAST  BLOW  AT  GETTYSBURG. 

Illustrations  :  Ground  over  which  Pickett,  Pettigrew,  and  Trimble  Charged,  from  photo,  hy  W.  H. 
Tipton  CTF.  Ta&er;  —  Cemetery  Ridge  after  Pickett's  Charge  (Edwin  Forbes). 

I.  COLONEL  EDMUND  RICE 387 

II.  From  the  Official  Report  of  COLONEL  NORMAN  J.  HALL 390 

III.  From  the  Report  of  GENERAL  ALEXANDER  S.   IVEBB 391 

,v.  LIEUTENANT  L.  E.   BICKNELL 391 

FARNSWORTH'S  CHARGE  AND  DEATH   CAPTAIN  H.  C.  PARSONS 393 

Illustrations  :  Farnsworth's  Charge  (W.  Ta6er;  —  Map  of  Farnsworth's  Charge,  compiled  by  Captain 
H.  C.  Parsons  (Jacob  TfeWs;  —  Brigadier-General  Elon  J.  Farusworth,  from  Brady  photo. 

THE  CAVALRY  BATTLE   NEAR  GETTYSBURG CAPTAIN  WILLIAM  E.  MILLER 397 

Illustrations  :  Monument  on  tlie  Field  of  the  Cavalry  Fight  between  the  Forces  of  Gregg  and  Stuart, 
from  photo,  by  W.  H.  Tipton  (W.  Tuber)— 'Breyet  Major-General  D.  McM.  Gregg,  from  Brady  photo.— Two 
Maps  [Nos.  19  and  20]  of  the  Cavalry  Battle,  compiled  by  General  Abner  Doubleday  (Jacob  TTe/Zs;- Bat- 
tle between  the  Union  Cavali-y  imder  Gregg  and  the  Confederate  Cavalry  under  Stuart  (A.  R.  Waud). 

MEADE  AT  GETTYSBURG   GENERAL  FRANCIS  A.   WALKER 406 

Illustration  :  Monument  to  the  1st  Massachusetts  Cavalry,  on  the  Site  of  Sedgwick's  Headquarters, 
from  photo.  ( W.  Taber). 

THE  MEADE-SICKLES  CONTROVERSY. 

Illustration  :  Monimientin  the  Gettysburg  Cemetery,  from  photo,  by  W.  H.  Tipton  (W.  Taber). 

I.  A  Letter  from  GENERAL  GEORGE  G.  MEADE 413 

u.  Comment  by  GENERAL  DANIEL  E.  SICKLES 414 

THE  CONFEDERATE    RETREAT  FROM  )  ^^^^^^^  ^    ^^^^^^^ ^^^^ 

GETTYSBURG ^    ■■■    ■  j 

Illustrations  :  "  Carry  me  Back  to  Die  Virginny,"  Good-bye !  and  The  Retreat  from  Gettysbm-g  (A.  C. 
Redwood)  — General  J.  Johnston  Pettigrew,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo. 

A  PRISONER'S  MARCH   FROM  GETTYSBURG  )  ^    ^^^^^^^ ^^,  _ 

TO  STAUNTON    )■••■./ 

Illustrations:  Confederate  Vidette  CTF.  i.  -S'/tei^pa/vO— Confederates  Captured  at  Gettysburg,  from 
war-time  photo.  (W.  Taber). 

THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  GETTYSBURG,   PA.      Composition,  Strength,  and  Losses 434 

Illustration  :  Consecration  of  the  Gettysburg  Cemetery,  November  19th,  1863  — The  Gathering  that 
President  Lincoln  Addressed,  from  Gardner  photo.  (W.  Taber). 

THE    VICKSBURG   YEAR. 

THE  CONQUEST  OF  ARKANSAS COLONEL   THOMAS  L   SNEAD 441 

Illustrations  :  Union  Cavalrymen :  the  Watcr-Call  ( Wiiislom  i/o»ir/-; -Map  of  the  Campaigns  of  the 
Mississippi  Valley  (Jacob  Tl'c^s;  -  Lieutenant  Geii.'ral  T.  II.  Holnios,  G.  S.  A.,  from  photo,  by  Anthouy- 
Major-General  T.  C.  Ilindmau,  C.  S.  A.,  from  plioto.-Major-GciH-ral  John  S.  Marmaduke,  C.  S.  A.,  from 
Brady  photo.  — Miijor-General  James  G.  Blunt,  from  photo.- Fayetteville,  Arkansas,  from  photo,  by 
Hansard  &  Osborn  (C.  A.  VaHderhoof)-Unv  of  the  Battle  of  Prairie  Grove  (J.  von  Oliimer) -Bvisn- 
dier-Gencral  T.  J.  GhnrchiU,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo.- Map  of  the  Battle  of  Arkansas  Post  (.Tacob  Wells)  — 
Plan  of  Fort  Hindniaii.  Arkansas  Post;  section  of  a  Casemate  of  Fortlllndman;  and  Casemate  on  the 
Eastern  Curtain  of  Fort  Hindman,  showing  the  eflfect  of  Shot  from  the  Union  Guns  (Jacob  Wem)  - 
Helena,  Arkansas,  from  photo.  (O.  A.  Tanderhoof)  -  Map  of  the  Battle  of  Helena,  Arkansas  (Jacob  Wells) 
-Map  of  the  Capture  of  Little  Rock  (Jacob  Wells)  -  Major-General  Frederick  Steele,  fx'om  photo,  lent  by 
Colonel  Thomas  L.  Snead. 


CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  THREE.  xv 

PAGE 

THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  IN  ARKANSAS.     Composition,  Strength,  and  Losses 459 

THE  ASSAULT  ON  CHICKASAW  BLUFFS GENERAL  GEORGE  IV.  MORGAN. 4G2 

ILLUSTKATIONS :  CMckasaw  Bayou  and  the  Vicksburg  BUiffs,  from  a  sketch  lent  by  Dr.  E.  Wyllys 
Andrews  (Harry  Fenn)  —  Map  of  the  First  Vicksburg  Campaigu  or  Chickasaw  Bayou  (Jacob  Wells)  — 
Lieutenant-Geuei-al  S.  D.  Lee,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo.— Major-Geueral  Dabney  H.  Maurj',  C.  S.  A.,  from 
Auderson-Cook  photo. 

THE  OPPOSING   FORCES   AT    CHICKASAW    BLUFFS  (OR    FIRST    VICKSBURG),  MISS.     Com- 
position, Strength,  and  Losses    471 

JEFFERSON  DAVIS  AND  THE  MISSISSIPPI  CAMPAIGN.  GENERAL  JOSEPH  E.  JOHNSTON 472 

ILLUSTKATIONS :  Lieutenant-General  J.  C.  Pemberton,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo.— Major-General  Martin  L. 
Smith,  C.  S.  A.,  from  Brady  photo.— Vicksburg  Court  House,  from  photo,  by  A.  L.  Blanks  (C.  A. 
Vamlerhoof J  —Colonel  S.  H.  Lockett,  C.  S.  A.,  from  oil  portrait  by  Nicolo  Marschall,  made  in  1863. 

THE  DEFENSE  OF  VICKSBURG S.  H.  LOCKETT 482 

Illustrations:  Confederate  Lines  in  the  Rear  of  Vicksburg,  from  jy^oto.— (Harry  Fenn)— Major- 
General  C.  L.  Stevenson,  C.  8.  A.,  from  photo.— Passage  of  Gun-boats  and  Steamers  at  Vicksburg  on  the 
Night  of  April  16th,  1863,  from  oil  sketch  by  Colonel  Lockett  (J.  O.  Davidson)—  "  Sky  Parlor  Hill,"  a  Confed- 
erate Signal-Station  during  the  Siege,  and  Caves  of  the  kind  in  which  Residents  of  Vicksburg  sought 
Refuge  during  the  Bombardment  by  the  Fleet,  from  photos.  (Harry  J'cmm;— Brigadier-General  Edward 
Higgins,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo.— Effect  of  the  Gun-boat  shells  on  Vicksburg  houses  (Theo.  R.  Dai'is;  —  First 

'  Monument  that  stood  on  the  Spot  of  the  Interview  between  Generals  Grant  and  Pemberton,  and  Monu- 
ment'now  on  the  Spot  of  the  Interview,  from  photos.  (Harry  Fenn)  —  Logan's  Division  entering  Vicks- 
burg by  the  Jackson  Road,  July  4th,  1863  (Theo.  R.  Davis). 

THE  VICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN GENERAL  ULYSSES  S.   GRANT 493 

Illustrations  :  Vicksburg  from  the  North,  after  the  Surrender  (Theo.  R.  Davis)  —Map  of  the  Campaign 
against  Vicksburg,  from  General  Badeau's  "Military  History  of  U.  S.  Grant "— Fimeral  on  the  Levee  at 
the  Duckport  Canal,  April,  1863  (Theo.  R.  X>apts;  — Rear- Admiral  Porter's  Flotilla  passing  the  Vicksburg 
Batteries,  Night  of  April  16th,  1863,  fi-om  a  sketch  by  Rear- Admiral  Walke  (F.  H.  Schell  and  Thos.  Hogan)  — 
Rear- Admiral  Porter's  Flotilla  arriving  below  Vicksburg  on  the  night  of  April  16, 1863,  from  a  sketch  (J.  A. 
Davidson).— Majov-Geneval  William  W.  Loriug,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo.—  Major-General  J.  S.  Bowen,  C.  S.  A., 
from  photo.— Major-General  Andrew  J.  Smith,  fiom  Bradj' photo.— Major-General  Richard  J.  Ogleeby, 
fi-om  Brady  photo.— Map  of  the  Battles  of  Raymond,  Jackson,  Champion's  Hill,  and  Big  Black  River 
Bridge  (Jacob  Wells j  —  Map  of  the  Battle-fleld  of  Big  Black  River  Biidge,  fac-siiuile  of  the  official  map.— 
General  Blair's  Division  crossing  Big  Black  River  ("J^awes  ^.  Taylor)  -Map  of  the  Siege  of  Vicksburg, 
from  General  Badeau's  "  Military  History  of  U.  S.  Grant "—  Headquarters  of  the  Union  Signal  Corps, 
Vicksburg,  from  photo.  (W.  Taber )  —V,'ooden  Coehorn  on  Grant's  Lines  (TJieo.  R.  Davis)  — Poaitiou  of 
Hovey's  Division  of  McClernand's  Corps,  and  Position  of  Qninby's  Division  of  McPherson's  Corps,  two 
pictures,  after  lithographs  of  war-time  sketches  by  A.  E.  Mathews  (E.  J.  ^eeA-cr;- Position  of  Logan's 
Division  of  McPherson's  Corps  —  The  Fight  in  the  Crater  after  the  Explosion  of  the  Uni(m  Mine  under 
the  Confederate  Fort  on  the  Jackson  Road,  June  25th,  1863,  two  pictures,  after  lithographs,  of  war-time 
sketches,  by  A.  E.  Mathews  (Harry  Fenn)  —  In  the  Saps  between  the  White  House  and  the  Vicksburg 
Crater,  July  2d,  1863;  First  Conference  between  Grant  and  Pemberton,  July  3d,  1863,  and  Union  Headquar- 
ters, July  3d  ;  General  Grant  Receiving  General  Pemberton's  Message,  three  pictiires  (Theo.  R.  Davis)  — 
Extract  in  Fac-simile  from  a  Letter  of  General  Grant  to  General  Marcus  J.  Wright,  C.  S.  A.,  dated  New 
York,  Novembei-  30th,  1884. 

THE  VICKSBURG  MINE GENERAL  ANDREIV  HICKENLOOPER. .  539 

Illustrations  :  The  White  House,  or  Shirley,  at  the  Entrance  to  McPherson's  Saps  against  the  "Third 
Louisiana  Redan,"  Vicksburg  ( Theo.  R.  Davis)  —  Plan  of  the  Approaches  to  the  Vicksburg  Mine  (looking 
west),  from  a  drawing  by  General  Hickenlooper  — Explosion  of  the  Mine  under  the  Confederate  Fort  on 
the  Jackson  Road  (Theo.  R.  X»«»is;  —  Vicksburg,  from  the  River,  from  a  photo.  (W.  Tabcr). 

THE  TERMS  OF  SURRENDER. 

Illustration  :  Arrival  of  General  Grant  at  General  Pemberton's  Vicksburg  House.  July  4th,  1863  (Theo. 
R.  Davis). 

I.  GENERAL  JOHN  C.  PEMBERTON 543 

II.  GENERAL  ULYSSES  S.   GRANT 545 

111.  Correspondence  between       GENERAL    PEMBERTON    AND    GENERALS 
GRANT  AND  BLAIR 545 

THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  IN  THE  VICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.    Composition,  Strength,  and  Losses  .  .54(5 
Illustrations:  Confederate  River-battery  on  the  Ridge  South  of  Vicksburg  (Theo.  li.  Dans;  —Wreck 
of  the  "Star  of  the  West,"  in  the  Tallahatchie  River,  Opposite  the  Site  of  Fort  Pemberton,  from  photo, 
lent  by  8.  B.  Morgan  (C.  A.  Vanderhoof). 


xvi  CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  THREE. 

PAGE 

NAVAL    OPERATIONS    IN    THE    VICKSBURG  » 

CAMPAIGN  ♦  ■  ■  ■   PROFESSOR  JAMES  RUSSELL  SOLEY.  5  51 

Illustrations  :  Colonel  Charles  Rivers  Ellet,  from  aiiibrotype  lent  by  Mrs.  Mary  V.  E.  Cabell  —  The  Con- 
fedciratc  Ram  "  Arkansas  "  running  through  the  Union  Fleet  at  Vicksburg,  July  15th,  1862  (J.  O.  Davidson) 
—The  "Black  Hawk,"  Admiral  Porter's  Flag-ship,  Vicksburg,  1863  (F.B.  Schell),  and  the  "Osage"  and 
"Choctaw,"  from  photos.— The  Union  Vessels  "Mississippi"  and  "Winona"  at  Baton  Rouge,  from 
photos.  C  W.  Taber)  —  Battle  of  Grand  Gulf  (second  position) ,  from  a  sketch  by  Rear- Admiral  Walke  (F.  H. 
Schell  and  Tfiomas  //o(/«>0  —  Lieutenant-Comuiander  Januis  M.  Prichett,  from  photo. 

GULF  OPERATIONS  IN    1802  AND    1863   PROFESSOR  JAMES  RUSSELL  SOLEY  .511 

THE  CONFEDERATE  GUN-BOAT  "  ARKANSAS  ",  .  ..CAPTAIN  ISAAC  N.   BROIVN 572 

Illustrations:  Building  the  "Arkansas  "  (J.  O.  Z)at)if/so/0— The  Confederate  Ram  "Arkansas"  along- 
side the  Union  Gun-boat  "  Caroudelet,"  from  a  sketch  by  Rear-Admiral  Walke  (F.  II.  Schell  and  Thomas 
Hogan )  —Cajttam  I.  N.  Brown,  C.  8.  N.,  from  photo.— Lieutenant  John  Grimball,  C.  8.  N.,  from  photo,  by 
W.  Kurtz,  lent  by  Captain  Isaac  N.  Brown —Commodore  W.  D.  Porter,  from  photo,  by  Fredericks.— 
Destruction  of  the  Confederate  Ram  "Arkansas"  (J.  O.  Davidson). 

CONFEDERATE  TORPEDOES  IN  THE  YAZOO CAPTAIN   ISAAC  N.  BROIVN 580 

UNION  VESSELS  IN  THE  VICKSBURG  OPERATIONS 581 

PORT   HUDSON. 

MILITARY  OPERATIONS  IN  LOUISIANA  IN   1862  ...COLONEL  RICHARD  B.  IRIVIN 582- 

Illustration:  Private  Houses  in  New  Orleans  in  which  Confederate  Officers  were  Confined,  from 
photos  (E.  J.  Meeker). 

THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT    BATON  ROUGE,  LA.     Composition,  Strength,  and  Losses 585 

Illustration  :  Burning  of  the  State-House,  Baton  Rouge,  on  Sunday,  December  28th,  1862  (Frank 
H.  Schell). 

THE  CAPTURE  OF  PORT  HUDSON COLONEL  RICHARD  B.  IRIVIN 586 

Illustrations:  Magruder's  men  boarding  the  "  Harriet  Lane"  at  Galveston  (J.  O.  Davidsonj  —Shvir\)- 
shooters  of  the  75th  N.  Y.  Volunteers  picking  off  the  Gimuers  of  the  Confederate  Gun-boat  "  Cotton,"  in 
the  Action  at  Bayou  Teche,  La.,  January  14th,  1863  (Frank  H.  Schell)  —  Return  of  a  Foraging  Party  of  the 
24th  Connecticut  Volunteers  to  Baton  Rouge  (Frank  H.  Schell)  —March  of  the  Nineteenth  Army  Corps  by 
the  Bayou  Sara  Road  toward  Port  Hudson  (Frank  H.  Schell)  — The  Baggage  Train  of  General  Augur's 
Division  crossing  Bayou  Montecino  on  the  March  to  Port  Hudson  (Frank  H.  Schell)  —  Opening  of  the 
Naval  Attack  on  Port  Hudson  (A.  B.  TF^wrf;  — Map  of  the  Siege  of  Port  Hudson,  La.  (Jacob  Wells). 

THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  PORT  HUDSON,  LA.     Composition,  Strength,  and  Losses 598 

MURFREESBORO'. 

BRAGG'S  ADVANCE  AND  RETREAT COLONEL  DA^ID  URQUHART 600 

Illustrations:  General  Braxton  Bragg,  C.  S.  A.,  from  Anderson-Cook  photo.— Buildings  at  Murfrees-  . 
boro'— General  Rosecrans's  Headquarters  —  Christian  Church,  used  as  a  Post  Chapel  by  the  Union 
Army  — Soule  Female  College,  need  as  a  Hospital— Ileadqiiartors  of  General  Bragg,  afterward  of  Gen- 
erals Thomas  and  Garfield  —  Union  University,  uwcd  as  a  Hospital,  from  photos,  taken  in  lH8i(C.A. 
Vanderhoof)  —The  Nashville  Pike  out  of  Murfreesboro'  and  View  of  Minfrecsboro'  from  the  Vicinity  of 
Fortress  Rosecraus,  from  photos,  taken  in  1884  (E.  J.  J/ecA:e/';  —  Brigadier-General  James  E.  Rains,  C.  S.  A., 
from  photo.— Brigadier-General  R.  W.  Hanson,  C.  8.  A.,  from  Brady  photo. 

THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  STONE'S  RIVER,   TENN.     Composition,  Strength,  and  Losses. ..  .610 

THE  BATTLE  OF  STONE'S  RIVER COLONEL  GILBERT  C.  KNIFFIN 613 

Illustrations:  Monument  to  the  Dead  of  tlie  Regular  Brigade,  Stone's  River  Cemetery  — Cannon  In- 
scribed with  the  Number  Buried  in  Stone's  River  Cemetery  — Stone's  River  Cemeterj-,  thcNashvill(>  Rail- 
road in  tlie  Foreground,  from  pliotos.  taken  in  1884  (E.  J.  Meeker)  —  Mixp  of  the  Battle-fields  of  Stone's 
River,  Tenn.  (Jacob  Wells)  —View  on  the  Nashville  Pike  at  the  Union  Cemetery,  and  Monument  to  the 
Dead  of  llazf-n's  Brigade,  on  the  Position  held  by  his  Brigade  in  the  Angle  between  the  Pike  and  the  Rail- 
road, from  photos,  taken  in  1884  (E.  J.  Jfee/i-er)- Brigatlier-General  Edward  N.  Kirk,  from  Bi-ady  photo.— 
Briga<lier-(Jeneral  Joshua  W.  Sill,  from  a  steel  engraving  — General  Rosecrans's  Headquarters  at  Stone's 
River,  and  Bridge  over  Overall's  Creek,  from  photos,  taken  in  1884  (C.  A.  FaJirff r/ioo/;  — General  Samuel 
Beatty's  Brigade  (Van  Cleve's  Division)  advancing  to  Sustain  the  Union  Right  near  the  Nashville  Pike, 
from  litlmgrapli  of  war-time  sketch  by  A.  E.  Atathcws  (E.  J.  ifeckcr)  — Scone  of  the  Fighting  of  Palmer's 
and  Rousseau's  Divisions,  from  lithograph  of  war-time  sketch  l)y  A.  E.  Mathews  (W.  Taber ) -Volition 
of  Starkweather's  and  Seribner's  Brigades  on  January  l8t,2d,  and  3d,  from  lithograph  of  war-time  sketch 
by  A.  E.  Mathews  (TTarri/  Fe;iH)  —  Position  of  Mendenhall's  Fifty-eight  Guns  (as  seeti  from  the  East  Bank 
above  the  Ford)  which  Repelled  the  Clnirgo  of  Breckinridge,  January  2d,  1863,  from  photo,  taken  in  1884 
(0.  A.  Vanderhoof)  —  Advnnce  Colonel  M.  B.  Walker's  Union  brigade  on  January  2d,  from  lithograph 
of  war-time  sketch  by  A.  E.  Mathews  (E.  J.  Meeker). 


CONTENTS  OF  f^OLUME  THREE.  xvii 

TAGE 

THE  UNION  LEFT  AT  STONE'S  RIVER GENERAL  THOMAS  L.   CRITTENDEN.  .  G32 

Illustration  :  Brigadier-General  Jobu  H.  Morgan,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo,  by  W.  E.  Jolins  of  picture 
taken  at  Eiclimond  in  1864. 

MORGAN'S  OHIO  RAID 634 

Illustration  :  Map  of  Morgan's  Ohio  Raid  (Jacob  Wells), 

CHICKAMAUGA. 

MANCEUVRING  BRAGG  OUT  OF  TENNESSEE COLONEL  GILBERT  C.   KNIFFIN G35 

Illustrations  :  Map  of  the  Tullahoina  Campaign  (Jacob  Wells)  —  The  Old  John  Ross  House  at  Rose- 
ville,  from  Brady  photo.  (Hurry  Fenn). 

CHICKAMAUGA— THE  GREAT  BATTLE  OF  THE  WEST .  GENERAL  DANIEL  H.  HILL 638 

Illustrations  :  Confederate  Line  of  Battle  in  the  Chickamauga  Woods  (  W.  Tuber)  —  Map  of  the  Chicka- 
mauga  Campaign  (Jacob  Wells)  —  Alexander's  Bridge,  from  the  Confederate  Side  of  the  Chickamauga 
looking  Up-stream,  from  photo,  taken  in  1884  (Harry  Fenn)  —Jjee  and  Gordon's  Mills  on  the  Chicka- 
mauga, from  Brady  photo.  (Harry  Fenn)  — Map  of  the  Battle-tield  of  Chickamauga  (Jacob  Wells)  — 
Crawfish  Springs,  from  photo,  taken  in  1884  (Harry  Fenn)— GenaTal  Thomas's  Bivouac  after  the  First 
Day's  Battle  (Gilbert  Gaul)  —Tha  Sink-Hole  near  Widow  Glenn's  House,  from  photo,  taken  in  1884  (Harry 
fcwn;  —  General  W.  H.  Lytle,  from  Brady  photo.— General  J.  M.  Brannan,  from  photo. 

GENERAL  POLK  AT  CHICKAMAUGA CAPTAIN  IV.   M.   POLK 662 

THE  CRISIS  AT  CHICKAMAUGA GENERAL  GATES  P.    THRUSTON 663 

REENFORCING  THOMAS  AT  CHICKAMAUGA GENERAL  J.  S.  FULLERTON 665 

Illustration:  The  Suodgrass  Farm-house,  General  Thomas's  Headquarters,  from  photo,  taken  in 
1884  (Harry  Fenn). 

NOTES  ON  THE  CHICKAMAUGA  CAMPAIGN GENERAL  EMERSON  OPDYCKE 668 

Illustration  :  House  of  J.  M.  Lee,  Crawfish  Springs,  Rosecrans's  Headquarters  before  the  Battle, 
and  Site  of  the  Union  Field  Hospital  for  the  Right  Wing,  from  photo,  taken  in  1884  (W.  Tuber). 

THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  CHICKAMAUGA,  GA.     Compositiou,  Strength,  and  Losses 672 

CHATTANOOGA. 

THE  LITTLE    STEAMBOAT    THAT    OPENED    THE  J  ^^,,^„  ,,    „,„,,,.,  ^     ,^  ^,,^ 

a  ^D  A^i/cD   I  iMcn  \  GENERAL  IVILLIAM  G.   LE  DUG 676 

" CRACKER  LINE" ) 

Illustration:  The  Steamer  "Chattanooga"  unloading  Forage  at  Kelley's  Landing,  from  war-time 
photo,  lent  by  General  W.  G.  Le  Due  (  W.  Taber). 

CHATTANOOGA GENERAL  ULYSSES  S.   GRANT 679 

Illustrations  :  The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  in  Front  of  Chattanooga,  from  lithograph  of  war-time 
sketch  by  A.  E.  Mathews  (E.  J.  Mcclccr)—Mn\t  of  the  Battle  of  Chattanooga,  from  (ieneral  Badeau's 
"Military  History  of  U.  S.  Grant"— Ilazcn's  men  Landing  from  I'oiitoon-boats  at  Brown's  Ferry  (Theo. 
It.  Davis)  —Panoramic  View  of  the  Chattanooga  region  from  Point  Lookout,  on  Lookout  Mountain,  from 
lithograph  lent  by  J.  B.  Linn  (E.  J.  Meeker)  —  View  of  Chattanooga  and  Moccasin  Point  from  the  side  of 
Lookout  Mountain,  from  photo,  lent  by  J.  B.  Linn  (Hurry  Fenn)  —  View  of  Lookout  Mountain  from  the 
Hill  to  the  North,  which  was  General  Hooker's  position  during  the  Battle  on  the  Mountain,  November 
24th,  1863,  from  photo,  lent  liy  General  W.  G.  Le  Due  (Hurry  Fenn)  —  Bridging  Lookout  Creek  preparatory 
to  the  assault  by  Hooker  ("77.  ^.  JSro?*'*?;  —  The  Battle  of  Lookout  IMountain  (W.  L.  Sheppard)— The 
Fight  East  of  the  Palisades  on  Lookout  :\ronnt:iin  (H.  E.  J?/v)ir>0  — Baird's  Divisiim  Fighting  for  the 
Crest  of  Missionary  Ridge,  and  Confedeiatcs  Resisting  Baird's  Division  on  Missionary  Ridge,  fi-om 
photos,  of  Cyclorama  of  Missi<mary  Ridge  — D.parture  of  the  First  Hospital  Train  from  Chattanooga, 
.January,  1864,  and  Interior  of  a  Ilositital  Car  (Tluo.  It.  Duvis). 

SHERMAN'S  ATTACK  AT  THE  TUNNEL CAPTAIN  S.  H.  M.  BYERS 712 

COMMENTS  ON  GENERAL  GRANT'S  "  CHATTANOOGA." 

Illustration:  Umbrella  Rock,  Point  of  Lookout  Mountain,  from  war-time  photo.  ( ir.  Taber). 

I.  GENERAL  IVILLIAM  FARRAR  SMITH.    7  H 

u.  GENERAL  HENRY  M.  CIST 717 

m.  GENERAL  IV.  F.  SMITH 718 

THE  ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND GENERAL  JOSEPH  S.  FULLERTON      . .  719 

Illustrations:  Military  Bridge  over  the  Tennessee  River  at  Chattanooga,  built  in  Octol)er,  18C3,  fnuu 
photo,  by  R.M.Cressey,  lent  by  General  G.  P. ThrustonCTT.  rafter^  — General  Hooker  and  Staff  on  the  Ulll 


xviii  CONTENTS  OF  l/OLUME  THREE. 

PAGE 

North  of  Lookout  Creek,  from  whicli  lie  directed  tlie  Battle  of  Lookout  Mountain,  from  plioto.  lent  by 
General  W.  G.  Le  Due  (W.  Taber)  — The  Charge  up  Missionary  Kidge  of  Baird's,  Wood's,  Sheridan's, 
and  Johnson's  Divisious,  from  a  sketch  for  the  Cyclorama  of  Missionary  Ridge. 

GENERAL  BRAGG'S  COMMENTS  ON  MISSIONARY  RIDGE   .727 

OPPOSING  FORCES  IN  THE  CHATTANOOGA  ) 

TAMPAirN  \   Composition,  Strength,  and  Losses 727 

THE  DEFENSE  OF  KNOXVILLE GENERAL  ORLANDO  M.  POE 731 

Illustrations:  Confederate  Assault  on  Fort  Sanders  (W.  Tafter^  — Map  of  the  Approaches  and 
Defenses  of  Knoxville,  Tenn.,  from  drawing  lent  by  General  O.  M.  Poe  — The  North-western  Bastion  of 
Fort  Sanders,  Viewed  from  the  North,  from  photo.  (W.  Taber)— Mav  of  the  Immediate  Vicinity  of  Fort 
Sanders,  from  drawing  lent  by  General  O.  M.  Poe  — Brigadier-General  William  P.  Sanders,  from  photo, 
lent  by  General  Poe  —  North-western  Bastion  of  Fort  Sanders,  Viewed  from  the  South-western  Bastion, 
fi'om  photo,  lent  by  General  Poo  (W.  Ta^c/-;— Brigadier-General  E.  P.  Alexander,  C.  S.  A.,  from  photo, 
by  E.  Wearn  (V.  Gribayedoff). 

LONGSTREET  AT  KNOXVILLE GENERAL   E.  P.  ALEXANDER 74G 

Illustrations  :  The  North-western  Bastion  of  Fort  Sanders,  showing  the  Ground  over  which  the  Con- 
federates Charged,  from  war-time  photo.  (W.  Taier)  — Fort  Stanley,  Knoxville,  from  war-time  photo, 
lent  by  General  Poe  (E.  J.  Meeker)  —Yevtical  Section  of  Fort  Sauders  (Fred.  E.  Sitis). 

THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  KNOXVILLE.     Composition,  Strength,  and  Losses 751 

Illustration  :  Knoxville  in  1870  (Harry  Venn). 


MAPS. 

NORTH  MISSISSIPPI  AND  WEST  TENNESSEE 2 

CORINTH  AND  lUKA  REGION 3 

BRAGG'S  INVASION  OF   KENTUCKY 6 

BATTLE-FIELD  OF  PERRYVILLE,    KY 24 

PLAN  OF  CONFEDERATE  WORKS  AT  CUMBERLAND    GAP 65 

BATTLE  OF    FREDERICKSBURG,   VA 74 

OUTLINE  MAP  OF  THE  CH ANCELLORSVILLE    CAMPAIGN 155 

CHANCELLORSVILLE  CAMPAIGN 158 

POSITIONS  OF  ELEVENTH  CORPS  AT  CHANCELLORSVILLE  AT  6  P.  M.  MAY  sD,   1863  ...  191 
POSITIONS  OF  THE  TWELFTH    CORPS  AND  PART   OF  THE  THIRD  CORPS,   COVERING  ) 

THE  CHANCELLORSVILLE  PLATEAU,  MAY  2D  AND  3D S  ^^""^ 

GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN 246 

RELIEF  MAP  OF  THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN .  247 

GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  — POSITIONS  JUNE  3D,  6TH,  9TH,   12TH,    13TH 262 

POSITIONS  JUNE   17TH,  24TH,  28TH 264 

POSITIONS  JUNE  2qTH,  30TH    266 

POSITIONS  JULY    1ST,   8  TO   10  A.  M.,  10:10  TO   10:30  A.  M.,  3:30  P.  M  ,  ABOUT  4  P.  M.  272 

POSITIONS  JULY    I  ST  ABOUT  b  P.   M 282 

POSITIONS  JULY  2D,  ABOUT  3  :  ^jo  P.  M 299 

POSITIONS  JULY  2D,  ABOUT  7:15  P.  M.  TILL  AFTER  DARK 308 

POSITIONS  JULY  3D,  3:15  TO  5 :  30  P.   M 344 

POSITIONS  JULY  4TH,   ^TH,   6TH,   7TH,   8TH,   qTH,    i  iTH   381 

POSITIONS  JULY   13TH,    14TH 382 

RELIEF  MAP  OF  THE  BATTLE-FIELD  OF  GETTYSBURG,    LOOKING  SOUTH   292 

FARNSWORTH'S   CHARGE  AT  GETTYSBURG 394 

CAVALRY  BATTLE  NEAR  GETTYSBURG,  JULY  3D,   POSITIONS  AT  2:30  AND  3:30  P.   M.  400 

CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE   MISSISSIPPI   VALLEY 442 


CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  THREE.  xix 

PAGE 

BATTLE  OF  PRAIRIE  GROVE,  ARK 449 

BATTLE  OF  ARKANSAS    POST,  ARK 452 

PLAN  OF  FORT  HINDMAN,  ARKANSAS   POST,  ARK '. 453 

BATTLE  OF  HELENA,  ARK 455 

CAPTURE    OF  LITTLE   ROCK,  ARK 457 

FIRST  VICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN   OR  CHICKASAW  BAYOU,  MISS 465 

CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  VICKSBURG,    MISS 494 

BATTLES  OF  RAYMOND, JACKSON,  CHAMPION'S  HILL,  AND  BIG  BLACK  RIVER  BRIDGE,  MISS  506 

BATTLE-FIELD  OF  BIG  BLACK  RIVER  BRIDGE,  MISS 512 

SIEGE  OF   VICKSBURG,    MISS 516 

PLAN  OF  THE  APPROACHES  TO  THE  VICKSBURG  MINE 540 

SIEGE  OF  PORT  HUDSON,   LA 596 

BATTLE-FIELDS  OF  STONE'S  RIVER,  TENN ; . '. 616 

MORGAN'S   OHIO  RAID , . 635 

TULLAHOMA  CAMPAIGN 636 

CHICKAMAUGA  CAMPAIGN 640 

BATTLE-FIELD  OF  CHICKAMAUGA,  GA ; 648 

BATTLE  OF  CHATTANOOGA,   TENN 686 

APPROACHES  AND  DEFENSES  OF  KNOXVILLE 736 

IMMEDIATE  VICINITY  OF  FORT  SANDERS,  TENN 739 


ARTISTS. 


BROIVN,  H.  E. 
DAyiDSON,  J.  O. 
DAl^lS,   THEO.  R. 
FENN,   HARRY 
FORBES,  EDIVIN 
GAUL,  GILBERT 
GIBSON,  GEORGE 


GRIBAYEDOFF,  V. 
HALM,  GEORGE  R. 
HOGAN,  THOMAS 
HOMER,  IVINSLOIV 
MEEKER,  EDIVIN  J. 
OGDEN,  HENRY  A. 
PEN  NELL,  JOSEPH 


REDIVOOD,  ALLEN  C. 
REED,  C.   IV. 
SCHELL,  FRANK  H. 
SCHELL,  FRED.  B. 
SH ELTON,   IV.  H. 
SHEPPARD,   IV.  L. 
TABER,   IV ALTON 


TAYLOR,  JAMES  E. 
THULSTRUP,  T.  DE 
l^ANDERHOOF,  C.  A. 
IVAUD,  ALFRED  R. 
IVOODIVARD,  J.  D. 
ZOGBAUM,  RUFUS  F. 


SITTS,  FRED.  E. 


DRAUGHTSMEN 

VAN  GLUMER,  J. 


IVELLS,  JACOB 


AITKEN,    PETER 
ANDREIVS,  JOHN 
ATIVOOD,  K.   C. 
BABCOCK,  H.  E. 
BARTLE,  G.  P. 
BERTRAM,  IV.   A. 
BODENSTAB,   IV.  R. 
BUTLER,   T.   A. 
CLEMENT,  E. 
CLOSSON,  IV.  B. 
COLLINS,  R.  C. 
DANA,  IV.  J. 


ENGR 

DAnS,   SAMUEL 
DE  LORME,  E.  H. 
ENGBERG,  J. 
ERTZ,  EDIVARD 
EVANS,  J.   IV. 
FAY,   GASTON 
GAMM,  ANTHONY 
HEARD,    T.   H. 
HEINEMANN,  E. 
HELD,  E.  C. 
HELL  A IV ELL,  THOS. 
JOHNSON,    THOMAS 


AVERS. 

JONES,  M. 
JUNGLING,  J.   F. 
KING,  F.   S. 
KINGS  LEY,  ELBRIDGE 
KLASEN,   IV. 
KRUELL,   G. 
LE  BLANC,  FELIX 
MILLER,   IVILLIAM 
MULLER,   R.  A. 
NICHOLS,  DAVID 
NORTHCOTE.  S. 
OIVENS,   MARY  L. 


POIVELL,  C.   A. 
REED,  C.   H. 
SCHOONMAKER,  E. 
SCHUSSLER,   T. 
SPIEGLE,   CHARLES 
TIETZE,   R.  G. 
TYNAN,  JAMES 
UNDERHILL,  F. 
VELTHN,  H. 
IVHALEY,  M.  J. 
IVHITNEY,  J.  H.   E. 
IVILLIAMS,  G.  P. 


ihs 


^^1'^, 


Awmm 


BRAGG'S   INVASION  OF  KENTUCKY. 


BY  JOSEPH   WHEELER,  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL,   C.  S.   A. 


GENEKAL  BRAGGr  succeeded  General  Beauregard  in  command  of  the 
Confederate  troops  at  Tupelo,  Miss.,  about  fifty  miles  south  of  Corinth, 
on  June  27th,  1862.  The  field  returns  of  June  9th,  a  week  after  our  army 
reached  Tupelo,  reported  it  at  45,080.  J  This  return  included  the  Army  of 
Mississippi,  reenforced  by  the  troops  brought  from  Arkansas  by  Generals 
Price  and  Van  Dorn,  together  with  detachments  gathered  from  various  locali- 
ties. About  two  thousand  cavalry  not  included  in  this  return  also  belonged 
to  the  army.  This  was  the  maximum  force  General  Bragg  could  expect  to 
concentrate  at  that  point.  General  Halleck,  immediately  confronting  Bragg 
with  the  armies  of  Grant,  Pope,  and  Buell,  had  in  and  about  Corinth  a  force 
of  128,315  men,  of  which  the  field  return  of  June  1st  showed  108,538  present 
for  duty.  A  division  reporting  8682  for  duty,  under  the  Federal  General 
George  W.  Morgan,  was  at  Cumberland  Gap ;  a  division  with  6411  for  duty, 
under  General  Ormsby  M.  Mitchel,  was  in  north  Alabama,  and  three  bri- 
gades were  located  at  Nashville,  Murfreesboro',  and  other  points  in  middle 
Tennessee.  Buell  soon  started  en  route  to  north  Alabama,  General  Halleck 
remaining  at  or  near  Corinth  with  seventy  thousand  men  for  duty,  a  force 
strong  enough  to  hold  Corinth  and  west  Tennessee,  while  Buell  could  menace 
or  even  invade  Alabama  or  north  Georgia. 

The  changed  condition  of  the  opposing  armies  during  four  months  should 
now  be  considered.     In  January,  1862,  the  Confederates   had  held    all  of 

J  To  prevent  misconception,  and  to  avoid  fre-  retiirnsof  Confederate  troops  I  shall  always  include 
quent  repetitions,  I  will  here  state  that  through-  all  officers,  all  non-coimuissioned  officers,  and  all 
out  this  paper  when  I  mention  the  figures  of  field      privates  who  are  reported  present  for  duty.— J.  W. 


BRAGG 'S  INVASION  OF  KENTUCKY. 


Tennessee  and  most  of  Kentucky,  and  the  Mississippi  River  from  Colnmbus 
to  the  delta.  Now,  after  a  series  of  Confederate  reverses,  both  States  were 
virtually  under  the  control  of  the  armies  under  General  Halleck,  and  the 
Federal  flotilla  sailed  unmolested  from  St.  Louis  to  Vicksburg.  The  Federal 
right  was  thrown  forward  into  Mississippi.  Its  center  occupied  north  Ala- 
bama, and  its  left  was  pressing  the  Confederates  to  the  southern  border  of 
east  Tennessee. 

The  Confederate  problem  was  to  devise  some  plan  to  turn  the  tide  of  dis- 
aster and  recover  at  least  a  portion  of  our  lost  territory.  Our  soldiers  had 
expected  a  battle  at  Corinth,  in  which  they  felt  confident  of  as  decisive  a  vic- 
tory as  was  won  by  them  on  the  first  day  of  Shiloh ;  and  the  withdrawal  to 
Tupelo  had  at  last  forced  upon  them  a  conviction  that  the  numerical  prepon- 
derance of  the  enemy  was  such  that  they  could  not  expect  to  cope  success- 
fully with  the  combined  armies  then  commanded  by  General  Halleck. 

Already  the  army  had  suffered  much  from  sickness,  and  we  could  hardly 
expect  any  improvement  while  it  remained  idle  in  the  locality  where  it  had 
halted  after  its  retreat  from  Corinth.  An  advance  into  west  Tennessee 
would  not  afford  protection  to  Alabama  or  Georgia.  An  advance  into  middle 
Tennessee  by  crossing  the  river  at  Florence,  Decatur,  or  any  neighboring  point, 
would  have  the  disadvantage  of  placing  the  Confederates  between  the  armies 
of  Grant  and  Buell  under  circumstances  enabling  these  two  commanders  to 
throw  their  forces  simultaneously  upon  General  Bragg,  who  could  not,  in  this 
event,  depend  upon  any  material  cooperation  from  the  army  in  east  Tennessee 
under  General  Kirby  Smith.  There  was  another  line  for  an  aggressive  move- 
ment.  A  rapid  march  through  Alabama  to  Chattanooga  would  save  that  city, 

protect  Georgia  from  invasion,  and 
open  the  way  into  Tennessee  and  Ken- 
tucky, without  the  disadvantage  of  an 
intervening  force  between  the  column 
commanded  by  Bragg  and  that  under 
the  orders  of  General  Kirby  Smith. 
This  movement  was  determined  upon 
and  resulted  in  what  is  called  the 
Kentucky  Campaign  of  1862. 

Major-General  E.  Kirby  Smith  had 
reached  Knoxville  March  8th,  1862, 
and  assumed  command  of  the  Confed- 
erate troops  in  east  Tennessee.  The 
retm*ns  for  June  reported  his  entire 
force  at  11,768  infantry,  1055  cav- 
alry, 5>  and  635  artillery.  The  occu- 
pation of  Cumberland  Gap,  June  18tli, 
by  a  Federal  division,  and  the  approach 
of  Buell's  forces  toward  Chattanooga 
seriously  threatened  his  department. 


SCALE  OF  STATUTE  MILES     ; 
30     'so  l(io 


lUAf    OJF    NORTH    MISSISSIPPI    AND    WEST    TENNESSEE. 


^  Not  includiug  Allstou's  brigade. — Editors. 


BRAGG  'S  INVASION  OF  KENTUCKY. 


MAP    OF  THE    CORINTH    AND    ItTKA   REGION. 

General  Bragg  recognized  the  inadequacy  of  General  Smith's  force,  and  on 
June  27th  he  transferred  the  division  commanded  by  Major-Geueral  John  P. 
McCown  from  Tupelo  to  Chattanooga.  |  Forrest  and  John  H.  Morgan  had 
already  been  sent  into  middle  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  and  the  operations 
of  these  enterprising  officers  materially  lessened  the  pressure  upon  General 
Smith.  Correspondence  between  Generals  Bragg  and  Smith  resulted  in  an 
order,  dated  July  21st,  transferring  the  entire  Army  of  Mississippi  to  Chatta- 
nooga. To  mislead  the  enemy  and  to  prevent  an  advance  upon  Tupelo, 
Bragg  had,  on  the  19th,  sent  Colonel  Joseph  A\nieel(n-  with  a  In-igade  of  cav- 
alry into  west  Tennessee,  and  Brigadier-General  Frank  C.  Armstrong  ^vith 
a  like  force  into  north  Alabama.  Wheeler's  operations  in  west  Tennessee 
may  be  briefly  summarized  as  a  rapid  march  from  Holly  Springs,  Mississippi, 

4  General  Kirby  Smith,  in  a  letter  dated  July  14tb,  18  02,  estimated  Stevenson's  division  at  10.000, 
Heth's  and  McCown's  at  10,000,  Morgan's  cavalry  1300.  "Official  Records,"  Vol.  XVI.,  Pt.  II.,  p. 
727.— Editors. 


4  BRAGG 'S  INVASION  OF  KENTUCKY. 

to  Bolivar,  Tennessee ;  an  attack  upon  the  outposts  at  that  place ;  the  destruc- 
tion of  bridges  on  the  line  of  communications  of  the  troops  at  Bolivar  and 
Jackson ;  a  number  of  slight  affairs  with  the  enemy's  cavalry,  and  the  burn- 
ing of  a  quantity  of  cotton  in  transit  to  the  North. 

One  week  was  thus  occupied  behind  the  enemy's  lines,  the  main  object  of 
the  movement  being  to  create  the  impression  of  a  general  advance.  On  July 
31st  Bragg  and  Kirby  Smith  met  at  Chattanooga,  and  a  joint  movement  into 
middle  Tennessee  was  determined  upon.  Price  and  Van  Dorn  being  left  to 
confront  Grant  in  northern  Mississippi.  On  August  5th  Bragg  sent  two  of 
his  brigades  (Cleburne's  and  Preston  Smith's)  to  General  Smith  at  Knoxville. 
General  C.  L.  Stevenson,  with  nearly  nine  thousand  men,  was  ordered  to  watch 
the  Federal  General  G.  W.  Morgan,  who  occupied  Cumberland  Gap.  General 
Smith  started  on  the  14th  en  route  to  Rogers's  Gap,  with  4  brigades,  6000 
strong.  The  brigades  of  Preston  Smith  and  B.  J.  Hill  were  commanded  by 
General  P.  E.  Cleburne,  and  the  brigades  of  McCray  and  McNair  were  under 
command  of  General  T.  J.  Churchill.  General  Henry  Heth,  with  a  force 
nearly  4000  strong,  was  ordered  to  march  direct  to  Barboursville  by  way  of 
Big  Creek  Gap,  and  the  army  was  preceded  by  900  cavahy  under  Colonel 
John  S.  Scott.  General  Smith  had  at  first  contemplated  cutting  off  the  sup- 
plies of  the  garrison  at  Cumberland  Gap,  but  learning  that  they  were  well 
provisioned,  and  seeing  the  difficulty  of  supplying  his  own  troops  in  the  poor 
and  barren  region  of  south-eastern  Kentucky,  he  determined  to  push  rapidly 
on  to  the  rich  blue-grass  country  in  the  central  part  of  the  State.  This  deter- 
mination had  been  communicated  to  General  Bragg,  and  a  march  toward 
Lexington  was  commenced. 

On  the  evening  of  the  29th,  having  reached  Madison  County,  Kentucky, 
Colonel  Scott  found  the  enemy  about  half  way  between  the  small  village  of 
Kingston  and  the  town  of  Richmond.  The  force  displayed  and  resistance 
offered  indicated  that  they  were  resolved  to  contest  any  farther  advance  of 
the  Confederates.  Although  his  troops  were  quite  weary  and  General  Heth 
was  far  to  the  rear,  General  Smith  determined  upon  an  immediate  attack. 
He  was  in  the  heart  of  Kentucky,  and  the  Confederate  commander  rightly 
judged  that  boldness  was  the  sui'est  road  to  victory. 

Early  on  the  30th,  General  Cleburne,  being  in  advance  with  his  two  bri- 
gades, found  that  the  Federal  force  had  moved  forward  and  was  in  line  of 
battle  about  a  mile  north  of  Kingston  and  probably  five  miles  south  of  Rich- 
mond. The  extreme  advance-guard  of  the  enemy,  about  six  hundred  yards  in 
front  of  their  main  line,  became  engaged  with  Cleburne's  leading  brigade,  com- 
manded by  Colonel  Hill,  but  after  a  light  brush  retired  upon  the  main  body 
of  the  Federal  army.  Hill's  brigade  was  soon  formed  in  lino  behind  the  crest 
of  a  low  ridge  which  was  nearly  parallel  with  and  about  five  hundred  yards 
south  of  the  position  occupied  by  the  enemy.  Cleburne  also  brought  up 
Douglas's  battery,  which  he  placed  in  a  favorable  position  near  the  center  of 
his  line.  A  fire  of  artillery  and  infantry  commenced,  and  Captain  Martin,  with 
a  second  battery,  having  arrived,  it  was  also  brought  into  action,  and  for  two 
hours  both  infantry  and  artillery  were  engaged  from  their  respective  positions. 


BRAGG 'S   INVASION  OF  KENTUCKY.  5 

General  Mahlon  D.  Manson,  who  was  in  command  of  the  Federal  army 
before  G-eneral  Nelson  arrived,  and  who  commenced  the  battle,  now  pushed 
his  left  forward  to  turn  our  right.  Cleburne  met  this  with  one  reg- 
iment of  Preston  Smith's  brigade,  which  had  been  formed  behind  a  crest 
in  his  rear,  but  the  persistence  of  the  enemy  in  that  quarter  made  it  neces- 
sary to  reenforce  the  right  with  all  of  the  reserve  brigade  under  Preston 
Smith. 

In  the  meantime  Greneral  Kirby  Smith  had  reached  the  field  with  the  two 
brigades  (McCray's  and  McNair's)  forming  General  Churchill's  division.  He 
promptly  dispatched  that  officer  with  one  brigade  to  turn  the  enemy's  right. 
The  Federal  commander,  apparently  disregarding  this  movement,  still  boldly 
advanced  his  own  left  to  carry  out  his  plan  of  tui'ning  the  Confederate  flank. 
This  well-conceived  manoeuvre  at  first  seemed  to  endanger  the  Confederate 
army,  but  Colonel  Preston  Smith  with  his  brigade  stood  firm,  and  after  a 
severe  struggle  checked  and  finally  drove  back  the  advancing  enemy.  Gen- 
eral Cleburne,  who  up  to  this  time  had  displayed  both  skill  and  gallantry,  was 
severely  wounded  and  left  the  field.  General  Churchill  had  now  gained  the  ene- 
my's right,  and  by  a  bold  and  determined  charge  threw  the  enemy  into  disorder. 

Two  miles  farther  north  the  Federal  force  made  a  stand,  and  McCray's 
gallant  brigade,  by  a  rapid  march,  struck  their  right,  while  Cleburne's  division, 
now  commanded  by  Colonel  Preston  Smith,  moved  to  the  attack  in  front.  The 
celerity  of  McCray's  movements  brought  him  into  action  before  the  other 
troops  reached  the  field,  and  he  suffered  from  the  concentration  of  a  galling  and 
destructive  fire ;  but  the  approach  of  Preston  Smith,  with  troops  cheering  as 
they  advanced  again,  caused  a  rout  of  the  Federal  army,  closely  followed  by  om* 
victorious  soldiers.  When  in  sight  of  the  town  of  Richmond  the  enemy  were 
seen  forming  for  a  final  struggle  upon  a  commanding  ridge,  which  had  been 
judiciously  selected  by  the  Federal  commander,  Major-General  William 
Nelson,  both  of  the  enemy's  flanks  being  protected  by  skirts  of  woods. 
General  Smith  promptly  sent  McNair's  brigade  again  to  turn  the  Federal 
flank,  and  with  the  remaining  force  attacked  directly  in  front.  A  warm  fusil- 
lade lasted  a  few  moments,  when  the  Federal  army  again  retreated.  Early  in 
the  morning  Colonel  Scott  had  been  sent  to  gain  the  rear  of  the  town.  His 
arrival  at  this  moment  increased  the  dismay  of  the  enemy,  and  assisted 
materially  in  securing  prisoners.  The  reports  of  the  di\ision  and  brigade 
commanders  show  that  General  Smith's  entire  force  was  about  five  thousand. 
The  enemy  supposed  it  much  greater,  their  estimate  including  General  Hetli, 
but  his  division  did  not  join  General  Smith  until  the  day  after  the  battle.  ^ 
Kirby  Smith's  loss  was  78  killed,  372  wounded,  and  1  missing. 

Nelson  in  his  report  speaks  of  his  own  command  on  the  Kentucky  River  as 
16,000  strong,\  and  the  official  report  of  casualties  is  given  as  20(3  killed,  844 
wounded,  and  4303  captured.  The  Federal  official  reports  admit  that  nine 
pieces  of  artillery  and  all  their  wagon  trains  were  captured  by  the  Confederates. 

^In  a  letter  to  General  Bragg  dated  August  24th,  1862,  General  Kirby  Smith  says  ho  will  have 
with  him,  in  his  advance  to  Lexington,  "about  12,000  effective  men." — Editors. 
\  This  is  the  total  force  spoken  of  by  Nelson  as  being  on  the  Confederate  flank.—  Editors. 


BRAGG 'S  INVASION  OF  KENTUCKY. 


Bragg  s 
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General  Manson  contends  that  the  Federals  en- 
gaged did  not  exceed  6500. i^Ir    General  Horatio 
G.  Wright,  who  commanded  the  department,  in  his  report  of  Sept.  2d,  saj^s : 

"  The  force  engaged  in  the  battle  in  front  of  Richmond  was  utterly  broken  up,  and  after  all 
the  exertions  that  could  be  made  to  collect  the  stragglers,  only  some  800  or  900  could  be  found. 
The  remainder  of  the  force  were  killed,  captured,  or  scattered  over  the  country." 

7^  According  to  the  official  reports  tho  Union  force  only  been  mustered  into  service  a  few  (Jays.  Gen- 
engaged  consisted  of  Hanson's  and  Cruft's  bri-  eral  Nelson  says  in  his  report  that  he  had  ordered 
gades,  eight  regiments  and  two  detachments  of  in-  General  Manson  not  to  fight,  but  to  fall  back,  so  as 
fantry,  one  regiment  and  a  battalion  of  cavalry  and  to  concentrate  on  the  Confederate  flank.  See  the 
two  batteries  of  artillery,  all  neiu  troops  xcho  had  previous  note.—  Editors. 


BRAGG 'S  INVASION  OF  KENTUCKY.  7 

Elated  with  success,  and  reenforced  by  about  four  thousand  troops  just 
arrived  under  Heth,  the  victorious  army  moved  forward  to  Lexington,  and 
was  designated  by  its  commander  as  "  The  Army  of  Kentucky."  During  che 
month  of  September  the  greater  portion  of  the  army  remained  in  that  \dcinity. 

On  September  4th  Colonel  Scott,  with  a  brigade  of  cavalry,  was  ordered 
to  push  on  as  near  as  practicable  to  Louisville,  and  to  destroy  the  Louisville 
and  Nashville  Railroad.  Heth,  with  a  division  of  infantry  and  a  brigade  of 
cavalry,  marched  north ;  some  of  his  troops,  on  September  6th,  reached  the 
suburbs  of  Covington,  but  his  instructions  were  not  to  make  an  attack  upon 
the  city.  Smith  used  vigorous  efforts  to  gather  and  concentrate  supplies, 
arouse  the  people,  and  raise  and  organize  troops  for  the  Confederacy. 

General  Gleorge  W.  Morgan  (Federal),  who  was  left  at  Cumberland  Gap 
with  8682  men,  seeing  these  active  movements  in  his  rear,  evacuated  that 
position  on  September  17th  and  made  his  way  through  eastern  Kentucky  to 
the  Ohio  River  at  Greenupsburg,  arriving  there  October  3d. 

While  these  events  were  haj)pening,  Bragg  had  organized  his  army  at 
Chattanooga  into  two  wings.  The  right,  commanded  by  General  Polk,  con- 
sisted of  Cheatham's  and  Withers's  divisions  of  infantry  and  Colonel  Lay's 
brigade  of  cavalry.  The  left  wing,  commanded  by  General  Hardee,  consisted 
of  Buckner's  and  Anderson's  divisions  of  infantry  and  Wheeler's  brigade  of 
cavalry.  This  entu'e  force,  on  August  27th,  reported  27,816  ofi&cers  and  men 
for  duty.  J  On  the  28th  the  army  was  fairly  in  motion,  but  up  to  this  time 
General  Bragg  had  not  positively  determined  upon  his  plan  of  cam.paign, 
and  much  depended  upon  the  course  pursued  by  the  Federal  army. 

As  early  as  the  22d  General  Buell  had  established  his  headquarters  at 
Decherd,  on  the  Nashville  Railroad,  thirty  miles  north-west  of  Stevenson,  and 
had  all  the  supplies  at  Stevenson  transferred  to  that  place.  %  Two  parallel 
mountain  ranges,  running  north-east  and  south-west,  separated  him  from 
Chattanooga.  A  railroad,  connecting  McMinnville  and  Tullahoma,  ran  nearly 
parallel  to  the  north-west  slope  of  these  mountain  ranges.  Already  he  had 
located  General  Thomas  at  McMinnville  with  Wood's  and  Ammen's  divisions, 
while  the  divisions  of  Schoepf,  McCook,  and  Thomas  L.  Crittenden  were 
near  the  Nashville  and  Stevenson  Raih'oad  within  easy  call  of  headquarters 
at  Decherd.  Buell  seemed  impressed  with  the  belief  that  Bragg's  objective 
point  was  Nashville,  and  that  he  would  take  the  short  route  over  the  moun- 
tain by  way  of  Altamont,  which  movement,  if  made,  would  have  placed  Bragg 
between  the  force  under  Thomas  and  the  ]*est  of  Buell's  army.  To  prevent 
this  Buell,  on  the  23d,  ordered  these  five  divisions  to  concentrate  at  Altamont. 
General  Thomas  reached  his  destination  on  the  25th,  but,  finding  no  enemy 
to  confront  him  and  learning  that  there  was  no  enemy  on  the  mountains,  the 
nearest  Confederates  being  at  Dunlap's  in  the  Sequatchie  Valley,  he  reported 

\  This  return  reports  a  total  of  431  officers  and  ^  On  August  Gth,  during  this  advance  from  Ste- 

men  in  the  cavalry.    September  1 0th  (O.  R.,  XVI.,  venson  to  Declierd,  Brig. -Gen.  Kobert  L.  McCook 

893)  Colonel  Joseph  Wheeler  reported  his  com-  (of  Thomas's  division;  brother  to  Alex.  McD.  Mc- 

mand  on  the  march  (apparently  a  part  of  it)  as  700  Cook),  who,  being  ill,  was  riding  in  an  ambulance, 

strong,  and  (p.  890)  part  of  Colonel  Lay's  brigade  is  was  mortally  wounded  by  the  enemy's  scouts  near 

mentioned  as  550  strong,  August  27th.—  Editors.  New  Market.— Editors. 


BRAGG 'S  INVASION  OF  KENTUCKY. 


these  facts  to  Buell  and  returned  to 
McMinnville.  Crittenden's  division 
halted  near  Pelham,  and  Schoepf  at 
Hillsboro'.  McCook  pressed  on  and 
reached  Altamont  on  the  29th,  where, 
on  the  30th,  Wheeler  attacked  his  out- 
posts, and  McCook  retired  down  the 
mountain.  The  same  day  General 
Buell  ordered  his  entire  army  to  con- 
centrate at  Murfreesboro'. 

By  September  5th,  the  five  divisions 
just  mentioned  had  reached  that  place, 
together  with  all  detachments  from 
along  the  lines  of  railroad  except 
Rousseau's  division,  which,  being  on 
the  Nashville  and  Decatur  Railroad, 
marched  directly  to  Nashville.  The 
strength  of  Buell's  forces  during  the 
months  of  July,  August,  and  Septem- 
ber was  estimated  by  witnesses  before 
the  Buell  Commission,  in  1863,  at  from 
45,000  to  59,309.  His  own  returns  for 
June,  deducting  the  force  at  Cumber- 
land Gap,  showed  56,706  present  for 
duty,  and  his  October  returns,  with 
the  same  deduction,  66,595.  |  General  Buell  presented  a  paper  to  the  Com- 
mission which  does  not  question  any  of  these  statements  regarding  strength, 
but  states  that  he  could  not  have  concentrated  more  than  31,000  men  at 
McMinnville  to  strike  the  Confederate  forces  as  they  debouched  from  the 
mountains ;  and  the  same  paper  estimated  Bragg's  army  at  60,000,  while  his 
retm-ns  on  August  27th  showed  but  27,816  officers  and  men  for  duty.  ^  These 
facts  prove  the  large  preponderance  of  the  Federals. 

At  Murfreesboro'  Buell  heard  of  Nelson's  defeat  at  Richmond,  and  without 
halting  he  marched  to  Nashville.  On  September  7th  he  intrusted  General 
Thomas  with  the  defense  of  that  city  with  the  divisions  of  Palmer,  Negley, 
and  Schoepf,  while  with  the  infantry  divisions  of  McCook,  Crittenden, 
Ammen,  Wood,  Rousseau,  and  R.  B.  Mitchell,  and  a  cavahy  division  under 
Kennett,  General  BueU  determined  to  race  with  Bragg  for  Louisville. 

4.  The  October  returns  include  the  heavy  reen- 
foreements,  placed  by  General  Buell  at  22,000, 
that  were  added  to  Buell's  army  on  its  arrival  at 
Louisville,  at  the  end  of  September.  —  Editors. 

J^  In  his  official  report,  dated  November  4th, 
1862,  General  Buell  estimated  his  whole  effective 
force  on  the  7th  and  8th  of  October,  at  58,000, 
including  22,500  raw  troops,  with  little  or  no 
instruction.  He  also  estimated  the  total  Confed- 
erate force  engaged  in  the  invasion  at  from  55,000 
to  65,000.    In  "The  Army  under  Buell "  (N.  Y. : 


IKUM    A    PHOTUGKAjeH. 


D.  Van  Nostrand),  General  James  B.  Fry,  Assist- 
ant Adjutant-General,  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Army 
of  the  Ohio,  after  a  careful  study  of  all  the 
data,  estimates  the  force  with  which  Buell  moved 
against  Bardstown  (exclusive  of  Sill's  division 
that  moved  against  Frankfort)  at  58,000  ;  and 
Bragg's,  including  Kirby  Smith's,  at  68,000. 
By  this  estimate,  when  Sill  joined  the  main 
body  of  Buell's  army  after  the  battle  of  Perry- 
ville,  the  armies  were  about  equal  in  number. 

Editors. 


BRAGG 'S  INVASION  OF  KENTUCKY,  9 

It  was  a  fair  race,  as  on  that  day  most  of  Bragg's  army  was  south  of 
the  Cumberland  Eiver,  at  Carthage  and  Grreensboro'.  Bragg  was  nearest  to 
Louisville  by  some  twenty-five  miles,  but  Buell  had  the  advantage  of  a  bridge 
at  Nashville  and  the  assistance  of  the  railroad  to  aid  in  his  march.  With 
seven  hundred  cavalry,  I  hastened  to  strike  and  break  the  raihoad  at  points 
between  Bowling  Green  and  Nashville,  and  otherwise  sought  to  retard  the 
northern  march  of  the  Federal  army.  By  the  12th  it  was  e^ddent  to  Buell 
that  no  attack  would  be  made  on  Nashville,  and  he  ordered  Greneral  Thomas 
to  join  him  with  his  own  division,  which  had  been  commanded  by  General 


r  ■  <yf%':."*r"^; ';%:^. 


UNION    FORT   AT   MUNFORDVILLB,    CAPTURED    BY    BRAGG,    SEPTEMBER    17,    1862  — THE    GREEN    RIVER    BRIDGE 
ON    THE    LEFT.      FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH    TAKEN    EN    1886. 

Schoepf.  Buell  reached  Bowling  Green  with  his  cavalry  and  two  divisions 
of  infantry  on  the  14th,  and  turned  his  column  in  the  direction  of  Mun- 
fordville.  I  interposed  my  cavalry  on  the  Munfordville  road,  and  also  on 
the  roads  leading  to  Glasgow,  and  reported  Buell's  movements  to  Bragg. 
General  Chalmers,  with  Bragg's  advance,  reached  Munfordville  at  daylight 
on  the  14th  and  learned  that  Colonel  Scott,  with  a  cavalry  brigade,  had 
demanded  the  surrender  on  the  night  previous.\  Chalmers  was  misinformed 
regarding  the  strength  of  the  garrison  and  the  character  of  the  defensive 
works.  He  attacked  with  vigor,  but  was  repulsed.  He  reported  his  force  at 
1913  men,  and  his  loss  at  35  killed  and  253  wounded.  On  the  14th  all  of 
Buell's  six  divisions  had  reached  Bowling  Green,  and  on  the  16th  he  advanced 
vigorously  to  succor  the  garrison  at  Munfordville,  the  head  of  his  column 
being  opposed  by  cavalry.  Bragg,  hearing  of  Chalmers's  attack  and  of  Buell's 
movements,  ordered  his  entire  army,  which  had  rested  two  days  at  Glasgow, 
to  start  early  on  the  15th  en  route  for  Munford\dlle.  On  the  next  day  he 
reached  that  place,  boldly  displayed  his  army,  and  on  the  17th  at  2  p.  M.  the 

\  The  post  was  commanded  by  Colonel  J.  T.  Wilder  (17th  Indiana),  whose  force  consisted  of  foiu-  regi- 
ments of  infantry,  a  battery,  and  several  detachments,  aggregating  about  4000  men. —  Editors. 
VOL  III.    ft 


lo  BRAGG 'S  INJyASION  OF  KENTUCKY. 

fort  and  garrison  surrendered.  The  Federals  reported  their  loss  at  15  killed, 
57  wounded,  and  4076  prisoners.  We  also  captured  their  armament,  10  pieces 
of  artillery,  and  5000  stand  of  small-arms.  As  might  be  expected,  the  Con- 
federate army  was  much  elated,  and  were  eager  to  grapple  with  the  dispirited 
army  under  General  Buell. 

Bragg  placed  his  troops  in  a  strong  position  south  of  the  river,  using  the 
fort  as  a  part  of  his  line  of  defense.  My  command  was  thrown  forward  to  meet 
and  skirmish  with  the  enemy,  who,  on  the  19th,  commenced  preparations  for  an 
attack.  On  the  20th  General  Thomas  joined  the  Federal  army  with  his  division. 
General  Bragg,  in  referring  to  the  situation  of  September  20th,  wrote : 

''  With  my  effective  force  present  reduced  by  sickness,  exhaustion,  and  the  recent  affair  before 
the  intrenchments  at  Munfordville  to  half  that  of  the  enemy,  I  could  not  prudently  afford  to 
attack  him  there  in  his  selected  position." 

If  Kirby  Smith's  command  had  been  ordered  from  Lexington  to  Munford- 
ville even  as  late  as  the  12th,  a  battle  with  Buell  could  not  have  been  other 
than  a  decided  Confederate  victory.  Bragg  at  first  had  determined  to  fight 
with  his  four  divisions,  and  no  doubt  would  have  done  so  had  Buell  advanced 
on  the  17th,  or  18th,  or  19th.  Early  on  the  morning  of  the  18th,  General  Bragg 
sent  for  me  and  explained  his  plans.  I  never  saw  him  more  determined  or 
more  confident.  The  entire  army  was  in  the  best  of  spirits.  I  met  and 
talked  with  Generals  Hardee,  Polk,  Cheatham,  and  Buckner ;  all  were  enthu- 
siastic over  our  success,  and  our  good  luck  in  getting  Buell  where  he  would 
be  compelled  to  fight  us  to  such  a  disadvantage.  It  is  true  our  back  was  to  a 
river,  but  it  was  fordable  at  several  places,  and  we  felt  that  the  objection  to 
having  it  in  our  rear  was  fully  compensated  by  the  topographical  features, 
which,  with  the  aid  of  the  fort,  made  our  position  a  strong  one  for  defense. 
So  anxious  was  Bragg  for  a  fight  that  he  sent  Buckner's  division  to  the 
front  in  the  hope  that  an  engagement  could  thus  be  provoked ;  but  after  the 
arrival  of  General  Thomas,  Bragg  did  not  deem  it  advisable  to  risk  a  battle 
with  the  force  then  under  his  command,  believing  that  another  opportunity 
would  offer  after  being  joined  by  Kirby  Smith.  ,He  therefore  withdrew  to 
Bardstown,  sending  to  me,  who  still  confronted  Buell,  the  following  order, 
dated  September  20th,  through  General  Hardee : 

''  General  Bragg  directs  that,  if  possible,  the  enemy  be  prevented  from  crossing  Green 
River  to-morrow,  and  General  Hardee  instructs  me  to  say  that  he  expects  you  wiU  contest  the 
passage  of  that  river  at  Munfordville  to  that  end." 

Buell  heard  of  Bragg's  movements  and  pressed  forward  with  determina- 
tion. My  small  brigade  of  cavalry  contested  his  advance  on  the  20th  and 
21st,  in  efforts  to  comply  with  the  instructions  from  General  Bragg.  On 
the  afternoon  of  the  21st,  Buell's  right  approached  the  river  above  the  town, 
and  at  the  same  time  he  pressed  forward  his  line  of  battle  so  rapidly  as 
almost  to  command  the  only  ford  by  which  I  could  cross  Green  River  with 
both  artillery  and  cavalry.  Allen's  1st  Alabama  Regiment,  being  directly  in 
front,  was  thrown  into  column  and,  charging  gallantly,  defeated  the  opposing 
cavalry  and  broke  through  their  infantry.    Among  our  killed  was  the  noble 


BRAGG 'S  INVASION  OF  KENTUCKY.  1 1 

Lieutenant-Colonel  T.  B.  Brown,  but  the  charge  sufficiently  checked  the 
advance  to  enable  the  command  to  cross  the  ford  in  good  order.  The  fol- 
lowing note,  referring  to  this  engagement,  explains  itself : 

''Headquarters,  Sixth  DmsiON,  Army  of  the  Ohio,  September  22d,  1862.  General 
Wheeler,  Commanding  Cavalry  Brigade.  General  :  I  am  directed  by  General  Buell  to  say, 
in  answer  to  your  request  to  admit  the  brother  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Brown,  killed  in  the 
affair  of  yesterday  within  our  lines,  he  regi-ets  he  cannot,  on  account  of  the  present  state  of 
the  service,  accede  to  youi'  wishes.  General  Buell  has  referred  your  note  to  me  to  give  you 
the  desired  information  in  regard  to  the  fate  of  Colonel  Brown.  He  was  killed  outright  in  the 
handsome  cavahy  charge  executed  by  your  troops  yesterday  afternoon.  His  body  was  taken  to 
a  neighboring  house  and  cared  for.  He  wUl  be  interred  to-day,  and  doubtless  in  the  vicinity. 
His  watch  was  taken  charge  of  by  an  officer  of  rank  in  our  service,  and  I  will  make  it  a 
point  to  have  it  forwarded  to  you.  I  am  not  now  informed  whether  there  were  any  other  val- 
uables on  the  person  of  Colonel  Brown.  I  am,  General,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  sei-vant, 
Th.  J.  Wood,  Brigadier-General  of  Volunteers,  Commanding." 

The  watch  was  subsequently  sent  to  Colonel  Brown's  daughter. 

On  the  22d,  with  a  clear  road  to  Louisville,  Buell  moved  with  celerity  in 
that  direction.  My  cavahy  contested  his  advance,  but  the  country  was 
too  open  to  allow  of  effective  opposition  with  so  small  a  force.  On  the 
25th  the  leading  Federal  column  reached  the  city,  and  the  seven  divisions 
were  all  up  on  the  27th.  Bragg,  Polk,  and  Hardee  had  been  kept  thoroughly 
informed  of  Buell's  march  and  of  the  exposure  of  his  flank,  which  presented 
an  inviting  opportunity  for  attack,  but  so  worn  and  wearied  was  the  con- 
dition of  our  army  that  these  officers  did  not  feel  justified  in  attempting 
an  aggressive  movement.  On  the  28th  Bragg  left  Bardstown  with  his 
staff  to  confer  with  Kirby  Smith  at  Lexington,  and  then  proceeded  to 
Frankfort,  where,  on  the  4tli  of  October,  a  day  was  occupied  in  the  instal- 
lation of  the  Hon.  Richard  Hawes  as  Confederate  Provisional  Goverrior  of 
the  Commonwealth. 

While  these  events  were  happening  Buell  was  making  active  preparations 
for  an  aggressive  campaign.  On  the  26th  Major-General  Wright,  command- 
ing the  Department  of  the  Ohio,  went  from  Cincinnati  to  Louisville  to  confer 
with  him,  and  on  the  27th  General  Halleck  issued  an  order  placing  Buell  in 
command  of  the  troops  of  both  departments,  then  in  Louisville.  There  has 
been  much  controversy  as  to  the  "  strength  of  the  opposing  armies."  After 
the  most  careful  study  of  Federal  and  Confederate  official  statements,  I 
have  reached  the  following  conclusions : 

FEDERAL  FORCES  AVAILABLE  TO  MEET  BRAGG,  ix 

Collected  at  Cincinnati 45,000 

Collected  at  Louisville 30,000 

Canied  to  Louisville  by  Buell,  September  25th  to  29th 54,198 

Morgan's  Seventh  Division 8,084 

Total  under  BueU's  and  Wright's  command 137,282  \ 

it  It  will  be  contended,  with  some  force,  that  most  meager  guard  would  have  sufficed  to  protect 

a  portion  of  these  troops  was  necessary  to  guard  those  cities  had  the  main  body  moved  vigorously 

Cincinnati  and  Louisville.     But  on  the  other  hand  against  the  Confederates. — J.  W. 

it  may  be  insisted,  just  as  strenuously,  that  the  J  But  see  other  estimates,  p.  31.— Editors. 


12  BRAGG 'S  INVASION  OF  KENTUCKY. 

To  these  we  might  with  propriety  add  the  26,351  men  which  General  Wright 
could  have  drawn  from  his  command  in  West  Virginia. 

These  stupendous  armies  did  not  include  the  12,397  troops  left  at  Nashville, 
which  would  make  the  entire  force  subject  to  Buell's  and  Wright's  orders 
176,030.    , 

MAXIMUM   CONFEDERATE  FORCES. 

General  E.  Kirby  Smith's  column  taken  to  Kentucky 10,000 

Humphrey  Marshall,  from  West  Virginia 2,100 

Stevenson,  joining  after  PeiTyviUe 7,500 

John  H.  Morgan 1,300 

Bragg's  largest  force  before  crossing  Tennessee  River  —  officers  and 

men,  for  duty 27,816 

Bragg,  Smith,  and  Marshall 48,776  g> 

The  above  was  the  reported  strength  of  the  Confederate  troops  when  the 
campaign  began,  but  to  make  sure  and  to  compensate  for  any  omitted  cavalry 
let  us  add  1000,  making  the  entire  force  49,776.  The  losses  at  Richmond  and 
Muufordville  were  very  slight,  compared  to  the  daily  depletion  caused  by 
dropping  out  along  the  route.  Some  were  allowed  to  organize  in  squads  and 
make  their  way  back  to  east  Tennessee  ;  some  sought  shelter  among  the  kind 
and  hospitable  people  ;  some  struggled  along  with  the  ambulance  trains,  and 
some  were  left  at  temporarily  established  hospitals,  one  of  which,  containing 
two  hundred  inmates,  was  captured  by  the  enemy  at  Glasgow. 

This  character  of  loss  always  attends  a  rapidly  moving  army,  and  its  extent 
can  be  realized  when  we  see  that  Hardee's  wing  left  Chattanooga  12,825 
strong,  was  reenforced  by  Cleburne's  brigade  early  in  October;  yet,  even 
with  Cleburne  included,  Hardee,  in  stating  officially  the  force  with  which 
he  fought  at  Perry ville,  says:  "Thinned  by  battle  and  long  and  arduous 
service,  my  effective  force  did  not  exceed  10,000  men."  It  will  be  seen,  there- 
fore, that  these  causes  reduced  the  Confederate  ranks  in  much  greater  pro- 
portion than  they  were  increased  by  enlistments  and  other  accretions,  and 
General  Bragg  in  his  official  report  of  the  campaign  asserts  that  we  were  able 
"at  no  time  to  put  more  than  forty  thousand  men  of  all  arms  and  at  all  places  in 
battle."  This  included  Bragg's,  Smith's,  and  Marshall's  columns,  and  although 
it  is  probably  true  that  their  aggregate  strength  in  August  was  48,776,  it 
would  have  been  as  difficult  for  Bragg  and  Smith  to  have  concentrated  that 
number  as  it  would  have  been  for  Buell  and  Wright  to  have  concentrated  the 
163,633  which  they  commanded.  Even  with  such  a  force  available  to  drive 
40,000  men  out  of  Kentucky,  General  Wright  on  the  16th  appealed  to  the 
governors  of  Indiana,  Illinois,  Wisconsin,  and  Michigan  for  additional  troops. 
What  troops  came  in  answer  to  these  calls  I  would  not  venture  to  say;  but 
leaving  these  and  the  troops  in  West  Virginia  under  General  Wright  out  of 
the  calculation,  our  strength,  even  after  Stevenson  joined  us,  was  less  than 
half,  and  but  little  more  than  one-third  that  of  the  enemy,  and  that  powerful 
enemy  was  directly  on  its  base  of  supplies,  with  unlimited  commissary  and 

%  But  see  other  estimates,  p.  31.— Editors. 


BRAGG 'S  INVASION  OF  KENTUCKY. 


13 


ordnance  stores,  while  the  Confederate  army  had  no  base,  was  living  off  the 
country,  and  had  no  possibility  of  replenishing  ammunition.  Bragg  felt  very 
keenly  the  misfortune  caused  by  his  inability  to  concentrate  and  gain  a 
victory  over  Buell  before  he  should  reach  the  reenforcements  which  awaited 
him  at  Louisville. 
In  writing  to  the  Government,  September  25th,  Bragg  says : 

"  I  regret  to  say  we  are  sadly  disappointed  in  the  want  of  action  by  our  friends  in  Kentucky. 
We  have  so  far  received  no  accession  to  this  army.   General  Smith  has  secured  about  a  brigade 
—  not  half  our  losses  by  casualties  of  different  kinds. 
Unless  a  change  occurs  soon  we  must  abandon  the  gar- 
den spot  of  Kentucky.    .    .    ." 

On  September  18th,  Kirby  Smith  writes  to 
General  Bragg : 

''  The  Kentuckians  are  slow  and  backward  in  rally- 
ing to  our  standard.  Then-  hearts  are  evidently  with 
us,  but  their  blue-grass  and  fat-grass  are  against  us. 
Several  regiments  are  in  process  of  organization,  and 
if  we  remain  long  enough  recruits  will  be  found  for  all 
the  disposable  arms  in  our  possession." 

These  letters  illustrated  why  a  victory  over 
Buell  was  necessary. 

Although  Kentucky  maintained  her  neu- 
trality as  long  as  it  was  possible,  the  chivalric 
spirit  of  her  gallant  sons  was  fully  manifested 
at  the  earliest  opportunity  —  each  obeying 
only  the  dictates  of  his  own  convictions  of  duty.  While  thousands  united 
their  fortunes  with  the  South,  other  and  more  thousands  flocked  to  the 
standard  of  the  North. 

The  proud  old  families  —  descendants  of  the  pioneers  of  the  Common- 
wealth—  each  sent  sons  to  do  battle  in  the  opposing  armies.  Friends, 
neighbors,  kinsmen,  and  even  brothers  bade  each  other  adieu  —  one  to  the 
Northern  army,  the  other  to  the  Confederate.  |  Wherever  daring  courage, 
rare  intelligence,  extraordinary  fertility  of  resource,  or  fortitude  under  pri- 
vation and  suffering  were  displayed,  Kentuckians  were  conspicuous;  and 
when  the  fight  was  over  and  the  battle-rent  banner  of  the  vanquished  Con- 


LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  E.  KIRBY  SMITH,  C.  S.  A. 
FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


4.  The  remarkable  division  of  sentiment,  upon 
the  issue  presented  by  the  secession  of  the  South, 
that  existed  in  Kentucky  is  clearly  illustrated  by 
the  course  of  some  of  her  leading  families.  The 
three  most  prominent  families  in  the  State  were 
the  Breckinridges,  the  Clays,  and  the  Crittendens, 
and  each  of  them  had  representatives  in  both 
armies.  Major-Gen eral  Thomas  L.  Crittenden  and 
Colonel  Eugene  W.  Crittenden  served  in  the  army 
of  the  Nortli,  while  their  brother,  Major-Greneral 
George  B.  Crittenden,  served  in  the  army  of  tlie 
South.  Of  Henry  Clay's  grandchildren,  I  recall 
three  who  espoused  the  Federal  cause,  and  four 
who  joined  the  Southern  army.  Vice-President 
Breckinridge  and  three  sons  adhered  to  the  South, 


while  his  two  distinguished  cousins,  the  eminent 
Presbyterian  divines,  were  uncompromisiug  in 
their  devotion  to  the  Union.  The  elder,  and  per- 
haps more  famous  of  these  cousins.  Dr.  Eobert  J. 
Breckinridge,  had  two  sons  in  the  Confederate  and 
two  in  the  Federal  army;  one  of  whom  (CoIouelJ. 
C.  Breckinridge,  now  [ISSS]  of  the  regular  army), 
in  the  fierce  battle  at  Atlanta,  July  22d,  1S04, 
became  a  prisoner  to  his  brother,  W.  C.  P.  Breckin- 
ridge, the  present  member  of  Congress,  who  made 
as  brilliant  a  record  as  a  soldier  as  he  lias  since  made 
as  a  statesman.  They  passed  the  night  following  that 
sanguinary  battle  with  as  much  warmth  of  fraternal 
affection  as  though  visiting  each  other  from  neigh- 
boring armies  engaged  in  the  same  cause. —  J.  W. 


14  BRAGG 'S  INVASION  OF  KENTUCKY. 

f ederacy  fui'led  about  its  shattered  staff  was  buried  in  that  grave  from  which 
a  resurrection  is  no  less  unwished  for  than  impossible,  the  survivors  of 
the  contest  from  that  State  returned  to  their  homes  with  no  feelings  of 
animosity,  no  brooding  hopes  of  vengeance  to  be  wreaked  upon  their  late 
opponents. 

On  October  1st  Buell  commenced  his  march  from  Louisville  upon  Bragg  at 
Bardstown.  On  September  29th  General  Thomas  had  been  assigned  by  Presi- 
dent Lincoln  to  the  command  of  the  army,  but  at  Thomas's  request  the  order 
was  revoked,  and  he  was  announced  in  orders  as  second  in  command. 

Buell  organized  his  infantry  into  three  army  corps,  of  three  divisions  each. 
The  First  Corps  on  the  left,  under  Major-G-eneral  McCook,  marched  through 
Taylorsville.  The  Second  Corps,  under  Major-General  Crittenden,  marched 
through  Mount  Washington,  and  the  Third  Corps,  under  Major-Oeneral  Gil- 
bert, which  formed  the  Federal  right,  took  the  route  by  way  of  Shepherdsville. 
General  Sill,  of  McCook's  corps,  reenforced  by  Dumont's  independent  division, 
marched  direct  to  Frankfort  to  threaten  Kirby  Smith. 

Buell,  in  his  official  report,  says : 

"  Skiitnisliing  with  the  enemy's  cavah-y  and  artillery  marked  the  movement  of  each  column 
from  within  a  few  miles  of  LouisviUe.  It  was  more  stubborn  and  formidable  near  Bardstown, 
but  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  infantry  retired  from  that  place  eight  hours  before  oui-  arrival,  when 
his  rear-guard  of  cavalrj^  and  artillery  retreated  after  a  sharp  engagement  with  my  cavalry. 
The  pursuit  and  skirmishing  with  the  enemy's  rear-guard  continued  toward  Springfield." 

General  Smith  prepared  to  meet  Sill  and  Dumont,  and  on  October  2d  Bragg 
ordered  General  Polk  to  move  the  entire  army  from  Bardstown  via  Bloom- 
field  toward  Frankfort,  and  to  strike  Sill's  column  in  flank  while  Smith  met 
it  in  front.  For  reasons  which  were  afterward  explained  that  order  was 
not  complied  with,  but,  on  the  approach  of  Buell^^  Polk  marched  via  Perry- 
ville  toward  Harrodsburg,  where  he  expected  the  entire  army  would  be  con- 
centrated. ^  General  Smith,  confronted  by  Sill  and  Dumont  near  Frankfort, 
had  several  times  on  the  6th  and  7th  called  upon  Bragg  for  reenforcements, 
and  Wither s's  division  of  Polk's  corps  was  ordered  to  him.  Reports  reached 
Bragg  exaggerating  the  strength  of  the  movement  upon  Frankfort.  He  was 
thus  led  to  believe  that  the  force  behind  Polk  was  not  so  heavy  as  represented, 
and  on  the  evening  of  October  7th  he  directed  him  to  form  the  cavalry 
and  the  divisions  of  Cheatham,  Buckner,  and  Patton  Anderson  at  Perry^ille, 
and  vigorously  attack  the  pursuing  column.  Since  October  1st  our  cavalry 
had  persistently  engaged  the  two  most  advanced  of  Buell's  columns. 

The  reader  should  now  observe,  by  the  map  [p.  6],  that  McCook's  corps 
approached  Perryville  by  the  road  through  Bloomfield,  Chaplin,  and  Mack- 
ville,  its  general  direction  being  nearly  south-east.  General  Gilbert's  corjis 
approached  by  the  road  from  Springfield,  its  general  direction  being  east,  but 
bearing  north-east  as  it  approached  the  town.  Crittenden's  corps,  accom- 
panied l)y  General  Thomas  and  preceded  by  cavalry,  having  crossed  Gilbert's 
line  of  march,  was  on  a  road  which  runs  due  east  from  Le])anon  to  Danville. 

i  General  Polk,  finding  his  own  front  threatened,  availed  himself  of  previous  instruetions  as  to  how- 
he  should  handle  his  force  in  certain  contingencies,  and  retired  slowly.—  Editors. 


BRAGG  'S  INJ/ASION  OF  KENTUCKY.  i  5 

At  a  point  about  five  miles  south-west  of  Perryville  this  road  has  a  branch 
which  turns  north-east  to  that  place.  Now  remember  that  our  stores  and 
supplies  were  at  Bryantsville  and  Camp  Dick  Robinson  about  eighteen  miles 
east  of  Perryville,  and  that  Kirby  Smith  was  at  McCown's  Ferry,  on  the 
Kentucky  River,  en  route  for  Versailles,  menaced  by  two  divisions  under 
General  Sill.  Also  observe  the  important  feature  that  McCook  was  at  Mack- 
ville  during  the  night  of  the  7th,  at  which  place  a  road  forks,  running  east  to 
Harrodsburg  and  thence  to  om*  depot  at  Bryants^ille ;  and  also  consider  that 
Mack\dlle  was  as  near  Bryants\alle  as  were  our  troops  in  front  of  Perrj^ille. 
On  the  7th  our  cavalry  fought  with  considerable  tenacity,  particularly  in 
the  evening,  when  the  enemy  sought  to  get  possession  of  the  only  accessible 
supply  of  water.     General  Buell,  in  his  report,  says : 

"  The  advanced  guard,  consisting  of  cavalry  and  artillery,  supported  toward  evening  by  two 
regiments  of  infantry,  pressed  successfully  upon  the  enemy's  rear-guard  to  within  two  miles 
of  the  town,  against  a  somewhat  stubborn  opposition." 

After  dark,  at  General  Hardee's  request,  I  went  to  his  bivouac  and  dis- 
cussed the  plans  for  the  following  day.  I  explained  to  him  the  topogi-aphy 
of  the  country  and  the  location  of  Buell's  columns.  I  understood  from  him 
that  the  attack  would  be  made  very  early  the  next  morning,  and  I  endeavored 
to  impress  upon  him  the  great  advantage  which  must  follow  an  early  com- 
mencement of  the  action.  An  early  attack  on  the  8th  would  have  met  only 
the  advance  of  Gilbert's  corps  on  the  Springfield  road,  which  was  four  or  five 
miles  nearer  to  Perryville  than  any  other  Federal  troops,  and  their  overthrow 
could  have  been  accomphshed  with  little  loss,  while  every  hour  of  delay  was 
bringing  the  rear  divisions  of  the  enemy  nearer  to  the  front,  besides  bringing 
the  corps  of  MeCook  and  Crittenden  upon  the  field.  I  explained,  also,  that 
Thomas  and  Crittenden  on  the  Lebanon  and  Dan^dlle  road  could  easily  gain 
our  rear,  while  all  our  forces  were  engaged  with  McCook  and  Gilbert.  For 
instance,  if  Crittenden  turned  toward  Perryville  at  the  fork  five  miles  from 
that  place,  he  would  march  directly  in  the  rear  of  our  troops  engaged  with 
Gilbert's  corps.  If  he  kept  on  toward  Danville  and  Camp  Dick  Robinson, 
our  position  would  be  turned,  and  a  rapid  retreat  to  our  depot  of  supplies, 
closely  followed  by  McCook  and  Gilbert,  would  be  the  ine\4table  result.  With 
equal  ease,  McCook,  by  marching  from  Mackville  to  Harrodsburg,  could 
reach  our  depot,  thus  turning  our  right  flank. 

The  reader  will  plainly  see  that  Perryville  was  not  a  proper  place  for  six- 
teen thousand  men  to  form  and  await  the  choice  of  time  and  manner  of 
attack  by  Buell,  with  his  tremendous  army,  and  that  every  moment's  delay 
after  daylight  was  lessening  the  probabilities  of  advantage  to  the  Confeder- 
ates. The  cavalry  under  my  command  was  pressed  forward  at  dawn  on  the 
8th,  and  skirmished  with  the  outposts  of  the  enemy,  until,  on  the  approach 
of  a  Federal  brigade  of  cavalry  supported  by  a  line  of  infantry,  we  charged, 
dispersing  the  cavalry,  and,  breaking  through  both  infantry  and  artillery, 
drove  the  enemy  from  their  guns  and  took  140  prisoners. 

The  Federal  army  was  now  being  placed  in  line :  McCook's  corps  on  tlie 
left,  Gilbert's  in  the  center,  and  Crittenden's  corps,  which  reached  the  field 


i6 


BRAGG 'S  INl/ASION  OF  KENTUCKY. 


at  11  o'clock,\  on  the  right,  its 
flank  being  covered  by  Edward 
M.  McCook's  brigade  of  cav- 
ahy.  The  management  of  the 
Federal  right  wing  was  un- 
der the  supervision  of  General 
Thomas. 

General  Bragg  reached  Per- 
ryville  about  10  o'clock.  Gen- 
eral Liddell's  brigade,  of 
Buckner's  division,  had  been 
advanced  with  his  left  near 
the  Springfield  road,  and  his 
skirmish  line  became  engaged. 
The  cavalry  on  the  Confederate 
left  apparently  being  able  to 
hold  their  own  against  the  ene- 
my upon  that  part  of  the  field, 
Cheatham's  division,  composed 
of  Donelson's,  Stewart's,  and 
Maney's  brigades,  was  ordered 
to  the  right,  where,  between  1 
and  2  o'clock,  with  its  right 
supported  by  cavalry,  it  moved 
forward  to  the  attack.  Gen- 
erals Hardee  and  Buckner,  see- 
ing Cheatham  fairly  in  action, 
ordered  General  Bushrod  John- 
son's and  Cleburne's  brigades 
forward.  There  being  considerable  space  between  Cheatham's  left  and 
Buckner's  right.  General  John  C.  Brown's  and  Colonel  Jones's  brigades,  of 
Anderson's  division,  and  General  S.  A.  M.  Wood's,  of  Buckner's  division,  had 
been  placed  in  position  to  fill  the  vacancy.  Adams's  and  Powell's  brigades,  of 
Anderson's  division,  were  to  the  left  of  Buckner,  and  the  line  thus  arranged 
with  cavalry  on  both  flanks  gallantly  advanced  upon  the  enemy.  Cheatham 
was  first  in  action  and  was  almost  immediately  exposed  to  a  murderous  fire  of 
infantry  and  artillery,  which  soon  spread  to  the  left  of  our  line. 

Our  artillery,  handled  with  great  skill,  told  fearfully  on  the  enemy,  who 
sought,  when  practicable,  to  take  shelter  behind  stone  walls  and  fences. 
Fortunately  we  were  enabled  to  enfilade  many  of  their  temporary  shelters 
with  a  well-directed  fire  from  our  batteries,  and  this,  added  to  our  musketry, 
was  so  effective  that  first  one  regiment,  then  another,  nnd  finally  the  entire 
Federal  line,  gave  way  before  the  determined  onset  of  onr  troops. 

\  Critteuden  testified  before  the  Buell  Commission  that  his  leiidiiig  division  "was  in  line  of  battle 
between  10  and  11."  This  line  was  formed  ou  the  Lebanon  pike  about  three  miles  from  the  battle- 
field.—Editors. 


LIEUTENANT  (.1  M 

FK<  I 


BRAGG 'S  INI/ASIOK  OF  KENTUCKY.  17 

At  one  time  Cleburne  and  Jolmson  seemed  checked  for  a  moment,  as  they 
assailed  a  very  strong  position,  the  fire  from  which  cut  down  our  men  and 
severely  wounded  General  Clebui-ne.  But  encouraged  by  the  steady  advance 
on  both  right  and  left,  these  troops  recovered  from  the  shock,  and  with 
increased  speed  the  entire  line  overran  the  enemy,  capturing  three  batteries 
and  a  number  of  prisoners.  Among  the  dead  and  wounded  Federals  lay  one 
who,  the  prisoners  told  us,  was  General  James  S.  Jackson,  the  commander  of 
one  of  McCook's  divisions.  General  Liddell,  who  had  been  placed  in  reserve, 
followed  the  movement,  and  when  the  contest  became  warmest  was  sent  to 
reenforee  Cheatham,  where  he  did  valiant  service. 

During  this  sanguinary  struggle,  our  line  had  advanced  nearly  a  mile. 
Prisoners,  guns,  colors,  and  the  field  of  battle  were  ours ;  not  a  step  which 
had  been  gained  was  yielded.  The  enemy,  though  strongly  reenforced, 
was  still  broken  and  disordered.  He  held  his  ground  mainly  because 
our  troops  were  too  exhausted  for  further  elfort.  At  one  point  just  at 
dusk  we  captured  a  disorganized  body,  including  a  number  of  brigade  and 
division  staff-officers.  Soon  darkness  came  on  and  we  rested  on  the  field 
thus  bravely  won. 

Our  entire  force  engaged,  infantry,  cavalry  and  artillery,  was  but  16,000 
men.  Our  loss  was  510  killed,  2635  wounded,  and  251  missing.  Generals 
S.  A.  M.  Wood  and  Cleburne  were  disabled,  and  a  large  proportion  of  higher 
officers  were  killed  or  wounded.  Three  of  General  Wood's  staff  were  among 
the  killed. 

General  Buell  lost  916  killed,  2943  wounded,  and  489  captured  by  the 
Confederates.  General  Jackson,  commanding  a  division,  and  General  Terrill 
and  Colonel  Webster,  commanding  brigades,  were  among  the  Federal  killed, 
and  Colonel  Lytle  was  among  the  wounded. 

At  every  point  of  battle  the  Confederates  had  been  victorious.  We  had 
engaged  three  corps  of  the  Federal  army;  i^  one  of  these,  McCook's,  to  use 
Buell's  language,  was  "  very  much  crippled,"  one  division,  again  to  use  his 
language,  "  having  in  fact  almost  entirely  disappeared  as  a  body." 

After  darkness  had  closed  a  battle,  it  was  a  custom  to  send  messengers  or 
notes  to  the  nearest  generals,  detailing  results,  telling  of  this  or  that  one  who 
had  fallen,  and  asking  information  from  other  portions  of  the  field.  Resting 
quietly  on  the  ground,  the  army  expected,  and  would  gladly  have  welcomed, 
a  I'enewal  of  the  fight  on  the  next  day,  but  the  accumulation  of  Buell's  forces 
was  such  as  not  to  justify  further  conflict  in  that  locality.  Kirby  Smith  was 
near  Lawrenceburg  with  his  own  troops  and  Withers's  division,  and  after  full 
consultation  it  was  determined  to  march  to  Harrodsburg,  where  it  was  hoped 
the  entire  Confederate  force  in  Kentucky  might  bo  concentrated.  I  was 
directed  with  the  cavalry  to  prevent  an  advance  on  the  road  leading  to 
Danville.  At  midnight  the  troops  withdrew  to  Perry ville,  and  at  sunrise 
continued  the  march.  It  was  long  after  this  when  the  Federal  pickets  began 
to  reconnoiter,  and  it  was  fully  10  o'clock  when,  standing  on  the  edge  of  the 
town,  I  saw  the  advance  of  the  skirmish  line  of  Buell's  army.    Bragg  prepared 

■5^  Only  a  small  part  of  Crittendeu's  corps  was  in  actiou  ;  see  p.  31.— Editors. 


1 8  BRAGG 'S  INVASION  OF  KENTUCKY. 

for  battle  on  the  Harrodsbiirg  road,  only  eight  miles  from  Perryvillo,  and 
awaited  Buell's  advance. 

Two  days  elapsed,  and  the  Federal  army  evinced  no  disposition  to  attack. 
A  division  of  infantry  and  a  brigade  of  cavalry  fought  me  back  to  near 
Danville,  and  at  the  same  time  Buell  formed  with  his  right  within  four 
miles  of  that  place,  making  a  feint  in  Bragg's  immediate  front  on  the  road 
leading  from  Perryville  to  Harrodsburg.  Buell,  no  doubt,  hoped  to  cut  him 
off  from  the  crossing  of  the  Dick  River  near  Camp  Dick  Robinson. 

I  sent  Greneral  Bragg  information  of  Buell's  dispositions,  whereupon  he 
issued  orders  to  his  army  and  wrote  me  as  follows: 

''Harrodsburg,  Ky.,  October  10th,  1862.  Colonel  Wheeler.  Dear  Colonel:  I 
opened  yom-  dispatch  to  General  Polk  regarding  the  enemy's  movements.  The  information 
you  furnish  is  very  important.  It  is  just  what  I  needed  and  I  thank  you  for  it.  This  infor- 
mation leaves  no  doubt  as  to  the  proper  course  for  me  to  pursue.  Hold  the  enemy  firmly  till 
to-morrow.    Yours,  etc.,  Braxton  Bragg." 

Bragg  had  now  determined  to  retreat  to  Knoxville  by  the  way  of  Cumber- 
land Gap.  It  was  evident  that  Buell's  large  army  would  enable  him  to  select 
his  own  time  and  position  for  battle  unless  Bragg  chose  to  attack.  Bragg 
already  had  1500  sick  and  over  3000  wounded.  A  severe  battle  would 
certainly  have  increased  the  wounded  to  4000  or  5000  more.  The  care  of 
such  a  number  of  wounded  would  have  embarrassed,  possibly  controlled, 
our  movements. 

Hardee  states  that  he  had  but  10,000  men  before  the  battle  of  Perryville, 
and  Bragg  said  that  the  three  divisions  which  fought  that  battle  had  but 
14,500.    If  that  was  correct  they  had  now  but  11,000. 

It  was  too  hazardous  to  guard  our  depot  of  supplies  and  contend  with  the 
Federal  forces  within  easy  march.  Our  wagon  trains  were  immense,  and  our 
artillery  large  in  proportion  to  other  arms. 

The  enemy  pushed  up  close  to  Danville  on  the  night  of  the  10th,  but  we 
easily  held  him  in  check  until  all  our  army  had  crossed  Dick  River.  On  the 
11th  we  contended  against  a  force  of  infantry,  which  finally  pressed  us  so 
warmly  that  we  were  compelled  to  retire  east  of  Danville.  Here  the  enemy 
was  again  diiven  back,  and  we  held  our  position  near  the  town. 

Before  day  on  the  13th  I  received  the  following  appointment  and  instruc- 
tions in  a  special  order  from  Greneral  Bragg,  dated  Bryantsville : 

*'  Colonel  Wheeler  is  hereby  appointed  chief  of  cavalry,  and  is  authorized  to  give  orders 
in  the  name  of  the  commanding  general.  He  is  charged  under  Major-General  Smith  with 
covering  the  rear  of  the  army  and  holding  the  enemy  in  check.  All  cavahy  will  report  to  him 
and  receive  his  orders." 

Compliance  with  the  above  of  course  involved  considerable  fighting,  but  by 
using  the  cavalry  to  the  best  advantage,  and  adopting  available  expedients, 
the  movement  of  our  infantry  and  trains  in  retreat  was  unmolested.  These 
engagements  were  constant,  and  were  often  warmly  and  bitterly  contested. 

The  large  trains  of  captured  stores  made  the  progress  of  our  infantry  very 
slow,  and  the  corps  commanders  sent  frequent  admonitions  to  me  urging  the 


BRAGG' S  INVASION  OF  KENTUCKY. 


19 


importance  of  persistent  resistance  to  Buell's  advance.  In  crossing  Big  Hill, 
and  at  other  points,  the  trains  hardly  averaged  five  miles  a  day,  and  General 
Kirby  Smith  at  one  time  regarded  it  as  impossible  for  the  cavahy  to  save 
them.  In  his  letter  to  Bragg,  on  the  14th,  he  says :  "  I  have  no  hope  of  saving 
the  whole  of  my  train  " ;  and  in  his  letter  on  the  15th  he  says :  "  I  have  little 
hope  of  saving  any  of  the  trains,  and  fear  much  of  the  artillery  wiU  Ije 
lost."  But  fortunately  nothing  was  lost.  Our  cavalry  at  times  dismounted 
and  fought  behind  stone  fences  and  hastily  erected  rail  breastworks,  and  when 
opportunity  offered  charged  the  advan- 
cing enemy.  Each  expedient  was  adopted 
several  times  each  day,  and  when  practi- 
cable the  road  was  obstructed  by  felling 
timber.  These  devices  were  continually 
resorted  to  until  the  22d,  when  the  enemy 
ceased  the  pursuit,  and  early  in  Novem- 
ber the  cavalry  force,  which  covered  the 
retreat  from  Kentucky,  reached  middle 
Tennessee  and  was  close  to  the  enemy, 
less  than  ten  miles  south  of  Nashville. 

The  campaign  was  over.  Buell  was 
deprived  of  his  command  for  not  having 
defeated  Bragg,  who,  in  turn,  was  cen- 
sured by  the  Southern  people  for  his 
failure  to  destroy  the  Federal  army  com- 
manded by  Buell. 


*=^, 


This  campaign  was  made  at  a  time 


MAJOR-GENERAL  B.  F.  CHEATHAM,  C.  S.  A. 
FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


when  the  opposing  Grovernments  hoped 

for  more  from  their  generals  and  armies  than  could  reasonably  be  accom- 
plished. The  people  of  the  South  were  misinformed  regarding  the  resoui'ces 
at  the  disposal  of  Generals  Bragg  and  Kirby  Smith,  and  oiu'  fii'st  successes 
aroused  expectations  and  hopes  that  the  Kentucky  movement  would  result 
in  the  defeat,  or  at  least  the  discomfiture,  of  Buell's  army,  the  possible  inva- 
sion of  the  North,  and  certainly  the  recovery  of  Confederate  power  in  the  cen- 
tral and  eastern  portions  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee.  They  were  sorely 
disappointed  when  they  heard  of  General  Bragg's  "svithdrawal  through  Cum- 
berland Gap,  and  could  not  easily  be  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  such  a 
movement  immediately  following  the  battle  of  Perryville,  which  they 
regarded  as  a  decisive  victory.  The  censure  which  fell  upon  Bragg  was 
therefore  severe  and  almost  universal.  It  somewhat  abated  after  the  prompt 
advance  of  the  army  to  Murfreesboro' ;  but  to  this  day  there  are  many  who 
contend  that  Bragg  should  have  defeated  Buell  and  maintained  himseh'  in  the 
rich  and  productive  plains  of  Kentucky.  On  the  other  hand  the  Federal 
Government  was,  if  possible,  more  severe  in  denunciation  of  General  Buell, 
and  held  that,  fcir  from  allowing  General  Bragg  to  cross  the  Tennessee  River 
and  the  mountains  into  middle  Tennessee,  Buell  should  have  anticipated  these 
movements,  occupied  Chattanooga,  and,  as  some  even  contended,  inarched 


20  BRAGG 'S  INK4SI0N  OF  KENTUCKY. 

his  army  toward  Atlanta.  The  Government  was  convinced  that  he  could 
easily  have  met  and  halted  Bragg  as  he  debouched  from  the  mountains  before 
entering  middle  Tennessee.  It  was  emphatic  in  its  assertion  that  ordinary 
celerity  on  the  part  of  General  Buell  would  have  saved  Munford\dlle  and  its 
garrison  of  4'200  men ;  that  proper  concentration  would  have  destroyed  the 
Confederate  forces  at  Perryville,  and  that  the  plainest  principles  of  strategy 
presented  the  opportunity  of  throwing  forward  a  column  to  cut  off  Bragg's 
retreat  via  Camp  Dick  Robinson,  or  that  at  least  after  the  commencement  of 
the  conflict  at  Perryville  he  should  have  pressed  close  to  his  antagonist  and 
forced  Bragg  to  continuous  battle,  contending,  as  they  did,  that  superior  num- 
bers and  proximity  to  his  base  gave  the  Federal  commander  advantages 
that,  if  properly  improved,  would  have  resulted  in  the  destruction  of  the 
Confederate  army. 

Buell's  strategy  and  tactics  were  the  subject  of  Congressional  investigation 
and  inquiry  by  a  military  commission.  With  regard  to  the  adverse  criticisms 
on  Bragg's  campaign  it  must  be  admitted  that  there  were  opportunities,  had 
they  been  improved,  to  cripple,  if  not  to  defeat,  the  Federal  army. 

The  failure  to  "  concentrate  and  attack "  tells  the  story  of  the  campaign. 
The  first  opportunity  was  on  September  18th,  when  we  caught  Buell  south  of 
Munfordville.  Bragg  could  not  have  attacked  at  Altamont,  because  it  will  be 
remembered  that  on  August  30th,  at  the  first  appearance  of  our  cavalry,  the 
Federal  force  retreated  from  that  place  down  the  mountain.  Neither  could 
he  have  overtaken  Buell's  troops  at  McMinnville,  because,  fully  three  days 
before  Bragg  could  have  reached  that  place,  Buell  had  ordered  all  his  army 
to  Murfreesboro'. 

Those  who  contend  that  Bragg  should  have  followed  Buell  to  Nashville  do 
not  consider  that  he  would  have  found  him  in  a  good  position,  strengthened 
by  fortifications,  and  defended  by  9  divisions  of  infantry  and  1  of  cavalry; 
his  available  force  for  duty  then  being  66,595. 

After  the  surrender  of  the  Federal  fort  at  Munfordville,  it  became  painfully 
apparent  that  a  single  mind  should  control  the  Confederate  troops  in  Ken- 
tucky, and  concentrate  our  entire  force  and  attack  the  divided  enemy ;  but  a 
condition  existed  which  has  been  repeated  in  military  operations  for  four 
thousand  years,  and  always  with  disastrous  results.  The  troops  in  Kentucky 
had  two  commanders.  The  troops  of  two  different  departments  were  expected 
to  cooperate. 

Both  Kirby  Smith  and  Bragg  were  brave  and  skillful  generals.  The 
devotion  of  each  to  the  cause  in  which  they  were  enlisted  was  absolute,  and 
their  only  amlntion  was  to  contribute  to  its  success.  In  their  characters  the 
pettiness  of  personal  rivalry  could  find  no  place,  and  either  would  willingly 
have  relinquished  to  the  other  the  honor  of  being  the  victor,  if  the  victory 
could  only  have  been  won. 

It  will  be  remembered  how  promptly,  in  the  preceding  June,  General  Bragg 
had  weakened  his  own  army  and  strengthened  Smith's  by  sending  McCown's 
division  from  Tupelo  to  Chattanooga,  and  again  in  August  by  sending  the 
brigades  of  Cleburne  and  Preston   Smith  from  Chattanooga  to  Knoxville; 


BRAGG' S  INK4SI0N  OF  KENTUCKY. 


PEARTRFE,    OM      II I  M   1  I  I  >     ^  I    M  -    < 'I  1        \1     I 
ROUSSLVt    >    lO-UloN,   1  1  KUWll  I  1         1 
PHOTOGRAPH   TAKEN    IN    18«o 


SPKrsG  >r  \n  vru\  ^  \  ii  1 1     w  iik  ii  in  i 

lO    REIILVI      BllVO(    b     I'VUCllLD      VKM\ 
I  ROM  A    PHOTOGRAPH  TAKFX  IN  1885. 

and  again,  when  Smith  was 
pressed  at  Frankfort,  that 
Bragg  reenf  orced  him  prompt- 
ly with  one  of  his  best  divi- 
sions. That  Kirby  Smith 
would,  at  any  time,  have  been 
as  ready  and  prompt  to  give 
Bragg  any  part  or  all  of  his 
army  there  can  be  no  doubt, 
but  when  the  decisive  moment 
came,  the  two  independent 
armies  were  more  than  one 
hundi-ed  miles  apart,  and  neither  commander  could  be  informed  of  the  other's 
necessities.  Bragg  and  Smith  conferred  together,  but  neither  commanded  the 
other.  If  all  the  troops  had  belonged  to  one  army,  Bragg  would  have  ordered, 
and  not  conferred  or  requested. 

To  aggravate  the  difficulties  inherent  in  the  system  of  independent 
commands  and  divided  responsibility,  Brigadier-Greneral  Marshall,  who  had 
commanded  in  West  Virginia,  appeared  upon  the  field  of  active  opemtions 
with  2150  men.  He  was  an  able  and  distinguished  man  and  determined 
in  his  devotion  to  the  Confederac^y.  He  wished  to  do  his  full  duty,  but  he 
appeared  to  feel  that  he  could  render  more  efficient  service  with  a  separate 
command  than  if  trammeled  by  subordination  to  a  superior  commander-; 
and  his  aversion  to  having  any  intervening  power  between  himself  and  the 
President  was  apparent. 

While  G-eneral  Smith  was  anxious  to  cooperate,  he  nevertheless,  in  reply 
to  Bragg's  request  for  cooperation,  wrote  indicating  very  forcibly  that  he 
thought  other  plans  were  more  important ;  and,  in  fact,  the  only  cooperative 
action  during  the  campaign  was  Bragg's  compliance  aWHi  Smitli's  request  to 


22  BRAGG' S  INVASION  OF  KENTUCKY. 

transfer  to  him  two  brigades  on  August  5th,  and  to  transfer  Withers's  division 
to  him  on  October  7th. 

In  reply  to  the  question  as  to  what  one  supreme  commander  could  have 
done,  I  confidently  assert  he  could  have  concentrated  and  attacked  and 
beaten  Buell  on  September  18th  south  of  Munfordville.  He  could  then  have 
turned  and  marched  to  Louisville  and  taken  that  city.  If  it  should  be  argued 
that  this  plan  involved  unnecessary  marching  on  the  part  of  Kirby  Smith, 
who  was  then  at  Lexington,  a  supreme  commander  could  have  adopted  the 
one  which  was  contemplated  by  Bragg  early  in  the  campaign.  \ 

After  the  surrender  of  Munfordville  he  could  by  September  21st  have 
reached  Louisville  with  all  the  force  in  Kentucky,  taken  the  city,  and  then 
risked  its  being  held  by  a  small  garrison,  while  making  another  concentra- 
tion and  attack  upon  Buell. 

As  an  evidence  of  how  easily  we  could  have  taken  Louisville,  it  must  be 
observed  that  on  September  22d  Buell  sent  Major-General  Nelson  orders 
containing  these  words : 

"  If  you  have  only  the  force  you  speak  of  it  would  not,  I  should  say,  be  advisable  for  you  to 
attempt  a  defense  of  Louisville  unless  you  are  strongly  intrenched ;  under  no  circumstances 
should  you  make  a  fight  with  his  whole  or  main  force.  The  alternative  would  be  to  cross  the 
river  or  march  on  this  side  to  the  mouth  of  Salt  River  and  bridge  it  so  as  to  form  a  junction 
with  me.     .     .     . " 

Nelson  seemed  to  concur  with  Buell,  and  it  was  not  until  that  officer  was 
but  a  day's  march  from  Louisville  that  Nelson  telegraphed  the  fact  to  General 
Wright,  saying,  "  Louisville  is  now  safe ;  '  Grod  and  Liberty.' " 

In  further  corroboration  of  this,  "  Harper's  History,"  p.  311,  says  : 

"  Just  before  the  Federal  army  entered  Louisville,  on  the  25th  of  September,  the  panic  there 
had  reached  its  height.     In  twenty -foui*  hours  more  Nelson  would  have  abandoned  the  city." 

But  sui^pose  neither  plan  had  been  adopted,  the  next  chance  for  a  supreme 
commander  of  the  Kentucky  forces  was  to  "concentrate  and  attack"  Buell's 
flank  while  his  army  was  strung  out  en  route  to  Louisville.  Elizabethtown 
would  have  been  a  good  place,  and  had  it  been  done  with  vigor  about 
September  23d  it  certainly  would  have  resulted  in  victory.  But  at  this  time 
General  Smith's  forces  were  all  moving  to  Mount  Sterling,  130  miles  to  the 
east  of  that  place  (Elizabethtown),  and  General  Smith  was  asking,  not  order- 
ing. General  Marshall  to  cooperate  with  him.  The  next  field  upon  which  a 
supreme  commander  had  an  opportunity  to  concentrate  and  attack  was 
at  Perryville.  Three  hundred  cavalry  could  have  played  with  Generals 
Sill  and  Diimont  around  Frankfort,  and  every  other  soldier,  except  a  few 

\  On  the   1st  of  August   General   Bragg  wrote  the  fairest  prospect  of  cutting  off  General  Buell." 

from  Chattanooga  to   Eichmond :    "As  some  ten  On  the  12  th  Bragg  wrote  to  Smith,  at  Knoxvillo, 

days  or  two  weeks  must  elapse  before  my  means  as  follows:    "On    Friday   I  shall   probably  com- 

of  transportation  will  reach  here  to  sucli  extent  as  mence  crossing  the  river  [Tennessee],  by  which  I 

to  enable  mo  to  take  the  field  with  ray  main  force,  shall  draw  their  attention  from  you.  ...  I  shall  not 

it  has  been  determined  that  General  Smitli  shall  desire  to  hold  you  longer  in  check  than  will  enable 

move  at  once  against  General  [G.  W.]  Morgan  in  me  to  get  in  motion  to  support  you,  for  it  would  be 

front  of  Cumberland  Gap.     Shoidd  he  be  success-  too  great  a  risk  to  allow  Buell,  by  rapid  railroad 

ful,  and  our  well-grounded  hopes  fulfilled,  our  en-  movements,  to  get  in  your  front.     In  the  meantime 

tire  force  will  be  thrown  into  middle  Tennessee  with  I  hope  you  will  bring  Morgan  to  terms."—  Editors. 


BRAGG 'S  INVASION  OF  KENTUCKY. 


23 


scouts,  could  then  have  struck  Clilbert's  corps  as  day  dawned  on  the  8th 
of  October. 

Since,  in  the  final  result,  we  neither  defeated  Buell  nor  took  Louis^dlle,  it 
is  now  evident  that  it  was  unfortunate  Bragg  did  not  foresee  the  end  imme- 
diately after  his  victory  at  Munfordville,  He  could  certainly  have  crippled 
Buell  to  some  extent  as  he  attempted  his  hazardous  flank  movement  en  route 
to  Louisville,  and  then,  by  a  rapid  march,  he  could  have  reached  and 
captm-ed  Nashville  and  relurned  and  established  himself  at  Bowling  Green. 

I  have  pointed  out  these 
lost  opportunities  as  an 
additional  proof  of  the 
adage,  as  old  as  war  itself, 
"that  one  bad  general  is 
better  than  two  good  ones." 
The  very  fact  that  both  the 
generals  are  good  intensi- 
fies the  evil;  each,  full  of 
confidence  in  himself  and 
determined  to  attain  what 
he  has  in  view,  is  unwilling 
to  jdeld  to  any  one  ;  but  if 
both  are  weak  the  natural 
indisposition  of  such  men 
to  exertion,  their  anxiety  to 
avoid  responsibility,  and 
their  desire  in  a  great  crisis 
to  lean  on  some  one,  will 
frequently  bring  about  the 
junction  of  two  independ- 
ent armies  without  any 
deliberately  planned  concert  of  action  between  the  commanders.  Both 
Bragg  and  Kirby  Smith  were  men  who  had,  to  an  eminent  degree,  those 
qualities  that  make  good  generals,  and,  once  together  with  their  armit\'<  upon 
the  same  field,  victory  would  have  been  certain.  Both  fully  appreciated  the 
fact  that,  when  an  adversary  is  not  intrenched,  a  determined  attack  is  the 
beginning  of  victory.  By  this  means  Smith  had  been  \dctorious  at  Manassas 
and  at  Richmond,  Ky.,  and  by  ^dgorous  attack  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  and 
Bragg  had  won  at  every  point  of  battle  at  Sliiloh,  on  the  Cth  of  April.  Later, 
the  Confederate  points  of  attack  were  Bragg's  scene  of  \nctory  the  first  day  at 
Murfreesboro',  and  the  boldness  of  his  onset  gave  Bragg  his  great  triumph 
at  Chickamauga.  Nothing  was  therefore  wanting  in  Kentucky  but  absolute 
authority  in  one  responsible  commander.  Cooperation  of  the  most  cordial 
character  is  a  poor  substitute.  The  word  cooperation  should  be  stricken  from 
military  phraseology. 

Li  writing  to  the  Government  on  August  1st,  aftei-  he  had  met  (Jeneral 
Smith,  General  Bragg  says  :  "  We  have  arranged  measures  for  mutual  sup- 


corner   OF  THE   CONFEDERATE   CEMETERY   AT   PERRTVILLE. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH    TAKEN    IN    1886. 

The  cemetery  is  situated  on  a  knoU  a  few  rods  south-east  of  the  hill  on 
which  General  J.  S.  Jackson  was  killed.  After  the  battle  Squire  Henry 
P.  Bottom  oflered  the  friends  of  the  Confederates  any  plot  of  sroimd 
they  might  choose  on  his  farm  for  a  burial  spot.  They  chose  this  knoll 
because  their  dead  lay  thickest  near  its  eastern  slope.  In  the  autumn 
of  1886  a  fragment  of  a  lime-stone  wall  was  visible  above  the  weeds.  At 
that  time  Squire  Botton>  said  that  435  Confederates  were  buried  hero, 
of  whom  about  100  were  identified.  Only  one  headstone  was  to  be  found, 
and  that  lioic  tlie  name  of  Samuel  H.  Ransom,  of  the  1st  Tenn.,  and 
was  placed  there  by  his  wife.  Several  offlcers  were  buried  with  the 
unidentiticd  dead.—  EDITORS. 


BRAGG 'S  INVASION  OF  KENTUCKY. 


25 


DEFENSE    UE 


CLAUiEKLANO    KIVEli, 
FROM    A    LITHOGllAPH. 


According  to  a  note  on  the  lithograph,  a  detach- 
ment of  Morfraii'8  cavalry,  and  of  infantry,  approached 
Cage's  Ford  at  daybreak  of  November  21,  18G2,  hoiiiiig 
to  surprise  the  31st  Ohio  regiment,  which  had  been  en- 
camped on  the  south  side  of  the  Cumberland.  Finding 
that  the  Union  troops  had  changed  their  camp  to  the 


north  side,  the  Confederates  threw  shells  from  two  12- 
pouuder  howitzers  until  tlieir  cannoneers  were  driven 
from  the  pieces  b.\-  the  musketry  tire  of  the  Ohioaus, 
under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Lister,  three  of  -whom  were 
wounded.  The  Confederates  made  no  serious  attempt 
to  cross,  and  soon  withdrew.—  Editors. 


port  and  effective  cooperation."  On  August  8th  Bragg  writes  to  Smith:  "  I 
find  myself  in  your  department ;  without  explanation  this  might  seem  an 
unjustifiable  intrusion."  While  it  is  no  doubt  true  that  General  Smith  was 
at  all  times  willing  to  yield  to  the  authority  of  General  Bragg,  yet  the  fact 
that  Smith  was  the  commander  of  an  independent  department,  receiving 
orders  from  and  reporting  directly  to  the  President,  made  him  prhnarily 
responsible  to  the  Executive,  and  this  limited  the  authority  of  General  Bragg. 
Nevertheless  the  Kentucky  campaign  was  attended  with  great  results  to  the 
Confederacy.  Two  months  of  marches  and  battle  by  the  armies  of  Bragg  and 
Smith  had  cost  the  Federals  a  loss  in  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners  of  2(v')o0. 
We  had  captured  35  cannon,  16,000  stand  of  arms,  millions  of  rounds  of 
ammunition,  1700  mules,  300  wagons  loaded  with  military  stores,  and  'JOOO 
horses.  We  had  recovered  Cumberland  Gap  and  redeemed  middle  Ten- 
nessee and  north  Alabama.  Yet  expectations  had  been  excited  that  were 
not  realized,  and  hopes  had  been  cherished  that  were  disappointed;  and 
therefore  this  campaign  of  repeated  triumi»hs,  without  a  single  reverse, 
has  never  received — save  from  the  thougliirul,  intelligent,  and  inii)artial 
minority — any  proper  recognition. 


MORGAN'S    CAVALRY    DURING   THE   BRAGG    INVASION. 

BY    BASIL   W.    DUKE,    BRIGADIER-GENERAL,     C.    S.   A. 


"T'TT^HILE  Bragg  was   concentrating   at   Chatta- 

VV  nooga,  in  August,  1862,  preparatory  to  his 
march  iuto  Kentucky,  Colonel  John  H.  Morgan, 
with  his  cavalry  command,  numbering  some  nine 
hundred  effectives,  was  actively  engaged  in  middle 
Tennessee,  operating  chiefly  against  the  Federal 
garrisons  in  the  vicinity  of  Nashville,  and  the 
detachments  employed  immediately  north  and  to 
the  east  of  that  city.  All  of  these  were  successively 
captured  or  dispersed,  and  on  the  21st  of  August 
Morgan  defeated  and  completely  routed  a  select 
body  of  cavalry,  twelve  hundred  strong,  sent  under 
command  of  General  R.  W.  Johnson  to  drive  him 
out  of  Tennessee.  Of  this  force  164  were  killed 
and  wounded,  and  a  much  larger  number,  includ- 
ing Johnson  and  his  staff,  were  made  prisoners. 

Morgan  had  been  notified  of  the  intended  inva- 
sion of  Kentucky,  and  part  of  his  duty  was  the 
destruction  of  the  railroad  track  and  bridges 
between  Nashville  and  Bowling  Green,  for  the 
purpose  of  retarding  Buell's  movements  when  the 
latter  should  begin  his  retreat  to  Louisville. 

On  the  28  th  of  August  Bragg  crossed  the  Ten- 
nessee River  at  Chattanooga,  and  pushed  north- 
ward. General  Kirby  Smith  had  previously  entered 
Kentucky,  and  had  ordered  Morgan  to  report  to 
him  at  Lexington,  in  the  blue-grass  region.  Mor- 
gan marched  from  Hartsville,  Tenn.,  on  the  29th 
of  August,  and  on  the  4th  of  September  reached 
Lexington,  already  occupied  by  General  Smith. 
His  command  consisted  of  the  2d  Kentucky  Cav- 
alry C.  S.  A.,  about  700  strong,  and  Gano's  squad- 
ron, of  2  companies  of  Texan  cavalry,  about  150 
strong.  It  was  vex'y  largely  recruited,  however, 
during  the  occupation  of  Kentucky.  A  small 
detachment  of  the  2d  Kentucky,  leaving  Lexing- 
ton on  the  same  day,  made  a  rapid  march  of  some 
90  miles,  and  captured  the  garrison,  150  strong, 
of  the  stockade  fort  erected  for  the  protection  of 
the  railroad  bridge  over  Salt  River,  17  miles 
south  of  Louisville.  The  bridge  was  burned  in 
pursuance  of  the  programme  to  destroy  rail  com- 
munication between  Bowling  Green  and  Louis- 
ville. By  order  of  General  Smith,  the  command 
was  then  divided  for  separate  service.  I  was 
ordered  to  proceed  with  600  men  of  the  2d  Ken- 
tucky to  the  vicinity  of  Covington,  whence 
General  Heth,  who  had  threatened  Cincinnati, 
was  then  retiring.  Colonel  Morgan  was  ordered, 
with  the  remainder  of  the  regiment,  Gano's  squad- 
ron, and  all  the  cavalry  recruits  then  organized,  to 
march  to, the  assistance  of  General  Marshall  in  the 
mountains  of  eastern  Kentucky,  The  Federal 
general,  George  \V.  Morgan,  had  evacuated  Cum- 
berland Gap,  and  followed  by  Stevenson,  who  had 
been  instructed  to  observe  and  pursue  liim  if  he 
moved,  was  making  his  way  to  the  Ohio.  It  was 
intended  that  Marshall  and  Morgan  should  inter- 
cept and  arrest  his  niarcli  until  Stevenson  could 
overtake  him  and  attack  him  in  rear. 

The  detachment  under  my  command  became 


immediately  very  actively  engaged  with  the  enemy, 
who,  in  considerable  numbers,  had  crossed  the 
river  and  advanced  to  Walton,  twenty-five  miles 
south  of  Covington.  For  several  days,  skirmishing 
went  on  constantly,  and  I  was  steadily  driven 
back,  until  I  became  convinced  that  it  was  an 
advance  in  force.  Discovering,  however,  by  care- 
ful reconnoissance  that  the  entire  Federal  strength 
consisted  of  only  7000  or  8000  infantry,  about 
1000  cavalry,  and  8  pieces  of  artillery,  and  that 
troops  were  being  transported  in  large  numbers 
by  the  river  from  Cincinnati,  I  became  satisfied 
that  the  movement  was  intended  to  cover  and 
divert  attention  from  the  real  concentration  at 
Louisville,  and  was  not  meant  as  a  serious  move- 
ment on  Lexington,  and  I  so  reported  to  General 
Smith.  Reports  fi'om  my  scouts  and  from  citizens, 
to  the  effect  that  these  troops  were  quite  raw  and 
inexperienced,  and  that,  on  account  of  the  omission 
to  scout  or  reconnoiter,  the  encampment  at  Wal- 
ton, where  the  enemy  had  halted,  could  be  easily 
approached,  induced  me  to  attack  the  camp.  By 
a  quick  dash  upon  it,  just  after  daybreak,  I  secured 
90  or  100  prisoners,  with  very  little  loss  on  my 
part ;  but  found  that  no  effort  by  a  force  numer- 
ically so  inferior  could  compel  the  enemy  to  retire. 
It  was  important,  however,  that  his  column 
should  be  forced  to  fall  back  and  not  remain  as  a 
menace  to  Lexington,  whence  it  was  distant  only 
two  or  three  days'  march.  I  learned  that  a  regiment 
was  orgaTiized  for  the  Federal  army  out  of  some 
"home  guai"d  "  companies  at  Augusta,  a  small  town 
on  the  Ohio,  about  forty  miles  above  Co\angton.  I 
was  also  informed  that  at  that  season  of  year,  when 
the  river  was  at  a  very  low  stage  of  water,  it  was 
f  ordable  immediately  below  this  place.  Leaving  the 
greater  part  of  my  command  in  front  of  the  enemy 
at  Walton  to  observe  and  follow  him  if  he  retreated, 
I  marched  rapidly  with  250  men  to  Augusta,  be- 
lieving that  the  recruits  there  could  be  captured 
or  dispersed  with  ease,  and  without  loss  on  my 
part,  and  that  I  could  cross  the  river  into  Ohio, 
enter  the  suburbs  of  Cincinnati,  and  induce  such 
consternation  that  the  troops  at  Walton  would  be 
recalled.  On  the  27th  of  September  I  attacked, 
meeting,  however,  with  fierce  resistance.  Two 
small  river  steamers  were  there,  bulwarked  with 
bales  of  hay,  and  each  carrying  a  12-pounder  how- 
itzer. On  these  boats  were,  about  one  hundred  in- 
fantry. The  "  Home  Guards,"  400  or  500  strong, 
were  ensconced  in  the  houses  of  the  little  town.  I 
planted  two  small  howitzers  attached  to  my  com- 
mand on  a  hill  overlooking  the  village,  and  within 
a  half-mile  range  of  the  river.  After  the  exchange 
of  a  few  shots  on  each  side,  the  boats,  with  the 
troops  upon  them,  steamed  off  in  disgraceful  panic. 
I  thought  then  that  the  affair  was  over,  but  when 
I  entered  the  town  I  found  nearly  every  house  a 
fortress,  and  was  met  with  severe  volleys  which  did 
much  damage.  Before  I  could  overcome  the  resist- 
ance of  the  inmates,  I  was  forced  to  burn  some  of 


MORGAN'S  CAl/ALRY  DURING   THE  BRAGG  INVASION. 


27 


I 

i 


the  houses,  storm  many  others,  and  even  double- 
sliot  the  small  tield-pieces  aud  fire  them  point-blauk 
from  the  street  into  some  whose  defenders  were 
unusually  stubborn.  The  hand-to-hand  fighting  in 
this  little  skirmish  was  the  fiercest  lever  saw.  In 
many  instances  when  the  firing  from  the  windows 
was  stopped  by  the  volleys  poured  into  them  from 
the  streets,  the  inmates  still  refused  to  surrender, 
and  the  details  of  my  men  who  broke  down  tlie  doors 
and  entered  were  compelled  to  kill  all  they  found 
inside.  Captain  S.  D.  Morgan  killed  seven  men 
with  his  own  hand,  and  was  himself  killed  before 
the  house  he  entered  was  taken.  In  some  houses  I 
saw  blood  dripping  down  the  stairways. 

My  loss  was  21  men  killed  aud  IS  wounded.  A 
very  much  larger  number  of  the  "  Home  Guards  " 
was  killed,  and  I  carried  off  between  300  and  400 
prisoners.  The  combat  lasted  not  more  than  fif- 
teen minutes  after  I  entered  the  town;  but  my 
loss,  the  number  of  prisoners,  and  especially  the 
fact  that  I  had  nearly  exhausted  my  ammunition, 
decided  me  not  to  cross  the  Ohio  and  carry  out  the 
movement  on  Cincinnati  I  had  contemplated.  I 
knew,  also,  that  500  or  600  Federal  troops  at  Mays- 
ville,  not  far  distant,  would  be  ordered  immediately 
to  Augusta,  and  that  my  return  by  that  point  would 
be  intercepted.  On  the  next  morning  I  was  at- 
tacked at  Brookvill  e  by  these  troops,  under  Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel H.  B.  Wilson,  nine  miles  from  Augusta ; 
but  the  affair  was  trifling,  the  loss  on  either  side 
slight,  and  I  carried  off  my  prisoners.  Four  or  five 
days  afterward  I  was  ordered  to  return  to  Lex- 
ington. 

Col.  John  H.  Morgan  had  been  sent  to  eastern 
Kentucky,  as  I  have  said,  to  intercept  the  retreat 
of  the  Federal  general,  George  W.  Morgan.  He  did 
not  find  Marshall  in  the  vicinity  where  he  was  in- 
structed to  seek  him,  nor,  indeed,  at  all.  Learning 
that  the  Federal  column  was  moving  from  Man- 
chester via  Booneville  to  Mount  Sterling,  doubtless 
to  reach  the  Ohio  at  Maysville,  Colonel  Morgan  ex- 
pected to  strike  the  enemy  between  Booneville  and 
Mount  Sterling.  But  General  Morgan  concentrated 
at  Irvine  on  the  21st,  and  moved  toward  Proctor. 
The  Confederate  cavalry  then  moved  as  rapidly 
as  the  mountainous  country  permitted,  and  receiv- 
ing further  information  tliat  the  enemy  had  turned 
to  the  right  and  was  at  Carapton,  in  Wolfe  County, 
succeeded  in  getting  directly  iu  his  front  near 
Hazel  Green.  From  the  2r)th  of  September  until 
the  1st  of  October  every  effort  was  made  to  arrest 
or  delay  the  Federal  retreat.  The  roads  were  bar- 
ricaded, the  column  was  attacked  in  front  and 
flank,  and  the  skirmishing  was  contiimous.  Dur- 
ing that  time  the  enemy  progressed  only  thirty 
miles ;  nevertheless,  John  Morgan  received  no  aid 
as  promised  him,  Jior  did  Stevenson  overtake  the 
Federal  commander  and  force  liim  to  battle.  At 
noon,  October  the  1st,  Colonel  Morgan  received 
orders  to  withdraw  from  the  enemy's  front,  and 
rejoin  General  Smith  "  at  Lexington,  or  wherever 
he  might  be."  He  reached  Lexington  on  the  4th 
of  October.  I  reported  to  him  there  the  next  day. 
The  town  was  about  to  be  evacuated,  and  Gen- 
eral Smith's  entire  army,  Stevenson  having  arrived, 
was  marching  to  effect  a  junction  with  Bragg.    Wo 


left  Lexington  on  the  Gth,  and  until  the  10th  were 
employed  in  preventing  the  debouchment  of  Sill's 
and  Dumont's  divisions  (Federal)  from  the  rough 
country  west  of  Frankfort,  where  they  wer(;  demon- 
strating to  induce  Bragg  to  believe  that  Buell's  at- 
tack would  be  delivered  from  that  direction  when 
the  latter  had  in  reality  marched  to  Perryville. 

After  General  Bragg  had  moved  from  Munford- 
ville  to  Bardstown,  the  entire  Confederate  strategic 
line,  including  the  disposition  of  the  forces  under 
General  Smith,  may  be  described  as  extending 
from  Bardstown  on  the  left  flank,  via  Lexington,  to 
Mount  Sterling  on  the  extreme  i-ight.  It  was  one 
admirably  adapted  for  defense.  However  threat- 
ened, the  troops  could  be  marched  to  the  point 
menaced  by  excellent  interior  roads,  and  favorable 
ground  for  battle  was  available  wherever  attack 
was  probable.  The  base  at  Bryantsville  was 
secure,  and  was  an  exceedingly  strong  natural  posi- 
tion. The  aggregate  strength  of  the  Confederate 
armies  was  little,  if  any,  less  than  Gl  ,000  men. 

On  October  1st  Buell  moved  out  of  Louisville 
with  58,000  effective  men,  of  whom  22,000  were 
raw  troops. 

Under  the  impression  that  Buell  was  about  to 
throw  his  entire  army  upon  Smith  at  Frankfort, 
Bragg,  on  the  2d,  ordered  Polk  to  march  with  the 
Army  of  the  Mississippi  from  Bardstown  via  Bloom- 
field  toward  Frankfort  in  order  that  he  might  strike 
the  enemy  in  rear,  while  Kirby  Smith  should  assail 
him  in  front.  Until  the  7th  he  remained  appar- 
ently under  the  impression  that  Buell  was  advan- 
cing to  attack  Smith.  But  on  the  evening  of  the  7th, 
Gilbert,  in  command  of  Buell's  center,  came  in 
contact  with  Hardee  near  Perryville,  and  compelled 
him  to  prepare  for  action.  Hardee  called  for  reen- 
forcements,  and  Cheatham's  division  was  sent  him, 
while  the  remainder  of  Polk's  corps  continued  its 
march  toward  Versailles  with  the  view  of  joining 
the  forces  under  General  Smith. 

It  thus  happened  that  General  Bragg,  completely 
misled  by  the  mere  demonstration  upon  Frankfort, 
kept  more  than  two-thirds  of  the  entire  force  under 
his  control  idly  manoeuvring  in  a  quarter  where 
nothing  could  possibly  be  accomplished,  and  per- 
mitted less  than  20,000  men  to  become  engaged 
upon  afield  where  more  than  45,000  of  the  enemy 
could  have  been  hm-led  upon  them.  Buell's  whole 
army  (with  the  exception  of  the  di%isions  of  Sill 
and  Dumont  — together  10,0(tOor  12,000  strong) 
was  concentrated  at  Perryville  on  the  8th,  and  but 
for  the  unaccountable  circumstance  that  McCook 
had  been  fighting  several  hours  before  Buell  was 
informed  that  a  T)attle  was  in  progress,  the  Con- 
federate line  would  have  been  overwhelmed  by  an 
attack  in  force.  If  such  had  been  the  result  at 
Perryville  on  the  Sth,  and  Buell  liad  then  gotten 
between  the  scattered  remnants  of  the  troojis 
that  opposed  liiju  tlun-e,  as  he  would  almost 
surely  liave  done,  he  would  have  been  master  of 
the  situation,  and  nothing  but  disaster  could  liave 
befallen  the  Confederates.  For  on  the  0th  Sill 
and  Dumont  were  marching  to  rejoin  tlie  main 
body,  and  in  another  day  Bu(dl  coidd  have  had  his 
entire  58,000  — minus  the  loss  sustained  in  the 
battle  —  well  in  hand. 


28 


MORGAN'S  CAyALRY  DURING   THE  BRAGG  INVASION. 


After  Perryville,  Morgan  was  ordered  to  rejoin 
tlie  army,  when  everytliing  was  concentrated  at 
Harrodsburg,  as  if  for  a  battle  which  General 
Bragg  couhl  have  won  but  never  meant  to  fight. 
When  the  army,  leaving  Harrodsburg,  without 
battle,  began  its  retreat  to  Tennessee,  Morgan, 
assisted  by  Col.  Henry  Ashby  with  a  small  brigade 
of  cavalry,  was  employed  in  covering  its  rear. 
This  rear-guard  was  engaged  very  arduously,  and 
almost  constantly,  in  contact  with  Buell's  advance 
regiments  until  the  I7th.  At  that  date  Morgan 
received  permission  to  retrace  his  march,  capture 
Lexington,  which  was,  of  course,  in  the  hands  of 
the  enemy,  and  then  move  southward,  directly 
across  Buell's  rear,  doing  the  latter  all  possible 
damage.  Marching  rapidly  for  twenty-four  hours, 
he  reached  Lexington  at  dawn  of  the  following 
morning,  and  immediately  attacked  the  4th  Ohio 
Cavalry,  which  was  encamped  at  Ashland  —  once  the 
residence  of  Henry  Clay  —  about  two  miles  from 
the  city.  The  enemy  was  defeated  after  a  short 
combat,  and  nearly  six  hundred  were  made  prison- 
ers. The  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  on  either  side 
was  slight.  Resuming  his  march  at  noon  that 
day,  Morgan  encamped  on  the  following  night  at 
Shryoek's  ferry  on  the  Kentucky  River.  At  mid- 
night he  was  attacked  by  Dumont,  and  fearing 
that  be  would  be  surrounded  and  entrapped  in  the 
rugged  hills  of  that  region,  he  marched  with  all 
speed  for  Lawrenceburg,  four  miles  distant,  reach- 
ing and  passing  through  that  little  town  just  as  a 
heavy  Federal  column,  sent  to  intercept  him  there, 
was  entering  it  upon  the  Frankfort  turnpike.  Pass- 
ing around  Bardstown  on  the  next  day,  we  encamped 
between  that  place  and  Elizabethtown.  We  were 
now  directly  in  Buell's  rear,  and  during  the  next 
twenty-four hoiu's  capturedmauy  laggards,  and  sev- 
eral wagon  trains  —  one  quite  lai-ge  and  richly  laden. 

From  the  20th  to  the  25th  of  October  Morgan 
continued  to  march  in  a  south-western  direction, 
reaching  Hopkinsville  on  the  25th.  Here  he  had 
entirely  passed  beyond  the  zone  of  Federal  garri- 
sons in  middle  Kentucky,  but  still  had  arduous  work 
before  him  in  Tennessee  and  in  front  of  Nashville, 
whither  Bucll,  having  turned  aside  from  pursuit 
of  Bragg  through  the  mountains  of  south-eastern 
Kentucky,  was  now  directing  his  course.  After  a 
short  sojourn  at  Hopkinsville  for  much-needed  rest. 
Colonel  Morgan  moved  directly  to  Gallatin,  Ten- 
nessee, with  a  view  of  completing  the  dostruetion 
of  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  Railroad  in  that 
vicinity,  and  to  that  extent  impeding  the  transpor- 
tation of  troops  and  supplies  to  Nashville.  While 
engaged  in  this  work  lie  received  orders  from  Gen- 
eral John  C.Breckinridge,  who  was  stationed  with 
a  small  infantry  force  at  Murfreesboro',  to  coiip- 
erate  with  Forrest  in  a  movement  intended  to  effect 
the  destruction  of  the  rolling-stock  of  the  Louis- 
ville and  Nashville  Railroad  (Jompany  collected  at 
Edgefield,  on  tlio  bank  of  the  Cumberland  River, 
opposite  Nashville.  It  was  planned  that  Forrest 
should  make  such  a  demonstration  south  of  Nash- 


ville that  the  attention  of  the  garrison  would  be 
attracted,  while  Morgan  should  dash  into  Edgefield 
and  burn  the  cars,  several  hundred  in  number. 

Leaving  Gallatin  on  the  night  of  November  the 
4th,  Morgan  entered  Edgefield  at  daybreak  the 
next  morning,  and  immediately  attacked  the  IGth 
Illinois  and  part  of  another  regiment  stationed 
there.  After  a  sharp  fight  he  drove  this  force  back 
and  obtained  possession  of  the  cars  it  was  intended 
he  should  destroy.  We  heard  Forrest's  artillery 
at  the  same  moment  on  the  other  side  of  the  river. 
But  Nashville  was  so  strongly  fortified  on  that 
side,  and  perhaps,  also,  the  inadequacy  of  the  small 
force  under  Forrest  to  make  any  serious  attempt 
upon  the  place  was  so  apparent,  that  although  he 
advanced  resolutely  upon  the  works,  the  movement 
failed:  a  large  portion  of  the  garrison  was  dis- 
patched to  reenforce  the  detachment  we  had  at- 
tacked; and  before  the  work  of  demolition  was 
fairly  commenced,  a  column  of  infantry  streamed 
at  the  double-quick  over  the  pontoon-bridge,  and 
reenforced  the  troops  with  which  we  were  already 
engaged.  The  fight  grew  too  hot  to  be  maintained 
so  near  to  yet  stronger  hostile  forces,  and  under  the 
heavy  batteries  which  commanded  the  ground  on 
which  we  stood.  Morgan  accoi-dingly  withdrew, 
followed  a  short  distance  by  the  enemy.  Our  loss 
in  killed  and  wounded  was  not  so  heavy  as  the  en- 
emy's, and  we  carried  off  a  few  prisoners.  Only  a 
small  number  of  the  railroad  ears  were  burned,  and 
the  expedition  was  a  failure.  Rosecrans's  army  •j^ 
was  now  close  at  hand,  marching  upon  three  or  four 
roads  leading  into  Nashville,  and  we  were  immedi- 
ately in  it  s  path.  Crittenden's  corps  was  in  advance, 
the  major  part  of  it  marching  on  the  Louisville  and 
Nashville  turnpike.  Morgan  sent  strong  detach- 
ments to  harass  these  troops,  and,  if  possible, 
delay  their  march.  The  leading  division  was  am- 
buscaded near  Tyree  Springs,  and  a  volley  deliv- 
ered at  seventy-five  yards'  range  inflicted  some 
loss.  Similar  attacks  were  kept  up  all  day  on  the 
8th,  but  of  course  the  efforts  of  so  small  a  body 
against  more  than  twenty  thousand  men  were 
merely  annoying.  Early  on  the  morning  of  the 
9th  Wood's  and  Van  Clove's  divisions  moved  into 
and  on  either  flank  of  Gallatin,  nearly  surrounding 
our  people,  who  incautiously  resisted  the  advance 
of  the  central  column  too  long,  thus  necessitating 
brisk  movement  as  well  as  sharp  fighting  to  effect 
an  escape.  That  afternoon  Morgan  crossed  the 
Cumberland  and  encamped  in  a  safe  position  be- 
tween Lebanon  and  Mui-freesboro'.  Morgan's  loss 
diiring  the  entire  campaign,  in  killed  and  wounded, 
was  not  more  than  one  hundred.  He  had  inflicted 
a  much  greater  loss  on  the  enemy,  and  had  capt- 
ured nearly  twelve  hundred  prisoners.  He  had 
entered  Kentucky  with  less  than  900  effectives ; 
his  command  when  he  returned  to  Tennessee  was 
nearly  2000  strong.  It  was  admirably  mounted,  ai;(l 
well  armed,  and  the  recruits  were  fully  the  equals  of 
the  original  "Morgan  IMen,"  in  spirit, intelligence, 
and  capacity  to  endure. 


1^  Ocncral  Buell  was  succocdort  in  the  conuDand  of  OrdovR  of  October  21th  the  Department  of  the  Cum- 
the  trnoi)H  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  by  G('n(>ral  W.  S.  berlanrt  was  croatod,  :m<l  tlio  troops  witliin  it  were 
RoBocrauB  ou  the  30th  day  of  October.    Under  General      designated  the  Fourtceutli  Army  Corps.— Editors. 


THE   OPPOSING   FORCES    AT   PERRYVILLE,    KY., 

October  8th,  18G2. 

The  composition,  lo.ssea,  and  strength  of  each  army  as  licri!  .stated  give  the  gist  of  all  the  data  obtainable  in  the  OfiScial 
Records.    K  stands  for  killed  ;  w  for  wounded ;  in  \v  for  mortally  wounded ;  m  for  captured  or  missing  ;  c  for  captured. 

THE  UNION  FORCES. 

ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO.— Maj.-Gen.  Don  Carlos  Bucll;  Maj.-Gen:  George  H.  Thomas,  second  in  command. 


Escort:  Anderson  (Pa.)  Troop,  Lieut. Thomas S.  Maple; 
4th  U.  8.  Cav.  (6  GO'S),  Lieut.-Col.  James  Oakes.  E.s- 
cort  loss  :  m,  1.  Unattached :  7th  Pa.  Cav.  {i  co's),  Maj. 
John  E.  Wyukoop.    Loss  :  w,  4;  m,  3  =  7. 

FIRST  ARMY  CORPS,  Maj.-Gen.  Alexander  McD. 
McCook. 

THIRD  DIVISION,  Brig -Gen.  Lovell  H.  Rousseau.    StaflT 
loss :  m,  1. 

Ninth  Brigade,  Col.  Leonard  A.  Harri.s:  38th  Ind.,  Col. 
Benjamin  F.  Scribner;  2d  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  John  Kell; 
33d  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  Oscar  F.  Moore  (w  and  c),  Maj.  Fred- 
erick J.  Look ;  94th  Ohio,  Col.  Joseph  W.  Frizell ;  10th 
Wis.,  Col.  Alfred  R.  Chapin;  5th  Ind.  Battery,  Capt. 
Peter  Simonson.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  121 ;  w,  419  ;  m,  51  =  591. 
Seventeenth  Brigade,  Col.  William  H.  Lytle  (w  and  c), 
CoL  Curran  Pope  (m  w) :  42d  Ind.,  Col.  James  G.  Jones ; 
88th  Ind.,  Col.  George  Humphrey;  15th  Ky.,  Col.  Curran 
Pope  ;  3d  Ohio,  Col.  John  Beatty  ;  10th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col. 
Joseph  W.  Burke;  Ist  Mich.  Battery,  Capt.  Cyrus  O. 
Loomis.  Brigade  loss:  k,  193;  w,  606;  m,  23=822. 
Twenty-eighlh  Brigade,  Col.  John  C.  Starkweather:  24th 
111.,  Capt.  August  Mauflf;  79th  Pa.,  Col.  Henry  A.  Ham- 
bright;  1st  Wis.,  Lieut.-Col.  George  B.  Bingham;  21st 
Wis.,  Col.  Benjamin  J.  Sweet;  4th  Ind.  Battery,  Capt. 
Asahel  K.  Bush ;  Ist  Ky.  Battery,  Capt.  David  C.  Stone. 
Brigade  loss:  k,  170;  w,  477;  m,  109  =  756.  Unattached  : 
2d  Ky.  Cav.  (6  co's).  Col.  Buckner  Board ;  A,  C,  and  H,  Ist 
Mich.,  Eng'rs  and  Mech's,  Maj.  Enos  Hopkins.  Unat- 
tached loss  :  w,  18 ;  m,  4  =  22. 

TENTH  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gcn.  James  8.  Jackson  (k).    Staff 
loss:  k,  1, 

Thirty-third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  William  R.  Terrill  (k). 
Col.  Albert  S.  Hall :  80th  111.,  Col.  Thomas  G.  Allen ;  123d 
ni.,  Col.  James  Monroe;  Detachments  7th  and  32d  Ky. 
and  3d  Tenn.,  Col.  Theophilus  T.  Garrard;  105th  Ohio, 
Col.  Albert  S.  Hall;  Parsous's  (improvised)  Battery, 
Lieut.  Charles  C.  Parsons.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  100 ;  w,  336 ; 
m,  91  =  527.  Thirty-fourth  Brigade,  Col.  George  Webster 
(k) :  80th  Ind.,  Lieut.-CoL  Lewis  Brooks  ;  50th  Ohio,  Col. 
Jonah  R.  Taylor,  Lieut.-Col.  Silas  A.  Strickland;  98th 
Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  Christian  L.  Poorman;  121st  Ohio,  Col. 
WiUiam  P.  Reid;  19th  Ind.  Battery,  Capt.  Samuel  J. 
Harris.    Brigade  loss  :  k,  87 ;  w,  346 ;  m,  146  =  579. 

SECOND  ARMY  CORPS,  )  Maj.-Gen.  Thomas  L.  Crit- 
tenden. 
FOURTH  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  William  S.  Smith. 

Tenth  Brigade,  Col.  William  Grose :  84th  111.,  Col.  Louis 
H.  Waters;  36th  Ind.,  Lieut.-Col.  O.  H.  P.  Carey;  23d 
Ky.,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  P.  Jackson;  6th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col. 
Nicholas  L.  Anderson ;  24th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  Frederick 
C.  Jones;  H,  4th  U.  8.  Arfy.  Lieut.  Samuel  Canby  ;  M, 
4th  U.  S.  Art'y,  Capt.  John  Mendenhall.  Nineteenth 
Brigade,  Col.  William  B.  Hazen :  110th  111.,  Col.  Thomas 
8.  Casey;  9th  Ind.,  Col.  William  H.  Blake;  6th  Ky.,  Col. 
Walter  C.  Whitaker;  27th  Ky.,  Col.  C.  D.  Peunobaker; 
4l8t  Ohio.  Lieut.-Col.  George  8.  Mygatt;  F,  1st  Ohio 
Art'y,  Capt.  Daniel  T.  Cockerill.  Twenty-second  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  Charles  Cruft:  31st  Ind.,  Lieut.-Col.  John 
Osborn;  Ist  Ky.,  Lieut.-Col.  David  A.  Enyart;  2d  Ky., 
Col.  Thomas  D.  Sedgwick ;  20th  Ky.,  Lieut.-C(d.  Charles 
8.  Hanson;  90th  Ohio,  Col.  Isaac  N.  Ross;  B,  1st  Ohio 
Art'y,  Capt.  William  E.  Standart.  Cavalry:  2d  Ky. 
(4  co's),  Lieut.-Col.  Thomas  B.  Cochran. 
FIFTH  DIVISION,  Brig.-(ien.  Horatio  P.  Van  Clove. 

Eleventh  Brigade,  Col.  Sanmcl  Beatty :  79th  Ind.,  Col. 


Frederick  Knefler ;  9th  Ky.,  Lieut.-Col.  George  H.  Cram ; 
13th  Ky.,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  B.  Carlile;  19th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col. 
E.  W.  HolUnsworth ;  59th  Ohio,  Col.  James  P.  Fyffe. 
Fourteenth  Brigade,  Col.  Pierce  B.  Hawkins :  44th  Ind., 
Col.  Hugh  B.  Reed;  86th  Ind.,  Col.  Orville  8.  Hamilton  ; 
11th  Ky,  Lieut.-Col.  S.  P.  Love;  2Gth  Ky.,  Col.  Cicero 
Maxwell;  13th  Ohio,  Col.  Joseph  G.  Hawkins.  Tventij- 
third  Brigade,  Col.  Stanley  Matthews:  35th  Ind.,  Col. 
Bernard  F.  Mullen  ;  8th  Ky.,  Col.  Sidney  M.  Barnes;  2l8t 
Ky.,  Col.  S.  Woodson  Price;  5l8t  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col. 
Richard  W.  McClain ;  99th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  John  E. 
Cummins.  Artillery:  7th  Ind.,  Capt.  George  R.  Swallow ; 
B,  Pa.,  Lieut.  Alanson  J.  Stevens;  3d  Wis.,  Capt.  Lucius 
H.  Druiy. 
SIXTH  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Thomas  J.  Wood. 

Fifteenth  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Milo  8.  HascaU:  100th 
111.,  Col.  Frederick  A.  Bartleson;  17th  Ind.,  Lieut.-Col. 
George  W.  Gorman  ;  58th  Ind.,  Col.  George  P.  Buell ;  3d 
Ky.,  Lieut.-Col.  William  T.  Scott;  26th  Ohio,  Msy.  Chris, 
M.  Degenlield ;  8th  Ind.  Battery,  Lieut.  George  Estep. 
Ticentietli  Brigade,  Col.  Charles  G.  Harker:  51st  Ind., 
Col.  Abel  D.  Streight ;  73d  Ind.,  Col.  Gilbert  Hathaway ; 
13th  Mich.,  Lieut.-Col.  Frederick  W.  Worden ;  64th  Ohio, 
Col.  John  Fergu,son;  65th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  William  II. 
Young ;  6th  Ohio  Battery,  Capt.  Cullen  Bradley.  Twenty- 
first  Brigade,  Col.  George  D.  Wagner:  15th  Ind.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Gustavus  A.  Wood  ;  40th  Ind.,  Col.  John  W.  Blake  ; 
57th  Ind.,  Col.  Cyinis  C.  Hiues ;  24th  Ky.,  Col.  Louis  B. 
Grigsby ;  97th  Ohio,  Col.  John  Q.  Lane ;  10th  Ind.  Bat- 
tery, Capt.  Jerome  B.  Cox.  Brigade  loss  (40th  Ind.) : 
w,  2.  Unattached  :  B,  E,  I,  and  K,  Ist  Mich.,  Eng's  and 
Mech's,  Col.  William  P.  Innes;  let  Ohio  Cav.  (detach- 
ment), Miy.  James  Laughlin. 

THIRD  ARMY  CORPS,  Maj.-Gen.  Charles  C.  Gilbert. 
FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Geii.    Albin  Schoepf. 

First  Brigade,  Col.  Moses  B.  Walker:  82d  Ind.,  Col. 
Morton  C.  Hunter;  12th  Ky.,  Col.  William  A.  Iloskins; 
17th  Ohio,  Col.  John  M.  Council ;  3l8t  Ohio.  Lieut.-Col. 
Frederick  W.  Li.'^ter;  38th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  William  A. 
Choate.  Second  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Speed  S.  Fry:  10th 
Ind.,  Col.  William  C.  Kise;  74th  Ind.,  Col.  Charles  W. 
Chapman ;  4th  Ky.,  Col.  John T.  Croxton ;  10th  Ky.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Wilham  H.  Hays;  14th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  (ieorge  P. 
Este.  Brigade  loss:  k,  4;  w,  7  =  11.  Third  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  James  B.  Steedman  :  87th  Ind.,  Col.  Kline  ii. 
Shryock;  2d  Minn.,  Col.  James  George  :  iHli  Ohio,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Charles  .Joseph  ;  35th  Ohio,  Col.  Ferdinand  Van  Der- 
veer  ;  18tli  U.  8.,  Miij.  Frederick  Townsend.  Brigade 
lo.ss:  w,  6;  m,  8  =  14.  Artillery:  4tli  Mich.,  Capt.  Josiah 
W.  Church ;  C,  let  Ohio,  Capt.  Daniel  K.  Southwick ;  I, 
4th  U.  8.,  Lieut.  Frank  G.  Smith.  Artillery  loss:  w,  1. 
Cavalry:  1st  Ohio  idetachment),  Col.  Minor  Milliken. 
NINTH  DIVISION.  Bri^'.-(i«n.  Robert  B.  Mitchell. 

Thirtieth  J{riga<lr.Vo\.  Michael  Gooding:  59th  111..  Mnj. 
Joshua  C.  Winters;  74th  111.,  Lieut.-Col.  James  B.  Kerr; 
75th  111.,  Lieut.-Col.  .Tohn  E.  Bennett:  22d  Ind..  Lieut.- 
Col.  Scpiire  I.  Keith  (k) ;  .^th  Wis.  Battery,  Capt.  Oscar  F. 
Pinnev.  Brigade  loss  :  k.  121 ;  w.  314  ;  m.  61  =  499.  Thir- 
ty-first Brir/ade.  Col.  Wllliani  P.  Carlin  :  21.<t  111..  Col. 
John  W.  8.  Alexander;  38th  111..  Ma.j.  Daniel  II.  (Jilm.r: 
lOlst  Ohio.  C<d.  Leander  Stem:  l.^tli  Wis..  Col.  Hans  C. 
Heg;  2d  Minn.  Battery.  Capt.  Willi;im  \.  Hot<hkiss. 
Brigade  loss  :  w.  10.  Thirly-seroml  lirigadc.  Col.  Williani 
W.  Caldwell :  25th  111..  Lieut.-Col.  James  S.  McClelland; 
35th  111.,  Lieut.-Col.  William  P.  Chandler;    Slst   Iml., 


i  Of  the  operations  „f  this  corps  O.Mier.al  Buell  .says,  in  his  ..lllcial  report  :  "  The  corps  «f  Oenoral  «;ritt'<nden  closed  in.  and 
Wagner's  brigade,  of  WooTs  division,  became  engaged  and  di.l  good  service  on  the  right  of  Mltehell  s  dlvl-sion.  but  knowing 
nothing  of  tlie  severity  of  tlie  light  on  the  extreme  left  the  rest  of  the  corps  did  not  get  into  acUou."  -  t,DlT0W8. 

29 


30 


THE  OPPOSING   FORCES  AT  PERRYl^ILLE,  KY. 


Lieut. -Col.    Jotin    Timlierlake ;    8tli    Kan.    (battalion), 
liieiit.-Col.   John  A.   Martin;     8th   Wis.   Battery,  Capt. 
Stephen  J.  Carpenter.    Cavalry:  B,  3f>tb  111.,  Capt.  Sam- 
uel B.  Sherer. 
ELEVENTH  DIVISION,  Brif,'.-Gon.  Philip  H.  Sheridan. 

Thirty-fifth  Brigade,  Lieut.-Col.  Bernard  Laiboldt :  44th 
111.,  Capt.  Wallace  W.  Barrett ;  73d  111.,  Col.  James  F. 
Jaquess ;  2d  Mo.,  Capt.  Walter  Hoppe  (k) ;  15th  Mo., 
Maj.  John  Weber.  Brigade  loss:  k,  22;  w,J02;  m,  1  = 
12.5.  Thirty-sixth  Brigade,  Col.  Daniel  McCook  :  85th  111., 
Col.  Robert  8.  Moore-  86th  111.,  Col.  David  D.  Irons; 
I25th  111.,  Col.  Oscar  F.  Harmon ;  52d  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col. 
D.  D.  T.  Cowen.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  7  ;  w,  63 ;  m,  9  =  79. 
Thirty-seventh  Brigade,  Col.  Nicholas  Greusel :  36th  lU., 
Capt.  Silas  Miller;  88th  111.,  Col.  Francis  T.  Sherman; 
21st  Mich.,  Col.  Ambrose  A.  Stevens;  24th  Wis.,  Col. 
Charles  n.  Larrabee.  Brigade  loss:  k,  15;  w,  124;  m, 
4  =  143.  Artillery  :  I,  2d  111.,  Capt.  Charles  M.  Barnett; 
G,  1st  Mo.,  Capt.  Henry  Hescock.    Artillery  loss :  w,  3. 

cavalry:  Third  Brigade,  Capt.  Ebenezer  Gay:  9tli 
Ky.  (detachment),  Lieut.-Col.  John  Boyle;  2d  Mich., 
Lieut.-Col.  Archibald  P.  Campbell ;  9th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col. 
Thomas  C.  James.    Cavalry  loss :  k,  4 ;  w,  13  =  17. 

%  In  March,  1888,  General  D.  C.  Buell  wrote  to  the  editors : 
"  Adopting  this  estimate  and  adding  Sill's  Division,  say  7000, 
which  moved  on  the  Frankfort  road  and  did  not  join  until 
after  tlio  battle  (i.  e.,  on  the  11th),  will  make  tlie  entire 
aruiv  01,000  before  the  battle  and  57,000  after.    The  corps 


Total  Union  loss :  killed,  845  ;  wounded,  2851 ;  captured 
or  missing,  515  =  4211. 

The  most  definite  information  afforded  by  the  "  Official 
Records"  relative  to  the  strength  of  the  Union  forces  is 
contained  in  tlie  testimony  given  before  the  Buell  Com- 
mission by  Major  J.  M.  Wright,  assistant  adjutant-gen- 
eral at  Buell's  headquarters.  On  page  660,  Vol.  XVT., 
Part  I.,  ho  says  :  "  After  the  battle  I  do  not  think  there 
were  more  than  fifty  thousand  of  the  army  which  ap- 
peared in  front  of  Perryvllle."  Adding  to  this  number 
the  4000  casualties  sustained  in  the  battle,  would  make 
the  entire  army  at  and  about  Perry viUe  54,000  strong.  3> 
Perhaps  not  over  one-half  of  these  were  actually  en- 
gaged. General  McCook,  commanding  the  First  Corps 
(which  bore  the  brunt  of  the  fight),  says  that  "  Rous- 
seau had  present  on  the  field  7000;  Jackson,  5500;  the 
brigade  of  Gooding  [from  Mitchell's  division  of  Gilbert's 
corps]  amounting  to  about  1.500."  The  strength  of  Crit- 
tenden's (Second)  and  Gilbert's  (Third)  Corps  is  not  any- 
where otHcially  stated.  Crittenden  did  not  reach  the 
field  of  action  until  the  conflict  was  practically  ended, 
and  only  parts  of  Wagner's  and  Hazen's  brigades  of 
Ms  corps  became  slightly  engaged. 

were  of  about  equal  strength.  Gilbert  told  me  recently 
that  he  estimated  his  corps  at  about  18,000  before  the 
battle.  About  one-thirrt  of  the  whole  were  raw  troops. 
Jackson's  division  was  composed  almost  entirely  of  raw 
regiments."  —  EDITOUS. 


THE   CONFEDERATE  FORCES. 
General  Braxton  Bragg. 


ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI :  Major-General  Leonl- 
das  Polk.  Right  WiNG,Maj.-Gen.  Benjamin  F.Cheatham. 
cuKATHAM's  DIVISION,  Brig.-Geu.  Daniel  S.  Donelson. 

First  Brigade,  Col.  John  H.  Savage :  8th  Tenn.,  Col. 
W.  L.  Moore;  15th  Tenn.,  Col.  R.  C.  Tyler;  16th 
Tenn.,  Lieut.-Col.  D.  M.  Donnell ;  38th  Tenn.,  Col.  John 
C.  Carter;  5l8t  Tenn.,  Col.  John  Chester;  Tenn.  Bat- 
tery, Capt.  W.  W.  Carnes.  Brigade  loss:  k,  68;  w,  272; 
m,  7  =  347.  Second  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  A.  P.  Stewart: 
4th  Tenn.,  Col.  O.  F.  Strahl;  5th  Tenn.,  Col.  C.  D.  Ven- 
able;  24th  Tenn.,  Lieiit.-Col.  H.  L.  W.  Brattou;  31st 
Tenn.,  Col.  E.  E.  Tansil;  33d  Tenn.,  Col.  W.  P.  Jones; 
Miss.  Battery,  Capt.  T.  J.  Stanford.  Brigade  loss :  k, 
62;  w,  340;  m,  26  =  428.  Third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen. 
George  Maney:  4l8t  Ga.,  Col.  Charles  A.  McDaniel  (w), 
Maj.  John  Knight;  IstTenn.,  Col.  H.  R.  Field;  6th Tenn., 
Col.  George  C.  Porter;  9th  Tenn.,  Lieut.-Col.  John  W. 
Buf(ud  (w).  Major  George  W.  Kelsoe;  2;thTenn.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  W.  Friei'son  (w),  Ma^jor  A.  C.  Allen;  Miss.  Battery, 
Lieut.  William  B.  Turner.  Brigade  loss :  k,  136 ;  w,  517  ; 
m,  34  =  687. 

CAVALRY  BRIGADE,  Col.  Jolm  A.  Wharton :   1st  Ky. 

(3co's), ;  j.  4thTeun., ;  8th Tex., .  Brigade 

loss  (not  separately  reported). 

Left  Wing,  Maj. -Gen.  William  J.  Hardee. 
SECOND  division,  Brig.-Gen.  J.  Patton  Anderson. 

First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  John  C.  Brown  (w),  Col. 
William    Miller:    Ist    Fla.,    Col.    William    Miller;    3d 

Fla., ;  41.st  Miss., ;  Palmer's  Battery, 

Brigade  loss  (not  separately  reported).  Second  Bri- 
gade, Brig.-Gen.  Daniel  W.  Adams :  13th  La.,  Col.  R.  L. 
Gibson;  16th  La..  Col.  D.  C.  Gober;  20th  La.,  Col.  Aug. 
Reichard,  Lieut.-Col.  Leon  von  Zinken;  25th  La.,  Col.  S. 
W.  Fisk;  14th  Battalion  La.  Sharp-sliooters,  Ma^ior  J.  E. 
Austin;  5th  Co.  Washington  (La.)  Art'y,  Capt.  C.  H. 
Sloconib.    Brigade  loss:  k,  6;  w,  78;  m,  68=1.52.    Third 

Brigade,    Col.    Samu<'l    Powell:    4.5th    Ala., ;    1st 

Ark., ;  24th  Miss.,  Col.  William    F.  Dowd;    29th 

4-  The  dasli  indicates  tli.at  the  name  nf  the  commanding  otfl- 
cer  lias  not  been  found  in  the  "  Ofticial  Uecorda."—  Editors. 
bin  March,  1888,  General  Buell  wrote  to  the  editors : 
"This  probably  did  not  include  tlie  cavalry.  It  is  scarcely 
credible  that  the  three  divisions  of  infantry  contained  only 
13,500. 


Tenn., ;   Mo.  Battery,  Capt.  Overton  W.  Barret. 

Brigade  loss  (not  separately  reported).  Fourth  Bri- 
gade, Col.  Thomas  M.  Jones:    27th  Mis.'?., ;   30th 

Miss., ;    37th  Miss., ;    Ala.    Battery   (Lums- 

den's).    Brigade  loss  (not  separately  reported). 
THIRD  division,  Maj. -Gen.  Simon  B.  Buckner. 

First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  St.  JolinR.  Liddell :  2d  Ark., 

;  5th  Ark.,  Col.  L.  Featherston ;  6th  Ark., ;  7th 

Ark.,  Col.  D.  A.  Gillespie ;  8th  Ark.,  Col.  John  H.  Kelly ; 
Miss.  Battery  (Swett's).  Brigade  loss  :  k,  w,  and  m,  71. 
Second BHgade,  Brig.-Gen.  P.  R.  Cleburne  (w) :  13th  Ark., 

;  15th  Ark., ;  2d  Tenn., ;  Ark.  Battery 

(Calvert's).  Brigade  loss  (not  separately  reported). 
Third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Bushrod  R.  Johnson :  5th 
Confederate,  Col.  J.  A.  Smith;  17th  Tenn.,  Col.  A.  8. 
Marks;  23d  Tenn.,  Lieut.-Col.  R.  H.  Keeble;  25th  Tenn., 
Col.  John  M.  Hughs;  37th  Tenn.,  Col.  Moses  White; 
44th  Tenn.,  Col.  John  S.  Fulton ;  Miss.  Battery  (Jefl'er- 
son  Art'y),  Capt.  Put.  Darden.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  30 ;  w, 
165;  m,  9  =  204.  Fourth  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  S.  A.  INI. 
Wood  (w)  :  16th  Ala., r  33d  Ala., ;  3d  Con- 
federate,   ;  45th  Miss., ;  I5th  Battalion  Miss. 

Sharp-shooters, ;    Ala.   Battery,  Capt.   Henry    C. 

Semplo.    Brigade  loss  (not  separately  reported). 

CAVALRY  BRIGADE,  Col.  Joseph  Wheeler:  1st  Ala., 
Col.  William  W.  Allen ;  3d  Ala.,  Col.  James  Hagau  ;  6th 
Confederate,  Lieut.-Col.  James  A.  Pell ;  2d  Ga.  (battal- 
ion), Maj.  C.  A.  Whalcy;  3d  Ga.,  Col.  Martin  J.  Craw- 
ford ;  Ist  Ky.  (6  co's),  Maj.  J.  W.  Caldwell.  Brigade  loss 
(not  separately  reported). 

Total  Confederate  loss:  killed,  510;  wounded,  2635; 
missing,  251  =  3396. 

General  Bragg  reiiorts  ("  Official  Records,"  Vol.  XVI., 
Pt.  I.,  p.  1092)  that  "our  forces  .  .  .  consisted  of 
three  divisions  of  infantry  (about  14,500)  .and  two  small 
brigades  of  cavalry  (about  1500)."  General  Polk  reports 
(p.  1110) :  "  The  whole  of  our  force,  including  all  arms, 
did  not  exceed  15,000."  ^ 

"  However,  the  imjiortant  question  is  as  to  the  force  that 
Bragg  had  in  the  field  in  Kentucky,  for  that  was  the  force 
tlijit  was  to  be  expected  in  a  great  battle.  That  question 
is  not  fully  di'tcrmined  by  oflicial  reports,  but  a  careful 
study  of  the  i)ublisli('d  records  seems  to  place  it  at  not  leas 
than  08,000  men."—  EDITQKS. 


-%.  ^^'■ 


ON    THE    SKIRMISH    LINE. 


EAST  TENNESSEE  AND  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  PERRYVILLE. 


BY  DON  CARLOS  BUELL,  MAJOR-GENERAL,  U.  8.  V. 


THE  invasion  of  Kentucky  in  the  summer  of  1862  by  the  Confederate  forces 
under  General  Bragg  was  one  of  the  most  prominent  incidents  of  the  war; 
and  both  the  officer  who  conducted  it  and  the  one  who  repelled  it  were  the 
objects  of  much  popular  displeasure  on  their  respective  sides.  On  the  one 
side  there  was  severe  condemnation  of  the  withdrawal,  and  on  the  other 
unmeasm*ed  dissatisfaction  that  the  invaders  had  not  been  captured  in  a  body. 
Of  course,  there  were  in  both  cases  numerous  specifications  to  the  general  mat- 
ter of  complaint.  With  reference  to  the  result,  it  i^ust  follow  that  the  critics 
were  wi^ong  on  one  side  or  the  other.  It  may  even  be  that  in  the  main,  what- 
ever may  have  been  the  incidental  blunders,  they  were  wi'ong  on  both  sides : 
that  is,  that  an  invasion  for  a  permanent  occupation  which  lacked  the  support 
of  the  population,  and  was  opposed  by  an  army  able  and  ready  to  contest  the 
object,  was  wisely  abandoned  without  further  resistance ;  and  that  the  con- 
testant, in  the  presence  of  a  skillful  and  not  inferior  adversary,  wisely  took 
his  measures  to  make  the  result  reasonably  certain.  The  rashness  of  revo- 
lutionary ends  might  reject  the  former,  but  no  rule  of  loyalty  to  the  public 
welfare  would  condemn  the  latter. 

In  gi\dng  here  a  brief  review  of  the  subject — which  properly  includes  the 
project  for  my  advance  into  east  Tennessee  in  the  early  summer — I  shaU 
undertake  no  more  than  a  simple  outline  of  the  essential  facts,  and  an  expo- 
sition of  the  circumstances  which  controlled  events. 

The  period  immediately  following  the  evacuation  of  Coi-inth,  and  lasting 
through  the  summer,  found  the  Western  armies  in  a  less  satisfactory  state 
than  at  the  first  glance  would. be  supposed.  The  early  delusion  of  a  ninety- 
days'  campaign  had  not  so  completely  passed  away  as  not  to  give  rise  to  dis- 
appointment in  the  ranks  and  among  the  people,  at  finding  no  signs  in  the 


32 


E/tST  TENNESSEE  AND    THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  PERRY yiLLE. 


South  of  reconciliation  or  submission,  after  the  signal  successes  which  the 
Union  cause  had  achieved ;  and  it  could  hartUy  fail  to  happen  that  the  dis- 
appointment would  for  a  while  act  injuriously  upon  the  temper  and  efficiency 
of  unseasoned  troops.  It  resulted,  in  fact,  that  the  desire  to  get  back  to 
friends,  or  to  find  relief  for  a  time  from  the  hardships  and  restraints  of  service, 
caused  large  numbers  to  get  away  from  the  front  on  every  possible  pretext 

on  leave  granted  with  or  without  proper  authority,  upon  authority  exercised 

too  loosely,  and  even  without  any  authority ;  and  when  once  away  their  return 
was  very  difficult.  Appeals  were  of  little  avail,  and  the  recourse  of  sending 
officers  to  recall  the  absentees  was  attended  with  poor  results. 

But  al)sence  from  the  colors  was  not  the  worst  form  of  the  evil.  Duty  of 
every  sort  was  performed  with  a  sluggishness  which  greatly  retarded  every 
sort  of  work,  of  which  there  was  much  that  had  to  be  done,  and  the  service 
of  escorts  and  road  guards  was  executed  in  very  many  cases  with  a  fatal 
laxity.  An  idea  grew  up  that  a  soldier  on  parole  was  virtually  released  from 
all  restraint ;  and  there  was  good  reason  to  believe  that  large  numbers  of 
stragglers  were  quite  willing  to  find  themselves  for  a  moment  in  the  hands 
of  the  enemy,  and  that  even  the  vigilance  and  resoluteness  of  escorts  and 
guards  were  materially  affected  by  the  idea  that  captivity  meant  liberty  and 
relaxation.  J 

Even  in  the  routine  of  camp  life,  the  weariness  and  impatience  manifested 
themselves  in  some  manner,  actively  or  passively,  in  a  protest  against  the 
interior  demands  and  the  exterior  restraints  of  discipline.  The  thousands  of 
letters  which  poured  from  the  camps  into  the  soldiers'  homes  and  the  puljlic 
press  were  mediums  for  these  manifestations,  which  put  upon  the  general  in 


)To  this  rule  there  were  of  coui-se  honorable 
exceptions.  The  followng  orders  concerning 
absentees  and  paroles  were  published  in  view  of 
these  evils,  which  were  seriously  impairing  the 
strength  and  efficiency  of  the  army : 

"  Headquarters,  Army  of  the  Ohio, 
•'  In  Camp,  near  Florence,  Ala.,  June  24th,  1862. 
"fiKNERAL  Orders,  No.  26:  There  are  14,000  officers 
anil  HDldifTs  absent  from  their  duty  with  the  various 
(liviHioiis  of  this  army,  /.  c,  the  live  tlivisious  south 
of  tlic  TcniK'Sscc  Uivcr.  Some  of  them  have  gimc  otF 
without  any  aiitliority ;  others  with  the  permission  of 
oHicers  not  autliorized  to  fjraiit  it.  In  general,  sickness 
is  given  as  the  cause  of  iil>Neiiee.  hut  in  very  mauj'  cases 
that  cause  has  notoriously  ceased  to  exist,  and  men 
remain  away,  drawing  the  same  pay  as  their  comrades 
wlio  are  faithfully  performing  their  duty.  To  correct 
this  abuse  it  is  ordered 

"(4th.)  .\11  absejit  oflieers  and  soldiers  who  do  not.join 
their  coinj>aiiicH  and  regiments  or  are  not  satisfactorily 
aeeoiinteil  for  as  above  l)y  the  10th  of  July  next,  will  be 
reiiorled  on  their  muster-roll  as  deserters,  dating  from 
the  tini<'  that  they  may  have  been  absent  without 
aiitliority.  I$y  act  of  f'ongress  every  deserter  forfeits 
all  claim  on  the  (Joveriimcnt  for  i)ay  and  allowances, 
besides  being  liable  to  arrest  ;ind  trial  by  court-martial. 
Any  iierson  who  ai)pr(heiiils  and  returns  a  deserter  to 
the  commanding  oflflcer  of  a  military  post  is  entitled  to 
a  reward  of  f.i.  liy  command  of  MA.ioR-ft  enehal  Ktteli,. 
James  B.  Fry,  Aseistant  Adjutant-General,  Chief-of- 
Staff." 


"  Headquarters,  Army  of  the  Ohio, 
"In  Camp,  Huntsville,  Ala.,  August  8th,  1862. 

"General  Orders,  No.  41:  The  system  of  paroles 
practiced  in  this  army  has  run  into  an  intolerable  abuse. 
Hereafter  no  otficer  or  soldier  belonging  to  the  forces  in 
this  district  will  give  his  paroU'  not  to  take  up  arms,  for 
the  purpose  of  leaving  the  enemy's  lines  without  the 
sanction  of  the  general  commanding  this  army,  except 
when,  by  reason  of  wounds  or  disease,  he  could  not  bo 
removed  without  endangering  his  life. 

"Any  parole  given  in  violation  of  this  order  will  not 
be  recognized,  and  the  jurson  giving  it  will  be  required 
to  perform  military  duty  and  take  the  risks  prescribed 
by  the  laws  of  war. 

"  Any  ollicer  or  soldier  of  this  command,  being  in  the 
hands  of  the  enemy  and  desiring  to  be  released  on  parole 
for  the  purpose  of  lea\  ing  the  enemy's  lines,  will  make 
application  to  the  general  coiiinianding  tills  army,  in- 
closing in  duplicate  the  parole  which  he  proposes  to 
give,  and  await  its  ap)iroval. 

"The  sanction  of  tli<' ollicer  commanding  the  forces  by 
which  he  is  held,  being  necessary  to  eflfect  the  arrange- 
ment, should  l)c  forwarded  with  the  application.  No  such 
application  will  be  appioved  when  the  capture  has  re- 
sulted from  neglect  or  misbehavior  on  the  part  of  the 
prisoner  or  of  the  command  to  which  he  belonged. 

"  The  evidence  of  a  lawful  parole  will  be  the  parole 
itself,  l)eariiig  the  ai>i>roval  of  the  commanding  general. 

"  The  same  rule  will  be  observed  by  this  army  in  parol- 
ing iirisoiicis  taken  frinii  the  eneiny.  If  fliey  cannot  bo 
held  until  (he  siinction  of  such  ofliceras  the  general  com- 
manding' tlie  enemy's  forces  may  designate;  for  that  pnr- 
Iiose  is  obtained,  they  will  be  released.    By  commajid  of 

M\.IOR-<iENKRAL   BUELL.      JAMES  B.    FRY,   Coloucl  and 

Chlcf-of-Staff." 


EAST  TENNESSEE  AND   THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  PERRYU'ILLE. 


33 


command  the  burthen  of  every  compkiint,  and  the  responsibility  of  every 
miscarriage.  If  a  command  started  upon  a  march,  every  soldier  would  be 
anxious  to  know  how  his  haversack  was  to  be  replenished,  but  it  never 
occurred  to  him  that  there  was  a  question  as  to  how  the  depots  were  to  be 
supplied. 

The  Government,  also,  seemed  to  di*op  suddenly  into  a  similar  state  of 
disappointment,  discontent,  and  inaction.  It  had  not  apparently  been 
imagined  that  the  depletion  which  would  unavoidably  go  on  rapidly  in  the 
ranks  must  be  replaced,  and  when  at  length  the  work  of  repair  was  taken  up 
it  was  done  by  creating  new  regi- 
ments instead  of  replenishing  the 
old  ones.  A  vast  waste  of  time,  and 
material,  and  efficiency  was  caused 
by  this  plan  of  throwing  large 
numbers  of  raw  troops  suddenly 
into  service  in  distinct  bodies. 
Moreover,  party  politics,  which  at 
first,  under  a  spontaneous  burst  of 
patriotism,  had  put  aside  all  party 
distinctions,  began  now  to  resume 
its  old  organization.  That,  of 
course,  meant  old  ambitions  and 
opposing  policies  with  reference 
to  means,  however  united  men 
might  be  in  motive  upon  the 
one  great  object  of  preserving 
the  Union.  No  doubt  all  of  these 
causes  worked  to  the  same  end. 
At  all  events  it  resulted  that  dur- 
ing the  summer  of  1862,  after  the 
withdrawal  of  the  Confederates 
from  Corinth,  the  armies  were 
weaker  numerically  than  they 
had  been  or  ever  were  afterward,  and  that  the  tone  of  the  troops,  though 
always  loyal,  was  in  some  respects  seriously  defective. 

It  was  exactly  the  reverse  on  the  other  side.  To  the  South  the  result  of 
the  battle  of  Shiloli  was  the  disappointment  of  a  great  hope  almost  consum- 
mated, rather  than  a  discouragement.  The  first  depressing  effect  of  the 
retreat  from  Corinth  was  more  than  compensated  for  by  the  splendid  successes 
which  were  considered  to  have  been  gained  in  Virginia.  Their  Government 
acted  vigorously.  Their  armies  were  speedily  recruited,  and  never  again 
entered  the  field  in  as  great  relative  strength  and  as  high  spirit  as  in  tliat 
summer.  The  army  at  Tupelo,  no  longer  thrc^atened,  an«l  under  a  new  com- 
mander of  established  reputation  for  nerve  and  ability,  paused  for  a  moment 
to  discover  an  opening  for  attack  or  a  call  for  defense,  and  the  disposition 
of  the  now  unoccupied  force  under  General  Halleck  soon  pointed  the  wa\-. 


BREVET    MAJOR-GENERAL  JAMES   B.   FRY,  CHIEF-OF-8TAFP 

TO  GENERAL    BUELL  ;    AFTERWARD    I'ROVOST-MAR- 

SHAL-GENERAL.     FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


34  BAST  TENNESSEE  AND   THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  PERRYl^ILLE. 

As  soon  as  the  expulsion  of  the  Confederates  from  the  line  of  the  Mem- 
phis and  Charleston  Railroad  was  consummated  by  the  definitive  retreat  of 
the  Corinth  army,  the  large  Federal  force  that  had  been  called  together  for 
the  operations  on  that  line  was  redistriliuted  for  ulterior  objects.  About 
65,000  men  were  retained  under  General  Halleck's  immediate  command  to 
occupy  the  line  from  the  Tennessee  Eiver  to  Memphis;  the  Army  of  the 
Ohio  was  restored  to  its  original  departmental  territory,  to  advance  into  east 
Tennessee,  perhaps  even  to  penetrate  Georgia;  and  the  remainder  of  the  force 
was  sent  to  strengthen  General  Curtis  in  Arkansas.  Thus  the  Army  of  the 
Ohio  was  the  only  army  in  the  West  that  was  assigned  to  an  aggressive 
campaign. 

The  occupation  of  east  Tennessee  had  from  the  first  been  a  favorite  meas- 
ure with  the  President,  apparently  more  from  political  than  from  military 
considerations.  It  had  at  one  time  been  enjoined  upon  my  predecessors  in 
specific  orders,  and  was  m-ged  upon  my  attention  by  General  McClellan  in 
the  instructions  with  which  I  came  to  Kentucky.  Some  abortive  steps  had 
been  taken  in  that  direction  by  General  Sherman  before  my  arrival,  but  vari- 
ous causes,  which  need  not  here  be  enumerated,  compelled  its  postponement 
then  and  afterward, — especially  the  inexpediency  of  the  attempt  upon  military 
grounds  under  the  circumstances,  and  finally  the  drift  of  events,  which  car- 
ried the  bulk  of  the  army  to  Shiloh  and  Corinth.  A  general  view  of  the  thea- 
ter of  war,  and  a  consideration  of  the  geography  of  east  Tennessee,  will  show 
the  importance  of  the  lodgment  that  was  now  to  be  undertaken,  and  indicate 
the  opposition  it  was  sure  to  encounter,  unless  seconded  by  operations  of  a 
decisive  character  in  other  quarters. 

East  Tennessee  is  an  elevated  valley  of  great  salubrity  and  considerable 
agricultural  capacity,  practically  inclosed,  though  with  some  natural  open- 
ings, by  a  mountainous  and  rugged  belt  of  country  in  which  rise  the  sources 
of  the  Tennessee  River.  The  surplus  of  food  products  during  the  war  was  not 
large,  but  was  not  without  value  to  the  South  at  first,  when  so  much  of  the 
country  was  absorbed  in  the  growth  of  cotton.  The  railroad  passing  east  and 
west  through  the  valley  afforded  the  most  direct  and  convenient  communica- 
tion between  Richmond  and  the  Mississippi,  while  abreast  of  it,  from  Chatta- 
nooga, a  branching  railroad  penetrated  the  Atlantic  and  Gulf  States  to  the 
coast,  affording  a  valuable  system  of  internal  communication  for  supply 
or  defense,  and  an  equally  effective  line  for  external  invasion.  On  the 
northern  side,  the  valley  had  a  strong  defensive  line  in  the  difficult,  though 
not  impracticable  mountains,  which,  farther  to  the  north,  assume  an  expanse 
and  ruggedness  that  present  what  might  bo  considered  practically  a  secm-e 
barrier  between  Kentucky  and  Virginia.  East  Tennessee  might  therefore  be 
regarded  as  a  doorway  to  the  rear  of  Richmond,  and  a  commanding  rendez- 
vous which  looked  down  with  a  menacing  adaptability  upon  tlie  Gulf  and 
Atlantic  States.  In  the  latter  light,  more  than  as  a  means  of  defense,  its 
preservation  was  of  vital  moment  to  the  Confederacy.  The  occupation  of  it 
by  the  Federal  force  would  be  like  the  last  stage  in  a  regular  siege,  when  the 
glacis  is  crowned  and  batteries  are  established  for  breaching  the  walls  and 


EAST  TENNESSEE  AND   THE  CAMPAIGN  OP  PERRYl^fLLE. 


35 


delivering  the  final  assault.  But  the  fact  that  it  was  the  home  of  all  that 
was  loyal  to  the  Union  in  the  States  in  rebellion,  seemed  to  blind  the  Grovern- 
ment  to  the  considerations  which  insured  that  it  would  be  defended  with  all 
the  energy  of  self-preservation.  The  powerful  force  and  desperate  battles 
that  were  finally  found  necessary  to  secure  the  object,  afforded  a  vindication, 
to  which  nothing  need  be  added,  against  the  fatuity  which  demanded  that 
the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  without  supplies  and  with  severed  communications, 
should  accomplish  it  in  the  summer  of  1862  with  a  movable  force  of  31,000 
men  against  more  than  60,000  that  barred  the  way.     [See  maps,  pp.  3  and  6.] 

I  was  following  the  movements  of  the  enemy  retreating  from  Corinth, 
when,  on  the  9th  of  June,  I  received  notice  from  General  Halleck  that  my 
army  was  to  resume  its  separate  action,  and  advance  into  east  Tennessee. 
My  divisions  started  in  the  new  direction  the  next  day,  and  on  the  11th  I 
received  my  instructions  verbally  from  G-eneral  Halleck.  I  was  to  move 
as  diligently  as  possible  to  the  object  specified,  but  I  was  to  repair  the 
Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad  as  I  proceeded,  guard  it,  and  draw  my 
supplies  from  it.  The  inexpediency  of  these  conditions,  as  I  had  pointed  out, 
was  realized  before  the  rejDairs  were  completed.  The  road,  running  along  the 
enemy's  front,  was  peculiarly  exposed  to  attack — was  in  fact  attacked  while 
we  were  working  on  it  and  afterward;  it  was  not  supplied  with  rolling 
stock,  and  we  derived  no  benefit  from  it,  though  the  repairs  detained  us 
until  the  last  of  June.  Foreseeing  these  embarrassments,  I  had  given  orders 
for  the  repair  of  the  roads  south  from  Nashville,  and  for  the  accumulation 
of  supplies  at  that  point.  I  desired  also  the  option  of  making  the  advance 
through  McMinnville  and  Kingston,  which  I  imagined  might  be  found  to 
present  decided  advantages.  It  would  avoid  the  heavy  work  on  the  railroads 
to  the  Tennessee  River,  the  bridging  of  the  river,  and  the  extremely  difficult 
ground  that  must  at  first  be  overcome  by  wagon  transportation  after  crossing. 
It  would  establish  a  junction  promptly  with  the  force  under  Gr.  W.  Morgan 
operating  against  Cumberland  Gap,  and  give  actual  possession  of  east  Ten- 
nessee, which  the  mere  occupation  of  Chattanooga  would  not.  Halleck  at  first 
assented  to  my  proposition,  but  a  day  or  two  afterward  \vithdrew  his  consent, 
and  enjoined  that  the  movement  should  be  made  directly  upon  Chattanooga. 

We  crossed  the  Tennessee  by  extemporized  ferries  —  three  di\'isions  at 
Florence,  arriving  at  Athens  on  the  Nashville  and  Decatur  Railroad  on  the  28th 
of  June,  and  one  division  l)etween  the  1st  and  6th  o|  July,  by  a  very  inefficient 
ferry  prepared  by  General  Mitchel  at  Decatur.        !««  4  6  S  4  3  9 

General  Thomas  with  his  division  was  still  detained  on  the  Corinth  road 
under  General  Halleck's  orders,  and  did  not  join  at  Huntsville  until  the  last 
of  July ;  so  that  the  available  effective  force  for  an  advance  when  I  reached 
Huntsville  on  the  29th  of  June  was  between  24,000  and  25,000  men.  The 
16,000  already  in  middle  Tennessee  and  north  Alabama  would  still  be  retiuired 
to  guard  Nashville  and  keep  open  the  connnunications.  But  there  was  much 
to  be  done  before  an  advance  could  be  possible.  We  found  ourselves  already 
at  the  very  limit  of  our  means  of  transportation.  Nothing  had  been  accom- 
plished in  the  way  of  repairing  the  raih-oads,  and  it  required  every  wagon  to 


36  EAST  TENNESSEE  AND   THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  PERRY^ILLE. 

haul  supplies  euougli  for  the  daily  consumption.  Much  of  the  time  there- 
after the  troops  were  on  half  rations.  We  could  gather  some  forage  from  the 
country,  but  not  enough  for  the  animals. 

Before  my  arrival  G-eneral  Mitchel  had  urgently  reported  demonstrations  of 
the  enemy  from  the  direction  of  Chattanooga.  To  the  Secretary  of  War  he 
said,  June  21st :  "  I  am  with  difficulty  maintaining  my  position  in  front  of 
Chattanooga.  I  will  endeavor  to  hold  my  position  until  reenforcements 
arrive."  His  nearest  position  was  in  fact  at  Battle  Creek,  twenty  miles  below 
Chattanooga,  with  the  Tennessee  River  and  a  mountain  range  intervening. 
To  me  he  telegraphed,  June  21st :  "  I  think  everything  depends  on  celerity  of 
movement.  If  we  should  be  driven  from  Stevenson  (the  junction  of  the  Nash- 
ville and  Chattanooga  and  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  railroads),  or  even 
from  the  position  we  now  occupy  (at  Battle  Creek,  nine  miles  above  Bridge- 
port), I  should  deem  it  a  great  misfortune."  Partly  therefore  to  oppose  this 
supposed  danger,  and  especially  to  place  a  strong  working  force  on  the  Nash- 
ville and  Chattanooga  Railroad,  McCook's  and  Crittenden's  divisions  were  sent 
to  Stevenson  and  Battle  Creek.  Nelson's  and  Wood's  divisions  were  for  the 
present  kept  on  the  Nashville  and  Decatur  road ;  and  the  repairs  by  means  of 
the  troops  and  by  experienced  hired  hands  were  urged  energetically.  At  the 
same  time  mills  were  put  to  work  to  get  out  lumber,  and  the  building  of  boats 
for  a  bridge  was  commenced.  We  had  no  pontoon  train,  and  the  Tennessee 
was  a  formidable  river,  requiring  a  bridge  1400  yards  long. 

The  depredations  of  the  small  bands  that  had  harassed  Mitchel  before  my 
arrival  were  continued  afterward,  and  soon  demonstrated  the  necessity  of 
defensive  works  for  bridges  and  other  vulnerable  points.  An  inclosed  earth- 
work of  considerable  strength,  large  enough  for  a  regiment,  was  constructed 
at  Stevenson  for  the  protection  of  the  depot  to  be  established  there  for  the 
advance;  and  a  specific  plan  and  instructions  for  small  block-houses,  or, 
more  properly  speaking,  picket-houses,  at  the  less  important  points  were 
prescribed.  An  officer  was  specially  assigned  to  the  direction  of  these  works, 
and  the  supervision  of  the  guards.  Iron-clad  dummy  cars  were  provided  for 
such  purj^oses  and  for  express  service.  Much  of  the  road-repairing  and 
other  engineering  work  was  done  and  supervised  by  a  splendid  regiment  of 
mcichanics  and  engineers  from  Michigan,  under  Colonel  William  P.  Innes. 

These,  from  among  the  thousand  other  details,  are  mentioned,  because  they 
were  infinitely  important  to  our  existence,  and  absolutely  necessary  for  the 
first  step  in  advance.  Clearly  the  means  of  transportation,  which  were  barely 
sufficient  to  provider  us  with  a  precarious  subsistence  where  we  were,  would 
l)e  insufficient  to  carry  us  at  least  thirty  miles  farther  away,  across  a  l)road 
river  and  a  mountainous  country,  into  the  presence  of  the  enemy.  The  records 
show  that  lab(n'ious  and  unceasing  efforts  were  used  to  bring  about  the  neces- 
sary conditions  for  a  forward  movement,  and  that  every  officer  employed 
in  command  or  in  staff  positions  was  stimulated  to  the  utmost  by  advice  and 
instructions  for  the  object  before  us.  We  had  been  engaged  in  this  earnest 
manner  just  nine  days  from  the  time  of  my  arrival  at  Huntsville  [June  29th], 
when  I  received  a  dispatch  from  Ilalleck,' saying  that  my  progress  was  not 


E/IST  TENNESSEE  AND   THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  PERRY^ILLE. 


satisfactory  to  the  President.  I  was  so  astonished  at  the  message  that  I  made 
no  reply  until  three  days  afterward,  when  I  was  called  on  for  explanations.  \ 
The  road  from  Nashville  to  Stevenson  was  completed  on  the  12th  of  July, 
and  a  train  was  started  the  next  morning  with  supplies  for  the  depot  at 
Stevenson.  My  attention  had  been  attracted  to  the  importance  of  McMinn- 
ville  as  an  outpost.  It  was  at  the  foot  of  the  mountain  on  the  direct  wagon 
road  between  Nashville  and  Chattanooga,  and  was  the  terminus  of  a  branch 
railroad,  twenty  miles  east  of  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  Kailroad.  I  had 
just  organized  a  new  brigade  at  Murfreesboro'  to  occupy  McMinnville.  On 
the  morning  of  the  13th  Forrest,  \\dth  a  large  body  of  cavalry,  surprised  the 
brigade,  killed  and  wounded  some  and  captured  the  rest,  damaged  the  railroad 
seriously,  and  produced  alarm  in  Nashville,  where  the  force  was  not  large.  \ 


4.  "Official  Records,"  Vol.  XVI.,  Part  II.,  pp. 
104,  122. 

^  The  following  orders  were  published  with  ref- 
erence to  this  and  similar  affairs.  It  is  proper  to 
add  that  a  Court  of  Inquiry,  instituted  by  General 
Rosecrans,  at  the  request  of  General  T.  T.  Crit- 
tenden, the  commander  of  the  brigade,  after  his 
exchange,  acquitted  the  commander  of  blame,  on 
the  ground  that  he  had  only  arrived  the  day  before 
the  attack,  and  had  shown  commendable  energy 
in  his  new  position.  Colonel  Duffield  had  also  just 
arrived.  He  appeared  to  have  behaved  well  in  the 
attack,  and  was  severely  wounded: 

"  Headquarters,  Army  of  the  Ohio, 
"In  Camp,  Huntsville,  Ala.,  July  21st,  1862. 

"  General  Orders,  No.  32 :  Ou  the  13th  instant  the 
force  at  Murfreesborough,  under  command  of  Brigadier- 
General  T.  T.  Crittenden,  late  colonel  of  the  6th  Indiana 
Regiment,  and  consisting  of  6  companies  of  the  9tb 
Michigan,  9  companies  of  the  3d  Minnesota,  2  sections  of 
Hewett's  (Kentucky)  battery,  4  companies  of  the  4th 
Kentucky  Cavalry,  and  3  companies  of  the  7th  Penn- 
sylvania Cavalry,  Wiis  captured  at  that  place  bj'  a  force 
of  the  enemy's  cavalry  variously  cstiniatcd  at  from 
1800  to  3.'50).  It  appears  from  tlic  ixst  infoi-niation  that 
can  be  obtained,  that  Bi'ijjadicr-CJcucral  Crittenden  and 
Colonel  Duffleld  of  the  '.tth  Michigan,  with  the  six  com- 
panies of  that  rciiinii  lit  and  all  of  the  cavalry,  were 
surprised  and  oapt  nnd  early  in  the  morning  in  the 
houses  and  streets  of  the  town,  or  in  their  camp  near 
by,  with  but  slii,'^ht  rcHistaiiec^  and  witliout  any  timely 
warning  of  tlie  presences  of  tlie  enemy.  The  rest  of  the 
force,  consisting  of  tlie  3d  Minnesota  and  the  artillery 
under  Col.  Lester,  left  its  camp  and  took  aiiollier  posi- 
tion, M'liieli  it  maintained  with  but  few  casualties  again.st 
tlie  feeble  attacks  of  the  eiuMuy  until  about  3  o'clock, 
when  it  was  surrendered  and  marched  into  captivity. 

"Take  it  in  all  its  features,  few  more  disgraceful 
examples  of  neglect  of  duty  and  lack  of  good  conduct 
can  be  found  in  tlie  history  of  wars.  It  fully  merits  the 
extreme  penalty  whicli  the  law  provides  for  such  mis- 
conduct. The  force  was  more  than  sufflcient  to  reoel 
the  attack  effectually.  The  mortification  which  the 
army  will  f(-el  at  the  result  is  poorly  compens.ated  bv  the 
exertion  made  by  Kome  —  perhaps  inany  —  of  thi>  otlicers 
to  retrieve  the  disgrace  of  the  surprise.  The  action  lit 
to  be  adopted  with  reference  to  those  who  arc  bliiniable. 
especially  the  officers  highest  in  conunaiid, 'cannot  be 
determined  without  fiirthei'  investigation. 

"In  contrast  to  this  slianicfiil  affair,  the  general  com- 
manding takes  ph'asnre  in  making  honorable  mention 
of  the  conduct  of  a  detachment  of  twenty-two  men  of 
Companies  I  and  II.  loth  Wisconsin  Reginieiit.  nnder  the 
command  of  Scrg<'ants  W.  Nelson  and  A.  II.  Makinson. 


The  detachment  was  on  duty  guarding  a  bridge  east 
of  HuntsviUe,  when  it  was  attacked  on  April  28th  by  a 
force  of  some  200  or  300  cavalry,  wlii<-li  it  fought  for  two 
hours  and  repulsed  in  the  most  signal  manner.  Such  is 
the  conduct  that  duty  and  honor  demand  of  every  sol- 
dier;  and  this  example  is  worthy  of  imitation  by  higher 
officers  and  larger  conmiands.  By  command  of  Ma.jor- 
General  Buell.  James  B.  Fry,  Col.  and  Chief-of-Btaff. 

"  Headquarters,  Army  of  the  Ohio, 
"In  Camp,  Huntsville,  Ala.,  August  1st.  1862. 

"  General  Orders,  No.  37  :  The  nnijor-general  com- 
manding has  to  announce  other  instances  of  disgrace- 
ful neglect  and  contrast  them  with  another  of  gallantry : 

"The  guard  at  Courtland  Bridge,  consisting  of  com- 
panies A  and  H,  10th  Kentucky,  under  the  command 
of  Captain  Davidson,  and  a  part  of  Captain  Egglcston's 
company,  1st  Ohio  Cavalry,  was  completely  surprised 
and  captirrcd  with  but  trifling  loss  on  the  morning  of 
the  25th  ultimo,  by  a  force  of  irregular  cavalry.  On  the 
same  day  the  companies  of  Captains  Boyl  and  Goben, 
10th  Indiana,  which  wen-  ordered  to  protect  two  bridges 
on  the  same  road,  respectively  six  and  twelve  miles 
east  of  Courtland,  deemed  it  Aviser  to  bring  in  an 
empty  train  which  came  up  than  to  defend  their  posts, 
threatened  with  an  attack  from  the  same  irregular  cav- 
alry ;  and  so  put  themselves  on  the  train  and  arrived 
safely  at  Decatur,  a  few  miles  distant,  without  the  loss 
or  injury  of  a  man.  On  the  same  day,  and  on  the  same 
road,  eight  miles  from  Decatur,  a  guard,  consisting  of 
twenty-four  men  of  Ccmipauy  E,  31st  Ohio,  under  the 
command  of  Lieutenant  Harman,  were  suddenly  at- 
tacked by  a  greatly  superior  force  of  the  same  cav- 
alry. The.v  defended  themselves  gallantly,  however, 
and  repulsed  the  enemy,  killing  several  of  the  nunilur. 
Lieut,  llarinan  ami  eleven  of  his  men  were  wounded, 
himself  in  two  places,  and  two  of  his  men  were  killed. 

"The  general  submits  these  examples  to  tlie  reflection 
of  the  troops.  He  reminds  t  hem  that  neglect  and  bn<l  con- 
duct on  the  part  of  guards  brings  dishonor  upon  them  and 
may  even  jeopardize  the  safety  of  an  army.  If  these  ap- 
peals to  their  personal  and  professional  pride  should  fail 
of  their  oltject.  he  warns  them  that  the  extreme  penalty 
of  the  law  niust  intervene  to  punish  the  guilty  and  save 
the  army  from  the  jeopardy  in  which  they  place  it.  The 
duty  of  guarding  the  coumiunicatious  of  the  army  is 
among  the  most  important  with  which  an  officer  and  his 
troops  can  b(>  intrusted.  Vigilance,  det«'rmination.  and 
the  ju-eparation  of  suitable  defenses  in  the  way  of  in- 
trcnchnients  or  stockades  will  i>revent  such  attacks,  or 
enable  a  small  force  to  repel  a  greatly  siiiverior  one.  Had 
the  order  for  bridge-guards  to  fortify  their  posts  been 
promptly  executed  and  iU'Oi)er  vii.'ilance  been  observed, 
the  attacks  referred  to,  if  made  at  all.  would  hav.'  had 
very  different  results.  This  order  and  (tcnend  Orders, 
No." 32,  will  be  read  at  the  head  of  ev(>ry  company  and 
detachment.  By  command  of  M  v.toR-ciKNERAL  ItCEl.L. 
James  B.  Fry,  Colonel  and  Chicf-of-Stafl'." 


38  EAST  TENNESSEE  AND   THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  PERRYl^ILLE, 

This  was  the  first  appearance  of  any  large  body  of  the  enemy  in  our  rear 
south  of  the  Cumberland,  though  Morgan  was  at  the  same  time  engaged  in  a 
formidable  raid  in  Kentucky.  Nelson  was  immediately  ordered  to  occupy 
Murfreesboro'  and  McMinnville  with  his  division,  himself  and  one  brigade 
going  by  railroad.  He  had  just  reached  Murfreesboro'  with  a  portion  of  his 
troops  when  Forrest,  on  the  18th,  appeared  again  on  the  railroad  between 
him  and  Nashville,  captured  guards,  and  destroyed  two  more  bridges.  Work 
was  immediately  commenced  to  repair  the  damage.  It  was  completed  on  the 
28th  of  July,  and  the  shipment  of  supplies  for  the  depot  at  Stevenson  was 
resumed. 

As  soon  as  my  designs  upon  east  Tennessee  were  known,  the  Confederate 
authorities  took  prompt  measures  to  counteract  them.  The  sudden  appear- 
ance of  large  bodies  of  cavalry  under  Morgan  and  Forrest  on  my  communi- 
cations in  Tennessee  and  Kentucky  early  in  July,  and  the  increased  activity 
of  small  parties,  were  a  part  of  these  measures.  It  was  at  first  in  contempla- 
tion to  move  the  Tupelo  army  upon  my  rear  in  middle  Tennessee,  but  the 
wiser  plan  was  adopted  of  concentrating  in  my  front.  One  division  of  that 
army,  and  reenforcements  from  other  quarters,  reached  Chattanooga  in  June. 
General  Bragg  arrived  on  the  30th  of  July,  and  by  that  time  the  transfer  of 
his  force  from  Tupelo  was  about  completed.  The  nucleus  of  a  force  under 
Van  Dorn  and  Price  was  left  in  Mississippi  to  neutralize  the  large  Federal 
force  on  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  road,  an  object  which  was  accomplished 
at  first  by  inaction  alone,  and  at  last  by  bold  though  unsuccessful  attacks 
with  inferior  numbers. 

The  foreshadowing  of  an  aggressive  campaign  from  east  Tennessee  soon 
began  to  be  seen.  By  report,  and  actually,  as  the  record  now  shows,  the 
objective  was  at  first  middle  Tennessee  and  Nashville.  Rumor,  as  usual, 
placed  the  force  that  was  ready  for  the  work  at  very  large  numbers — 80,000 
or  100,000  men.  I  realized  that  the  enemy  in  front  of  us  was  assuming  formi- 
dable proportions,  but  I  did  not  doubt  that  his  strength  was  over-estimated, 
nor  that,  if  necessary,  my  own  force  would  be  increased,  and  therefore  my 
efforts  for  the  accumulation  of  supplies  for  an  advance  were  not  relaxed. 

On  the  7th  of  August  I  informed  Oeneral  Halleck  of  the  condition  which 
the  campaign  was  assuming,  and  told  him  that  my  force  should  be  increased. 
I  estimated  the  force  opposed  to  me  at  sixty  thousand  men.  The  records  now 
show  that  it  was  greater.  He  answered  on  the  8th  that  Oeneral  Grant  would 
turn  over  two  divisions  to  my  command  "  if  I  absolutely  required  them,"  but 
cautioned  me  not  to  ask  for  them  if  I  could  avoid  it  with  safety.  By  the  12th 
the  accumulating  evidence  showed  that  the  call  could  not  be  dispensed  with, 
and  I  requested  General  Grant  to  forward  the  divisions  without  delay.  One 
of  them  joined  on  the  1st  of  September;  the  other  did  not  arrive  until  the 
12th,  after  the  movement  northward  to  follow  Bragg  had  commenced.  The 
strength  of  the  two  divisions  was  about  5000  men  each. 

Our  communications  south  of  the  Cumberland  had  been  made  secure  by 
the  distribution  of  the  troops,  but  to  the  north  the  depredations  were  prose- 
cuted with  increased  vigor.   Our  cavalry  was  totally  insufficient  to  cope  with 


EAST  TENNESSEE  AND    THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  PERRY ^ILLE. 


39 


these  incursions,  which  it  must  be  said,  also,  were  seldom  resisted  by  the 
infantry  guards  with  vigilance  and  resohition.  On  the  10th  of  August,  Mor- 
gan again  appeared  on  the  railroad  north  of  Nashville,  captured  the  guard  of 
about  150  men  at  Grallatin,  effectually  disabled  the  tunnel  north  of  that  place, 
and  destroyed  several  bridges  toward  Nashville.  Our  communication  with 
Louisville,  on  which  we  were  dependent  for  supplies,  was  thus,  for  the  pres- 
ent, effectually  severed.  Work  was  immediately  commenced  to  repaii-  the 
damage,  but  the  constantly  recurring  presence  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  inter- 
fered so  effectually  as  to  require  a  large  increase  of  force  from  the  front  or 
the  rear  for  the  defense.  I  had  already  strengthened  the  guards  at  Bowling 
Grreen  and  Munfordville.  To  continue  to  draw  from  the  front  was  not  yet 
to  be  thought  of.  On  the  16tli,  therefore,  I  gave  General  Nelson  a  couple  of 
field-batteries  and  some  experienced  cavalry  and  infantry  officers,  and  sent 
him  to  Kentucky  to  organize  such  troops  as  could  be  got  together  there  to 
reestablish  our  communications  and  operate  against  Morgan's  incursions. 

On  the  18th  a  guard  of  a  regiment  belonging  to  Orant's  command  was  capt- 
ured without  a  show  of  resistance  at  Clarksv^lle,  i^  where  a  considerable  quan- 
tity of  supplies  had  been  deposited  for  transshipment  in  consequence  of  the 
suspension  of  navigation  by  low  water  in  the  Cumberland.  Upon  hearing  of 
Morgan's  appearance  again  on  the  Cumberland  north  of  Nashville,  General  R. 
W.  Johnson,  a  spirited  cavalry  officer,  under  whose  command  I  had  asseml)led 
all  the  cavalry  that  was  available,  moved  promptly  in  pursuit,  and  with  his 
inferior  force  attacked  Morgan  vigorously  near  Hartsville.  Johnson  was 
defeated  with  a  loss  of  80  killed  and  wounded  and  75  prisoners,  himself  among 
the  latter.  The  rest  escaped  and  made  their  way  as  stragglers  or  in  small 
bodies  to  Nashville. 

These  details,  harassing  and  disappointing  to  the  actors  at  the  time,  are  now 
no  less  wearisome  and  uninteresting  to  the  careless  reader ;  but  the  considera- 
tion of  them  is  essential  to  a  correct  appreciation  of  the  campaign.  It  is  a 
story  familiar  to  history  of  the  crippling  of  an  invading  army  by  a  successful 
war  upon  its  too  long  and  inadequately  protected  communications,  with  an 
enemy  in  its  front.  The  line  in  this  case  was  a  single  railroad,  350  miles  long, 
through  a  population  either  hostile  to  the  invader,  or  at  least  in  a  consider- 
able degree  friendly  to  his  opponent.  Under  the  circumstances  that  were 
to  ensue,  it  is  not  perhaps  to  be  accounted  a  misfortune  that  the  contemplated 
advance  was  checked  at  the  start.  A  Union  army  of  81,000  men  at  Chatta- 
nooga in  July,  1862,  without  supplies,  with  its  communications  broken  for 
400  miles,  and  the  Government  on  the  Potomac  appealing  for  25,000  men 
which  could  not  be  spared  from  Corinth,  might  well  have  been  in  a  worse 
condition  than  the  stronger  army  in  November,  1863,  which  was  reduced  to 
horse  and  mule  meat  for  its  ration,  with  its  communications  complete  to 
within  30  miles,  and  with  an  unoccupied  army  from  Vicksburg  and  consider 
able  reenforcements  from  the  Potomac  hastening  to  its  succor. 

i^Fov  an  explanation  of  the  sun-ender  see  Vol.  after  the  surronder  tlio  colonel  iind  nil  the  liiio-otli- 

XVI.,  Part  I.,  pp.   8G2-8G9,   "Official  Records."  cers  present  were  cashiered  ])y  order  of  the  I'resi- 

Colonel  Rodney  Mason,  71st  Oliio   regiment,  the  dent,  but  tliis  action  was  subse«itieii(ly  revoked,  and 

commander,  had  less  than  200  effective  men.    Soon  they  were  honorably  discliarged.—  D.  (,'.  B. 


40  EAST  TENNESSEE  AND    THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  PERRYl^lLLE. 

The  roi)orts  of  the  superior  force  assembled  in  east  Tennessee  were  con- 
finutMl  as  tlie  time  passed,  and  there  could  be  no  doubt  that  our  position  in 
middle  Tennessee  was  about  to  be  assailed.  Already  there  were  rumors  of 
crossing  at  Chattanooga,  Harrison's  Landing,  and  Kingston.  These  starting- 
points  indicated  no  certain  plan  of  attack.  The  enemy  might  descend  the 
Sequatchie  and  Cumberland  valleys  and  enter  at  north  Alabama,  in  which 
case  he  would  have  a  railroad  for  his  supplies ;  or  he  might  cross  the  mount- 
ains by  direct  roads  toward  middle  Tennessee.  In  either  case,  Stevenson, 
on  the  south  side  of  a  declining  spur  of  the  Cumberland  Mountains  reaching 
to  Huntsville,  was  unsuitable  for  om-  depot,  and  Decherd,  on  the  north  side, 
was  adopted  instead. 

On  the  19th  of  August  I  received  information  from  Gleneral  McCook,  who 
was  at  Battle  Creek  with  his  own  and  Crittenden's  divisions,  that  the  enemy 
was  crossing  in  force  at  Chattanooga.  My  plans  were  already  matured  and 
McCook  had  his  orders  for  such  a  case,  only  waiting  the  signal  to  act,  which 
was  given  on  the  20th.  He  was  to  march  with  his  division  to  the  point  at 
which  the  Anderson  or  Thm*man  road  between  Chattanooga  and  McMinnville 
crossed  the  Sequatchie  valley,  watching  and  opposing  the  enemy  on  that  road, 
and  gradually  fall  back  toward  McMinnville  until  he  joined  the  remainder 
of  the  army.  Crittenden  was  to  follow  him,  and  act  similarly  and  in  con- 
junction with  him  on  the  Higginbottom  road,  which  crossed  the  valley  a  little 
lower  down,  and  united  with  the  Thurman  road  further  north.  They  had 
pre\iously  been  provided  with  rockets  and  a  signal  code  for  communicating 
with  each  other  and  with  the  rest  of  the  army.  The  same  day  I  went  to  Battle 
Creek  and  then  to  Decherd  to  superintend  the  further  concentration,  for 
which  general  instructions  had  already  been  given.  Altamont,  in  advance 
of  McMinnville,  was  designated  as  the  point  of  junction,  though  that  could 
have  been  modified,  if  desirable,  after  an  examination  of  the  locality.  General 
McCook  proceeded  up  the  valley  some  distance  until  he  received  information 
on  which  he  relied,  that  the  enemy  had  already  entered  the  valley  in  force, 
or  would  enter  it  before  he  could  be  intercepted.  He  therefore  returned  to 
Crittenden  at  the  Higginbottom  road,  which  he  deemed  to  be  impracticable 
for  his  artillery  and  train,  and  both  divisions  returned  to  Battle  Creek,  where, 
after  hearing  from  them,  I  sent  them  fm^ther  orders.  The  information  was 
positive  that  the  enemy  was  advancing  on  the  Thurman  road,  where  in  fact 
his  cavalry  was  encountered ;  and  under  the  orders  for  the  concentration 
Thomas  went  to  Altamont  from  McMinnville  with  one  division,  but  returned 
to  McMinnville.  McCook  arrived  there  a  little  later  and  remained  until  the 
final  concentration  at  Murfreesl)oro'  under  the  orders  of  the  30th.  A  brigade 
under  Colonel  W.  H.  Lytic,  of  Rousseau's  division,  was  still  retained  at  Hunts- 
ville, and  two  regiments  under  Colonel  L.  A.  Harris  were  at  Battle  Creek.  The 
failure  of  McCook's  movement  up  the  Sequatchie  was  unfortunate.  It  gave 
a  false  impression  of  the  enemy's  progress,  and  of  the  route  he  was  to  pursue. 
But  for  the  erroneous  information  under  which  it  was  abandoned,  it  ought 
to  have  led  to  important  results.  There  would  have  been  no  advantage, 
however,  in  retiring  on  the  Higginbottom  road  without  meeting  the  enemy. 


EAST  TENNESSEE  AND    THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  PERRYJ/ILLE.  41 

We  were  now  reduced  to  ten  days'  provisions.  Our  railroad  communica- 
tion north  of  Nashville  had  been  broken  for  twenty  days,  and  no  effort  was 
being  made  at  Louisville  to  reopen  it.  My  orders  to  General  Nelson  had 
been  of  no  avail.  In  fact,  on  his  arrival  there  he  found  Kentucky  organized 
into  a  separate  department  not  under  my  command ;  and  his  report  of  my 
instructions  and  his  representations  of  the  necessity  of  opening  the  road  to 
Nashville  were  answered  with  orders  from  Washington  to  first  open  com- 
munication with  Cumberland  Gap,  where  General  G.  W.  Morgan  was  not  in 
danger,  and  had  abundant  supplies  for  the  present.  The  result  of  those 
orders,  unnecessary  for  the  relief  of  Morgan,  and  insufficient  for  stopping 
Kirby  Smith,  was  the  defeat  of  Nelson  at  Richmond  on  the  30th.  Ten  days 
had  elapsed  since  the  enemy's  advance  was  positively  reported,  and  there  was 
no  more  evidence  of  his  approach  than  at  first.  He  was,  of  course,  to  be 
expected,  any  day,  but  he  might  not  come  in  two  weeks. 

Under  the  circumstances  it  was  plainly  necessary  to  concentrate  nearer 
Nashville,  where  we  could  get  to  work  on  the  railroad,  and  at  the  same  time 
be  ready  for  the  enemy  when  he  should  come.  Orders  were  accordingly 
given  on  the  30th  of  August  for  concentrating  at  Murfreesboro'  on  the  5th 
of  September.  Thomas,  at  McMinnville,  was  to  march  on  the  2d,  and  other 
commands  according  to  their  position.  To  the  last  Thomas  had  no  defi- 
nite information  of  the  approach  of  the  enemy.  It  turned  out  that  Bragg 
crossed  at  Chattanooga  on  the  28th  of  August,  entered  Sparta  on  the  3d  of 
September,  and  made  his  way  to  Glasgow,  where  he  arrived  on  the  14th, 
ha^dng  crossed  the  Cumberland  at  Carthage  and  Gainsboro'.  Something 
of  these  movements,  though  not  of  the  entii-e  force,  was  learned  on  the  6th, 
and  that  Bowling  Green  was  threatened.  Two  divisions  were,  therefore, 
moved  across  the  river  at  Nashville  on  the  7th, —  one  to  go  to  the  protection 
of  Bowhng  Green,  where  there  was  a  small  garrison  with  some  stores,  and 
the  other  to  Gallatin,  to  gain  information  of  the  movements  of  the  enemy  in 
the  valley. 

At  the  same  time  preparation  was  made  to  act  with  the  remaining  force  as 
circumstances  might  require.  Two  and  a  half  divisions,  including  Paine's 
division  from  Grant,  which  had  not  yet  arrived,  and  a  large  nunil)er  of  con- 
valescents, were  designated  to  hold  Nash\alle,  under  the  eoniniand  of  General 
Thomas.  It  was  ascertained  on  the  lOtli  that  the  bulk  of  Bragg's  army  had 
marched  north  from  the  Cumberland,  and  my  movable  divisions  were  accord- 
ingly put  in  motion  to  follow.  They  were  concentrated  at  Bowling  Gi-een  on 
the  evening  of  the  15th.  I  there  learned  that  the  garrison  at  Munfonhille 
had  been  attacked,  but  the  result  was  not  certainly  known,  Bragg  was 
reported  at  Glasgow,  and  on  the  KJth  I  marched  to  givi^  battle  to  him  at  that 
place;  but  during  the  day  it  was  asc(>rtaiiied  that  he  had  marched  the  day 
before  for  Miiiit'ordville,  the  garrison  of  which,  it  was  also  ascertained,  had 
re]ielled  the  first  attack,  and  my  divisions  were  directed  upon  that  point.  Tlu» 
next  day,  at  Prewett's  Knob,  thirteen  miles  from  :Munfordville,  I  learned  tliat 
the  garrison  had  that  morning  surrendered  to  Bragg's  entiic  army,  and  that 
night  Colonel  Wilder  reported  to  mo  with  his  command  as  j.risoners  of  war, 

VOL.  Ill      4. 


42 


EAST  TENNESSEE  AND   THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  PERRYKILLE 


The  enemy  was  now  concentrated  in  front  of  us,  and  had  taken  up  a  posi= 
tion  of  unusual  strength  upon  and  beliind  a  rather  low  crest  on  the  south  side 
of  Green  River.  My  information  of  the  aggregate  force  assembled  in  east 
Tennessee  was  sufficiently  accurate,  but  at  fii'st  there  was  no  means  of  know- 
ing what  portion  of  it  was  with  Bragg,  and  what  portion  had  followed  Kirby 
Smith.  The  proximity  of  the  last  three  days  had  given  a  better  knowledge 
of  Bragg's  strength.  Colonel  Wilder,  who  was  competent,  and  had  had  some 
opportunity  for  observation,  estimated  it  at  from  35,000  to  40,000  men,  and 
nobody  estimated  it  at  any  less.     I  supposed  it  to  be  from  30,000  to  40,000.     I 

had  with  me  35,000  effective  men,  but 
on  being  satisfied  at  Bowling  Green 
that  no  considerable  force  remained  to 
threaten  Nashville,  I  called  up  Thom- 
as's division,  and  now  determined,  on 
its  arrival,  to  attack  Bragg's  position  if 
he  should  remain.  Thomas  arrived  on 
the  20th.  There  was  some  skirmishing 
between  the  lines  that  evening,  but 
the  enemy  withdrew  during  the  night. 
His  rear-guard  was  driven  out  of  Mun- 
f  ordville  the  next  day,  and  was  pressed 
by  oui'  advanced  guard  until  he  turned 
off  the  main  road  toward  Bardstown.->V 
There  was  no  reason  to  hesitate  at 
this  point  as  to  the  course  which  I 
should  pursue.  I  did  not  know  where 
Kii'by  Smith  was,  but  the  junction  be- 
tween himself  and  Bragg  was  to  be 
considered  as  practically  established. 
United  for  battle  they  would  outnumber  me  very  greatly.  Louisville  also,  in  the 
presence  of  this  combined  force,  might  be  in  danger.  Besides,  our  provisions 
were  nearly  exhausted ;  some  of  the  troops  were  without  rations  after  arriv- 
ing at  West  Point,  twenty-five  miles  from  Louisville.  I  therefore  pushed  for- 
ward to  Louisville,  the  leading  division  arriving  there  on  the  25th,  and  the 
last  on  the  29th.  The  cavalry  was  kept  as  an  outpost  at  Elizabethtown  to 
guard  the  flank  of  the  passing  columns  and  watch  any  possible  movements 
of  the  enemy  toward  Bowling  Green.  The  large  empty  wagon  train  which 
the  exhaustion  of  our  supplies  at  Nashville  had  rendered  useless  and  insup- 
portable, had  })een  pushed  through  from  Bowling  Green  by  the  way  of  Browns- 
ville, Litchfield,  and  West  Point,  under  a  cavalry  escort. 

The  army  was  now  to  encounter  grave  danger  from  the  influence  of  Oliver 
P.  Morton,  Governor  of  Indiana.  He  had  from  the  ])eginning  tried  to  retain 
a  r/uasl  authority  over  Lidiana  troops  after  they  had  been  mustered  into  the 

•^  111  his  official  report  General  Bragg  states  that  he  ' '  offered  battle  "  at  Mimf ordville.  No  doubt  he 
was  willing  to  fight  on  his  own  terms  at  more  than  one  point.  But  the  general  who  offers  battle  is  he 
who  stays  to  give  or  receive  it. — D.  C.  B. 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL    JAMES    8.   JACKSON,  KILLED    AT 
PERRYVILLE.       FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


EAST  TENNESSEE  AND   THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  PERRYl^ILLE.  43 

service  of  the  United  States  and  had  joined  my  army.  His  interference  was 
injurious  to  discipline  5  but  he  persisted  in  order  to  preserve  his  influence  with 
the  troops,  the  people,  and  the  Government.  The  seeds  of  mischief,  always 
present  in  his  extra-official  conduct  toward  the  Indiana  troops,  were  now  being 
sown  with  a  vigorous  but  crafty  hand,  in  the  counsels  at  Washington  and 
among  the  executives  of  other  States,  to  impair  my  authority  and  effect  my 
removal  from  command.  General  Nelson,  an  officer  of  remarkable  merit,  was 
in  command  of  the  center  corps  of  my  army.  He  was  assaulted  and  killed  by 
General  Davis,  accompanied  by  Governor  Morton,  the  very  day  before  the 
army  was  to  march  against  the  invaders.  Nelson,  though  often  rough  in 
command,  was  always  solicitous  about  the  well-being  of  his  troops,  and  was 
held  in  high  esteem  for  his  conspicuous  services,  gallantry  in  battle,  and 
great  energy ;  and  his  death  caused  much  indignation  among  the  troojDS  that 
knew  him  best.  Davis,  an  Indianian,  was  unknown  in  my  arm}^  except  in  his 
own  division,  which  had  just  joined  while  he  was  absent ;  but  Morton's  rela- 
tion to  the  affair  brought  to  bear  in  Davis's  behalf  a  State  feeling  inspired  by 
Morton  and  strengthened  by  his  habitual  intervention  in  favor  of  Indiana 
troops  against  the  rigidity  of  my  control.  The  restraining  influence  of  dis- 
cipline was  all  that  prevented  an  outbreak  between  the  friends  of  Nelson  and 
Davis,  which  might  have  added  the  most  serious  consequences  to  the  criminal 
occurrence. 

Nothing  but  the  law  of  violence  could,  under  any  circumstances,  justify  the 
manner  of  the  killing  for  the  alleged  provocation,  and  no  mere  merit  of  ordi- 
nary soldiership  could  ever  atone  for  the  sacrilege  against  discipline  under 
the  circumstances  which  existed.  The  dignity  of  a  State  was  abused  by  the 
attitude  of  its  governor  in  the  affair,  and  the  authority  of  the  general  gov- 
ernment was  even  more  degraded  by  its  condonement  of  the  act  —  a  con- 
donement  made  virtually,  if  not  actually,  at  his  dictation.i!^ 

Davis  was  immediateh^  placed  in  arrest,  and  the  case  reported  to  General 
Halleck,  with  the  request  that  a  court  might  be  ordered  from  Washington 
for  its  trial,  as  the  operations  then  in  progress  made  it  impracticable  for  me 
to  spare  the  officers  for  the  purpose  at  the  moment.    Instead  of  that,  Davis 

i^  Briefly  stated,  the  particulars  of  the  occurrence  nounced  him  for  appearing  as  an  abettor  of  the  in- 

are  as  follows  :    Nelson  was  in  command  at  Louis-  suit  forced  upon  him,  and  retired  toward  his  room 

villc,  and  was  laboring  to  put  the  city  in  a  state  of  in  the  adjoining  hall.    Davis  received  a  pistol  from 

defense  against  the  expected  attack.  A  few  days  be-  the  hand  of  his  other  attendant,  not  Morton,  and 

fore  my  arrival  lie  rebuked  Davis,  no  doubt  harshly,  followed  Nelson  to  the  hall.     Nelson,  apparently 

for  what  he  considered  a  neglectful  or  inefficient  dis-  changing  his  purpose,  returned  before  reaching  his 

charge  of  duty,  and  ordered  him  to  report  to  General  room,  and  as  he  nearly  reached  the  end  of  the  liall 

Wright  at  Cincinnati.     Upon  my  arrival  Davis  was  where  DaWs  was,  the  latter  tired,  inflicting  a  wound 

ordered  by  Wright  to  report  to  me  for  duty  with  his  in  the  breast,  of  which  Nelson  died  in  about  half  an 

division.     Instead  of  proceeding  directly  to  Louis-  hour,  after  receiving  the  ministrations  of  the  church 

ville,  he  went  by  Indianapolis  and  was  joined  by  and   forgiving  his  slayer.      It  has  recently  been 

Morton.     With  liim  and  with  another  friend  Davis  made  known  for  the  lirst  tinu^  in  a  publislied  stati-- 

approached  Nelson  in  tlio  vestibule  of  the  Gait  House  ment  of  the  affair  by  General  James  B.  Fry,  who 

at  Louisville  at  breakfast-time,  in  the  presence  of  at  the  moment  ])laced  Davis  in  arrest,  and  as  a 

a  considerable  number  of  persons.    The  reception  ])ersonal    friend    listened    to    his    statement,    that 

which  Davis's  demand  for  satisfaction  received  was  upon  accosting  Nelson.  Davis  tilliiied  into  Ins  face 

no  doubt  such  as  he  had  expected.     Wliat  the  l)y-  a  i)aper-wad  that  he  Inid  b(HMi  crumpling  between 

standers  witTiessed  and  what  was  reported  at  the  liis  fingers.    It  was  then  tluit  Nelson  struck  liim.    I 

time  was  a  slap  from  the  back  of  Nelson's  liand  in  was  not  aware  of  this  circumstance  until  the  ap- 

Davis's  face.     Nelson  then  turned  to  Morton.  <le-  pearance  of  the  statenu'nt  referred  to.— D.  C.  B. 


44  EAST  TENNESSEE  AND   THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  PERRYI/ILLE. 

was  released,  ostensibly  that  the  case  might  be  turned  over  to  the  civil 
authority;  and  thus  the  military  authority  of  the  Government  was  abased 
over  the  grave  of  a  high  officer,  whose  slaughter  by  another  officer  under 
such  circumstances,  and  as  a  purely  military  offense,  it  had  not  the  character 
to  bring  to  trial.  J 

In  the  midst  of  the  excitement  caused  by  the  killing  of  Nelson,  and  the 
active  preparation  that  was  going  on  for  an  advance  against  the  enemy  the 
next  day,  an  order  was  received  from  Washington  relieving  me  from  the  (».om- 
mand,  and  appointing  Greneral  Thomas  to  succeed  me.  In  a  little  while 
General  Thomas  came  to  my  room  and  stated  his  intention  to  decline  the 
command.  I  answered  that  I  could  not  consent  to  his  doing  so  on  any  gi'ound 
that  was  personal  to  me,  and  that  if  his  determination  was  fixed  I  must  be 
allowed  to  see  the  message  he  proposed  to  send.  He  then  prepared  the  fol- 
lowing dispatch  to  General  Halleck : 

"  Colonel  McKibbin  handed  me  your  dispatch  placing  me  in  command  of  the  Department  of 
the  Tennessee.  General  Buell's  preparations  have  been  completed  to  march  against  the  enemy, 
and  I  therefore  respectfully  ask  that  he  may  be  retained  in  command.  My  position  is  very 
embarrassing,  not  being  as  well  informed  as  I  should  be  as  the  commander  of  this  army,  and 
on  the  assumption  of  such  a  responsibility." 

I  could  make  no  personal  objection  to  his  reasons,  but  I  encouraged  him  to 
accept  the  duty  assigned  to  him,  saying  that  nothing  remained  to  be  done  but 
to  put  the  army  in  motion,  and  that  I  would  cheerfully  explain  my  plans  to 
him  and  give  him  all  the  information  I  possessed.  He  persisted,  however, 
and  the  message  went  off.  I  did  not  then  know  of  the  steps  that  were  being 
taken  for  my  retention  by  both  of  the  senators  and  two  representatives 
from  Kentucky.  5^ 

Halleck  replied  to  Thomas  that  the  order  had  not  been  made  by  him  or 
by  his  advice,  and  he  had  no  power  to  revoke  it,  but  that  he  would  sus- 
pend it  until  the  question  could  be  submitted  to  the  Government,  and  that 
Colonel  McKibbin  had  been  twice  telegraphed  to  withhold  the  order.  The 
order  was  accordingly  suspended.  I  at  once  resumed  the  reins  of  command, 
which,  indeed,  had  scarcely  been  laid  aside,  and  proceeded  with  the  prepara- 
tions to  advance. 

On  my  arrival  at  Louisville  I  had  found  a  considerable  number  of  newly 
made  regiments  or  fragments  of  regiments,  which  the  crisis  had  hurried  into 

\  The  following  order  announced  General  Nel-  of  public  duty;  but  no  man  was  more  prompt  to  recog- 

son's  death  to  the  army :  "i^^  ^""^  foster  merit  in  bis  inferiors,  and  in  bis  own 

conduct  be  set  an  example  of  tbat  vigilance,  indus- 

"  HEADQUAKTEKS,  ARMY  OF  THK  Oiiio,  Loi'isviLLE,  t^'^'  •'^"*^  Piowpt  attention  to  duty  whicb  be  exacted 

September  29tb,  18(;2.   General  Orders,  No.  47a.    Tbe  fiomotbers.   In  battle  bis  example  was  equally  marked, 

seiicnil  conniianding  announces  witb  inexpressible  re-  ^n   more  tban   one  field -at  Sbilob,   Ricbmond,  and 

Kr.-t  tl.e.leutber  Msuor-General  William  Nelson,  wbicb  Ivy   Mountain -be   was   conspicuous   for   bis   gallant 

occurred  in  tbis  city  at  8 :  30  o'clock  tbis  morniiiK-  bearing. 

"Tbe  deceased  was  bred  a  sailor,  and  was  an  officer  of  "T'lf  funeral  of  the  deceased  wiU  take  place  at  3 

tbe  navy  wbile  bolding  a  commission  in  tbe  militan'  ^-  '"•  t'>-m<.rrow,  at  Calvary  Cbureb,  Third  street.    By 

service.    ITisfory  will  honor  him  as  one  of  tlie  first  to  f""'""""^  of  Major-General  Buell.     James  B.  Fey, 

()n,'iiiii/,c.  l)y  bis  iiKlividiml  exertion,  a  military  force  in  Colonel  and  Cbief-of-8taflF." 

K.iitu.'ky.  his  naf  iv  HI  ate.  to  rescue  be-  from  tbe  vor-  +  Dispatch  from  Senators  Crittenden  and  Davis, 

'"^n::::^2^"^:^^::s:!^ts,::z^::"::^;.,r ,.  ™.iBep.-™.«tive.M»,wa„dD„„iap,to,he 

sive  views,  and  great  eiu-rgy  and  foicr  of  cbaraitei-.  By  l'i-(^sident  ("  Official  Records,"  Vol.  XVI.,  Part  II., 
bis  nature  be  was  intolerant  of  disobedience,  or  neglect      p.  557). 


EAST  TENNESSEE  AND   THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  PERRYK/LLE. 


4S 


the  State  from  Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Illinois.  After  desi^-nating  a  portion  as  a 
guard  for  Louisville,  mostly  organized  into  a  division  under  General  Dumont, 
the  remainder  of  the  new  regiments  were  assigned  to  places  in  the  old  divisions ; 
the  baggage,  hospital,  and  supply  trains  were  reorganized  ;  the  equipment  of 
the  soldier  was  repaired ;  each  man  was  provided  with  individual  cooking- 
utensils,  so  as  almost  to  dispense 
with  baggage-wagons;  and  on 
the  arrival  of  the  last  division,  on 
the  29th,  the  army  was  ready  to 
march  on  the  next  day.  One  day 
was  lost  by  the  instructions  from 
Washington,  Ijut  orders  were 
given  for  marching  on  the  1st  of 
October.  The  army  was  divided 
into  three  corps :  the  First  under 
Genera]  McCook,  the  Second  un 
der  General  T.  L.  Crittenden,  and 
the  Third  under  General  Gilbert. 
This  corps  was  to  have  been  com- 
manded by  General  Nelson.  Gen- 
eral Thomas  was  announced  as 
second  in  command  in  the  army. 
It  is  now  proper  to  take  a  survey 
of  the  military  situation  which 
was  before  me. 

My  instructions  of  the  18th 
of  March  placed  General  G.  W.  Morgan  in  command  of  the  Seventh  division 
of  the  army,  to  operate  in  the  Cumberland  Gap  road  from  Kentucky  to  east 
Tennessee,  and  required  him  to  take  the  Gap  if  practicable,  and  if  not,  to 
hold  the  enemy  in  check  on  that  route.  The  division  was  at  first  only 
partially  formed,  and  some  time  elapsed  before  it  was  in  a  condition  to 
advance.  The  Gap  was  naturally  strong,  and  was  occupied  by  a  consider- 
able force.  Morgan  turned  the  position  on  the  17th  of  June  by  marching 
through  Big  Creek  and  Rogers's  Gaps.  The  Confederates  thereupon  evacu- 
ated the  place  without  waiting  for  an  attack,  and  Morgan  took  possession 
on  the  18th.  It  was  at  once  strongly  intrenched  under  the  supervision  of 
an  officer  of  engineers,  but  its  importance  in  a  general  campaign  was  not  in 
proportion  to  the  force  to  which  its  maintenance  gave  occupation.  It  was 
chiefly  as  an  encouragement  to  the  loyal  element  in  east  Tennessee  that  the 
possession  of  it  was  desirable.  The  campaign  inaugurated  by  the  Confed- 
ei-ates  in  east  Tennessee  emi)loyed  the  troops  of  two  military  dei>artments, 
and  lal)ored  under  the  inconvenience  of  cooperation  l)etween  the  two  inde- 
])endent  commanders,  instead  of  subordination  to  a  single  authority.  It  was 
executed  with  a  harmony  and  zeal  unusual  under  such  circumstaiKM's,  but 
perhaps  lacked  the  consistency  which  either  of  the  two  leaders  wt)uld  have 
been  amply  capable  of  imi)arting  to  it. 


BEIGADIER-GENERAL    WILLIAM    R.   TERRILL,  KILLED    AT 
PERRTVILLE.       FROM    A   PHOTOGRAPH. 


46 


EAST  TENNESSEE  AND  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  PERRY yiLLE. 


The  original  plan  was  for  a  combined  movement 
into  middle  Tennessee  for  the  recovery  of  Nash- 
ville. The  invasion  of  Kentucky  was  at  first  prob- 
ably not  thought  of  at  all,  or  at  least  only  as  a 
later  possibility.  But  as  Bragg  could  not  be  ready 
to  cross  the  river  from  Chattanooga  for  about  two 
weeks  after  his  arrival,  it  was  arranged  that  in  the 
meantime  Kirby  Smith  with  his  troops  should  at- 
tack and  capture  Morgan  at  Cumberland  Gap.  The 
strength  of  Morgan's  fortified  position,  however, 
with  8000  good  troops  to  defend  it,  was  upon  con- 
sideration deemed  to  preclude  the  attempt.  The 
alternative  was  to  invest  him  on  the  soutii  side 
with  1)000  men  under  Stevenson,  while  Smith  with 
lL',000  sliould  seize  and  hold  his  communications 
on  the  north ;  by  which  means,  not  being  strong 
enough  to  break  his  way  out  on  either  side,  Mor- 
gan, upon  the  exhaustion  of  his  sup])lie8,  would  be 
compelled  to  surrender.  This  i)laii  l)eiug  adopted, 
Smith  commenced  his  movement  through  Kogers's 
and  Big  Creek  Gaps  on  the  14th  of  August,  and 
reached  Morgan's  rear  at  Barbourville  on  the  18th. 
He  now  perceived  that  it  would  be  impossible 
for  him  to  gather  supplies  for  his  command  from 
that  poor  and  exhausted  region,  and  later  his  em- 
barrassment was  increased  by  Morgan's  occupa- 
tion of  Eogers's  and  Big  Creek  Gaps.  Nothing 
therefore  remained  for  him  but  to  withdraw  or 
advance  boldly  into  the  rich  portion  of  Kentucky. 
Bragg  was  not  at  first  in  favor  of  the  latter  course, 
until  he  should  be  prepared  to  follow  up  the  pre- 
cipitate movement  which  it  was  not  doubted  I 
would  make  from  middle  Tennessee  for  the  pro- 
tection of  Kentucky.  However,  his  concurrence 
was  readily  yielded,  for  the  proposition  was  allur- 
ing. The  idea  of  invasion,  which  had  now  taken 
firm  root,  was  coupled  with  the  chimera  of  an  up- 
rising of  the  people  and  a  transfer  of  the  State  to 
the  Confederacy.  I  never  had  the  slightest  appre- 
hension of  such  a  result.  Boys  might  join  John 
Morgan's  roving  cavaliers,  and  some  mature  men 
might  commit  themselves  with  less  romance  to  the 
cause  of  the  Confederacy,  and  these  phenomena 
would  of  course  be  multiplied  by  the  backing  of  an 
army.  But  when  Kentucky  so  far  overcame  her 
sympathy  as  to  assume  an  attitude  of  neutrality, 
she  listened  to  a  call  of  reason  and  interest,  not 
unmingled  with  genuine  love  of  the  Union,  that 
was  not  to  stop  at  half-measures ;  and  as  soon  as 
it  became  apparent  that  neutrality  was  impractica- 
ble, it  was  the  deliberate  choice  of  the  mass  of  the 
people  —  not  any  pressiire  of  coercion — that  ar- 
rayed her  irrevocably  on  the  side  of  the  Union. 
To  that  choice  she  was  thoroughly  loyal,  and  no 
finer  example  of  political  and  popular  generosity 
can  anywhere  be  foimd  than  that  wherein,  at  the 
close  of  the  conflict,  she  restored  to  all  the  rights 
of  citizenship  and  the  ties  of  fraternity  her  oxp:i- 
triated  sons  who  for  four  years  had  inad<'  war 
upon  her. 

Smith  advanced  from  Barljourville  with  12,000 
men  on  the  2r)th  of  August,  encountered  at  Kogers- 
ville  and  Richmond  the  5000  or  0000  raw  troops 
assembled  there,  scattered  them  like  chaff,  mak- 
ing prisoners  and  capturing  arms,  proceeded  to 
Lexington,  where  he  established  his  head<iuarters 


.on  the  2d  of  September,  occupied  Frankfort  and 
Cynthiana,  and  finally  threw  his  pickets  almost  to 
the  gates  of  Cincinnati  and  Louisville. 

These  events  produced  widespread  effects.  They 
were  the  signal  tor  the  movement  of  Humphrey 
Marshall  with  3000  men  into  Kentucky  through 
Pound  Gap,  and  it  would  seem  stimulated  Bragg's 
advance  from  Chattanooga.  They  changed  the 
concentration  of  my  army  from  Murfreesboro'  to 
Nashville,  and  would  perhaps  have  caused  the  trans- 
fer of  half  of  it  into  Kentucky,  which  seemed  to  be 
jjowerless,  but  for  the  sudden  appearance  of  Bragg 
in  the  Valley  of  the  Cumberland  endangering  Nash- 
ville. In  Kentucky  and  other  bordering  States, 
they  produced  an  excitement  which  was  intense  in 
some  places,  amounting  almost  to  consternation. 
Business  at  Cincinnati  was  for  a  few  days  entirely 
suspended  for  the  purpose  of  defense  ;  intreneh- 
ments  were  vigorously  prosecuted  at  Covington 
and  Louisville  by  the  labor  of  the  citizens  and  the 
troops,  and  raw  regiments  in  the  process  of  forma- 
tion were  hurried  into  Cincinnati  and  Louisville 
from  Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Illinois.  The  Government 
of  Kentucky  sought  refuge  at  Louisville,  where  on 
my  arrival  Nelson  reported  a  force  of  30,000  raw 
troops. 

General  Morgan  at  Cumberland  Gap  was  promptly 
aware  of  Kirby  Smith's  movement,  and  informed 
me  of  it  on  the  IGth  of  August.  He  had  thirty 
days'  provisions,  and  was  instructed  the  same  day 
to  hold  his  position.  The  exhaustion  of  his  sup- 
plies and  the  improbability  of  their  being  replen- 
ished in  time  made  it  necessary  for  him  at  last  to 
withdraw,  which  he  did  on  the  night  of  the  17th 
of  September'.  He  was  pm"sued  by  Stevenson  and 
harassed  by  John  Morgan's  cavalry,  but  made  his 
way  successfully  through  Manchester,  Boonesville, 
West  Liberty,  and  Grayson  to  the  Ohio  River  at 
Greenup,  where  he  arrived  about  the  2d  of  Octo- 
ber. Stevenson  with  his  division  joined  Kirby 
Smit-h  near  Frankfort  about  the  time  of  my  arrival 
at  Louisville,  and  was  present  in  the  operations 
around  Perryville. 

On  his  ai'rival  in  central  Kentucky,  Smith  issued 
his  proclamation  inviting  the  people  to  join  the 
cause  of  their  deliverance,  and  Bragg  did  the  same 
in  pathetic  terms  at  Glasgow.  These  appeals,  like 
many  of  the  orders  promulgated  to  arouse  the  ani- 
mosity and  stimulate  the  valor  of  the  Southern 
troops,  would  give  a  sad  impression  of  the  condi- 
tion of  the  inhabitants,  especially  the  innocent  and 
helpless,  and  of  the  brutality  of  the  oppressor ; 
but  they  were  not  confirmed  by  the  feebleness  of 
the  response.  There  was  a  sweet  sympathy,  so  the 
Confederates  thought,  but  that  was  all.  The  arms 
in  abundance,  which  Kentuckians  were  advised  to 
grasp,  remained  in  the  store-houses.  Kentuckians 
suffered  just  as  Ohioans  would  have  suffered  with 
armies  in  their  midst,  and  they  had  as  a  body  no 
more  thought  of  changing  their  colors.  During  the 
whole  occupation  enough  perhaps  for  a  brigade 
joined  tlie  invaders. 

The  arrival  of  Bragg  at  Bardstown  gave  the 
Confederates  ^^rtual  possession  of  the  whole  of 
Kentucky  east  of  the  Louisville  and  Nashville 
Railroad,  excepting  within  the  limits  of  Covington 


EAST  TENNESSEE  AND  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  PERRYI^ILLE. 


47 


and  Louisville,  and  Smith  called  his  troops  to- 
gether near  Frankfort  to  assist  in  the  proposed 
attack  upon  Louisville.  That  project  was  post- 
poned after  tny  arrival ;  but  Polk,  Bragg  having 
gone  to  Frankfort  and  Lexington,  was  ordered 
to  occupy  Shepherdsville,  Taylorsville,  and  other 
near  points  around  Louisville.  Steps  were  being 
taken  to  that  end  when,  on  the  2d  of  October,  the 
enemy's  pickets  announced  to  the  leaders  at  Frank- 
fort and  Bardstown  the  advance  of  my  army  in 
force  on  four  roads,  threatening  the  whole  of  their 
front,  which  covered  a  distance  of  sixty  miles. 

The  plan  of  my  movement  was  to  force  the  ene- 
my's left  back  and  compel  him  to  concentrate  as 
far  as  possible  from  any  convenient  line  of  retreat, 
while  at  the  same  time  making  a  strongdemonstra- 
tion  against  his  right,  so  as  to  mislead  him  as  to 
the  real  point  of  attack,  and  prevent  him  from 
moving  upon  my  left  flank  and  rear.  With  that 
object  General  Sill,  commanding  a  division  in  Mc- 
Cook's  corps,  was  ordered  to  move  boldly  toward 
Frankfort  through  Shelbyville,  followed  tempora- 
rily by  the  division  of  raw  troops  under  Dumont 
which  hadljeen  organized  as  a  guard  for  Louisville. 
McCook  with  his  two  remaining  divisions  moved 
upon  Taylorsville,  where  he  halted  the  second  night 
in  a  position  which  pointed  to  either  flank.  The 
other  two  corps  moved  respectively  through  Shep- 
herdsville  and  Mt.  Washington,  to  converge  upon 
Bardstown,  and  halted  the  second  night  at  Salt 
River.  The  enemy's  pickets  were  encountered  on 
all  of  the  roads  within  a  few  miles  of  the  city,  in- 
creasing in  strength  as  the  movement  progressed, 
and  opposing  a  sharp  opposition  at  Bardstown  and 
Shelbyville.  Polk  withdrew  his  army  from  Bards- 
town on  the  night  of  the  3d,  going  through  Spring- 
field, and  Sill,  against  a  considerable  resistance, 
pushed  back  the  force  in  front  of  him  toward 
Frankfort.  These  measures  brouglit  to  a  hurried 
completion  the  inauguration  of  Provisional  Gov- 
ernor Hawes  at  Frankfort  on  the  4th,  under  the 
supervision  of  General  Bragg.  Polk,  on  his  part, 
was  pressed  so  closely  t lint  Hardee,  who  was  bring- 
ing up  his  rear,  w.is  ((niiiMlled  to  make  a  stand  at 
PeiTyville  and  call  for  assistance.  Assuming  that 
Smith  was  the  object  of  my  attack,  and  that  my 
right  and  rear  would  thereby  bo  exposed  to  Polk 
at  Bardstown,  Bragg  ordered  Polk  on  the  2d  to 
attack  in  that  manner,  while  Smith  should  attack 
my  left,  and  that  view  of  my  design  was  persisted 
in  ;  so  tliat  only  one  of  the  two  divisions  which 
were  being  pressed  forward  to  reenforce  Smith 
was  returned  to  assist  Hardee  at  Perryville  on  the 
uiglit  of  the  7th. 

The  strength  of  the  opposition  to  Sill  and  the 
continued  presence  of  Kirby  Smith  about  Frankfort 
pointed  to  a  concentration  in  that  dii-ection,  at  least 
nortli  of  PeiTyville  ;  but  on  the  (Ith  the  information 
was  that  Smith  was  moving  upon  Danville.  Mc- 
Cook, who  had  been  halted  momentarily  at  Bloom- 
field  until  the  question  should  be  developed,  was 
therefore  directed  on  Harrodsburg,  and  Sill  was 
ordered  to  join  him  by  forced  marclies.  During  tlie 
night  the  information  in  regaril  to  Smith  was  con- 
tradicted, and  the  expectation  of  a  concentration 

i  "  Olllcial  Kecords,"  Ve 


at  or  north  of  Perryville  was  confirmed.  MeCook 
was  therefore  promptly  turned  upon  Perryville, 
and  Sill  was  ordered  to  follow  him.  Under  a  stub- 
born resistance  fi"om  Polk,  during  the  7th,  the 
center  corps  halted  in  the  evening  about  three 
and  a  half  miles  from  Perryville  without  water,  of 
which  it  had  had  but  little  since  morning,  and  the 
corps  was  put  in  order  of  battle.  It  appeared 
now  that  the  enemy  was  vii'tually  concentrated  in 
our  front.  Orders  were  therefore  dispatched  to 
McCook,  who  was  supposed  to  be  about  seven 
miles  back,  on  the  left,  and  to  Thomas,  who  had 
been  ordered  to  halt  the  right  corps  (Crittenden's) 
for  the  night  at  Haysville,  about  four  miles  in  rear, 
on  the  road  from  Lebanon  to  Perryville.  They 
were  to  march  precisely  at  3  o'clock  in  the  morn- 
ing, prepared  in  every  respect  for  battle,  and  on 
arriving  at  certain  designated  jioints  were  to  be 
formed  in  order  of  battle  on  the  left  and  right, 
respectively,  of  the  center  corps.  They  were  then 
to  be  made  as  comfortable  as  possible,  but  not  to 
leave  ranks.  A  reconnoissance  was  to  be  made  to 
ascertain  the  position  of  the  enemy,  and  as  soon 
as  that  was  done  Thomas  and  McCook  were  to 
report  at  headquarters  for  further  orders.  |  I 
expected  that  these  objects  would  be  accomplished 
by  7  o'clock  in  the  morning. 

During  the  night  it  was  ascertained  that  there 
were  some  pools  of  water  in  the  bed  of  Doctor's 
Fork,  which  crossed  the  road  in  front  of  us,  and 
of  which  the  enemy's  rear-guard  held  possession. 
Colonel  Daniel  McCook,  commanding  a  brigade  in 
Sheridan's  division,  was  selected  to  attack  the 
enemy  and  get  possession  of  the  water,  which  he 
did  in  a  handsome  manner  at  day  dawn.  Very 
soon  the  enemy  attempted  to  recover  the  lost  posi- 
tion, but  Sheridan's  and  Mitchell's  divisions  were 
moved  to  the  front  and  defeated  the  design.  From 
that  time  a  desultory  cannonading  was  kept  up 
between  the  two  lines  until  it  merged  into  the  bat- 
tle, which  suddenly  burst  forth  fiercely  at  2  o'clock. 
The  arrival  of  McCook's  corps  is  dated  from  half- 
past  10  o'clock,  but  for  the  bulk  of  the  corps  it 
was  later.  He  reported  to  me  at  about  half-past 
12,  and  I  hastened  his  return  to  his  command; 
for  though  the  time  had  passed  when  I  had  some- 
what apprehended  an  attack,  while  the  center 
corps  was  alone,  yet  the  occasion  was  critical, 
and  he  had  not  reconnoitered  his  front.  Thomas 
had  not  reported,  and  no  final  instructions  for 
attack  could  be  given.  When  McCook  readied 
his  corps,  it  had  materially  changed  its  ground  and 
was  not  in  position.  Artillery  guns  were  exchang- 
ing distant  shots,  but  evidently  no  one  on  our  side 
was  expecting  an  attack.  It  came  at  about  2 
o'clock,  while  a  line  was  moving  forward  to  take 
possession  of  the  water  which  could  be  discerned 
in  the  bed  of  Clniplin  river,  behind  wliich  the 
enemy  were  formed  for  the  assault. 

It  turned  out  tliat  Polk  witli  three  divisions,  with 
cavalry  on  both  fljinks,  had  determined  \o  figlit  a 
"defensive-olTensive"  battle;  but  as  the  morning 
wore  away  without  the  attack,  which  was  awaited, 
Bragg  came  ujion  the  ground  and  onlered  an  as- 
sault. If  was  delivered  mainly  upon  McCook,  but 
1.  XVI.,  I'Mit  H.,  1).  580. 


48 


EAST  TENNESSEE  AND  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  PERRYl^lLLE. 


also  fell  heavily  upon  Sheridan,  who  repelled  it 
handsomely  on  his  side.  MeCook  fought  bravely, 
and  by  (rilberfs  order  was  reenforced  with  Good- 
ing's brigade  from  Mitchell's  division ;  but  he  was 
steadily  driven  back  for  a  mile,  until  the  enemy's 
pursuing  line  came  within  the  enfilading  fire  of 
Sheridan's  artillery,  which  was  delivered  with  great 
effect  across  the  intervening  valley  of  Doctor's 
Fork.  At  4  o'clock  Captain  Fisher  of  McCook's 
staff  arrived  and  reported  to  me  that  the  left  corps 
had  been  sustaining  a  severe  conflict  for  a  consid- 
erable time,  and  was  being  driven  back.  I  was 
astonished.  Not  a  sound  of  musketry  had  been 
heard,  and  my  staff-oflB.cers  had  been  at  the  front 
until  dinner-time,  I  had  noticed  a  sudden  increase 
of  eaiinonadiiig  at  2  o'clock,  and  General  Gilbert, 
who  had  come  in  from  his  lines  and  was  getting 
his  dinner  with  mo,  immediately  proceeded  to  his 
command  ;  but  as  the  firing  as  suddenly  subsided, 
and  no  report  came  to  me,  I  had  ceased  to  think 
of  the  occurrence. 

Keenforcements  were  immediately  ordered  to 
McCook  from  Schoepf's  division,  which  was  in  re- 
serve, and  a  staff-officer  was  dispatched  to  Thomas 
with  orders  to  move  the  right  corps  forward  vigor- 
ously and  attack  the  enemy's  left.  Thomas  could 
not  be  found  until  about  6  o'clock,  and  owing  to 
the  lateness  of  the  hour  the  advance  was  not  made ; 
but  McCook  was  relieved  by  the  succor  sent  to  him 
and  the  battle  ceased  about  night-fall.  Fm'ther 
orders  were  sent  to  Thomas  at  6.30  P.  M. : 

October  8th,  1862,  6.30  p.  m.  General  Thomas,  Sec- 
ond in  Comiiiaiid :  The  First  Corps  (McCook's)  on  our 
left  has  been  very  hciivily  engaged.  The  left  and  center 
of  this  cori)8  gained  ground,  but  the  right  of  it  yielded  a 
little.  Press  your  lines  forward  as  far  as  possible  to- 
night, and  get  into  position  to  make  a  vigorous  attack 
in  tlie  niorning  at  daylight.  Tf  you  have  got  your  troops 
into  a  position  whicli  yon  dconi  advantageous  it  will  not 
be  advisable  to  make  acliant;c  for  tlicpuriioseof  coiuply- 
.  ing  witli  tlif  gcnci-al's  iiistiiutioiiK  for  yon  sent  by  Cap- 
tain Mack.  It  may  lie  as  well  to  halt  tlic  division  ordered 
to  the  center  and  let  it  wait  wliere  it  is  for  further  orders. 
The  general  desires  to  see  you  in  ])erson  as  soon  to-night 
as  yoni- duties  will  permit  you  to  come,  over.  Respect- 
fully, Jamks  U.  Fry,  Colonel  and  Cliief-of-Staff. 

McCook  liad  12,500  men  in  the  battle,  and  lost 
in  killed  and  womided  about  3000  —  nearly  one- 
quarter  ;  Gilbert  lost  in  killed  and  woimded  nearly 
900,  all  of  which  belonged  to  Sheridan's  division 
and  one  of  Mitchell's  brigades;  and  about  iSOinall 
were  taken  prisoners  ;  total  loss,  4348.    The  force 

i  "  IlAYSViLLE,  October  7th,  1862, 6  p.  m.—  Major-Gen- 
ERAL  BnELL:  About  two  and  a  half  miles  west  of  this 
place  I  can  get  a  camp  on  the  Rolling  Fork,  where  th(>re 
ifl  said  to  bo  an  abundance  of  M'ater.  As  there  is  no 
water  here,  1  propose  to  camp  there.  It  will  only  throw 
us  about  one  and  a  half  miles  farther  from  Perry  ville. 
It  was  reported  to  me  on  7iiy  arrival  that  the  rebels  had 
200,000  pounds  of  pork  at  Lelianon.  At  flrst  I  ordered  a 
regiment  to  go  there  and  seize  it.  I  afterward  learned 
that  it  belonged  to  a  (•nm))any  of  pork-packers,  who 
profess  to  be  Union  men.  I  tlierefare  concluded  not 
to  send  or  seize  it,  as  we  can  get  it  at  any  lime  by  send- 
ing for  it.  Maxey's  lirigade  is  also  rei)orle(l  as  leaving 
Lebanon  to-day  for  Danville,  via  liiadfordsville  and 
rinstonville,  with  a  train  loaded  with  flour  and  pork 
from  Lebanon.  Shall  I  send  and  intercept  him  now,  or 
laiiture  him  hereafter?  Very  respectfully,  Geo.  H. 
Thomas." 


actually  engaged  on  the  Union  side  numbered 
about  22,000,  though  more  came  into  position  for 
battle  near  the  close.  All  of  the  force  had  a  good 
number  of  new  regiments.  One  of  McCook's  di- 
visions was  composed  entirely  of  new  regiments, 
with  one  exception.  Its  division  commander, 
Jackson,  and  its  two  brigade  commanders,  Terrill 
and  Webster,  were  killed.  The  enemy  claim  to 
have  fought  the  battle,  according  to  Bragg's  re- 
port, with  16,000  men.  His  loss  is  reported  at 
3396,  of  which  251  were  prisoners.  He  captm-ed 
some  artillery  that  he  did  not  carry  off,  though  he 
exchanged  some  of  his  pieces  for  better  ones. 

Not  long  before  the  commencement  of  this 
partial  but  fierce  contest,  a  staff-officer  arrived 
from  General  Thomas  and  reported  two  divisions 
of  the  right  corps  up  —  the  last  had  not  yet  ar- 
rived. The  enemy  was  in  front,  and  Thomas 
thought  it  not  advisable  to  leave  to  report  in 
person.  The  want  of  definite  information  from 
both  flanks,  the  failure  of  a  meeting  of  the 
two  commanders  at  my  headquarters  for  explana- 
tions and  final  orders,  and  the  lateness  of  the  hour 
for  effecting  these  preliminaries  for  the  great  bat- 
tle which  was  to  be  fought,  precluded  the  idea  of 
bringing  it  on  that  evening.  That  conclusion  had, 
indeed,  been  rendered  probably  unavoidable  at 
the  time  of  McCook's  arrival  at  my  headquarters, 
by  two  dispatches  which  had  been  received  from 
Thomas  dui-ing  the  morning  :  One  dated  the  7th, 
6  o'clock  p.  M.,  at  Haysville,  ^  saying  that  finding 
no  water  at  that  point  he  would  march  the  right 
corps  to  the  Rolling  Fork  for  a  camp  ;  and  the 
other,  dated  on  the  EoUiug  Fork,  October  8th,  3 
o'clock,  A.  M.,\  reporting  that  my  order  to  march 
at  3  o'clock  had  just  been  received,  that  the  corps 
reached  that  place  at  11  o'clock  at  night,  and  was 
then  camping,  the  trains  being  not  all  yet  up,  and 
that  he  would  be  in  front  of  Perryville  as  soon  as 
possible.  The  staff-officer  was,  therefore,  started 
back  a  few  minutes  before  2  o'clock  with  some 
minor  instructions  to  General  Thomas,  and  a  desire 
that  he  should  report  in  person  after  night-fall. 

Thomas,  McCook,  and  Gilbert  met  at  my  head- 
quarters after  dai-k,  and  after  conversation  upon 
the  events  of  the  day,  orders  were  given  for  battle 
the  following  morning.  Crittenden's  corps  on  the 
right  was  to  move  forward  at  6  o'clock  and  engage 
the  enemy,  and  the  center  was  to  do  likewise  as 
soon  as  they  were  abreast.     MeCook  was  to  close 

"X  "  HE\DQtTARTERS,  UNITED  STATES  FORCES,  ROLLING 

Fork,  Ky.,  October  8th,  1862,  3  a.  m.— General  Buell: 
Your  letter  of  instruction  came  to  hand  at  the  time 
indicated  for  the  Second  Corps  to  nuirch.  Have  given 
the  necessary  orders  to  General  Crittenden,  and  will 
take  position  before  Perryville  as  8007i  as  possible.  The 
roads  over  which  we  marched  yesterday  were  exceed- 
ingly rough  and  tortuous,  and,  with  one  exception, 
witlioMt  water.  Reached  this  {)liice  at  11  o'clock  last 
Jiighf,l)nt  all  the  trains  are  not  up  yet.  I  found,  as  night 
approached,  that  the  troops  must  have  water,  which 
could  not  be  obtained  short  of  Rolling  Fork,  some  two 
miles  out  of  our  way,  to  which  place  the  command  was 
ordered,  and  \V(i  are  now  camping.  As  soon  as  I  decided 
to  make  Rolling  Fork,  I  dispatch(>d  messengers  to  your 
headiiuarters,  who  nnist  have  reached  you  l)efore  this. 
Respectfully,  etc.,  Geo.  H.  Thomas,  Major-General,  U. 
8.  Volunteers." 


EAST  TENNESSEE  AND   THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  PERRYl/lLLE. 


4^ 


ill  and  remain  in  reserve.  In  fact,  only  one  of  his 
divisions  (Rousseau's)  was  in  a  condition  to  fight 
as  a  distinct  body.  At  that  hour  not  a  man  in  the 
army  who  had  any  knowledge  beyond  the  limit  of 
his  own  vision  doubted  that  the  whole  Confeder- 
ate army  was  in  our  front,  and  that  the  battle  was 
to  be  renewed  in  the  morning. 

The  right  corps  did  not  commence  the  move- 
ment until  9  o'clock,  owing,  as  was  afterward 
explained,  to  Thomas's  message  to  Crittenden  by 
signal,  from  my  camp,  only  specifying  that  he 
should  be  ready  to  advance  at  6  o'clock;  so  that 
the  orders  to  advance  had  to  be  repeated  when 
it  was  discovered  that  the  movement  had  not 
commenced.  It  was  then  ascertained  that  the 
enemy  had  withdrawn,  and  that  only  three  of  his 
divisions  had  been  present.  The  battle  had  en- 
abled him  to  perfect  his  junction  with  Kirby  Smith 
at  Harrodsbui-g,  as  originally  intended,  and  I  did 
not  hesitate  to  await  the  arrival  of  Sill's  division 
before  precipitating  the  anticipated  battle.  In 
the  meantime,  the  army  was  put  in  position  for 
any  emergency,  andreconnoissances  were  actively 
employed  to  gain  information  of  the  movements 
of  the  enemy. 

We  had  repelled  the  enemy's  fierce  attack  when 
it  was  supposed  his  whole  force  was  in  front  of 
us.  My  official  report  stated  succinctly  the  causes 
which  prevented  us  from  winning  a  more  fruitful 
success,  namely,  the  difficulties  which  prevented 
the  troops  from  getting  on  the  ground  simultane- 
ously, and  the  fact  that  I  was  not  apprised  early 
enough  of  the  condition  of  affairs  on  my  left 
("Official  Records,"  Vol.  XVI.,  Part  I.,  p.  1031). 
When  the  orders  in  anticipation  of  battle  were 
given  on  the  evening  of  the  7th,  McCook's  exact  posi- 
tion was  .not  known.  He  was  supposed  to  be  about 
seven  miles  in  rear.  The  orders  did  not  reach 
him  until  2  :  30  o'clock,  and  he  marched  at  5.  It 
■was  10:30  when  the  head  of  his  column  arrived. 
The  road  was  hilly  and  rough,  and  the  march  was 
understood  to  be  made  in  the  vicinity  of  the  en- 
emy. It  was  therefore  properly  conducted  with 
prudence,  and  was  of  course  slow.  The  right 
corps  had  been  ordered  to  halt  for  the  night  at 
Haysville,  not  more  tlian  four  miles  to  the  rear. 
But  on  arriving  at  that  point,  finding  no  water, 
General  Thomas,  who  was  conducting  tlie  corps, 
determined  to  go  to  the  Rolling  Fork  to  encamp. 
He  was  told  the  distance  was  two  and  one-lialf 
miles  off  to  the  right,  but  he  did  not  arrive  until  1 1 
o'clock,  after  five  liours  of  night  marching.  The 
courier  diil  not  find  him  until  .3  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  at  which  hour  he  was  camping,  his  trains 
being  not  all  yet  up.  It  is  evident  from  his  dis- 
patches that  he  did  not  rea.lize  the  gi-avity  of  tlie 
occasion.  It  wfis  impossible,  under  the  circum- 
stances, that  marches  should  be  regulated  witli 
reference  to  water.  The  center  corps  marched 
witli  no  assurance  of  finding  it,  halted  on  the  even- 
ing of  the  7th  without  it,  and  only  obtained  it  th(> 
next  morning  by  wresting  it  from  the  haiuls  of  the 
enemy.  Had  tli(>  right  corps  been  found  at  Hiiys- 
villt>,  it  sliould  have  been  in  ])ositi(ui  for  battle 
by  7  o'clock,  and,  whatever  else  iray  have  liii]>- 
pened,  wo^ild  have  been  in  such  coniuH-lioii  with 


headquarters  by  signals,  as  the  otlier  corps  were, 
that  the  orders  of  4  o'clock  for  it  to  attack  would 
have  been  delivered  immediately,  and  would  have 
given  fully  two  hours  of  daylight  for  action. 

On  the  other  hand,  had  the  battle  on  the  left 
been  reported  at  2  o'clock,  when  it  commenced, 
the  succor  which  was  ordered  from  the  reserve  at 
4  would  have  come  in  the  form  of  reenforcements 
two  hours  earlier  ;  and  the  orders  which  were  sent 
at  the  same  time  to  the  right  corps  would  have  had 
at  least  that  much  more  time  for  execution.  I 
make  no  prediction  of  all  of  the  consequences 
that  might  have  flowed  from  these  conditions.  It 
would  have  depended  much  upon  the  action  of  the 
riglit  corps.  They  ought  to  have  been  of  a  very 
decisive  character.  For  the  rest,  the  reports  show 
that  the  left  corps  was  not  fully  prepared  for  the 
heavy  blowthat  fell  upon  it,  but  the  reverse  which 
it  sustained  was  largely  due  to  the  ^aw^^ess  of  the 
troops.  Fully  one-half  of  the  two  diNisions  was 
made  up  of  new  regiments. 

While  the  battle  was  in  progress  at  PerrjTille, 
Kirby  Smith,  still  thinking  that  my  movement  was 
upon  his  front,  had  prepared  for  a  battle  at  or  near 
Lawrenceburg.  His  cavalry  attacked  Sill  at  that 
point  on  that  day,  and  the  next  day  on  the  march, 
but  Sill  extricated  himself  skillfully,  and  contin- 
ued his  march,  joining  his  corps  at  Perryville  on 
the  1 1th.  Smith  now  discovered  his  mistake,  and 
dispatched  Bragg  on  the  51th  that  he  would  join 
him  immediately  at  Harrodsburg,  which  he  accom- 
plished partly  on  the  9th  and  fully  on  the  10th. 
On  the  latter  day  a  strong  reconnoissance  found 
him  in  line  of  battle  about  four  miles  south  of  Har- 
rodsburg. He  withdi-ew  entirely  on  the  11th,  fol- 
lowed by  my  cavalry  toward  Camp  Dick  Robinson, 
where  Bragg's  whole  force  now  took  position,  shel- 
tered in  front  and  on  his  right  flank  by  the  perpen- 
dicular cliffs  of  Dick's  River  and  the  Kentucky.  I 
was  moving  on  the  12th  and  13th  to  turn  his  jiosi- 
tion  and  attack  him  on  the  left,  when  I  learned  that 
he  was  withdrawing.  General  Bragg  states  in  his 
report  that  he  was  ready  and  desirous  for  battle  at 
this  point  and  previously  after  Perr\-A-ille,  and  I 
have  no  doubt  that  was  true,  if  he  could  have  had 
his  own  terms.  His  order  for  withdrawal  was  an- 
nounced on  the  1 3th. 

The  piu-suit  was  taken  up  that  night,  under  the 
supervision  of  Thomas,  Avith  Crittenden's  corjis.  fol- 
lowed by  the  other  corps.  The  details  afford  no 
interesting  or  important  fact,  exce])t  that  tlie  re- 
treating army  was  pressed  into  difficulties  wliich 
involved  it  in  great  hardship  and  teni]>(U-ary  dis- 
organization. The  juirsuif  was  ciuitinued  in  that 
manner  as  far  as  London,  and  then,  about  the 
20th,  my  several  colunins  were  turned  by  the  most 
direct  routes  toward  the  gmund  in  Tennessee  and 
Alabama  from  which  they  had  started  six  weeks 
before,  and  where  it  was  foreseen  tlie  iiieiny  would 
soon  again  be  «>ncountered.  The  rejtnir  of  the 
railroa<l  had  been  pushed  forward  witli  energy, 
and  the  army  was  arriving  at  Glasgow  and  Howl- 
ing (Jreen  on  its  route,  when  on  the  3(Uii  of  Octo- 
ber I  turned  over  th(>  commiind  to  General  Rose- 
(•r.ins,  in  nbedieiice  to  onlers  from  Washington.  It 
woidd  lie  useh'ss  to  review  tlu-  oflicio-personr.l  jiart 


50 


EAST  TENNESSEE  AND    THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  PERRYl^ILLE. 


of  the  correspondence  wliich  immediately  preceded 
that  event  between  the  Washington  authorities 
and  myself,  or  even  the  official  part  of  it,  relating 
chiefly  to  the  plan  of  a  movement  into  east  Ten- 
nessee, to  which  my  successor  in  a  measure  fell 
heir.  Toward  him,  I  may  add,  the  transfer  brought 
no  heart-burning  on  my  part,  and  the  prayer  ex- 
pressed in  my  parting  order  was  sincere,  that  the 
army  might,  under  his  command,  be  the  means  of 
speedily  restoring  the  Union  to  its  integrity. 

In  spite  of  my  connection  —  I  can  scarcely  speak 
of  it  as  a  personal  interest — with  the  subject,  I  ven- 
ture to  make  some  observations  that  appear  to  me 
proper  with  reference  to  the  campaign  which  I 
have  outlined.  It  extended  over  a  greater  territory 
and  involved  greater  hazard  on  the  side  of  the 
Union  than  any  other  campaign  of  the  war.  In  the 
early  part,  and  up  to  the  time  of  ray  arrival  in 
Louisville,  it  was  more  neglected  by  the  Govern- 
ment than  any  other.  It  was  distinguished  also 
from  all  others,  except  a  part  of  Pope's  operations 
in  Virginia,  in  the  relative  strength  of  the  con- 
tending forces. 

The  important  results,  favorable  and  adverse, 
were  that  the  object  for  which  I  had  started  out, 
the  occupation  of  east  Tennessee,  was  not  even  in 
a  condition  to  be  attempted ;  and  that  on  the  other 
hand,  a  formidable  political  and  strategical  scheme 
which  aimed  at  the  conquest  and  absorption  of 
Kentucky,  was  defeated  with  substantial  disaster 
to  the  invader,  and  at  the  close  the  Federal  arms 
returned  with  increased  strength  to  the  possessions 
from  which  they  had  been  withdrawn  to  counter- 
act the  invasion.  It  has  been  said  that  territory 
was  given  up  which  was  not  recovered  for  a  year ; 
but  that  is  not  substantially  true,  except  with  ref- 
erence to  Cumberland  Gap,  and  as  to  that,  it  is  to 
be  remarked  that  it  had  been  held  at  a  greater  cost 
than  it  was  worth,  and  that  afterward  it  was  no 
obstacle  when  the  advance  into  east  Tennessee 
was  made  with  an  adequate  force.  When  the 
army  on  the  way  back  changed  commanders  at 
Bowling  Green,  there  was  no  new  obstacle  to  its 
resumption  of  every  position  it  had  held  in  middle 
Tennessee  and  Alabama.  The  enemy,  with  broken 
fortune  and  relatively  impaired  strength,  was 
only  on  the  south  side  of  the  Tennessee  from 
which  he  had  started  two  months  before.  I  do 
not  comment  upon  what  was  afterward  done,  or 
raise  the  question  whether  it  was  desirable  to 
resume  the  position  which  had  been  occupied 
as  a  point  of  departure ;  but  if  it  was  not  desir- 
able to  resume  it,  certainly  for  stronger  reasons  it 
was  not  a  position  which  it  was  advisable  for  me 
to  hold. 

If  the  campaign,  with  no  more  advantageous  re- 
sults, had  been  marked  by  one  general  and  destruc- 
tive, but  not  disastrous  battle,  it  would  no  doubt 
have  been  received  with  more  popular  favor,  and 
perhaps  even  have  been  more  easy  of  professional 
praise.  I  shall  not  insist  on  that  point,  but  T  shall 
particularly  make  no  apology  for  not  ha\ing  fought 
battles  where  the  issue  was  reasonably  doubtfid, 
and  wliere  they  in  fact  proved  not  to  have  been 
necessary  for  the  success  of  my  cause.  Besides, 
in  an  open  field,  with  capable  commanders,  it  takes 


two  parties  to  inaugurate  a  battle  —  one  to  begin 
the  attack,  and  another  to  stand  to  receive  it. 

It  was  much  talked  of  after  the  event,  that  Ken- 
tucky was  known  to  be  the  immediate  object  for 
which  Bragg  moved  from  Chattanooga ;  that  it 
was  proposed  to  me  to  concentrate  at  Sparta  to 
oppose  him ;  and  that  that  mountainous  and  com- 
paratively barren  region  could  have  been  relied 
upon  to  support  my  army,  with  exhausted  maga- 
zines and  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy;  but  the 
facts  were  as  erroneous  as  the  theories  were 
fallacious.  There  was  never  at  the  time  an  intelli- 
gent judgment  or  an  accepted  rumor  that  Bragg's 
first  object,  if  he  had  any,  was  any  other  than  the 
recovery  of  middle  Tennessee  and  Nashville  ;  and 
if,  under  the  circumstances,  a  proposition  had  been 
made  to  me  to  concentrate  the  army  at  Sparta,  I 
should  have  rejected  it. 

Various  speculations  and  confident  declarations 
have  been  indulged  in  by  critics  on  both  sides, 
as  to  the  results  that  would  have  flowed  from  cer- 
tain drfferent  action  on  the  part  of  the  two 
commanders.  Such  opinions  with  reference  to 
extended  operations  are  seldom  of  any  value. 
They  generally  have  no  knowledge  of  the  circum- 
stances which  would  have  prevented  the  prescribed 
action,  and  take  no  account  of  the  modifying 
influence  which  it  would  have  had  on  the  conduct 
of  the  opposing  commander.  It  is,  therefore,  idle 
to  assert,  as  many  have  done,  that  Kirby  Smith 
could  and  should  have  marched  into  Lou:s\'ille 
after  the  battle  of  Richmond,  or  what  would  have 
been  the  substantial  fruit  of  that  proceeding  if  it 
had  been  accomplished  ;  or  that  Bragg  and  Smith 
united  would  have  overwhelmed  me  at  Munford- 
ville.  The  disappointment  of  calculations  pending 
the  events,  affords  no  stronger  marks  of  fallibility 
than  do  assumptions  afterward.  Of  the  former 
this  campaign,  like  all  campaigns,  presents  many 
examples.  Thus,  the  military  problem,  as  it  ap- 
peared to  my  mind,  was  to  be  solved  by  a  com- 
bined descent  of  the  Confederates  upon  the  iufeinor 
Union  force  in  middle  Tennessee.  But  instead  of 
that,  an  army,  embarrassed  in  its  situation,  to  be 
sure,  but  intact  and  powerful,  was  left  in  the  rear, 
and  a  distant  invasion  which  had  no  well-founded 
prospect  of  success  was  undertaken.  The  bold- 
ness and  formidable  character  of  this  alternative 
appeared  to  give  assurance  that  it  would  not  be 
abandoned  without  at  least  one  vigorous  blow  in 
attack  or  defense ;  but  when  prudential  measures 
were  taken  on  the  opposing  side  with  reference  to 
such  a  contingency,  the  invader,  with  a  prudence, 
not  to  be  expected  from  the  audacity  of  his  ad- 
vance, withdrew  from  the  contest.  On  the  other 
side,  to  General  Bragg's  mind,  as  early  as  the  24th 
of  August,  the  army  opposed  to  him  was  demoral- 
ized and  in  full  flight,  with  doubtful  prospect  of 
stopping  short  of  the  Ohio ;  later  it  was  racing  to 
get  the  lead  of  liim  at  Munfordville  ;  and  at  that 
point,  astonished  to  find  himself  not  attacked  at 
sight,  he  imagined  that  his  opponent  must  be  in 
retreat  by  some  secret  route  to  the  Ohio  River. 
But  all  of  these  impi-essions  wei-e  delusive.  When 
to  his  mind  the  opposing  army  was  in  retreat, 
it  was  awaiting  his  approach   from  behind  the 


E^ST  TENNESSEE  AND   THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  PERRYl^/LLE. 


SI 


Tennessee  River  and  the  mountains.  When  he 
imagined  it  trying  to  get  ahead  of  him,  it  was 
moving  especially  to  keep  him  in  front  and  away 
from  Nashville,  deeming  the  retention  of  that  point 
of  more  consequence  than  his  transient  intrusion 
upon  Kentucky;  always  pursuing  him,  always 
aiming  to  get  nearer  to  him,  always  willing  to 
avail  itself  of  advantages,  and  confident  in  the 
end  of  triumphing  over  him. 

A  philosophical  study  of  our  civil  conflict  must 
recognize  that  influences  of  some  sort  operated 
fundamentally  for  the  side  of  the  Confederacy  in 
every  prominent  event  of  the  war,  and  nowhere 
with  less  effect  than  in  the  Tennessee  and  Ken- 
tucky campaign.  They  are  involved  in  the  fact  that 
it  required  enormous  sacrifices  from  24,000,000  of 
people  to  defeat  the  political  scheme  of  8,000,000 ; 
2,000,000  of  soldiers  to  subdue  800,000  soldiers: 
and,  descending  to  details,  a  naval  fleet  and  15,- 
000  troops  to  advance  against  a  weak  fort,  manned 
by  less  than  100  men,  at  Fort  Henry ;  35,000  with 
naval  cooperation  to  overcome  12,000  at  Donel- 
son ;  60,000  to  secure  a  victory  over  40,000  at 
Pittsburg  Landing;  120,000  to  enforce  the  retreat 
of  65,000  intrenched,  after  a  mouth  of  fighting 
and  manoeuvring,  at  Corinth;  100,000  repelled  by 
80,000  in  the  first  Peninsular  campaign  against 
Richmond;  70,000,  with  a  powerful  naval  force 
to  inspire  the  campaign,  which  lasted  nine  months, 
against  40,000  at  Vicksburg;  90,000  to  barely 
withstand  the  assault  of  70,000  at  Gettysburg;^ 
115,000  sustaining  a  frightful  repulse  from 
60,000  at  Fredericksburg  .  100,000  attacked  and 
defeated  by  50,000  at  Chancellorsville  ;  85,000 
held  in  check  two  days  by  40,000  at  Antietam ; 
43,000  retaining  the  field  uncertainly  against 
88,000  at  Stone  River  ;  70,000  defeated  at  Chiek- 
amauga,  and  beleaguered  by  70,000  at  Chatta- 
nooga ;  80,000  merely  to  break  the  investing  line 
of  45,000  at  Chattanooga  ;  100,000  to  press  back 
50,000,  increased  at  last  to  70,000,  from  Chatta- 
nooga to  Atlanta,  a  distance  of  120  miles,  and 
then  let  go  —  an  operation  which  is  commemorated 
at  festive  reunions  by  the  standing  toast  of  "one 
hundred  days  under  fire";  50,000  to  defeat  the 
investing  line  of  30,000  at  Nashville  ;  and  finally 
120,000  to  overcome  60,000  with  exhaustion 
after  a  struggle  of  a  year  in  Virginia.  The  rule 
which  this  summary  establishes  will  not  determine 
al)solutely  the  relative  merit  of  the  different 
achievements,  but  is  not  to  be  ignored  in  a  judg- 
ment upon  particular  events. 

Individually,  the  Northern  soldier  was  in  no  sense 
the  inferior  of  the  Soutliern.  What,  then,  is  the 
explanation  of  this  rule  which  is  so  nearly  invari- 
able as  to  show  that  superior  numbers  were  gener- 
ally essential  to  Union  victories,  and  the  success  of 
Union  operations  ?  Much  was  due  to  the  character 
of  the  contest.  Revolution  is  calculat(>d  to  in- 
spire bold  and  desperate  action,  and  Wiirs  of  s(>nti- 
inent,  of  the  nature  of  whicli  this  partook  more  in 
the  South  thaTi  in  the  Nortli.  are  always  marked 
by  unusual  energy.     In  tlic  North  there  was  much 

7!V(i'Micral  Fnniris  .\.  Wiilk.T,  in  his  "IIin(or.v  of  tlu 
tlic  roHi)onsil)ility  of  renewing  tlic  attack  an  ordcrotl  by 
advance  is  I'lioucou.s.— Editohs. 


animosity,  but  it  was  more  collective,  and  operated 
more  in  shaping  public  policy  than  upon  the 
temper  of  the  armies.  The  style  of  the  orders  and 
I)roelamations  issued  by  many  of  the  Southern 
generals  shows  how  much  they  relied  on  the  jjas- 
sionate  enthusiasm  of  their  soldiers,  and  how  they 
tried  to  stimulate  it.  They  recognized  that  the 
odds  must  generally  be  against  them,  and  that 
they  must  find  some  means  of  overcoming  the 
effect  of  the  fact  upon  the  spirits  of  their  troops, 
and  themselves  set  an  example  of  audacity. 

Of  eom-se  the  necessity  of  invasion  against  a 
hostile  population  placed  the  Federal  cause  at  a 
tlisadvantage  which  had  to  be  overcome  by 
greater  numbers.  The  sinapler  mode  of  life  to 
which  the  bulk  of  the  Southern  troops  were  accus- 
tomed made  them  more  contented  with  meager 
supplies  ;  the  lack  of  resources  of  eveiy  sort  pre- 
cluded the  luxurious  outfit  to  wliich  the  Nortliern 
troops  were  accustomed ;  and  thus  the  inqiedi- 
menta  of  military  operations  were  more  restricted 
without  impairing  their  efficiency  than  in  the 
Northern  armies.  It  took  some  time  to  eradicate 
this  inequality.  Another  sectional  distinction  pro- 
duced a  marked  effect  in  the  beginning  of  the  war. 
The  habits  of  the  Southern  people  facilitated  the 
formation  of  cavalry  corps  which  were  com- 
paratively efficient  even  without  instruction  ;  and 
accordingly  we  see  Stuart,  and  John  Morgan, 
and  Forrest  riding  with  impunity  around  the  Union 
armies,  and  destrojdng  or  harassing  their  com- 
munications. Late  in  the  war  that  agency  was 
reversed.  The  South  was  exhausted  of  horses, 
while  the  Northern  cavalry  increased  in  numbers 
and  efficiency,  and  acquired  the  audacity  which 
had  characterized  the  Southern. 

But  still  another  influence  must  be  found  in  the 
personal  differences  between  the  two  sections, — 
differences  due  chiefly  to  the  more  rural  condition 
of  the  South  and  the  institution  of  slavery.  In  all 
popular  movements  the  Southern  leader  was  then, 
and  is  now  in  a  less  degi-ee,  followed  with  an  im- 
plicit confidence  which  did  not  mean  humility  by 
any  means,  but  produced  subordination.  Tliis 
difference  is  illustrated  by  two  historical  incidents. 
At  Cold  Harbor,  the  Northern  troops,  who  had 
proven  their  indomitable  qualities  by  losses  nearly 
equal  to  the  whole  force  of  their  ojiponent,  when 
ordered  to  another  sacrifice,  even  under  such  a  sol- 
dier as  Hancock,  answered  the  demand  as  one 
man,  with  a  silent  and  stolid  inertia  :  ■^  at  Gettys- 
burg, Pickett,  when  waiting  for  the  signal  wliich 
Longstreet  dreaded  to  repeat,  for  the  hopeless  but 
immortal  charge  against  Cemetery  Hill,  saluted 
and  said,  as  he  turned  to  his  ready  column:  "I 
shall  move  forward,  sir!" 

Nor  must  we  give  slight  importance  to  the  infiu- 
ence  of  the  Southern  women,  who  in  agony  of 
heart  girded  the  sword  upoii  their  loved  ones  and 
bade  them  go.  It  was  to  be  expected  that  these 
various  inlhiences  would  give  a  confidence  to  lead- 
ershi])  that  would  tend  to  bold  adventure,  and  leave 
its  mark  upon  the  contest. 

St'coiid  Army  CorpH."  Hnys.  i>.  filfi.  that  Hancock  doclhied 
Moadc ;  and  fliat  the  statciucut  that  the  troops  refused  to 


\iy- 


KENTUCKY,     LOOKING    SOUTH-EAST     FROM    THE     MACKVILLE     PIKE.        FROM    A     PHOTOGRAPH     TAKEN 


ON  THE  FIELD  OF  PERRYVILLEJ 


BY  CHARLES  C.   GILBERT,   MAJOR-GENERAL,  U.  8.  V. 


AS  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  moving  from  Bardstown,  approached  Perry ville 
^t\-  on  the  7th  of  October,  1862,  McCook's  corps  formed  the  left,  Critten- 
den's the  right,  and  mine — which  was  moving  on  the  direct  road  by  the  way 
of  Springfield,  and  was  ahead  of  the  others — the  center.  [See  maps,  pp. 
6  and  24.]  In  my  column,  R.  B.  Mitchell's  division  had  the  lead;  Schoepf 
followed,  and  Sheridan  brought  up  the  rear.  Our  advance  was  vigorously 
resisted  by  Wheeler's  cavalry,  forming  the  rear-guard  of  Hardee's  corps,  which 
was  retiring  before  us.  About  2  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  when  the  head  of 
the  column  was  nearing  the  line  of  Doctor's  Creek,  a  tributary  of  the  Chaplin 
River,  or  more  properly  the  Chaplin  Fork  of  Salt  River,  the  enemy,  in  force, 
was  observed  lining  the  crest  of  the  ridge  on  the  farther  bank,  obviously 
with  the  intention  of  disputing  the  possession  of  a  few  pools  of  water  that 
remained  in  the  water-course,  Avhich  was  otherwise  nearly  dry.  An  excessive 
drought  had  prevailed  for  months  in  this  part  of  Kentucky.  At  sight  of  the 
enemy,  orders  were  given  to  form  Mitchell's  division  in  order  of  battle  across 
the  Springfield  road  and  along  some  high  ground  on  the  right.  When  Schoepf 
cani(;  up  his  di\dsion  was  massed  in  reserve  in  Mitchell's  rear,  on  the  left  of  the 
road,  and  Sheridan,  arriving  after  Wheeler  had  been  dislodged  and  was  being 
pressed  back  toward  Porryville,  was  posted  in  front  and  to  the  right  of  Mit- 
chell. Before  daybreak  on  the  8th,  a  position  was  gained  that  covered  the 
pools  in  Doctor's  Creek,  and  these  formed  our  only  water-supply  for  the  next 
two  days,  or  as  long  as  the  enemy  held  the  Chaplin  River. 

^Condensed  from  General  Gilbert's  articles  iu  the  "Soutliern  Bivouac,"  and  revised  bv  him.— Editors. 


ON   THE  FIELD  OF  PERKYl^ILLE. 


53 


During  the  night  Greneral  Buell  ordered  McCook's  and  Crittenden's  corps 
to  march  at  3  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  8th,  and  to  form  in  order  of 
battle  on  the  center  corps — my  own.  The  movements  of  these  columns 
were  delayed,  and  General  Buell,  apprehensive  of  an  attack  while  the  center 
corps  was  isolated,  directed  me  to  select  a  strong  position,  and  my  troops 
were  soon  moving  out  of  their  camps  and  taking  positions  for  the  main  attack, 
which  it  was  supposed  would  come  on  about  10  o'clock.  As  that  horn*  drew 
near,  I  observed,  in  visiting  General  Sheridan's  ground,  that  a  part  of  it  was 
vacant,  and  that  one  of  his  brigades  was  in  march  on  the  road  to  PeiTyville, 
and  the  remainder  were  preparing  to  follow.  On  inquiry  it  was  discovered 
that  this  movement  was  in  consequence  of  some  misunderstanding  of  orders. 
General  Sheridan  was  directed  to  recall  the  brigade,  resume  his  position, 
and  limit  himself  to  its  defense  until  a  general  advance  to  attack  in  force 
should  be  ordered.  To  this' order  was  added  the  explanation  that  General 
Buell  was  particularly  solicitous  that  nothing  be  done  to  bring  on  a  general 
engagement  until  after  the  junction  of  the  flank  corps. 

General  Sheridan  lost  no  time  in  reestablishing  his  division  on  the  ground 
to  which  he  had  been  originally  assigned.  He  had  barely  accomplished  it 
when  he  was  attacked  in  force  and  a  fight  ensued,  in  which  the  loss  was 
severe  on  both  sides.  In  the  meantime  the  head  of  General  McCook's 
corps,  coming  over  the  Mackville  pike,  appeared  on  the  high  ground  marked 


.iv^^U^-^>^* 


wi- 


1^^ 

1 


KIDGK    ON   THE    UNION'    I.KFT    ()(('tTIIi;i)    liV    STONK'S    AND    BUSH  S    BAT 
TKKIKS  — THE    SCENE    OK    STAKKWEATHEK'S    CONTEST    [SEE    I'.   58]. 
I'HOM    A    PHOTOGRAPH    FBOM    THE    DIRECTION    OF    ROUS- 
SEAU'S   LINE, 'taken    in    188"). 

by  Russell's  house,  due  north  of  Sheridan's  posi- 
tion about  one  mile.  This  was  about  10:  !>()  .\.  m. 
Marking  out  his  line  of  battle.  General  McCook 
ordered  General  R<^usseau  to  form  it.  Looniis's 
battery  was  established  on  a  commanding  piece 
of  gi-ound  near  Russell's  house,  and  to  the  l«'ft 
of  it.  General  Rousseau  had  been  ]>rovi()iisly 
ordered  to  send  a  line  of  skinnishers  to  tlif  left 


54 


ON  THE  FIELD  OF  PERRYI/ILLE. 


VIEW   LOOKING    NORTH-EAST  FROM    THE    POSITION    OF  LOOMIS'S    BATTERY,  THE    CENTER    OF  ROUSSEAU'S 
LINE  [SEE    MAP,   P.   24,   AND  NOTE  ON  P.  55].      FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH    TAKEN    IN    1885. 


and  front  to  examine  some  wood  on  that  quarter,  and  Captain  Wiekliffe, 
with  his  company  of  cavahy,  was  sent  to  reconnoiter  the  ground  to  the  left 
of  this  line  of  skirmishers.  At  this  time  there  was  some  light  skirmishing 
going  on  with  Sheridan's  division, .  at  the  head  of  the  center  corps,  which  was 
still  in  column,  as  previously  described ;  but  this  soon  ceased,  and  General 
McCook  was  satisfied  that  the  enemy  he  found  engaging  my  corps  when 
he  arrived  had  retired  from  the  field. 

McCook's  corps,  as  previously  related,  had  been  ordered  to  march  at  3  a.  m., 
but  it  was  2 :  30  A.  M.  before  the  order  reached  Greneral  McCook,  and  his 
march  began  at  5  a.  m.  M(;Cook  had  with  him  then  two  divisions,  Rousseau's 
and  Jac^kson's.  Rousseau's  division  took  the  lead  on  the  march,  but  when  it 
arrived  at  Perry ville  only  two  of  the  brigades  were  present  —  the  remaining 
one,  Starkweather's,  having  been  thrown  to  the  rear  by  the  interposition  of 
Jackson's  division,  which  cut  it  off  at  Mackville.  Without  waiting  for  the 
arrival  of  this  brigade.  General  McCook,  after  giving  his  assistant  adjutant- 
general  particular  instructions  to  post  Jackson's  two  brigades  on  a  command- 
ing ]riece  of  ground  immediately  to  the  right  of  the  Mackville  and  Perryville 
road,  and  to  hold  them  in  column  so  that  they  could  be  moved  in  any  direc- 
tion as  occasion  required,  turned  over  the  command  to  General  Rousseau, 
and  galloped  off  to  report  to  General  Buell  at  headquarters.  Buell  was  in 
my  camp,  on  the  Springfield  pike  about  two  and  a  half  miles  distant  from 
McCook's  position  on  the  Mackville  pike.  At  half -past  12  the  Confederates 
advanced,  and  in  a  few  moments  the  skirmishers  and  artillery  were  engaged. 
The  attack  fell  upon  Sheridan's  division  at  the  head  of  my  corps  and  upon 


ON   THE  FIELD  OF  PERRYl/ILLE. 


55 


POSITION    OF    LOOMIS'S    BATTERY  ON    ROUSSKAU'S    LINE,   LOOKING   ACROSS    DOCTOR'S    CREEK. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH    TAKEN    IN    1885. 


Loomis'8  battery  occupied  the  highest  part  of  the 
rid^e  above  H.  P.  Bottom's  house,  at  about  the  center 
of  KouHseau's  liue  (see  map,  p.  24).  Lytlc's  l)riga(l('  ox- 
teiuled  from  the  battery  across  the  old  Mackvillc  iiikf  to 
the  "burnt  baru."  Lytlc's  brigade  was  awsailcd  fioni 
the  direction  of  Bottom's  house,  and  from  the   right 


flank.  The  attack  upon  the  position  lield  by  Loomis's 
battery  was  made  chiefly  from  the  ridge  in  the  middle 
distance  of  the  i)icture  on  page  54.  The  Confederates 
gained  the  north-oast  side  of  that  ridge  by  following 
down  the  dry  bed  of  Doctor's  Creek  under  tlie  shelter  of 
its  west  bank.—  Editors. 


the  head  of  McCook's  corps,  now  advancing  from  its  first  position  at  Kussell's 
house  down  the  slope  toward  Chaplin  Eiver. 

When  General  McCook  returned  to  his  troops  after  having  reported  at 
headquarters,  he  found  that  General  Rousseau  had  advanced  the  right  of  the 
hue  about  eight  hundred  or  a  thousand  yards,  and  was  occupying  a  com- 
manding ridge  which  was  to  the  left  of  the  Mackville  and  Perry^illc  inke. 
The  enemy  was  firing  on  this  line  from  three  batteries,  and  Loomis's  and 
Simonson's  batteries  were  replying.  As  there  was  no  Confederate  infantry  in 
sight  McCook  ordered  the  firing  to  cease,  so  as  to  economize  ammunition,  and 
then  prepared  to  make  a  reconnoissance  toward  Chaplin  River  for  water,  as  he 
had  just  been  ordered  to  do  by  General  Buell.  Riding  off  to  the  left,  General 
McCook  found  a  commanding  ridge  about  six  hundretl  yards  from  tlie  stream 
and  overlooking  it.  Sending  for  Generals  Jackson  and  Terrill,  he  showt'd 
them  the  water,  marked  his  line  of  l)attle,  and  placed  a  l)attery  on  it  with 
strong  supports.  General  Teri'ill  was  then  ordered  to  advance  a  body  of 
skirmishers  down  the  slope  to  the  water  as  soon  as  tlic  line  nvjis  formed. 
Not  being  apprehensive  of  an  attack,  General  McCook  then  went  back  to  his 
rigiit.  It  was  now  nearly  2  o'clock.  At  this  time  the  liiu>  of  the  left  corps 
stood  with  its  right  on  the  Mackville  and  Perryville  ])ike  near  t]i(>  rr.>ssing  of 
Doctor's  Creek  and  its  left  near  (liai)lin  Riv(M-,  its  direetioii  being  abont  y\\\o 
north  and  south.     It  Avas  formed  of    two  l)rigades  of    Ixousseaii's    division 


56 


ON   THE  FIELD  OF  PERRY l^iLLE. 


i  V 


FARM-HOUSE    OF  n.    p.    BOTTOM.     FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH    TAKICN    IN    1885. 

The  fariii-house  stands  near  Doctor's  Creek,  under  the  ridge  occupied  by  Rousseau;  and  the  view 
is  from  the  old  MackvlUe  pike.    [See  map,  p.  24.] 

(Lytle's  and  Harris's)  and  Terrill's  brigade  of  Jackson's  division,  Webster's 
brigade  of  Jackson's  division  had  not  yet  come  into  position,  and  Stark- 
weather's brigade  of  Rousseau's  division  had  not  yet  reached  the  field. 

Just  previously  to  this  the  enemy,  in  pursuance  of  his  plan  of  attack,  had 
begun  to  engage  Sheridan's  division,  the  head  of  the  center  corps.  Mitchell's 
division  was  at  that  tim(3  closing  up  to  take  position  within  supporting  dis- 
tance of  Sheridan.  Caldwell's  and  Carlin's  brigades  of  this  division  were  to 
the  right  and  roar,  under  cover,  and  Gooding's  brigade  was  north  of  Doctor's 
Creek,  near  the  stream.  In  this  position  the  latter  covered  Sheridan's  left, 
and  watched  the  interval  between  the  two  corps  so  long  as  the  left  corps 
remained  in  its  place  in  line  of  battle,  and  before  it  advanced  to  the  front. 
As  Mitchell  came  into  his  position  on  the  second  line,  the  enemy  appeared  on 
his  right  in  force  and  engaged  Carlin's  brigade,  but  were  repulsed.  It  was 
now  nearing  lialf-past  2,  and  tlie  enemy's  entire  line,  from  his  left,  where  the 
attack  began  on  SlK^-idan,  to  his  right,  where  it  fell  in  heaviest  force  on 
Rousseau,  was  in  full  progress,  carrjdng  everything  before  it.  When  Sheri- 
dan's assailants  reached  his  main  line  he  gave  them  a  reception,  cool,  effect- 
ive, and  disastrous,  and  when  their  repulse  was  complete  a  brigade  from  the 
second  line  (Carlin's),  which  had  been  called  up  to  assist  in  the  defense,  pur- 
sued the  enemy  to  Perryville,  thus  turning  his  left  and  establishing  itself  on 
his  rear,  (xeneral  Sheridan's  action  was  according  to  the  sound  principles 
of  tlie  profession,  and,  as  lie  was  am]ily  and  promptly  supported,  tlie  opera- 
tions on  this  ])arl  of  the  Held,  in  wliicli  he  liad  Ihc  lead,  were  fully  successful. 


Olsf   THE  FIELD  OF  PERRYl^lLLE.  57 

and  his  conduct  here  foreshadowed  the  exceptionally  successful  career  that 
lay  before  him. 

General  McCook  was  assailed  by  greatly  superior  numbers.  His  brigades, 
which  Greneral  Rousseau  had  put  in  motion  to  the  front  in  his  absence,  were 
surprised  on  the  march  by  Greneral  Bragg's  attack,  and  were  taken  in  the  act 
of  forming,  and  on  ground  favorable  to  the  attacking  party.  Rousseau's  right 
brigade,  the  extreme  right  of  the  left  corps,  was  attacked  with  great  severity 
and  pertinacity.  Terrill's  brigade  on  the  left,  and  Starkweather's,  which  had 
now  arrived,  were  in  turn  heavily  assailed.  Being  composed  of  entirely  raw 
troops,  Terrill's  brigade  in  a  few  moments  gave  way  in  confusion,  losing  Par- 
sons's  battery  of  eight  Napoleon  guns.  Greneral  Jackson,  who  was  with  this 
brigade,  was  killed  at  the  first  fire.  Genei'al  Terrill  did  all  in  his  power  to 
steady  his  men,  but  in  vain.  An  hour  and  a  half  later,  while  still  striving  to 
rally  his  broken  troops,  he  was  mortally  wounded.  5t  Starkweather's  brigade 
and  Stone's  and  Bush's  batteries  were  on  the  extreme  left  and  rear  of  Terrill's 
brigade,  and  checked  the  attack. 

General  McCook,  perceiving  that  he  was  assailed  by  at  least  three  times  his 
number,  sent  an  aide-de-camp,  Lieutenant  L.  M.  Hosea,  to  General  Sheridan, 
requesting  him  to  look  to  the  right  of  his  line  and  see  that  it  was  not  turned. 
Just  at  this  time  Sheridan  had  his  attention  fully  occupied  with  his  own 
right,  where  two  opposing  batteries  were  in  position,  and  troops  were  mass- 
ing behind  them  to  attack  him  front  and  tlank.  About  half  an  hour  later 
McCook  sent  Captain  H.  N.  Fisher,  of  his  staff,  to  General  Schoepf,  com- 
manding the  reserve  of  my  corps,  with  an  urgent  request  for  reenforcement, 
reporting  that  his  reserves  were  all  exhausted  and  his  corps  upon  the  point 
of  being  compromised.  General  Schoepf  was  at  the  time  on  the  march  to 
the  front  with  two  of  his  brigades  (Walker's  and  Steedman's),  and  although 
desirous  of  rtmdering  assistance,  he  declined  to  take  the  responsibility  of 
changing  his  line  of  march.  He  referred  the  officer  to  me,  but  I  was  at  the 
time  at  General  Buell's  headquarters,  wdiere  I  had  been  since  noon. 

Owing  to  the  conformation  of  the  gi'ound  and  to  the  limited  use  of  artillery 
on  both  sides,  no  sound  of  the  battle  had  been  heard  at  General  Buell's  head- 
quarters until  the  attack  reached  General  Sheridan's  position,  which  was 
about  half-past  3  o'clock.  Then  the  cannon  firing  became  so  continuous  and 
was  so  well  sustained  and  so  different  from  the  irregular  shots,  at  wiile 
intervals,  which  had  characterized  the  "shelling  of  the  woods"  earlier  in 
the  day,  that  it  was  readily  recognized  as  a  battle.  It  was  near  4  o'clock 
when  there  came  up  the  valley  of  Doctor's  Creek  the  sound  of  rapid  artil- 
lery firing.  It  was  too  heavy  and  too  well  sustained  to  come  from  merely 
"shelling  the  woods."  Listening  attentively  for  a  nioincnt,  (Jcncral  Bn.'U 
said  to  me,  "That  is  something  more  than  shelling  the  woods;  it  sounds 
like  a  fight."     I  at   once  mounted   and  set   off"  at   a  rapid   jtace  down  the 

^Colonel    Cliiiili's   D.-iil.y.    of   th.'     llM    IikHmm:!       "'i>  .■n-.i-rmml.     Th.ir  ..pinion   was   thai    mm   would 


reRinu'iit,  says  :  '"•v 


i;lil.ii.'.l  if  tli<\    .onsidi  if.l  the  tlo.-tiiiu' of 


l.iol.Ml.illtirs  and   liow   sli.i,'lil    tin-  .hanc."  was  of  any 
"ItiH  <uri<His  tliat  tlu>  night  lu'fort'  tin-  battU'  |of      parti,  iilar  prrwon  It.in^;  kill. -d.    Tlifory  failod.  an  it  has 
Perryvillc]  (i.n.iMls  Jackson  and  Torrill  and  Colonel      oft.ii   d.>n.'  lioforo;  all  tlnoo  wiTC  killod  in  tlie  noxt 
WcbHtcr  weiv  discussiuK  Ibc  cliancfs  of  being  bit   in      day's  tlgbt."  EDITORS. 

VOL  III.  5 


=,8 


ON  THE  FIELD  OF  PERRYl/ILLE. 


•■    SI-' 


mmri^^ 


ENGAGEMENT   OF    STARKWEATHER'S    BRIGADE    ON    THE    EXTREME    UNION    LEFT.       FROM    A    LITHOGRAPH. 


Gciicr.'il  .Toliii  ('.  Starkwpathor,  in  his  official  report, 
savH  tliat  flic  bri.i^adc,  coiisiHtiiig  at  the  time  of  the  24th 
Illinois.  iHt  and  Slst  WisconHiii,  and  79th  Pennsylvania, 
'•  arrived  on  the  held  of  battle  at  about  1 :  30  P.  M.,  havliiR 
iiiarclicd  twelve  miles  — about  three  miles  thereof  being 
tluKiitrli  tiilds,  woods,  etc.  Finding  the  troops  already 
engaged  well  on  the  right,  center,  and  left,  and  thinMng 
the  extreme  left  position  most  accessible,  and,  from 


appearances,  one  that  should  be  held  at  all  hazards,  1 
placed  my  command  at  once  in  iiosition  facing  the  en- 
emy's right."  General  McCook,  in  his  report  on  the  part 
taken  by  Starkweather's  brigade,  saj's  that  the  21st 
Wisconsin  was  stationed  "in  a  corn-field,  lying  down, 
awaiting  the  approach  of  the  enemy,  and  when  he  ap- 
proached with  his  overwhelming  force  this  new  regi- 
ment poured  into  his  raiLks  a  most  withering  tire." 


road  in  the  direction  of  the  firing.  Within  a  mile  I  met  Captain  Fisher  com- 
ing at  full  speed  and  bearing  General  McCook's  message.  Instead  of  sending 
Captain  Fisher  back  to  General  McCook  with  my  answer  to  his  appeal  for 
help,  I  advised  him  to  continue  on  and  bear  to  General  Buell  the  astound- 
ing news,  and  at  once  sent  orders  to  Schoepf  to  go  to  the  interval  between 
the  two  corps, — on  the  left  of  Sheridan, — and  to  Mitchell  to  close  toward 
Sheridan's  right  and  support  him.  Directing  \xij  course  toward  the  left,  I 
found  Gooding's  brigade  of  Mitchell's  division  still  standing  to  the  left  of 
Doctor's  Creek,  and  at  once  put  it  in  motion  to  the  right  to  join  the  main 
body  of  the  division  and  be  nearer  Sheridan,  who  had  just  reported  that  he 
was  hard  pressed  in  front  and  that  the  enemy  was  driving  our  left  wing. 
General  Schoepf  was  now  on  the  ground  with  his  leading  brigade  (Walker's). 
This  he  was  ordered  to  deploy,  to  replace  Gooding.  In  the  midst  of  these 
movements,  another  staff -officer.  Captain  AV.  T.  Hol)litzell,  came  from  the  left 
coi-ps  for  lielp,  with  the  information  that  the  troops,  though  fighting  stub- 
boi-nly,  were  falling  back  everywhere,  and  that  if  assistance  was  not  speedily 
afforded  they  must  soon  be  driven  from  the  field. 

Up  to  this  moment  the  fighting  with  Sheridan  had  been  gi'owing  in  inten- 
sity, and  judging  fi-om  the  sound  that  it  must  soon  cuhninate,  I  detained 
C'aptaiii  no])litzell  to  await  the  issue.  It  was  soon  perceived  that  the  firing 
was  diminisliiug,  and  as  there  were  no  signs  of  defeat  on  our  side,  I  turned 


ON   THE  FIELD  OF  PERRYyiLLE. 


S9 


to  Walker's  brigade  to  send  it  over  to  the  left  wing,  Avlien  I  discovered  it  had 
not  yet  deployed,  and,  moreover,  did  not  seem  to  be  sufficiently  familiar 
with  the  tactics  to  make  the  simplest  movements  with  promptness  and  in- 
telligence. Accordingly  I  sent  my  adjutant-general,  Captain  J.  E.  Stacy, 
to  recall  Gooding  and  order  him  to  proceed  under  the  guidance  of  Captain 
Hoblitzell  to  report  to  Greneral  McCook.  Gooding  took  with  him  Pinney's 
Wisconsin  battery.  Within  twenty  minutes  after  receiving  the  order,  Good- 
ing made  himself  felt  on  the  flank  of  the  Confederates,  who  had  thus  far 
been  steadily  diiving  Rousseau's  troops  back  toward  the  Russell  House. 
Within  a  few  minutes  after  this  brigade  had  started,  Sheridan,  ha^'ing  re- 
pulsed his  assailants,  turned  his  guns  and  opened  fire  across  the  valley  of 
Doctor's  Creek  on  Rousseau's  assailants,  who,  in  their  advance,  had  come  to 
present  their  flank  within  easy  range,  and  from  his  commanding  position 
he  delivered  a  fire  so  effective  as  to  force  back  the  enemy  in  this  part  of  the 
field,  to  the  great  relief  of  the  right  of  General  McCook's  line.  Just  after 
Sheridan's  artillery  opened,  General  Steedman  came  up  with  his  brigade  of 
Schoepf  's  division  and  kept  on  his  course  down  Doctor's  Creek.  The  enemy 
had  now  been  So  far  driven  from  McCook's  front  that  they  were  beyond  the 
reach  of  Steedman's  infantry ;  but,  passing  under  the  fire  of  Sheridan's  guns, 
Steedman  halted  and  opened  to  the  left  with  Smith's  battery  of  his  brigade. 

Viewed  from  the  Confederate  stand-point,  the  battle  of  Perry\dlle  appears 
to  have  consisted  of  an  attempt  to  turn  the  left  flank  of  the  Union  line,  in 
which,  for  the  distance  of  a  thousand  or  twelve  hundred  yards,  the  assailants 
drove  all  before  them.  At  this  junctm'e,  after  a  fierce  fight,  the  attack  came 
to  a  stand,  having  expended  its  force,  and  the  left  of  the  Confederate  Hue 
was  now  itself  di'iven  and  turned,  and  its  line  of  retreat  threatened.  This 
last  the  Confederates  supposed  had  been  effected  by  a  fresh  corps  arriving 
on  the  field  from  the  direction  of  Lebanon.  In  abandoning  the  battle-ground 
the  Confederates,  although  obliged  to  leave  their  wounded  behind,  moved 
without  any  sense  of  humiliation,  for  they  had  made  a  good  fight,  and 
appeared  only  to  be  withdrawing  from  the  presence  of  a  greatly  superior  force. 

From  the  Union  side,  the  battle  takes  this  appearance :  The  center  corj^s, 
arriving  on  the  ground  alone  on  the  afternoon  of  the  7tli,  met  with  consider- 
able opposition  in  establishing  itself  in  position.  This  opposition  continued 
with  only  a  Inief  interval  till  about  11  o'clock  on  the  8th,  when  the  Hank 
corps  began  to  arrive  on  the  line  abreast  of  the  center.  After  the  lapse  of  about 
an  hour  four  brigades  from  the  left  wing  started  to  the  front  in  cpiest  of  wat(»r. 
Tliis  movement  coincided  with  the  advance  of  the  Confederates  in  full  foicc  to 
turn  the  left  of  the  Union  army.  Those  brigades  were  accordingly  met  and 
overpowered  and  driven  back  to  their  places  in  line,  and  some  of  them  l)eyond 
it.  But  they  made  a  most  obstinate  resistance.  In  the  center  ('ori»s  the 
detachments  thrown  out  to  watch  the  ap])roaches  to  the  i)osition  held  by 
the  leading  division  were  driven  in,  and  that  division  was  attacked  in  strong 
force  and  with  great  determination.  liut  the  assailants  were  r(»]>nlsed  and 
driven  from  the  field,  and  then  thecenter  cor}>s  conti'ibuted  al)out  one-third  of 
its  effective  force  to  the  relief  of  the  left  winir  and  saved  it  from  destruction. 


NOTES  OF  A   STAFF- OFFK'Eli   AT   PEUKYVILLEJ 


BY  J.   MONTGOMERY  WRIGHT,    MAJOR,   ASSISTANT  ADJUTANT-GENERAL,    U.  S.  V. 


rpnE  situation  at  Louisville  in  the  latter  part  of 
-J-  September,  18G2,  was  not  unlike  that  at  Wash- 
ington after  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Run.  The  be- 
lief was  entertained  by  many  that  Bragg  would 
capture  the  city,  and  not  a  few  had  removed  their 
money  and  valuables  across  the  Ohio  River,  not 
over-assured  that  Bragg  might  not  follow  them  to 
the  lakes.  Nelson  had  sworn  that  he  would  hold 
the  city  so  long  as  a  house  remained  standing  or 
a  soldier  was  alive,  and  he  had  issued  an  order 
tiiat  all  the  women,  childi'en,  and  non-combatants 
should  leave  the  place  and  seek  safety  in  Indiana. 
Tie  liiul  only  raw  troops  and  convalescent  veterans, 
ami  few  citizens  believed  that  he  could  hold  out 
against  an  attack.  His  tragic  death  occurred  a 
few  days  later.  3> 

Buell's  arrival  changed  the  situation  of  affairs. 
The  uncertain  defensive  suddenly  gave  way  to  an 
aggi'cssive  attitude,  and  speculation  turned  from 
whether  Bragg  would  capture  Louisville  to  whether 
Buell  would  capture  Bragg. 

The  country  through  which  Buell's  army  marched 
is  almost  destitute  of  water,  but  at  Perry ville  a 
stream  ilowed  between  the  contending  armies,  and 
access  to  that  water  was  equally  important  to  both 
armies.  Buell  accompanied  the  center  corps  (Gil- 
bert's), and  the  advance  reached  this  stream  on  the 
evening  of  October  7th.  From  that  time  until  the 
stream  was  crossed  there  was  constant  fighting  for 
access  to  it,  and  the  only  restriction  on  this  fighting 
was  that  it  should  not  bring  on  an  engagement  until 
the  time  for  the  general  attack  should  arrive.  An 
incident  will  illustrate  the  scarcity  of  water.  I  ob- 
tained a  cantoenful,  and  about  dark  on  October 
7tli,  after  giving  myself  a  good  brushing  and  a 
couple  of  dry  rubs  without  feeling  much  cleaner, 
mycai'eless  announcement  that  I  was  about  to  take 
a  tin-dipper  bath  brought  General  Buell  out  of  his 
tent  with  a  rather  mandatory  suggestion  that  I 
pour  the  water  back  into  my  canteen  and  save  it 
for  an  emergency.     The  emergency  did  not  come  to 

i  Condensed  from  a  paper  in  "  The  Southern  Bivouac." 

Editors. 

^The  facts  hi  relation  to  the  killing  of  Geucral  Will- 
iam Nelson  by  General  Jefferson  C.  Davis  are  recounted 
by  General  James  B.  Fry  in  his  pamplilet,  "  Killed  by  a 
Brother  Soldier,"  from  which  the  followins  ac(!Ount  is 
coiidcTiscd :  Davis,  wlio  had  been  on  sick  leave  in 
Indiana,  hearing  that  goneral  offlcers  were  nrcdcd  about 
f'iiiiiiinati  and  Louisville  to  assist  in  rciiclliufr  the 
invawion  of  Kirby  Smith  and  Bragg,  vohiutccrcd  liis 
8crvi('i-s,  and  was  sent  by  General  H.  G.  Wriglit  at  Cin- 
cinnati to  report  to  Nelson  at  Louisville.  Tlie  latter 
assigned  to  Davis  tlu^  work  of  arming  the  citizens  of 
l^ouisville.  A  day  or  two  afterward  Davis  called  at 
Nelson's  headipiarters  in  tlie  Gait  House.  N(>l8on  in- 
quired, "  Well,  Davis,  how  are  you  getting  along  with 
your  ooniniand  f "  Davis  re)ilied,  "  I  don't  know,"  and 
gave  similar  answeiHlo  t  woor  three  questions  as  to  the 
number  of  regiments  and  companies  he  liad  organized. 
Nelson,  who  was  angered  by  his  seeming  inditt'erenee, 
rose  and  said,  "  But  you  should  know.  I  am  disa))- 
pointed  in  you.  General  Davis  ;  I  selected  you  for  this 
duty  because  you  were  an  olliccr  of  the  regular  army. 


me,  but  on  the  morning  of  October  9th  that  water 
helped  to  relieve  the  suffering  of  some  wounded 
men  who  lay  between  the  two  armies. 

At  Buell's  headquarters,  on  the  Sth,  preparations 
were  going  on  for  the  intended  attack,  and  the  in- 
formation was  eagerly  waited  for  that  Crittenden 
had  reached  his  position  on  the  right.  Fighting 
for  water  went  on  in  our  front,  and  it  was  under- 
stood that  it  extended  all  along  the  line,  but  no 
battle  was  expected  that  day.  McCook  was  at 
Buell's  headquarters  in  the  morning,  and  received, 
I  believe,  some  oral  instructions  regarding  the 
contemplated  attack.  It  was  understood  that  care 
would  be  taken  not  to  bring  on  a  general  engage- 
ment, and  no  importance  was  attached  to  the 
sounds  that  reached  us  of  artillery-firing  at  the 
front  of  the  center.  Of  course  the  young  officers 
of  the  staff,  of  whom  I  was  one,  were  not  taken 
into  conference  by  General  Buell,  but  we  all  knew 
that  the  subject  of  attention  that  morning  was 
the  whereabouts  of  Crittenden's  corps,  and  the 
placing  it  in  position  on  the  right  for  the  general 
engagement  that  was  to  be  brought  on  as  soon  as 
the  army  was  in  line.  We  all  saw  McCook  going 
serenely  away  like  a  general  carrying  his  orders 
with  him. 

In  the  afternoon  we  moved  out  for  a  position 
nearer  Crittenden,  as  I  inferred  from  the  direc- 
tion taken.  A  message  came  from  the  line  on 
the  left  center  to  General  Buell,  and  in  a  few  mo- 
ments Colonel  James  B.  Fry,  our  chief  of  staff, 
called  me  up,  and  sent  me  with  an  order  to  Gen- 
eral Gilbert,  commanding  the  center  corps,  to 
send  at  once  two  brigades  to  reenforce  General 
McCook,  commanding  the  left  corps.  Thus  I  came 
to  be  a  witness  to  some  of  the  curious  features  of 
Perryville. 

I  did  not  know  what  was  going  on  at  the  left, 
and  Colonel  Fry  did  not  inform  me.  He  told  me 
what  to  say  to  General  Gilbert,  and  to  go  fast,  and 
taking  one  of  the  general's  orderlies  with  me,  I 

but  I  Und  I  made  a  mistake."  Davis  replied,  deliber- 
ately, "General  Nelson,  I  am  a  regular  soldier,  and  I 
demand  the  treatment  due  to  mo  as  a  general  officer." 
Dr.  Irwin,  Nelson's  medical  director,  was  called  in  by 
Davis  to  be  a  witness  to  the  altei-cation.  In  his  presence 
Nelson  rejieated  the  rei)riniau(l,  and  ordered  Davis  to 
report  to  (ieneial  Wright  at  Cineiiniati.  Davis  replied, 
"You  have  no  authority  to  oi'<ler  mo."  Nelson  turned 
to  his  ad,jntaiit  geneial  and  said,  "  Captain,  if  General 
Da\is  does  not  leave  the  city  bj'  9  o'clock  to-night,  give 
instructions  to  the  provost-marshal  to  see  that  he  is  put 
across  the  Ohio."  Davis  was  highly  incensed  by  the 
manner  and  bearing  of  Nelson.  He  withdrew,  and  that 
night  reported  to  Wright  in  Cincinnati.  When  Buell 
reached  Louisville  on  September  25th,  Wright  ordered 
Davis  to  return  and  report  to  Buell.  IIo  arrived  at  the 
Gait  House  on  the  mrirning  of  September  2!>th.  Nelson, 
after  breakfast,  was  standing  in  the  hotel  office,  and  was 
leaning  against  the  counter  when  he  was  approached 
by  Davis  in  company  with  (Jovernor  Oliver  P.  Mor- 
ton, of  Indiana.  Davis  accosted  Nelson  Avith  the  re- 
mark that  Nelson  had  insulted  him  at  the  last  meetmg 
and  that  he  must  have  satisfaction.    Nelson  told  him 


NOTES  OF  A  STAFF-OFFICEK  AT  PERRVyiLLE. 


6i 


started  on  my  errand.  I  found  General  Gilbert  at 
the  front,  and  us  he  had  no  staff-officer  at  hand  at 
the  moment,  lie  asked  me  to  go  to  General  Schoepf, 
one  of  his  division  commanders,  with  the  order. 
Schoepf  promptly  detached  two  brigades,  and  he 
told  me  I  had  better  go  on  ahead  and  find  out 
where  they  were  to  go.  There  was  no  sound  to 
direct  me,  and  as  I  tried  to  take  an  air  line  I 
passed  outside  the  Union  lines  and  was  over- 
taken by  a  cavalry  officer,  who  gave  me  the  pleas- 
ing information  that  I  was  riding  toward  the  en- 
emy's pickets.  Now  up  to  this  time  I  had  heard  no 
sound  of  battle ;  I  had  heard  no  artillery  in  front 
of  me,  and  no  heavy  infantry-firing.  I  rode  back, 
and  passed  behind  the  cavalry  regiment  which  was 
deployed  in  the  woods,  and  started  in  the  direction 
indicated  to  me  by  the  officer  who  called  me  back. 
At  some  distance  I  overtook  an  ambulance  train, 
urged  to  its  best  speed,  and  then  I  knew  that  some- 
thing serious  was  on  hand.  This  was  the  first  inti- 
mation I  had  that  one  of  the  fiercest  struggles  of 
the  war  was  at  that  moment  raging  almost  within 
my  sight. 

Directed  by  the  officers  in  charge  of  the  ambu- 
lances I  made  another  detour,  and  pushing  on  at 
greater  speed  I  suddenly  turned  into  a  road,  and 
there  before  me,  within  a  few  hundred  yards,  the 
battle  of  Perryville  burst  into  view,  and  the  roar 
of  the  artillery  and  the  continuous  rattle  of  the 
musketry  first  broke  upon  my  ear.  It  was  the  finest 
spectacle  I  ever  saw.  It  was  wholly  unexpected, 
and  it  fixed  me  with  astonishment.  It  was  like 
tearing  away  a  curtain  from  the  front  of  a  great 
picture,  or  the  sudden  bursting  of  a  thunder-cloud 
when  the  sky  in  front  seems  serene  and  clear.  I 
had  seen  an  unlooked-for  storm  at  sea,  with  hardly 
a  moment's  notice,  hurl  itself  out  of  the  clouds  and 
lash  the  ocean  into  a  foam  of  wild  rage.  But  here 
there  was  not  the  warning  of  an  instant.  At  one 
bound  my  horse  carried  me  from  stillness  into  the 
uproar  of  battle.  One  turn  from  a  lonely  bridle- 
path through  the  woods  brought  me  face  to  face 
with  the  bloody  stiniggle  of  thousands  of  men. 


Waiting  for  news  to  carryback,  I  saw  and  heard 
some  of  the  unhappy  occurrences  of  Penyville.  I 
saw  young  Forman,  with  the  remnant  of  his  com- 
pany of  the  intli  Kentucky  regiment,  withdrawn 
to  make  way  for  the  reenforcements,  and  as  they 
silently  passed  me  they  seemed  to  stagger  and 
reel  like  men  who  had  been  beating  against  a  great 
storm.  Forraan  had  the  colors  in  his  hand,  and  he 
and  several  of  his  little  gioup  of  men  had  their 
hands  upon  their  chests  and  their  lips  apart  as 
though  they  had  difficulty  in  breathing.  They  filed 
into  a  field,  and  without  thought  of  shot  or  shell 
they  lay  down  on  the  ground  apparently  in  a  state 
of  exhaustion.  I  joined  a  mounted  gi-oup  about  a 
young  officer,  and  heard  Rumsey  Wing,  one  of 
Jackson's  volunteer  aides,  telling  of  that  general's 
death  and  the  scattering  of  the  raw  division  he 
commanded.  I  remembered  how  I  had  gone  up  to 
Shiloh  with  Terrill's  battery  in  a  small  steamer, 
and  how,  as  the  first  streak  of  daylight  came,  Ter- 
rill,  sitting  on  the  deck  near  me,  had  recited  a  line 
about  the  beauty  of  the  dawn,  and  had  wondered 
how  the  day  woidd  close  upon  us  all.  I  asked  about 
Terrill,  who  now  commandeil  a  brigade,  and  was 
told  that  he  had  been  carried  to  the  rear  to  die. 
I  thought  of  the  accomplished,  good,  and  brave 
Parsons, —  whom  I  had  seen  knocked  down  seven 
times  in  a  fight  with  a  bigger  man  at  West  Point, 
without  ever  a  thought  of  (juitting  so  long  as  he 
could  get  up,  and  who  lived  to  take  orders  in 
the  church,  and  die  at  Memphis  of  the  yellow 
fever,  ministering  to  the  last  to  the  spiritual 
wants  of  his  parishioners, —  and  I  asked  about 
Parsons's  battery.  His  raw  infantry  support  had 
broken,  and  stunned  by  the  disaster  that  he  thought 
had  overtaken  the  whole  army,  he  stood  by  his 
guns  until  every  horse  and  every  man  had  gone, 
and  the  enemy  was  almost  touching  him,  and  had 
been  dragged  away  at  last  by  one  of  his  men  who 
had  come  back  to  the  rescue.  His  battery  was  a 
wreck  and  no  one  knew  then  where  he  was.  And 
so  the  news  came  in  of  men  I  knew  and  men  with 
friends  about  me. 


to  go  away.    Davis  pressed  his  demand  and  Nelson 

Bald,  "  Go  away,  you puppy.    I  don't  want  anything 

to  do  with  you."  Davis,  who  had  picked  up  a  blank  visit- 
ing card  and  had  squeezed  it  into  a  ball  as  he  was  talk- 
liiK,  responded  to  the  liisultiug  words  by  flipplnfi  the 
card  into  Nelson's  fiioe.  Nelson  then  8lai)ped  l)avin  in 
the  face  and  siiid  to  Governor  Morton,  "  Did  you  eouie 
here,  sir,  to  see  me  insulted  1 "  "  No,"  replied  Morton, 
whereupon  Nelson  walked  toward  his  room  on  the  office 
floor.  After  the  ulap  Davis  asked  for  a  pistol,  and  a 
friend  borrowed  one  and  lian(h'(l  it  to  Davis,  who  started 
toward  NelHon's  room  and  met  liim  in  the  corridor 
ne;ir  tlie  foot  of  the  Hlaircase.  apparently  on  his  way  to 
Hnell'H  apartment  npstairn.  When  a  yiird  apart  Davis 
tired.  Nelson  walked  npstairs  and  fell  in  the  hall  m-ar 
linell's  door.  To  the  proin-ietor  of  tin'  liolel  Nelson 
said,  "Send  for  a  <-lerLcynniii ;  I  wisli  to  t)e  liaptiz.tl.  I 
have  l)oen  basely  murdered."  General  T.  L.  Crittenden, 
who  wasattln^  in-eakfiist  tahle.  hnrrie<l  to  the  corridor, 
and,  takiiifr  N«'lson's  hand,  said,  "  Nelson,  ar."  yon  seri- 
ously hurt?"  Nelson  replied.  "Tom,  I  am  nmrdered." 
WluMi  Rnrseon  Uobert  Mni-rav  arrived  Nelson  waslvins,' 
.Ml  tin'  floor  of  a  n.om  m^ar  wlnMe  h.'  ha.l  fallen,  insensi- 
ble.   Tliesnnill  pistol-ball  entered  Just  over  tlu>  li.aM. 


In  less  than  an  hour  Nelson  was  dead.  General  Fry  was 
in  the  grand  hall  of  the  hotel  at  the  time  of  the  en- 
counter. On  hearing  the  sound  of  the  pistol  he  made 
his  way  through  the  crowd  that  had  surrounded  Davis 
and  arrested  him  in  the  nann'  of  General  Ruell.  Fry 
took  Davis's  arm.  and  tlu'y  went  to  Davis's  room  on  an 
upi)er  floor.  Wlien  the  door  was  closed  Davis  said  he 
wanted  to  relate  the  facts  while  they  were  fresh  in  his 
mind,  and  anu)ug  other  details  mentioned  the  flipping 
of  the  paper  into  Nelsmi's  face.  (JeJieral  Gilberi  was 
appointed  to  succeed  Nelson,  and  fwo  «h(ys  afferwanl 
the  army  nnirehed  for  rerryville.  Ruidl  could  not  then 
si)are  oftleers  for  a  eourt-nnirtial.  ami  suggested  to 
IIalle<k  that  a  trial  by  eomndssion  appointeii  from 
Wasliington  should  take  place  immediately  As  no 
eliarires  were  preferred  against  Davis  within  the  luriod 
tlxed  by  military  rules,  he  was  released  by  onler  of 
General  Wright." 

On  October  27th,  1S62,  (Jcnernl  Davis  was  tndieted 
by  a  grand  Jury  for  inanshiughler.  and  was  admittetl 
to  bail  in  tliV  sum  of  live  thousand  dollars.  The  ejise 
was  continued  from  tiux'  to  time  until  May  IWh,  IsiVI, 
when  "it  was  stricken  from  the  do<ket.  with  h-«ve  to 
reinstate."— Kditoks. 


CUMBERLAND  GAP. 

BY  GEORGE   W.  MORGAN,  BRIGADIER-GENERAL,  U.  S.  V. 

ON  the  11th  of  April,  1862,  with  the  Seventh  Division  of  the  Army  of  the 
Ohio  under  my  command,  I  arrived  at  Cumberland  Ford  with  orders 
from  General  Buell  to  take  Cumberland  Gap,  fourteen  miles  to  the  south- 
ward, and  occupy  east  Tennessee,  if  possible;  if  not,  then  to  prevent  the 
Confederates  from  advancing  from  that  direction.  [See  map,  p.  6.]  This 
movement  and  Mitchel's  advance  into  northern  Alabama  formed  detached 
parts  of  the  general  plan  of  operations  arranged  between  General  Buell  and 
General  Halleck. 

The  division  under  my  command  consisted  of  four  brigades,  commanded 
by  Brigadier-Generals  Samuel  P.  Carter  and  James  G.  Spears,  Colonel  John 
F.  De  Com-cy,  16th  Ohio  regiment,  and  Colonel  John  Coburn,  33d  Indiana 
regiment.  (Coburn's  brigade  was  afterward  commanded  by  Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Absalom  Baird.)  During  the  preceding  wintei'.  Carter  had  occupied  a 
position  near  the  ford  and  threatening  the  Gap. 

The  condition  of  Carter's  brigade  was  deplorable.  The  winter's  storms, 
converting  the  narrow  roads  into  torrents,  had  practically  cut  him  off  from 
his  base  of  supplies,  and,  in  spite  of  all  he  could  do,  his  troops  were  half- 
famished  and  were  suffering  from  scurvy.  Of  the  900  men  of  the  49th 
Indiana  regiment,  only  200  were  fit  for  duty. 

Reconnoissances  at  once  satisfied  me  that  the  fastness  could  not  be  taken 
by  a  direct  attack,  nor  without  immense  loss.  I  determined  to  try  to  force 
the  enemy  to  abandon  his  stronghold  by  strategy. 

The  position  of  the  Confederate  commander  in  east  Tennessee,  Major- 
General  E.  Kirby  Smith,  was  a  difficult  one.  A  large  majority  of  the  people 
of  east  Tennessee  were  devoted  to  the  Union,  and  the  war  there  had  become 
a  vendetta.  The  Union  men  regarded  the  Confederates  as  criminals,  and 
were  in  turn  denounced  by  the  Confederates  as  insurgents.  Kirby  Smith 
recommended  the  arrest  and  incarceration  in  Southern  prisons  of  leading 
citizens,  not  in  arms,  as  a  means  of  converting  the  majority  to  the  South- 
ern cause.  J 

For  a  distance  of  eighteen  miles  north  of  Big  Creek  Gap,  a  pass  south- 
west of  Cumberland  Gap,  the  Confederates  had  heavily  blockaded  the  narrow 
and  al)ru])t  defiles  along  that  route.  The  work  of  clearing  the  blockades 
was  tlioroughly  done.  But  while  Spears  was  thus  engaged  Kirby  Smith 
advanced  with  a  large  force  of  infantry  through  a  bridle-path  called  Wood- 
son's Gap,  to  cut  him  ott'.     Th(^  attempt  might  well  have  succeeded  but  for  the 

i  On  our  side  acts  not  less  vigorous  were  resorted  was  that  th<>y  liad  arrested  T.  A.  R.  Nelson,  while 

to.   A  few  days  after  our  occupation  of  Cumberland  on  his  way  to  take  his  seat  in  the  United  States 

Gap,  June  ISth,  General  Spears,  witliout  authority,  Congress,  and  had  sent  him  to  Eiclmiond.     Their 

sent  out  in  the  night,  captnred  and  wanted  to  hang  lives  were  saved  by  my  interposition,  and  they  were 

a  number  of  Confederate  citizens,  wliose  offense  sent  as  prisoners  to  Indianapolis.— G.  W,  M. 


I 


CUMBERLAND   GAP. 


63 


heroic  act  of  Mrs.  Edwards,  a  noble  womai],  whose  heart  was  wholly  in  the 
Union  cause,  although  she  had  a  son  in  each  of  the  opposing  armies.  Well 
mounted,  she  passed  the  mountains  by  another  path,  and,  by  incredible 
efforts,  reached  my  headquarters  in  time  to  enable  me  to  send  couriers  at  full 
speed  with  orders  for  Spears  to  fall  back  toward  Barboursville,  until  his 
scouts  should  report  that  Smith  had  recrossed  the  mountains. 

In  order  to  succeed  in  the  task  committed  to  me  it  was  necessary  to  compel 
Kirby  Smith,  who  was  at  this  time  concentrating  his  whole  army  in  my  im- 
mediate front,  to  divide  his  forces. 
To  this  end  I  urged  General  Buell 
to  direct  General  0.  M.  Mitchel  to 
threaten  Chattanooga,  and  thus 
draw  the  main  force  of  the  Confed- 
erates in  that  direction. 

About  four  miles  south  of  Cum- 
berland Ford  is  a  narrow  defile 
formed  by  an  abrupt  mountain  on 
one  side,  and  the  Cumberland  Elver 
on  the  other,  through  which  passes 
the  State  Road  to  Cumberland  Gap, 
and  on  the  edge  of  the  defile  was  an 
abandoned  cabin,  known  as  "The 
Moss  House,"  situated  at  the  junc- 
tion of  the  State  Road  and  a  path- 
way leading  to  Lambdin's  on  the 
main  road  to  Big  Creek  Gap.  On 
the  morning  of  May  22d  I  sent 
forward  the  brigade  of  De  Courcy, 
with  a  battery,  with  orders  to  oc- 
cupy the  defile,  and,  as  a  stratagem  intended  to  puzzle  Smith,  to  construct  a 
fort  at  the  junction  of  the  pathway  and  road. 

I  threw  forward  a  strong  party  of  pioneers  to  widen  the  path  leading  to 
Lambdin's,  so  as  to  enable  my  artillery  and  train  to  move  forward.  The 
mountain  was  steep  and  rugged,  and  skill  and  toil  were  necessar>-  to  the 
accomplishment  of  the  work.  Twenty-two  guns,  2  of  them  SO-poundcr  and 
2  20-pounder  Parrott's,  had  to  be  dragged  over  the  Pine  and  Cumberland 
mountains,  at  times  by  means  of  block  and  tackle,  at  others  by  putting 
in  as  many  horses  as  could  be  used,  and  again  by  men  —  200  at  a  single 
piece  —  hauling  with  drag-rojuxs.  The  pathway  leading  from  tlie  ]\I(>ss  House 
had  been  made  the  width  of  a  wagon,  but  two  teams  could  not  pass  eacb 
other  there. 

On  the  6tli  and  7tli  of  June  J^ncll  caHscd  divcrsi 
advance  of  part  of  Mitchel's  command  to  the  v'ww  ( 
and  Smith,  with  two  brigades,  hastened  to  its  i-esene 
Courcy  had  gone  forward;   Baird   oecujtied  the  delilc 
and  Carter  was  assiijrned  to  liold  tlie  delile  till  th<'  la 


HKIGADIER-GENERAL    GEORGE    W.   MORGAN. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


lis  to  be  made  l»y  aii 
•1  )l)0site  Chattanot)ga, 
.     The  brigade  ,.f  De 

■    at     the     Moss    IloUM-, 

t   moment,  and  then 


64  CUMBERLAND  GAP. 

bring  up  the  rear  of  the  cohimn.     On  the  9th  of  June  Greneral  Buell  tele- 
gi-aphecl  me  from  Booneville,  Mississippi : 

"  The  force  now  iu  Tennessee  is  so  small  that  no  offensive  operation  against  east  Tennessee 
can  be  attempted,  and  you  must  therefore  depend  mainly  on  your  own  resources." 

And  on  the  10th: 

"  Considering  your  force  and  that  opposed  to  you,  it  will  probably  not  be  safe  for  you  to 
undertake  any  offensive  operations.  Other  operations  will  soon  have  an  influence  on  your 
designs,  and  it  is  better  for  you  to  i-un  no  risk  at  present." 

It  was,  however,  next  to  impossible  to  change  my  plans  at  this  moment, 
and  move  back  on  a  road  such  as  described.  We  therefore  continued  to  toil 
forward  over  the  almost  impassable  mountains. 

Thinking  that  the  series  of  feints  against  Chattanooga  that  were  being- 
made  at  my  request  indicated  an  advance  in  force,  Kirby  Smith  now  con- 
centrated for  defense  at  that  point,  after  evacuating  Cumberland  Grap  and 
removing  the  stores.  This  was  just  what  I  wanted.  On  the  evening  of  the 
17th  of  June,  General  Carter  L.  Stevenson  of  the  Confederate  forces  sent 
Colonel  J.  E.  Eains  to  cover  the  evacuation  of  Cumberland  Gap,^  which  had 
been  commenced  on  the  afternoon  of  that  day ;  Rains  withdrew  in  the  night 
and  marched  toward  Morristown.  Unaware  of  that  fact,  at  1  o'clock  on  the 
morning  of  June  18th  we  advanced  in  two  parallel  columns,  of  two  brigades 
each,  to  attack  the  enemy ;  but  while  the  troops  were  at  breakfast  I  learned 
from  a  Union  man  who  had  come  along  the  valley  road  that  Rains  had  with- 
drawn and  that  the  gap  was  being  evacuated.  The  advance  was  at  once 
sounded,  the  Seventh  Division  pressed  forward,  and  four  hours  after  the 
evacuation  by  the  Confederates  the  flag  of  the  Union  floated  from  the  loftiest 
pinnacle  of  the  Cumberland  Range.  The  enemy  had  carried  away  his 
field-guns,  but  had  left  seven  of  his  heavy  cannon  in  position,  dismantling 
the  rest. 

At  the  request  of  Carter,  his  brigade  was  sent  forward  in  pursuit  of  the 
enemj^  as  far  as  Tazewell,  but  the  enemy  had  fallen  back  south-eastward  to 
the  Clinch  Mountains.  Cumberland  Gaj)  was  om-s  without  the  loss  of  a 
single  Hfe.  Secretary  Stanton  telegraphed  the  thanks  of  the  President,  and 
General  Buell  published  a  general  order  iu  honor  of  this  achievement  of  the 
Seventh  Division. 

Lieutenant  (now  Colonel)  William  P.  Craighill,  of  the  Corps  of  Engineers, 
a  soldier  of  distinguished  merit  and  ability,  was  sent  by  Secretary  Stanton 
to  strengthen  the  fortifications  at  the  Gap,  and  he  soon  rendered  them 
impregnable  against  attack. 

My  hope  and  ambition  now  was  to  advance  against  Knoxville  and  arouse 
the  Uidon  men  of  east  Tennessee  to  arms.  I  urgently  asked  for  two  additional 
brigades  of  infantry,  a  battery,  and  two  regiments  of  cavalry,  and,  thus  reen- 
forced,  pledged  myself  to  sweep  east  Tennessee  of  the  Confederates.  My  guns 
were  increased  from  22  to  28,  and  a  battery  of  east  Tennessee  artillery  was 
organized,  commanded  by  Lieutenant  Daniel  Webster,  of  Forster's  1st  Wis- 

3>  The  Confederate  forces  covering  the  mountain  and  river  passes  north  of  Knox-sdlle  at  this  time 
were  under  General  C.  L.  Stevenson,  First  Division,  Department  of  East  Tennessee.— Editors. 


CUMBERLAND  GAP. 


65 


"^^. 


M-n 


PLAN    OF    THE    CONFEDERATE  WORKS    AT   CUMBERLAND    GAP,    JUNE    14,   18G2. 
FROM  A  DRAWING    BY    CAPTAIN  W.   F.   PATTERSON. 

consin  battery.  Four  thousand  stand  of  arms,  destined  for  east  Tennessee,  but 
left  at  Nicholasville  and  Crab  Orchard  during  the  winter  on  account  of  the 
impassable  state  of  the  roads,  were  now  sent  forward  to  Cumberland  Gap 
with  a  largo  supply  of  ammunition,  and  magazines  and  an  arsenal  were  got 
ready  for  them.  A  vast  store-house,  capable  of  containing  supplies  for 
20,000  men  for  G  months,  was  also  built  by  Cai)tain  AV.  F.  Patterson.  The 
nerves  and  muscles  of  every  man  were  stretched  to  the  utmost  tension,  and 
the  Gap  became  a  vast  workshop.  Captain  S.  B.  Brown,  assistant  quarter- 
master and  acting  commissary  of  subsistence,  a  man  of  fine  intelligence 
and  great  energy,  put  on  the  road  in  small  trains  over  four  hundred  wagons, 
and  by  this  means  the  various  munitions  of  war  were  dragged  from  the  blue- 
grass  region  through  the  wilderness  to  Cumberland  Gap. 

Colonel  De  Courcy  and  Captain  Joseiili  Edgar  (afterward  killed  in  action 
under  De  Courcy  at  Tazewell)  were  detailed  as  instructors  of  tactics  for  the 
of&cers  of  the  new  regiments  of  east  Tennessee  troops,  who  wcic  brave, 
ambitious  men  and  anxious  to  learn.  Forage  was  collected  with  tlilliculty 
by  armed  partitas. 

About  the  middle  of  August  Stevenson  went  into  position  in  my  immediate 
front.  On  the  morning  of  the  17th  T  receiviMl  iiitelligtMice,  ]>robabl(»  in  its 
character,  that  Stevenson  woiiM  a1tem])t  to  carry  the  (lap  that  night.     At 


66  CUMBERLAND   GAP. 

2:. 'JO  A.  M.  oil  the  18tli  reveille  was  sounded,  and  the  lines  were  manned,  but 
the  enemy  did  not  attack.     It  was  evident  that  he  intended  a  siege. 

On  the  16th  Kirby  Smith  crossed  the  mountains  south  of  us,  into  Ken- 
tucky, occupied  Cumberland  Ford,  and  sent  a  demand  for  the  surrender  of 
the  Gap,  to  which  I  replied :  "  If  you  want  this  fortress,  come  and  take  HP 

Smith's  position  was  critical.  He  had  no  base  of  supplies ;  the  valley  in 
which  his  troops  were  concentrated  was  soon  exhausted;  the  longer  he 
delayed  pushing  toward  the  blue-grass  region,  the  greater  would  be  the 
force  he  would  have  to  meet  on  reaching  there.  Having  completely  cut  me 
oif  from  my  base,  he  therefore  pushed  forward  toward  Lexington,  leaving 
Stevenson  still  in  front  of  me. 

The  Confederates  were  invading  Kentucky  in  three  Columns:  Bragg  on 
the  left.  Smith  in  the  center,  Humphrey  Marshall  on  the  right,  while  John 
H.  Morgan  hovered  like  an  eagle  on  the  wing,  ready  to  pounce  upon  any 
weak  point.  They  now  regarded  the  capture  or  destruction  of  my  division  as 
certain.  Our  situation  was  indeed  critical.  We  had  been  three  months  in 
this  isolated  position.  Our  only  reasonable  hope  of  succor  had  been  destroyed 
by  the  defeat  and  dispersion  of  Nelson's  force  at  Richmond  on  the  30th  of 
August.  [See  p.  4.]  We  were  destitute  of  forage.  The  horses  of  the  9th 
Ohio  Battery  literally  starved  to  death,  and  then-  skeletons  were  dragged 
outside  the  lines.  Our  supplies  of  food  were  rapidly  becoming  exhausted. 
De  Courcy  had  been  sent  to  Manchester,  sixty  miles  distant,  in  the  hope  of 
obtaining  supplies,  but  there  was  scarcely  sufficient  for  his  own  brigade. 
Enveloped  on  every  side  by  the  enemy,  absolutely  cut  off  from  my  base  of  sup- 
plies, and  with  starvation  staring  us  in  the  face,  I  assembled  a  council  of  war, 
and,  stating  the  situation  in  a  few  words,  asked  for  the  opinions  of  the  mem- 
bers. Spears,  Carter,  and  Baird  (De  Courcy  being  absent)  gave  it  as  their 
opinion,  in  which  I  concurred,  that  retreat  was  inevitable.  In  fact,  I  had 
already  marked  out  in  red  chalk  on  the  map  of  Kentucky  my  line  of  retreat, 
just  as  it  was  afterward  carried  out.  Holding  out  the  idea  that  we  were 
seeking  to  obtain  supplies  by  way  of  the  barren  wilderness  through  which  I 
purposed  to  reach  the  Ohio,  I  had  previously  caused  Lieutenant-Colonel  George 
W.  Gallup,  of  the  14th  Kentucky,  a  soldier  of  rare  merit,  to  send  me  at  inter- 
vals men  of  his  command  familiar  with  the  country  through  which  each  day's 
march  would  have  to  be  made.  The  information  given  me  by  those  brave 
mountaineers  w^as  discouraging.  The  want  of  water,  the  rugged  character  of 
tlie  defiles,  the  almost  absolute  want  of  supplies,  were  stated  by  every  one, 
but  the  opinion  was  expressed  that  a  few  wagons,  laden  with  half  a  ton  each, 
might  get  tiirough.  My  topogi-aphical  engineer.  Captain  Sidney  S.  Lyon,  a 
man  of  fine  intelligence  and  skill,  had  been  the  geologist  of  Kentucky,  and 
was  familiar  with  every  foot  of  the  State.  Pointing  out  to  him  the  region 
I  had  marked  across  the  map  T  said,  "  Can  I  take  my  di\asion  by  that  route 
to  the  Ohio  River  ?"  "Yes,  possibly,  by  abandoning  tiie  artillery  and  wagons." 
However,  there  was  practi(^ally  no  choice.  To  retreat  on  Lexington  would 
have  ])laced  my  division,  with  its  reduced  numbers,  between  Stevenson  in 
our  imincdiate  rear,  Smith  in  our  front,  Bragg  on  our  left,  and  Humphrey 


CUMBERLAND  GAP. 


67 


^       ll 


^^^^iiil-^^ 


f'vlii 


^M~t\ 


VIEW  OF    CUMBERLAND    GAP   FROM    THE    SOUTH,  SEPT.  14, 


FROM  A  LITHOGRAPH. 


A,  Battery  No.  1 ;  B,  Battery  No.  2 ;  C,  Fort  Moripllan  ;  D,  Battery  No.  3  ;  E,  Fort  Halleck ;  1, 1st  Teiiuessee  Regt. ; 

2,  2d  Tennessee ;  5,  49th  Indiana ;  6,  l-ttli  Kentucky;  8,  Headquarters  Provost  Guard;  9,  3d  Kentucky ; 

10,  33d  Indiana;  11,  General  Baird's  lit  ;ul(iiiarters;  12,  (ieneral  Carter's  Headquarters ; 

13,  House  used  as  General  Morgan's  Headquarters. 

Marshall  on  our  right,  with  the  passes  of  the  Wild  Cat  or  of  the  Big  Hill  to 
overcome.  I  therefore  determined  to  retreat  by  the  red-chalk  line,  and  at  all 
hazards  to  take  my  artillery  and  wagons  with  me.  | 

Stevenson,  who  knew  as  well  as  I  did  that  I  must  attempt  a  retreat,  was 
vigilant  and  energetic.  From  a  knob  on  the  east  flank  of  Baptist  Gap,  with 
the  aid  of  a  good  telescope,  he  could  see  all  that  was  going  on  in  Cumberland 
Gap.  His  line  was  nearly  a  semicircle,  the  opposite  points  of  .the  diameter 
resting  on  the  mountain's  base  to  the  right  and  left  of  the  Gap.  His  policy 
was  to  starve  us  out. 

During  the  night  of  the  16th  of  September,  a  long  train  of  wagons  was  sent 
toward  Manchester  under  the  convoy  of  Colonel  Coburn's  3od  Indiana,  two 
companies  of  Garrard's  3d  Kentucky  regiment,  and  the  9th  Ohio  Battery. 
This  entire  night  and  the  following  day,  every  preparation  was  made  for  the 
retreat.  Mines  had  beiMi  constructed  to  blow  uj^  the  magazines  and  arsenal 
and  fire  the  vast  store-houses  constructed  and  under  construction.  Every- 
thing moved  with  the  precision  of  a  well-constructed  and  well-oiled  jnece  of 
machinery,  until  late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  17th,  when  a  ri'port  came  from 
our  signal  station  on  the  crest  of  the  mountain  that  a  flag  of  truce  from  the 
enemy  was  approaching.  This  was  in  reality  a  party  of  observation.  I  tlien^- 
fore  sent  Lieutenant-Colonel  Galluji,  with  a  small  escort  and  a  few  .^lirewd 
olficers,  to  meet  the  enemy's  flag  outside  oni-  jticket  liin's.     The  oflicers  in 

4.Tho  retreat  was  made  across  Kentucky  by  the  way  of  .Mancliesler,  H i.ville,  ami  West  Lilterty 

to  Greenup  on  the  Ohio  Kiver.     [See  map,  p.  tJ.]  —  Ki>it(M;s. 


68  CUMBERLAND  GAP. 

either  side  were  laughing  and  joking  together,  when  suddenly  a  glare  of 
fii-e  shone  from  the  valley  at  the  foot  of  the  Gap  and  a  volume  of  smoke 
curled  over  Poor  Valley  Ridge.  One  of  the  Confederates  exclaimed,  "  Why, 
Colonel,  what  does  that  mean  ?  It  looks  like  an  evacuation."  With  admirable 
coolness  and  address  Gallup  replied,  "  Not  much.  Morgan  has  cut  away  the 
timber  obstracting  the  range  of  his  guns,  and  they  are  now  burning  the  brush 
on  the  mountain-side."  This  off-hand  explanation  was  apparently  satisfac- 
tory, but  the  fact  was  that  some  reckless  person  had  fired  a  quartermaster's 
building, — a  criminal  blunder  that  might  have  cost  us  dear. 

On  the  night  of  the  17th,  Gallup,  with  a  body  of  picked  men,  was  left  to 
guard  the  three  roads  leading  from  the  camps  of  Stevenson,  and  to  fire  the 
vast  quartermaster  buildings,  as  well  as  the  enormous  store-house,  nearly 
completed,  on  the  crest  of  the  mountain,  and  near  the  gap.  The  arsenal, 
containing  four  thousand  stand  of  small-arms,  and  a  large  amount  of  shells 
and  grenades,  had  been  mined,  and  trains  had  been  laid  to  the  magazines. 

At  8  o'clock  that  night  my  command  wheeled  into  column  with  the  cool- 
ness and  precision  of  troops  on  review ;  and  without  hurry,  without  confu- 
sion, with  no  loud  commands,  but  with  resolute  confidence,  the  little  army, 
surrounded  by  peril  on  every  side,  set  out  on  its  march  of  more  than  two 
hundred  miles  through  the  wilderness.  Toward  morning  Gallup  fired  the 
vast  buildings  and  the  trains  leading  to  the  mines.  The  shock  of  the  explosion 
was  felt  fourteen  miles  away ;  the  fiaming  buildings  lighted  up  the  sky  as 
though  the  Gap  and  mountain  crests  were  a  volcano  on  fire,  and  from  time  to 
time  till  after  dawn  we  heard  the  explosion  of  mines,  shells,  or  grenades.  At 
Manchester  we  halted  for  a  day  and  a' half,  to  concentrate  the  command,  and 
to  organize  for  the  march  before  us.  A  day  or  two  before  a  soldier  had 
murdered  a  comrade  in  cold  blood,  under  circumstances  of  great  aggravation. 
I  had  ordered  a  court  to  try  him.  The  sentence,  of  course,  was  death,  and 
at  the  very  moment  of  the  execution  the  fii^ing  of  our  troops  could  be  heard 
repelling  the  dash  of  Stevenson's  cavalry  on  the  wagon  train  of  Spears. 

1  fully  expected  to  be  met  by  the  enemy  in  force  at  Proctor,  where  the  deep 
and  abrupt  banks  would  have  rendered  the  passage  of  the  Kentucky  River 
perilous  and  difficult  if  disputed.  We  accordingly  moved  by  two  nearly  parallel 
roads,  and  the  two  columns  reached  Proctor  almost  simultaneously.  I  at  once 
threw  a  brigade,  with  a  battery,  across  the  river,  and  gave  the  command  half  a 
day's  rest.  The  previous  day  and  night  the  ever -vigilant  John  H.  Morgan, 
with  his  dai-ing  followers,  had  been  at  Proctor,  had  burned  the  steam  flouring- 
mill  and  its  valuable  contents,  and  had  then  withdrawn  to  Irvine,  thirteen 
miles  away. 

In  order  to  deceive  the  enemy  as  to  my  intended  line  of  march,  I  directed 
Captain  George  M,  Adams,  Commissary  of  Subsistence,  to  send  an  officer 
toward  Mount  Sterling  with  written  authority  to  purchase  supplies.  He  set 
out,  wearing  his  uniform,  and  attended  only  by  two  or  three  soldiers,  know- 
ing with  certainty  that  he  would  be  taken  prisoner,  and  his  papers  seized. 
He  was,  of  course,  captured,  since  the  Confederates  were  concentrating  at 
Mount  Sterling,  believing  my  objective  point  to  be  Maysville. 


CUMBERLAND    GAP.  69 

Two  roads  run  from  Proctor  to  Hazel  Green :  the  Ridge  road,  then  destitute 
of  water,  and  the  North  Fork  road,  which  had  water,  but  which  the  torrents 
of  the  previous  rainy  season  had  greatly  damaged  and  in  parts  destroyed. 
De  Courcy  and  Spears  marched  by  the  former,  while  Baird  and  Carter,  with 
the  wagon  train,  took  the  latter.  It  was  largely  through  the  energy  of  Baird 
that  the  wagon  train  was  saved.  After  a  day's  halt  at  Hazel  Green  to  rest  and 
refresh  the  half-famished  men  and  animals,  the  march  was  resumed  toward 
West  Liberty,  supposed  to  be  occupied  by  Humj^hrey  Marshall.  However, 
he  was  not  there.  During  this  march,  John  H.  Morgan  attacked  the  rear  of 
De  Courcy's  brigade  and  scattered  a  lot  of  cattle  intended  for  the  use  of  the 
retreating  column.  Morgan  then  passed  around  us  and  commenced  blockad- 
ing the  defiles  between  West  Liberty  and  Grayson  and  destroying  everything 
that  could  feed  man  or  beast.  He  did  his  work  gallantly  and  well.  Frequent 
sku'mishes  took  place,  and  it  several  times  happened  that  while  the  one  Mor- 
gan was  clearing  out  the  obstructions  at  the  entrance  to  a  defile,  the  other 
Morgan  was  blocking  the  exit  from  the  same  defile  with  enormous  rocks  and 
felled  trees.  In  the  work  of  clearing  away  these  obstructions,  one  thousand 
men,  wielding  axes,  saws,  picks,  spades,  and  block  and  tackle,  under  the  gen- 
eral direction  of  Captain  William  F.  Patterson,  commanding  his  company  of 
engineer-mechanics,  and  of  Captain  Sidney  S.  Lyon,  labored  with  skill  and 
courage.  In  one  instance  they  were  forced  to  cut  a  new  road  through  the 
forest  for  a  distance  of  four  miles  in  order  to  turn  a  blockade  of  one  mile.  At 
Grayson,  however,  on  the  1st  of  October,  John  Morgan  abandoned  the  con- 
test, to  seek  a  new  field  for  the  exercise  of  his  superior  partisan  skill  and 
high  courage;  and  on  the  3d  we  reached  the  Ohio  River  at  Greenup  [see 
map,  p.  6],  without  the  loss  of  a  gun  or  a  wagon,  and  with  the  loss  of  but 
eighty  men.  Not  only  that,  but,  as  General  Bragg  states  in  his  report,  we  had 
detained  General  Kirby  Smith,  and  thus  prevented  the  junction  of  the  Con- 
federate armies  in  Kentucky,  long  enough  to  save  Louisville. 


THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT   CUMBERLAND  GAP,  JUNE    17th— IStii,  1S02. 

Union   Forces.— seventh  ditision,    army  of  the  iiartiiioiit  of  East  Tenneesec,  was  In  position  confront- 

Oiiio.    Brif;.-(!(Mi.  GioiKt'  W.  Mmjjan.  ini;  Morj^an  at  ("uniborlaud  (inp.    The  strtMisjtli  of  tliis 

Twi-uln-foiirtlt  llrii/iii/c,  Hv\'^.-(ir]\.  Samuel  P.  Carter:  division  was  stated  by  (teiieral  Kirby  Sniitli  on  the  •J4th 
49th  Intl.,  Lieut. -Col.  James  Keif,'\viii;  3d  Ky.,  Col.  of  th<' month  to  be  HOMO  eltVetives.  ••  well  oiiicanized  and 
T.  T.  Garrard;  1st  Tenn.,  Col.  Kobort  K.  Byrd;  mobilized,  and  in  j^ood  eondition  for  active  serviee." 
2d  Tonn.,  Col.  James  P.  T.  Carter.  Twentij-Sifth  The  organization  on  the  ;ul  of  July  was  as  foUows  : 
Brujade,  Hrif?.-(ien.  James  (}.  Spears:  3d  Tenn.,  ."JcroHf/ /{/•/(/«(/<■.  ("ol.  Jaines  K.  Kains :  4th  Tenn.,  Col. 
Col.  LeonidasC.  Ilouk  ;  4th  Tenn.,  Col.  Robert  .lohnson  ;  J.  A.  MeMnrry;  llth  Tenn..  C<d.  J.  K.  Hains;  42d  (Ja.. 
5tli  Tenn.,  C(d.  James  T.  Shelley  ;  0th  Tenn.,  Col.  Joseph  Col.  K.  .T.  Henderson  ;  3d  (Ja.  J?attalion,  Lient.-Col.  M. 
A.  Cooper.  Twfuli/sijfli  nrii/tide.  Col.  John  V.  De  A.  Stovall;  2!nh  N.  C.  Col.  H.  H.  Vanee;  (Ja.  Kattery. 
Conrey:  2'2d  Ky.,  Col.  Daniel  W.  Lindsey;  ir.th  Ohio,  Capt.  J.  C  Yeiser.  T/iinf  liriuade,  UrifT.-Gen.  S.  M. 
Lient.-Col.  <ieor^a■  W.  Hailey;  ud  Ohio.  Col.  Lionel  A.  liarton  :  :iOth  Ala.,  Col.  C.  M.  Shelley;  31st  Ala.,  Col.  I). 
8heldoii.  Tirciiti/sfi'riitli  Urii/nilf,  Hrijr.-Cien.  .Vbsalom  \i.  Hundley;  40th  (ia..  Col.  .\.  Johnson;  S2d  (ia..  Col. 
Baird;  33d  Ind.,  Col.  John  ("obnrn;  14th  Ky..  Col.  John  \V.  Boyd;  i)th  (ia.  Battalion,  .Ma.|.  J.  T.  Sndth;  Va.  But- 
C.  Cochran;  IDtli  Ky.,  Col.  William  J.  Landr.im.  .1/7//-  tery,  (apt.  Josei)h  W.  .\nderson.  Fourl/i  llrii/nttr,  ro\. 
icn/,  Capt.  J. leob  T.  Foster;  7th  Mich  .  Capt.  Charles  H.  A.  \v.  Keynol.ls:  201  h  Ala.,  C<d.  L  W.  (iarrott  ;  3<5th  (Ja.. 
Lanphere:'.ithOhio,  Lieut.  Leonar<l  I*.  Marrows;  1st  Wis.,  Col.  J.  .V.Cl.nn;  :!'.)! h  t;a..  Col.  J.  T.  MeConnell ;  4;td(;H.. 
Lieut.  John  D.  Anders<ni ;  Sie^'e  Battery,  Lieut.  Daniel  Col.  S.  Harris;  imili  N.  C.,  Col.  D.  Coleman;  :)d  M.l.  Hat- 
Webster,  ('(inilrti:  Ky.  Battalion,  Li<iit. Col.  KeulMii  tery.  ("apt.  11.  B.  Latrobe.  Fifth  llri,/<i<lr.  Col.  T.  H. 
Muuday.     A'//.  Eiu/iiirns.  Ca|)t.  William  F.  Patterson.  Taylor:  2;iit  Ala.,  Col.  F.  K.  Beek ;  4f.tli  Ala.,  Col.  M.  L. 

CONFEDICRATE     FoitCKs.  —  Tli.ir    enupositioii    is    not  Woods;  :!<l    Tenn..  Col.  J.  C.   Vaughn;   31st  Tenn..  CoL 

stated  in  the"  Offleial  Records."     During;  tin-  nu>idh  of  W.   M.    Bradfonl;  .VJtIi  Tenn.,  Col.  J.  B.  Cooko;   Tenu. 

July  Brig.-Geu.  Carter L.  Bteveusou,  First  Division,  De-  (Khett)  Ball.ry.  Capt   W.  IL  Burroughs. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG. 


BY  JAMES  LOXGSTREET,  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL,  C.  S.  A. 


CONFEDERATE    PICKET 


'-HIOE    MOCCASINS. 


N  the  early  fall  of  1862,  a  distance  of  not  more  than 
tlnrty  miles  lay  between  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  A  state  of  uncertainty 
had  existed  for  several  weeks  succeeding  the  battle  of 
Sharpsburg,  but  the  movements  that  resulted  in  the 
battle  of  Fredericksburg  began  to  take  shape  when  on 
the  5th  of  November  the  order  was  issued  removing 
General  McClellan  from  command  of  the  Federal  forces. 
The  order  assigning  General  Burnside  to  command 
was  received  at  General  Lee's  headquarters,  then  at  Cul- 
peper  Court  House,  about  twenty-four  hours  after  it 
reached  Warrenton,  though  not  through  official  courtesy.  General  Lee,  on 
receiving  the  news,  said  he  regi-etted  to  part  with  McClellan,  "for,"  he  added, 
"  we  always  understood  each  other  so  well.  I  fear  they  may  continue  to  make 
these  changes  till  they  find  some  one  whom  I  don't  understand." 

The  Federal  army  was  encamped  around  Warrenton,  Virginia,  and  was  soon 
divided  into  three  grand  divisions,  whose  commanders  were  Generals  Sumner, 
Hooker,  and  Franklin. 

Lee's  army  was  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  Eappahannock  Eiver,  divided 
into  two  corps,  the  First  commanded  by  myself  and  the  Second  commanded 
by  General  T.  J.  (Stonewall)  Jackson.  At  that  time  the  Confederate  army 
extended  from  Culpeper  Court  House  (where  the  First  Corps  was  stationed) 
on  its  right  across  the  Blue  Ridge  down  the  Valley  of  Virginia  to  Winchester. 
Tliere  Jackson  was  encamped  with  the  Second  Corps,  except  one  division 
which  was  stationed  at  Chester  Gap  on  the  Blue  Ridge  Mountains. 

About  the  18tli  or  19th  of  November,  we  received  information  through  our 
scouts  that  Sumner,  with  his  grand  division  of  more  than  thirty  thousand 
men,  was  moving  toward  Fredericksburg.  Evidently  he  intended  to  surprise 
us  and  cross  the  Rappahannock  before  we  could  offer  resistance.  On  'receipt 
of  the  infonnation,  two  of  my  divisions  were  ordered  down  to  meet  him.  We 
made  a  forced  march  and  arrived  on  the  hills  around  Fredericksburg  about 
3  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of  the  21st.  Sumner  had  already  arrived,  and  his 
army  was  encamped  on  Stafford  Heights,  overlooking  the  town  from  the 
Federal  side.  Before  I  reached  Froderickslnirg,  General  Patrick,  provost- 
marshal-general,  crossed  the  river  under  a  flag  of  truce  and  put  the  people 
in  a  state  of  great  excitement  by  delivei-ing  the  following  letter : 

"Headquarters  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  November  21st,  1862. 
"  To  the  Mayor  and  Common  Council  of  Fredericksburg.  Gentlemen  :  Under  cover 
of  the  houses  of  your  city,  shots  have  been  fired  upon  the  troops  of  my  command.  Your  mills 
and  manufactories  are  furuishinj?  provisions  and  the  material  for  clothing  for  armed  bodies  in 
rebellion  against  the  Government  of  the  United  States.  Youi-  railroads  and  other  means  of 
transportation  are  removing  supplies  to  the  depots  of  such  troops.     This  condition  of  things 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG.  71 

must  terminate,  and  by  direction  of  General  Burnside  I  accordingly  demand  the  sui'render  of 
your  city  into  my  hands,  as  the  representative  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  at 
or  before  5  o'clock  this  afternoon.  Faihng  in  an  affirmative  reply  to  this  demand  by  the 
hour  indicated,  .sixteen  hours  will  be  permitted  to  elapse  for  the  removal  from  the  city  of 
women  and  children,  the  sick  and  wounded  and  aged,  etc.,  which  period  ha^'iug  expii-ed  I 
shall  proceed  to  shell  the  town.  Upon  obtaining  possession  of  the  city  eveiy  necessaiy  means 
will  be  taken  to  preserve  order  and  secure  the  protective  operation  of  the  laws  and  policy  of 
the  United  States  Government.     I  am,  veiy  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"E.  V.  Sumner, 
"  Brevet  Major- General,  U.  S.  Army,  Commanding  Right  Grand  Division." 

While  the  people  were  in  a  state  of  excitemeut  over  the  receii:)t  of  this 
demand  for  the  surrender  of  their  town,  my  troops  appeared  upon  the  heights 
opposite  those  occupied  by  the  Federals.  The  alarmed  non-combatants  heard 
of  my  arrival  and  immediately  sent  to  me  the  demand  of  the  Federal  general. 
I  stated  to  the  town  authorities  that  I  did  not  care  to  occupy  the  place  for 
militarv  pui-poses  and  that  there  was  no  reason  why  it  should  be  shelled  by 
the  Federal  army.  We  were  there  to  protect  ourselves  against  the  advance 
of  the  enemy,  and  could  not  allow  the  town  to  be  occupied  by  the  Fed- 
erals. The  mayor  sent  to  General  Sumner  a  satisfactory  statement  of  the 
situation  and  was  notified  that  the  threatened  shelling  would  not  take  place, 
since  the  Confederates  did  not  purpose  to  make  the  town  a  base  of  mihtary 
operations. 

Before  my  troops  reached  the  little  city,  and  before  the  people  of  Freder- 
icksburg knew  that  any  part  of  the  Confederate  army  was  near,  there  was 
great  excitement  over  the  demand  for  surrender.  No  people  were  in  the  place 
except  aged  and  infirm  men,  and  women  and  childi-en.  That  they  should 
become  alarmed  when  the  surrender  of  the  town  was  demanded  by  the  Fed- 
erals was  quite  natural,  and  a  number  proceeded  with  great  haste  to  board  a 
train  then  ready  to  leave.  As  the  train  drew  out,  Sumner's  batteries  on  Staf- 
ford Heights  opened  fire  on  it,  adding  to  the  general  terror,  but  fortunately 
doing  no  serious  damage.  The  spectacle  was  nothing,  however,  to  what  we 
witnessed  a  short  time  after.  About  the  26tli  or  27th  it  became  e\ddent 
that  Fredericksburg  would  be  the  scene  of  a  battle,  and  we  ad^'ised  the 
people  who  were  still  in  the  town  to  prepare  to  leave,  as  they  would  soon 
be  in  danger  if  they  remained.  The  evacuation  of  the  place  by  the  dis- 
tressed women  and  helpless  men  was  a  painful  sight.  Many  were  almost 
destitute  and  had  nowhere  to  go,  but,  yielding  to  the  cruel  necessities  of 
war,  they  collected  their  portable  effects  and  turned  their  backs  on  the 
town.  Many  were  forced  to  seek  shelter  in  the  woods  and  brave  the  icy 
November  nights  to  escape  tht»  approaching  assault  from  the  Fedei'al  army. 

Very  soon  after  I  reached  Fredei-icksburg  the  remainder  of  my  corps  arrived 
from  Culpeper  Court  House,  and  as  soon  as  it  was  known  that  all  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  was  in  motion  for  the  prosjxvtive  scene  of  battle  Jackson 
was  drawn  down  from  the  Blue  Ridge.  In  a  v»M-y  .-^liorl  liiiic  tlic  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  was  face  to  face  with  the  Army  «»t'  the  I'oloniac 

Wlien  Jackson  arrived  he  objected  to  the  positi(Mi,  n..t  that  he  1"care<l  the 
result  of  the  l.attUs  hut  because  lie  tiiought  (liat  bcliiiid  the  North  Anna  was 


72 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG. 


a  point  from  which  tlie  most  fruitful  results  would  follow.  He  held  that  we 
would  win  a  victory  at  Fredericksburg,  but  it  would  be  a  fruitless  one  to  us, 
whereas  at  North  Anna,  when  we  drove  the  Federals  back,  we  could  give 
pursuit  to  advantage,  w^liich  we  could  not  do  at  Fredericksburg.  General 
Lee  did  not  entertain  the  proposition,  however,  and  we  continued  our  prep- 
arations to  meet  the  enemy  at  the  latter  place,  i^ 

At  a  point  just  above  the  town,  a  range  of  hills  begins,  extending  from  the 
river  edge  out  a  short  distance  and  bearing  around  the  valley  somewhat  in 

the  form  of  a  crescent.  On  the  opposite 
side  are  the  noted  Stafford  Heights,  then 
occupied  by  the  Federals.  At  the  foot  of 
these  hills  flows  the  Rappahannock  River. 
On  the  Confederate  side  nestled  Fredericks- 
burg, and  around  it  stretched  the  fertile 
bottoms  from  which  fine  crops  had  been 
gathered  and  upon  which  the  Federal  troops 
were  to  mass  and  give  battle  to  the  Confed- 
erates. On  the  Confederate  side  nearest 
the  river  was  Taylor's  Hill,  and  south  of  it 
the  now  famous  Marye's  Hill ;  next.  Tele- 
graph Hill,  the  highest  of  the  elevations  on 
the  Confederate  side  (later  known  as  Lee's 
Hill,  because  during  the  battle  General  Lee 
w^as  there  most  of  the  time),  where  I  had 
my  headquarters  in  the  field;  next  was  a 
declination  through  which  Deep  Run  Creek 
passed  on  its  way  to  the  Rappahannock 
River ;  and  next  was  the  gentle  elevation  at 
Hamilton's  Crossing,  not  dignified  with  a 
name,  upon  which  Stonewall  Jackson  massed  thii'ty  thousand  men.  It  was 
upon  these  hills  that  the  Confederates  made  their  preparations  to  receive 
Burnside  whenever  he  might  choose  to  cross  the  Rappahannock.  The 
Confederates  were  stationed  as  follows :  On  Taylor's  Hill  next  the  river  and 
forming  my  left,  R.  H.  Anderson's  division ;  on  Marye's  Hill,  Ransom's  and 
McLaws's  divisions;  on  Telegraph  Hill,  Pickett's  di\dsion ;  to  the  right 
and  about  Deep  Run  Creek,  Hood's  division,  the  latter  stretching  across 
Deep  Run  Bottom. 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL    MAXCY    GREGG,    C.  S. 
KILLED    AT   FREDERICKSBURG. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


■5^  That  General  Lee  was  not  quite  satisfied  with 
the  place  of  battle  is  shown  by  a  dispatch  to  the 
Riclimond  authorities  on  the  second  day  after  the 
battle,  when  it  was  uncertain  what  Burnside's 
next  move  would  be.  In  that  dispatch  he  says: 
"Sliould  the  enemy  cross  at  Port  Royal  in  force, 
before  I  can  fi;et  tliis  army  in  position  to  meet  him, 
I  tliink  it  more  advantageous  to  retire  to  the 
Annas  and  give  battle,  than  on  the  banks  of  the 
Rappahannock.  My  desip:n  was  to  have  done  so 
in  the  first  instance.  My  purpose  was  changed 
not  from  any  advantage  in  tiiis  position,  but  from 


an  unwillingness  to  open  more  of  our  country  to 
depredation  than  possible,  and  also  with  a  view  of 
collecting  such  forage  and  provisions  as  could  be 
obtained  in  the  Rai^pahannoek  Valley.  With  the 
numerous  array  opposed  to  me,  and  the  bridges 
and  transportation  at  its  command,  the  crossing  of 
the  Rappahannock,  where  it  is  narrow  and  wind- 
ing as  in  the  vicinity  of  Fredericksburg,  can  be 
made  at  almost  any  point  without  molestation.  It 
will,  therefore,  be  more  advantageous  to  us  to  draw 
him  farther  away  from  his  base  of  operations." 

Editors. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG.  73 

On  the  hill  occupied  by  Jackson's  (iorps  were  the  divisions  of  A.  P.  Hill, 
Early,  and  Taliaferro,  that  of  D.  H.  Hill  being  in  reserve  on  the  extreme 
right.  To  the  Washington  Artillery,  on  Marye's  Hill,  was  assigned  the 
service  of  advising  the  army  at  the  earliest  possible  moment  of  the  Federal 
advance.  General  Barksdale,  with  his  Mississippi  brigade,  was  on  picket 
duty  in  front  of  Fredericksburg  on  the  night  of  the  advance. 

The  liills  occupied  by  the  (Confederate  foi'ces,  although  over-crowned  by  the 
heights  of  Stafford,  were  so  distant  as  to  be  outside  the  range  of  effective  fire 
by  the  Federal  guns,  and,  with  the  lower  receding  grounds  between  them, 
formed  a  defensive  series  that  may  be  likened  to  natural  bastions.  Taylor's 
Hill,  on  our  left,  was  unassailable ;  Marye's  Hill  was  more  advanced  toward 
the  town,  was  of  a  gradual  ascent  and  of  less  height  than  the  others,  and  we 
considered  it  the  point  most  assailable,  and  guarded  it  accordingl}'.  The 
events  that  followed  proved  the  correctness  of  our  opinion  on  that  point. 
Lee's  Hill,  near  our  center,  with  its  rugged  sides  retired  from  Marye's  and 
rising  higher  than  its  companions,  was  comparatively  safe. 

This  was  the  situation  of  the  65,000  Confederates  massed  around  Fred- 
ericksburg, and  they  had  twenty-odd  days  in  which  to  prepare  for  the 
approaching  battle. 

The  Federals  on  Stafford  Heights  carefully  matured  their  plans  of  advance 
and  attack.  Grenei'al  Hunt,  chief  of  artillery,  skillfully  posted  147  guns  to  cover 
the  bottoms  upon  which  the  infantry  was  to  form  for  the  attack,  and  at  the 
same  time  play  upon  the  Confederate  batteries  as  circumstances  would  allow. 
Franklin  and  Hooker  had  joined  Sumner,  and  Stafford  Heights  held  the 
Federal  army,  116,000  strong,  watching  the  plain  where  the  bloody  conflict 
was  soon  to  be.  In  the  meantime  the  Federals  had  been  seen  along  the  banks 
of  the  river,  looking  for  the  most  available  points  for  crossing.  President 
Lincoln  had  been  do^m  with  General  Halleck,  and  it  had  been  suggested  hy 
the  latter  to  cross  at  Hoop-pole  Ferry,  about  28  oi-  30  miles  below  Freder- 
icksburg. We  discovered  the  movement,  however,  and  prepared  to  meet 
it,  and  Burnside  abandoned  the  idea  and  turned  his  attention  to  Fredericks- 
burg, under  the  impression  that  many  of  our  troops  were  down  at  Hoop-pole, 
too  far  away  to  return  in  time  for  this  battle.  \ 

The  soldiers  of  both  armies  were  in  good  fighting  condition,  and  there  was 
every  indication  that  we  would  have  a  desperate  battle.  We  were  confident 
that  Burnside  could  not  dislodge  us,  and  patiently  awaited  the  attack. 

On  the  morning  of  the  11th  of  December,  1862,  an  hour  or  so  before  day- 
light, the  slumbering  Confederates  were  awakened  by  a  solitary  canncm 
thundering  on  the  heights  of  Marye's  Hill.  Again  it  boomed,  and  instantly 
the  aroused  Confederates  recognized  the  signal  oi  the  Washington  Artillery 
and  knew  that  the  Federal  ti-oops  were  preparing  to  crc^ssthe  Ka])pahannock 
to  give  us  the  expected  battle.  The  Federals  came  down  to  tlio  rivrr's  edge 
and  l)egan  the  constructicm  of  their  bridges,  when  Barksdale  opened  lire  with 
such  ett'ect  that  they  were  fcnved  to  retire.     Again  and  again  they  made  an 

4  It  is  more  than  probablo  that  Biinisidc  a.-i-.-i-lcil  tlu>  proposition  to  movo  by  Hoop-polo  Ft-rry  for  the 
purpose  of  drawing  some  of  our  troops  from  thi'  [loints  ht-  had  roally  soloctod  for  his  crossing.—  J.  L. 
VOL.  III.    G 


NoTK.— Tlio  hiittcrics  wliicli  liiid  position  on  the  oiitslfirtsot'  the  town  in  rear  of  Sumner's  attack  were  AVaternian's 

Kusserow's,  Kirby's,  Hazard's,  Frank's,  Arnold's,  Phillips's,  and  Dickenson's.   In  placing  the  Union  artillery,  we 

liave  followed  au  official  map  made  under  direction  of  General  Henry  J.  Hunt,  cliief  of  artillery.—  Editoks. 

74 


THE  BATTlE  of  FREDERICKSBURG.  75 

effort  to  cross,  but  each  time  they  were  met  and  repulsed  by  the  well- 
directed  bullets  of  the  Mississippiaus.  This  contest  lasted  until  1  o'clock, 
when  the  Federals,  with  angry  desperation,  turned  their  whole  available  force 
of  artillery  on  the  Httle  city,  and  sent  down  from  the  heights  a  perfect  storm 
of  shot  and  shell,  crushing  the  houses  with  a  cyclone  of  fiery  metal.  From  our 
position  on  the  heights  we  saw  the  batteries  hurling  an  avalanche  upon 
the  town  whose  only  off'ense  was  that  near  its  edge  in  a  snug  retreat 
nestled  three  thousand  Confederate  hornets  that  were  stinging  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  into  a  frenzy.  It  was  terrific,  the  pandemonium  which  that 
little  squad  of  Confederates  had  provoked.  The  town  caught  fire  in  sev- 
eral places,  shells  crashed  and  burst,  and  solid  shot  rained  like  hail.  In  the 
midst  of  the  successive  crashes  could  be  heard  the  shouts  and  yells  of  those 
engaged  in  the  struggle,  while  the  smoke  rose  from  the  burning  city  and  the 
flames  leaped  about,  making  a  scene  which  can  never  be  effaced  from  the 
memory  of  those  who  saw  it.  But,  in  the  midst  of  all  this  fury,  the  little  bri- 
gade of  Mississippiaus  clung  to  their  work.  At  last,  when  I  had  everything  in 
readiness,  I  sent  a  peremptory  order  to  Barksdale  to  withdraw,  which  he  did, 
fighting  as  he  retired  before  the  Federals,  who  had  hj  that  time  succeeded  in 
landing  a  number  of  their  troops.  The  Federals  then  constructed  their  pon- 
toons without  molestation,  and  during  the  night  and  the  following  day  the 
grand  division  of  Sumner  passed  over  into  Fredericksbui'g. 

About  a  mile  and  a  half  below  the  town,  where  the  Deep  Run  emj^ties  into 
the  Rappahannock,  General  Franklin  had  been  allowed  without  serious  oppo- 
sition to  throw  two  pontoon-bridges  on  the  11th,  and  his  grand  division 
passed  over  and  massed  on  the  level  bottoms  opposite  Hamilton's  Crossing, 
thus  placing  himself  in  front  of  Stonewall  Jackson's  corps.  The  11th  and  12th 
were  thus  spent  by  the  Federals  in  crossing  the  river  and  preparing  for  battle. 

Opposite  Fredericksburg,  the  formation  along  the  river-bank  was  such  that 
the  Federals  were  concealed  in  their  approaches,  and,  availing  themselves 
of  this  advantage,  they  succeeded  in  crossing  and  concealing  the  grand 
division  of  Sumner  and,  later,  a  part  of  Hooker's  grand  di^dsion  in  the  city 
of  Fredericksburg,  and  so  disposing  of  Franklin  in  the  open  plain  below  as 
to  give  out  the  impression  that  the  great  force  was  with  the  latter  and  about 
to  oppose  Jackson. 

Before  daylight  on  the  morning  of  the  eventful  13tli  I  rode  to  the  right  of 
my  line  held  by  Hood's  division.  General  Hood  was  at  his  post  in  plain 
hearing  of  the  Federals  south  of  Deep  Run,  who  were  marching  their  trooj^s 
into  i)osition  for  the  attack.  The  morning  was  cold  and  misty,  and  every- 
thing was  obscured  from  view,  but  so  distinctly  did  the  mist  bear  to  us  the 
sounds  of  the  moving  Federals  that  Hood  thought  the  advance  was  against 
him.  He  was  relieved,  however,  when  I  assured  him  that  the  enemy,  to 
reach  him,  would  have  to  put  himself  in  a  pocket  and  be  subjected  to  attack 
from  Jackson  on  one  side,  Pickett  and  McLaws  on  the  other,  and  Hood's  own 
men  in  front.  The  position  of  Franklin's  men  on  the  V2th,  with  the  configu- 
ration of  th(^  ground,  had  left  no  doubt  in  my  mind  as  to  Franklin's  inten- 
tions.    I  explained  all  this  to  Hood,  assuiiug  him  that  the  attack  would  be 


76 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG. 


FRONT    OF  THE    MAKYE    MANSION.       FROM    A 
AVAR-TIME    PHOTOGRAPH. 


on  Jackson.  At  the  same  time  I 
ordered  Hood,  in  case  Jackson's 
line  should  be  broken,  to  wheel 
around  to  his  right  and  stiike 
in  on  the  attacking  bodies,  tell- 
ing him  that  Pickett,  with  his 
division,  would  be  ordered  to  join 
in  the  flank  movement.  These 
orders  were  given  to  both  divis- 
ion generals,  and  at  the  same 
time  they  were  advised  that  I 
would  be  attacked  near  my  left 
center,  and  that  I  must  be  at 
that  point  to  meet  my  part  of 
the  battle.  They  were  also  ad- 
vised that  my  position  was  so 
well  defended  I  could  have  no 
other  need  of  their  troops.  I  then 
returned  to  Lee's  Hill,  reaching 
there  soon  after  sunrise. 

Thus  we  stood  at  the  eve  of 
the  great  battle.  Along  the  Stafford  Heights  147  guns  were  turned  upon  us, 
and  on  the  level  plain  below,  in  the  town,  and  hidden  on  the  opposite  bank 
ready  to  cross,  were  assembled  nearly  100,000  men,  eager  to  begin  the  com- 
bat. Secure  on  our  hills,  we  grimly  awaited  the  onslaught.  The  valley,  the 
mountain-tops,  everything  was  enveloped  in  the  thickest  fog,  and  the  j^rep- 
arations  for  the  fight  were  made  as  if  under  cover  of  night.  The  mist  brought 
to  us  the  sounds  of  the  preparation  for  battle,  but  we  were  blind  to  the  move- 
ments of  the  Federals.  Suddenly,  at  10  o'clock,  as  if  the  elements  were 
taking  a  hand  in  the  ch*ama  about  to  be  enacted,  the  warmth  of  the  sun 
brushed  the  mist  away  and  revealed  the  mighty  panorama  in  the  valley  below. 
Franklin's  40,000  men,  reeiiforced  by  two  divisions  of  Hooker's  grand 
division,  were  in  front  of  Jackson's  30,000.  The  flags  of  the  Federals  fluttered 
gayly,  the  polished  arms  shone  brightly  in  the  sunlight,  and  the  beautifid 
uniforms  of  the  buoyant  troops  gave  to  the  scene  the  air  of  a  holiday  occasion 
rather  than  the  spectacle  of  a  great  army  about  to  be  thrown  into  the 
tumult  of  battle.  From  my  place  on  Lee's  Hill  I  could  see  almost  every 
soldier  Franklin  had,  and  a  splendid  array  it  was.  But  off  in  the  distance 
was  Jackson's  ragged  infantry,  and  beyond  was  Stuart's  battered  cavalry, 
with  their  soiled  hats  and  yellow  butternut  suits,  a  striking  contrast  to  the 
handsomely  equipped  troops  of  the  Federals. 

About  the  city,  here  and  there,  a  few  soldiers  could  be  seen,  but  there  was 
no  indication  of  the  heavy  masses  that  were  concealed  by  the  houses.  Those 
of  Franklin's  men  who  were  in  front  of  Jackson  stretched  well  up  toward  Lee's 
Hill,  and  were  almost  within  reach  of  our  best  guns,  and  at  the  other  end 
they  stretched  out  to  the  east  until  they  came  well  under  the  fire  of  Stuart's 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG. 


11 


THE    SUNKEN    HOAD     rM>i;U    MAKYE"; 


In  the  background  is  seen  the  continuation  of  Hanover 
street,  which  on  the  left  ascends  the  hill  to  the  Marye 
Mansion.  The  little  sciuaic  field  lies  hi  the  fork  made  by 
the  former  road  and  flic  T(lci;ra|ih  road  (sec  map,  p. 
74).  Nearly  all  that  remained  in  lS8t  of  the  famous  stone- 
wall is  seen  in  the  right  of  the  picture.  The  horses  are 
in  the  road,  which  is  a  continuation  of  the  street  south 
of  Hanover  street,  and  on  which  is  the  brick  house  men- 
tioned ill  (icmial  Coucirs  article.  Tla^  house  in  which 
(ieneralCnhl)  died  would  lie  tlie  iii'xf  ol.ject  in  the  right 
of  t  lie  piel  lire  it  t  lie  toret;roiiiid  were  extended.  And  be- 
yond that  house,  following  the  Telegraph  road  south, 
there  was,  at  the  time  of  the  battle,  a  long  stretch  of 
stone-wall  (see  map,  p.  74),  little  if  any  of  which  was  to 
be  scM'ii  in  188i,  the  stone  having  been  used  for  the  gate- 
llous(^  of  till-  National  Cemetery. 

In  his  ollieial  report  (ieneral  Kershaw,  who  succeeded 
(icneral  Cobb,  thus  describes  llni  situation  durlTig  the 
battle  in  that  part  of  tin- road  seen  in  the  picture:  "The 
roail  is  about  'i'>  I'eet  wide,  and  is  faced  by  a  stone-w.all 
about  4  feet  high  on  thi^  city  side.  The  road  having 
been  cut  out  of  the  sid<>  of  the  hill,  in  iiiaiiy  places  this 
last  wall  is  not  visible  above  the  surface  of  the  ground. 
The  ground  falls  off  rapidly  to  almost  a  level  surface. 
Which  extends  aboiil  150  yards,  then,  with  another 
abrupt  fallof  a  lew  feet,  to  another  plain  which  extends 
some  '.iOO  yardw,  and  then  falls  oil'  abruptly  into  a  wide 
ravine,  which  extends  along  flic  whole  front  of  the  city 
and  discharges  into  Hazel  Knn.  I  found,  on  my  arrival, 
that  ('obb'H  tirii;ade.  Colonel  McMillan  coninianding,  oc- 
cuiiied  our  entire  front,  and  my  trooiis  conid  only  get 
into  position  by  doiililiiig  on  them.  This  was  accord- 
ingly doni!,  and  the  formation  ahing  most  of  the  lino 
during  the  engagement  wae  cousequoutly  four  deep.  As 


III.I..      FliOM     A    I'lIoToCltAl'H    TAKEN    IN    1884. 

an  evidence  of  the  coolness  of  the  command,  I  may  men- 
tion here  that,  notwithstanding  that  their  tiro  was  the 
most  rapid  and  continuous  I  h.ave  ever  witnessed,  not  a 
man  was  injured  by  the  fire  of  his  comrades.  .  .  .  lu 
the  meantime  line  after  line  of  the  enemy  dephiycd  in 
the  ravine,  and  advanced  to  the  attack  at  intervals  of 
not  more  than  lifteeu  minutes  until  about  4 :  30  o'clock, 
when  there  was  a  lull  of  about  a  half  hour,  during  which 
a  mass  of  artillery  was  placed  in  position  in  front  of  the 
town  and  opened  upon  our  position.  At  this  time  I 
brought  up  Colonel  De  .<?aussure"s  regiment.  Our  batter- 
ies on  the  hill  were  silent,  haviiiir  exhausted  their  am- 
munition, and  till'  Washimrton  .Art illery  were  relieved 
by  a  part  of  Colonel  Alexander's  battalion.  Undercover 
of  this  artillery  lire,  the  most  formidable  column  of  at- 
tack was  formed,  which,  about  5  o'clock,  emerged  from 
the  ravine  and,  no  longer  impt'ded  by  our  artillery, 
impetuously  assailed  our  whole  front.  From  this  time 
until  after  6  o'clock  the  attack  was  continnous,  and  the 
Are  on  both  sides  terrirtc.  Some  few,  chiefly  ollicers,  got 
within  30  yards  of  our  lines,  luit  in  every  instance  their 
columns  were  shattered  by  the  time  they  got  within  \oo 
paces.  The  tiring  gradually  subsided,  and  by  7  o'clock 
our  pickets  were  established  within  thirty  yards  of  those 
of  the  enemy. 

"  Our  chief  lo.ss  after  getting  Into  position  In  the  road 
was  from  the  tire  of  sharp-shooters,  who  occupieil  some 
buildings  on  my  left  flank  in  the  curly  part  of  the  en- 
gagement, and  were  only  silenced  by  Captain  (W.)  Wal 
lace,  of  the  2d  Regiment,  directing  the  continuous  Are  of 
one  company  upon  the  bidltlings.  (buieral  Cobb,  I  learn, 
was  killed  by  a  shot  from  that  quarter.  The  regimciits 
on  the  hill  sutTered  most,  as  they  were  less  perfectly 
covered."—  Editors. 


78 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG. 


horse  artillery  under  Major  John  Pelham,  a  brave  and  gallant  officer,  almost 
a  boy  in  years.  As  the  mist  rose,  the  Confederates  saw  the  movement  against 
theu'  right  near  Hamilton's  Crossing.  Major  Pelham  opened  fire  upon  Frank- 
lin's command  and  gave  him  lively  work,  which  was  kept  up  until  Jackson 
ordered  Pelham  to  retire,  Franklin  then  advanced  rapidly  to  the  hill  where 
Jackson's  troops  had  been  stationed,  feeling  the  woods  with  shot  as  he 
progressed.  Silently  Jackson  awaited  the  approach  of  the  Federals  until 
they  were  within  good  range,  and  then  he  opened  a  terrific  fire  which  threw 
the  Federals  into  some  confusion.  The  enemy  again  massed  and  advanced, 
pressing  through  a  gap  between  Archer  and  Lane.  This  broke  Jackson's  line 
and  threatened  very  serious  trouble.  The  Federals  who  had  wedged  them- 
selves in  through  that  gap  came  upon  Gregg's  brigade,  and'  then  the  severe 
encounter  ensued  in  which  the  latter  general  was  mortall}^  wounded.  Archer 
and  Lane  very  soon  received  reenforcements  and,  rallying,  joined  in  the 
counter-attack  and  recovered  their  lost  ground.  The  concentration  of  Talia- 
ferro's and  Early's  divisions  against  this  attack  was  too  much  for  it,  and  the 
counter-attack  drove  the  Federals  back  to  the  railroad  and  beyond  the  reach 
of  our  guns  on  the  left.     Some  of  our  troops  following  up  this  repulse  got 

too  far  out,  and  were  in  turn  much 
,     ^■.  discomfited  when  left  to  the  enemy's 

superior  numbers,  and  were  obliged  to 
retire  in  poor  condition.  A  Federal 
brigade  advancing  under  cover  of 
Deep  Run  was  discovered  at  this  time 
and  attacked  by  regiments  of  Pender's 
and  Law's  brigades,  the  former  of 
A.  P.  Hill's  and  the  latter  of  Hood's 
division ;  and,  Jackson's  second  line 
advancing,  the  Federals  were  forced  to 
retire.  This  series  of  demonstrations 
and  attacks,  the  partial  success  and 
final  discomfiture  of  the  Federals,  con- 
stitute the  hostile  movements  between 
the  Confederate  right  and  the  Federal 
left. 

I  have  described,  in  the  opening  of 
this  article,  the  situation  of  the  Con- 
federate left.  In  front  of  Marye's  Hill  is 
a  plateau,  and  immediately  at  the  base 
of  the  hill  there  is  a  sunken  road  known  as  the  Tt^egraph  road.  On  the  side 
of  the  road  next  to  the  town  was  a  stone-wall,  slioulder-high,  against  which 
the  eartli  was  banked,  forming  an  almost  uiia])proacliable  defense.  It  was 
impossible  for  the  troops  occupying  it  to  expose  more  than  a  small  portion 
of  tlieir  bodies.  Behind  this  stone-wall  I  had  placed  about  twenty-five  hun- 
dred men,  being  all  of  General  T.  P.  R.  Cobb's  brigade,  and  a  portion  of  the 
brigade  of  General  Kershaw,  both  of  McLaws's  division.    It  must  now  be 


^()U8^:  uv  the  stone-wall,  iv  WFiirii  general 

OOBIJ  DIED       FROM  A  WAR-TIME  rilOTOGKAril. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG.  79 

understood  that  the  Federals,  to  reach  what  appeared  to  be  my  weakest 
point,  would  have  to  pass  dii-ectly  over  this  wall  held  by  Cobb's  infantry. 

An  idea  of  how  well  Marye's  Hill  was  protected  may  be  obtained  from  the 
following  incident :  General  E.  P.  Alexander,  my  engineer  and  superintend- 
ent of  artillery,  had  been  placing  the  guns,  and  in  going  over  the  field  with 
liim  before  the  battle,  I  noticed  an  idle  cannon.  I  suggested  that  he  i)lace  it 
so  as  to  aid  in  covering  the  plain  in  front  of  Marye's  Hill.  He  answercnl : 
"  General,  we  cover  that  ground  now  so  well  that  we  will  comb  it  as  with 
a  fine-tooth  comb.  A  chicken  could  not  live  on  that  field  when  we  open 
on  it." 

A  little  before  noon  I  sent  orders  to  all  my  batteries  to  open  fire  through 
the  streets  or  at  any  points  where  the  troops  were  seen  about  the  city,  as  a 
diversion  in  favor  of  Jackson.  This  fire  began  at  once  to  develop  the  work 
in  hand  for  myself.  The  Federal  troops  swarmed  out  of  the  city  like  bees  out  of 
a  hive,  coming  in  double-quick  march  and  filling  the  edge  of  the  field  in  front 
of  Cobb.  This  was  just  where  we  had  expected  attack,  and  I  was  prepared 
to  meet  it.  As  the  troops  massed  before  us,  they  were  much  annoyed  by  the 
fire  of  our  batteries.  The  field  was  literally  packed  with  Federals  from  the 
vast  number  of  troops  that  had  been  massed  in  the  town.  From  the  moment 
of  their  appearance  began  the  most  fearful  carnage.  With  our  artillery  from 
the  front,  right,  and  left  tearing  through  their  ranks,  the  Federals  pressed 
forward  with  almost  invincible  determination,  maintaining  their  steady  step 
and  closing  up  their  broken  ranks.  Thus  resolutely  they  marched  upon 
the  stone  fence  behind  which  quietly  waited  the  Confederate  brigade  of 
General  Cobb.  As  they  came  within  reach  of  this  brigade,  a  storm  of  lead 
was  poured  into  their  advancing  ranks  and  they  were  swept  from  the  field 
like  chaff  before  the  wind.  A  cloud  of  smoke  shut  out  the  scene  for  a 
moment,  and,  rising,  revealed  the  shattered  fragments  I'ecoiling  from  their 
gallant  but  hopeless  charge.  The  artillery  still  i)lowed  through  their  retreat- 
ing ranks  and  searched  the  places  of  concealment  into  which  the  troops  had 
])lunged.  A  vast  number  went  pell-mell  into  an  old  railroad  cut  to  escape 
fh-e  from  the  right  and  front.  A  battery  on  Lee's  Hill  saw  this  and  turned 
its  fire  into  the  entire  length  of  the  cut,  and  the  shells  began  to  pour  down 
ui)on  the  Federals  with  the  most  frightful  destruction.  They  found  their 
position  of  refuge  more  uncomfortable  than  the  field  of  the  assault. 

Thus  the  right  grand  division  of  the  Army  of.  the  Potomac  found  itself 
repulsed  and  shattered  on  its  first  attempt  to  drive  us  from  Marye's  Hill. 
Hardly  was  this  attack  off'  the  field  before  we  saw  the  determined  Federals 
again  filing  out  of  Fredericks! )urg  and  prepaiing  for  another  charge.  The 
Confederate's  under  (Jobb  reserved  their  fire  and  cpiietly  awaited  tlie  a})proat'h 
of  the  enemy.  The  Federals  came  nearer  than  before,  l)nt  were  forced  to 
retire  before  the  well-directed  guns  of  Cobb's  brigade  and  the  fire  of  the 
artillery  on  the  heights.  By  that  time  the  field  in  front  of  CV^bb  was  thickly 
strewn  with  the  dead  and  dying  Federals,  but  again  they  formed  with  des- 
perate courage  and  renewed  the  attack  and  again  were  driven  off.  At  each 
attack  the  slaughter  was  so  great   that  by  the  time   the  lliird  attack  was 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG. 


repulsed,  the  ground  was  so  thickly  strewn  with  dead  that  the  bodies  seri- 
ously impeded  the  approach  of  the  Federals.  General  Lee,  who  was  with  me 
on  Lee's  Hill,  became  uneasy  when  he  saw  the  attacks  so  promptly  renewed 
and  pushed  forward  with  such  persistence,  and  feared  the  Federals  might 
break  through  our  line.  After  the  third  charge  he  said  to  me :  "  General, 
they  are  massing  very  heavily  and  will  l)reak  your  line,  I  am  afraid."  "  Gen- 
eral," I  replied,  "  if  you  put  every  man  now  on  the  other  side  of  the  Potomac 
on  that  field  to  approach  me  over  the 
same  line,  and  give  me  plenty  of  am- 
munition, I  will  kill  them  all  before 
they  reach  my  line.  Look  to  your 
right ;  you  are  in  some  danger  there, 
but  not  on  my  line." 

I  think  the  fourth  time  the  Fed- 
erals charged,  a  gallant  fellow  came 
within  one  hundred  feet  of  Cobb's 
position  before  he  fell.  Close  behind 
him  came  some  few  scattering  ones, 
but  they  were  either  killed  or  they 
fled  from  certain  death.  J^  This  charge 
was  the  only  effort  that  looked  like 
actual  danger  to  Cobb,  and  after 
it  was  repulsed  I  felt  no  apprehen- 
sion, assuring  myself  that  there  were 
enough  of  the  dead  Federals  on  the 
field  to  give  me  half  the  battle.  The 
anxiety  shown  by  General  Lee,  how- 
ever, induced  me  to  bring  up  two  or 
three  brigades,  to  be  on  hand,  and 
General  Kershaw,  with  the  remainder 
of  his  brigade,  was  ordered  down  to  the  stone-wall,  rather,  however,  to  carry 
ammunition  than  as  a  reenforcement  for  Cobb.  Kershaw  dashed  down  the 
declivity  and  arrived  just  in  time  to  succeed  Cobb,  who,  at  this  juncture,  fell 
from  a  wound  in  the  thigh  and  died  in  a  few  ndnutes  from  loss  of  blood. 
[See  also  p.  94.] 

A  fifth  time  the  Federals  formed  and  charged  and  were  repulsed.  A  sixth 
time  they  charged  and  were  driven  back,  when  night  came  to  end  the  dread- 
ful carnage,  and  the  Federals  withdrew,  leaving  the  battle-field  literally  heaped 
with  the  l)odies  of  their  dead.  Before  the  well-directed  fir.'  of  CoblVs  brigade, 
the  Federals  had  fallen  like  the  steady  dri])i)ing  of  rain  finm  tlic  eaves  of  a 
house.     Oui-  musketry  alone  killed  and    wounded  at  least  .")()()();  au<l   thes»». 


"  ""^""r^^ 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL   THOMAS    R.    R.    COISB,    0.  S.    A. 
FROM    A    PIH)TOGUArH. 

Before  the  war,  General  Cobb  was  a  lawyer.    He  was 

born  in  (Jeorfria  in  1820.    In  1851  he  imblishe<l  a 

"Difjeet  of  the  Laws  of  Georgia." 


^  In  his  oilieial  report  (iencral  Ijat'ayctd'  Mc- 
Laws  says:  ''Tlio  body  of  one  man,  Ix-lieved  to 
bo  an  oflieor,  was  fonnd  within  about  tliirty 
yards  of  the  stone-wall,  and  otlier  sing^lo  bodies 
were  scattered  at  increased  distances  until  tlie 
main  mass  of  the  dead  lav  tliieklv  strewn  over  tlie 


,1,'roMnd  at  sonielhiiif,'  over  one  iiiindred  yards  o(T. 
and  extendin^j  to  tlie  ravine,  eoinmeneinf?  at  the 
point  where  our  men  would  allow  the  enemy's 
column  to  apin-oaeh  before  oixMiiuj;  fire,  nntl  be- 
yoiul  which  no  organized  body  of  men  was  able  to 
jiass."— Editors. 


82  THE  BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG. 

with  the  slaughter  by  the  artillery,  left  over  7000  killed  and  wounded  before 
the  foot  of  Marye's  Hill.  The  dead  were  piled  sometimes  three  deep,  and  when 
morning  broke,  the  spectacle  that  we  saw  upon  the  battle-field  was  one  of  the 
most  distressing  I  ever  witnessed.  The  charges  had  been  desperate  and 
bloody,  but  utterly  hopeless.  I  thought,  as  I  saw  the  Federals  come  again  and 
again  to  their  death,  that  they  deserved  success  if  courage  and  daring  could 
entitle  soldiers  to  victory. 

During  the  night .  a  Federal  strayed  beyond  his  lines  and  was  taken  up 
by  some  of  my  troops.  On  searching  him,  we  found  on  his  person  a  memo- 
randum of  Oeneral  Burnside's  arrangements,  and  an  order  for  the  renewal  of 
the  battle  the  next  day.  This  information  was  sent  to  General  Lee,  and 
immediately  orders  were  given  for  a  line  of  rifle-pits  on  the  top  of  Marye's 
Hill  for  Ransom,  who  had  l)een  held  somewhat  in  reserve,  and  for  other  guns 
to  be  placed  on  Taylor's  Hill. 

We  were  on  our  lines  before  daylight,  anxious  to  receive  Greneral  Burnside 
again.  As  the  gray  of  the  morning  came  without  the  battle,  we  became  more 
anxious ;  yet,  as  the  Federal  forces  retained  position  during  the  14th  and  15th, 
we  were  not  without  hope.  There  was  some  little  skirmishing,  but  it  did  not 
amount  to  anything.  But  when  the  full  light  of  the  next  morning  revealed 
an  abandoned  field,  General  Lee  tui-ned  to  me,  referring  in  his  mind  to  the  dis- 
patch I  had  captured  and  which  he  had  just  re-read,  and  said :  "  General,  I 
am  losing  confidence  in  your  friend  General  Burnside."  We  then  put  it  down 
as  a  ruse  de  guerre.  Afterward,  however,  we  learned  that  the  order  had  been 
made  in  good  faith  but  had  been  changed  in  consequence  of  the  demoralized 
condition  of  the  grand  divisions  in  front  of  Marye's  Hill.  During  the  night 
of  the  15th  the  Federal  troops  withdrew,  and  on  the  16th  our  lines  were 
reestablished  along  the  river,  i^ 

I  have  heard  that,  referring  to  the  attack  at  Marye's  Hill  while  it  was  in 
progress,  General  Hooker  said:  "There  has  been  enough  blood  shed  to  satisfy 
any  reasonable  man,  and  it  is  time  to  quit."  I  think  myself  it  was  fortunate 
for  Burnside  that  he  had  no  greater  success,  for  the  meeting  with  such 
discomfiture  gave  him  an  opportunity  to  get  back  safe.  If  he  had  made  any 
progress,  his  loss  would  i)rol)ably  have  been  greater. 

8uch  was  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg  as  I  saw  it.  It  has  been  asked  why 
we  did  not  follow  up  the  victory.  The  answer  is  plain.  It  goes  without  say- 
ing that  the  battle  of  the  First  Corps,  concluded  after  nightfall,  could  not  have 
been  changed  into  offensive  operations.  Our  line  was  about  three  miles  long, 
extending  tln-ough  woodland  over  hill  and  dal(\  An  attempt  at  concentration 
to  throw  the  troops  against  the  walls  of  the  city  at  that  hour  of  the  night 
would  have  been  little   better  than   madnc^ss.     The  Confederate  field  was 

•j^  General  Lee  explained  officially,  as  follows,  not  fk'cnicd  expedient  to  lose  the  advantages  of  our  posi- 

why  he  expected  the  attack  woidd  be  resumed  :  '••>"  ""••  exi)oso  tlie  troops  to  the  Are  of  his  inaccessible 

Imttcrics  licyond   t lie  river  ))v  advaneinir  a.irninst  him; 

"The  attack  on  the  13th  hnd  been  so  easily  repulsed,  l)ut  we  wen'  ncc<"ss;iril v  itriioraiit  of  the  extent  to  which 

and  by  so  Nuiall  a  part  of  our  army,  that  it  was  not  sup-  he  had  suflTered,  and  onlv  l.eeanie  aware  of  it  when,  on 

ixmod  the  eneiny  would  liuiit    his  efforts  to  :in  att(Mnpt  the  morning  of  the  lOth.  it  was  discovered  that  he  had 

whieli  in  view  of  the  ini.fr.iitnde  of  his  preimrations  :ind  availed  himself  of  the  darkness  of  nitflit.  and  the  prcv- 

the  <;\teiit  of  hiH  toree,  seemed  to  be  eomi.iii-af  ively  in-  alenco  of  a  violent  storm  of  wind  iind  rain,  to  recross 

^'f.'ll  !'.""!■  the  river.    The  town  was  immediately  reoccupied  and 

liem-vm-,  therefore,  that  he  would  attack  ns.  it  w.as  our  position  on  the  river-bank  resumed."     EDITORS. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG. 


83 


CONFEDERATE    WORKS    ON    WILLIS'S    HILL,   NOW    THE    SITE    OF    THE    NATIONAL    CEMETERY. 
FROM    A    WAR-TIME    PHOTOGRAPH. 


armiigod  for  defensive  battle.  Its  abrupt  termination  could  not  have  l)e('n 
anticipated,  nor  could  any  skill  have  marshaled  our  trooi)s  for  olfensive  oper- 
ations in  time  to  meet  the  emergency.  My  line  was  long  and  over  broken 
country, — so  much  so  that  the  troops  could  not  be  promptly  handled  in  offen- 
sive operations.  Jackson's  corps  was  in  mass,  and  coidd  he  have  anticipated 
the  result  of  my  battle,  he  would  have  been  justified  in  pressing  Franklin  to  the 
river  when  the;  battle  of  the  latter  was  lost.  Otherwise,  pursuit  would  have 
IxH'u  as  unwise  as  the  attack  he  had  just  driven  off.  The  Federal  batteries 
on  Stafford  Heights  were  effectively  posted  to  jn'otect  their  troops  against  our 
adv^ance,  and  Franklin  would  have  been  in  good  defensive  position  against 
attack  on  the  next  day.  It  is  well  known  that  after  driving  off  attacking 
forces,  if  immediate  pursuit  can  bo  made  so  that  the  victors  can  go  aU)ng  with 
tlie  retreating  forces  pell-mell,  it  is  well  enough  to  do  so;  but  the  attack 
should  be  innnediate.  To  follow  a  success  by  counter-attack  against  the 
enemy  in  position  is  problematical.  In  the  case  of  the  armies  at  Fredericks- 
l)urg  it  would  have  been,  to  say  the  least,  very  hazardous  to  give  counter- 
attack, the  Federal  position  being  about  as  strong  as  oui-s  from  wliicli  we  had 
(h'iven  them  back.  Attempts  to  break  uj*  .-in  ;inn\-  by  foIl<«\\  ing  on  iis  line  of 
retreat  are  hazardous  and  rnr(>ly  successful,  while  movements  against  the 
Hanks  and  rear  increase  the  demoralization  :ni<l  otb  r  better  oi)portunities 
for  great  results.     The  condition  of  a  retreating  army  may  b(>  illustrated  by 


84 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG. 


^'^^ 


^**WBaf«^  1^  ^•^'(^m^ 


a  little  incident  witnessed  thirty  years  ago  on  the  western  plains  of  Texas. 
A  soldier  of  my  regiment  essayed  to  capture  a  rattlesnake.  Being  pursued, 
the  reptile  took  refuge  in  a  prairie-dog's  hole,  turning  his  head  as  he  entered 
it,  to  defend  the  sally-port.  The  soldier,  coming  up  in  time,  seized  the  tail  as 
it  was  in  the  act  of  passing  under  cover,  and  at  the  same  instant  the  serpent 
seized  the  index  finger  of  the  soldier's  hand.  The  result  was  the  soldier  lost 
the  use  of  his  finger.  The  wise  serpent  made  a  successful  retreat.  The  rear 
of  a  retreating  army  is  always  its  best  guarded  point. 

During  the  attack  upon  Greneral  Jackson,  and  immediately  after  his  line 
was  broken,  General  Pickett  rode  up  to  General  Hood  and  suggested  that 

the  moment  was  at  hand  for 
%  the    movement    anticipated 

by  my  orders,  and  requested 
that  it  be  executed.  Hood 
did  not  agree,  so  the  oppor- 
tunity was  allowed  to  pass. 
Had  Hood  sprung  to  the  oc- 
casion we  would  have  envel- 
oped Franklin's  command, 
and  might  possibly  have 
marched  it  into  the  Con- 
federate camp.  Hood  com- 
manded splendid  troops, 
quite  fresh  and  eager  for 
occasion  to  give  renewed  as- 
sui-ances  of  their  mettle. 

It  has  been  reported  that 
the  troops  attacking  Marye's 
Hill  were  intoxicated,  having 
been  plied  with  whisky  to  nerve  them  to  the  desperate  attack.  That  can 
hardly  be  true.  I  know  nothing  of  the  facts,  but  no  sensible  commander 
will  allow  his  troops  strong  drink  upon  going  into  battle.  After  a  battle  is 
over,  the  soldier's  gill  is  usually  allowed  if  it  is  at  hand.  No  troops  could 
have  displayed  greater  courage  and  resolution  than  was  shown  by  those 
brought  against  Marye's  Hill.  But  they  miscalculated  the  wonderful  strength 
of  the  line  behind  the  stone  fence.  The  position  held  by  Cobb  surpassed 
courage  and  resolution,  and  was  occupied  by  those  who  knew  well  how  to 
hold  a  comfortable  defense. 

After  the  retreat.  General  Lee  went  to  Richmond  to  suggest  other  opera- 
tions, but  was  assured  that  the  war  was  virtually  over,  and  that  we  need  not 
harass  our  troops  l)y  marches  and  other  hardships.  Gold  had  advanced  in 
Now  York  to  two  hundred,  and  wo  were  assured  by  those  at  the  Confederate 
capital  that  in  thirty  or  forty  days  we  would  be  recognized  and  peace  pro- 
claimed.    General  Loo  did  not  share  in  this  belief. 

I  have  been  asked  if  Bnrnside  could  have  been  victorious  at  Fredericks- 
burg.    Such  a  thing  was  hardly  possible.     Perhaps  no  general  could  have 


'-^^^\~ 


WELFORD'S    MILL    ON    HAZEL    RUN    AND    THE    TELEGRAPH    ROAD. 
FROM    A  WAR-TIME    PHOTOGRAPH. 

The  southern  slope  of  Willi«'.s  Hill  is  seen  in  the  background. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG.  85 

accomplished  more  than  Bura.side  did,  and  it  was  possible  for  him  to  have 
suffered  greater  loss.  The  battle  of  Frederickslnirg  was  a  great  and  unprofit- 
able sacrifice  of  human  life  made,  through  the  pressure  from  the  rear,  upon 
a  general  who  should  have  known  better  and  who  doubtless  acted  against 
his  judgment.  [See  p.  99.]  If  I  had  been  in  General  Burnside's  place,  I 
would  have  asked  the  President  to  allow  me  to  resign  rather  than  execute 
his  order  to  force  the  passage  of  the  river  and  march  the  army  against 
Lee  in  his  stronghold. 

Viewing  the  battle  after  the  lapse  of  more  than  twenty  years,  I  may  say, 
however,  that  Burnside's  move  might  have  been  made  stronger  by  throwing 
two  of  his  grand  divisions  across  at  the  mouth  of  Deep  Eun,  where  Franklin 
crossed  with  his  grand  division  and  six  brigades  of  Hooker's.  Had  he  thus 
placed  Hooker  and  Sumner,  his  sturdiest  fighters,  and  made  resolute  assault 
with  them  in  his  attack  on  our  right,  he  would  in  all  probability  have  given 
us  trouble.  The  partial  success  he  had  at  that  point  might  have  been  pushed 
vigorously  })y  such  a  force  and  might  have  thrown  our  right  entirely  from 
position,  in  which  event  the  result  would  have  depended  on  the  skillful  hand- 
ling of  the  forces.  Franklin's  grand  division  could  have  made  sufficient 
sacrifice  at  Marye's  Hill  and  come  as  near  success  as  did  Sumner's  and 
two-thirds  of  Hooker's  combined.  I  think,  however,  that  the  success  would 
have  been  on  our  side,  and  it  might  have  been  followed  by  greater  disaster 
on  the  side  of  the  Federals;  still  they  would  have  had  the  chance  of  success 
in  their  favor,  while  in  the  battle  as  it  was  fought  it  can  hardly  be  claimed 
that  there  was  even  a  chance. 

Burnside  made  a  mistake  from  the  first.  He  should  have  gone  from  War- 
renton  to  Chester  Gap.  He  might  then  have  held  Jackson  and  fought  me,  or 
have  held  mo  and  fought  Jackson,  thus  taking  us  in  detail.  The  doubt  about 
the  matter  was  whether  or  not  he  could  have  caught  me  in  that  trap  l)efore 
we  could  concentrate.  At  any  rate,  that  was  the  only  move  on  the  board  that 
could  have  benefited  him  at  the  time  he  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  By  interposing  between  the  corps  of  Lee's  army  he 
would  have  secured  strong  ground  and  advantage  of  position.  With  skill 
equal  to  the  occasion,  he  should  liave  had  success.  This  was  the  move  about 
which  we  felt  serious  apprehension,  and  we  were  occupying  our  minds  with 
plans  to  meet  it  when  the  move  toward  Fredericksburg  was  rejtorted.  Gen- 
eral McClelhin,  in  his  report  of  August  -ith,  1861),  spi^aks  of  this  move  as  that 
upon  which  he  was  studying  when  the  order  for  Burnside's  assignment  to 
command  reached  him. 

When  Burnside  determined  to  move  by  Fredericksburg,  he  sliould  lKi\t' 
moved  rapidly  and  occujned  the  city  at  once,  but  this  would  only  liave  t<>i-ct'd 
us  back  to  the  plan  })referred  by  General  Jackson. 


THE  CONFEDERATE  LEFT  AT  FREDERICKSBURG. 

BY  LAFAYETTE  McLAWS,   MAJOR-GENERAL,   C.  S.  A. 

ON  the  25th  of  November,  1862,  my  division  marched  into  Fredericksburg, 
and  shortly  after,  by  direction  of  General  Longstreet,  I  occupied  the  city 
with  one  of  my  brigades  and  picketed  the  river  with  strong  detachments  from 
the  dam  at  Falmouth  to  a  quarter  of  a  mile  below  Deep  Run  creek,  the  enemy's 
pickets  being  just  across  the  river,  within  a  stone's-throw  of  mine.  Detach- 
ments were  immediately  set  at  work  digging  rifle-pits  close  to  the  edge  of  the 
bank,  so  close  that  our  men,  when  in  them,  could  command  the  river  and 
the  shores  on  each  side.  The  cellars  of  the  houses  near  the  river  were  made 
available  for  the  use  of  riflemen,  and  zigzags  were  constructed  to  enable  the 
men  to  get  in  and  out  of  the  rifle-pits  under  cover.  All  this  was  done  at 
night,  and  so  secretly  and  quietly  that  I  do  not  believe  the  enemy  had  any 
conception  of  the  minute  and  careful  preparations  that  had  been  made  to 
defeat  any  attempt  to  cross  the  river  in  my  front.  No  provision  was  made 
for  the  use  of  artillery,  as  the  enemy  had  an  enormous  array  of  theii'  bat- 
teries on  the  heights  above  the  town,  and  could  have  demolished  ours  in 
five  minutes. 

Two  or  three  evenings  previous  to  the  Federal  attemj^t  to  cross,  I  was  with 
General  Barksdale,  and  we  were  attracted  by  one  or  more  of  the  enemy's  bands 
playing  at  their  end  of  the  railroad  bridge.  A  luimber  of  their  officers  and  a 
crowd  of  their  men  were  about  the  band  cheering  their  national  airs,  the 
"  Star  Spangled  Banner,"  "  Hail  Columbia,"  and  others,  once  so  dear  to  us  all. 
It  seemed  as  if  they  expected  some  response  from  us,  but  none  was  given 
until,  finally,  they  struck  up  "  Dixie,"  and  then  both  sides  cheered,  with  much 
laughter.  Surmising  that  this  serenade  meant  mischief,  I  closely  inspected 
our  bank  of  the  river,  and  at  night  caused  additional  rifle-pits  to  be  con- 
structed to  guard  more  securely  the  approaches  to  the  bridge. 

Early  in  the  night  of  the  10th  General  Barksdale  reported  that  his  pickets 
had  heard  noises,  as  if  the  enemy  were  hauling  pontoon-boats  to  the  brink  of 
the  river ;  a  dense  fog  had  prevented  a  clear  view.  About  2  a.  m.,  of  the  11th, 
General  Barksdale  notified  me  that  the  movements  on  the  other  side  indi- 
cated that  the  enemy  were  preparing  to  lay  down  the  pontoon-bridges.  I  told 
him  to  let  the  bridge  building  go  on  until  the  enemy  were  committed  to  it 
and  the  construction  parties  were  within  easy  range.  At  4:30  he  reported 
that  the  bridge  was  being  rapidly  constructed  and  was  nearly  half  done, 
and  he  was  about  to  open  fire.  I  then  ordered  the  signal  to  be  given  by  firing 
two  gTins  of  J.  P.  W.  Read's  battery,  posted  on  the  highest  j^oint  along  my 
front,  on  the  edge  of  the  hills  alongside  the  main  road  running  to  the  city. 

Previous  notice  had  been  sent  to  General  Lee  and  to  corps  headquarters  that 
tlu!  bridge  was  being  constructed.  With  the  sound  of  the  cannon  was  mingled 
the  rattle  of  the  rifles  of  the  Mississippi  men,  who  opened  a  concentrated  fire 
from  the  rifle-pits  and  swept  the  bridge,  now  crowded  with  the  construction 


THE  CONFEDERATE  LEFT  AT  FREDERICKSBURG. 


87 


parties.  Nine  distinct 
and  desperate  attempts 
were  made  to  complete 
the  bridge,  but  every 
one  was  attended  with 
such  heavy  loss  from 
our  fire  that  the  efforts 
were  abandoned  until 
about  10  A.  M.,  when 
snddenly  the  tremen- 
dous array  of  the  Fed- 
eral artillery  opened 
fire  from  the  heights 
above  the  city. 

It  is  impossible  fitly 
to  describe  the  effects 
of  this  iron  hail  hurled 
against  the  small  band 
of  defenders  and  into 
the  devoted  city.  The 
roar  of  the  cannon,  th(^ 
])ursting  shells,  the  fall- 
ing of  walls  and  chim- 
neys, and  the  flying 
bricks  and  other  ma- 
terial dislodged  from 
the  houses  by  the  iron 
balls  and  shells,  added 
to  the  fin^  of  the  infan- 
try from  both  sides  and 
the  smoke  from  the  guns  and  from  the  burning  houses,  made  a  scene  of 
indescrilmble  confusion,  enough  to  appall  the  stoutest  hearts !  Under  cover  of 
this  bond )ardment  the  Federals  renewed  their  efforts  to  construct  the  bridge, 
but  the  little  band  of  Mississippians  in  the  rifle-pits  under  Lieutenant-Colonel 
John  C.  Fiser,  17th  Mississippi,  composed  of  his  own  regiment,  10  shai-p- 
shooters  from  the  13th  Mississippi,  and  3  companies  from  the  18th  Mississippi 
(Ijieutenant-Colonel  Luse),  held  their  posts,  and  successfully  rei^«'ll«Ml  t^very 
attempt.  The  enemy  had  been  committed  to  that  point,  l>y  ha\iiig  iis.'d 
half  their  })ontoons. 

About  4:30  p.  iv[.  the  enemy  began  crossing  in  boats,  and  tlic  conccnti 
fire  from  all  arms,  directed  against  Barksdale's  men  in  the  rille-pits,  be* 
so  severe  that  it  was  impossible  for  tliem  to  use  their  rilh's  with  etfect.  ,1 

As  the  main  purpose  of  a  determined  defense,  wliidi  was  to  gain  tim 
the  other  troops  to  take  position,  had  been  accomiilislicd,  Colonel  Fiser 


BARKSDAI.E'S    MISSISSIPPI ANS    OPPOSINr.    THE    LAYING    OF  THE 
PONTOON-BKIDU  ES. 


itrd 


for 
was 


i  Colonel  Fiser  himself  had  V)eeii   ki 
recovering  consciousness, 


•1<(<1  down  and  stum 
.'Id  to  Ids  post,  and  d 


;.f  a  fall! 
.-L.  Ml 


ig  wall,  hut, 


88  THE  CONFEDERATE  LEFT  AT  FREDERICKSBURG. 

directed  to  di'aw  his  command  back  from  the  river  and  join  the  brigade  iu 
the  city ;  and  just  in  time,  for  the  enemy,  no  longer  impeded  by  our  fire, 
crossed  the  river  rapidly  in  boats,  and,  forming  on  the  flanks,  rushed  down  to 
capture  the  men  in  the  rifle-pits,  taking  them  in  the  rear.  Some  of  the  men 
in  the  cellars,  who  did  not  get  the  order  to  retire,  were  thus  captiu^ed,  | 
but  the  main  body  of  tliem  rejoined  the  brigade  on  Princess- Anne  street, 
where  it  had  been  assembled,  and  all  attempts  made  by  the  enemy,  now  cross- 
ing in  large  numbers,  to  gain  possession  of  the  city  were  defeated.  The  firing 
ceased  by  7  o'clock,  and  as  the  grand  division  of  Franklin  had  effected  a  cross- 
ing below  the  mouth  of  Deep  Run,  and  thus  controlled  ground  which  was 
higher  than  the  city,  and  other  ti'oops  had  crossed  above  the  city,  where, 
also,  the  ground  was  higher,  so  that  our  position  would  become  untenable  in 
the  morning,  I  directed  Greneral  Barksdale  to  retire  to  a  strong  position  I  had 
noticed  along  a  sunken  road  cut  through  the  foot  of  Marye's  Hill  and  running 
perpendicular  to  the  fine  of  the  enemy's  advance. 

We  read  in  the  accounts  given  by  Federal  officers  of  rank  that  although 
General  Franklin's  command  had  constructed  a  bridge  or  two  across  the 
Rappahannock,  below  the  mouth  of  Deep  Run,  and  had  crossed  the  greater 
portion  of  his  division  on  the  11th,  yet,  because  of  the  failure  of  General 
Sumner's  grand  division  to  force  a  crossing  in  front  of  Fredericksburg,  all 
but  one  brigade  of  Franklin's  grand  division  had  been  recrossed  to  the  left 
bank  to  await  the  result  of  Sumner's  efforts,  and  that  Franklin's  grand  divis- 
ion was  not  again  crossed  to  our  side  until  the  12th.  The  Federal  accounts 
show  that  this  detennined  defense  offered  by  a  small  fraction  of  Barksdale's 
brigade  not  only  prevented  Sumner's  crossing,  but  by  this  delay  caused  the 
whole  of  Franklin's  Left  Grand  Division,  except  one  brigade,  to  recross  the 
Rappahannock,  and  thus  gave  General  Lee  twenty-four  hours'  time  to  prepare 
for  the  assault,  with  full  notice  of  the  points  of  attack. 

Early  on  the  night  of  the  11th  General  Thomas  R.  R.  Cobb  was  directed  to 
relieve  the  brigade  of  General  Barksdale,  and  accordingly  three  Georgia 
regiments  and  the  Phillips  Legion  of  Cobb's  brigade  took  position  in  the 
sunken  road  at  foot  of  Marye's  Hill,  on  the  lower  side  of  which  there  was  a 
stone- wall  something  over  four  feet  high,  most  of  which  was  protected  by  the 
earth  thrown  from  the  road,  and  was  invisible  from  the  front.  Barksdale's 
brigade  retired  to  their  originally  assigned  position  as  my  rear  line  of 
defense,  in  Bernard's  woods,  where  they  constructed  abatis  and  rifle-pits 
during  the  12th. 

Meanwhile  tlui  18th  Mississippi  Regiment,  of  Barksdale's  brigade,  under 
Colonel  Luse,  which  had  been  detached  to  defend  the  river-bank  below  the 
town  on  the  night  <^f  the  10th,  had  offered  such  vigorous  resistance  from 
behind  some  old  huts  and  thickets  that  the  enemy  had  delayed  the  construc- 
tion of  their  pontoon-bridges  there  until  after  daylight  on  the  11th,  and  there- 
fore, instead  of  crossing  the  grand  division  by  daylight  of  the  11th,  did  not 
cross  until  late  on  that  day.  The  enemy  on  the  11th  brought  grape  and 
canister  against  Colonel  Luse,  who  was  not  fortified,  not  having  rifle-pits 

jPorliaps  tliirty  or  forty,  not  more.—  L.  McL. 


THE  CONFEDhKATE  LEFT  AT  FKEDEK/CKSBURG. 


FREDICUICKSBURG    FUOM    TIIU    FOOT    OF  WILLIS'S    HILL.      FROM    A   WAR-TIME    I'UOTOGKAPII. 


Ill  the  niiddlc-Krouiid  is  Keen  the  Routh  end  of  tlie 
stoue-wall,  aud  it  may  be  hccii  tliat  the  trout  Hue  of 
defense  foriued  by  the  wall  waw  contiuiied  still  farther 
to  the  right  by  the  eiiukeu  Tclci,a'aph  road.  At  the 
base  of  the  hill,  this  side  of  the  stone-wall,  is  seen  an 
earth-work  which  was  a  part  of  the  second  line.     A 


third  line  [see  p.  83]  wa.-:  on  tlu"  brow  of  this  hill,  n..w 
the  National  Cenietery.  Between  the  steeples  on  the 
outskirts  of  Fredericksburg  is  seeu  the  end  of  Han- 
over street,  by  which,  and  by  the  street  in  the  right 
of  the  picture,  the  Union  forces  tiled  out  to  form  for  the 
assault.—  Editors. 


even,  and  liis  regiment  was  witlulrawn  to  the  river  I'oad.  The  IGtli  Georgia, 
Colonel  Bryan,  and  tlie  15tli  S(Kitli  Carolina,  Colonel  De  Sanssure,  wliieh  had 
been  ordered  to  the  assistance  of  Colonel  Luse,  retired  with  liis  cokunn.  Early 
on  the  11th  a  battalion  of  the  8th  Florida,  under  Captain  Lang,  numbering 
150  men,  had  been  posted  to  the  left  of  Colonel  Fiser's  command,  above  Fred- 
ericksburg, and  while  under  Captain  Lang  did  good  service.  But  unfortu- 
nately the  captain  was  badly  wounded  about  11  a.  m,  and  the  battalion  was 
withdrawn.  I  think  the  defense  of  the  river-crossing  in  front  of  Fredericks- 
burg was  a  notable  and  wondei'ful  feat  of  arms,  challenging  conii)arison  witli 
aiiytliing  that  liappened  during  the  war. 

On  tlie  12th  close  and  heavy  skirmishing  was  kept  up  between  my  advanced 
parties  and  the  enemy,  and  whole  divisions  were  employed  in  fortifying  tlu^r 
l)Ositions  and  preparing  for  the  coming  assaults.  The  grounds  in  my  front 
had  been  well  studied  by  myself,  in  company  with  my  brigade  commanders 
and  colonels  of  regiments,  and  all  the  details  for  the  suj)ply  of  annnunition, 
]»rovisions,  water,  care  for  the  wounded,  and  otlier  necessary  arrangements 
liad  been  attended  to,  so  lliat  we  waited  for  the  enemy  willi  perfect  cahimess 
and  with  confidence  in  our  ability  to  repel  them. 

A  heavy  fog  hung  over  the  valley,  concealing  tlie  town  froni  our  \  iew,  and 

until  late  in  the  day  the  banks  below  were  not  visible.      As  I  was  anxiously 

iiKpuring  for  some  news  from  the  i)ickets,  since  the  point  «•!"  attack  had  not  yet 

been  developcMl,  my  aid(wle-cami),  Cajttain  11.  L.  P.  ]\iiig,  \oInnteered  to  goto 

VOL.  in.  7. 


90  THE  CONFEDERATE  LEFT  AT  FREDERICKSBURG. 

the  river  and  collect  information  by  personal  observation,  and  I  consented  to 
his  going,  but  did  not  send  him.  He  rode  off,  and  in  about  two  hours  returned, 
reporting  that  he  had  ridden  down  Deep  Run  as  far  as  he  could  go  in  safety 
on  horseback,  and,  dismounting  and  concealing  his  horse,  had  gone  on  foot 
down  the  run  to  its  mouth,  and  from  there  he  had  watched  the  enemy  cross- 
ing the  river  on  two  bridges.  One  or  two  hundred  yards  below  the  mouth  of 
the  I'un  large  bodies  of  infantry,  artillery,  and  some  cavalry  had  crossed, 
while  heavy  forces  on  the  opposite  side  were  waiting  their  turn  to  cross.  On 
his  return  he  had  gone  into  a  two-story  wooden  dwelling  on  the  banks  of  the 
river,  and  had  taken  a  leisurely  view  of  the  whole  surroundings,  confirming 
his  observations  taken  from  the  mouth  of  Deep  Run.  This  was  a  daring 
reconnoissance,  as,  at  the  time,  none  of  our  troops  were  within  a  mile  of  him. 
Up  to  this  time  the  enemy  had  not  shown  us  any  very  large  body  of  troops, 
either  in  Fredericksburg,  on  the  opposite  side,  or  below. 

On  the  13th,  during  the  early  morning,  a  thick  fog  enveloped  the  town  in 
my  front  and  the  valley  of  the  river,  but  between  9  and  10  o'clock  it  lifted, 
and  we  could  see  on  our  right,  below  Deep  Run,  long  lines  of  the  enemy 
stretching  down  the  river,  and  near  it,  but  not  in  motion.  Reconnoitering 
parties  on  horseback  were  examining  the  grounds  in  front  of  our  army,  coming 
within  range  without  being  fired  on.  After  they  retired  a  strong  body  of 
infantry  advanced  from  a  point  on  the  river  somewhat  below  my  extreme 
right,  as  if  to  gain  possession  of  the  Bernard  woods,  but  I  had  seven  rifle- 
guns  on  the  hill  above  those  woods  to  meet  this  very  contingency,  and  these 
opening  on  this  advancing  body,  it  fell  back  to  the  river  before  coming 
within  reach  of  Barksdale. 

As  the  fog  lifted  higher  an  immense  column  of  infantry  could  be  seen 
halted  on  the  other  side  of  the  river,  along  the  road  leading  from  the  hills 
beyond  to  the  pontoon-bridges  in  front  of  the  town,  and  extending  back  for 
miles,  as  it  looked  to  us,  and  still  we  could  not  see  the  end.  In  Jackson's  front 
the  enemy  had  advanced,  and  their  forming  lines  were  plainly  visible,  while  in 
Longstreet's  front  we  could  see  no  body  of  troops  on  the  Fredericksburg  side 
of  the  river.  The  indications  were  that  Jackson  was  to  receive  the  first  blow, 
and  General  Longstreet  came  to  me  and  said  he  was  going  over  to  that  flank. 
I  called  his  attention  to  the  immense  column  of  troops  opposite  us,  on  the 
other  side  of  the  river,  with  its  head  at  the  pontoon-bridges,  crossing  to 
Fredericksburg  in  our  immediate  front,  and  told  him  that  in  my  judgment 
the  most  desperate  assault  was  to  be  made  on  his  front,  and  it  would  Ije 
developed  close  to  us,  without  our  knowing  that  it  was  forming,  nor  would  we 
know  when  it  commenced  to  move  against  us;  that  the  assault  would  be 
sudden  and  we  should  be  ready  to  meet  it,  acd  that  there  wei-e  certainly  as 
many  of  the  enemy  in  that  column  threatening  us  as  appeared  in  the  lines 
opposite  General  Jackson.   General  Longsti'cet  agreed  with  me,  and  remained. 

Not  long  after,  the  grand  division  of  General  Franklin,  in  plain  view  from 
where  we  stood,  was  seen  advancing  in  two  lines  against  Jackson's  front, 
marching  in  most  magnificent  order.  No  perceptible  check  could  I  observe 
in  the  advance,  and  the  first  line  in  good  order  entered  the  woods  and  was 


THE  CONFEDERATE  LEFT  AT  FREDERICKSBURG.  91 

lost  to  our  view.  But  the  immediate  crash  of  musketry  and  the  thunder  of 
artillery  told  of  a  desperate  conflict,  and  we  waited  anxiously  for  some  sign  of 
the  result.  Soon  masses  of  the  enemy  were  seen  emerging  from  the  woods  in 
retreat,  and  the  whole  body  of  the  enemy  marched  back  in  the  direction  they 
came  from,  in  excellent  order,  and  very  deliberately.  Now  began  the  trial 
against  Longstreet's  lines;  but  our  confidence  in  our  ability  to  resist  all 
assaults  against  us  had  been  wonderfully  increased  by  seeing  the  rei)ulse  of 
Franklin. 

My  line  of  defense  was  a  broken  one,  running  from  the  left  along  the 
sunken  road,  near  the  foot  of  Marye's  Hill,  where  General  Cobb's  brigade 
(less  the  16th  Georgia)  was  stationed.  During  the  12th  the  defenses  of  this 
line  had  been  extended  beyond  the  hill  by  an  embankment  thrown  up  to  pro- 
tect the  right  from  sharp-shooters,  as  also  to  resist  assaults  that  might  be 
made  from  that  direction,  and  then  the  line  was  retired  a  hundred  or  more 
yards  to  the  foot  of  the  hills  in  the  rear,  along  which  was  extended  Kershaw's 
brigade  of  South  Carolina  troops,  and  General  Barksdale's  Mississipijians, 
from  left  to  right,  the  brigade  of  General  Semmes  being  held  in  reserve.  The 
Washington  Artillery,  under  Colonel  Walton,  were  in  position  on  the  crest  of 
Marye's  Hill  over  the  heads  of  Cobb's  men  [see  p.  97],  and  two  brigades 
under  General  Ransom  were  held  here  in  reserve.  The  heights  above  Kershaw 
and  Barksdale  were  crowned  with  18  rifle-guns  and  8  smooth-bores  belonging 
to  batteries,  and  a  number  of  smooth-bores  from  the  reserve  artillery.  The 
troops  could  not  be  well  seen  by  the  enemy,  and  the  artillery  on  my  rear 
line  was  mostly  concealed,  some  covered  with  brush.  The  enemy,  from  theu* 
position,  could  not  see  the  sunken  road,  near  the  foot  of  Marye's  Hill,  nor  do  I 
think  they  were  aware,  until  it  was  made  known  to  them  by  our  fire,  that 
there  was  an  infantry  force  anywhere  except  on  top  of  the  hill,  as  Ransom's 
troops  could  be  seen  there,  in  reserve,  and  the  men  in  the  sunken  road  were 
visible  at  a  short  distance  only. 

Soon  after  11  a.  m.  the  enemy  approached  the  left  of  my  line  by  the  Tele- 
gi-aph  road,  and,  deploying  to  my  right,  came  forward  and  planted  guidons 
or  standards  (whether  to  mark  their  advance  or  to  aid  in  the  alignment  I  do 
not  know),  and  commenced  firing ;  but  the  fire  from  our  artillery,  and  espe- 
cially the  infantry  fire  from  Cobb's  brigade,  so  thinned  their  ranks  that  tlie 
line  retreated  without  advancing,  leaving  their  guidons  phinted.  Soon  an- 
other force,  heavier  than  tlie  first,  advanced,  and  were  driven  l)ack  with  great 
slaughter.  They  were  met  on  retiring  by  reenforcements,  and  advanced 
again,  but  were  again  repulsed,  with  great  loss.  This  continued  until  about 
1  V.  M.,  when  General  Cobb  reported  to  me  that  he  was  sliort  of  ;immu- 
nitioii.  I  sent  his  own  very  intelligent  and  brave  conrici-,  little  -lolinny 
Clark,  from  Augusta,  Georgia,  to  bring  up  his  ordnance  sui)])lies,  and  directed 
General  Kei'shaw  to  reenforce  General  Cobb  with  two  of  his  South  Carolina 
regiments,  and  I  also  sent  the  IGth  Georgia,  which  had  been  detached,  to 
report  to  General  Cobb.  A  few  minutes  after  these  ord(M-s  had  been  given  I 
received  a  note  from  General  Cobb,  informing  me  that  General  R.  H.  Anders(Ui, 
whose  division  was  posted  on  the  left  and  rear  of  Cobb's,  had  just  told  him 


92  THE  CONFEDERATE  LEFT  AT  FREDERICKSBURG. 

that  if  the  attack  was  tui-ned  on  him  he  would  retire  his  troops  to  the  hills 
in  their  rear.  As  this  would  leave  my  troops  in  the  sunken  road  with  their 
left  flank  unprotected,  and  at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy,  should  they  come  up 
on  my  left,  I  went  over  to  Greneral  Longstreet  and  represented  to  him  that  if 
this  were  done  I  would  have  to  provide  in  some  other  way  for  the  protection 
of  the  troops  in  the  sunken  road,  or  move  them  out,  so  soon  as  there  was  a 

lull  in  the  attack,  which  would  be  vir- 
tually giving  up  the  defense  of  Marye's 
Hill.  General  Longstreet  at  once  or- 
dered General  Pickett  to  reenforce 
Anderson,  and  directed  Anderson  to 
hold  his  position  until  forced  back.  I 
then  went  over  and  examined  the 
ground  where  Anderson's  force  was  on 
my  left,  and  finding  that  the  prepa- 
rations for  defense  made  to  resist  an 
^^^  _       assault  were  incomplete  and  inconsid- 

♦  ^T-     erable,  I  thought  it  best  to  take  meas- 

^        ^  I  w^         ^      ^        ures   to   protect    my   own   flank   with 

I*  -     _        ^^  my  own  troops,  and  therefore  directed 

General  Kershaw  to  take  his  brigade, 

BKIGADIER-GENERAL    ROBERT    RANSOM,    C.   S.  A.  aud,     SCUdiug      tWO      Of     lllS     rCglmCntS     tO 

FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH.  ,  ,-,  ^  1         /^     1    1   i  T  1 

strengthen  General  Cobb's  line  be- 
neath the  hill,  to  hold  the  rest  of  his  command  on  top  of  the  hill,  to  the  left 
of  Cobb's  line,  to  meet  emergencies,  and  especiall}^  to  hold  in  check,  or  aid 
in  repelling,  any  force  coming  on  Cobb's  flank,  until  the  force  in  the  sunken 
road  could  be  withdrawn  by  the  right  flank  ^  the  only  chance  it  would  have 
of  retiring  without  very  heavy  loss.  I  then  tore  a  leaf  from  my  memoran- 
dum-book and  wrote  to  General  Cobb,  "  General :  Hold  your  position,  witli 
no  fear  of  your  flank,  it  will  be  protected,"  and  handing  it  to  Captain  King, 
my  aide-de-camp,  told  him  to  carry  it  to  General  Cobb,  and  to  inform  him 
that  both  ammunition  and  reenforcements  were  on  the  way.j  General  Ker- 
shaw at  once  moved  his  brigade  as  ordered,  but  while  it  was  in  motion  a 
courier  came  from  General  Cobb  and  informed  me  that  the  general  was  des- 
perately wounded.  General  Kershaw  was  directed  to  go  at  once  and  take 
command  of  the  force  at  the  foot  of  Marye's  Hill. 

Kershaw  doubled  his  2d  and  8th  regiments  on  Phillips's  Legion  and  24th 
Georgia,  commanded  by  Colonel  McMillan,  who  succeeded  General  Cobb  in 
command  of  the  brigade,  leaving  the  3d  and  7th  South  Carolina  on  the  hill, 
and  holding  the  15th,  Colonel  l)e  Saussure,  in  reserve.  His  3d  Battalion  was 
])osted  on  the  right  at  Tlowison's  mill  to  repulse  any  attack  up  Hazel  Run,  and 
the  l()tli  (Sreorgia  was  doubled  on  the  right  of  Col)b's  brigade  in  the  road.  The 
3d  and  7th  South  Carolina  suffered  severely  while  getting  into  position,  Colonel 
Nance,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Rutherford,  Major  Maffett,  Captains  P.  Todd  and 

^  This  was  the  last  I  saw  of  Captaiu  King  until  we  found  this  gallant  officei-'s  body,  after 
the  battle. — L.  McL. 


THE  CONFEDERATE  LEFT  AT  FREDERICKSBURG. 


93 


John  C.  Summer  being  shot  down.  Summer  was  killed.  The  2d  and  8th 
arrived  just  in  time  to  resist  a  heavy  assault  made  on  the  left  about  2:45  p.  m., 
and  all  of  these  reenforcements  were  opportune.  The  enemy,  then  deploy- 
ing in  a  ravine  about  three  hundred  yards  from  the  stone-wall,  advanced  with 
fresh  lines  of  attack  at  short  intervals,  but  were  always  di'iven  back  with 
great  loss.  This  was  kept  up  until  about  4:30  p.  m.,  when  the  assaults  ceased 
for  a  time ;  but  the  enemy,  posting  artillery  on  the  left  of  the  Telegraph  road, 
opened  on  our  position ;  however,  they  did  no  damage  worth  particularizing. 

The  batteries  on  Marye's  Hill  were  at  this  time  silent,  having  exhausted 
their  ammunition,  and  were  being  relieved  by  gans  from  Colonel  E.  P.  Alex- 
ander's battalion.  Taking  advantage  of  this  lull  in  the  conflict,  the  15tli 
South  Carolina  was  brought  forward  from  the  cemetery,  where  it  had  been 
in  reserve,  and  was  posted  behind  the  stone-wall,  supporting  the  2d  South 
Carolina  regiment. 

The  enemy  in  the  meanwhile  formed  a  strong  column  of  lines  of  attack, 
and  advancing  under  cover  of  their  own  artillery,  and  no  longer  impeded  by 
ours,  came  forward  along  our  whole  front  in  the  most  determined  manner ; 
but  by  this  time,  as  just  explained,  I  had  lines  four  deep  throughout  the 
whole  sunken  road,  and  beyond  the  right  flank.  The  front  rank,  firing, 
stepped  back,  and  the  next  in  rear  took  its  place  and,  after  firing,  was 
replaced  by  the  next,  and  so  on  in  rotation.  In  this  way  the  volley  fi]-ing 
was  made  nearly  continuous,  and  the  file  firing  very  destructive.  The  enemy 
were  repulsed  at  all  points. 

The  last  charge  was  made  after  sundown — in  fact,  it  was  already  dark  in 
the  valley.  A  Federal  officer  who  was  in  that  assault  told  me  that  the  first 
discharge  at  them  was  a  volley,  and  the  bullets  went  over  their  heads  "  in 
sheets,"  and  that  his  command  was  ordered  to  lie  down,  and  did  lie  down  for  a 
full  half-hour  and  then  retired,  leaving  a  large  number  of  killed  and  wounded. 
The  firing  ceased  as  darkness  increased,  and  about  7  p.  m.  the  pickets  of  the 
opposing  forces  were  posted  within  a  short  distance  of  each  other,  my  pickets 
reporting  noises  as  of  movements  of  large  bodies  of  troops  in  the  city. 

Thus  ended  the  battle.  The  enemy  remained  in  possession  of  the  city  until 
the  night  of  the  15th,  and  then  retired  across  the  Rappahannock,  resuming 
their  former  positions,  and  Kershaw's  brigade  of  my  di\'ision  re-occupied 
the  city.  My  loss  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing  was  853 ;  of  which  number 
67  were  missing,  62  being  from  Barksdale's  brigade,  100  of  the  853  being 
killed.  Over  200  of  the  number  were  killed  or  disabled  in  Kershaw's  conunaiid 
while  taking  positions  to  defend  my  left  flank. 

There  was  a  ravine  in  my  front,  distant  between  200  or  300  yards,  where 
large  masses  of  the  enemy  were  constantly  deployed,  and  they  controlled  the 
slope  of  Marye's  Hill,  so  that  it  would  have  been  a  hazardous  feat,  even  for 
a  dog,  to  have  attempted  to  run  down  it;  and  yet  a  Georgia  boy  named 
Crumley,  an  orderly  of  Genei-al  Kershaw's,  fliiding  that  the  general  had  no 
use  for  his  horse  in  the  sunken  rond,  or  thi?d<ing  that  it  was  no  place  for  a 
fine  animal,  deliberately  rode  him  up  that  slope  without  injury  either  to  the 
horse  or  to  himself, — and  going  back  to  his  camp,  returned  with  an  inferior 


94 


RANSOM'S  DIVISION  AT  FREDERICKSBURG. 


horse,  rode  down  the  slope  unscathed,  and  joined  his  chief,  who,  until  his 
return,  was  ignorant  of  Crumley's  daring  feat. 

General  Cobb,  who  was  wounded  by  a  musket-ball  in  the  calf  of  the  leg,  ^ 
died  shortly  after  he  was  removed  to  the  field-hospital  in  rear  of  the  division. 
He  and  I  were  on  intimate  terms,  and  I  had  learned  to  esteem  him  warmly, 
as  I  beheve  every  one  did  who  came  to  know  his  great  intellect  and  his 
good  heart.  Like  Stonewall  Jackson,  he  was  a  reUgious  enthusiast,  and, 
being  firmly  convinced  that  the  South  was  right,  believed  that  God  woiild 
give  us  visible  sign  that  Providence  was  with  us,  and  daily  prayed  for  His 
interposition  in  our  behalf. 

%  The  statement  in  the  text  is  made  on  the  authority  of  Surgeon  Todd,  of  Cobb's  brigade,  who  says 
he  saw  the  wound,  and  I  am  assured  that  General  Cobb  received  all  possible  attention,  and  that  every- 
thing that  skill  could  do  was  done  to  save  his  life. — L.  McL. 


EANSOM'S  DIVISION  AT   FREDERICKSBURG. 


BY  ROBERT   RANSOM,    BRIGADIER-GENERAL,  C.  S.  A. 


IN  "The  Century"  magazine  for  August,  1886, 
General  James  Lougstveet  published  what  he 
"  saw  of  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  Va.,  Decem- 
ber 13th,  1862."     [See  p.  70.] 

The  omissions  in  that  article  were  so  glaring,  and 
did  such  injustice,  that  I  wrote  to  him  and  re- 
quested him  to  correct  what  would  produce  false 
impressions.  His  answer  was  unsatisfactory,  but 
promised  that,  "  I  [Longstreet]  expect  in  the  near 
future  to  make  accounts  of  all  battles  and  put  them 
in  shape,  in  a  form  not  limited  by  words,  but  with 
full  details,  when  there  will  be  opportunity  to 
elaborate  upon  all  points  of  interest." 

General  Lee,  in  his  report  of  the  battle  of  Fred- 
ericksburg, December  13th,  1862,  writes  as  fol- 
lows : 

..."  Longstreet's  corps  constituted  our  left,  with 
Audersou's  division  resting  upon  the  river,  aud  those 
of  McLaws,  Pickett,  and  Hood  cxtciuling  to  the  righr  in 
the  order  named.  RiuiHomV  division  supported  the  bat- 
teries on  Marye's  and  Willis's  hills,  at  the  foot  of  wliich 
Cobb's  l)rigad(-  of  McLaws's  divisinu  and  tlif  ittli  North 
Carolinaof  Kansoiu's  brigade  were  stationed,  protected 
by  a  stonewall.  Tlie  hnincdialc  cure  of  litis  )Ktint  Wds 
commuted  to  General  Ransom." 

The  italics  in  this  paper  are  all  mine.  The 
positions  are  stated  by  General  Lee  exactly  as 
the  troops  were  posted.  Lee's  report  continues 
farther  on : 

..."  About  11  A.  M.,  having  massed  hie  [the  en- 
emy's] troops  under  cover  of  the  houses  of  Fredericks- 
burg, ho  moved  forward  in  strong  cobimns  to  seize 
Marye's  and  Willis's  liills.  General  Ransom  advanced 
Cooke's  brigade  to  the  top  of  the  hill,  ami  placed  his 
own,  with  the  exception  of  the  24th  North  Carolina,  a 
short  distance  in  rear."  .  .  .  "In  the  third  as- 
sault," his  report  continues,  "the  brave  and  lamented 
Brigiulier-General  Thomas  R.  R.  Cobb  fell  at  the  head  of 
his  gallant  troops,  and  almost  at  the  same  monn^nt 
Brigadier-General  Cooke  was  borne  from  the  tlcld 
severely  wounded.  Fearing  that  Cobb's  brigade  might 
exhaust  its  ammuiiithm,  General  Longstreet  had  di- 
rected General  Kershaw  to  take  two  regiments  to  its 
support.    Arriving  after  the  fall  of  Cobb,  ho  assumed 


command,  his  troops  taking  position  on  the  crest  and  at 
the  foot  of  the  hill,  to  jp/iich  point  General  Ransom  also 
advanced  three  other  regiments." 

General  Kershaw  took  command  of  Cobb's  bri- 
gade, which  I  had  had  supplied  with  ammunition 
from  my  wagons,  and  I  repeated  the  supply  during 
the  day. 
General  Longstreet,  in  his  official  report,  says : 
.  .  .  "  GeneralRansom  on  Marye's  Hill  was  cJiarged 
u^ith  the  immediate  care  of  the  point  attacJ^ed,  with  orders 
to  send  forward  additional  reenforcements  if  it  should 
become  necessary,  and  to  use  Featherston's  brigade  of 
Anderson's  division  if  he  should  require  it."  And  con- 
tinuing, "I  directed  Major-General  Pickett  to  send  me 
two  of  his  brigades  :  one,  Kemper's,  teas  sent  to  General 
Ransom  to  be  placed  in  some  secure  position  to  be  ready 
in  case  it  should  be  wanted."  And  again,  "  I  would  also 
mention,  as  particularl.\  distinguished  in  the  engage- 
ment of  the  13th,  Brii^adier-CJcnerals  Ransom,  Kershaw, 
and  Cooke  (severely  wounded)." 

General  McLaws  was  not  upon  the  part  of  the 
field  in  the  vicinity  of  Marye's  and  Willis's  hills 
during  the  battle,  but  his  aide,  Captain  King,  was 
killed  on  the  front  slope  of  the  hill  near  Marye's 
house. 

My  own  permanent  command  was  a  small  divis- 
ion of  two  brigades  of  infantry, — my  own,  con- 
taining the  24th,  25th,  35th,  and  49th;  and 
Cooke's,  the  15th,  27th,  46th,  and  48th  regi- 
ments,—  all  from  North  Carolina  ;  and  attached  to 
my  brigade  was  Branch's  battery,  and  to  Cooke's 
brigade  the  battery  of  Cooper, 

At  the  time  the  fog  began  to  lift  from  the  iield,  I 
was  with  Generals  Lee  and  Longstreet  on  what  has 
since  been  known  as  Lee's  Hill.  Starting  to  join 
my  command  as  the  Federals  began  to  emerge 
from  the  town,  General  Longstreet  said  to  me : 
"  Remember,  General,  I  place  that  salient  in  your 
keeping.  Do  what  is  needed ;  and  call  on  Ander- 
son if  you  want  help." 

I  brought  up  Cooke  before  the  first  assault  to 
the  crest  of   the   hill,   and  before    that  assault 


KERSHAW'S  BHIGADE  AT  FREDERICKSBURG. 


95 


ended  Cooke  took  the  27th  and  the  4Gth  and  part 
of  the  15th  North  Carolina  into  the  sunken  road 
in  front.  The  iSth  North  Carolina  fought  on  top 
of  the  hill  all  day. 

At  the  third  assault  I  brought  up  the  25th  North 
Carolina  just  in  time  to  deliver  a  few  deadly  vol- 
leys, and  then  it  "  took  position  shoulder  to  shoul- 
der with  Cobb's  and  Cooke's  men  in  the  road." 

During  this  third  attack  Genei-al  Cobb  was  mor- 
tallj'  hit,  and  almost  at  the  same  instant,  and 
within  two  paces  of  him,  General  Cooke  was  se- 
verely wounded  and  borne  from  the  field,  Colonel 
E.  D.  Hall,  46th  North  Carolina,  assuming  com- 
mand of  Cooke's  brigade. 

At  this  juncture  I  sent  my  adjutant-general, 
Captain  Thomas  Rowland,  to  the  sunken  road  to 
learn  the  condition  of  affairs.  "His  report  was 
most  gratifying,  representing  the  troops  in  fine 
spirits  and  an  abundance  of  ammimition.  I  had 
ordered  Cobb's  brigade  supplied  from  my  wagons." 

After  this  tliird  attack  I  was  bringing  up  the 
35th  and  49th  North  Carolina  of  my  brigade,  when 
General  Kershaw,  by  a  new  road  leading  from  the 
mill  below,  came  up  on  horseback  with  his  staff  at 
the  head  of  one  regiment,  which  he  took  in  just  at 
Marye's  house.  He  was  followed  by  a  second  regi- 
ment, which  halted  behind  a  brick-walled  gi-ave- 
yard  upon  Willis's  Hill.     [See  below.] 

About  sundown  Brigadier-General  Kemper  was 
brought  up,  and  relieved  the  24th  North  Carolina 
with  two  of  his  regiments  and  held  the  others  in 
closer  supporting  distance.  On  the  20th  of  Decem- 
ber, 1862,  he  sent  me  a  list  of  his  casualties,  with 
this  note : 

"Headquarters,  Kemper's  Brigade, 
"  Dpceiuber  20th,  1862. 

"  General  :  I  inclose  heremth  the  statement  of  the 
losses  of  ray  brigade  on  the  13th  and  14th  lust,  while 
acting  as  part  of  your  command.  While  a  report  of  my 
losses  has  been  called  for  by  my  permanent  division 
commander,  and  rendered  to  him,  it  has  occmn-ed  to  me 
that  a  similar  one  rendered  to  yourself  would  be  proper 
and  acceptable.    Permit  me  to  add,  General,  that  our 


brief  .service  with  you  was  deeply  gratifying  to  myself 
and  to  my  entire  command.  I  have  the  honor  to  be, 
General,  very  respectfully,  yom-  obedient  servant, 

"  J.  L.  Kemper,  Brigadier-General. 
"  Brig.-Gen.  Ransom,  Commanding  Division." 

As  stated  in  my  letter  to  General  Longstreet 
dated  August  14th,  1886,  when  I  brought  to  his 
attention  his  extraordinary  omissions,  it  gave  me 
unfeigned  pleasure  to  mention  properly  in  my  offi- 
cial i-eport  the  meritorious  conduct  of  those  who 
were  a  part  of  my  permanent  command  and  those 
others  who  that  day  fell  under  my  direction  by 
reason  of  my  "  immediate  care  of  the  point  attacked." 
My  official  report  exhibits  no  self-seeking  nor  par- 
tial discriminations. 

Upon  a  letter  from  me  (of  the  17th  of  Decem- 
ber, 1862)  to  General  R.  H.  Chilton,  assistant  ad- 
jutant-general Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  wherein 
I  protest  against  the  ignoring  of  my  command  in 
some  telegraijhic  dispatches  to  the  War  Depart- 
ment at  Richmond  relative  to  the  battle  of  the  1 3th, 
General  Longstreet  indorses  these  words:  ''Gen- 
eral Ransom^s  division  teas  engaged  throughout  the 
battle  and  was  quite  as  distinguished  as  an;/  troops 
upon  the  field"  ;  and  the  same  day,  the  19th  of  De- 
cember, I  received  from  both  him  and  General 
Chilton  notes  expressing  the  regret  felt  by  General 
Lee  at  the  injustice  of  which  I  complained.  Those 
original  letters  are  now  among  the  "  Official  Rec- 
ords "  in  Washington. 

I  may  be  pardoned  for  remembering  with  pride 
that  among  the  Confederate  troops  engaged  on  the 
whole  battle-field  of  Fredericksburg,  Va.,  Decem- 
ber 13th,  1862,  none  were  more  honorably  dis- 
tinguished than  the  sons  of  North  Carolina,  and 
tiiose  of  them  who,  with  brother  soldiers  from 
other  States,  held  the  lines  at  Marye's  Hill  against 
almost  ten  times  their  number  of  as  brave  and 
determined  foes  as  ever  did  battle,  can  well  trust 
their  fame  to  history  when  written  from  truthful 
official  records.  | 


I  Where  credit  Is  not  given  for  quotations,  they  are  from  my  official  report  of  the  battlo.- 


KERSHAW'S    BRIGADE   AT   FREDERICKSBURG. 


GENERAL  J.  B.  Kershaw  writes  to  the  editors 
as  follows,  December  6th,  1887: 

"  General  Ransom's  letter,  in  '  The  Century  '  for  De- 
cember, 1887,  in  regard  to  his  services  at  Fredericks- 
burg, contains  an  error  in  relation  to  the  operations  of 
my  brigade.  In  the  morning  of  that  day,  my  troops 
wt'ic  sfatioiifd  at  the  footof  Lee's  Hill.  After  the  as- 
Riiiilts  on  (icMKTiil  ('obl)'s  position  had  connnenccd,  I  was 
ilircctcd  to  send  two  of  my  regiments  to  rcf'nforcc  Cobb, 
and  (li<l  so.  lictoi-c^  they  had  reached  liini,  tidinirs  ar- 
rived of  tlie  fall  of  (ioneral  Cobb,  and  I  wasininiediately 
ordered  to  take  t lie  rest  of  my  brigade  to  the  position 
held  by  his  forces,  and  assiini(>  eonniiand  of  tlie  troops 
of  MeLaws's  division  there.  I  preceded  my  troops,  and 
as  soon  as  possil)h'  arrived  at  the  Stevens  House  at  the 
foot  of  Marye's  Hill.  As  my  brigade  arrived  they  were 
placed  —  two  regiments,  the  3d  and  the  7th  South  Caro- 


lina, at  Marye's  House  on  the  hill,  and  the  rest  of  them  In 
the  sunken  road,  with  the  left  resting  about  the  Stevens 
House.  The  last  regiment  that  arrived  was  the  L-jth 
South  Carolina  (Colonel  De  Saussure'si.  He  sheltered 
his  command  behind  the  cemetery  on  the  hill  until  his 
prop<'r  position  was  made  known,  when  he  moved  delib- 
erately and  in  perfect  order  down  the  road  to  the  Stevens 
House,  and  proceeded  to  the  right  of  my  line.  Instead 
of  having  two  regiments  engaged  at  that  point,  as  (ien- 
eral  Hansom  supposes,  I  had  Hve  regiments  and  a  bat- 
talion (my  entire  brigade),  eai-h  of  which  suffered  more 
or  less  severely.  During  these  operations  I  received  no 
orders  or  directions  from  any  officer  but  my  division 
commander,  (General  Mcl.aws.  I  recpiestod  not  to  bo 
relieved  tliat  night,  and  remained  in  that  position  until 
the  evacuation  of  Fredericksburg  by  the  Union  forces. 
These  facts  were  officially  reported  iit  the  time,  and  were 
then  too  well  known  to  be  the  subject  of  ndstake." 


•1111 


I 


A   HOT    DAY   ON    MARYE'S   HEIGHTS. 


BY   WILLIAM    MILLER    OWEN,    FIRST   LIEUTENANT,  C.   S.  A. 


ON  the  night  of  the  10th  of  December  we,  of  the 
New  Orleans  Washington  Artillery,  sat  up  late 
in  our  camp  on  Marye's  Heights,  entertaining  some 
visitors  in  an  improvised  theater,  smoking  our 
pipes,  and  talking  of  home.  A  final  punch  having 
been  brewed  and  disposed  of,  everybody  crept 
under  the  blankets  and  was  soon  in  the  land  of 
Nod. '  In  an  hour  or  two  we  were  aroused  by  the 
report  of  a  heavy  gun.  I  was  up  in  an  instant,  for 
if  there  should  be  another  it  would  be  the  signal 
that  the  enemy  was  preparing  to  cross  the  river. 
Mr.  Florence,  a  civilian  in  the  bivouac,  bounced 
as  if  he  had  a  concealed  spring  under  his  blanket, 
and  cried  out,  "  Wake  up !  wake  up  !  what's  that  ?  " 
The  deep  roar  of  the  second  gun  was  heard,  and  we 
knew  wliat  we  had  to  do.  It  was  4  o'clock.  Our 
orders  were  that  upon  the  firing  of  these  signal 
guus  we  should  at  once  take  our  places  in  the 
redoubts  prepared  for  us  on  Marye's  Hill,  and 
await  developments.  "Boots  and  saddles"  was 
sounded,  and  the  camp  was  instantly  astir,  and  in 
the  gray  of  the  morning  we  were  on  the  Plank  road 
leading  to  the  hill.  The  position  reached,  our  nine 
guns  were  placed  as  follows:  Two  12-pounder 
howitzers  and  two  12-pounder  light  Napoleon 
guns  of  the  4th  Company,  under  Captain  Eshle- 
man  and  Lieutenants  Norcom  and  Battles,  were 
put  in  the  work  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  line 
next  to  the  Telegraph  road ;  two  12-poimder 
Napoleon  guns  of  the  3d  Company,  under  Cap- 
tain Miller  and  Lieutenant  McElroy,  in  the  center; 
two  3-inch  rifle-gims  of  the  1st  Company,  under 
Captain  Squires  and  Lieutenant  Brown,  on  the  left, 
next  to  a  little  brick-house  and  in  fi-ont  of  the  Wel- 
ford  graveyard,  and  one  10-pounder  PaiTott  rifle, 
under  Lieutenant  Galbraith,  of  the  1st  Company, 
next  to  the  Plank  road  leading  into  Fredericksburg. 

The  2d  Company,  mider  Captain  Richardson, 
with  four  Napoleon  guns,  moved  on  across  the 
Telegraph  road  to  the  right,  and  reported  as 
ordered  to  General  Pickett  for  service  with  his 
troops.  Without  delay  the  men  made  the  re- 
doubts as  snug  as  possible,  and  finding  the  epaide- 
ments  not  to  their  liking,  went  to  work  with 
pick  and  shovel  throwing  tlie  dirt  a  little  higher, 
and  fashioning  embrasures  to  fire  thi'ough.  The 
engineers  objected,  and  said  they  were  "ruining 
the  works,"  but  the  cannoneers  said,  "We  have 
to  fight  here,  not  you ;  we  will  arrange  them  to 
suit  ourselves."  AtkI  General  Longstreet  approv- 
ingly said,  "If  you  save  tlio  finger  of  a  man's 
liand,  that  does  some  good."  A  dense  fog  covered 
the  country,  and  we  could  not  discern  what  was 
going  on  in  tlie  town. 

Tlic  morning  of  the  1  2th  was  also  foggy,  and  it 
was  not  until  2  i>.  m.  tliat  it  cleared  ofl",  and  tliiMi 
w(>  could  sec  tlie  Staff"ord  Hoiglits,  across  the  river, 
densely  packed  with  troops.  At  3  P.  M.  a  lieavy 
column  moved  down  toward  one  of  the  bridges 
near  tlie  gas-works,  and  we  opeiiod  upon  it,  mak- 
ing soni(>  sph'iulid  practice  and  apiiarcntly  stirring 
tlicin  u])  ])ro(ligi()usly,  for  thoy  soon  sougiit  cooler 
localities.  While  our  guns  were  tiring,  the  enemy's 


long  range  batteries  on  the  Stafford  Heights  opened 
upon  us,  as  much  as  to  say,  "What  are  you  about 
over  there  ? "  We  paid  no  attention  to  theii-  in- 
quiry, as  our  guns  could  not  reach  them. 

At  dawn  the  next  morning,  December  13th,  in 
the  fresh  and  nipping  air,  I  stepped  upon  the 
gallery  overlooking  the  heights  back  of  the  little 
old-fashioned  town  of  Fredericksburg.  Heavy 
fog  and  mist  hid  the  whole  plain  between  the 
heights  and  the  Rappahannock,  but  under  cover 
of  that  fog  and  within  easy  cannon-shot  lay  Burn- 
side's  army.  Along  the  heights,  to  the  right  and 
left  of  where  I  was  standing,  extending  a  length 
of  nearly  five  miles,  lay  Lee's  army.  The  bugles 
and  the  drum  corps  of  the  respective  armies  were 
now  sounding  reveille,  and  the  troops  were  pre- 
paring for  their  early  meal.  All  knew  we  should 
have  a  battle  to-day  and  a  great  one,  for  the  en- 
emy had  crossed  the  river  in  immense  force,  upon 
his  pontoons  during  the  night.  On  the  Confeder- 
ate side  all  was  ready,  and  the  shock  was  awaited 
with  stubborn  resolution.  Last  night  we  had 
spread  our  blankets  upon  the  bare  floor  in  the  par- 
lor of  Marye's  house,  and  now  om-  breakfast  was 
being  prepared  in  its  fire-place,  and  we  were  im- 
patient to  have  it  over.  After  hastily  dispatching 
this  light  meal  of  bacon  and  corn-bread,  the 
colonel,  chief  bugler,  and  I  (tlie  adjutant  of  the 
battalion)  mounted  our  horses  and  rode  out  to  in- 
spect our  lines.  Visiting  first  the  position  of  the 
10-pounder  Parrott  rifle  on  the  Plank  road,  we 
found  Galbraith  and  his  boj's  wide-awake  and  ready 
for  business.  Across  the  Plank  road,  in  an  earth- 
work, was  the  battery  of  Donaldsonville  Can- 
noneers, of  Louisiana,  all  Creoles  and  gallant 
soldiers.  Riding  to  the  rear  of  Marye's  house,  we 
visited  in  turn  the  redoubts  of  Squires,  Miller,  and 
Eshleman,  and  found  everything  ready  for  instant 
action.  The  ammunition  chests  had  been  taken  off 
the  limbers  and  placed  upon  the  ground  behind  the 
traverses  close  to  the  guns.  The  horses  and  lijiibers 
had  been  sent  to  the  rear  out  of  danger.  We  drew 
rein  and  spoke  a  few  words  to  each  in  passing,  and 
at  the  3d  Company's  redoubt  we  were  invited  by 
Sergeant  "  Billy  "  Ellis  to  partake  of  some  "caf6 
noir''  which  his  mess  had  prejiared  in  a  horse 
bucket.  Nothing  loath,  we  drank  :i  tin-cupfnl,  and 
found,  not  exactly  "Mocha,"  or  "Java,"  but  the 
best  of  parched  corn.  However,  it  was  liot,  the 
morning  was  raw,  and  it  did  very  well. 

At  12  o'clock  the  fog  had  cleared,  and  wliile  we 
were  sittingin  Marye's  yard  smokiiigour]>ipes,  after 
a  lunch  of  luird  crackers,  a  courier  came  to  Colonel 
Walton,  bearing  a  dispatch  from  General  Long- 
street  for  General  Cobb,  but,  for  our  information  as 
well,  to  be  read  and  tluMi  given  to  liiin.  It  was  as 
follows:  "  Should  General  ,\nderson,  on'your  left, 
be  compelled  to  fall  back  to  tlie  second  line  of 
lieights,  j'ou  must  conform  to  his  nioven'eiits." 
Des<'en(ling  the  hill  into  tlie  sunken  road.  I  maile 
my  way  through  the  troojjs.  to  a  little  house  where 
General  Cobb  had  his  headquarters,  and  handed 
him  the  dispatch.     He  rea.l  it  carefully,  and  said. 


98 


A  HOT  DAY  ON  MA  RYE'S  HEIGHTS. 


JAMES    A.    SEDDON,    SECRETARY    OF  WAR   TO   THE    SOUTHERN 
CONFEDERACY,    FROM    NOVEMBrCR    20,   1862,    TO    JAN- 
UARY  28,   1865.     FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


"Well!  if  they  wait  for  me  to  fall  back, they  will 
wait  a  long  time."  Hardly  had  he  spoken,  when 
a  brisk  skirmish  fire  was  heard  in  front,  toward 
the  town,  and  looking  over  the  stone-wall  we  saw 
our  skirmishers  falling  back,  firing  as  they  came  ; 
at  the  same  time  the  head  of  a  Federal  column 
was  seen  emerging  from  one  of  the  streets  of  the 
town.  They  came  on  at  the  double-quick,  with 
loud  cries  of  "  Hi !  Hi !  Hi !  "  which  we  could  dis- 
tinctly hear.  Their  arms  were  carried  at  "right 
shoulder  shift,"  and  their  colors  were  aslant  the 
shoulders  of  the  color-sergeants.  They  crossed  the 
canal  at  the  bridge,  and  getting  behind  the  bank  to 
the  low  ground  to  deploy,  were  almost  concealed 
from  our  sight.  It  was  12:30  P.  M.,  and  it  was 
evident  that  we  were  now  going  to  have  it  hot  and 
heavy. 

The  enemy,  having  deployed,  now  showed  him- 
self above  the  crest  of  the  ridge  and  advanced  in 
columns  of  brigades,  and  at  once  our  guns  began 
their  deadly  work  with  shell  and  solid  shot.  How 
beautifully  tliey  came  on  !  Their  bright  bayonets 
glistening  in  the  sunlight  made  the  line  look  like 
a  huge  sei-pent  of  blue  and  steel.  The  very  force 
of  their  onset  leveled  the  broad  fences  bounding 
the  small  fields  and  gardens  that  interspersed  the 
plain.  We  could  see  our  shells  bursting  in  their 
ranks,  making  great  gaps;  but  on  they  came,  as 
though  they  would  go  straight  through  and  over 
us.  Now  we  gave  them  canister,  and  tliat  staggered 


them.  A  few  more  paces  onward  and  the 
Georgians  in  the  road  below  us  rose  up, 
and,  glancing  an  instant  along  their  rifle 
barrels,  let  loose  a  storm  of  lead  into  the 
faces  of  the  advance  brigade.  This  was 
too  much  ;  the  column  hesitated,  and  then, 
turning,  took  refuge  behind  the  bank. 
But  another  line  appeared  from  behind 
the  crest  and  advanced  gallantly,  and 
again  we  opened  om*  guns  upon  them, 
and  through  the  smoke  we  could  discei'n 
the  red  breeches  of  the  "Zouaves,"  and 
hammered  away  at  them  especially.  But 
this  advance,  like  the  preceding  one,  al- 
though passing  the  point  reached  by  the 
first  column,  and  doing  and  daring  all 
that  brave  men  could  do,  recoiled  under 
our  canister  and  the  bullets  of  the  infan- 
try in  the  road,  and  fell  back  in  great  con- 
fusion. Spotting  the  fields  in  our  front, 
we  could  detect  little  patches  of  blue  — 
the  dead  and  wounded  of  the  Federal 
infantry  who  had  fallen  facing  the  very 
muzzles  of  our  guns.  Cooke's  brigade 
of  Ransom's  division  was  now  placed  in 
the  sunken  road  with  Cobb's  men.  At 
2  P.  M.  other  columns  of  the  enemy  left 
the  crest  and  advanced  to  the  attack;  it 
appeared  to  us  that  there  was  no  end  of 
them.  On  they  came  in  beautiful  array^ 
and  seemingly  more  'determined  to  hold 
the  plain  than  before ;  but  our  fire  was 
murderous,  and  no  troops  on  earth  could 
stand  the  feu  d'cnfcr  we  were  giving 
them.  In  the  foremost  line  we  distin- 
guished the  green  flag  with  the  golden 
harp  of  old  Ireland,  and  we  knew  it  to  be  Meag- 
her's Irish  brigade.  The  gunners  of  the  two  rifle- 
pieces,  Corporals  Payne  and  Hardie,  were  directed 
to  turn  their  guns  against  this  column  ;  but 
the  gallant  enemy  pushed  on  beyond  all  former 
charges,  and  fought  and  left  their  dead  within  five 
and  twenty  paces  of  the  sunken  road.  Our  position 
on  the  hill  was  now  a  hot  one,  and  three  regiments 
of  Ransom's  brigade  were  ordered  up  to  reenforce 
the  infantry  in  the  road.  We  watched  them  as 
they  came  marching  in  line  of  battle  from  the  rear, 
where  they  had  been  lying  in  reserve.  They 
passed  through  our  works  and  rushed  down  the  hill 
with  loud  yells,  and  then  stood  shoulder  to  shoulder 
with  the  Georgians.  The  25th  North  Carolina 
regiment,  crossing  Miller's  guns,  halted  upon  the 
crest  of  the  hill,  dressed  its  line,  and  fired  a  deadly 
volley  at  the  enemy  at  close  range,  and  then  at  the 
command  "Forward! "  dashed  down,  the  hill.  It 
left  dead  men  on  Miller's  redoubt,  and  he  had  to 
drag  them  away  from  the  muzzles  of  his  guns.  At 
this  time  General  Cobb  fell  mortally  wounded,  and 
General  Cooke  w^as  borne  from  the  field,  also 
wounded.  Among  other  missiles  a  3-inch  rifle-ball 
came  crashing  through  the  works  and  fell  at  our 
feet.  Kursheedt  picked  it  up  and  said,  "Boys, 
let's  send  this  back  to  them  again";  and  into  the 
gun  it  went,  and  was  sped  back  into  the  dense 
ranks  of  the  enemy. 

General  Kershaw  now  advanced  from  the  rear 


A  HOT  DAY  ON  MA  RYE'S  HEIGHTS. 


99 


with  two  regiments  of  his  infantry,  to  reenforce 
the  men  in  the  sunken  road,  who  were  running 
short  of  ammunition,  and  to  take  command. 

The  sharp-shooters  having  got  range  of  our  em- 
brasures, we  began  to  suffer.  Corporal  Kuggles 
fell  mortally  wounded,  and  Pei-ry,  who  seized  the 
rammer  as  it  fell  from  Ruggles's  hand,  received  a 
bullet  in  the  arm.  Eodd  was  holding  "vent,"  and 
away  went  his  "  crazy  bone."  In  quick  succession 
Everett,  liossiter,  and  Kursheedt  were  wounded. 
Falconer  in  passing  in  rear  of  the  guns  was  struck 
behind  the  ear  and  fell  dead.  We  were  now  so 
short-handed  that  cvciydiicwasin  the  work,  officers 
and  men  putting  tlicii-  slmulilcrs  to  the  wheels  and 
running  up  the  gnus  after  each  recoil.  The  frozen 
ground  had  given  way  and  was  all  slush  and  mud. 
We  were  compelled  to  call  uj)on  the  infantry  to  help 
us  at  the  guns.  Eshleman  crossed  over  fi'om  the 
right  to  report  his  guns  nearly  out  of  ammunition ; 
the  other  officers  reported  the  same.  They  were 
reduced  to  a  few  solid  shot  only.  It  was  now  5 
o'clock,  p.  M.,  and  there  was  a  lull  in  the  storm. 
The  enemy  did  not  seem  inclined  to  renew  his 
efforts,  so  our  guns  were  withdrawn  one  by  one, 
and  the  batteries  of  Woolfolk  and  Moody  were 
substituted. 

The  little  whitewashed  brick-house  to  the  right  of 
the  redoubt  we  were  in  was  so  battered  with  bullets 
during  the  four  hours  and  a  half  engagement  that 
at  the  close  it  was  transformed  to  a  bright  brick- 
dust  red.     An  old  cast-iron  stove  lay  against  tlie 


house,  and  as  the  bullets  would  strike  it  it  would 
give  forth  the  sound  of  "bing!  bing!"  with  dif- 
ferent tones  and  variations.  Dm-ing  the  hottest 
of  the  firing  old  Mr.  Florence,  our  non-combatant 
friend,  was  peering  around  the  end  of  the  house 
(in  which,  by  the  way,  our  wounded  took  refuge), 
looking  out  to  see  if  his  son,  who  was  at  the  gun, 
was  all  right.  A  cannon-ball  struck  the  top  of  the 
work,  scattering  dirt  all  over  us  and  profusely 
down  our  necks,  and,  striking  tlie  end  of  the  house, 
carried  away  a  cart-load  of  bricks,  just  where  Mr. 
Florence  had  been  looking  an  instant  before.  We 
thought  surely  he  had  met  his  fate,  but  in  a  mo- 
ment we  were  jjleased  to  see  his  gray  head  *'bob 
up  serenely,"  determined  to  see  *  *  what  was  the  gage 
of  the  battle." 

After  withdrawing  from  the  liill  the  comnumd 
was  placed  in  bivouac,  and  the  men  threw  them- 
selves upon  the  ground  to  take  a  much-needed  rest. 
We  had  been  under  the  hottest  fire  men  ever  ex- 
perienced for  four  hours  and  a  half,  and  our  loss 
had  been  three  killed  and  twenty-four  wounded. 
Among  them  was  Sergeant  John  Wood,  our  lead- 
ing spirit  in  camp  theatricals,  who  was  severely 
injured  and  never  returned  to  duty.  One  gim  was 
slightly  disabled,  and  we  had  exhausted  all  of  our 
canister,  shell  and  case  shot,  and  nearly  every  solid 
shot  in  our  chests.  At  5 :  80  another  attack  was 
made  by  the  enemy,  but  it  was  easily  repulsed,  and 
the  battle  of  Fredericksburg  was  over,  and  Burn- 
side  was  baffled  and  defeated. 


WINTliK    Sl'OKT    IN    A    (.ONI-KIMCKATI 


CONFEDERATE 


NOTES  OF  A  CONFEDERATE  STAFF- OFFICER. 

BY  W.    ROY  MASON,    MAJOR,   C.  S.  A. 


FREDERICKSBURG  was  the  first  great  battle  that 
I  saw  in  its  entire  scope.  Here  the  situation 
of  the  country  —  a  champaign  tract  inclosed  in 
hills — offered  the  opportunity  of  seeing  the  troops 
on  both  sides,  and  the  movements  down  the  entire 
lines.  I  witnessed  the  magnificent  charges  made 
on  our  left  by  Meagher's  Irish  Brigade,  and  was 
also  a  sorrowful  witness  of  the  death  of  our  noble 
T.  R.  R.  Cobb  of  Georgia,  who  fell  mortally  wounded 
at  the  foot  of  the  stone-wall  just  at  the  door  of  Mrs. 
Martha  Stevens.  This  woman,  the  Molly  Pitcher 
of  the  war,  attended  the  wounded  and  the  dying 
fearless  of  consequences,  and  refused  to  leave  her 
house,  although,  standing  just  between  the  advan- 
cing line  of  the  enemy  and  the  stone-wall,  the  posi- 
tion was  one  of  danger.  It  is  said  that  after  using 
all  tlio  iii;itci-i;ils  for  bandages  at  her  command,  she 
tore  tVoin  her  ]Mison  most  of  her  garments,  even  on 
that  letter  cold  (hiy,  in  her  anxiety  to  administer  to 
necessities  greater  than  her  own. 

Mrs.  Stevens  still  lives  in  her  old  home  at  the  foot 
of  Marye's  Heights,  honored  by  every  Confederate 
soldier.  Not  long  ago,  hearing  that  she  was  very 
sick,  I  went  out  with  a  party  of  gentlemen  friends 
who  were  visitors  in  Fredericksburg  to  inquire  for 
her.  Being  told  of  our  visit,  she  requested  her  son- 
in-law  to  ask  me  in.  When  jocularly  asked  by  him 
if  she  was  going  to  invite  a  gentleman  into  her 
sick-room,  the  old  lady  replied:  "Yes,  ask  Major 
Mason  in, —  we  were  old  soldiers  together." 

After  Burnside  had  witlidrawn  liis  forces  across 
the  Rappahannock,  General  Lee  rode  over  to 
Marye's  Heights,  where  I  then  was,  and  said  to  me: 
"Captain,  those  people  [meaning  the  enemy]  have 
sent  over  a  flag  of  truce,  asking  permission  to  send 


a  detachment  to  bury  their  dead.  They  have  landed 
near  yotu-  house,  '  The  Sentry  Box.'  Have  you  any 
objection  to  taking  this  reply  down  ?  "  As  he  spoke, 
he  handed  me  a  sealed  envelope  directed  to  General 
Burnside.  I  accordingly  rode  into  town  and  made 
my  way  down  to  the  river-front  of  my  residence, 
from  which  Burnside  had  only  that  morning  re- 
moved his  ijontoons.  There  I  found  a  Federal 
lieutenant-colonel  with  two  soldiers  in  a  boat, 
holding  a  flag  of  triice.  I  handed  him  the  dispatch 
and  at  the  same  time  asked  where  Burnside  was. 
He  answered,  "Just  up  the  hill  across  the  river, 
under  an  old  persimmon-tree,  awaiting  the  dis- 
patch." Telling  him  my  name,  I  said:  "  Give  my 
regards  to  General  Burnside,  and  say  to  him  that  I 
thought  he  was  too  familiar  with  the  surroundings 
of  Fredericksburg  to  butt  his  brains  out  deliber- 
ately against  our  stone-walls." 

"  Do  you  know  General  Burnside  ?  "  inquired  the 
officer. 

"Oh,  yes!"  I  replied,  "he  is  an  old  acquaint- 
ance of  mine." 

"  Then  will  you  wait  till  I  deliver  your  message 
and  return  ?    He  may  have  something  to  say." 

"  I  will  wait  then,"  was  my  answer. 

In  a  very  short  time  the  flag  of  truce  returned 
with  a  request  from  Burnside  that  I  would  come 
over  in  the  boat  to  see  him.  I  thoroughly  appre- 
ciated the  fact  that  I  was  running  the  risk  of  a 
court-martial  from  my  own  side  in  thus  going  into 
the  enemy's  lines  without  permission ;  but  being 
that  rather  privileged  person,  a  staff-officer,  from 
whom  no  pass  was  required  and  of  whom  no  ques- 
tions were  asked,  I  determined  to  accept  this  in- 
vitation and  go  over. 


NOTES  OF  A  CONFEDERATE   STAFF-OFFICER. 


After  passing  the  river  and  walking  leisurely  up 
the  hill,  the  idle  Federal  soldiers,  seeing  a  Confed-  . 
erate  officer  oJi  their  side  and  feeling  curious 
ahout  it,  ran  down  in  numbers  toward  the  road. 
For  the  first  time  I  was  frightened  by  this  result 
of  my  act,  as  I  feared  that  our  generals  on  the 
hills  with  their  strong  glasses,  seeing  the  commo- 
tion, might  inquire  into  it.  As  soon  as  I  approached 
Burnside,  who  met  me  with  the  greatest  cordiality, 
I  expressed  to  him  this  fear.  He  at  once  sent  out 
couriers  to  order  the  soldiers  back  to  camji,  and 
we  then  sat  down  on  an  old  log,  and  being  provided 
with  crackers,  cheese,  sardines,  and  a  bottle  of 
■  brandy  (all  luxuries  to  a  Confederate),  we  discussed 
this  lunch  as  well  as  the  situation.  General  Burn- 
side  seemed  terribly  mortified  and  distressed  at 
his  failure,  but  said  that  he  wanted  me  to  tell  his 
old  army  friends  on  the  other  side  that  he  was  not 
responsible  for  the  attack  on  Fredericksburg  in 
the  manner  in  which  it  was  made,  as  he  was  him- 
self under  orders,  and  was  not  much  more  than  a 
figure-head,  or  words  to  that  effect. 

We  talked  pleasantly  for  au  hour  about  old 
times,  Burnside  asking  me  many  questions  about 
former  friends  and  comrades,  now  on  our  side  of 
the  fratricidal  struggle.  When  I  expressed  my 
wish  to  return,  he  WTapped  up  a  bottle  of  brandy 
to  give  me  at  parting,  and  sent  me  under  escort  to 
the  river.  Having  recrossed,  I  mounted  my  horse 
and  rode  back  to  Marye's  Heights,  but,  enjoyable 
as  this  escapade  had  been,  I  said  nothing,  of  course, 
about  it  to  my  army  friends  till  long  afterward. 

That  day  I  witnessed  with  pain  the  bui'ial  of 
many  thousands  of  Federal  dead  that  had  fallen 
at  Fredericksburg.  The  night  before,  the  ther- 
mometer must  have  fallen  to  zera,  and  the  bodies 
of  the  slain  had  frozen  to  the  ground.  The  ground 
was  frozen  nearly  a  foot  deep,  and  it  was  necessary 
to  use  pick-axes.  Trenches  were  dug  on  the  battle- 
field and  the  dead  collected  and  laid  in  line  for 
burial.  It  was  a  sad  sight  to  see  these  brave 
soldiers  thrown  into  the  trenches,  without  even  a 
blanket  or  a  word  of  prayer,  and  the  heavy  clods 
thrown  upon  them  ;  but  the  most  sickening  sight 
of  all  was  when  they  threw  the  dead,  some  four  or 
five  hundred  in  number,  into  Wallace's  empty  ice- 
house, where  they  were  found  —  a  hecatomb  of  skel- 
etons—  after  the  war.     In  1865-66  some  shrewd 


Yankee  contractors  obtained  government  sanction 
to  disinter  all  the  Federal  dead  on  the  battle-fields 
of  Fredericksburg,  Chancellorsville,  the  Wilder- 
ness, and  Spotsylvania  Court  House.  They  were  to 
be  paid  per  capita.  When  I  went  out  to  see  the 
skeletons  taken  from  the  ice-house,  I  fomid  the  con- 
tractor provided  with  unpainted  boxes  of  common 
pine  about  six  feet  long  and  twelve  inches  wide ; 
but  I  soou  saw  that  this  scoundrel  was  dividing  the 
remains  so  as  to  make  as  much  by  his  contract  as 
possible.  I  at  once  reported  what  I  had  seen  to 
Colonel  E.  V.  Sumner,  Jr.,  then  in  command  of  the 
Sub-district  of  the  Rappahannock.  He  was  utterly 
shocked  at  this  vandalism.  I  afterward  heard  that 
the  contract  was  taken  away  from  the  fellow  and 
given  to  more  reliable  parties. 

One  morning  about  this  time  I  was  at  breakfast, 
when  the  servant,  terribly  frightened,  announced 
a  sergeant  and  file  of  soldiers  in  my  ijorch  asking 
for  me.  The  ladies  immediately  imagined  that 
this  squad  had  been  sent  to  arrest  me,  as  they  had 
heard  more  than  once  that  charges  would  be  pre- 
ferred against  me  by  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment for  extreme  partisanship.  Going  to  the  door, 
I  was  told  by  the  sergeant  that  Colonel  Sumner 
had  sent  him  to  me  to  inquire  as  to  the  burial 
places  of  the  Federal  soldiers  whom  I  had  found 
dead  iipon  my  lot  and  in  my  house  after  the  battle 
of  Fredericksburg.  I  told  him  that  I  had  found 
one  Federal  soldier  stretched  on  one  of  ray  beds. 
In  my  parlor,  lying  on  the  floor,  was  another  whose 
entire  form  left  its  imprint  in  blood  on  the  floor, — 
as  may  be  seen  to  this  day.  In  my  own  cham- 
ber, sitting  up  in  an  old-fashioned  easy-chair,  I 
had  found  a  Federal  lieutenant-colonel.  WTien  I 
entered,  I  supposed  him  to  be  alive,  as  the  back 
of  his  head  was  toward  me.  Much  startled,  I 
approached  him,  to  find  that  he  had  been  shot 
through  the  neck,  and,  probably,  placed  in  that 
upright  position  that  he  might  better  breathe.  He 
was  quite  dead.  I  had  all  these  bodies,  and  five 
or  six  others  found  in  my  yard,  buried  in  one  grave 
on  the  wharf.  They  had  been  killed,  no  doubt,  by 
Barksdale's  Mississippi  brigade,  in  tlieir  retreat 
from  my  lot.  I  made  my  report  at  Sumner's  head- 
quarters, after  which  I  took  the  burial  squad  to 
the  grave,  and  then  returned  home  to  quiet  the 
apprehensions  of  my  family. 


NEWSPAPERS 


CAMP.        FROM    A    WAR-TIME     SKETCH. 


THE    EEMOVAL    OF   McCLELLAN. 


BY    RICHARD    B.    IRWIN,    LIEUTENANT-COLONEL,    ASSISTANT  ADJUTANT-GENERAL,   U.  S.  V. 


IN  some  former  notes  ^  I  tried  to  trace  with  an 
impartial  hand,  and  without  intruding  any  prej- 
udice or  opinion  of  my  own,  the  course  of  the  un- 
fortunate differences  that  had  ai'isen  between  the 
Government  and  the  commander  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac.  The  acute  stage  was  reached  on  the 
Peninsula ;  Pope's  campaign  marked  the  first  crisis. 
On  the  1st  of  September  McClelhm  toiiiid  liimself 
a  general  without  an  army.  On  the  L'd  the  ( iovern- 
ment  gave  him  what  was  left  of  two  armies,  and 
only  asked  him  to  defend  the  capital.  On  the 
nth  the  troops  were  in  motion  ;  on  the  7th,  without 
another  word,  and  thus,  as  appears  probable,  over- 
stepping the  intentions  of  the  Government,  3>  he 
set  out  to  meet  Lee  in  Maryland;  and,  moving 
deliberately  imder  repeated  cautions,  ten  days 
later  he  once  more  gi-appled  fiercely  with  his 
antagonist,  who  stood  waiting  on  the  banks  of 
the  Antietam.  Antietam  strained  the  back  of 
the  Confederacy. 

^  "  The  Adruinistration  in  the  Poniusular  Campaign," 
Vol.  II.  of  this  work,  p.  435 ;  "  Washinjfton  under  Banks," 
Vol.  II.  of  this  work,  p.  541. 

%  Ro(5  Vol.  II.,  p.  542,  and  note.  This  is  Btronf;l.y  c.on- 
lirnicd  hy  Chase's  diary,  Scptenibera  (Warden's"  Life  of 
C'liase,"!).  .'->4i))  :  "Tlie  President  repeated  thai  the  whole 
Heoi)et)f  the  order  was  simply  to  direct  Met 'lellan  toput 
the  troops  iido  the  fortifications  .and  conunand  them  for 
the  defense  of  Washini^fton."  Septond)er  3d  (Ibid.,  p.  460), 

the  diary  says :   "    .    .    .    the  President assin-ed 

lliin[Poi)e]  .  .  .  that  McClellan's  command  was  only 
temporary,  and  save  him  reason  to  expect  tlnit  another 
anuy  of  active  operations  would  be  orf,Muize(l  at  once 
which  he  fPopc]  would  lead."  The  same  evening  (Sep- 
tember 3d)  the  President  gave  General  Halleck  an  order, 


Hardly  had  the  echo  of  the  guns  died  away  than 
again  the  angry  ink  began  to  flow.  To  follow  its 
track  would  here  be  as  tedious  and  unnecessary  as 
it  must  always  be  painful.  The  sullen  stage  of  the 
disorder  had  been  reached ;  collapse  was  soon  to  fol- 
low. As  one  turns  the  pages  of  the  history  of  the 
seven  weeks  after  Antietam,  or  the  scattered  leaves 
that  are  some  time  to  be  gathered  into  history,  it 
is  impossible  not  to  realize  that  we  are  reading  of 
the  last  days  of  the  first  and  best-loved  commander 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  ;  that  the  last  hour 
is  not  far  off. 

Without  going  into  the  details,  and  without  at- 
tempting to  pass  judgment,  it  must  be  said  that  no 
candid  person,  knowing  anything  of  war  and  armies, 
can  doubt  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  in  the 
last  days  of  September  and  early  October,  18G2, 
needed  nearly  everything  before  beginning  a  fresh 
campaign  of  its  own  choice.  For  some  things,  such 
as  shoes,  the  troops  were  really  suffering.    It  is 

which  never  became  known  to  General  McClellan,  "to 
organize  an  army  for  active  operations  .  .  .  independ- 
ent of  the  forces  ho  may  deem  necessary  for  the  de- 
fense of  Washin.gton,  when  such  active  army  shall 
take  the  field."  ("  Official  Records,"  Vol.  XIX.,  Part  II., 
p.  169.) 

The  published  extracts  from  Chase's  diary,  though 
volunnnous  in  the  earlier  stages,  are  silent  on  the  sub- 
ject of  McClellan's  final  renmval.  In  Warden's  "Life  of 
Chase"  (p.  506)  we  read:  "Another  chapter'^  ofi'ers  a 
few  words  relating  to  our  hero's  responsibility  for  that 
fall,"  and  the  foot-note  refei-s  us  to  ""-Post  Chapter 
LVII.,"  but  not  another  word  is  said,  and  "Chapter 
LVI.,  Conclusion,"  ends  the  book.  This  is  at  least  curi- 
ous, if  not  significant,— R.  B.  J. 


102 


THE  REMOVAL  OF  MCCLELLAN. 


103 


equally  evident  that  the  duty  of  providing  these 
essential  supplies  rested  with  the  administrative 
services  in  Washington  ;  that  some  of  the  supplies 
did  not  reach  the  troops  for  a  long  time, 4  and  that 
certain  subordinate  chiefs  were  at  least  indulged  in 
expending  an  amount  of  energy  in  combating  the 
earnest  representations  that  came  poiu'ing  in  from 
the  army  on  the  field;  that  they,  or  some  one,  might 
well  have  been  required  to  devote  to  the  task  of 
seeing  that  the  supplies  reached  the  troops  who 
needed  them,  instead  of  resting  content  with  per- 
functory declarations  that  the  stores  had  "been 
sent."  Nor  can  any  commander  of  an  anny  be 
blamed  for  not  liking  this.  The  wonder  is,  that  a 
railway  journey  of  a  few  hours  should  have  stood 
in  the  way  of  a  complete  understanding  and  swift 
remedy,  on  one  side  or  the  other. 

President  Lincoln  visited  General  MeClellan  on 
the  1st  of  October,  and  went  over  the  battle-fields 
of  South  Mountain,  Crampton's  Gap,  and  Antietam 
in  his  company.  When  the  President  left  him  on 
the  4th,  General  MeClellan  appears  to  have  been 
imder  the  impression  that  his  military  acts  and 
plans  were  satisfactory.  ^  What  these  plans  were 
at  this  time,  beyond  the  reorganizationandrefitting 
of  his  army,  in  the  absence  of  direct  evidence,  one 
can  but  conjecture  from  a  passage  that  occurs  in 
a  private  letter  dated  October  2d,  printed  in  "  Mc- 
Clellan's  Own  Story"  (p.  654).  "His  [the  Presi- 
dent's] ostensible  purpose  is  to  see  the  troops  and 
the  battle-field ;  I  incline  to  think  that  the  real 
purpose  of  his  visit  is  to  push  on  into  a  premature 
advance  into  Vii-ginia.  .  .  .  The  real  truth  is 
that  my  army  is  not  fit  to  advance."  \  However,  on 
the  Gth,  two  days  after  Mr.  Lincoln's  departure, 
General  Halleck  telegraphed  to  General  MeClellan  : 

"  The  President  directs  that  you  croes  the  Potomac 
and  give  battle  to  the  enemy  or  tlri\  e  hira  south.  Your 
army  must  move  now,  while  the  roads  are  Rood.  If  you 
cross  the  river  between  the  enemy  and  Washington  and 
cover  the  latter  by  your  operation,  you  can  be  reen- 
forced  with  30,000  men.  If  you  move  up  the  valley  of  the 
Shenandoah,  not  more  than  12,000  or  15,000  can  be  sent 
to  you.  The  President  advises  the  interior  line  between 
Wiishingtou  and  the  enemy,  but  does  not  order  it.  He  is 
very  desirous  that  your  army  move  as  soon  as  possible." 

General  MeClellan  at  first  selected  the  valley 
route,  but  the  tardy  delivery  of  supplies  delayed 
his  movement,  and  when  he  began  crossing  the 

4.  In  particular  the  statement  of  General  Rufus  lu- 
galls("  Official  Records,"  Vol.  XTX.,  Part  I.,  p.  95)  seems 
to  lue  concliiHivc,  altliough  tlio  contrary  view  isstrouiily 
held  by  high  aiitliority.     K.  B.  I. 

^  "  We  spent  some  time  on  the  battle-field  and  eon- 
versed  fully  on  the  state  of  affairs.  He  told  me  that  ho 
was  eutirely  satisfied  with  me  and  with  all  that  I  had 
done;  that  ho  would  stand  ))y  me  against  'all  comers'; 
that  he  wished  me  to  <'Outiuue  my  prejiaratioiis  for  a 
new  eam|iiiign,  not  to  stir  an  inch  until  fully  ready,  and 
when  ready  to  do  what  \  tlionght  l)est.  He  repealed  that 
he  was  (entirely  satisfied  wifli  me;  that  I  should  l)c  let 
alone;  that  he  would  stand  l>y  me.  1  liaye  no  doubt  he 
meant  exactly  what  he  said.  He  parted  from  me  willi 
tile  utmost  cordiality.  We  never  met  again  on  tliis 
earfli."  |"  Mc( 'lellan's  Own  Story,"  pp.  027,  f)2H.] 

"X  President  Lincoln's  yiews  as  to  tlie  eomj>arative 
readiness  to  moye  of  t lie  Federal  and  ConfedtM'ate  armies 
may  be  found  tersely  e\]iressed  in  liis  letter  to  (ieneral 
MeClellan,  dated  Oefolier  i;!tli,  mv2.  printed  on  p.  lOr.. 

^  Among  otlier  filings,  Stuart  crossed  tlie  I'otomac 


Potomac  on  the  2.'jth  and  advanced  a  few  days 
later,  the  circumstances  had  somewhat  changed. ■j;^ 
Then,  leaving  the  Twelfth  Corps  to  hold  Harper's 
Ferry,  he  marched  down  the  eastern  side  of  the 
Blue  Kidge,  as  the  President  had  originally  desired, 
picked  up  the  Third  and  Eleventh  corps  and  Bay- 
ard's division  of  cavalry  on  striking  the  railway 
opposite  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and  on  the  5th  of 
November  made  his  headquarters  at  Kectortown, 
with  all  his  arrangements  in  progress  for  concen- 
trating the  army  near  Warrenton. 

This  movement  in  eifect  (although  General  Me- 
Clellan does  not  appear  to  have  known  it  definitely 
until  three  days  later)  placed  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  with  a  force  double  that  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia, )  between  the  two  halves  of  that 
army,  farther  separated  by  the  Blue  Kidge ;  for  Lee, 
with  Longstreet's  corps,  had  moved  to  Culpeper  as 
soon  as  it  was  seen  that  MeClellan  was  advancing 
east  of  the  Blue  Eidge,^  and  Jackson  was  still  in 
the  Shenandoah,  distant  several  days'  march. 

On  that  very  day,  November  5th,  the  President, 
with  his  own  hand,  wTote  the  following  order:  44- 

"Executive  Mansion, 
Washington,  ,  186  . 

"  By  direction  of  the  President  it  is  ordered  that  Major- 
General  MeClellan  be  relieved  from  the  command  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  that  Major-General  Bui nside 
take  eonnuand  of  that  army.  Also  that  Major-(;enenil 
Hiniter  take  command  of  the  corps  in  said  army  now 
commanded  by  General  Buruside. 

"That  Major-Geneial  Fitz  John  Porter  be  relieved 
from  the  command  of  the  corps  he  now  commands  in 
said  array,  and  that  Major-General  Hooker  take  com- 
mand of  said  corps. 

"  The  general-in-chief  is  authorized,  in  [his]  discretion, 
to  issue  an  order  substantially  as  tho  above,  forthwith 
or  as  soon  as  he  may  deem  i)roper. 

"A.  Lincoln. 

"  November  5th,  1862." 

Forthwith  the  following  orders  were  issued: 
"Headquarters  of  the  Army, 

Washington,  November  5th,  1862. 
"Ma.jor-General  McCi.ellan,  Commanding,  etc.— 
General  :  On  receipt  of  the  order  of  the  President,  seut 
herewith,  you  will  immediately  turn  oyer  your  com- 
mand to  MaJor-General  Buruside,  and  repair  to  Trenton, 
N.  .L,  reporting,  on  your  arrival  at  that  place,  by  tele- 
graph, for  further  orders. 

"  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 
"H.  W.  Halleck, 

"  General-in-Chief." 

at  Williamsport  on  the  lOth  of  October,  on  his  famous 
raid  into  Maryland  and  Pennsyhania,  rode  completely 
round  the  rear  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and.  eluding 
Phasonton's  vigorous  but  iuellectual  piu-suit,  safely 
reerossed  the  river  near  the  mouth  of  tlie  Monocacy. 
One  eflect  of  this  raid  on  tlie  mind  of  the  President  is 
indicated  in  an  anecdote  related  in  "  Washington  under 
Banks,"  VoL  IL  of  this  work.  p.  .'-.44.-  R.  B.  I. 

)  Tlie  "Otlicial  Kccoids"  show  that  McCIellan's  effe<-t- 
iye  force  was  about  14.-..0<i;),  Le.-'s  about  72,(XHi.  Long- 
street  :ind  .Tackson  each  had  about  :12,(KH».— R.  B.  I. 

;^  Lee's  inders  for  Longstreet's  moy<ntcnt  are  dated 
October  2Kth.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  luulnot  then 
tlnislied  crossing  the  riy<M-.— R.  B.  I. 

Ult  is  yirfually  certain  that  (i.iicral  MeClellan  ncyi-r 
saw  this  order,  which,  in  the  form  as  written  l>y  the 
President,  was  iieycr  promulgated.  G.neral  Hunter 
was  not  placed  in  coniiiiand  of  Tiiirnsidc's  corps.  Hooker 
was  ordered  to  iclicyc  Porter  by  Special  Orders  from  the 
War  Deiiartnunt.  AiUntant-GeHeral's  Office,  dated  No- 
ycmber  lOtli.  l.Wi. 


I04 


THE  REMOVAL  OF  MCCLELLAN. 


This  order  was  inclosed  : 

"  War  Department,  Adjutant-General's  Office, 
Washington,  November  5tli,  1862. 
"GENERAL  Orders,  No.  182:  By  direction  of  the 
President  of  tlie  United  States,  it  is  ordered  that  Major- 
General  McClellau  be  relieved  from  the  command  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  that  Msyor-General  Burnside 
take  the  command  of  that  aiiuy. 

"  By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War : 

"E.  D.  TOWNSEND, 

"  Assistant  Adjutant-General." 

If  we  except  Halleck's  report  of  October  28t]i, 
obviously  called  for  and  furnished  as  a  record, 
and  containing  nothing  new,  no  cause  or  reason 
was  ever  made  public  either  officially  or  in  any 
one  of  the  many  informal  modes  in  which  official 
action  so  often  finds  it  convenient  to  let  itself  be 
known  until  the  appearance  in  "The  Century" 
majrazine  for  February,  1889,  in  which  Messrs. 
Hay  and  Nicolay  make  it  clear  that  the  President 
had  some  time  before  made  up  his  mind  to  remove 
MeClellan  "if  he  should  jiermit  Lee  to  cross  the 
Blue  Ridge  and  place  himself  between  Richmond 
and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac." 

General  C.  P.  Buckingham,  the  confidential  assist- 
ant adjutant-general  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  bore 
these  orders  from  Washington  by  a  special  train. 
He  arrived  atRectortown  in  a  blinding  snow-storm. 
First  calling  upon  Burnside  to  deliver  to  him  a 
counterpart  of  the  order,  late  on  the  night  of  No- 
vember 7th  these  two  officers  proceeded  together 
to  General  McClellan's  tent.     MeClellan  says :  ^ 

"  I  at  once  [when  he  heard  of  Buckingham's  arrival] 
suspected  that  he  brought  the  order  relieving  me  from 
command,  but  kept  my  own  counsel.  Late  at  night  I 
was  sitting  alone  in  my  tent,  writing  to  my  wife.  All 
the  staff  were  asleep.  Suddenly  some  one  knocked 
upon  the  tent-pole,  and  upon  my  invitation  to  enter 
there  appeared  Burnside  and  Buckingham,  both  look- 
ing very  solemn.  I  received  them  kindly  and  com- 
menced conversation  upon  general  subjects  in  the  most 
unconcerned  manner  possible.  After  a  few  moments 
Buckingham  said  to  Burnside :  '  Well,  General,  I  think 


we  had  better  tell  General  MeClellan  the  object  of  our 
visit.'  I  very  pleasantly  said  that  I  should  be  glad  to 
learn  it.  Whereupon  Buckingham  handed  me  the  two 
orders  of  which  he  was  the  bearer.    .    .    . 

"I  saw  that  both  —  especially  Buckingham  —  were 
watching  me  most  intently  while  I  opened  and  read  the 
orders.  I  read  the  papers  with  a  smile,  immediately 
turned  to  Burnside,  and  said :  '  Well,  Burnside,  I  turn 
the  command  over  to  you.' "  ^ 

The  movements  of  troops  that  had  already  been 
begun  were  completed  on  the  Sth  and  9th,  at  Gen- 
eral Burnside's  request;  but  there  the  execution 
of  General  McClellan's  plans  stopped.  Burnside 
turned  to  the  left  and  massed  his  army  on  the 
Rappahannock,  opposite  Fredericksburg;  Lee 
conformed  to  this  movement,  called  in  Jackson, 
and  concentrated  on  the  opposite  heights.  The 
disaster  of  Fredericksburg  followed. 

On  the  10th  MeClellan  bade  farewell  to  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  As  he  rode  between  the 
lines,  formed  almost  of  their  own  accord  to  do 
honor  for  the .  last  time  to  their  beloved  com- 
mander, grief  and  disappointment  were  on  every 
face,  and  manly  tears  stood  in  many  an  eye  that 
had  learned  to  look  on  war  without  a  tremor. 
In  the  simple,  touching  words  of  the  gallant  and 
accomplished  Walker:  "Every  heart  was  filled 
with  love  and  grief ;  every  voice  was  raised  in 
shouts  expressive  of  devotion  and  indignation  ; 
and  when  the  chief  had  passed  out  of  sight,  the 
romance   of  war  was   over  for  the  Army  of  the 

Potomac."  Jj' 

In  all  that  these  brave  men  did,  in  all  that  they 
suffered,  and  great  were  their  deeds,  unspeakable 
their  sufferings,  never,  perhaps,  were  their  devotion 
and  loyalty  more  nobly  proved  than  by  their  in- 
stant obedience  to  this  order,  unwisely  wrung 
from  the  President  as  many  of  them  believed  it 
to  have  been,  yet  still  for  them,  as  American  sol- 
diers, as  American  citizens,  an  implicit  mandate. 
The  men  who  coidd  talk  so  glibly  of  "praetorian 
guards"  knew  little  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 


i^  "  McClellan's  Own  Story,"  pp.  652,  653. 

\  General  Buckingham,  in  a  letter  printed  in  the 
"  Cliicago  Tribune,"  of  September  4th,  1875  (quoted  in  the 
"  History  of  the  Civil  War  in  America,"  by  the  Comte  de 
Paris,  Vol.  II.,  p.  555),  writes  substantifilly  to  the  same 
eflfect.  He  also  states  that  General  Burnside  at  first 
declined  the  command  (as  there  is  good  reason  for  believ- 
ing he  had  done  twice  before,  namely,  in  August,  and 
again  early  in  September).  Ho  adds:  "General  Me- 
Clellan has  himself  borne  tcsfimony  to  the  kind  manner 
in  which  I  communicated  tlir  urdcr,  and  I  can  bear 
testimony  to  his  prompt  and  cheerful  obedience  to 
it."— R.B.I. 

^  "History  of  the  Second  Army  Corps,"  by  General 
Francis  A.  Walker,  p.  137. 

From  "  McClcllini's  Last  Service  to  the  P>cpublip,"  liy 
George  Ticknor  Cui'tis  (N.  Y. :  D.  Ai>ph1nn  A- Co.),  pp. 
81-83,  we  tnk(^  tlie  following  description  of  McClellan's 
farewell  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  : 

"After  he  had  readiort  Warreiit.on,  a  day  was  spent  in 
vi(^\vins  tlio  i)()sitioii  of  \\n\  tr()<)i)s  and  in  cnnforeiices  with 
(iciirtal  I',uriisiili>  icH)iC(tiii'r  flit  lire  (ipcrations.  In  tlie 
course  of  tiKit  ilay  tlie  order  was  ])ii))lislied,  and  Gener.al 
Mc('lell:in  issiiod  a  farewell  address  to  the  army.  On  the 
evening  of  Sunday,  the  9th,  there  was  an  assembly  of  officers 
who  came  to  take  leave  of  liim.  On  the  lOtli  he  visited  some 
of  the  v.arioiia  camps,  and  amid  the  iniiiassioned  cries  and 
demonstrations  of  the  men  lie  tool;  a  last  look  of  tlii>  troops 
who  had  followed  him  with  such  luifalteriiiij;  devotion.  •  His- 


tory,' lie  said  to  the  ofQcers  who  crowded  around  him  —  '  his- 
tory will  do  justice  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  even  if  the 
ju'esent  generation  does  not.  I  feel  as  if  I  had  been  intimately 
connected  \\  itli  e:ieh  and  all  of  you.  Nothing  is  more  liinding 
than  tlic  fiiiiMlsliiii  of  companions  in  arms.  Stay  yon  all  in 
fntuie  iiie.sei\c  I  he  hish  reputation  of  our  army,  and  servo 
all  as  well  ami  f:iitlitiiriy  as  you  have  8er\-ed  me.'  (Ju  tlio 
11th,  at  Wariiiitiiii  .)  unction,  he  entered  with  liis  staff  a  rail- 
road train  that  w  ;is  iilidiit  to  start  toward  Washington.  Here 
there  was  stationed  a  detachment  of  2000  troops.  Tliey 
were  drawn  up  in  line,  and  a  salute  was  fired.  The  men  then 
broke  their  ranks,  surrounded  the  car  in  wliich  he  was  seated, 
uncoupled  it  from  the  train  and  ran  it  back,  insisting  wildl.v 
that  he  shcuild  not  leave  them,  and  uttering  the  bitterest 
imprecations  against  those  who  had  (le]irive<l  them  of  their 
beloved  comniamler.  The  scene  has  lieeii  deseiilied  to  us  liy 
an  officei  who  was  present  as  one  of  tearful  excitement.  The 
momeiil  u.is  critical.  One  word,  one  look  of  encouragement, 
the  liftiiii^dl  :i  liii-(  r,  would  have  been  the  signal  forarevolt 
a.gainst  law  fiil  aiitliority,  the  consequences  of  which  no  man 
can  nn>asuTe.  M<'Clell:in  steiipeil  upon  the  front  ]»latform  of 
the  car,  and  there  w;is  instant  sileiHc.  His  address  was 
short.  It  ended  in  the  memoralile  woids,  '  Stand  liy  General 
Burnside  as  ron  have  stood  liy  me,  and  all  will  lie  well.'  The 
soldiers  were  calmed.  They  rolled  the  caronward,  recoupled 
itto  the  train,  and  with  one  lonp;  and  mnmnfiil  huzza  bade 
farewell  to  their  late  commander,  whom  many  of  them  were 
destined  never  to  behold  again.  General  MeClellan  reached 
Washington  on  the  following  dav,  and  without  tarrying  for 
an  hour  proceeded  at  once  to  Trenton,  where  he  arrived  at 
4  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  12th.  From  that  time  he 
never  again  saw  Lincoln,  or  Stanton,  or  Halleck."  —EDITORS. 


V- - 


'^^Xi^:^/ir^ 


HOT    WORK    FOR     HAZARD'S    BATTERr.        SEE    P.     116. 


SUMNER'S  "RIGHT  GRAND  DIVISION." j 


BY  DAKIUS  N.  COUCH,  MAJOR-GENEKAL,  U.  S.  V. 


ON  the  evening  of  October  15th,  1862,  a  few  days  aftei'  McClellan  had  phiced 
me  in  command  of  the  Second  Corps,  then  at  Harper's  Ferry,  the  com- 
manding general  sent  an  order  for  Hancock  to  take  his  division  the  next 
morning  on  a  reconnoissance  toward  Charlestown,  about  ten  miles  distant. 
The  division  started  in  good  season,  as  directed.  About  10  in  the  morning 
General  McClellan  reined  up  at  my  headquarters  and  asked  me  to  go  out 
with  him  to  see  what  the  troops  were  doing.  Our  people  had  met  the  enemy's 
outpost  five  miles  from  the  Ferry,  and  while  artillery  shots  were  being 
exchanged,  both  of  us  dismounted,  walked  away  by  ourselves,  and  took  seats 
on  a  ledge  of  rocks.  After  a  little  while  McClellan  sent  to  an  aide  for  a  map 
of  Virginia.  Spreading  it  before  us,  he  pointed  to  the  strategic  features  of  the 
valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  and  indicated  the  movements  he  intended  to  make, 
which  would  have  the  effect  of  compelling  Lee  to  concentrate  in  the  vicinity, 
I  think,  of  Gordons ville  or  Charlottesville,  where  a  great  battle  would  ho 
fought.  Continuing  the  conversation,  he  said,  "  But  I  may  not  have  command 
of  the  army  much  longer.  Lincoln  is  down  on  me,"  and,  taking  a  paper  from 
his  pocket,  he  gave  me  my  first  intimation  of  the  President'3  famous  letter.  ;J, 


J  It  is  due  to  General  Couch  to  state  that,  with 
limited  time  in  which  to  prepare  tliis  paper,  he 
dictated  it  to  a  stenoj^rapher  in  answer  to  ques- 
tions by  the  editors  bearing  cliiefiy  on  his  personal 
recollections.—  Editors. 

3^  Lincoln's  letter  is  dated  October  13th,  18r>2, 
and  begins:  "  My  Dear  Sir,— You  remember  my* 
speaking  to  you  of  what  I  called  your  rtver-cautious- 
ness.  Are  you  not  over-cautious  wlien  you  assunu^ 
that  you  cannot  do  what  tho  enemy  is  constantly 
VOL.  III.  8.  l( 


doing  ?  Sliould  you  not  claim  to  be  at  least  his  equal 
in  prowess,  and  act  upon  the  claim  f  "  Furtlier  on 
tho  President  says:  "Ciiange  positions  witli  tlie 
enemy,  and  think  you  not  he  would  break  your 
communication  with  Richmond  within  the  next 
twenty-four  hours?  You  dread  his  going  into 
Pennsylvania ;  but  if  he  does  so  in  full  force,  he 
gives  up  his  communication  to  you  absolutely, 
and  you  have  notiiiiig  to  do  but  to  follow  and  ruin 
him.  .    .    .  Exclusive  of   the   water-line,    you   aro 


io6  SUMNER'S  "RIGHT  GRAND  DIVISION." 

He  read  it  aloud  very  carefully,  and  when  it  was  finished  I  told  him  I  thought 
there  was  no  ill-feeling  in  the  tone  of  it.  He  thought  there  was,  and 
quickly  added,  "  Yes,  Couch,  I  expect  to  be  relieved  from  the  Ai'my  of  the 
Potomac,  and  to  have  a  command  in  the  West ;  and  I  am  going  to  take  three 
or  four  with  me,"  calling  off  by  their  names  four  prominent  officers.  I 
queried  if  "  so  and  so  "  would  be  taken  along,  naming  one  who  was  generally 
thought  to  be  a  great  favorite  with  McClellan.  His  cm^t  reply  was,  "  No,  I 
sha'n't  have  him." 

This  brief  conversation  opened  a  new  world  for  me.  I  had  never  before 
been  to  any  extent  his  confidant,  and  I  pondered  whether  on  a  change  of  the 
commanders  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  the  War  Department  would  allow 
him  to  choose  the  generals  whose  names  had  been  mentioned.  I  wondered 
what  would  be  the  future  of  himself  and  those  who  followed  his  fortunes  in 
that  untried  field.  These  and  a  crowd  of  other  kindred  thoughts  quite 
oppressed  me  for  several  days.  But  as  the  time  wore  on,  and  preparations 
for  the  invasion  of  Virginia  were  allowed  to  go  on  without  let  or  hindrance 
from  Washington,  I  naturally  and  gladly  inferred  that  McClellan's  fears  of 
hostile  working  against  him  were  groundless.  However,  the  blow  came,  and 
soon  enough. 

On  the  8th  of  November,  just  at  dark,  I  had  dismounted,  and,  standing 
in  the  snow,  was  superintending  the  camp  arrangements  of  my  troops, 
when  McClellan  came  up  with  his  staff,  accompanied  by  General  Burn  side. 
McClellan  drew  in  his  horse,  and  the  first  thing  he  said  was : 

''  Couch,  I  am  relieved  from  the  command  of  the  army,  and  Burnside  is  my 
successor." 

I  stepped  up  to  him  and  took  hold  of  his  hand,  and  said,  "  General  McClel- 
lan, I  am  sorry  for  it."  Then,  going  around  the  head  of  his  horse  to  Burnside, 
I  said,  "  General  Burnside,  I  congratulate  you." 

Burnside  heard  what  I  said  to  General  McClellan;  he  tui*ned  away  his  head, 
and  made  a  broad  gesture  as  he  exclaimed ; 

"  Couch,  don't  say  a  word  about  it." 

His  manner  indicated  that  he  did  not  wish  to  talk  about  the  change ;  that 
he  thought  it  was  not  good  policy  to  do  so,  nor  the  place  to  do  it.  He  told  me 
afterward  that  he  did  not  like  to  take  the  command,  but  that  he  did  so  to 
keep  it  from  going  to  somebody  manifestly  unfit  for  it.  I  assumed  that  he 
meant  Hooker.  Those  of  us  who  were  well  acquainted  with  Burnside  knew 
that  he  was  a  brave,  loyal  man,  but  we  did  not  think  that  he  had  the  military 
ability  to  command  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

McClellan  took  leave  on  the  10th.  Fitz  John  Porter  sent  notes  to  the 
corps  commanders,  informing  them  that  McClellan  was  going  away,  and 
suggesting  that  we  ride  about  with  him.     Such  a  scene  as  that  leave-taking 

now  nearer  Richmond  than  the  enemy  is,  by  the  sen,  McClurg  &  Company)  Isaac  N.  Arnold  makes 
route  that  you  can  and  he  7nust  take."  And  in  President  Lincoln  say :  "  With  all  his  failings  as  a 
conclusion:  "It  is  all  easy  if  our  troops  march  as  soldier,  McClellan  is  a  pleasant  and  scholarly  gen- 
well  as  the  enemy,  and  it  is  unmanly  to  say  they  tleman.  He  is  an  admirable  engineer,  but  he 
cannot  do  it.  This  letter  is  in  no  sense  an  order."  seems  to  have  a  special  talent  for  a  stationary 
In  his  "  Life  of  Abraham  Lincoln  "  (Chicago  :  Jan-  engine."—  Editors. 


SUMNER'S  "RIGHT  GRAND  DIVISION."  107 


CHAXriAM,   OPPOSITE  FREDERICKSBURG,  ALSO  KNOWN  AS  THE  "LACY  HOUSE."      FROM   A  WAR-TIME  PHOTOGRAPH. 

had  never  been  known  in  our  army.  Men  shed  tears  and  there  was  great 
excitement  among  the  troops.     [See  p.  104.] 

I  think  the  soldiers  had  an  idea  that  McClellan  would  take  care  of  them, — 
would  not  put  them  in  places  where  they  would  be  unnecessarily  cut  up  ;  and 
if  a  general  has  the  confidence  of  his  men  he  is  pretty  strong.  But  officers 
and  men  were  determined  to  serve  Burnside  loyally. 

A  day  or  two  afterward  Burnside  called  the  corps  commanders  together, 
mapped  out  a  course  that  he  intended  to  pursue ;  and,  among  other  things,  he 
said  that  he  intended  to  double  the  army  corps,  and  he  proposed  to  call  the  three 
new  commands  —  or  doubles  —  "  grand  divisions."  Under  this  arrangement 
my  corps,  the  Second,  and  Willcox's,  the  Ninth,  which  had  been  Burnside's, 
formed  the  Right  Grand  Division  imder  General  Sumner.  When  Sum- 
ner and  I  arrived  near  Falmouth,  opposite  Fredericksburg,  November  17th, 
we  found  the  enemy  in  small  force  in  readiness  to  oppose  our  crossing  the 
Eappahannock.  Everybody  knew  that  Lee  would  rush  right  in ;  we  could  see 
it.  If  the  pontoons  had  been  there,  we  might  have  crossed  at  once.  [See  p. 
121.]  Yet  we  lay  there  nearly  a  month,  while  they  were  fortifying  before  our 
eyes ;  besides,  the  weather  was  against  us.  Under  date  of  December  7th,  my 
diary  contains  this  entry :  "  Very  cold ;  x^lenty  of  snow.  Men  suffering ;  cold 
outdoors,  ice  indoors  in  my  room." 

Sumner's  headquarters  were  at  the  Lacy  House,  while  the  Second  Corps  lay 
back  of  the  brow  of  the  hill  behind  Falmouth. 

On  the  night  of  the  9th,  two  niglits  before  the  crossing,  Sumner  called  a 
council  to  discuss  what  we  were  to  do,  the  corps,  division,  and  bi-igade  com- 
manders being  present.  The  result  was  a  plain,  free  talk  all  around,  in  whicli 
words  were  not  minced,  for  the  conversation  soon  drifted  into  a  markeil  dis- 
approbation of  the  manner  in  which  Burnside  contemplated  meeting  the 
enemy. 

Sumner  seemed  to  feel  badly  that  the  officers  did  not  agree  to  Burnside's 
mode  of  advance.  That  noble  old  hero  was  so  faithful  and  loyal  that  lie  wanted, 
even  against  impossibilities,  to  carry  out  evei-ything  Burnside  suggested.     I 


io8 


SUMNER'S  ''RIGHT  GRAND  DIVISION: 


THE    PHILLIPS    HOUSE,    BUENSIDE'S    HEADQUARTERS. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH    TAKEN    WHILE    THE    HOUSE    WAS    BURNING 


should  doubt  if  his  judgment  concurred.  It  was  only  chivalrous  attachment 
to  Burnside,  or  to  any  commander.  But  there  were  not  two  opinions  among 
the  subordinate  officers  as  to  the  rashness  of  the  undertaking. 

Somebody  told  Burnside  of  our  views,  and  he  was  irritated.  He  asked  us 
to  meet  him  the  next  night  at  the  Lacy  House.  He  said  he  understood,  in  a 
general  way,  that  we  were  opposed  to  his  plans.     He  seemed  to  be  rather 

severe  on  Hancock, — to  my 
.'-  surprise,  for  I  did  not  think 

that  officer  had  said  as  much 
as  myself  in  opposition  to 
the  plan  of  attack.  Burn- 
side  stated  that  he  had 
formed  his  plans,  and  all  he 
wanted  was  the  devotion  of 
his  men.  Hancock  made  a 
reply  in  which  he  disclaimed 
any  personal  discourtesy, 
and  said  he  knew  there  was 
a  line  of  fortified  heights  on 
the  opposite  side,  and  that  it 
would  be  pretty  difficult  for  us  to  go  over  there  and  take  them.  I  rose  after 
him,  knowing  that  I  was  the  more  guilty,  and  expressed  a  desire  to  serve 
Burnside,  saying,  among  other  things,  that  if  I  had  ever  done  anything  in 
any  battle,  in  this  one  I  intended  to  do  twice  as  much,  French  came  in 
while  I  was  talking.  He  was  rather  late,  and  in  his  bluff  way  exclaimed: 
"  Is  this  a  Methodist  camp-meeting  !  " 

The  heights  on  the  morning  of  the  11th,  before  the  bridges  were  thrown 
across,  did  not  offer  a  very  animated  scene,  because  the  troops  were  mostly  hid- 
den. The  bombardment  for  the  purpose  of  dislodging  the  sharp-shooters  who 
under  cover  of  the  houses  were  delaying  the  bridge-making,  was  terrific,  while 
the  smoke  settled  down  and  veiled  the  scene.  After  the  bombardment  had 
failed  to  dislodge  the  enemy,  the  7tli  Michigan  and  the  19th  and  the  20th 
Massachusetts  of  Howard's  division  sprang  into  the  pontoons,  and  rowing 
themselves  over  drove  away  Barksdale's  sharp-shooters.  This  gallant  action 
enabled  the  engineers  to  complete  the  bridges.  Howard's  division  was  the 
first  to  cross  by  the  upper  bridge  [see  map,  p.  74],  his  advance  having  a  lively 
fight  in  the  streets  of  Fredericksburg.  Hawkins's  brigade  of  Willcox's  corps 
occupied  the  lower  part  of  the  town  on  the  same  evening,  and  the  town  was  not 
secured  without  desperate  fighting.  I  went  over  the  next  morning,  Friday, 
the  12tli,  with  Hancock's  and  French's  divisions.  The  remainder  of  Willcox's 
corps  crossed  and  occupied  the  lower  part  of  the  town. .  There  was  consider- 
al)le  looting.  I  placed  a  provost-guard  at  the  bridges,  with  orders  that  nobody 
should  go  back  with  plunder.  An  enormous  pile  of  booty  was  collected  there 
by  evening.  But  there  came  a  time  when  we  were  too  busy  to  guard  it,  and 
I  suppose  it  was  finally  carried  off  by  another  set  of  spoilers.  The  troops 
of  the  two  corps  bivouacked  tliat  night  in  the  streets  and  were  not  per- 


SUMNER'S  "RIGHT  GRAND   DiyiSION." 


109 


mitted  to  make  fires.  Late  on  that  day  we  had  oi'ders  to  be  read^y  to  cross 
Hazel  Run,  which  meant  that  we  were  to  join  Frankhn.  That  was  the  only 
pi-oper  move  to  make,  since  we  had  done  just  what  the  enemj^  wanted  us  to 
do, — lijid  divided  our  army.  The  conditions  were  favorahle  for  a  change  of 
position  unknown  to  the  enemj^  since  tlie  night  was  (hirk  and  the  next  morn- 
ing was  foggy.  But  it  would  have  been  very  dilhcult  to  make  the  movenuMit. 
I  was  much  wori'ied  in  regard  to  ])uilding  tlie  necessary  bridges  over  Hazel 
Run  and  the  dangers  attending  a  fiauk  movement  at  niglit  in  the  preseiice  ot" 
the  enemy.  But  the  order  to  march  never  came.  The  orders  tliat  were  gi\  «mi 
by  Burnside  showed  that  he  had  no  fixed  plnn  of  battle.  After  getting  in 
the  face  of  the  enemy,  his  intentions  seemed  to  be  continually  changing. 

Early  the  next  morning,  Snturday,  the  llUh,  I  receive<l  orders  to  make  an 
assault  in  front.     My  instructions  came  fcom  (Jenenil  Sunnier,  who  did  not 


no  SUMNER'S  "RIGHT  GRAND  DIl^ISION." 

cross  the  river  during  the  fight,  owing  to  a  special  understanding  with  which 
1  had  nothing  to  do,  and  which  related  to  his  supposed  rashness.  At  Fan- 
Oaks,  Antietam,  and  on  other  battle-fields  he  had  shown  that  he  was  a  hard 
fighter.  He  was  a  grand  soldier,  full  of  honor  and  gallantry,  and  a  man  of 
great  determination. 


FEEDER ICKSBD EG    FEOM    THE    EAST    BANK    OF   THE    EAPPAHANNOCK  — I. 

As  I  have  said,  on  that  Saturday  morning  we  were  enveloped  in  a  heavy 
fog.  At  8:15,  when  we  were  still  holding  ourselves  in  readiness  to  move 
to  the  left,  I  received  the  following  order : 

'*  Headquarters,  Right  Grand  Division,  near  Falmouth,  Va.,  December  12tli,  1862. 
**  Major-General  Couch,  Commanding  Second  Corps  d'Armee. 

"  General  :  The  major-general  commanding  directs  me  to  say  to  you  that  General  Willcox  has 
been  ordered  to  extend  to  the  left,  so  as  to  connect  with  Franklin's  right.  Yon  will  extend  your 
right  so  far  as  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  the  enemy  occupying  the  upper  part  of  the  town. 
You  will  then  form  a  column  of  a  division  for  the  purpose  of  pushing  in  the  direction  of  the 
Plank  and  Telegi-aph  roads,  for  the  purpose  of  seizing  the  heights  in  rear  of  the  town.  This 
column  will  advance  in  three  lines,  with  such  intervals  as  you  may  judge  proper,  this  movement 
to  be  covered  by  a  heavy  line  of  skirmishers  in  front  and  on  both  flanks.  You  will  hold  another 
division  in  readiness  to  advance  in  support  of  this  movement,  to  be  formed  in  the  same  manner 
as  the  leading  division.  Particular  care  and  precaution  must  be  taken  to  prevent  collision  with 
our  own  troops  in  the  fog.  The  movement  will  not  commence  until  you  receive  orders.  The 
watchword  wUl  be,  '  Scott ! '     Very  respectfully,  your  most  obedient  servant, 

"J.  H.  Taylor,  Chief  of  Staff  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General. 

"  P.  S.  The  major-general  tliinks  that,  as  Howard's  division  led  into  the  town,  it  is  propei 
that  one  of  the  others  take  the  advance." 


SUMNEK'S  "RIGHT  GRAND  DIVISION." 


Ill 


French  was  at  once  directed  to  prepare  his  division  in  three  brigade  lines 
for  the  advance,  and  Hancock  was  to  follow  with  his  division  in  the  same 
order.     The  distance  between  the  brigade  lines  was  to  be  about  200  yards. 

Toward  10  o'clock  the  fog  began  to  lift ;  French  reported  that  he  was  ready, 
I  signaled  to  Sumner,  and  about  11  o'clock  the  movement  was  ordered  to  begin. 
French  threw  out  a  strong  body  of  skirmishers,  and  his  brigades  filed  out  of 
town  as  rapidly  as  possible  by  two  parallel  streets,  the  one  on  the  right,  which 


FKEDERICKSBUKG    FROM    THE    EAST    BANK    OF  THE    KAPPAHANNOCK  —  II. 

was  Hanover  street,  running  into  the  Telegraph  road,  and  both  leading  direct 
to  Marye's  Hill,  the  stronghold  of  the  enemy.  On  the  outskirts  of  the  town  the 
troops  encountered  a  ditch,  or  canal,  so  deep  as  to  be  almost  impassable  except  at 
the  street  bridges,  and,  one  of  the  latter  being  partly  torn  up,  the  troops  had  to 
cross  single  file  on  the  stringers.  Once  across  the  canal,  the  attacking  forces 
deployed  under  the  bank  bordering  the  plain  over  which  they  were  to  charge. 
This  plain  was  obstructed  here  and  there  by  houses  and  fences,  notably  at  a 
fork  of  the  Telegraph  road,  in  the  narrow  angles  of  which  was  a  cluster  of 
houses  and  gardens  ;  and  also  on  the  parallel  road  just  south  of  it,  where  stood 
a  large  square  brick  house.  This  cluster  of  houses  and  the  brick  house  were 
the  rallying-points  for  parts  of  our  disordered  lines  of  attack.  The  fork  in 
the  road  and  the  ])rick  house  were  less  than  150  yards  from  the  stone-wall, 
which  covered  also  as  much  more  of  the  plain  to  the  left  of  the  brick  liouse. 
A  little  in  advance  of  the  brick  house  a  slight  rise  in  the  ground  alforded 
protection  to  men  lying  down,  against  the  musketry  behind  the  stone-wall, 
but  not  agahist  the  converging  fire  of  the  artillery  on  the  heights.  My  head- 
quarters were  in  the  field  on  the  edge  of  the  town,  overlooking  the  plain.^ 

A  few  minutes  after  noon  French's  division  charged  in  the  order  of  Kim- 
ball's, Andrews's,  and  Palmer's  brigades,  a  part  of  Kimball's  men  getting  into 
the  cluster  of  houses  in  the  fork  of  the  road.  Hancock  followed  them  in  th.' 
order  of  Zook's,  Meagher's,  and  Caldwell's  brigades,  the  two  former  getting 


SUMNER'S  "RIGHT  GRAND  Dl VISION ."  113 

nearer  to  the  stone-wall  than  any  who  had  gone  before,  except  a  few  of 
Kimball's  men,  and  nearer  than  any  brigade  which  followed  them. 

Without  a  clear  idea  of  the  state  of  affairs  at  the  front,  since  the  smoke  and 
light  fog  veiled  everything,  I  sent  word  to  French  and  Hancock  to  carry  the 
enemy's  works  by  storm.  Then  I  climbed  the  steeple  of  the  court-house,  and 
from  al)ove  the  haze  and  smoke  got  a  clear  view  of  the  field.  Howard,  who 
was  with  me,  says  I  exclaimed,  "  Oh,  great  God !  see  how  our  men,  our  poor 
fellows,  are  falling ! "  I  remember  that  the  whole  plain  was  covered  with  men, 
prostrate  and  dropping,  the  live  men  running  here  and  there,  and  in  front 
closing  upon  each  other,  and  the  wounded  coming  back.  The  commands 
seemed  to  be  mixed  up.  I  had  never  befoi'e  seen  fighting  like  that,  nothing 
approaching  it  in  terrible  uproar  and  destruction.  There  was  no  cheering  on 
the  part  of  the  men,  but  a  stubborn  determination  to  obey  orders  and  do 
their  duty.  I  don't  think  there  was  much  feeling  of  success.  As  they 
charged  the  artillery  fire  would  break  their  formation  and  they  would  get 
mixed;  then  they  would  close  up,  go  forward,  receive  the  withering  infantry 
fire,  and  those  who  were  able  would  run  to  the  houses  and  fight  as  best  they 
could  ;  and  then  the  next  brigade  coming  up  in  succession  would  do  its  duty 
and  melt  like  snow  coming  down  on  warm  ground. 

I  was  in  the  steeple  hardly  ten  seconds,  for  I  saw  at  a  glance  how  they 
were  being  cut  down,  and  was  convinced  that  we  could  not  be  successful  in 
front,  and  that  our  only  chance  lay  by  the  right.  I  immediately  ordered 
Howard  to  work  in  on  the  right  with  the  brigades  of  Owen  and  Hall,  and 
attack  the  enemy  behind  the  stone-wall  in  flank,  which  was  done.  Before  he 
could  begin  this  movement  both  Hancock  and  French  had  notified  me  that 
they  must  have  support  or  they  would  not  be  responsible  for  the  maintenance 
of  their  position.  Sturgis,  of  Willcox's  corps,  who  had  been  supporting  my 
left,  sent  the  brigades  of  Ferrei-o  and  Nagle  to  the  fruitless  charge. 

About  2  o'clock  General  Hooker,  who  was  in  command  of  the  Center 
Grand  Division  (Stoneman's  and  Butterfield's  corps),  came  upon  the  field. 
At  an  earlier  hour  Whipple's  division  of  Stoneman's  corps  had  crossed  the 
river  and  relieved  Howard  on  the  right,  so  that  the  latter  might  join  in  the 
attack  in  the  center,  and  Grifiiu's  division  of  Butterfield's  corps  liatl  come 
over  to  the  support  of  Sturgis.  Humphreys  and  Sykes,  (^f  the  latter  corps, 
came  to  my  support.     Toward  3  o'clock  I  received  the  following  di8i>atch ; 

"  Headquarters,  Right  Grand  Division,  Army  op  the  Potojiac, Dec.  13th,  1862.— 2: -K)  p.m. 
General  Couch  :  Hooker  has  been  ordered  to  put  in^  verything.  You  must  hold  on  until  he  eoiues 
in.    By  command  of  Brevet  Major-General  Sumner.   W.  (1.  Jones,  Lieut.,  Aide-de-camp,  etc." 

Note  to  illustration.— The  Artillery  Reserve  near  the  center  of  tlie  ridge,  and  consisting  of  27 

posted  on  the  eastern  bank  of  the  river  comprised  guns  ;  the  Left  Division,  vnider  Captain  0.  A.  l>e 

four  coiimiiinds,  as  follows  :  the  Right  Division,  Russy,  numbering  42  guns.     When  the  order  was 

un.lcr  Licutciiant-Coloiicl   William  Hays,  extend-  given  to  fire  upon  the  town,  only  the  guns  of  the 

ing  from  Falmouth  down  to  the  raviue.'about  500  Right  (Y'liter  ami  L«>ft  Tenter  could  bi-  bronglit  to 

yards  below  Falmouth  (see  map,  p.  74),  and  con-  bear  effectually.    Hays's  batteries  delivered  a  few 

sisting  of  40  rifled  guns;  the  Right  Center  Division,  shots.     Tyler's  gims  opened  tire,  doing  but  little 

undor  Colonel  C.  H.  Tom))kins,  consisted  of  MS  execution.  Colonel  Tomiikinsrej^orte.!  that  his  bat- 

gans  ;  the  Left  Center  Division,  under  Colonel  R.  terios  oi)em".l  at  1  L' :  :{0  l\  M.  under  orders  to  burn 

O.  Tyler,  occupying  the  erest  of  the  ri.lgo  from  the  the  town,  and  ceased  tiring  at  2  :  30  p.  M.,  at  which 

middle   bridge   southward  to  the  wooded    ravine  time  several  buildings  were  burning.  — Editors. 


114 


SUMNER'S  "RIGHT  GRAND  DIHS/ON.' 


^-.4 


ih"4 


-w€s.f  ;'•^,■.:  "    ' 


hnr 


CUOSSING    THE    KIVER   IN   PONTOONS    TO 

DISLODGE    THE   CONFEDERATE 

SHAKP-SHOOTEKS. 


-s^-       Hooker  was  the  ranking  general,  and  as  I 

^^^     understood  that  he  was  to  take  command  of  the 

whole  fighting  line,  the  putting  in  of  his  fresh  men 

beside  mine  might  make  a  success.    His  very  coming 

\     was  to  me,  therefore,  like  the  breaking  out  of  the  sun  in  a  storm.   I  rode 

\     back  to  meet  him,  told  him  what   had  been  done,  and  said,  "  I  can't 

carry  that  hill  by  a  front  assault ;  the  only  chance  we  have  is  to  try  to  get 

in  on  the  right."    Hookcu*  replied,  "  I  will  talk  with  Hancock."  He  talked  with 

Hancock,  and  after  a  few  minutes  said,  "Well,  Couch,  things  are  in  such 

a  state  I  must  go  over  and  tell  Burnside  it  is  no  use  trying  to  carry  this  line 

here," — or  words  to  that  effect, —  and  then  he  went  off.     His  going  away 

left  me  again  in  command.     Burnside  was   nearly  two  miles   distant.     It 

was   not  much   after  2  o'clock  when  he  went  away,  and  it  was  about  4 

when  he  returned.    This  was  after  Humphreys  had  made  his  charge  and  the 

figliting  for  the  day  was  substantially  finished.     We  were  holding  our  lines. 

Hooker  left  word  that  Humphreys,  whose  division  was  ready  to  advance, 


SUMNER'S  "RIGHT  GRAND  DinSION."  115 

should  take  his  cue  from  me.  Butterfield  also  gave  Humphreys  orders  to 
that  effect.  After  a  lull  in  the  battle  General  Caldwell,  a  brigade  commander 
under  Hancock,  sent  word  to  the  latter  that  the  enemy  were  retreating 
from  Marye's  house.  It  was  probably  only  a  shifting  of  the  enemy's  troops 
for  the  relief  of  the  front  line.  But,  assuming  that  the  report  was  true, 
I  said,  "  General  Humphreys,  Hancock  reports  the  enemy  is  falling  back ; 
now  is  the  time  for  you  to  go  in ! "  He  was  ready,  and  his  troops  around 
him  were  ready.  The  order  had  evidently  been  expected,  and  after  an 
interval  of  more  than  twenty-five  years  I  well  recollect  the  grim  deter- 
mination which  settled  on  the  face  of  that  gallant  hero  when  he  received 
the  words,  "  Now  is  the  time  for  you  to  go  in  ! "  Spurring  to  his  work  he 
led  his  two  brigades,  who  charged  over  precisely  the  same  ground,  Init 
who  did  not  get  quite  so  near,  to  the  stone-wall  as  some  of  French's  and 
Hancock's  men.| 

The  musketry  fire  was  very  heavy,  and  the  artillery  fire  was  simply  terrible. 
I  sent  word  several  times  to  our  artillery  on  the  right  of  Falmouth  that  they 
were  firing  into  us,  and  were  tearing  our  own  men  to  pieces.  I  thought  they 
had  made  a  mistake  in  the  range.  But  I  learned  later  that  the  fire  came 
from  the  guns  of  the  enemy  on  their  extreme  left. 

Soon  after  4  o'clock,  or  about  sunset,  while  Humphreys  was  at  work,  Getty's 
division  of  Willcox's  corps  was  ordered  to  the  charge  on  our  left  by  the  unfin- 
ished railroad.  I  could  see  them  being  dreadfully  cut  up,  although  they 
had  not  advanced  as  far  as  our  men.  I  determined  to  send  a  battery  upon 
the  plain  to  shell  the  line  that  was  doing  them  so  much  harm ;  so  I  ordered 
an  aide  to  tell  Colonel  Morgan  to  send  a  battery  across  the  canal  and  plant  it 
near  the  brick  house.  Morgan  came  to  me  and  said:  "General,  a  battery 
can't  live  there."     I  replied,  "  Then  it  must  die  there  !  " 

Hazard  took  his  battery  out  in  gallant  style  and  opened  tire  on  the  enemy's 
lines  to  the  left  of  the  Marye  House.  Men  never  fought  more  gallantly,  and  he 
lost  a  great  many  men  and  horses.  When  Hooker  came  he  ordered  Frank's 
])attery  to  join  Hazard.  But  this  last  effort  did  not  last  long.  In  the  midst 
of  it  I  rode  to  the  brick  house,  accompanied  by  Colonel  Francis  A.  Walker, 
Lieutenant  Crushing,  and  my  orderly.  Long.  The  smoke  lay  so  thick  that  we 
could  not  see  the  enemy,  and  I  think  they  could  not  see  us,  but  we  were  aware 

I  Lieutonant-('olonel    Carswell    McClellan,   As-  tUuiiif;  the  war.    His  Thinl  Bii«a«le  rciuaiiioti  iiiaHsed 

sistant  Adjutant-General,  serving  on  General  i^'^>  Kiydericksburg  during  the.  night  of  Deeeiuber  I3th- 
Humphreys's  staff  at  Fredericksburg,  writes  to  tlio 

editors  to  correct   a  statement  nia<le  in  Walker's         Noticing,  also,  the  denials  of  General  Walker  and 

"History  of  the  Second  Army  Corps"  [p.  181],  as  otliers  that  General  Humphreys's  men  approached 

well  as  by  other  writers,  implying  that  the  charge  "nearer  to  tlu>   wall   than  any  other  troops  liad 

of  Humphreys's  division  was  supported  by  Sykes.  reached,"   Colonel   McClellan  cites   the   fact  that 

Colonel  McClellan  says:  General  Humphreys,    who  made    this   statement, 

..„,.,...,,,  ,  .,     r.  I  I  was  an  eve-witiu'ss  of  the  scene  from  his  position 

»yKVH»,  (Uvinum  hail  vol  crossof  t/ie  I{ni>/>nlniiiii(>rh-  .  .'<.,•,...  ,  •,  »i       ,i.   >i..,„.i«i,u 

when  (icn,-ral  IIui>.,.l.rc.v8'H  t1r«t  assault  was  nui.lc.  and  "'  ffoi't  "f  '"«  <l>vision.  while  on  the  other  hand  the 

the  head  of  his  coluiiiu  reached  tlie  bridge  crossing  officers  of  the  burial-parties  sent  out  a  week   later 

the    null-race  on    the  Telegranli   road,  only  after  the  (whose  evidence  has  been  relied  on  to  support  the 

last  charge  made  by  (ieiieral  Ilnmi.l.n-ys  had  been  opi>osite  view)  could  hardiv  have  identifie.l  the  nn-n 
rei)ulw.>d.     (Jeiieral  Mykes's  First  ami  .second  Hrigades         .'  ,.,-  .  i"     i     .   „       ..  >  ...i,.  ..ii  •!.« 

„ncnn,n(    relieved    the    troops    upon    the    advanced  ol   the  d.lTerent   com.nands,  because  nenrl.N  all  tho 

line  on  the  Telegrai>h  road.  aii<l  exp.Mieiu-ed  on."  of  bodies  had  in  the  meantime  been  stripped  of  their 

tUo  most  trying  tours  of  duty  exacted  fnuu  troops  clothing.— Editoks, 


lib 


SUMNER'S  "RIGHT  GRAND   DIVISION." 


HE    KINTH    COUPS    CROSSIN(i    BY   THE    I'ONTOON-BRIDGK    TO  THE    STEAM- 
BOAT   LANDING    AT    THE    LOWEH   END    OF    THE    TOWN. 


of  the  fact  that  some- 
body in  our  front  was 
doing  a  great  dt^al  of 
shooting.  I  found  the 
brick  house  packed  with 
men ;  and  behind  it  the 
dead  and  the  living 
were  as  thick  as  they 
could  be  crowded  to- 
gether. The  dead  were 
rolled  out  for  shelter, 
and  tlie  dead  horses  were  used  for  breastworks.  I  know  I  tried  to  shelter 
myself  behind  the  brick  house,  but  found  I  could  not,  on  account  of  the 
men  already  there.  The  plain  thereabouts  was  dotted  with  our  fallen. 
I  started  to  cross  to  the  fork  of  the  road  where  our  men,  under  Colonel  John 
E.  Brooke,  were  holding  the  cluster  of  houses. 

When  it  became  dark  the  wounded  were  being  lirought  oif  the  plain,  and 
Hooker  was  talking  about  relieving  my  men  in  front  by  putting  in  Sykes's 
division,  and  I  said,  "  No  !  No  men  shall  take  the  place  of  the  Second  Corps 
unless  General  Sumner  gives  the  orders.  It  has  fought  and  gained  that 
gi'ound  and  it  shall  hold  it."  Later  the  order  came  for  Sykes  to  relieve  the 
Second  Corps,  which  was  done  about  11  o'clock. 

That  night  was  bitter  cold  and  a  fearful  one  for  the  front  line  hugging  the 
hollows  in  the  ground,  and  for  the  wounded  who  could  not  be  reached.  It 
was  a  night  of  dreadful  suff(>ring.  Many  died  of  wounds  and  exposure,  and 
as  fast  as  men  died  they  stiffened  in  the  wintry  air,  and  on  the  front  line 
were  rolled  forward  for  protection  to  the  living.  Frozen  men  were  placed  for 
dumb  sentries, 


SUMNER'S  "RIGHT  GRAND  DI VISION : 


117 


My  corps  again  bivouacked  in  the  town,  and  they  were  not  allowed  fires 
lest  they  should  draw  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery. 

At  2  o'clock  in  the  morning  Burnside  came  to  my  headquarters  near  the 
center  of  the  town.  I  was  lying  down  at  the  time.  He  asked  me  to  tell  him 
about  the  battle,  and  we  talked  for  about  an  hour.  I  told  him  everything 
that  had  occurred.  "  And  now,"  I  said,  "  Greneral  Burnside,  you  must  know 
that  everything  that  could  be  done  by  troops  was  done  by  the  Second  Coi^ps." 
He  said,  "  Couch,  I  know  that ;  I  am  perfectly  satisfied  that  you  did  your 
best."  He  gave  no  intimation  of  his  plans  for  the  next  day.  He  was  cheerful 
in  his  tone  and  did  not  seem  greatly  oppressed,  Ijut  it  was  plain  that  he  felt 
he  had  led  us  to  a  great  disaster,  and  one  knowing  him  so  long  and  well  as 
myself  could  see  that  he  :\vished  his  body  was  also  lying  in  front  of  Marye's 
Heights.     I  never  felt  so  badly  for  a  man  in  my  life. 

The  next  day,  Sunday,  the  14th,  our  men  began  digging  trenches  along  the 
edge  of  the  town.  We  were  on  the  alert,  for  there  was  some  fear  of  an 
assault.  Of  course 
there  is  no  need  of 
denying  that  after 
the  battle  the  men 
became  strained. 
The  pressure  of  a 
fight  carries  you 
through,  but  after 
it  is  all  over  and 
you  have  been 
whipped     you    do 

not  feel  very  pugnacious.  The  men,  knowing  that  they  had  been  unsuc- 
cessful, were  in  a  nervous  state,  and  officers  suffered  also  from  the  reaction, 
the  worst  of  it  being  that  the  mass  of  the  army  had  lost  confidence  in  its 
commander. 

About  midday  of  the  14tli  Burnside  called  a  council  of  war,  in  which  it  was 
decided  to  fall  back,  but  to  hold  Fredericksburg.  No  attack  was  made  by 
us  that  day,  though  Burnside  had  said  that  lie  sliould  renew  the  assault  on 
Marye's  Hill,  with  his  old  Ninth  Corps,  and  that  he  would  place  himself  at 
its  head.  General  Getty  of  that  corps,  a  very  gallant  officer,  touched  me  as 
I  passed  him  and  said :  "  I  understand  that  Burnside  has  given  out  that  he 
intends  to  lead  seventeen  regiments  to  the  attack."  He  urged  lue  strongly 
to  dissuade  him  if  possiV)le,  as  it  would  be  a  perfect  slaughter  of  men. 


WAREHOUSE    IN    FREDERICKSBURG    USEH    AS    A    HOSPITAL. 


At  the   council   Hooker 


expresses 


1  himself  as  against  the  movement  ot 


retrtuit,  saying,  "We  nmst  figlit  tliose  people.  We  are  over  there  and  we 
must  fight  them."  But,  as  I  remember,  he  did  not  advocah'  llir  i>lan  of 
holding  Fredericksburg  if  we  were  not  to  renew  the  light.  1  urged  that  the 
army  was  not  in  a  condition,  after  oui-  repulse,  to  renew  tlie  assault,  but  tliat 
we  ought  to  hold  Frcdericksbui-g  at  all  hazards.  I  ha<l  an  argunuMit  with 
(Jeneral  Burnside  upon  that  poijit,  telling  him  that  T  was  willing  to  have  him 
throw  all  the  responsibility  upon  me;  that  if  wc  held  ihf  town  W(>  should 


SUMNER'S  "R;GHT  GRAND  DJKISfON." 


THE   GROUND    BETWEEN    FREDERICKSBURG    AND    MARTE'S    HEIGHTS.     FROM  A  WAR-TIME   PHOTOGRAPH. 

The  portico  of  the  Marye  mansion  is  faintly  marked  senton  the  fourth  day  after  the  battle  with  a  large  detail 

among  the  trees  of  the  hill  in  the  middle-background,  to  bury  the  dead.  In  his  official  report  he  says :  "  Those 

The  road  on  the  right  is  the  end  of  Hanover  street  and  bodies  nearest  the  enemy's  works  were  recognized  as 

the  beginning  of  the  Telegiaph  road,  by  which  most  of  belonging  to  Kimball's  brigade  of  French's  division  and 

the  attacking  troops  crossed  the  canal,  or  ditch,  and,  to  the  diflferent  regiments  of  Hancock's  division."    In 

filing  to  the  left,  formed  line  under  the  low  bank.    In  the  two  days  occupied  by  the  burial  he  says  he  "found 

the  middle-ground,  to  the  left  of  the  road,  is  seen  the  and  buried  913  of  our  soldiers,  and  brought  to  this  side 

square  brick  house  mentioned  by  General  Couch.    Part  of  the  river  the  bodies  of  five  officers,  making  a  total  of 

of  the  troops  crossed  the  canal  by  a  street  on  the  left  918.    Nearly  all  the  dead  were  stripped  entirely  naked 

parallel  with  Hanover  street,  and  a  few  waded.    Most  by  the  enemy."  A  woman  who  lived  in  one  of  the  houses 

of  the   dead   lay  a  short  distance   beyond   the  brick  near  the  stone-wall  has  related  that  "  the  morning  after 

house.  the  battle  the  field  was  blue ;  but  the  morning  after  the 

Colonel  John  R.  Brooke,  of  Hancock's  division,  was  Federals  withdrew  the  field  was  white."— Editors. 

have  a  little  something  to  show  for  the  sacrifice  of  the  day  before ;  that  the 
peophi  would  feel  we  had  not  failed  utterly.  It  was  agreed  that  Fredericks- 
burg should  be  held-.  Then  Burnside  dismissed  us  and  sent  Hooker  and 
myself  to  Fredericksburg  to  arrange  for  the  defense.  We  held  a  council  at 
the  corner  of  Hanover  street. 

It  was  decided  that  Hooker's  troops  should  hold  the  town.  The  question 
was  how  many  men  would  he  leave  for  that  purpose,  opinions  varying  from 
ten  to  eighteen  thousand.  My  limit  was  ten  thousand  men.  General  Tyler 
turned  to  me  and  said:  "Make  it  higher,  General."  We  compromised  on 
twelve  thousand.  We  remained  in  the  town  on  the  15th,  and  that  evening 
my  corps  and  the  Ninth  Corps  recrossed  the  river.  Next  morning  we  found 
that  Fredericksburg  had  been  evacuated.  When  Willcox  and  I  left,  we 
thought,  of  course,  it  would  be  held.  The  talk  was  that  during  the  night 
Hook<;r  prevailed  upon  Burnside  to  evacuate  the  town. 

Our  wing  of  the  army  thought  the  failure  of  the  campaign  was  due  in  part 
to  the  fact  that  we  were  put  in  where  we  ought  not  to  have  been.  We  were 
asked  to  achieve  an  impossibility.  We  had  something  to  do  that  was  not 
possible  for  us  to  do. 

After  the  battle  Burnside  tried  to  regain  the  confidence  of  the  army,  and 
there  is  no  doubt  that  Sumner  did  a  good  deal  to  help  him.  Bm-nside  con- 
ceived the  plan  of  crossing  the  Rappahannock  a  few  miles  above  Fredericks- 
burg, where  the  enemy  were  unprepared  to  receive  us.  The  result  was  the 
"mud  march"  of  January  20th -21st.  It  was  Burnside's  effort  to  redeem 
himself.    To  start  off  in  the  mud  as  we  did  with  the  army  in  its  discouraged 


SUMNER'S  "RIGHT  GRAND  DIVISION." 


119 


state  was  perfect  folly.  There  did  not  seem  to  be  anything  in  the  move  to 
recommend  itself.  If  the  weather  had  happened  to  tnrn  cold,  possibly  he 
might  have  surprised  Lee  and  gotten  across  the  river,  above  Fredericks- 
bui'g,  but  it  was  a  hazardous  move,  with  the  army  out  of  confidence  with 
its  commander  and  the  enemy  elated  with  brilliant  success.  The  general 
demoralization  that  had  come  upon  us  made  two  or  three  months  of  rest  a 
necessity.  ^ 

When  Hooker,  on  January  25tli,  was  placed  in  command  of  the  army,  many 
of  us  were  very  much  surprised ;  I  think  the  superior  officers  did  not  regard 
him  competent  for  the  task.  He  had  fine  qualities  as  an  officer,  but  not  th.e 
weight  of  character  to  take  charge  of  that  army.  Nevertheless,  under  his 
administration  the  army  assumed  wonderful  vigor.  I  have  never  known  men 
to  change  from  a  condition  of  the  lowest  depression  to  that  of  a  healthy  fight- 
ing state  in  so  short  a  time.  President  Lincoln  with  his  wife  came  down  to 
spend  a  few  days  with  General  Hooker,  and  to  see  the  different  officers  and 
talk  with  them.     To  further  that,  General  Hooker  gave  a  tiinner  party  at 


^  In  the  coiu'se  of  a  eorrespondeuee,  relating  to 
tbeir  sevei'al  controversies  with  General  Burnside, 
Franklin  wrote  to  Halleck,  under  date  of  June  1st, 
18G3  :  "I  was  of  your  opinion  with  regard  to  the 
honesty  and  integrity  of  purpose  of  General  Burn- 
side,  until  after  his  relief  from  the  command  of  the 
Array  of  the  Potomac.  I  lost  all  coniidenee  in  his 
ability  at  the  first  Fredericksburg  battle.  There 
was  not  a  man  in  my  command  who  did  not  believe 
that  everything  he  would  undertake  would  fail, 


and  General  Hooker  iufcrmed  me  that  that  was 
the  general  feeling  in  hip  command.  General  Sum- 
ner's feelings  were  noi  so  decided,  but  they  were 
nearly  so.  You  can  imagine  that  the  beds  of  the 
grand  division  oonmanders  were  not  of  roses,  and 
I  came  to  thr  conclusion  that  Burnside  was  fast 
losing  his  nilid.  So  I  looked  upon  the  rain  which 
stopped  iis  second  attempt  to  cross  the  river  [the 
'  mud 'Jiarch ']  as  almost  a  providential  interfer- 
ence in  our  behalf." — Editors. 


STUCiv    IN    Til 


j^UI>  — A   l-I.AMi.     MAKi  II    ACROSS    fOlNTKV.      IKo.M    A    WAUTIMK    SKKTCII, 


SUMNER'S  "RIGHT  GRAND   DIHSION." 


THE    GKAND    KE 


r    lAf.MoiTII     l»tl;lN(j    PRESIDENT 
•KOM    A    WAK-TIME    SKETCH. 


which  all  the  corps  commanders  were  present,  and  also  Mrs.  Lincoln.  Mr. 
Lincoln  would  talk  to  the  officers  ou^  the  subject  that  was  uppermost  in  our 
minds — how  we  were  to  get  the  bettei-of  the  enemy  on  the  opposite  hills. 
Before  he  went  away  he  sent  for  Hooke.^*  and  for  me,  I  being  second  in 
command,  and  almost  his  last  injunction  "vv-as :  "  Grentlemen,  in  your  next 
battle  2^i(t  in  all  your  menP  Yet  that  is  exactly-  what  we  did  not  do  at  Chan- 
cellorsville. 

We  had  a  grand  review  of  the  army  in  honor  of  tlae  President.  The  Second 
Corps  paraded  with  Howard's  Eleventh  Corps,  I  thibk,  for  after  I  had  saluted 
at  the  head  of  my' corps  I  rode  to  the  side  of  the  Presvdent,  who  was  on  horse- 
back, and  while  near  him  Genei-al  Schurz  approached  t\i  the  head  of  his  di- 
vision. I  said:  "Mr.  Lincoln,  that  is  General  Schurz,"  in'onouncing  it  Shios, 
after  the  American  fashion.  Mr.  Lincoln  turned  to  me  aLid  said :  "  Not  SJnos, 
General  Couch,  but  Shoort^y  But  he  did  it  very  pleasanitly,  and  I  was  just 
a  little  surprised  that  our  Western  President  should  hay(\^,  the  advantage  of 
me.  It  was  a  beautiful  day,  and  the  review  was  a  stirrihig  sight.  Mr.  Lin- 
coln, sitting  there  with  his  hat  off,  head  bent,  and  seemingly  meditating,  sud- 
denly turned  to  me  and  said :  "  General  Couch,  what  do;  you  suppose  will 
become  of  all  these  men  when  the  war  is  over?"  And  it  s, truck  me  as  very 
pleasant  that  somebody  had  an  idea  that  the  war  would  soi^netime  end. 


THE    CROSSING    OF   THE    RAPPAHANNOCK    BY  THE    19th    MASSACHUSETTS. 

BY    H.    G.    O.   WEYMOUTH,    CAPTAIN,     19TH    MASSACHUSETTS    REGIMENT. 


ON  the  morning  of  the  1  Ith  of  December,  1862, 
about  two  hours  before  daylight,  the  regi- 
mental coinmandei's  of  Colonel  Norman  J.  Hall's 
Third  Brigade,  of  Howard's  Second  Division,  Sec- 
ond Army  Corps,  were  assembled  at  brigade  head- 
quarters to  receive  preliminary  orders  for  the 
approaching  battle.  Our  brigade  commander  in- 
formed us  that  our  regiment  was  to  be  the  first  to 
cross  the  upper  pontoon-bridge,  which  was  to 
be  laid  by  the  engineer  corps  by  daylight,  and 
that  we  vrere  to  hold  and  occupy  the  right  of  the 
town  until  the  whole  army  should  have  crossed, 
when  the  Right  Grand  Division,  comprising  the 
Second  and  Ninth  (,'orps,  would  charge  the  heights, 
supported  by  artillery  in  front  and  on  the  right 
flank.  On 'our  arrival  at  the  river  at  daylight  wo 
found  but  a  very  small  section  of  the  bridge  laid, 
in  consequence  of  the  commanding  position  which 
the  enemy  hold  on  the  right  bank  of  the  river, 
secreted  as  they  were  behind  fences  made  musket- 
proof  by  piling  cord-wood  and  other  materials 
against  them.  After  a  fruitless  attempt  of  eight 
hours'  duration  to  lay  the  bridge  where  the  enemy 
had  alisoluti'  control  of  the  river  front,  the  idea 
was  abandoned,  and  notice  was  sent  down  to  us  at 
the  river  that  the  enemy  would  be  shelled  from  the 
heights,  with  orders  to  take  to  the  pontoon-boats  and 
cross  and  dislodge  the  enemy  in  order  to  enable  the 
engineer  corps  to  complete  the  bridge.  The  instant 
the  artillery  ceased  firing,  the  7th  Michigan  and 
19th  Massachusetts  took  to  the  boats  and  poled 
across  the  river  under  a  heavy  musketry  fire  from 
the  enemy.  The  7th  Michigan  was  the  first  to  make 
a  landing,  and  marched  up  Farquhar  street  in  a 
direct  line  from  the  bridge.  They  immediately  be- 
came severely  engaged,  and  the  first  two  companies 
of  the  19th  Massachusetts  that  had  crossed  went 


forward  and  joined  them.  A  few  minutes  later  the 
remainder  of  the  19th  crossed,  formed  in  line  on 
the  bank  of  the  river,  left  resting  on  Farquhar 
street,  and  advanced,  deploying  as  skirmishers  in 
order  to  drive  back  the  enemy  from  the  western 
part  of  the  city.  We  were  met  with  such  resist- 
ance by  Barksdale's  brigade,  very  aptly  styled  by 
General  Longstreet  "Confederate  hornets,"  that 
it  was  nearly  dusk  before  we  gained  the  north  side 
of  Caroline  street.  It  was  now  apparent  that  our 
thin  line  could  not  make  any  farther  advance 
against  the  formidable  barricades  the  enemy 
had  erected  on  the  south  side  of  the  street,  con- 
sisting of  barrels  and  boxes,  filled  with  earth  and 
stones,  placed  between  the  houses,  so  as  to  form 
a  continuous  line  of  defense,  and  the  left  of  our 
line  was  forced  to  fall  back  down  Farquhar  street, 
fully  one-half  the  distance  from  Caroline  street. 
On  reporting  our  position  to  a  staff-orticer  our  bri- 
gade commander  ordered  the  L'Otli  Massachusetts 
to  clear  the  streets.  They  marched  up  Farquhar 
street  in  company  or  division  front,  and  on  reach- 
ing Caroline  street  wheeled  to  the  right ;  but  before 
the  full  regiment  had  entered  tlie  street  the  enemy, 
from  their  snug  retreats,  pom-ed  sudi  a  deadly  fire 
on  tliem  as  to  force  them  to  retire  with  great  loss. 
Tliis  action  of  the  20th  enabled  our  left  to  re- 
gain our  position  on  Caroline  street,  wliich  was 
maintained  until  Barksdale  withdrew  his  com- 
mand to  the  heights,  about  an  hour  after  dark. 
At  about  11  o'clock  General  Howard  crossed  over 
to  learn  our  position.  Informing  him  tliat  the 
enemy  had  retired  in  our  front,  I  asked  him  if  we 
should  move  forward.  After  making  some  inquiries 
concerning  our  right,  he  thouglit  notliing  would  be 
gained  by  doing  so.  We  remained  in  this  i)Osition 
until  about  noon  of  the  13th. 


THE  PONTONIERS  AT  FREDERICKSBURG. 


BY    WESLEY    BRAINEllD,    MAJOR    50TH,    AND    COLONEL    15TH,    NEW  YORK 


ENO  INKERS. 


FROM  certain  remarks  made  by  various  writers 
[see  pp.  107  and  120]  on  the  battle  of  Fred- 
ericksburg, it  inight  be  inferred  that  there  was 
some  foundation  for  the  general  impression  that 
had  the  pontoons  arrived  in  time,  the  crossing 
could  have  been  made  before  t)ie  enemy  concen- 
trated, and  the  disastrous  defeat  whicli  followed 
might  thus  have  been  avoided. 

The  fact  is  that  the  engineers  (inth  and  r>0(h 
New  York),  with  two  full  trains  and  material  for 
two  pontoon-bridges,  ciich  420  feet  in  length,  ar- 
rived opposite  Fredericksburg  and  l)ivoua('ked  in 
rear  of  the  Lacy  house  on  the  afternoon  of  Nov(>m- 
ber  27tli,  and  could  have  thrown  two  bri<lges 
across  the  stream  witliout  opposition  that  night 
liad  they  been  allowed  to  do  so.  There  was  no 
force  of  the  enemy  in  tiu>  city,  and  General  Jjong- 
Htrei't,  with  (he  advance  of  (lie  Confederate  arinv. 


had  by  a  forced  raarcli  occupied  a  ^lortion  of  the 
heights  in  rear  of  the  city  on  the  21st. 

I  distinctly  remember  that  (ieneral  Sumner  rode 
up  to  our  position  soon  after  our  arrival  on  the  27tii 
and  asked  Major  Ira  Spauliling,  of  the  r.otli  New 
York,  and  myself  if  we  could  throw  a  bri<lge  across 
the  river  that  night,  to  which  we  rejdied  that  wo 
could  throw  two  bridges  across  in  three  lionrs  if  lie 
would  give  us  the  order  to  do  so.  After  a  little 
hesitation,  he  replied  tliat  he  would  like  to  give  us 
tlie  order,  as  there  was  certaiidy  nothing  to  opjuisc 
its  execution,  but  tJnit  lie  did  tiot  care  to  assume 
the  res]>onsil)iIity,  fearing  that  it  jiiight  contlict 
witli  (Jeiieral  Burns!  le's  plans.  He  also  remarked 
that  he  could  have  forded  the  stream  with  a  part  of 
liis  command  at  Falmouth  several  days  before  had 
lie  been  allowed  to  do  so  ;  he  then  rode  away.  We 
were  ordered  back  into    camp,  and    the  "golden 


122 


IN  FRONT  OF  THE  STONE  WALL  AT  FREDERICKSBURG. 


opportunity  "  passed  — a  blunder  for  which  we  were 
in  no  way  responsible,  but  for  which  we  were  des- 
tined to  suffer. 

We  did  not  receive  the  order  to  leave  Berlin,  six 
miles  below  Harper's  Ferry,  until  late  on  the 
seventh  day  after  it  was  issued. )  We  took  up  two 
bridj,'es,  each  1100  feet  long,  loaded  and  moved 
tlicni  by  canal  and  land  transportation  to  Wash- 
ington, where  we  received  500  unbroken  mules. 
We  then  fitted  up  two  trains,  moved  through  the 
mud  to  Occoquau,  where  we  divided  the  trains,  part 
going  by  water  and  part  by  land  to  Aquia  Creek, 
where  we  again  reloaded  the  entire  equipment, 
and  arrived  at  the  Lacy  house  but  six  days  behind 
Longstreet's  advance,  which  had  made  a  forced 
march  from  the  vicinity  of  Culpeper  to  reach  the 
heights  in  rear  of  Fredericksburg.  These  being  the 
facts,  it  can  hardly  be  said,  with  justice,  that  the 
engineers  were  slow  in  their  movements. 

The  idea  of  crossing  immediately  in  front  of  the 
town  seemed  to  have  passed,  temporarily  at  least, 
from  General  Burnside's  mind,  and  "demonstra- 
tions "  on  an  extensive  scale  were  made  to  the  right 
and  left. 

Twice  I  crossed  the  river  below  the  town  and 

J  The  "  Official  Records"  show  that  this  order,  issued 
by  Captain  J.  C.  Duane,  Chief-Engineer  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Rectortown,  on  the  6th  of  November,  did 


examined  the  country  for  some  distance  inland,  it 
being  rather  difficult  to  find  ground  suitable  for  the 
passage  of  artillery  on  both  sides  of  the  stream  at 
.all  stages  of  the  tide.  The  second  time  I  crossed 
at  "  Skinker's  Neck,"  and  made  a  thorough  exam- 
ination of  the  country  for  several  miles  around, 
pacing  off  the  distances,  and  furnished  General 
Burnside,  in  person,  with  my  sketches.  These  ex- 
peditions were,  of  course,  made  in  the  night. 

"  Skinker's  Neck"  seemed  to  me  to  be  the  proper 
place  for  a  crossing.  At  the  time  of  my  visit  it  was 
not  occupied  by  the  enemy,  except  by  a  cavalry 
patrol,  which  I  easily  avoided. 

Six  or  eight  miles  above,  where  I  made  my  first 
crossing,  it  was  somewhat  difficult  to  make  my 
way  through  the  picket  lines.  General  Burnside 
appeared  to  be  gi-eatly  pleased  and  relieved  when 
I  reported  favorably  on  the  "Skinker's  Neck" 
crossing.  He  gave  me  to  understand  that  we 
should  throw  our  bridges  there,  and  we  made  our 
arrangements  accordingly. 

What  was  my  s^^rprise  when,  a  few  days  after, 
the  orders  came  that  mine  was  to  be  one  of  two 
bridges  that  were  to  be  thrown  across  directly  in 
front  of  the  city,  near  the  Lacy  house. 

not  reach  Major  Spauldiug,  at  Berlin,  until  the  afternoon 
of  November  12th.  General  Halleck's  report  exonerates 
the  engineers  from  all  blame.—  Editors. 


IN    FEONT    OF   THE   STONE  WALL   AT    FREDEEICKSBURG.  3> 

BY    JOHN  W.    AMES,    BREVET    BRIGADIER-GENERAL,    U.    S.    V. 


ON  Saturday,  December  13th,  our  brigade  4-  had 
been  held  in  reserve,  but  late  in  the  day  we 
were  hurried  to  the  battle  only  to  see  a  field  full  of 
flying  men  and  the  sun  low  in  the  west  shining  red 
through  columns  of  smoke, —  six  deserted  field- 
pieces  on  a  slight  rise  of  ground  in  front  of  us, 
and  :i  cliceriiig  column  of  troops  in  regular  march 
disa  PI  leaving  on  our  left.  But  the  day  was  then  over 
and  the  l)attlc  lost,  and  our  line  felt  hardly  bullets 
enough  to  draw  blood  before  darkness  put  an  end 
to  the  uproar  of  all  hostile  sounds,  save  desultory 
shell-firing.  For  an  hour  or  two  afterward  shells 
from  Marye's  Heights  traced  bright  lines  across 
the  black  sky  with  their  burning  fuses.  Then,  by 
command,  we  sank  down  in  our  lines,  to  get  what 
sleep  the  soggy  ground  and  the  danger  might  allow 
us.  Experience  had  taught  us  that  when  the 
silent  line  of  fire  from  the  shells  had  flashed  across 
the  sky  and  disappeared  behind  us  the  scream  and 
explosion  tliat  followed  were  harmless,  but  still  it 
required  some  effort  to  overcome  the  discomfort  of 
the  damp  ground,  and  the  flash  and  report  of  burst- 
ing shells,  ajid  to  di-op  quietly  asleep  at  an  order. 
We  finally  slept,  but  wo  were  roused  before  mid- 
night, and  formed  into  line  with  whispered  com- 
mands, and  then  filed  to  the  right,  and,  reaching  the 

S  Condensed  from  the  "  Overland  Monthly,"  1869,  Vol. 
TIL.  p.  432,  !)>'  pcnniHsion  of  Fisher  Ames.  General 
Ji)hn  W.  Ames.  U.  8.  Surveyor-General  of  California, 
died  iu  Han  Rafael,  iu  that  State,  in  1878. 


highway,  marched  away  from  the  town.  There 
were  many  dead  horses  at  exposed  points  of  our 
turning  and  many  more  dead  men.  Here  stood  a 
low  brick  house,  with  an  open  door  in  its  gable  end, 
from  which  shone  a  light,  and  into  which  we  peered 
when  passing.  Inside  sat  a  woman,  gaunt  and 
hard-featured,  with  crazy  hair  and  a  Meg  Merrilies 
face,  still  sitting  by  a  smoking  candle,  though  it  was 
nearly  two  hours  past  midnight.  But  what  woman 
could  sleep,  though  never  so  masculine  and  tough 
of  fiber,  alone  in  a  house  between  two  hostile 
armies, —  two  corpses  lying  across  her  door-steps, 
and  within,  almost  at  her  feet,  four  more !  So, 
with  wild  eyes  and  face  lighted  by  her  smoky  can- 
dle, she  stared  across  the  dead  barrier  into  the 
darkness  outside  with  the  look  of  one  who  heard 
and  saw  not,  and  to  whom  all  sounds  were  a  terror. 
We  formed  in  two  lines, —  the  right  of  each  rest- 
ing near  and  in  front  of  this  small  brick  house, 
and  the  left  extending  into  the  field  at  right  angles 
with  the  highway.  Here  we  again  bivouacked, 
finding  room  for  our  beds  with  no  little  difficulty, 
because  of  tlie  sliattered  forms  of  those  who  were 
here  taking  their  last  long  sleep.  We  rose  early. 
The  heavy  fog  was  penetrating  and  chilly,  and  the 
damp  turf  was  no  warm  mattress  to  tempt  us  to 

iThe  2d  Brigade  of  regulars  (Sykes's  division.  Fifth 
Army  Corps),  comm.inded  by  Major  George  L.  Andrews, 
17tli  U.  8.  Infantry.  General  Ames  was  then  a  captain 
iu  the  11th  U.  8.  Infantry.— Editohs. 


IN  FRONT  OF  THE  STONE  WALL  AT  FREDERICKSBURG. 


123 


a  morning  nap.  So  we  shook  off  sloth  from  our 
moistened  bodies  willingly,  and  rolling  up  the  gray 
blankets  set  about  breakfast.  The  bivouac  break- 
fast is  a  nearer  approach  to  its  civilized  congener 
than  the  bivouac  bed.  Coffee  can  be  made  hot 
and  good  in  blackened  tins ;  pork  can  be  properly 
frizzled  only  on  a  stick  over  an  open  fire  ;  hard- 
tack is  a  better,  sweeter  morsel  than  the  average 
American  housewife  has  yet  achieved  with  her 
saleratus,  sour-milk,  "empt'ins,"  and  what-not; 
and  a  pipe  !  —  who  can  estimate  what  that  little 
implement  has  done  for  mankind  ?  Certainly  none 
better  than  those  who  have  sought  its  solace  after 
the  bivouac  breakfast  that  succeeds  a  bivouac  bed, 
in  December. 

We  now  began  to  take  note,  through  the  misty 
veil,  of  the  wreck  of  men  and  horses  cumbering  the 
ground  about  us,  and  a  slight  lifting  of  the  gray 
fog  showed  us  the  story  of  yesterday's  repeated 
assaults  and  repeated  failures.  When  our  pipes 
were  exhausted  we  got  up  to  inspect  and  criti- 
cise the  situation.  Just  here  was  the  wreck  of 
a  fence,  which  seemed  to  have  been  the  high- 
tide  mark  of  our  advance-wave  of  battle.  The 
fence  was  a  barrier  which,  slight  as  it  was,  had 
turned  back  the  already  wavering  and  mutilated 
lines  of  assault.  Almost  an  army  lay  about  us  and 
scattered  back  over  the  plain  toward  the  town. 
Not  only  coi-pses,  but  many  of  the  badly  wounded, 
liardly  distinguishable  from  the  dead,  were  here 
too.  To  die,  groveling  on  the  ground  or  fallen 
in  the  mire,  is  dreadful  indeed.  The  pallid  faces, 
and  the  clammy  hands  clenching  their  muskets, 
looked  ghastly  by  the  fog-light.  The  new,  bright, 
blue  overcoats  only  made  the  sight  the  ghastlier. 

About  eighty  yards  in  front  the  plowed  field 
was  bounded  by  a  stone-wall,  and  behind  the  wall 
were  men  in  gray  uniforms  moving  carelessly 
about.  This  picture  is  one  of  my  most  distinct 
memories  of  the  war  —  the  men  in  gray  behind  this 
wall,  talking,  laughing,  cooking,  cleaning  mus- 
kets, clicking  locks, —  there  they  were! — Lee's 
soldiers!  —  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia!  We 
were  so  absurdly  near  this  host  of  yesterday's  vic- 
tors that  we  seemed  wholly  in  their  hands  and  a 
part  of  their  great  mass  ;  cut  off  and  remote  from 
the  Federal  army^  and  almost  within  the  lines  of 
the  enemy  —  prisoners,  of  course.  That  was  the 
immediate  impression,  as  we  stupidly  gazed  in  the 
first  moment  of  the  awkward  discovery. 

But  the  sharp  whistle  of  a  bullet  sounded  in  our 
oars,  and  a  rebel's  face  peered  through  the  puff  of 
smoke,  as  he  removed  the  rifle  from  liis  sliouider; 
Hicn  rapidly  half-a-dozon  more  bullets  whistled 
by  us,  and  the  warning  sent  us  all  to  earth.  The 
order  to  lie  down  is  theoretically  infrequent,  but 
practically  it  is  often  given  in  modern  warfare. 
Napoleon's  maxim  tliat  ''an  army  travels  on  its 
belly"  was  metaphorical,  but  long-range  and  ro- 
p(Miting  rifles  have  gone  far  to  make  it  true  in  a 
literal  sense.  Our  double  linos  of  battle  sought 
the  shelter  of  the  ground  as  soon  as  blood  was 
drawn.     This   had    the   effect   of  hiding  us  from 


the  enemy,  or  partially  so,  for  the  fusillade  slack- 
ened. 

It  was  irksome  to  keep  one  position,  even  at 
full  length,  but  the  watch  over  us  was  very 
vigilant ;  hardly  a  movement  was  made  at  any 
part  of  our  line  that  did  not  draw  fire  from  the 
wall.  Necessity  compelled  us,  however,  to  keep 
up  something  of  a  lookout  upon  the  enemy  at  any 
risk.  A  cautious  inspection  showed  great  care- 
lessness in  their  lines,  the  men  still  strolling  and 
lounging  —  a  group  at  cards,  even,  evidently  ignor- 
ant or  careless  of  our  proximity. 

What  to  do  about  it  was  to  us  a  topic  second 
only  in  interest  to  the  probable  action  of  the 
enemy.  Could  we  long  lie  thus  without  waking 
up  the  big  guns,  whose  black  muzzles  looked  down 
at  us  from  the  hill-tops  on  our  right  ?  And  if  not, 
what  then  ?  From  these  guns  there  would  be  no 
possible  shelter.  Retreat  alone  was  more  danger- 
ous than  to  remain  as  we  were,  or  even  to  advance. 
The  field  behind  us  stretched  away  toward  the 
town,  level  and  exposed  —  the  focus  of  an  arc  of 
battery-crowned  hills,  with  no  inequality  of  ground 
to  protect  us  from  a  convergence  of  fire  that  would 
be  singularly  effective. 

The  situation  had  already  forced  upon  us  a  policy 
of  masterly  inactivity,  which  alone  seemed  to  meet 
our  immediate  difficulties.  So  we  drifted  into  a  com- 
mon understanding  that  no  doubt  an  abler  coun- 
cil of  war  would  have  approved.  Shots  might  rouse 
the  enemy  from  his  carelessness  or  ignorance; 
certainly  a  volley  from  our  line  would  not  go  unan- 
swered, and  the  odds  were  gi-eat.  Let  them  stick 
to  their  cards  and  forget  us  if  they  would !  But 
we  arrived  at  this  policy  only  as  the  least  of 
many  evils. 

The  enemy  riddled  every  moving  thing  in  sight : 
horses  tied  to  the  wheels  of  a  broken  gun-carriage 
behind  us;  pigs  that  incautiously  came  grunting 
fi'om  across  the  road  ;  even  chickens  were  brought 
down  with  an  accuracy  of  aim  that  told  of  a  fatally 
short  range,  and  of  a  better  practice  than  it  would 
have  been  wise  for  our  numbers  to  face.  They 
applauded  their  own  success  with  a  hilarity  we 
could  hardly  share  in,  as  their  chicken-shooting 
was  across  our  backs,  lea\ing  us  no  extra  room  for 
turning.  But  this  was  mere  wantonness  of  slaugh- 
ter, not  indulged  in  when  the  higher  game  in  blue 
uniform  was  in  sight.  The  men  who  ha«l  left  our 
raTiks  for  water,  or  from  any  cause,  before  we  were 
pinned  to  the  earth,  came  back  at  great  peril.  In- 
deed, I  believe  not  one  of  them  reached  our  line 
again  unhurt.  Some  were  killed  outright;  otliers 
were  mortally  wounded,  and  died  within  a  few 
steps  of  us;  and  several  who  tried  to  drag  them- 
selves away  flat  upon  their  faces  were  put  out  of 
their  misery.  This,  too,  sliowed  us  plainly  what 
we  might  expect,  and  fixed  our  Itounds  to  such 
segments  of  the  field  as  were  hidd.-n  from  the 
enemy.  This  was  not  alik<^  throughout  tht>  liiu^. 
At  one  point  the  exposure  was  absolute,  and  still- 
ness as  absolute  was  the  only  safety.  A  slight 
barrier  was  afterward  formed  at  this  point  by  a 


i  The  fore-  lirrc  consistod  of  Rucliannn'H  and  Anrlrews's  bHundort  of  n^tnilurs.  of  Pykew'H  division,  and 
Stockton's  brigade  of  volunteerH,  of  (irinin's  division,  Fiftli  .\rmy  Corps.— Editors. 


124 


IN  FRONT  OF  THE  STONE  WALL  AT  FREDERICKSBURG. 


disposal  of  the  dead  bodies  in  front,  so  that  the 
dead  actually  sheltered  the  living. 

After  two  or  three  hours  of  this  experience  we 
became  somewhat  accustomed  to  the  situation, — 
for  man  becomes  accustomed  to  almost  anything 
that  savors  of  routine,  — and  learned  with  consid- 
erable exactness  the  limit  inside  which  we  might 
move  with  safety,  and  the  limit  also  of  endurable 
constraint.  It  was  somewhat  curious  to  see  how 
strong  the  tobacco  hunger  was  with  many, —  jier- 
haps  with  most.  Men  would  jump  to  their  feet 
and  run  the  length  of  a  regiment  to  borrow  to- 
bacco, and  in  so  doing  run  the  gauntlet  of  a  hun- 
di-ed  shots.  This  was  so  rarely  accomplished  in 
entire  safety  that  it  won  the  applause'  of  our  line 
and  hearty  congratulations  to  any  one  fortunate 
enough  to  save  his  life  and  sweeten  it  with  the 
savory  morsel. 

All  this  would  have  been  ludicrous  but  for  the 
actual  suffering  inflicted  upon  so  many.  Men  were 
mortally  hit,  and  there  was  no  chance  to  bind  up 
their  wounds  ;  they  were  almost  as  far  beyond  our 
help  as  if  they  had  been  miles  away.  A  little  was 
accomplished  for  their  relief  by  passing  canteens 
from  hand  to  hand,  keeping  them  close  to  the 
ground  out  of  sight,  and  some  of  the  wounded 
were  where  a  little  manipulation  could  be  done  in 
safety.  It  was  sad  to  hear  the  cries  fade  away  to 
low  moans,  and  then  to  silence,  without  a  chance 
to  help.  The  laugh  over  a  successful  chase  for 
tobacco  would  die  away  only  to  change  into  a  mur- 
mur of  indignation  at  the  next  cruel  slaughter. 
A  young  officer,  boyish  and  riiddy,  fresh  from  a 
visit  home,  with  brighter  sword  and  shoulder- 
straps  than  most  of  us,  raised  his  head  to  look  at 
the  enemy,  and  a  bullet  at  once  pierced  his  brain. 
Without  a  word  or  groan  his  head  sank  again,  his 
rosy  cheek  grew  livid,  and  his  blood  crimsoned  his 
folded  hands.  Next  a  leg  or  arm  was  shattered 
as  it  became  exposed  in  shifting  from  the  weari- 
someness  of  our  position.  Presently  a  system  of 
reporting  the  casualties  became  established  ;  the 
names  of  the  injured  were  passed  from  mouth  to 

mouth; — "Captain    M ,    17th,    just    killed"; 

"Private ,   Co.  C,   11th ,  knocked  over." 

Those  who  were  fortunate  enough  to  have  paper 
and  pencil,  and  elbow-room  enough  to  get  them 
from  pocket-depths,  kept  a  list  of  the  names  of  the 
killed  and  wounded;  the  occupation  this  gave 
proved  a  blessing,  for  tlie  hours  were  very  long 
and  weary. 

I  suppose  ennni  is  hardly  the  word  where  nerves 
are  on  the  rack,  and  daiigc^r  pinions  one  to  a  single 
spot  of  earth,  yet  something  like  finiin  came  over 
us.  By  chance  I  found  a  fragment  of  newspaper 
which  proved  a  charm  that  for  a  time  banished  the 
irksome  present  with  its  ghastly  field  of  dead  men 
and  its  ceaseless  dangei-.  Through  this  ragged 
patch  of  advertisements  I  sailed  away  from  Fred- 
ericksburg with  the  good  bark  Ncptiote,  which 
had  liad  quick  dispatch  a  moTith  before, — for  the 
paper  was  of  ancient  date, — and  was  well  on  her 
way  to  summer  seas,  when  I  obeyed  the  printed 
injunction  and  api)lied  on  })oard  for  passage.  And 
oh,  pleasant  summer  meadows  of  the  peaceful 
North  !  who  would  have  suspected  you  to  lurk  in 


extracts  of  sarsaparilla  and  ointment  for  eruptive 
skins  ?  But  I  found  you  there,  and  forgot  the  sun- 
shine and  the  chill  earth,  the  grim  war,  the  rifle's 
crack  and  the  bullet's  whistle, — forgot  even  the 
dead  hand  that  had  stretched  itself  toward  me  all 
the  morning  with  its  clutch  of  grass. 

I  was  called  back  to  the  dull  wet  earth  and  the 
crouching  line  at  Fredericksburg  by  a  request  from 
Sergeant  Eead,  who  "  guessed  he  could  hit  that 
cuss  with  a  spy-glass," — pointing,  as  he  spoke, 
to  the  batteries  that  threatened  our  right  flank. 
Then  I  saw  that  there  was  commotion  at  that  part 
of  the  Confederate  works,  and  an  officer  on  the 
parapet,  with  a  glass,  was  taking  note  of  us.  Had 
they  discovered  us  at  last,  after  letting  us  lie  here 
till  high  noon,  and  were  we  now  to  receive  the 
plunging  fire  we  had  looked  for  all  the  morning? 
Desirable  in  itself  as  it  might  be  to  have  "that 
cuss  with  a  spy-glass"  removed,  it  seemed  wiser 
to  repress  Read's  ambition.  The  shooting  of  an 
officer  would  dispel  any  doubts  they  might  have 
of  our  presence,  and  we  needed  the  benefit  of  all 
their  doubts.  Happily,  they  seemed  to  think  us 
not  worth  their  powder  and  iron. 

Were  we  really  destined  to  see  the  friendly 
shades  of  night  come  on  and  bring  us  release  from 
our  imprisonment  ?  For  the  first  time  we  began 
to  feel  it  probable  when  the  groups  left  the  guns 
without  a  shot.  I  grew  easy  enough  in  mind  to 
find  that  sleep  was  possible,  and  I  was  glad  to  wel- 
come it  as  a  surer  refuge  from  the  snrroundings 
than  the  scrap  of  newspaper.  It  was  a  little  dis- 
couraging to  see  a  sleeping  officer  near  me  wakened 
by  a  bullet,  but  as  his  only  misfortune,  besides  a 
disturbed  nap,  seemed  to  be  a  torn  cap  and 
scratched  face,  he  soon  wooed  back  the  startled 
goddess.  I  had  enjoyed  sleep  for  its  quiet  and 
rest,  but  never  before  for  mere  oblivion. 

When  I  returned  to  consciousness  I  found  the 
situation  unchanged,  except  that  the  list  of  casu- 
alties had  been  swelled  by  the  constant  rifle  prac- 
tice, which  was  still  as  pitiless  and  as  continuous 
as  before.  It  was  almost  startling  to  see,  on  look- 
ing at  the  brick  house,  the  MegMerrilies  of  the  night 
before  standing  at  her  threshold.  With  the  same 
lost  look  of  helpless  horror  that  her  face  had  worn 
by  candle-light,  she  gazed  up  and  down  our  pros- 
trate lines,  and  the  disenchantment  of  day  and 
sunshine  failed  to  make  her  situation  seem  in  any 
way  prosaic  and  commonplace.  The  desolate  part 
she  had  to  play  suited  well  her  gaunt  and  witch- 
like features.  Shading  her  eyes  with  her  hand  at 
last,  as  if  to  banish  a  vision  and  call  her  senses 
back  to  earth,  she  searched  our  lines  once  more ; 
then,  with  a  hopeless  shake  of  the  head,  she  moved 
slowly  back  into  the  dismal  little  tomb  she  was 
forced  to  occupy.  In  which  army  was  her  husband 
serving?  Did  she  search  our  lines  and  the  dead 
ranks  for  any  friend  of  hers  ?  Was  maternal  anx- 
iety added  to  the  physical  terrors  of  her  forced 
isolation  ? 

Slowly  the  sun  declined.  He  had  been  our  friend 
all  day,  shining  through  the  December  air  with  an 
autujnn  glow  that  almost  warmed  tlie  chill  earth  ; 
but  at  his  last  half-hour  he  seemed  to  hang  mo- 
tionless in  the  western  sky.  His  going  down  would 


IN  FRONT  OF  THE  STONE  IVALL  AT  FREDERICKSBURG. 


set  us  free  ;  free  from  the  fire  that  was  galling  and 
decimating  us ;  free  from  the  fear  of  guns  on  the 
right,  and  advance  from  the  front;  free  from 
numbness,  and  constraint,  and  irksomeness,  and 
free  from  the  cold,  wet  earth.  Also  it  would  bring 
us  messengers  from  the  town  to  call  us  back  from 
the  exposed  position  and  the  field  of  dead  bodies. 
But  he  lingered  and  stood  upon  the  order  of  his 
going,  until  it  seemed  as  if  a  Joshua  of  the  Confed- 
erates had  caused  him  to  stand  still. 

When  at  last  the  great  disc  stood,  large  and  red, 
upon  the  horizon,  every  face  was  turned  toward  it, 
forgetting  constraint,  thirst,  tobacco,  and  rebel 
fire,  in  the  eagerness  to  see  the  end  of  a  day  that 
had  brought  us  a  new  experience  of  a  soldier's  life, 
and  had  combined  the  dangers  of  a  battle-field  and 
the  discomfort  of  a  winter's  bivouac  with  many 
new  horrors  of  its  own. 

At  last  the  lingering  sun  went  down.  December 
twilights  are  short ;  the  Federal  line  sprang  to  its 
feet  with  almost  a  shout  of  relief.  The  reoel  fire 
grew  brisker  as  they  saw  such  a  swarm  of  blue- 
coats  rising  from  the  ground,  but  it  was  too  late 
to  see  the  fore-sights  on  the  rifles,  and  shots  un- 
aimed  were  not  so  terrible  as  the  hated  ground. 
So  we  contemptuously  emptied  our  rifles  at  them, 
and  before  the  smoke  rolled  away  the  coming  dark- 
ness had  blotted  out  the  wall  and  the  hostile  line. 

With  our  line  rose  also  a  few  men  from  the 
ghastly  pile  of  yesterday's  dead,  who  hobbled  up 
on  muskets  used  as  crutches.  These  poor  fellows 
had  bound  up  their  own  wounds,  and  the  coffee  we 
had  given  them  had  cheered  them  into  life  and  hope. 
Their  cheerfulness  grew  into  hilarity  and  merri- 
ment as  they  found  themselves  clear,  at  last,  from 
the  dead,  and  facing  toward  home,  with  a  hope  not 
by  any  means  so  impossible  of  realization  as  it  had 
seemed  not  long  before.  Poor  fellows!  their  joy 
was  more  touching  than  their  sufferings, — which, 
indeed,  they  seemed  to  have  forgotten. 

In  our  own  brigade  we  found  we  had  lost  nearly 
150,  \  out  of  a  present-for-duty  strength  of  about 
1000  men.  This  would  have  been  a  fair  average 
loss  in  any  ordinary  battle,  but  we  had  suffered  it 
as  we  lay  on  the  ground  inactive,  without  the  ex- 
citement and  dash  of  battle  and  without  the  chance 
to  reply :  a  strain  upon  nerves  and  physical  endur- 
ance which  we  afterward  remembered  as  severer 
than  many  more  fatal  fields.  In  the  midst  of  our 
buzz  of  relief  and  mutual  congi-atulation,  the  ex- 
pected summons  came  for  us  to  fall  back  to  the 
town.  Once  more  w<'  formed  an  upright  line  of 
battle,  then  faced  by  the  rear  rank  and  inarclied 


in  retreat,  with  muffled  canteens  and  many  halts 
and  facings  about  toward  a  possible  pursuit. 
Reaching  a  slight  bank,  we  descended  to  the 
meadow  through  which  the  Fredericksburg  race- 
way was  dug,  and  here  we  changed  to  a  flank 
march  and  filed  into  the  highway.  The  highway 
soon  became  a  street,  and  we  were  once  more  in 
Fredericksburg. 

We  marched  past  the  court-house,  — past 
churches,  schools,  bank-buildings,  private  houses, 
—  all  lighted  for  hospital  purposes,  and  all  in  use, 
though  a  part  of  the  wounded  had  been  transferred 
across  the  river.  Even  the  door-yards  bad  their 
litter-beds,  and  were  well  filled  with  wounded  men, 
and  the  dead  were  laid  in  rows  for  burial.  The 
hospital  lights  and  camp-fires  in  the  streets,  and 
the  smoldering  ruins  of  burned  buildings,  with 
the  mixture  of  the  lawless  rioting  of  the  demor- 
alized stragglers,  and  the  suffering  and  deatli  in 
the  hospitals,  gave  the  sacked  and  gutted  town 
the  look  of  pandemonium. 

In  our  new  freedom  we  wandered  about  for  the 
first  half  of  the  night,  loath  to  lie  on  the  earth 
again  after  om-  day's  experience.  At  last  we 
spread  our  blankets  on  a  sidewalk  and  slept  in 
the  lurid  firelight  with  a  sense  of  safety  not  war- 
ranted by  our  position.  The  next  morning  we 
made  our  toilets  in  wanton  plenty.  Water  from  a 
pump!  and  we  bathed  in  the  falling  splash.  Our 
"contraband"  brought  us  a  box  of  soap  and  an 
uncut,  unhemmed  bolt  of  toweling  from  the  de- 
spised plunder  of  a  store.  The  same  source  gave 
us  a  table-cloth  for  our  breakfast.  This  we  spread 
upon  the  sidewalk  and  furnished  with  variously 
assorted  crockery  from  an  ownerless  pantry.  Cab- 
bage fresh  from  a  kitchen  garden,  with  vinegar 
from  the  deserted  kitchen,  added  a  welcome  and 
unusual  luxury  to  the  meal.  And  at  the  end  we 
rolled  dishes  and  debris  together  into  the  paved 
gutter  by  a  comprehensive  pull  at  the  table-cloth. 
Then  we  smoked  the  emblem  of  peace,  tilted  back 
against  the  buildings  in  borrowed  chairs,  and  were 
very  comfortable  and  happy.  This  was  the  holiday 
of  war, —  vastly  better  than  yesterday!  But  we 
were  hardly  safer  here,  tliough  more  comfortal>le. 
Lee  might  open  bis  guns  at  any  moment.  The 
drum-beat  made  us  tip  down  our  chairs  and  fall 
into  line.  We  had  roll-call  and  something  like  a 
dress  parade  without  music,  then  stacked  arms 
along  the  curb-stono  and  mounted  sentinels  over 
them.  A  bright,  beautifid  day  and  tlie  freedom 
of  an  uninhabited  and  plundered  city  were  be- 
fore us. 


\Tlic'M)lli(i;il  Kec()ra8"(Vol.  .XXL,  Tt.  I.,  p.  liiCi 
total.  HO.- 


:ivc  \\u-  lo, 
Kdmous. 


IN  \i.  kilUil,  114  wounded,  14  missing  ; 


WHY  BURNSIDE   DID   NOT   EENEW  THE  ATTACK  AT  FREDEEICKSBURG. 

BY  KUSH    C.    HAWKINS,    BREVET  BRIGADIER-GENERAL,    U.   S.  V. 


ny-rovEMBER  2 2d,  1862,  the  whole  Union  army 
iN  had  reached  Falmouth,  opposite  Fredericks- 
burg, and  General  Lee,  who  had  proved  upon  more 
than  one  oecasiou  his  watchfulness  and  enterprise, 
took  means  to  insure  the  arrival,  about  the  same 
time,  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  on  the 
heights  in  the  immediate  rear  of  Fredericksburg. 

Without  the  slightest  delay  the  enemy's  line  of 
defense  was  marked  out,  nor  did  their  labors  cease 
until  their  defensive  lines  were  made  formidable 
and  complete  by  the  mounting  of  a  large  number 
of  guns.  In  the  meantime  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
had  di'awn  its  abundant  supply  of  daily  rations,  sub- 
jected itself  to  some  drilling  and  several  reviews, 
while  its  commander  had  been  carrying  on  an  ani- 
mated correspondence  with  the  powers  at  Wash- 
ington, chiefly  in  relation  to  pontoons  which  had 
been  promised  but  had  failed  to  reach  Falmouth 
until  long  after  the  arrival  of  both  armies  at  the 
points  they  then  occupied.  [See  p.  121.]  Some 
time  during  the  first  week  in  December  the  much- 
looked-for  pontoou  train  appeared,  and  then  came 
the  oft-repeated  camp  rumor  of  a  "movement  over 
the  river,"  which  in  a  few  days  assumed  a  more 
definite  form,  the  actual  plan  of  attack  becoming 
the  topic  of  many  a  camp-fire.  It  was  freely  stated 
that  the  whole  army  was  to  cross  the  river  about 
such  a  time,  and  that  the  chief  attack  was  to  be 
made  by  General  Sumner's  Right  Grand  Division 
upon  the  enemy's  center  immediately  back  of  Fred- 
ericksbui'g,  where  the  hills  were  steepest  and  the 
fortifications  strongest. 

There  were  a  few  ofiieers  in  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  who  had  watched  the  gradual  growth 
of  the  enemy's  lines,  and  knew  something  of  the 
natural  formations  in  that  direction,— a  suc- 
cession of  steep  hills  which,  in  themselves,  were 
almost  as  potent  for  defensive  purposes  as  the 
average  artificial  fortifications.  I,  for  one,  had 
been  over  that  groimd  several  times  the  August 
before  while  engaged  in  ascertaining  the  best 
line  for  a  grand  guard  for  the  protection  of  the 
roads  leading  from  the  back  country  into  Fred- 
ericksburg. The  three  or  four  officers  who  were 
possessed  of  this  knowledge  expressed  themselves 
very  strongly  in  opposition  to  the  plan  of  attack 
as  foreshadowed  by  the  gossips  of  the  camp,  and 
the  news  of  these  adverse  ()])iiiions  having  come  to 
General  Buriiside,  lie  sent  acireularto  Tlie  general 
officers  of  the  Right  (iraii<l  Division  and  colonels 
commanding  brigades  to  meet  him  at  the  Phillips 
house  on  the  evening  of  December  9th.  At  the 
time  iii>i)<)inted  the  large  room  of  that  mansion  was 
fiUeil  with  general  officers,  with  here  and  there  a 
colonel  and  a  few  grand  division  stafl'-officers.  Gen- 
eral Burnside  made  a  speech  in  which  he  partly 
disclosed  and  explained  his  plan  for  the  coming 
battle.  If  was  received  without  any  ]>articular  crit- 
icism or  <M,tniiieiit,  but  ({eiieral  French,  who  was 
very  enthusiast  i<-,  said  th<'  battle  would  be  won  in 
forty-eight  liours,  and  called  for  three  cheers  for 
the  commander,  which  were  given. 

The  meeting  ended.  Colonel  J.  H.  Taylor,  assist- 


ant adjutant-general  of  the  Right  Grand  Division, 
and  myself  were  standing  together  in  the  hall  of  the 
house,  when  General  Burnside  came  along  and  said 
to  me,  "What  do  you  think  of  it?"  I  answered, 
"K  you  make  the  attack  as  contemplated  it  will 
be  the  greatest  slaughter  of  the  war ;  there  isn't 
infantry  enough  in  our  whole  army  to  carry  those 
heights  if  they  are  well  defended."  He  then 
turned  to  Colonel  Taylor  and  said,  "Colonel, 
what  do  you  say  about  it  f  "  The  response  came 
quickly  and  was  sufficiently  definite,  "I  quite 
agree  with  Colonel  Hawkins.  The  carrying  out  of 
your  plan  will  be  murder,  not  warfare."  The  com- 
manding general  was  very  much  surprised  and 
irritated  at  these  answers,  and  made  a  remark 
about  my  readiness  to  throw  cold  water  upon  his 
"  plans  " ;  he  repeated  the  assertion  of  French  about 
victory  within  forty-eight  hours,  and  passed  on. 

The  meeting  dispersed,  the  officers  who  had 
composed  it  going  to  their  respective  commands 
and  giving  their  final  orders  for  the  movement  of 
the  following  day.  Besides  attending  to  the  de- 
tails of  moving  my  command  on  the  morrow,  I 
f oimd  time  to  write  three  letters  —  one  to  my 
mother,  another  to  my  wife,  and  a  third  to  Charles 
P.  Kirkland,  of  the  city  of  New  York.  In  each  of 
these  defeat  was  distinctly  and  without  qualifica- 
tion predicted.  The  fii'st  letter  in  the  order  men- 
tioned has  been  preserved,  and  from  it  the  follow- 
ing quotations  are  given : 

"  Camp,  near  Falmouth,  Va.,  December  10th,  1862. 

"  Dear  Mother  — .  .  .  .  To-monow,  if  our  present 
plans  are  carried  out,  the  great  battle  of  the  war  will 
commence.  ...  I  have  little  hoiie  of  the  plans  succeed- 
ing. I  do  not  think  them  good,— there  will  he  a  great 
loss  of  life  and  nothing  accomplished.  I  am  sure  we  are 
to  fight  against  all  chances  of  success.  There  is  a  rumor 
and  a  hope  that  Banks  may  have  landed  on  the  James 
River ;  If  so,  a  large  part  of  the  enemy's  force  will  lie  di- 
verted from  this  point,  hut  if  they  have  a  force  au.v- 
where  near  our  own  in  munber  we  are  pretty  certain  to 
get  whipped." 

The  letter  to  Judge  Kirkland  was  much  stronger 
and  more  explicit,  and  evoked  an  answer  from 
which  one  paragraph  is  quoted  : 

"  New  York,  December  18th,  1862. 

"  How  wonderfully  prophetic  is  your  letter,  written  on 
the  lOth  of  December.  It  foretells  exactly  the  awful 
disaster  and  reverse  that  our  cause  has  met  with.  How 
is  it  iiossihie,  if  you  tlnis  knew  all  this,  tliat  those  liiir- 
imj  control  were'  iuiiorant  of  it  J  Tliis  wliole  transaction 
sfcins  iiowahnost  incrcdilde.    To  think  of  the  tliousaiids 


of  splendid,  brave,  i>atriotic  fellows  ab.solut.'ly  butch- 
ered without  the  least  bcnelicial  result  :  on  the  contrary, 
with  a  result  disgraceful  and  disheartening  to  us,  but  I 
fervently  trust  a  result  from  which  we  can  recover."' 

This  matter  of  the  letters  is  here  referred  to, 
not  in  a  spirit  of  pride,  but  simply  to  show  a  want 
of  knowledge,  judgment,  and  foresight  on  the 
part  of  those  high  in  command. 

We  now  pass  over  the  bombardment  of  Decem- 
ber 11th,  the  many  disastrous  attempts  to  lay  the 
pontoons  in  front  of  Fredericksburg,  and  come  to  3 
o'clock  of  that  day,  when  volunteers  were  called  for 
to  cross  the  river  in  open  boats  for  the  purpose  of 


JVHY  BURNSIDE  DID  NOT  RENEIV  THE  ATTACK. 


127 


dislodging  the  enemy  from  the  opposite  bank.   For 
this  service  the  7th  Michigan,  19th  and  20th  Mas- 
|i  sachusetts  of  General  Howard's  division,  and  the 

I  89th  New  York  of  my  brigade  answered  the  call. 

'  The  first  three  regiments  crossed  under  fire  where 

the  first  bridge  was  afterward  laid,  and  the  fourth 
under  sharper  fire  where  the  second  was  completed. 
By  9  o'clock  that  night  the  division  of  General 
Howard  and  my  brigade  had  obtained  possession 
of  the  town,  the  former  taking  the  right  of  the  line 
and  the  latter  the  left.  The  whole  of  the  12th  of 
December  into  the  night  was  occupied  in  cross- 
ing the  army,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  1 3th  the 
battle  began  and  continued  at  intervals  until  dark- 
ness set  in.  During  a  considerable  portion  of  that 
day,  while  the  attacks  upon  the  enemy's  center, 
known  as  "  Marye's  Heights,"  were  being  made, 
General  George  W.  Getty,  my  division  commander, 
and  myself  were  on  the  roof  of  the  Slaughterhouse, 
a  high  residence  at  the  lower  end  of  the  city, 
named  after  its  owner.  From  this  prominent  posi- 
tion our  repeated  repulses  and  the  terrible  de- 
struction of  the  Union  troops  had  been  witnessed. 
At  about  half-past  3  o'clock  the  order  came  for 
General  Getty's  Third  Division  of  the  Ninth  Corps 
to  make  an  attack  upon  that  part  of  the  enemy's 
line  to  the  left  of  where  the  principal  attacks  had 
been  made.  The  order  was  obeyed,  but  not  until 
I  had  tried  to  induce  General  Getty  to  protest 
against  its  obedience  and  the  further  useless  waste 
of  life.  The  attack  of  our  division  closed  a  battle 
which  was  one  of  the  most  disastrous  defeats  to  the 
Union  forces  during  the  war.  The  sadness  which 
prevailed  throughout  the  whole  army  on  that 
night  can  neither  be  described  nor  imagined.  The 
surgeons  were  the  happiest  of  all,  for  they  were  so 
busy  that  they  had  no  time  to  think  of  our  terrible 
defeat. 

About  9  o'clock  that  evening  I  found  myself  near 
a  building  situated  upon  the  main  street  of  the 
town,  where  several  of  the  generals  of  the  Right 
Grand  Division  had  assembled  for  the  purpose  of 
discussing  the  attack  to  be  made  the  next  morn- 
ing. Wlien  I  entered  the  room  these  oflicers  were 
looking  at  a  map  upon  a  table,  showing  the  posi- 
tion of  the  enemy.  There  were  present  Generals 
Willcox,  Humphreys,  Getty,  Butterfield,  Meade, 
and  three  or  four  others.  They  were  seriously 
discussing  the  proposed  renewal  of  the  attack  the 
next  day  as  though  it  had  been  decided  upon.  I 
listened  until  I  was  thoroughly  irritated  because 
of  the  ignorance  displayed  in  regard  to  our  sit- 
uation, and  then  uttered  a  solemn,  earnest,  and 
emphatic  protest  against  even  the  consideration  of 
another  attack.  With  a  pencil  I  made  a  i-ougli 
drawing  of  the  first  line  then  occupied  by  tlie  en- 
emy, and  also  showed  a  second  position  a  little 
to  the  rear,  to  whicli  they  could  fall  back  and 
make  a  strong  stand  in  the  event  of  their  being 
driven  out  of  their  first  line.  It  did  not  take  long 
to  convince  these  officers  that  a  second  attack 
would  probably  end  more  disastrously  than  the 
first,  aTul  they  united  in  a  request  that  I  should 
go  at  once  to  try  to  persuade  Burnside  that  the 
attack  ought  not  to  be  renewed. 


It  was  a  cheerless  ride  in  the  wet  and  cold,  and 
through  the  deep  mud  of  an  army-traveled  road 
that  dark  night,  for  I  was  already  weary  from 
much  care,  watching,  and  loss  of  sleep,  and  besides 
I  was  fully  aware  of  the  unpleasant  fact  that  an 
officer  of  very  inferior  rank  was  bent  upon  an 
ungrateful  errand  to  a  general  commanding  one  of 
the  largest  armies  of  modern  times.  But  a  solemn 
sense  of  duty,  and  a  humane  desire  to  save  further 
useless  slaughter,  convinced  me  that  any  sacrifice 
of  self  ought  to  be  made  in  tlie  interest  of  the 
men  who  were  fighting  oui-  battles. 

I  arrived  at  the  Phillips  house  about  1 1  o'clock 
to  learn  that  I  had  probably  passed  General  Burn- 
side  on  the  road,  who  had  gone  to  perfect  the  de- 
tails for  a  second  attack.  Those  present  at  the 
Phillips  house  were  Generals  Sumner,  Hooker, 
Franklin,  Hardie,  and  Colonel  Taylor.  I  made  a 
brief  statement  and  explanation  of  the  object  of 
my  mission,  which  deeply  interested  all  present. 
They  united  in  a  desire  that  I  should  wait  until 
the  arrival  of  General  Burnside,  which  occurred 
about  1  o'clock.  As  he  came  through  the  door  he 
said :  "  Well,  it's  all  arranged ;  we  attack  at  early 
dawn,  the  Ninth  Corps  in  the  center,  which  I  shall 
lead  in  person";  and  then  seeing  me  he  said: 
"  Hawkins,  your  brigade  shall  lead  with  the  9th 
New  York  on  the  right  of  the  line,  and  we'U  make 
up  for  the  bad  work  of  to-day." 

When  he  had  ceased  there  was  perfect  silence, 
and  he  was  evidently  astonished  that  no  one  ap- 
proved. With  hesitation  and  gi-eat  delicacy  Gen- 
eral Sumner  then  stated  the  object  of  my  visit, 
and  suggested  that  General  Burnside  should  ex- 
amine the  rough  di-awing  then  upon  the  table, 
and  listen  to  some  reasons  why  the  attack  con- 
templated ought  not  to  be  made.  After  I  had 
explained  the  enemy's  positions,  called  attention 
to  several  pertinent  circumstances,  and  made 
something  of  an  argument.  General  Burnside  asked 
General  Sumner  what  he  thought,  and  he  replied 
that  the  troops  had  undergone  such  gi-eat  fatigue 
and  privation,  and  met  with  such  a  disaster,  that  it 
would  not  be  prudent  to  make  another  attack  so 
soon.  General  Hooker,  who  was  lying  full  length 
upon  a  bed  in  one  corner  of  the  room,  upon  being 
appealed  to  by  General  Burnside,  sat  up  and  said 
in  the  most  frank  and  decided  manner  that  the 
attack  ought  not  to  be  renewed  that  morning. 
Then  a  general  consultation  took  place,  in  which 
all  who  were  i)resent  joined,  the  result  of  which  was 
a  verbal  order,  transmitted  through  nu\  counter- 
manding the  arrangements  for  a  second  attack. 

Of  those  present  at  the  first  interview,  on  the 
Fredericksburg  side,  Generals  Getty,  Willcox,  But- 
terfield, and  probably  several  others  whom  I  do 
not  now  remember,  are  living.  The  only  survivors 
of  the  Pliillips  house  interview  are  General  Frank- 
lin and  myself.  In  one  of  his  letters  to  me,  dated 
Hartford,  Conn.,  December  17th,  ISCcJ,  he  .says: 

"...  I  distinctly  ncoUo.l  your  talk  to  Hnniwidc. 
to  whii'li  you  n-fiT,  and  had  lu-  ben  ho  talked  fo  bcf.irc 
lio  crossed  the  rivir,  many  lives  would  have  been  saved, 
as  well  as  iiineh  ereilit  to  himself  and  reputation  to  tho 
Ballaiit  Army  of  the  Potoniae." 


'^^Ty/^^ 


CHARGING    ACROSS    THE     RAILROAD. 


FRANKLIN'S    "LEFT    GRAND    DIVISION, 


BY    WILLIAM    PARRAR    SMITH,    BREVET    MAJOR-GENERAL,   U.  S.  A. 


WHEN  General  Burnside  assumed  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  on  the  9tli  of  November,  1862,  he  gave  up  the  immense 
strategic  advantage  which  McClellan  had  gained,  and  led  the  army  to  Fal- 
mouth on  the  Eappahannock  Eiver,  opposite  the  city  of  Fredericksburg.  A 
few  days  after  his  arrival  on  the  Rappahannock  he  called  a  council  of  war. 
It  was  a  conference  rather  than  a  council,  for  he  stated  that  he  called  the 
generals  together  to  make  known  something  of  his  plans,  and  not  to  put  any 
question  l)efore  them  for  decision.  The  grand  division  commanders,  Sumner, 
Franklin,  and  Hooker,  were  present,  and  also,  I  think,  the  corps  commanders. 
I  was  present  as  commander  of  the  Sixth  Army  Corps.  The  entire  army  was 
massed  within  a  few  miles  of  Falmouth,  and  the  first  object  was  to  cross  the 
river  in  our  front,  and  gain  a  fair  field  for  a  battle.  From  the  same  ground 
Hooker  afterward  marched  north-west,  and  by  a  series  of  fine  movements 
placed  himself  in  a  position  to  offer  battle  at  Chancellorsville  on  at  least 
ecjual  terms.  The  outcome  of  Hooker's  campaign  belied  its  beginning,  but  it 
led  to  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  which  more  than  compensated  in  results  for 
the  previous  failui'e.  J 

General  Burnside  opened  the  conference  by  stating  that  within  a  few  days 
he  proposed  to  cross  the  river  to  offer  battle  to  General  Lee,  and  that  after 
a  close  study  of  the  reports  of  his  engineers  he  had  chosen  Skinker's  Neck  as 

^  When  General  Burnside  determined  to  occupy 
Fredericksburg  it  was  not  held  hy  a  large  force  of 
the  enemy.  A  body  of  cavalry,  sent  from  Warren- 
ton,  could  have  seized  the  place  without  serious 
opposition,  and  could  have  held  it  until  the  advance 
of  the  infantry  came  up.  In  the  preliminary  discus- 
sion of  the  move  from  Warreuton  to  Fredericks- 


burg, the  notion  that  a  serious  battle  was  necessary 
to  enable  the  army  to  get  into  Fredericksburg  was 
not  entertained  by  any  one.  Sumner,  who  had  the 
advance,  reported  that  when  he  arrived  at  Fal- 
mouth he  could  even  then  have  occupied  Freder- 
icksburg without  opposition,  had  his  orders  justified 
liim  in  crossing  the  river.— W.  B.  Franklin. 


FRANKLIN'S  "LEFT  GRAND    DIl^ISION.' 


129 


the  point  of  crossing.  Skinker's  Neck  is  a  shoe-shaped  bend  in  the  Rappa- 
hannock River,  about  twelve  miles  below  Fredericksburg.  It  offered  all 
the  necessary  military  features  for  forcing  a  crossing,  but,  like  Butler's 
famous  "  bottle  "  at  Bermuda  Hundred,  also  presented  great  facilities  for  pre- 
venting the  egress  of  an  army  which  had  effected  an  entrance  on  its  penin- 
sula. After  developing  to  a  limited  extent  his  plans,  the  general  said  that 
any  one  present  was  at  liberty  to  express  his  views  on  the  subject.  General 
Sumner,  if  I  recollect  aright,  remarked  only  that  he  would  do  his  utmost  to 
carry  out  the  plans  of  the  commanding  general.  General  Franklin  said  that 
we  could  doubtless  effect  a  crossing  at  the  designated  place ;  he  assumed  that 
the  movements,  after  crossing,  had  been  carefully  studied,  and  he  stood  ready 
to  execute  any  orders  he  might  receive.  General  Hooker  then  said,  in  suh- 
stance,  that  it  was  j^reposterous  to  talk  about  our  crossing  the  river  in  the 
face  of  Lee's  army;  that  he  would  like  to  be  in  command  of  fifty  thousand 
men  on  the  other  side  of  the  river,  and  have  an  enemy  make  the  attemx)t.  I 
then  stated  that  I  would  guarantee  the  crossing  of  the  river  if  my  command 
had  the  advance.  General  Bui*nside  closed  the  conference  by  stating  that 
his  mind  was  made  up ;  that  we  must  prepare  our  commands  for  the  work 
before  them ;  and  that  w^e  should  receive  the  proper  orders  in  due  time. 

Three  or  four  days  after  that  I  was  at  Burnside's  headquarters,  and  he 
invited  me  to  take  a  ride  with  him.     Riding  along  on  the  hills  near  the  river, 


?^«>=^-  ■' 


THE    rONTOON-BKIDGKS    AT    FHANKI.INS    TROSSI 

The  hills  oociipied  by  Stonewall  JacUson's  « 


1  R<1M    A    WVIt-TIMi;    nUlTOC.KAl'U. 

land  aiv  sctn  in  lln-  tllHtnni'c. 


130 


FRANKLIN'S  "LEFT  GRAND   DIl^ISfON.' 


ii;r.!)    AS  si;i;\  i-i.-om    iiaiiii.tdn's   cijossim;  ~  ii;i:i>i:i!I(  ivsr.i 

IN    THE    DISTANCE.      FliUM    A    SKETCH    MADE    IN    1884. 


he  pointed  out  some  fine  positions  for  artillery,  and  said :  "  My  reserve  artil- 
lery has  as  yet  had  no  chance  to  show  its  value,  and  I  am  going  to  make  the 
crossing  here  and  below,  under  cover  of  the  guns  of  the  reserve  artillery." 

To  this  I  replied,  "  You  can  cross  here  without  great  difficulty,  for  this 
bank  dominates  the  other,  but  when  your  army  is  across  your  troubles  will 
begin,"  calling  his  attention  at  the  same  time  to  the  range  of  hiUs  on  the 
other  side,  a  mile  or  more  l)ack  from  the  river. 

"  Oh ! "  said  Burnside,  "  I  know  where  Lee's  forces  are,  and  I  expect  to 
surprise  him.  I  expect  to  cross  and  occupy  the  hills  before  Lee  can  bring 
anything  serious  to  meet  me." 

I  then  said,  "  If  you  are  sure  of  that,  there  is  no  more  to  be  said  on  the 
subject." 

On  parting  Gleneral  Burnside  said,  "  I  wish  you  to  say  nothing  to  any  one 
about  my  change  of  plan.     I  will  make  it  known  at  the  proper  time." 

Though  General  Franklin  and  myself  were  on  the  most  intimate  terms,  and 
occupied  the  same  tent,  I  gave  him  no  hint  of  the  change.  Two  or  three 
days  before  the  movement  G-eneral  Franklin  was  notified  of  the  point  selected 
for  his  crossing,  and  I  then  told  him  the  story  of  the  change  of  plan. 

He  merely  said,  "  Your  command  is  the  strongest,  and  you  must  take  the 
advance." 


FRANKLIN'S  "LEFT  GRAND  DIVISION."  131 

As  I  remember,  it  was  on  the  afternoon  of  the  10th  of  December  that 
General  Franklin  received  an  order  to  have  the  head  of  his  command  at  a 
designated  jjoint  on  the  river,  about  one  and  a  half  miles  below  Fredericks- 
burg, and  since  known  as  Franklin's  Crossing,  at  daylight  on  the  morning  of 
the  nth,  where  he  would  at  once  begin  crossing  by  Ijridges  which  would  be 
found  ready. 

On  the  morning  of  the  11th  of  December,  at  5  o'clock,  the  First  Corps, 
under  Major-Greneral  John  F.  Reynolds,  marched  to  take  position  at  the 
bridges,  and  cover  the  crossing  of  the  Sixth  Corps  over  the  Rappahannock. 
A  brigade  of  the  corps  had  mov^ed  at  2  o'clock  a.  m.,  to  protect  the  engineer 
troops  while  throwing  the  bridges,  which  were  expected  to  be  finished  by  day- 
light. The  work  was  for  a  while  suspended  on  account  of  the  fire  of  sliarp- 
shooters,  covered  by  some  fishing-huts  and  a  thicket  on  the  opposite  shore. 
Two  batteries  placed  on  the  bank  opened  with  canister  and  shell,  and  caused 
the  enemy  to  disappear,  and  work  was  resumed.  When  the  head  of  the 
Sixth  Corps  reached  the  bank  at  7:30  A.  m.,  only  three  or  four  pontoons  of 
each  bridge  had  been  placed  in  position,  and  the  bridges  were  not  comiJeted 
till  about  1  p.  M.  It  was  not  until  about  4  p.  m.  that  I  received  orders  to  begin 
the  crossing. 

General  Devens's  brigade  held  the  post  of  honor  and  began  the  movement, 
using  both  bridges.  One  of  the  commanders  of  the  leading  regiments,  more 
patriotic  than  wise,  had  placed  his  band  at  the  head  of  the  column,  and 
it  was  ordered  to  begin  playing  as  it  reached  the  bridge.  This  threw  the 
men  on  the  bridges  into  "step,"  and  for  some  minutes  it  looked  as  though 
both  bridges  must  go  down.  Fortunately,  through  the  reckless  riding  of  a 
"Wild  Irishman"  on  the  staff,  an  order  reached  tlie  colonel,  and  the  nmsic 
was  stopi^ed  before  any  harm  was  done. 

The  troops  Were  rapidly  thrown  across,  when  an  order  came  to  recross  all 
but  one  brigade.  This  was  done  and  General  Devens's  brigade  was  left  to 
keep  the  bridge-head.  The  cause  of  this  was  that  the  upper  bridges  opposite 
the  town,  intended  for  the  use  of  the  right  wing,  had  not  yet  l)een  finished. 
Sharp-shooters  in  the  ])rick  houses  near  the  river  had  interfered  with  the 
work,  and  the  heavy  guns  of  the  reserve  artillerj^  could  not  make  the  same 
impression  on  masonry  walls  that  our  field-batteries  had  produced  on  thicket 
and  hut.  Some  volunteers  finally  crossed  the  river  to  Fredericksburg  in 
boats  and  cleared  the  other  bank,  and  the  bridge  was  rapidly  laid. 

Of  (iourse  all  chance  of  effecting  a  surprise  was  now  over,  and  if  W(^  per- 
sisted in  crossing  we  must  figlit  for  the  hills  soutli  of  the  river.  There  was, 
however,  a  very  fine  opportunity  for  turning  what  had  l»een  done  into  a 
feint,  and  crossing  the  main  army  elsewhere.     But  this  was  not  done,  and 

early  on  the  morning  of  the  TJth  the  Sixth  Corps  recommen 1  the  ]>assago 

of  the  river,  marched  to  the  front  about  a  mile,  and  formed  line  of  battle. 
Its  right  was  thrown  across  Deep  Run,  which,  between  the  Sixth  Corps  and 
the  river,  was  an  impassal)l(^  stream,  se})a rating  us,  until  bridged,  from  the 
right  wing  of  the  army.  In  the  right  front  was  an  open  field,  traversed  by 
Deep  Run  from  left  to  right,  bounded  by  the   Iiills  and   naiTowing  as  it 


;^2 


FRANKLIN'S  "LEFT  GRAND  DIVISION." 


FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH  TAKEN  ABOUT 


^xrT^^^^^y^^ujjtluA^ 


approached  a  gorge  a  mile  or  more  away.  In  front  of  the  left  and  right  at  a 
distance  of  perhaps  half  a  mile  was  the  ridge  of  hills  occupied  by  the  enemy. 

The  First  Corps,  imder  Major-General  John  F.  Reynolds,  followed  the 
Sixth,  and,  forming  on  its  left,  curved  back  across  the  Richmond  road  and 
rested  its  left  on  the  Rapi)aliannock  River.  In  its  right  front  was  the  range  of 
hills  at  a  short  distance,  which  broke  away,  leaving  an  open  space  on  the 
left  between  it  and  the  river.  Here  were  two  corps  with  an  impassable  stream 
on  their  right,  a  formidable  range  of  hills  occupied  by  the  enemy  covering 
almost  their  entire  front,  and  at  their  back  a  river  with  two  frail  bridges  con- 
necting its  shores.  It  takes  soldiers  who  do  not  believe  that  war  is  an  art  to 
be  perfectly  at  their  ease  under  such  circumstances. 

General  Franklin,  General  Reynolds,  and  myself  were  on  the  most  intimate 
social  and  official  terms.  We  always  discussed  questions  of  general  interest 
to  the  command,  and  after  General  Reynolds  had  placed  his  corps  in  position 


FRANKLIN'S  "LEFT  GRAND  DIVISION."  133 

we  met  and  looked  over  the  situation  as  it  then  appeared  to  us.  We  unani- 
mously agi-eed  that  there  was  but  one  thing  to  do,  and  that  was  to  put  the 
forty  thousand  men  of  the  Left  Grand  Division  into  columns  of  assault  on 
the  right  and  left  of  the  Richmond  road,  carry  the  ridge,  and  tm-ii  Lee's  right 
flank  at  any  cost.  To  do  this  the  Sixth  Corps  must  be  relieved  from  its  xjosi- 
tion  in  line,  where  it  was  covering  the  bridge.  This  could  only  be  done  after 
dark,  but  as  it  woidd  take  some  time  to  get  the  columns  formed,  and  as  it  was 
necessary  that  the  men  should  get  some  rest  before  morning,  the  work  of  prep- 
aration must  begin  directly  after  dusk.  In  coming  to  this  conclusion  we  had 
consideri^d  the  fact  that  Lee  being  on  the  exterior  had  longer  lines  than  those 
of  our  army,  and  that  therefore  he  could  not  have  force  enough  on  his  riglit 
to  resist  an  assault  by  forty  thousand  men,  and  that  the  demonstration  made 
on  his  left  would  prevent  the  withdrawal  of  any  of  his  force  from  that  flank. 
Besides  this  we  had  in  front  of  Reynolds  open  country  of  sufficient  width  to 
turn  the  hills  which  terminated  to  the  right  of  the  Richmond  road. 

About  5  p.  M.  General  Burnside  came  to  the  left  wing,  and  after  he  had 
taken  a  hurried  gallop  along  the  lines  General  Franklin  asked  him  to  go  to 
his  tent,  and  there  gave  him  the  above-described  plan  as  the  only  one  that 
in  om*  judgment  offered  a  fair  hope  of  success.  When  General  Burnside  left 
us  we  were  all  of  the  opinion  that  he  agreed  with  us,  and  the  last  re(iuest, 
urgently  pressed  upon  him,  was  that  he  should  at  once  give  the  order  for 
Birney's  and  Sickles's  divisions  of  the  Third  Corps  (Hooker's  Center  Grand 
Division)  to  cross  the  bridge  and  be  ready  to  begin  to  relieve  the  Sixth  Corps 
in  the  lines  at  dusk.  Under  the  supposition  that  the  orders  asked  for  woidd 
soon  be  received.  General  Franklin  ga^e  General  Reynolds  and  myself  ordei-s 
to  do  all  the  preliminary  work  possible ;  which  being  done,  we  returned  to 
General  Franklin's  headquarters  to  await  the  arrival  of  the  messenger  from 
General  Burnside.  As  the  precious  time  passed  by  we  fell  to  discussing  the 
condition  of  affairs.  Burnside  had  proposed  to  effect  a  surprise,  and  now 
before  Lee  could  be  attacked  he  would  have  had  forty-eight  hours  for  concen- 
tration against  us  and  for  fortifying  his  positions  on  the  hills.  Burnside  Iiad 
persisted  in  crossing  the  river  after  all  hope  of  a  surprise  hnd  faded  away, 
and  now  we  must  fight  our  way  out  under  great  disadvantages.  Had  Bnrnsi(k» 
been  forced  into  a  move  by  the  Administration?  Und(>r  tlie  circumstances 
would  he  make  a  desperate  fight  or  only  go  far  enough  to  keep  u])  a)))  lea ranees  ? 
Whatever  was  in  store  for  us  the  Left  Grand  Division  was  a  unit  in  senii- 
ment;  the  men  were  brave  and  well  disciplined,  and  wc^  felt  sure  lliat  wiili 
our  forty  thousand  men  we  could  force  back  Lee's  riglil  Hank  and  get  a 
better  i)ositi()n  for  a  general  battle,  if  one  were  then  necessary.  Would 
P>urnsid(^  adopt  our  plan,  and  if  so,  why  this  delay  whieli  was  costing  us  so 
nuieh  valuable  time  f  We  had  all  known  Burnside  socially,  long  and  inti- 
mately, but  in  his  new  position  of  grave  responsibility  he  was  to  ns  entirely 
unknown. 

The  weary  hours  of  that  long  winter  night  wore  away  in  lliis  |.i-olitl.  ss 
manner  until  about  .")  o'(dock,  when  (Jeneral  K*eyno!.Is  said  :  "1  kii"W  I  have 
hard   work  ahead  of  me  and   I   must   get   some  sleej..     Send  for  me  if  I  am 


134 


FRANKLIN'S  "LEFT  GRAND  DIHSION." 


RUINS   OF    "MANSFIELD,"    ALSO    KNOWN    AS    THE   "BERNARD    HOUSE."     FROM   A  WAR-TIME    PHOTOGRAPH. 

wanted."  General  Franklin  tlien  sent  an  aide  to  headquarters,  who  returned 
with  the  answer  that  the  orders  would  "  come  presently." 

The  order  came,  I  think,  at  7:45  a.  m. :  "Keep  your  whole  command  in 
position  for  a  rapid  movement  down  the  old  Richmond  road."  Two-thirds  of 
the  command  (the  Sixth  Corps)  was  so  placed  that  it  coiild  not  move,  without 
danger  of  losing  the  bridges,  until  relieved  by  other  troops  or  until  Lee's  right 
wing  should  be  in  full  retreat.  "  And  you  will  send  out  at  once  a  division,  at 
least,  to  pass  below  Smithfield," — a  hamlet  occupied  by  Reynolds  on  the 
previous  evening, — "  to  seize  if  possible  the  heights  near  Captain  Hamilton's, 
on  this  side  of  the  Massaponax,  taking  care  to  keep  it  well  supported  and  its 
line  of  retreat  open.'''' 

.  The  peculiar  wording  of  the  order  is  positive  evidence  that  when  it  .was 
penned  Burnside's  mind  was  still  filled  with  the  fallacy  of  effecting  a  surprise. 
The  order  recites  that  the  division  to  be  sent  out  by  Franklin  —  and  also 
one  to  be  jjushed  forward  by  Sumner  on  the  right  —  was  to  seize,  or  attempt 
to  seize,  certain  heights.  The  military  man  is  habituated  to  use  the  word  seize 
when  an  unguarded  position  is  to  be  occupied,  or  a  point  in  the  lines  of  the 
enemy  left  weak  through  ignorance  or  neglect  is  to  be  taken  by  a  sudden  rush. 
Both  of  these  operations  are  in  the  nature  of  a  military  surprise.  When  an 
advantage  is  to  be  gained  by  hard  fighting  or  the  weight  of  a  mass  of  troops, 
the  word  carrij  is  instinctively  used.  In  corroboration  of  this  proposition,  I 
will  state  that  in  the  third  interview  I  had  with  Burnside,  after  the  battle,  he 
said,  "I  sliouLl  have  ordered  Franklin  to  carry  the  heights  at  Captain  Hamil- 
ton's at  all  hazards."  \ 

"\.Just  as  CJeneral  Burnside  was  leavinfj,  shortly  suredme  I  would  have  the  orders  before  miduight. 

after  nif^litfall,  I  asked  to  he  permitted  to  order  Had  the  permission  been  granted,  the  First  and 

General  Stoneman's  eorps  (the  Tliird)  to  cross  at  Sixth  Corps  would  have  been  in  position  for  the  at- 

once.     He  declined  to  give  the  permission,  but  as-  tackby  daylight,  the  Third  Corps  takingthe  place  of 


FRANKLIN'S  "LEFT  GRAND  DIVISION. 


13^ 


Sns^ 


JACK-KNIFE    RECORD    ON    THE    STONE  WALL 
OF  THE    BERNAKD    HOUSE. 


The  Sixth  Corps  had  two  divisions  in  line  and  one  in  reserve.  It  remained 
in  an  exposed  position  during  the  day,  and  suffered  severely  from  artillery 
fire,  while  the  enemy  in  its  front  were  well  covered  by  woods  and  rifle-pits. 

In  obedience  to  his  orders  Reynolds  moved  to  the  attack  at  8:30  a.  M.,with 
his  center  division  under  Meade,  which  was  to  be  supported  by  the  division  of 
Gibbon  on  the  right  and  next  to  the  Sixth  Corps.  The  third  division,  under 
Doubleday,  was  in  reserve  and  guarding 
Meade's  left,  ik  Meade  crossed  the  ravine 
in  his  front,  and  directed  his  course  to- 
ward a  point  of  woods  coming  down 
from  the  heights.  The  artillery  on  the 
crest  was  silenced  by  three  batteries, 
and  Meade  pushed  on,  supported  on 
his  right  by  Gibbon,  and,  after  severe 
fighting,  carried  the  crest,  capturing  flags, 
and  prisoners.  In  the  dense  woods  on 
the  height,  the  connection  with  Gibbon 
was  lost,  and  Meade,  after  a  stubborn  contest,  was  finally  driven  back,  Gib- 
l)on  yet  holding  his  ground.  Two  regiments  from  the  Third  Corps  arriving 
were  sent  to  Gibbon's  left,  but  were  soon  overpowert^d,  and  they  were  forced 
back  with  Gibbon.  The  enemy  made  a  strong  show  of-  following  up  their 
success,  but  the  arrival  of  two  fresh  brigades  from  the  Third  Corps  checked 
them  and  drove  them  back  to  their  sheltered  positions.  Gibbon's  division, 
after  its  retreat,  was  relieved  by  Sickles's  division  of  the  Third  Corps. 
Newton's  division,  the  reserves  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  arrived. late  in  the  after- 
noon and  took  position  on  the  left,  but  was  not  engaged.  The  enemy's  bat- 
teries on  their  extreme  right,  ha^4ng  a  reverse  fire  upon  Mi^ade,  wlien  he 
advanced  up  the  crest,  maintained  their  position  throughout  the  battles 
Owing  to  the  foggy  character  of  the  day  our  artillery  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rappahannock  was  obliged  to  fire  somewhat  at  random,  and  for  the  same  reason 
the  fire  from  the  enemy's  batteries  was  not  very  well  du-ected.  The  contest 
ended  at  niglitfall,  our  troops  having  made  no  material  permanent  advance. 

The  military  reader  will  see  that  had  Meade  and  Gil)l)on  had  beliind  them, 
when  they  carried  the  enemy's  lines,  the  25,000  men  of  the  Sixtli  Corjts  in- 
stead of  2  regiments,  simply,  of  the  Tliird  Corps,  the  probaliihties  would  all 


tlio  Rixtli,  which  woiihl  luive  attiiekod  with  the 
First  Corps,  Had  the  necessary  orders  been  re- 
ceived, even  by  midnight,  the  movements  wouhl 
liiive  boon  made  under  cover  of  the  darkness,  and 
tho  whole  iiiglit  after  midnight  would  have  l)een 
r("(|uired  to  make  them.  It  seems  that  (Jeneral 
IJiiruside  went  to  bed  as  soon  as  lie  arrived  at  his 
headquarters,  and  did  not  write  the  orders  until 
I  he  next  morning.  None  of  my  urgent  messages 
sent  to  him  during  the  night  were  delivered  to 
him,  although  their  receipt  at  head(iuarters  was 
acknowledged. 

.  It  will  be  seen  that  the  order  sent  by  (IcMieral 
Burnsidf^    under  which    the    attack    was   made    is 


entirely  dilTerent  from  that  lor  an  attack  by  forty 
thousand  men,  which  I  luul  a  right  to  expect  from 
what  took  place  at  our  interview  of  the  previous 
evening.  And  its  receipt  at  7:4.".  in  the  morning 
[it  was  dated  ;">:.">")  A.  M.],  insteail  of  midnight, 
was  unaccountable,  except  uiuler  the  siijiposition 
that  Burnside,  for  some  reason  that  was  unknown 
to  us  on  the  left,  disai)proved  of  the  plan  to  which 
we  thought  he  had  assented,  or  that  no  serious  at- 
tack was  tobemade  from  theleft.—W.  H.  FkaNKUN. 
■5^  It  came  into  action  shortly  aftt'r  Meade's  ad- 
vance, to  repel  a  threatened  attack  fnuu  a  largo 
force  of  cavalry  which  developed  between  our  left 
and  the  M:issaponax  Creek.— W.  H.  Fraxklin. 


136 


FRANKLIN'S  "LEFT  GRAND  DIVISION. 


have  been  in  favor  of  a 
success.  When  night  fell 
there  were  no  longer  forty 
thousand  men  in  the  Left 
Grand  Division,  and  we 
had  gained  no  important 
advance. 

After  Meade's  division 
had  been  withdrawn  from 
the  front  he  came  to  Gen- 
eral Franklin's  headquar- 
ters, and  on  being  asked 
some  question  about  the 
light  said,  "  I  found  it 
quite  hot  enough  for  me," 
taking  off  his  slouched  hat 
and  showing  two  bullet- 
holes  between  which  and 
the  top  of  his  head  there 
must  have  been  little  space. 
During  one  of  the  feeble, 
skirmishing  attacks  made 

BRIGADIKR-GENERAL  GEORGE  D.  BAYARD,  KILLED  AT  FREDERICKSBURG.  OU     tllC      UnCS      Ot      tllC     OlXth 

EROM  AN  ENGRAVmG  BY  H.  B.  HALL.  ^^^.^^       ^^1^1'      iu       thC        daV, 

Meade,  who  was  still  at  headquarters,  was  expressing  great  uneasiness  lest  the 
enemy  should  break  through  and  capture  the  bridges.  General  Franklin  quieted 
him  by  saying  that  the  Sixth  Corps  could  not  be  driven  from  its  position. 

"  Mansfield,"  as  the  Bernard  house  was  called,  was  a  large,  stone  mansion,  that 
looked  down  on  the  Rappahannock  River  close  beneath  it,  and  was  approached 
by  an  imposing  drive,  while  behind  was  an  open  grove  of  magnificent  trees ; 
in  this  grove  was  the  headquarters  of  General  Franklin.  The  house  was  evi- 
dently one  of  Virginia's  ancestral  homes,  and  had  been  in  former  days  the 
center  of  generous  hospitality.  Though  under  artillery  fire,  it  was  used  as  a 
temporary  hospital,  and  in  it  the  brave  Bayard  died.  The  grove  was  filled 
with  saddled  horses.^  not  for  the  use  of  fair  ladies  and  gay  cavaliers,  as  in  the 
olden  time,  but  for  staff-officers  and  orderlies  to  carry  orders  into  the  fight 
and  bring  back  reports  from  the  field.  The  testy  owner,  who  remained  about 
the  house  during  the  early  part  of  the  day,  and  whose  word  had  been  law  for 
so  many  years  to  all  the  country  side,  did  not  realize,  when  he  demanded  the 
immediate  evacuation  of  his  premises,  that  he  spoke  to  a  man  who  com- 
manded 40,000  men,  and  one  who  on  that  day  had  little  regard  for  proprietary 
i-iglits,  and  did  not  stand  much  in  awe  of  a  Virginia  magnate  or  constable.  J 

^Whoii  I  first  arrivcil  at   tlic  licniaril  house  I  upon  staying  at  the  house  to  protect  it.    Eeyuolds 

found  Mr.  Bernard  hokling  a  lively  interview  with  on  such  occasions  was  a  man  of  few  words,  and  I 

Reynolds.     It  soenaed  that  Mr.  Bernard  protested  presently  saw  Mr.  Bernard  hurrying  toward  the 

against  the  use  of  Lis  house  and  grounds  liy  tlie  pontoon-bridges  between  two  soldiers,  and  he  was 

troops  because  they  would  spoil  Ihein,  and  insisted  not  seen  again  iu  that  vicinity.— W.  B.  Franklin. 


FRANKLIN'S   "LEFT  GRAND  Dll/ISION: 


'37 


During  this  day,  as  in  all  days  of  battle,  many  sad  and  many  linmorous 
incidents  occuiTed.  Some  of  the  shots  that  were  fired  too  high  for  the  Une  of 
battle  went  hurtling  through  the  headquarters  of  General  Franklin  into  the 
open  grove  of  large  trees.  General  George  D.  Bayard,  much  endeared  to  us 
by  his  social  qualities  and  his  rare  merits  as  a  cavalry  leader,  was  mortally 
wounded  by  a  round  shot  through  the  thigh.  Bayard  and  his  friend,  Captain 
H.  G.  Gibson,  commanding  a  battery  of  fljdng  artillery,  were  within  ten  feet 
of  Franklin,  and  were  just  rising  from  the  ground  to  go  to  luncheon  when 
the  shot  came.  It  severed  Gibson's  sword-belt  without  injury  to  him,  and 
struck  Bayard.   Many  generals  could  have  better  been  spared  from  the  service. 

A  few  days  before  the  battle  there  had  come  to  the  Sixth  Corps  the  first 
importation  of  bounty  men.  They  had  been  placed  in  the  front  to  save 
the  veterans  for  heavy  work,  and 
as  their  wounded  men  were  car- 
ried back  through  the  ranks  of  the 
old  soldiers,  the  latter  would  cry 
out,  "  Take  good  care  of  those  men; 
they  have  cost  the  Government  a 
great  deal  of  money."  The  l:)ouuty 
men  were  at  first  a  by- word  and  a 
cause  of  irritation  to  the  real  vol- 
unteers. During  the  afternoon, 
hearing  some  heavy  musketry  fir- 
ing in  my  front,  I  went  to  ascer- 
tain the  cause,  and  while  riding 
along  behind  a  regiment  lying  with 
their  faces  to  the  ground,  a  round 
shot  struck  the  knapsack  of  a  sol- 
dier, and,  cutting  it  open,  sent  a 
cloud  of  underclothes  into  the  air, 
and  high  above  them  floated  a  scat- 
tei-ed  pack  of  cards.  The  soldici-, 
hearing  the  shouts  of  laughtei', 
turned  over  to  see  what  was  the 
matter,  and  when  he  saw  the  mis- 
liap  which  had  befallen  him  made 
a  feeble  effort  to  join  in  the  laugh. 

Between  1  and  2  a.  m.  of  Decern-  k 

bei'  14th  a  council  of  war  of  the 
grand  division  commanders  was  ordere(l,  ;i 
liis  intention  of  leading  the  Ninth  ('<)i-}»s  ( 
against  the  works  which  the  Second  Corp.-^ 
Hancock,  had  failed  to  carry.  For  some  reason  the  project  was  abantloned. 
[See  p.  127.]  During  the  next  two  days  the  Left  Grand  Division  remained 
in  position,  with  no  disturbance  except  that  produced  by  an  angry  skirmisli 
line  with  an  occasional  artillery  engagement. 

VOL.111.     10 


■S'^^/^s? 


^m 


J^  J^/i,Q^^^h^</H<^ 


(1  ( icMU'ral    liiirnsii 

lie  announced 

is  oM  commaiHl) 

in  an  assault 

leil  liv  such  men 

as  Couch  and 

138  FRANKLIN'S  "LEFT  GRAND  DIVISION." 

Oil  Monday  afternoon  (the  15th)  I  received  an  order  from  Greneral  Franklin, 
then  detained  at  headquarters,  to  withdraw  the  Left  Grand  Division  after 
dark  to  the  left  bank  of  the  river,  and  what  remained  of  the  forty  thousand 
men  of  that  command  recrossed  during  the  night  without  loss  and  without 
molestation  from  the  enemy. 

After  the  battle  I  had  four  interviews  with  Burnside.  The  first  was  on 
Sunday,  the  l-ith  of  December.  I  found  him  alone  in  his  tent  walking  up 
and  down,  apparently  in  great  distress  of  mind,  and  turning  to  me  he  said, 
"Oh!  those  men!  oh!  those  men!"  I  asked  what  he  meant,  and  he  said, 
"  Those  men  over  there ! "  pointing  across  the  river  where  so  many  thousands 
lay  dead  and  wounded,  "  I  am  thinking  of  them  all  the  time." 

I  made  some  remark  about  the  fate  of  soldiers  and  changed  the  subject. 
Burnside  also  said  that  he  did  not  lead  the  Ninth  Corps  to  the  charge  as  he 
had  said  he  would,  because  the  generals  on  the  right  made  such  statements  with 
reference  to  the  demoralization  of  their  commands  that  he  feared  to  make 
the  attempt.  After  we  had  recrossed  the  river  I  saw  him  again,  when  he  told 
me  that  he  had  it  in  his  mind  to  relieve  Sumner  from  command,  place  Hooker 
in  arrest,  and  Franklin  in  command  of  the  army. 

In  the  third  interview  General  Reynolds  was  with  me.  Burnside  said 
that  the  men  on  the  left  did  not  fight  well  enough.  To  this  we  replied  that 
the  list  of  killed  and  wounded  proved  the  contrary.  He  then  said,  "  I  did 
not  mean  that ;  I  meant  there  were  not  muskets  enough  fired,"  adding,  "  I 
made  a  mistake  in  my  order  to  Franklin ;  I  should  have  directed  him  to  carry 
the  hill  at  Hamilton's  at  all  hazards."  ■>:r 

At  the  fourth  interview  he  stated  that  the  mistake  was  that  Franklin  did 
not  get  the  order  early  enough ;  that  he  had  started  it  at  4  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  but  that  General  Hardie,  to  whom  the  order  was  committed,  had 
stopped  an  hour  and  a  half  in  camp  to  get  breakfast.  I  then  told  him  that 
we  should  have  had  the  order  before  midnight  in  order  to  form  such  a  column 
of  attack  as  we  had  proposed. 

For  a  few  days  General  Burnside  was  dazed  by  the  defeat  and  grief -stricken 
at  the  loss  of  life;  but  he  soon  recovered,  and  planned  and  attempted  to  carry 
out  his  harmless  "  Mud  Campaign,"  his  last  at  the  head  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac. 

■5^  The  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  their  forces  to  such  an  extent  that  the  position  in  front 

received  from  General  Burnside  responses  to  ques-  could  be  easily  stormed  and  carried." 

tions  as  follows  •  ^"  "  "^^  '^hat  do  you  attribute  his  failure  to  accomplish 

that?" 

<?.  "Do  I  understand  you  to  say  tliat  yon  expected  A.  "To  the  great  strength  of  the  position,  and  the 

General  Friinklin  to  carry  tlir  point  at  tlic  extreme  left  accumulation  of  tlie  enemy's  forces  there." 

of  tin-  rid-.'  in  Ww  rear  of  tin-  town,  and  tlicrchy  enable  General  Burnside  then  explained  that  the  delay 

°r'^z:i:i^:::"s::;::s::zt;;:i';::^z^:,.^,  -  '»"><>i"g  /te  bridge  gave  *»  ene^y  ,ime ,. 

done  would  have  placed  our  forces  in  rear  of  tlieir  ex-      accumulate  his  forces  before  he  was  able  to  order 
treme  right,  and  which  I  thought  at  the  time  would  shake      the  attack. — W.  B.  FRANKLIN. 


ri 


TRAFFIC    BETWEEN    THE    LINES     DURING    A    TRUCE. 


WITH    JACKSON  AT  HAMILTON'S    CEOSSINGJ 


BY    J.    H.    MOORE,  C.  S.  A. 


THE  morning  of  the  13th  [of  December]  dawned 
with  a  dense  fog  enveloping  the  plain  and  city 
of  Fredericksbiu-g,  thi-ough  which  the  brilliant  rays 
of  the  sun  struggled  aboiit  10  in  the  morning. 
In  front  of  the  right  of  the  Confederate  army 
was  tlisplayed  the  vast  force  of  Franklin,  march- 
ing and  countermarching,  hastily  seeking  tlie 
places  assigned  for  the  coming  conflict.  Here  was 
a  vast  plain,  now  peopled  with  an  anny  worthy 
of  its  gi'and  dimensions.  A  slight  but  dazzling 
snow  beneath,  and  a  brilliant  sun  above,  inten- 
sified the  leaping  reflections  from  thousands  of 
gleaming  bayonets.  Officers,  on  restless  horses, 
rushed  from  point  to  point  in  gay  uniforms.  Field- 
artillery  was  whisked  into  position  as  so  many  frag- 
ile toys.  Kank  and  file,  foot  and  liorse,  small-arms 
and  field-ordnance  presented  so  magnificent  a 
pageant  as  to  call  forth  the  unbounded  admira- 
tion of  their  adversaries.  In  a  word,  this  Avas  the 
grandest  martial  scene  of  the  war.  The  contrast 
between  Stonewall  Jackson's  corps  and  Franklin's 
grand  division  was  very  marked,  and  so  far  as  ap- 
pearances went  the  former  was  hardly  better  tiian 
a  caricature  of  the  latter. 

When  all  was  in  readiness,  adjutants  stepped  to 
the  front  and,  plainly  in  oin-  view,  read  the  orders 
of  the  day.  This  done,  the  fatal  advance  across  the 
plain  commenced.  With  gay  pennants.  State,  regi- 
mental, and  brigade  standards  flying,  this  magnifi- 


cent army  advanced  in  three  closely  compacted 
lines  of  battle.  At  intervals,  in  front,  preceded 
by  horse-artillery  and  flanked  on  either  side  by 
numerous  field-pieces,  hundreds  of  heaAy  field- 
pieces  from  the  north  bank  of  the  Rappahannock 
belelied  forth  their  missiles  of  destruetion  and 
swept  the  plain  in  advance  of  Franklin's  columns, 
while  at  the  same  moment  his  smaller  field-pieces 
in  front  and  on  the  flanks  joined  in  to  sweep  the 
open  space  on  all  sides.  This  mighty  cannonad- 
ing was  answered  by  the  Confederate  onlnance. 
Onward,  steady  and  imwavering,  these  three  lines 
advanced,  preceded  by  a  lieavy  skirmish  line,  till 
they  neared  the  railroad,  when  Jackson's  right  and 
right  center  poured  into  these  sturdy  ranks  a 
deadly  volley  from  small-arms.  Spaces,  gaps,  and 
wide  chasms  instantly  told  the  tale  of  a  most  fatal 
encounter.  Volley  aft(>r  volley  of  small-arms  con- 
tinued the  work  of  destruction,  wliile  .lackson's 
artillery  jiosted  on  the  Federal  left  and  at  right 
angles  to  their  line  of  advance  kept  up  a  withering 
fire  on  the  lessening  ranks.  The  enemy  advanced 
far  in  front  of  tlie  Kiver  road  [and  crossing  tlio 
railroad  cliarged  tlie  slopes  upon  whidi  our  troops 
were  posted],  but  at  length  wavered,  lialted,  and 
suddenly  retreated  to  the  protection  of  the  railroad 
embankments.  The  struggle  was  kept  up  by  shaqv 
shooters  for  some  time,  wlien  another  general 
advance  was  made  against  a  furious  cannonade  of 


}  CoudeuHod  from  w  article  In  tlio  •'SoutUoru  Bivouac  "  for  Aufeniet,  1880. 
130 


40 


IVJTH  JACKSON  AT  HAMILTON'S   CROSSING. 


HAYS'S    HRIGADE    OF    STONEWALL   JACKSON'j 


small-arms  and  artillery.  Again  the  scene  of  de- 
struction was  repeated ;  still  the  Federals  crossed 
the  railroad,  when  a  gap  in  Jackson's  line  between 
Archer's  and  Thomas's  brigades  was  discovered  by 
some  of  the  assailants.  [See  map,  p.  74.]  This 
interval  was  rushed  for  by  a  part  of  Franklin's 
troops  as  a  haven  of  safety,  while  the  rest  of  his 
command  was  repulsed  in  confusion. 

The  left  of  Archer's  l)rigade,  that  is,  the  14th 
Tennessee  and  19th  Georgia,  commanded  by 
Colonel  Forbes,  -jIV  ^^^^  a  part  of  the  7th  Ten- 
nessee, commanded  by  Colonel  Goodner,  believing 
they  were  about  to  be  surromided,  gave  way. 
Their  comrades  on  the  right,  unaware  of  the 
condition  of  affairs  on  the  left,  and  seeing  the 
enemy  routed  in  their  fi'ont,  were  amazed  at 
this  confusion.  Officers  and  men  on  the  right 
were  enraged  at  what  seemed  to  bo  cowardice, 
and,  rushing  towai'd  the  broken  lines,  leveled 
their  pistols  and  muskets  and  fired  into  these 
fleeing  comrades. 

Presently  the  true  condition  of  affairs  appeared 
when  the  victorious  brigades  of  Franklin  emerged 
from  the  woods.  Line  and  field  officers  rushed  to 
and  fro,  wildly  shouting,  "Into  line,  into  line!" 
and,  even  in  the  face  of  a  flanking  foo,  the  gallant 
Colonel  Turney,  who  temporarily  commanded  Arch- 
er's brigade,  succeeded  in  re-forming  his  regiments 
at  right  angles  to  the  former  line  of  attack.  This 
gave  a  brief  check  to  the  victors.  Still  the  infantry 
and    artillery   fire    scourged    the   line.     The  rout 

t!V  Colonel  W.  A.  Forbes,  of  the  14tli  TonncRsee,  was 
mortally  wouncled  at  the  second  battle  of  Bull  Run,  and 
the  regiment  wns  etminiMndcd  at  rrcdcrickslmrg  by 
Llcutenant-fciloiicl  ,l.  w.  Lockcii.—  Kditoks. 


or  cajiture  of  the  Confederates  seemed  inevitable. 
Turney  was  struck  by  a  minie-ball,  which  entered 
his  mouth  and  came  out  at  his  neck,  and  his  ap- 
parently lifeless  body  was  hurriedly  placed  on  a 
blanket,  and  four  of  his  devoted  followers  attempted 
to  carry  him  to  the  rear.  They  had  not  proceeded 
far  when  a  shell  burst  among  them,  and  they  in 
turn  lay  helpless  by  the  side  of  their  bleeding  com- 
mander.^j  Colonel  Goodner  also  did  gallant  ser- 
vice in  preventing  a  rout,  for.  with  a  part  of  the 
7th  that  still  held  its  ground,  he  formed  a  line  at 
right  angles  to  their  former  position,  and  aided  in 
checking  this  dangerous  reverse. 

Up  to  the  time  of  the  break  in  our  line  no  one 
in  the  ranks  apprehended  any  danger.  Those  in 
front  and  near  this  scene  of  defeat  and  confusion 
made  desperate  efforts  to  rally  the  men  and  pre- 
vent a  stampede,  for  we  looked  for  nothing  but 
defeat  or  capture.  We  were  unaware  of  the  fact 
that  we  had  any  reserves.  Presently  Early's  divis- 
ion, in  the  very  mood  and  spirit  that  had  character- 
ized Archer's  brigade  before  the  breaking  of  the 
lines,  came  at  double-quick  to  our  relief,  jesting 
and  yellijig  at  us  :  "Here  comes  old  Jubal !  Let 
old  Jubal  straiglittMi  that  fence  !  Jubal's  boys  are 
always  getting  Hill  out  o'  trouble!" 

A  desperate  encounter  followed.  The  Federals 
fought  manfully,  but  the  artillery  on  our  right,  to- 
gether with  the  small-arms,  litei'ally  mowed  them 
down.  Officers  and  men  lost  courage  at  the  sight  of 
their  lessening  ranks,  and  in  the  utmost  confusion 

3j  Colonel  Turney,  thus  painfully  and  dangerously 
wounded,  has,  for  the  last  fifteen  years,  served  the 
Rtatc  of  Tennessee  as  one  of  its  supreuje  judges.— 
.T.  H.  M. 


IVITH  JACKSON  AT  HAMILTON'S  CROSSING. 


141 


they  again  sought  the  shelter  of  the  railroad. 
Archer's  brigade,  of  Jackson's  corps,  was  on  the 
extreme  right  of  A.  P.  Hill's  front  line,  composed 
of  the  following  regiments,  posted  in  the  order 
named:  19th  Georgia,  14th  Tennessee,  7th  Ten- 
nessee, 1st  Tennessee,  and  extended  from  the  in- 
terval or  space  left  unoccupied  by  Gregg's  brigade 
to  the  railroad  curve  near  Hamilton's  Crossing. 
We  occupied  groimd  slightly  higher  than  the  level 
of  the  plain  over  which  the  Federals  had  to  pass. 
In  our  immediate  rear  and  left  was  an  irregular 
growth  of  timber  of  varied  size,  which  obstructed 
the  view  in  the  direction  of  the  Gregg  interval. 

As  the  battle  opened  in  the  morning,  the  enemy 
was  plainly  in  our  view,  and  we  could  distinctly  see 
their  approach  to  the  railroad  in  our  front  and  to 
the  left,  where  in  every  attempt-  to  advance  they 
halted.  Now  and  then  they  woiild  make  an  effort 
to  advance  from  the  railroad  to  our  lines.  We 
who  were  on  the  right  had  no  trouble  to  repulse 
those  in  our  front,  and,  in  fact,  we  successfully  met 
every  assault  made  on  the  right,  and  that,  too,  with 
little  or  no  loss.  We  regarded  the  efforts  of  the  Fed- 
erals, so  far  as  the  right  was  concerned,  as  futile  in 
the  extreme.  In  fact,  their  assaults  on  this  part  of 
the  line  appeared  like  the  marching  of  men  to  cer- 
tain defeat  and  slaughter.  Our  infantry  fire,  aided 
by  fifteen  pieces  of  artillery  placed  at  our  right,  did 
terrible  execution  as  the  poor  fellows  emerged  from 
a  slight  railroad  cut  in  front  of  a  part  of  om-  line.  | 


On  the  morning  of  the  13th  General  Jack- 
son rode  down  his  lines  dressed  in  a  new  suit, 
presented  to  him,  as  we  understood,  by  General 
Stuart.  Some  of  our  men  facetiously  remarked 
that  they  prefen-ed  seeing  him  with  his  i-usty 
old  cap  on,  as  they  feared  he  wouldn't  get  down 
to  work.  He  inspected  all  of  his  positions, 
riding  alone.  After  halting  near  the  extreme 
right,  the  artillery  fire  was  begun,  and  here  I 
had  an  excellent  opportunity  to  see  him  under 
fire.  I  watched  him  closely,  and  was  unable  to 
detect  the  slightest  change  in  his  demeanor.  In 
a  few  minutes  he  rode  off  in  the  direction  of  Lee's 
headquarters. 

A  very  general  impression  prevails,  and  it  is  in 
a  gi-eat  measure  confirmed  by  writers  on  Freder- 
icksburg, that  Jackson's  lines  were  strongly  for- 
tified. This  is  not  correct:  we  had  no  time  to 
construct  anything  like  fortifications.  D.  H.  Hill's 
division  had  been  at  Port  Royal,  eighteen  miles 
below  Fredericksburg,  to  prevent  the  Federals  fi-om 
crossing  at  that  point ;  he  left  Port  Royal  after  the 
enemy  had  abandoned  the  project  of  crossing  there, 
and  did  not  reach  the  position  assigned  him  until 
about  daj'light  of  the  morning  of  the  battle. 

The  next  morning  the  scenes  of  caniage  were 
heart-sickening.  To  intensify  the  hoiTible  pic- 
ture, the  dead  and  the  mortally  wounded  were  in 
many  instances  burned  in  the  sedge-grass,  which 
was  set  on  fire  by  bursting  shells. 


4  The  report  of  General  Jolm  F.  Reynolds,  comniand- 
iug  the  Fii-st  Coi-ps,  coutuinH  the  followiu;;  account  of 
the  engagement  of  his  troops  at  Hamilton's  Crossing: 
"  About  8 :  30  A.  M.  Meade's  division  advanced  across  the 
Smithfleld  ravine,  formed  in  column  of  two  brigades, 
with  the  artillery  between  them,  the  Third  Brigade 
marching  by  the  flank  on  the  left  and  rear.  It  moved 
down  the  river  some  50O  or  600  jards,  when  it  tiu-ned 
sharp  to  the  right  and  crossed  the  Bowling  Green  road. 
The  enemy's  artillery  opened  tire  from  the  crest  and  the 
angle  of  the  Bowling  Green  road.  I  directed  General 
Meade  to  put  his  column  directly  for  the  nearest  point 
of  wood,  and,  having  gained  the  crest,  to  extend  his 
attack  along  it  to  the  extreme  point  of  the  heights, 
where  most  of  the  enemy's  artillerj^  was  ]»)st('d.  As  the 
column  crossed  the  Bowling  Green  road  the  artillery  of 
his  division  was  ordered  into  position  on  the  rise  of  the 
ground  between  this  road  and  the  railroad;  Cooper's 
and  Ransom's  l)atteii('H,  to  the  front,  soon  joined  by 
Anisdcn'H,  to  oi>p()se  those  of  the  enemy  on  the  crest, 
while  Simpson's  liad  to  be  thrown  to  the  left,  to  oppose 
that  on  till'  Bowling  (irocn  road,  which  was  taking  the 
column  in  Hank.  Hall's  ))attery  was  at  the  same  time 
thrown  to  the  front,  on  the  left  of  Gibbon's  division, 
which  was  advancing  in  line  on  Meade's  right.  The 
artillery  combat  here  raged  furiously  for  some  time, 
until  that  of  the  enemy  was  silenced,  when  all  of  our 
batteries  were  directed  to  sliell  the  wood,  wliere  his 
infantry  was  supposed  to  be  posted.  This  was  con- 
tinued some  half-honr,  when  the  column  of  Meade, 
advancing  in  tine  order  and  with  gallant  determina- 
tion, was  directed  into  the  point  of  wood  which  ex- 
tended this  side  of  the  railroad,  with  instructions,  when 
they  carried  the  crest  and  road  which  ran  along  it  in 
their  fi-ont,  to  move  the  First  Brigade  along  the  road, 
the  Second  Brigade  to  advance  aiid  hold  the  road,  while 
the  Third  moved  across  the  open  Held,  to  support  the 
First  in  carrying  the  extreme  point  of  the  ridge.  At 
this  time  I  sent  orders  to  General  Gil)bon  to  advance,  iti 
connection  with  General  Meade,  and  carry  the  wood  in 
Ills  front.  The  advanc<>  was  made  under  the  fire  of  the 
enemy's  batteries  on  his  right  and  front,  to  which  (,;ili- 


bon's  batteries  replied,  while  those  of  Smith  joined  in 
on  the  right. 

"Meade's  division  successfully  carried  the  wood  in 
front,  crossed  the  railroad,  charged  up  the  slope  of  the 
hill,  and  gained  the  road  and  edge  of  the  wood,  driving 
the  enemy  from  his  strong  positions  in  the  ditches  and 
railroad  cat,  captnringthe  flags  of  2  regimeutsaud  send- 
ing about  200  prisoners  to  the  rear.  At  the  same  time 
Gibbon's  division  had  <rossed  the  railroad  and  entered 
the  wood,  driving  back  the  first  line  of  the  enemy  and 
capturing  a  number  of  prisoners;  but,  from  the  dense 
character  of  the  wood,  the  connection  between  his  di- 
vision and  Meade's  was  broken.  The  infantry  combat 
was  hero  kept  up  with  great  spirit  for  a  short  time, 
when  Meade's  column  was  vigorously  assailed  by  the 
enemy's  nmsked  force,  and,  after  a  severe  contest, 
forced  back.  Two  regiments  of  Berry's  brigade,  Bir- 
neys  division,  arrived  al)out  this  time,  and  were  Im- 
mediately tlirown  into  the  wood  on  Gibbon's  left,  to  the 
support  of  the  line;  l)ut  they,  too,  were  soon  overpow- 
ered, and  the  whole  line  retiretl  from  the  wood,  Meade's 
in  some  confusion,  and,  after  an  inefTectual  effort  by 
General  Meade  and  myself  to  rally  them  under  the 
enemy's  fire,  that  of  the  artillery  having  resumed  almost 
its  original  intensity,  I  directed  Geiiernl  Meade  to  n»-form 
his  division  across  the  Bowling  Green  road,  and  ortlered 
the  remainder  of  Berry's  brigade,  which  had  come  up, 
to  the  supi)ort  of  the  liatteries. 

'•The  enemy,  showing  himself  in  strong  force  in  the 
wood,  scemeii  disposed  to  follow  onr  retiring  troops, 
Imt  the  arrival  of  the  other  brigades  of  Birney's  division 
on  tin'  ground  at  this  critical  moment,  to  oec>ii>y  our 
line  of  battle,  materially  aided  in  saving  Hall's  l>atlery, 
which  was  now  seriously  threat  incd  l>\  the  eniiny.and, 
together  with  our  artillery  tire,  soon  drove  him  to  his 
sheltered  positions  and  cover,  from  which  his  infantry 
did  not  again  niiiiear. 

"(Jcneral  Gil)bon's  division  was  assailed  In  turn  In 
the  same  manner,  and  compelled  to  retire  from  the 
wood  soon  after  Meade's."  (Jcneral  C.  Feger  Jackson 
(  onunanding  the  Third  Brigade  of  Meade's  division,  was 
killed  within  the  enemy's  lines.— Editoks. 


IN  THE  EANKS  AT  FREDERICKSBURG. 

I.  BY  GEORGE  E.  SMITH,  PRIVATE,  CO.  E,  2D  WISCONSIN  VOLUNTEERS. 


GENERAL  W.  F.  Smith,  in  bis  article  on  "  Frank- 
lin's Left  Grand  Division"  [p.  137],  makes 
mention  of  a  round  shot  that  ripped  open  a  sol- 
dier's knapsack  and  distributed  his  clothing  and 
cards.  It  was  not  a  round  shot,  but  the  second 
"  bolt "  that  came  from  the  Whitworth  gun  that  the 
"  Johnnies  "  had  run  in  on  our  fiank.  And  although 
we  were  surprised  and  durafounded  at  this  attack 
from  a  new  arm  that  appeared  to  take  in  about 
five  miles  of  our  line,  the  boys  could  not  forego 
their  little  joke  ;  so  when  that  column  of  cards  was 
thrown  some  twenty  feet  in  the  air,  on  all  sides 
could  be  heard  the  cry,  "  Oh,  deal  me  a  hand!  " 

Three  other  shots  in  that  battle  did  queer  work. 
Ours  was  the  last  brigade  (the  "Iron  Brigade" 
under  Meredith)  to  cross  on  the  pontoons,  and  we 
came  to  a  halt  upon  the  river-bank,  for  a  few  mo- 
ments, before  going  into  position  among  the  big 
cotton-wood  trees  at  the  Bernard  House.  We  had 
been  paid  off  that  day,  and  the  gamblers  began  to 
play  at  cards  the  moment  we  halted.  A  man  who 
was  about  to  "  straddle"  a  "fifty-cent  blind"  had 
his  knapsack  knocked  from  under  him  by  a  solid 
shot,  and  he  "straddled"  half  a  dozen  soldiers, 
who  were  covered  with  a  cart-load  of  dirt.  This 
was  the  first  shot  from  the  ' '  Johnnies  "  on  our  left. 
Their  second  passed  over  the  river  and  struck  a 
paymaster's  tent.  The  struggle  between  the  pay- 
master and  the  stragglers  for  possession  of  the 
flying  greenbacks  was  both  exciting  and  ridiculous. 

The  next  day,  December  13th,  our  officers  and 
the  enemy's  batteries  kept  us  on  the  jump.  Dur- 
ing a  moment's  halt,  behind  a  slight  rise  of  ground, 
we  lay  down.  A  soldier  facing  to  the  rear  was  in 
earnest  conversation  with  a  comrade.  Suddenly 
he  made  a  terrific  leap  in  air,  and  from  the  spot 
of  ground  on  which  he  had  been  sitting  a  solid 
shot  scooped  a  wheelbarrow-load  of  dirt.  It  was 
a  clear  ease  of  premonition,  for  the  man  could 
give  no  reason  for  having  jumped. 


General  Smith  also  speaks  of  the  veterans' 
ridicule  of  the  bounty  men.  The  24th  Michigan 
became  part  of  our  brigade  shortly  after  Antie- 
tam,  and  we  were  told  they  were  mostly  bounty 
men.  [See  below.]  We  made  unmerciful  sport  of 
them,  but  never  a  joke  or  word  of  abuse  did  I  hear 
after  the  24th  had  shoTvn  its  mettle  in  the  battle 
of  Fredericksburg. 

On  the  evening  of  December  14th,  General 
Doubleday  wanted  our  regiment  (the  2d  Wiscon- 
sin) to  go  on  picket  and  make  an  effort  to  stop  the 
firing  upon  the  picket-line,  for  the  shots  of  the 
Confederates  covered  the  whole  field,  and  no  one 
could  get  any  rest.  We  had  not  been  in  the  picket- 
line  more  than  twenty  minutes  before  we  made  a 
bargain  with  the  "  Rebs,"  and  the  firing  ceased, 
and  neither  they  nor  ourselves  pretended  to  keep 
under  cover.  But  at  daylight  the  24th  Michigan 
came  to  relieve  us.  Before  they  were  fairly  in 
line  they  opened  fire  upon  the  Confederates  with- 
out the  warning  we  had  agreed  to  give.  We  yelled 
lustily,  but  the  rattle  of  musketry  drowned  the 
sound,  and  many  a  confiding  enemy  was  hit.  This 
irritated  the  Confederates,  who  opened  a  savage 
fire,  and  the  24th  Michigan  were  put  upon  their 
good  behavior;  it  was  with  difficulty  a  general 
engagement  was  prevented.  All  that  day,  until 
about  4  o'clock,  the  picket-firing  was  intense ;  it 
was  abruptly  ended  by  a  Confederate  challenging 
a  6th  Wisconsin  man  to  a  fist-fight  in  the  mid- 
dle of  the  turnpike.  The  combatants  got  the 
attention  of  both  picket-lines,  who  declared  the 
fight  a  "  draw."  They  ended  the  matter  with  a 
coffee  and  tobacco  trade  and  an  agreement  to  do 
no  more  firing  at  picket-lines,  unless  an  advance 
should  be  ordered.  It  was  this  agreement  that 
enabled  Lieutenant  Rogers  to  save  a  long  picket- 
line  that  was  to  have  been  sacrificed  when  we  fell 
back. 

Racine,  Wis.,  October  3d,  1886. 


II.     BY    ORSON    B.    CURTIS,    CORPORAL,     CO.    D,    24TH    MICHIGAN. 


SINCE  Private  Smith,  above,  mentions  the  24th 
Michigan  as  "bounty  men,"  let  me  state  that 
in  July,  1802,  a  war  meeting  held  in  Detroit  to 
promote  enlistments  under  Lincoln's  call  for 
300,000  men  was  broken  up  by  the  disturbance 
created  by  a  large  number  of  Confederate  refugees 
from  Windsor,  Canada,  with  the  aid  of  some  anti- 
war men  here.  To  wipe  out  the  unexpected  insult, 
a  second  war  meeting  was  held,  which  resolved  to 
raise  immediately  an  entire  regiment, —  the  24th 
Michigan, —  in  Wayne  County  alone,  in  addition  to 
its  rcfiidar  quota ;  and  within  20  days  said  regiment 
was  recruited  and  mustered,  1027  strong.  Not  a 
man  of  us  received  a  cent  of  State  or  county  bounty. 
Each  man,  however,  did  receive,  in  .advance,  one 
month's  pay  and  $2;"  of  the  regular  $100  govern- 
ment bounty  promised  to  all  soldiers  enlisting  for 
two  years ;  G73  of  the  men  who  were  credited  to 
Detroit  received  sums  varying  from  $25  to  $.50 
apiece  as  a  gratuity  from  patriotic  friends,  while 
the  remaining  354  of  us  never  received  a  cent. 


Assigned  to  the  "Iron  Brigade,"  our  regiment 
shared  its  hardships  till  the  spring  of  18G5,  when 
its  remnant  was  sent  to  guard  conscripts  at  Spring- 
field, 111.,  and  formed  the  escort  at  President  Lin- 
coln's funeral.  At  Gettysburg  it  suffered  probably 
as  great  a  loss  as  any  regiment  of  its  size.  One  of 
the  first  infantry  regiments  to  engage  the  enemy 
in  the  first  day's  fight,  it  went  into  that  battle  with 
28  officers  and  468  men;  total,  496.  It  lost  that 
day  24  officers  and  339  men ;  total,  363,  of  which 
number  272,  or  about  bo  per  cent,  of  the  command, 
were  hilled  and  wounded  ;  91  were  taken  prisoners, 
over  a  third  of  whom  died  in  Southern  prisons ; 
twice  that  day  was  its  entire  color-guard  shot  down, 
and  only  3  officers  and  95  men  were  left  to  respond 
at  roll-call.  General  Wadsworth  thus  commended 
its  conduct  on  that  day :  "Colonel  Morrow,  the  only 
fault  I  find  with  you  is  that  you  fought  the  24th 
Michigan  too  long,  hut  God  only  Icnows  what  would 
have  become  of  us  had  you  not  held  the  ground  as 
long  as  you  did." 


THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  FREDERICKSBURG,  VA. 

The  composition,  losaea,  and  strength  of  each  army  as  here  stated  give  the  gist  of  all  the  data  obtainable  in  the  Official 
Records.    K  stands  for  killed;  w  for  wounded ;  m  w  for  mortally  wounded ;  m  for  captured  or  missing ;  c  for  captured. 


THE  UNION  ARMY. 
ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC—  Major-General  Ambrose  E.  Burnside. 


Escort,  etc. :  Oneida  (N.  Y.)  Cav.,  Capt.  Daniel  P.  Maun ; 
l8t  U.  S.  Cav.  (detachment),  Capt.  Marcus  A.  Reno ;  A 
and  E,  4th  U.  8.  Cav.,  Capt.  James  B.  Mclntyre.  Prov- 
ost Guard,  Brig.-Gen.  MarsenaR.  Patrick:  AandB,  Me- 
Clellan  (111.)  Dragoons,  Capts.  George  W.  Shears  and 
David  C.  Brown;  G,  9th  N.  Y.,  Capt.  Charles  Child  ;  93d 
N.  Y.,  Col.  John  S.  Crocker ;  2d  U.  S.  Cav.,  Maj.  Charles 
J.  Whiting ;  8th  U.  S.,  Capt.  Royal  T.  Frank.  Volunteer 
Engineer  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Daniel  P.  Woodbury :  15th 
N.  Y.,  Maj.  James  A.  Magruder;  50th  N.  Y.,  Msy.  Ira 
Spaulding.  Brigade  loss :  k,  8 ;  w,  48  =  56.  Battalion 
JJ.  S.  Engineers,  Lieut.  Charles  E.  Cross.  Loss :  w,  1 ; 
m,  2  =  3. 

ABTiLi.ERY,  Brig.-Gen.  Henry  J.  Hunt.  Artillery  Re- 
serve, Lieut.-Col.  William  Hays:  5th  N.  Y.,  Capt.  Elijah 
D.  Taft ;  A,  1st  Batt.  N.  Y.,  Capt.  Otto  Diederichs ;  B,  1st 
Batt.  N.  Y.,  Capt.  Adolph  Voegelee;  C,  1st  Batt.  N.  Y., 
Lieut.  Bemhard  Wever ;  D,  1st  Batt.  N.  Y.,  Capt.  Charles 
Kusserow;  K,  Ist  U.  S.,  Capt.  WilUam  M.  Graham;  A, 
2d  U.  S.,  Capt.  John  C.  Tidball;  G,  4th  U.  8.,  Lieut.  Mar- 
cus P.  Miller;  K,  5th  U.  S.,  Lieut.  David  H.  Kinzie;  C, 
32dMass.  (train  guard),  Capt.  Josiah  C.  Puller.  Unat- 
tached Artillery,  Maj.  Thomas  S.  Trumbull :  B,  1st 
Conn.  Heavy,  Capt.  Albert  F.  Brooker;  M,  Ist  Conn. 
Heavy,  Capt.  Franklin  A.  Pratt.  Artillery  reserve  loss : 
w,  8. 

RIGHT  GRAND  DIVISION,  Major-Gen.  Edwin  V. 
Sumner. 

SECOND  ARMY  CORPS,  Maj.-Gen.  Darius  N.  Couch. 
Staff  loss:  w,  1. 

FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Winfleld  S.  Hancock.    Staff 
loss :  w,  3. 

First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  John  C.  Caldwell  (w),  Col. 
George  W.  von  Schack :  5th  N.  H.,  Col.  Edward  E.  Cross 
(w),  Maj.  E.  E.  Sturtevant  (k),  Capt.  James  E.  Larkin, 
Capt.  Horace  T.  H.  Pierce ;  7th  N.  Y.,  Col.  George  W. 
von  Schack,  Capt.  G.  A.  von  Bransen;  61st  N.  Y.,  Col. 
Nelson  A.  Miles  ^  (w) ;  64th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Enos  C. 
Brooks;  ^  81st  Pa.,  Col.  II.  Boyd  McKeen  (w),  Capt.  Will- 
iam Wilson  ;  14.5th  Pa.,  Col.  Hiram  L.  Brown  (w), Lieut.- 
Col.  David  B.  McCreary.  Brigade  loss:  k,  108;  w,  729; 
m,  115  =  952.  Second  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Thomas  F. 
Meagher:  28th  Mass.,  Col.  Richard  Byrnes;  63d  N.  Y., 
Maj.  Joseph  O'Neill  (w),  Capt.  Patrick  J.  Condon;  69th 
N.  Y.,  Col.  Rol)ert  Nugent  (w),  Capt.  James  Saunders ; 
88th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Patrick  Kiilly ;  116th  Pa.,  Col.  Dennis 
Heenan  (w),  Lieut.-Col.  St.  Clair  A.  MulhoUand  (w), 
Lieut.  Francis  T.  Quinlan.  Brigade  loss :  k,  50 ;  w,  421 ; 
m,  74  =  545.  Third  Brigade,  Col.  Samuel  K.  Zook :  27th 
Conn..  Col.  Richard  S.  Bostwick;  2(1  Del.,  Col.  William 
P.  Baily  (w);  .52d  N.  Y.,  Col.  Paul  Frank;  57th  N.  Y., 
Lieut.-Col.  Alford  B.  Chapman  (w),  M!\j.  N.  Garrow 
Throop  (w),  Capt.  .Tames  W.  Britt ;  66th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col. 
James  H.  Bull  (k),  Capt.  Julius  Wehle  (k),  Capt.  John  S. 
IlammcU  (w),  Lieut.  James  G.  Derriekson  ;  .53d  Pa.,  Col. 
John  li.  Brooke.  Brigade  loss:  k,  60;  w,  427;  m,  40  = 
527.  Artillery:  B,  Ist  N.  Y.,  Capt.  Rufus  D.  Pettit ;  C, 
4th  U.  8.,  Lieut.  Evan  Thomas.  Artillery  loss :  k,  1 ;  w, 
4  =  5, 

SECOND  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gcn.  Oliver  O.  Howard.    Staff 
loss:  w,  1. 

First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Alfred  Sully:  19th  Me.,  Col. 
Frederick  I).  Sewall,  Lieut.-Col.  Francis  E.  Heath;  15th 
Mass.,  Maj.  Clia.sc  I'liilbrick  (w),  Capt.  John  Murkland, 
Capt.  Charles  II.  Watson  ;  1st  Co.  Mass.  Sharp-shooters, 
Capt.  William  Pliimer;  Ist  Minn.,  Col.  Georg(>  N.  Mor 
gan;   2d  Co.  Minn.  8harp-.shootcr8,  Capt.  William   F. 


Russell;  34th  N.  Y.,  Col.  James  A.  Suiter;  82d  N.  Y.  (2d 
Militia),  Lieut.-Col.  James  Huston.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  14 ; 
w,  77 ;  m,  31  =  122.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  Joshua  T.  Owtn  : 
69th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  Dennis  O'Kane  ;  71st  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col. 
John  Markoe;  72d  Pa.,  Col.  De  Witt  C.Baxter;  lOCth 
Pa.,  Col.  Turner  G.  Morehead.  Brigade  loss:  k,  27:  w, 
203;  m,  28  =  258.  Third  Brigade,  CoL  Norman  J.  Hall: 
19th  Mass.,  Capt.  H.  G.  O.  WejTuouth ;  20th  Mass.  Capt. 
George  N.  Macy;  7th  Mich.,  Lieut.-Col.  Henry  Baxter 
(w),  Maj.  Thomas  II.  Hunt :  42d  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  George 
N.  Bomfoid;  59th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  William  Northedge; 
127th  Pa.,  Col.  William  W.  Jennings.  Brigade  loss  :  k, 
63;  w,  419;  m,  33=515.  Artillery:  A,  1st  R.  I.,  Capt. 
William  A.  Arnold ;  B,  1st  R.  I.,  Capt.  John  G.  Hazard- 
Ai'tillei-y  loss  :  w,  18. 
THIRD  DIVISION,  Brlg.-Geu.  William  H.  Fi-ench. 

First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Nathan  Kimball  (w).  Col. 
John  S.  Ma.son :  14th  Ind.,  Ma^j.  Elyah  H.  C.  Cavins ; 
24th  N.  J.,  Col.  Wm.  B.  Robertson  ;  28th  N.  J.,  Col.  Moses 
N.  Wisewell  (w),  Lieut  -Col.  E.  A.  L.  Roberts;  4th  Ohio, 
Col.  John  S.  Mason,  Lieut.-Col.  James  H.  Godman  (,w), 
Capt.  Gordon  .\.  Stewart ;  8th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  Frank- 
lin Sawyer ;  7th  W. Va.,  Col.  Joseiih  Snider  (wi,  Lieut.-Col. 
Jonathan  H.  Lockwood.  Brigade  loss:  k,  36;  w,  420; 
m,  64  =  520.  Second  Brigade.  Col.  Oliver  H.  Palmer:  14th 
Conn.,  Lieut.-Col.  Sauford  H.  Perkins  (w),  Capt.  Samuel 
H.  Davis;  108th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Charles  J.  Powers; 
130th  Pa.,  Col.  Henry  I.  Zinn  (k),  Capt.  William  M.  Porter. 
Brigade  loss  :  k,  20 ;  w,  207 ;  m,  04  =  291.  Th  ird  Brigade, 
Col.  John  W.  Andiews,  Lieut.-Col.  William  Jameson, 
Lieut.-Col.  John  \V.  Mar.shaU :  1st  Del.,  Maj.  Thomas  A. 
Smyth ;  4th  N.  Y.,  Col.  John  D.  MacGregor  (w),  Lieut.- 
Col.  William  Jameson,  M;y.  Charles  W.  Kruger;  lOth  N. 
Y.,  Col.  John  E.  Bendix  (w),  Capt.  Salmon  Winchester 
(m  w),  Capt.  George  F.  Hopper;  132d  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col. 
Charles  Albright.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  32  ;  w,  271 ;  m,  39  = 
342.  Artillery:  G,  1st  N.  Y.,  Capt.  John  D.  Frank;  G, 
Ist  R.  I.,  Capt.  Charles  D.  Owen.  Artillery  loss:  k,  1; 
w,  6  =  7. 

ARTILLERY  RESERVE,  Capt.  Chaples  H.  Morgan :  I,  Ist 
U.  S.,  Lieut.  Edmund  Kirby ;  A,  4th  U.  S.,  Lieut.  Rufua 
King,  Jr.    Artillery  Reserve  loss :  w,  7. 

NINTH  ARMY  CORPS,   Brig.-Gen.  Orlando  B.  Will- 
cox.    Escort:  B,  6th  N.  Y.  Cav.,  Capt.  Hilhuan  A.  Hall ; 
C,  6th  N.  Y.  Cav.,  Capt.  William  L.  Heermance. 
FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gcu.  William  W.  Burns. 

First  Brif/ade,  Col.  Orlando  M.  Poe :  2d  Mich.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Louis  Dillman ;  17th  Mich.,  Col.  Williani  H.  With- 
ington;  20th  Mich.,  Col.  Adolphus  W.  Williams:  79th  N. 
Y..  Lieut.-Col.  Davitl  Morrison.  Brigade  loss:  k,  1;  w, 
12  =  13.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  Benjamin  C.  Christ :  J9th 
Mass.,  Licut.-Col.  Joseph  II.  Barnes;  8th  .Mich.,  MiO. 
Ralph  Ely;  27th  N.  .1..  Col.  George  W.  Mindil:  4f.th  N. 
Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Joseph  (ierhardt;  50th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col. 
Thomas  S.  Brenholtz.  Brigade  loss:  w,  7:  ui,  1=8. 
Third  Brigade,  Col.  Daniel  L«'asure:  3f.th  Mass..  Col. 
Henry  Bowman;  4.5th  Pa.,  Col.  Thomas  Welsh;  looth 
Pa.,  Lieut -Col.  D.ivid  A.  Ix'ckey.  Brigade  loss :  w.  X 
Arlillen/:  I),  1st  N.  Y.,  Capt.  Thomas  W.  Osborn  ;  L 
and  M.  3d  IT.  S.,  Lieut.  Horace  J.  Hayden.  .Vrtillery 
loss:  w,  2;  m,  1=3. 

SECOND  DIVISION.  Brig.-Gen.  Samuel  D.  Sturgis.    Staff 
loss:  w,  1. 

First  Brii/adc,  Brig.-Gen.  James  Nagle:  2»J  Md.,  Col. 
Thomas  I?.  Allard  ;  f.th  N.  H..  C«d.  Simon  G.  Griffln  :  9th 
N.  H..  I,i.ut.-Col.  John  \V.  Babbitt ;  48th  Pa.,  Col.  Joshua 
K.Siglric<l;  7tli  K.  1.  Col.  Zenus  R.  Bli.ss ;  12th  K.  I..  Col. 


)  Comniaiideil  Gist  ami  (Mlli  X.  Y..  ci.usdlldated. 
143 


144 


THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  FREDERICKSBURG. 


I 


George  H.  Browne.  Brigade  loss :  k,  31 ;  w,  421 ;  m,  48 
=  500.  Second  Brigade,  Brig. -Gen.  Edward  Ferrero :  2l8t 
Mass.,  Col.  William  S.  Clark;  35th  Mass.,  Maj.  Sidney 
WiUard  (k),  Capt.  Stephen  H.  Andrews;  11th  N.  H.,  Col. 
Walter  Harrimau  ;  51st  N,  Y.,  Col.  Robert  B.  Potter ;  Slst 
Pa.,  Col.  John  F.  Hartranft.  Brigade  loss :  k,  60 ;  w,  393 ; 
m,  38  =  491.  Artillerij :  L,  2d  N.  Y.,  Capt.  Jacob  Roeiner ; 
D,  Pa.,  Capt.  George  W.  Durell ;  D,  1st  R.  I.,  Capt.  Will- 
iam W.  Buckley  ;  E,  4th  U.  S.,  Lieut.  George  Dickenson 
(k),  Lieut.  John  Egau.  Artillery  loss :  k,  3 ;  w,  12  =  15. 
TUiKD  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  George  W.  Getty. 

First  Bngade,  Col.  Rush  C.  Hawkins :  10th  N.  H.,  Col. 
Michael  T.  Douohoe;  13th  N.  H.,  Col.  Aaron  F.  Stevens; 
25th  N.  J.,  Col.  Andrew  Derrora ;  9th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col. 
Edgar  A.  Kimball;  89th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Harrison  S.  Fair- 
child  ;  103d  N.  Y.,  Col.  Benjamin  Ringold.  Brigade  loss  : 
k,  14 ;  w,  187 ;  m,  54i=  255.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  Edward 
Harlaud:  8th  Conn.,  Maj.  John  E.  Ward,  Capt.  Henry  M. 
Hoyt;  11th  Conn.,  Col.  Grifflii  A.  Stedman,  Jr.;  15th 
Conn.,  Lieut.-Col.  Samuel  Tolles ;  16th  Conn.,  Capt. 
Charles  L.  Upham ;  2lHt  Coun.,  Col.  Arthur  H.  Dutton ; 
4th  R.  I..  Lieut.-Col.  Joseph  B.  Curtis  (k),  Maj.  Martin 
P.  Buflfum.  Brigade  loss:  k,  2;  w,  29;  m,  10  =  41. 
Artillery:  E,  2d  U.  S.,  Lieut.  Samuel  N.  Benjamin;  A, 
5th  U.  S.,  Lieut.  James  Gilliss. 

CAVALRY  DIVISION.  Brig.-Gen.  Alfred  Pleasonton. 

First Brigade,BTig.-Gen.  JohnF.  Farnsworth:  8th  111., 
Col.  William  Gamble;  3d  Ind.,  Maj.  George  H.  Chap- 
man; 8th  N.  Y.,  Col.  BenjamiD  F.Davis.  Second  Bri- 
gade, Col.  David  McM.  Gregg,  Col.  Thomas  C.  Devin: 
6th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Thomas  C.  Devin,  Lieut.-Col.  Duncan 
Mc Vicar ;  8th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  Amos  E.  Griffiths  ;  6th  U. 
8.,  Capt.  George  C.  Cram.  Artillery :  M,  2d  U.  S.,  Lieut. 
Alexander  C.  M.  Pennington,  Jr. 

CENTER  GRAND  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gen.  Jos.  Hooker. 

THIRD  ARMY  CORPS,  Brig.-Gen.  George  Stoueman. 
FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  David  B.  Birney. 

First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  John  C.  Robinson  :  20th  Ind., 
Col.  John  Van  Valkenburg;  63d  Pa.,  Maj.  John  A. 
Danks;  68th  Pa.,  Col.  Andrew  H.  Tippin;  105th  Pa.,  Col. 
Amor  A.  MoKnight;  114th  Pa..  Col.  Charles  H.  T.  Col- 
lis;  141st  Pa.,  Col.  Henry  J.  Madill.  Brigade  loss: 
k,  14;  w,  106;  m,  26=146.  Second  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen. 
J.  H.  Hobart  Ward:  3d  Me.,  Col.  Moses  B,  Lake- 
man;  4th  Me.,  Col.  Elijah  Walker;  38th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  William  Birney  (w) ;  40th  N,  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Nelson 
A.  Gesner  (w) ;  55th N.  Y., Col.  P.  Regis de  Trobriand ;  57th 
Pa.,  CoL  Charles  T.  Cami)b(!ll  (w),  Lieut.-Col.  Peter 
Sides;  99th  Pa..  Col.  Asher  S.  Leidy  (w),  Lieut.-Col. 
Edwin  R.  Biles.  Brigade  loss :  k,  79 ;  w,  397 ;  m,  153  =  629. 
Third  Bngade,  Brig.-Gen.  Hiram  G.  Berry:  17th  Me., 
Col.  Thomas  A.  Roberts;  3d  Mich.,  Maj.  Moses  B. 
Houghton;  5th  Mieh.,  Lieut.-Col.  John  Gilluly  (k),  Maj. 
Edward  T.  Sherlock;  1st  N.  Y.,  Col.  J.  Frederick  Pier- 
son  ;  37th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Samuel  B.  Haymau ;  lOlst  N.  Y.. 
Col.  George  F.  Chester.  Brigade  loss :  k,  19 ;  w,  144 ;  m, 
2  =  165.  Artillery,  Capt.  George  E.  Randolph :  E,  1st  R. 
L,  Lieut.  Pardon  S.  Jastram ;  F  and  K,  3d  U.  S.,  Lieut. 
John  G.  Turnbull.  Artillery  loss :  k,  2 ;  w,  8=  10. 
SECOND  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gon.  Daniel  E.  Sickles. 

First  Brigade,  Brif^.-Ocn.  Jo.scpli  B.  Carr:  1st  Mass., 
Lieut.-Col.  ClarkB.  Kalilwin,  Col.  Napoleon  B.  McLaugh- 
len;  11th  Mass.,  Col.  Williani  I'.laisdcll;  16th  Mass.,  Col 
Thomas  R.  Tannatt;  id  N.  H.,  Col.  Gilman  Marston  ; 
11th  N.  J.,  Col.  Robert  McAlli.ster;  26th  Pa..  Lieut.-Col. 
Benjamin  C.  Tilghman.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  11 ;  w,  68 ;  m,  2 
=  81.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  George  B.  Hall:  70th  N.  Y., 
Col.  J.  Egbert  Faniuiii ;  71st  N.  Y.,  Maj.  Thomas  Rafl'erty ; 
72d  N.  Y.,  Col.  William  O.  Stevens;  73d  N.  Y.,  Col.  Will- 
iam R.  Brewster;  74th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  William  H. 
I^uusbury ;  120th  N.  Y.,  Col.  George  H.  Sharpe.  Brigade 
loss:  w,  16.  Third  Brit/ade.  Brig.-Gen.  Joseph  W.  Re- 
vere: 5th  N.  J.,  Col.  William  J.  Sewell ;  6th  N.  J.,  Col. 
George  C.  Burling;  7th  N.  .L,  Col.  Louis  R.  Froneiue ; 
8th  N.  J.,  (;ol.  Adolphus  J.  Johnson  ;  2d  N.  Y.,  Col.  Sid- 
ney W.  Park;  115th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  William  A.  Olmsted. 
Brigade  loss:  k,  1;  w,  1  =  2.  Artillery,  Capt.  James  E. 
Smith :  2d  N.  J.,  Capt.  A.  Judson  Clark ;  4th  N.  Y..  Lieut. 
Joseph  E.  Nairn;  H,  1st  U.  S.,  Lieut.  Justin  E.  Dimick; 
K,  4th  U.  8.,  Lieut.  Francis  W.  Seeloy.  Artillery  loss :  m,  1. 


THIRD  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Amiel  W.  Whipple.     Staff 
loss:  m,  1. 

First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  A.  Sanders  Piatt,  Col.  Emlen 
Franklin :  86th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Barna  J.  Chapin ;  124th 
N.  Y.,  Col.  A.  Van  Home  Ellis;  122d  Pa.,  Col.  Emlen 
Franklin.  Brigade  loss  :  w,  3 ;  m,  6  =  9.  Second  Brigade, 
Col.  Samuel  8.  Carroll :  12th  N.  H.,  Col.  Joseph  H.  Pot- 
ter; 163d  N.  Y.,  Maj.  James  J.  Byrne;  84th  Pa.,  Col. 
Samuel  M.  Bowman ;  lioth  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  James 
Crowther.  Brigade  loss:  k,  19;  w,  88;  m,  11  =  118.  Artil- 
lery :  10th  N.  Y.,  Capt.  John  T.  Bruen ;  11th  N.  Y.,  Capt. 
Albert  A.  von  Puttkauimer;  H,  Ist  Ohio,  Lieut.  George 
W.  Norton.    Artillery  loss :  w,  1. 

FIFTH  ARMY  CORPS,  Brig.-Gen.  Daniel  Butterfleld. 
Staff  loss:  k,  1 ;  w,l=2. 
FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Charles  Griffin. 

First  Brigade,  Col.  James  Barnes  :  2d  Me.,  Lieut.-Col. 
George  Varney  (w),  Maj.  Daniel  F.  Sargent ;  2d  Co.  Mass. 
Sharp-shooters,  Capt.  Lewis  E.  Wentworth ;  18th  Mass., 
Lieut.-Col.  Joseph  Hayes;  22d  Mass.,  Lieut.-Col.  William 
8.  Tilton ;  Ist  Mich.,  Lieut.-Col.  Ira  C.  Abbott  (w) ;  13th 
N.  Y.,  Col.  Elisha  G.  Marshall  (w),  Lieut.-Col.  Francis  A. 
Schoeffel;  25th  N.  Y.,  Capt.  Patrick  Connelly ;  118th  Pa., 
Lieut.-Col.  James  Gwyn.  Brigade  loss:  k,  30;  w,  381; 
m,  89=500.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  Jacob  B.  Sweitzer: 
9th  Mass.,  Col.  Patrick  R.  Guiney  ;  32dMas8.,  Col.  Fran- 
cis J.  Parker ;  4th  Mich.,  Lieut.-Col.  George  W.  Lumbard ; 
14th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Thomas  M.  Davies ;  62d  Pa.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  James  C.  Hull.  Brigade  loss,  k,  23  ;  w,  193;  m,  6  = 
222.  Third  Brigade,  Col.  T.  B.  W.  Stockton :  20th  Me., 
Col.  Adalbert  Ames  ;  Brady's  Co.  Mich.  Shai-p-shoot- 
ers,  Lieut.  Jonas  H.  Titus,  Jr. ;  16th  Mich.,  Lieut.-Col. 
Norval  E.  Welch;  12th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Robert  M. 
Richardson;  17th  N.  Y.,  Capt.  John  Vickers;  44th  N. 
Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Freeman  Conner  (w),  Maj.  Edward  B. 
Knox;  83d  Pa.,  Col.  Strong  Vincent.  Brigade  loss: 
k,  18 ;  w,  158 ;  m,  25  =  201.  Artillery :  3d  Mass.,  Capt. 
Augustus  P.  Martin;  5th  Mass.,  Capt.  Charles  A. 
Phillips ;  C,  1  st  R.  I. ,  Capt.  Richard  Waterman ;  D, 
.5th  U.  S.,  Lieut.  Charles  E.  Hazlett.  Artillery  loss: 
k,  2;  w,  1  =  3.  Sharji-shooters :  1st  U.  8.,  Lieut.-Col. 
Casper  Trepp. 
SECOND  DIVISION,  Brlg.-Geu.  George  Sykes. 

First  Brigade,  Lieut.-Col.  Robert  C.  Buchanan  :  3d  U. 
S.,  Capt.  John  D.  Wilkins ;  4th  U.  S.,  Capt.  Htram  Dryer; 
l.st  Battalion,  12th  U.  S.,  Capt.  Matthew  M.  Blunt;  2d 
BattaUon,  12th  U.  8.,  Capt.  Thomas  M.  Anderson ;  1st 
Battalion,  14th  U.  S.,  Capt.  John  D.  O'Connell ;  2d  Bat- 
talion, 14th  U.  S.,  Capt.  Giles  B.  Overton.  Brigade  loss: 
k,  5 ;  w,  42 ;  m,  4  =  51.  Second  Brigade,  Maj.  George  L. 
Andrews,  Maj.  Charles  S.  Lovell :  1st  and  2d  U.  8.  (battal- 
ion), Capt.  Salem  S.  Marsh;  6th  U.  S.,  Capt.  Levi  C. 
Bootes;  7th  U.  8.  (battalion),  Capt.  David  P.  Hancock; 
10th  U.  S.,  Capt.  Henry  E.  Mayuadier ;  11th  U.  S.,  Capt, 
Charles  S.  RusseU ;  17th  and  19th  U.  8.  (battalion),  Capt. 
John  r.  Wales.  Brigade  loss :  k,  12;  w,  114  ;  m,  H  =  140. 
Third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  GouverneurK.  Warren  :  5th N. 
Y.,  Col.  Cleveland  Winslow;  140th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Patrick  H, 
O'Rorke;  146th  N.  Y'.,  Col.  Kenner  Garrard.  Brigade 
loss :  w,  6 ;  m,  30  =36.  Artillery :  L,  1st  Oliio,  Lieut.  Fred- 
erick Dorries ;  I,  5th  U.  8.,  Lieut.  Malbone  F.  Watson. 
Artillery  loss :  w,  1. 

THIRD   DIVISION,   Brig.-Gen.  Andrew   A.    Humphreys. 
Staff  loss  :  w,  3. 

First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Erastus  B.  Tyler :  91et  Pa., 
Col.  Edgar  M.  Gregory  (w) ;  I26th  Pa.,  CoL  James  G.  El- 
der (w),  Lieut.-CoL  David  W.  Rowe;  129th  Pa.,  Col. 
Jacob  G.  Frick;  134th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  Edward  O'Brien. 
Brigade  loss :  k,  52 ;  w,  321 ;  m,  81  =454.  Second  Brigade, 
Col.  Peter  H.  AUabach :  123d  Pa.,  CoL  John  B.  Clark; 
131st  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  William  B.  Shaut :  133d  Pa.,  CoL 
Franklin  B.  Speakman  ;  1.55th  Pa.,  Col.  Edw.ard  J.  AUeu. 
Brigade  loss:  k.  63;  w,  448;  n],.51=562.  Artillery:  C, 
1st  N.  Y..  I>ieut.  William  H.  Phillips;  E  and  G,  Ist  U.  8., 
Capt.  Alanson  M.  Randol. 

CAVALRY  BRIGADE,  Brig.-Gen.  W^illiara  W.  Averell : 
Ist  Mass.,  Col.  Horace  B.  Sargent;  3d  Pa.,  Lieut.-CoL 
Edward  8.  Jones ;  4th  Pa.,  Col.  James  K.  Kerr ;  5th  U.  8., 
Capt.  James  E.  Harrison.  Brigade  loss:  k,  1.  Artillery: 
B  and  L,  2d  U.  8.,  Capt.  James  M.  Robertson. 


THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  FREDERICKSBURG. 


14= 


LEFT  GRAND  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gou.  William  B. 
Fraiikliu. 

Escort:  Gtli  Pa.  Cav.,  Col.  Richard  H.  Rush. 

FIRST  ARMY  CORPS,  Maj.-Gea.  John  F.  Reynolds. 

EscoH :    L,  l8t  Me.  Cav.,  Capt,  Constantino  Taylor. 
Escort  loss  :  w,  3. 
FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Abner  Doubleday. 

First  Brigade,  Col.  Walter  Phelps,  Jr.:  22d  N.  Y., 
Lieut.-Col.  John  McKie,  Jr.;  24th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Sam- 
uel R.  Beardsley;  30th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Morgan  H. 
Chrysler;  84th  N.  Y.  (14th  Militia),  Lieut.-Col.  William 
H.  de  Bevoise;  2d  U.  S.  Sharp-shooters,  Maj.  Homer  R. 
Stoughton.  Brigade  loss:  k,  3  ;  w,  24;  m,  3=30.  Sec- 
ond Brigade,  Col.  James  Gavin:  7th  Ind.,  Lieut.-Col. 
John  F.  Cheek;  76th  N.  Y.,  Col.  William  P.  Wainwright; 
95th  N.  Y.,  Col.  George  H.  Biddle ;  56th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col. 
J.  William  Hofmanu.  Brigade  loss:  k,  5 ;  w,  21=26. 
Third  Brigade,  Col.  WilUam  F.  Rogers  :  21st  N.  Y.,  Capt. 
George  N.  Layton ;  23d  N.  Y.,  Col.  Henry  C.  Hoffman  ; 
35th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Newton  B.  Lord ;  80th  N.  Y'.  (20th  Militia), 
Lieut.-Col.  Jacob  B.  Hardenbergh.  Brigade  loss :  k,  10 ; 
w,  54;  m,  3  =  67.  Fourth  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Solomon 
Meredith,  Col.  Lysauder  Cutler:  19th  Ind.,  Lieut.-Col. 
Samuel  J.  Williams;  24th  Mich.,  Col.  Henry  A.  Mor- 
row ;  2d  Wis.,  Col.  Lucius  Fairchild  ;  6th  Wis.,  Col.  Ly- 
sander  Cutler,  Lieut.-Col.  Edward  S.  Bragg;  7th  Wis., 
Col.  William  W.  Robinson.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  9 ;  w,  40 ; 
m,  16  =65.  Artillenj,  Capt.  George  A.  Gerrish  (w),  Capt. 
John  A.  Reynolds :  1st  N.  H.,  Lieut.  Frederick  M.  Edgell ; 
L,  Ist  N.  Y.,  Capt.  John  A.  Reynolds;  B,  4th  U.  S.. 
Lieut.  James  Stewart.  Artillery  loss :  k,  4 ;  w,  22  =26. 
SECOND  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gcu.  John  Gibbon  (w),  Brig.- 
Gen.  Nelson  Taylor.    Staff  loss  :  w,  1. 

First  Brigade,  Col.  Adrian  R.  Root :  16th  Me.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Charles  W.  Tilden  ;  94th  N.  Y.,  Maj.  John  A.  Kress ; 
104th  N.  Y.,  Maj.  Gilbert  G.  Prey;  lOoth  N.  Y.,  Maj. 
Daniel  A.  Sharp  (w),  Capt.  Abraham  Moore;  107th  Pa., 
Col.  Thomas  F.  McCoy.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  47  ;  w,  373 ;  m, 
55  =  475.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  Peter  Lyle :  12th  Mass., 
Col.  James  L.  Bates;  26th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col,  Gilbert  S. 
Jennings,  Maj.  Ezra  F.  Wetmore ;  90th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col. 
William  A.  Leech ;  136th  Pa.,  Col.  Thomas  M.  Bayne. 
Brigade  loss  :  k,  51 ;  w,  377  ;  m,  32  =  460.  Third  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  Nelson  Taylor,  Col.  Samuel  H.  Leonard;  13th 
Mass.,  Col.  Samuel  H.  Leonard,  Lieut.-Col.  N.  Walter 
Batchelder;  83d  N.  Y'.  (9th  Militia*,  Capt.  John  Hen- 
drickson  (w),  Capt.  Joseph  A.  Moesch  (w),  Lieut.  Isaac  E. 
Hoagland;  97th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Charles  Wheelock;  11th  Pa., 
Col.  Richard  Coulter  (w),  Capt.  Christian  Kuhn;  88th 
Pa.,  Maj.  David  A.  Griffith.  Brigade  loss :  k,  41 ;  w, 
258;  m,  15=314.  Artillery,  Capt.  George  F.  Leppion  : 
2d  Me.,  Capt.  James  A.  Hall;   5tU  Me.,  Capt.  George 

F.  Leppien;  C,  Pa.,  Capt.  James  Thompson;  F,  1st 
Pa.,  Lieut.  R.  Bruce  Ricketts.  Artillery  loss:  k,  2;  w, 
15  =  17. 

THiuD  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gcn.  George  G.  Meade. 

First  Brigade,  Col.  William  Sinclair  (wi.  Col.  William 
McCandle-ss:  Ist  Pa.  Rc.-icrvcs,  Cai«t.  William  C.  Talley; 
2d  Pa.  Reserves,  Col.  William  .M.-Candh'.-^s,  Capt.  Timo- 
thy Mealey;  6th  Pa.  RoMcrvrw,  Maj  Wellington  H.  Ent; 
13th  Pa.  Reserves  (tst  Uilhs),  Caiit.  Cliarlcs  F.Taylor; 
121.stPa.,  Col.  Cliaimiaii  P.id.lle.  Rrigud.' lo.ss:  k.  47  ;  w, 
386;  m,  77  =  510.  Seroiid  lirigadr.  Col.  Albert  L.  Magil- 
tou:  3d  Pa.  Reserves,  Col.  Horatio  (}.  Sickel;  4th  Pa. 
R(^serves,  Lieut. -( 'id.  Richard  II.  Woolworth;  7th  Pa. 
Reserves,  Col.  Henry  C.  Bolinger;  8th  Pa.  Reserves, 
Mil,).  Silas  M.  Baily;  142d  Pa.,  Col.  Robert  P.  Cummins. 
Brigade  loss:  k,  65;  w, 420;  ju,  141  =0:12.  Third  lirigadr, 
Brig.-Gen.  C.  Foger  Jackson  (k).  Col.  Josei)li  W.  Fisher, 
Lieut. -Col.  Robert  Anderson:  5th  Pa.  Reserves,  Col. 
Josei)li  W.  Fisher,  Lieut.-Col.  George  Dare;  9th  Pa.  Re- 
servis,  Lieut.-Col.  Robert  Anderson,  Maj.  James  MeK. 
Hnodgrass;  loth  Pa.  Reserves,  M.ij.  James  B.  Knox; 
11th  Pa.  Reserves,  Lieut.-Col.  Sanniel  M.  Jackson  ;  12tli 
Pa.  Reserves,  Capt.  Richard  Gustiu.  Brigade  loss:  k. 
66;  w,  410;  in,  215  =  681.  Artillery:  A,  l.st  Pa.,  Lieut. 
John  G.  Simpson;  B,  1st  Pa.,  Capt.  James  H.  Cooper  ; 

G,  Ist  Pa.,  Capt.  Frank  P.  Amsdon  ;  C,  5tli  IT.  S., 
Capt.  Dunbar  R.  Ransom.  Artillery  loss :  k,  7;  w,  19; 
m,  4  =  30. 


SIXTH  ARMY'  CORPS,  Maj.-Gen.  WiUiam  F.  Smith. 

Escort:  L,  10th  N.  Y.  Cav.,  Lieut.  George  Vanderbilt; 
I,  6th  Pa.  Cav.,  Capt.  James  Starr;  K,  6th  Pa.  Cav., 
Capt.  Fi'ederick  C.  Newhall. 
FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  William  T.  H.  Brooke. 

First  Brigade,  Col.  Alfred  T.  A.Torbert:  1st  N.  J.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Mark  W.  Collet;  2d  N.  J.,  Col.  Samuel  L.  Buck  ;  3d 
N.  J.,  Col.  Henry  W.  Brown ;  4th  N.  J.,  Col.  William  B. 
Hatch  (w),  Lieut.-Col.  James  N.  Duffy;  15th  N.  J.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Edward  L.  Campbell;  23d  N.  J.,  Col.  Henry  O. 
Ryerson.  Brigade  loss:  k,  18;  w,  94;  m,  50  =  162.  Sec- 
ond Brigade,  Col,  Henry  L.  Cake  :  5th  Me.,  Col.  Edward 
A.  Scammon;  16th  N.  Y.,Col.  Joel  J.  Seaver;  27th  N.Y'., 
Col.  Alexander  D.  Adams;  121st  N.  Y.,  Col.  Emory 
Upton;  96th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  Peter  A.  Filbert.  Brigade 
loss:  k,  4;  w,  13  =  17.  Third  Brigade,  Britr.-Gen.  David 
A.  Russell:  18th  N.  Y.,  Col.  George  R.  Myers;  31st  N. 
Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Leopold  C.  Newman;  32d  N.  Y..  Capt. 
Charles  Hubbs;  95th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  Elisha  Hall.  Bri- 
gade loss:  w,  10.  Artillery:  A,  Md.,  Capt.  John  W. 
Wolcott;  Ist  Mass.,  Capt.  William  H.  McCartney;  Ist 
N.  J.,  Capt.  WiUiam  Hexamer;  D,  2d  U.  S.,  Lieut.  Ed- 
ward B.  Williston.  Artillery  loss:  k,  2;  w,  6=8. 
SECOND  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Albion  P.  Howe. 

First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gcn.  Calvin  E.  Pratt:  6th  Me., 
Col.  Hiram  Burnham;  43d  N.  Y^,  Col.  Beiyamin  F. 
Baker;  49th Pa.,  Col.  William  H.  Irwin;  119th  Pa.,  Col. 
Peter  C.  Ellmaker;  5th  Wis.,  Col.  Amasa  Cobb.  Brigade 
loss:  w,  23;  m,  3  =  26.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  Henry 
Whiting:  26th  N.  J.,  Col.  Andrew  J.  Morrison;  2d 
Vt.,  Lieut.-CoL  Charles  H.  Joyce;  3d  Vt.,  Col.  Breed 
N.  Hyde;  4th  Vt.,  Col.  Charles  B.  Stoughton;  5th  Vt., 
Col.  Lewis  A.  Grant;  6th  Vt.,  Col.  Nathan  Lord,  Jr. 
Brigade  loss:  k,  21  ;  w,  121 ;  m,  2  =144.  Third  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  Francis  L.  Vinton  (w).  Col.  Robert  F.  Taylor. 
Brig.-Gen.  Thomas  II.  Neill :  21st  N.  J.,  Col.  Gilliam 
VanHouten;  20th  N.Y'.,  Col.  Ernst  von  Vegesack;  33d 
N.  Y'.,  Col.  Robert  F.  Taylor;  49th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Daniel  D. 
Bidwell;  77th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Winsor  B.  French. 
Brigade  loss:  k,  1;  w,  14=15.  Artillery:  B,  Md.,  Capt, 
Alonzo  Snow;  1st  N.  Y'.,  Capt.  Andrew  Cowan  ;  3d  N.  Y., 
Lieut.  William  A.  Harn ;  F,  5th  U.  8.,  Lieut.  Leouai-d 
Martin.  Artillery  loss  ;  w,  1. 
THIRD  DIVISION,  Brig.-Geu.  John  Newton. 

First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gcn.  John  Cochrane:  65th  N.  Y., 
Col.  Alexander  Shaler;  67th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Nelson  Cross; 
122d  N.  Y.,Col.  Silas  Titus;  23d  Pa.,  M;y.  John  F.  Glenn; 
61st  Pa.,  Col.  George  C.  Spear;  82d  Pa.,  Col.  David  H. 
Williams.  Brigade  loss:  k,  2  ;  w,  19  ;  m,  3  =  24.  Second 
Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Charh's  Devens,  Jr. :  7th  Mass., 
Lieut.-Col.  Franklin  P.  Harlow;  10th  Mass.,  Col.  Henry 
L,  Eustis;  37th  Mass.,  Colonel  Oliver  Edwards;  36th  N. 
Y.,  Col.  William  H.  Browne;  2d  R.  I..  Col.  Frank 
Wheaton,  Lieut.-Col.  Nelson  Viall.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  3  ; 
w,  14  =17.  Third  Brigade,  Col.  Thomas  A.  Rowley,  Brig.- 
Gen.  Frank  Wheaton:  62d  N.  Y'.,  M:y.  Wilson  Hubbell ; 
93d  Pa.,  Maj.  John  M.  Mark  ;  98th  Pa..  Lieut.-Col.  Adolph 
Mehler;  102d  Pa..  Lieut.-Col.  Joseph  M.  Kinkead ;  139tb 
Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  James  D.  Owens.  Brigade  lo.<s :  w.  6; 
m,  6  =12.  Artillery  :  C.  1st  Pa..  Capt.  Jeremiah  McCar- 
thy;  D.  1st  Pa.,  Capt.  Michael  Hall;  G.  2d  U.  S..  Lieut. 
John  H.  Butler.    Artillery  loss :  k,  2  ;  w,  8  =  10. 

CAVALRY  BRIGADE,  Brig.-Gen.  George  I).  Bayanl 
(k).  Col.  David  McM.  Gregg:  Indep't  Co..  I).  C..  Lieut. 
Williams  H.  Orton  ;  1st  Me..  Lieut.-Ctd.  Calvin  S.  Douty  ; 
Ist  N.  J..  Lieut.-Col.  Joseph  Kargo  ;  2d  N.  Y..  Mii,i.  Henry 
E.  Davies;  10th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  William  Irvine;  1st 
Pa.,  Col.  Owen  Jcmes.  Brigade  loss  :  k.  1;  w,  3=4.  Ar- 
tillery: C,  :}d  IT.  S..  Capt.  Horatio  G.  Gibson. 

Total  Union  lo.ss :  killed.  1284;  wounded.  9«M)0:  capt- 
ured or  missimi.  17C.9  =  12.653. 

Refiarding  the  strength  of  his  army  on  the  morning  of 
December  i:tth.  General  Burnsid.'  says  ("Ollieial  Ree- 
ords,'"  Vol.  XXL,  p.  90)  :  "The  forces  now  under  com- 
mand of  (loneral  Franklin  consisted  of  ab..ut  CO.OOOnien. 
assln)wn  by  the  mornim:  reports,  ami  was  composed  a« 
follows:  sixth  Corps.  21.0(H):  First  (^>rps.  18..'i00:  Thini 
Corps  (two  divisions).  lO.(HX):  Ninth  Corps  (Burns's  divls- 
i(mi.  4000 ;  Bayard's  cavalry.  3500.  General  Sumner  had 
about  27.000  men,  comprising  his  own  grand  division, 


146 


THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  FREDERICKSBURG. 


except  Biirns's  division  of  the  NintU  Corps.    General  According  to  Burnside's  return  for  December  lOth 

Hooker's  command  was   about  26,000  strong,  two   of  ("Oflticial  Records,"  Vol.  XXI.,  p.  1121),  tlie  "present  for 

General  Stoneman's  divisions  having  reported  to  Gen-  duty  equippod,"  or  available  for  luie  of   battle,  was 

eral  Franklin."    These  numbers  aggregate  113,000.  104,903  infantry,  5884  cavalry,  and  5896  artiUery  =116,683. 


THE  CONFEDERATE  ARMY. 


ARMY   OF  NORTHERN   VIRGINIA.—  General  Robert  E.  Lee. 


FIRST  ARMY  CORPS,  Lieut.-Gen.  James  Longstreet. 
McLAWs's  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gcn.  Lafayette  McLaws.    Staff 
loss:  k,  1;  w,  1  =  2. 

Eershato's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Joseph  B.  Kershaw : 
2dS.  C,  Col.  John  D.  Kennedy;  3d  S.  C,  Col.  James  D. 
Nance  (w),  Lieut.-Col.  William  D.  Rutherford  (w),  Maj. 
Robert  C.  Maffett  (w;,  Capt.  William  W.  Hance  (w),  Capt. 
John  C.  Summer  (k),  Capt.  John  K.  G.  Nance;  7th  S.  C, 
Lieut.-Col.  Elbert  Bland;  8th  8.  C,  Capt.  E.  T.  Stack- 
house;  15th  S.  C,  Col.  W.  D.  De  Saussure;  3d  S.  C.  Bat- 
talion, Lieut.-Col.  W.  G.  Rice.  Brigade  loss :  k,  38 ;  w, 
341—379.  Barksdale's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  William 
Barksdale:  13th  Miss.,  Col.  J.  W.  Carter;  17th  Miss., 
Lieut.-Col.  John  C  Fiser ;  18th  Miss.,  Lieut.-Col.  WlUiam 
H.  Luse;  2l8t  Miss.,  Col.  Benjamin  G.  Humphreys. 
Brigade  loss :  k,  29 ;  w,  151 ;  m,  62  =  242.  Cobb's  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  Thomas  R.  R.  Cobb  (m  w),  Col.  Robert  Mc- 
Millan:  16th  Ga.,  Col.  Goode  Bryan;  18th  Ga.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  8.  Z.  Ruff;  24th  Ga.,  Col.  Robert  McMillan ;  Cobb 

(Ga.)  Legion, ;  "^  PhilUps  (Ga.)  Legion,  CoL  B.  F. 

Cook.    Brigade  loss  :  k,  33 ;  w,  198 ;  m,  4  =  235.    Semtnes's 

Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Paul  J.  Semmes :  10th  Ga., ; 

60th  Ga., ;  51st  Ga., ;  53d  Ga., .   Brigade 

loss:  w,  4.  ArtiUery,  Col.  Henry  C.  Cabell:  N.  C.  Bat- 
tery, Capt.  Basil  C.  Manly  ;  Ga.  Battery,  Capt.  J.  P.  W. 
Read;  1st  Richmond  (Va.)  Howitzers,  Capt.  E.  S.  Mc- 
Carthy; Ga.  Battery  (Troup  Art'y),  Capt.  Henry  H. 
Carlton.  Artillery  loss :  w,  2.  (Colonel  CabeU  also  com- 
manded Nelson's  battalion,  and  Branch's,  Cooper's 
Dearing's,  Ells's,  Eubank's,  Lane's,  Macon's,  and  Ross's 
batteries.) 
ANDERSON'S  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gcn.  Richard  H.  Anderson. 

Wilcox's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Cadmus  M.  Wilcox:  8th 

Ala.. ;  9th  Ala.,  ;  lOth  Ala., ;  11th  Ala.. 

;  14th  Ala., .    Brigade  loss:  k,  3;  w,  15=18. 

Mahone's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  William  Mahone:  6th  Va., 

;  12th  Va., ;  16th  Va., ;  41st  Va., ; 

61st  Va., .  Brigade  loss  :k,  2 ;  w,  6  =  8.  Feathcrston's 

Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  W.  S.  Featherston :  12th  Miss., ; 

16th  Miss.. ;  19th  Miss.. ;  48th  Miss.  (5  co's), 

.    Brigade  loss:  k,  5;  w,  38  =  43.    Wright's  Brigade, 

Brig.-Gen.  A.  R.  Wright :  3d  Ga.,  Col.  Edward  J.  Walker; 
22d  Ga., ;  48th  Ga.,  Capt.  M.  R.  Hall ;  2d  Ga.  Bat- 
talion, Capt.  C.  J.  Moffott.    Brigade  loss:  k,  2;  w,  1=3. 

Perry's  Brigade,  Brig.-(}en.  E.  A.  Perry :  2d  Fla., ; 

5th  Fla., ;  8th  Fla..  Capt.  David  Lang  (w),  Capt. 

Thomas  R.  Love.  Brii,^i(lo.  Iohh:  k,  7;  w,  38;  m,  44  =  89. 
Artillery:  La.  Battery  (Doiiiild.sonville  Art'y),  Capt.  Vic- 
tor Maurin  ;  Va.  Battery,  (aiit.  Frank  Hugor;  Va.  Bat- 
tery, Capt.  John  W.  Lewis ;  Va.  Battery  (Norfolk  Light 
Art'y  Blues),  Lieut.  William  T.  Peet.  Artillery  loss :  k, 
1;  w,  8  =  9. 
PICKETT'S  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gcn.  George  E.  Pickett. 

OarnetVs  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.   Ri(!hard   B.  Garnett: 

8th  Va., ;  18th  Va., ;  19th  Va., ;  28th  Va., 

;  56th  Va. , .    Armistcad's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen. 

Lewis  A.  Arraistead:  9th Va., ;  l4thVa., ;  38th 

Va., ;  53d  Va., ;  57th  Va., .  Kemper's  Bri- 
gade, Brig.-Gen.  James  L.  Kemper :  1st  Va., ;  3d 

Va., ;  7th  Va., ;  lith  Va., ;  24th  Va., 

.    Jenkins's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Micah  Jenkins: 

l8t  S.  C.  (Ilagood's);   2d  8.  C.  Rifles, ;  5th  8.  C, 

;    6th   8.     C,  ;    Hampton   (S.    C.)    Legion, 

;  Palmetto  (S.  C.)  Sharp-shooters, .     Corse's 

Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.   Montgomery  D.  Corse:   15th  Va., 

;  17th  Va., ;  30th  Va., ;  32d  Va., . 

Artillery  (composition  incomplete) :  Va.  Battery,  Capt. 


James  Dearing ;  Va.  Battery  (Fauquier  Art'y),  Capt.  R. 
M.  Stribling;  Va.  Battery  (Richmond  Fayette  Art'y), 
Capt.  Miles  C.  Macon.  Division  loss :  k,  3 ;  w,  50 ;  m,  1  =  54. 
HOOD'S  DIVISION,  Maj. -Gen.  John  B.  Hood. 

Law's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  E.  Mclver  Law:  4th  Ala., 

;  44th  Ala., ;  6th  N.  C, ;  54th  N.  C,  Col. 

J.  C.  8.  McDowell ;  57th  N.  C,  Col.  A.  C.  Godwin.  Brigade 
loss :  k,  50 ;  w,  164 ;  m,  5  =  219.  Robertson's  Brigade,  Brig.- 
Gen.  J.  B.  Robertson :  3d  Ark., ;  1st  Tex., ;  4th 

Tex., ;  5th  Tex., .    Brigade  loss:  k,l;  w,  4=5. 

Anderson's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  George  T.  Ander.son:  1st 

Ga.  (Regulars), ;  7th  Ga., ;  8th  Ga., ;  9th 

Ga., ;  11th  Ga., .  Brigade  loss:  k,  2;  w,  8;  m, 

4  =  14.     Toombs's  Brigade,  Col.  H.  L.  Benning :  2d  Ga., 

;  15th  Ga., ;  17th  Ga., ;  20th  Ga., . 

Brigade  loss :  k,  1 ;  w,  12 ;   m,  2  =  15.    Artillery :  S.  C. 
Battery  (German  Art'y),  Capt.  W.  K.  Bachman ;  8.  C. 
Battery  (Palmetto  Light  Art'y),  Capt.  Hugh  R.  Garden; 
N.  C.  Battery  (Rowan  Art'y),  Capt.  James  Reilly. 
RANSOM'S  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Robert  Ransom,  Jr. 

Ransom's  Brigade,   Brig.-Gen.  Robert  Ransom,  Jr.: 

24th  N.  C, ;  25th  N.  C,  Lieut.-Col.  Samuel  C.  Bry- 

son;  35th  N.  C, ;  49th  N.  C, ;    Va.  Battery, 

Capt.  J.  R.  Branch.  Brigade  loss :  k,  27  ;  w,  127  =  154. 
Cooke's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  John  R.  Cooke  (w).  Col.  E. 

D.  Hall:    15th  N.   C, ;    27th  N.  C,  Col.  John  A. 

Gilmer,  Jr.;  46th  N.  C,  Col.  E.  D.  Hall;  48th  N.  C, 
Lieut.-Col.  Samuel  H.  Walkup;  Va.  Battery  (Cooper's). 
Brigade  loss :  k,  52 ;  w,  328  =  380. 

CORPS  ARTILLERY  (not  assigned  to  divisions). 

WasJdngton  (La.)  Artillery,  Col.  J.  B.  Walton  :  1st  Co., 
Capt.  C.  W.  Squires ;  2d  Co.,  Capt.  J.  B.  Richardson ;  3d 
Co.,  Capt.  M.  B.  Miller;  4th  Co.,  Capt.  B.  F.  Eshleman. 
Battalion  loss:  k,  3;  w,  24  =  27.  Alexander's  Battalion, 
Lieut.-Col.  E.  Porter  Alexander :  Va.  Battery  (Bedford 
Art'y),  Capt.  Tyler  C.  Jordan  ;  Va.  Battery,  Capt.  J.  L. 
Eubank;  La.  Battery  (Madison  Light  Art'y),  Capt. 
George  V.  Moody  ;  Va.  Battery,  Capt.  William  W.  Par- 
ker; 8.  C.  Battery,  Capt.  A.  B.  Rhett;  Va.  Battery, 
Capt.  P.  Woolfolk,  Jr.    Battalion  loss :  k,  1 :  w,  10  =  11. 

SECOND  ARMY  CORPS,  Lieut.-Geiieral  Thomas  J. 
Jackson. 
HILL'S  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gcn.  Daniel  H.  Hill. 

First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  R.  E.  Rodes  :  3d  Ala., ; 

5th  Ala., ;  6th  Ala., ;  12th  Ala., ;  26th 

Ala., .     Brigade  loss:    k,  2;    w,  14  =  16.     Second 

Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  George  Doles :  4th  Ga., ;  44th 

Ga.,  Col.  John  B.  Estes ;  1st  N.  C, ;  3d  N.  C, 

Brigade  loss :   k,  2  ;  w,  25  =  27.     Third  Brigade,  Brig.. 

Gen.  A.  H.  Colquitt:   13th  Ala., ;  6th  Ga.,  ^ ; 

23d  Ga., ;  27th  Ga., ;  28th  Ga., .  Bri- 
gade loss:   w,  15.    Fourth  Brigade,   Brig.-Gen.  Alfred 

Iversou:  5th  N.  C, ;  12th  N.  C, ;  20th  N.  C, 

;  23d  N.  C, .    Brigade  loss:  k,  1 ;  w,  12=13. 

Fifth  Brigade,  Col.  Bryan  (Crimes:  2d  N.  C, ;  4th 

N.  C, ;  14th  N.  C, ;  30th  N.  C, .  Bri- 
gade loss :  k,  8 ;  w,  51  =  59.  Artillery,  M.njor  H.  P.  Jones : 
Ala.  Battery,  Capt.  R.  A.  Hardaway ;  Ala.  Battery  (Jeff 
Davis  Art'y),  Capt.  J.  W.  Bondurant;  Va.  Battery. 
(King  William  Art'y),  Capt.  Thomas  H.  Carter;  Va. 
Battery  (Morris  Art'y),  Capt.  R.  C.  M.  Page ;  Va.  Battery 
(Orange  Art'y),  Capt.  C.  W.  Fry.  Artillery  loss:  k,  4; 
W,  8  =  12. 
LIGHT  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gcn.  Ambrose  P.  Hill. 

First  Brigade,  Col.  J.  M.  Brock enbrough  :  40th  Va., 

;  47th  Va.,  Col.  Robert  M.  Mayo  ;  55th  Va.. ; 

22d  Va.  Battalion,  Lieut.-Col.   E.  P.  Tayloe.    Brigade 


3>The  dash  Indicates  that  the  name  of  the  commanding  officer  has  not  been  found  in  the  "  Official  Records."— Editors. 


THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  AT  FREDERICKSBURG. 


147 


loss:  k,  10;  w,  73  =  83.  Second  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen. 
Maxcy  Gregg  (m  w).  Col.  D.  H.  Hamiltoa :  let  8. 
C.  (Prov.  Army),  Col.  D.  H.  Hamilton;  1st  S.  C.  Rifles, 

;  12tli  8.  C, ;  13th  S.    C, ;  Uth  S.  C, 

Col.  Samuel  McGowan.  Brigade  loss :  k  and  w,  303. 
Third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Edward   L.  Tliomas :    14tli 

Ga., ;  35th  Ga., ;  45th  Ga., ;  49th  Ga., 

.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  42 ;  w,  288  =  330.  Fourth  Bri- 
gade, Brig.-Gen.  James  H.  Lano:  7th  N.  C,  Lieut-Col.  J. 
L.  Hill ;  18th  N.  C,  Col.  Thomas  J.  Purdie  (w) ;  28th  N. 
C,  Col.  8.  D.  Lowe ;  33d  N.  C,  Col.  Clark  M.  Avery ;  37th 
N.  C,  Col.  W.  M.  Barbour  (w).  Brigade  loss:  k,  62 ;  w, 
257;  m,  216  =  535.  Fifth  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  James  J. 
Archer:  5th  Ala.,  Battalion,  Miyor  A.  S.  Van  de  Graaff 
(w),  Capt.  8.  D.  Stewart ;  19th  Ga.,  Lieut.-Col.  Andrew 
J.  Hut  chins;  1st  Teun.  (Prov.  Army),  Col.  Peter  Turney 
(w),  Lieut.-Col.  N.  J.  George  (w),  Capt.  M.  Turney  (w), 
Capt.  H.  J.  Hawkins;  7th  Tenn.,  Col.  John  F.  Goodner ; 
14th  Tenn.,  Lieut.-Col.  James  W.  Lockert.  Brigade  loss : 
k,  40;  w,  211;  m,  166  =  417.  Sixth  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen. 
WilUani  D.  Pender  (w),  Col.  AKred  M.  Scales:  13th  N. 
C,  Col.  Alfred  M.  Scales;  16th  N.  C,  Col.  John  S.  McEl- 
roy;  22d  N.  C,  Maj.  Christopher  C.  Cole;  34th  N.  C, 

;  38th  N.  C, .    Brigade  loss:  k,  16;  w,  153  = 

169.  Artillery,  Lieut.-Col.  R.  L.  Walker  :  N.  C.  Battery 
(Branch  Art'y  — section),  Lieut.  J.  R.  Potts;  Va.  Battery 
(Crenshaw's  — section),  Lieut.  James  EUett  (k» ;  Va.  Bat- 
tery (Fredericksburg  Art'y),  Lieut.  E.  A.  Marye;  Va. 
Battery  (Johnson's  —  section),  Lieut.  V.  J.  Clutter  (w) ; 
Va.  Batterj-  (Letcher  Art'y),  Capt.  G.  Davidson ;  8. C.  Bat- 
tery (Pee  Dee  Art'y),  Capt.  D.  G.  Mcintosh;  Va.  Battery 
(Purcell  Art'y),  Capt.  W.  J.  Pegram  Artillery  loss :  k,  11 ; 
w,  88  =  99.  Division  loss :  k,  231 ;  w,  1474 ;  m,  417  =  2122. 
EWELL'8  DIVISION,  Brig.-Geu.  Jubal  A.  Early. 

Lawton's  Brigade,  Col.  E.  N.  Atkinson  (w  and  c).  Col. 
Clement  A.  Evans :  13th  Ga.,  Col.  J.  M.  Smith ;  26th  Ga., 
Capt.  B.  F.  Grace  ;  3l8tGa.,  Col.  Clement  A.Evans;  38th 
Ga.,  Capt.  WilUam  L.  McLeod;  60th  Ga.,  Col.  W.  H. 
Stiles;  61st  Ga.,  Col.  J.  H.  Lamar  (w),  Maj.  C.  W.  McAr- 
thur.  Brigade  loss :  k,  86  ;  w,  633  =  719.  Trimble's  Bri- 
gade, Col.  Robert  P.  Hoke:  15th  Ala., ;  12th  Ga., 

;  21st  Ga.,  Lieut.-Col.  Thomas  W.  Hooper;  21st  N. 

C, ;  1st  N.  C.  Battalion .    Brigade  loss  :  k,  8 ; 

w,  98  =  106.   Early's  Brigade,  Col.  James  A.  Walker :  13th 

Va.,  Lieut.-Col.  James  B.  Terrill ;  25th  Va., ;  3l8t  Va. 

;  44th  Va., ;  49th  Va., ;  52d  Va., ; 

58th  Va., .    Brigade  loss :  k,  17 ;  w,  140=  157.  Hays's 

Brigade,  Brig -Gen.  Harry  T.  Hays:  5th  La., ;6th 

La., ;  7th  La., ;  8th  La., ;  9th  La., . 

Brigade  loss :  k,  9 ;  w,  44 ;  m,  1  =  54.  Artillery,  Capt.  J.  W. 
Latimer:  Va.  Battery  (Charlottesville  Art'y),  Capt.  J. 
McD.  Carrington;  Md.  Battery  (Chesapeake  Art'y), 
Lieut.  John  E.  Plater;  1st  Md.  Battery,  Capt.  William  F. 
Dement ;  Va.  Battery  (Courtney  Art'y),  Lieut.  W.  A. 
Tanner;  La.  Battery  (Guard  Art'y),  Capt.  Louis  D'Aquin 
(k);  Va.  Battery  (Staunton  Art'y),  Lieut.  Asher  W.  Gar- 
ber.  Artillery  loss  :  k,  4  ;  w,  21  =  25. 
JACKSON'S  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  William  B.  Taliaferro. 

First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  E.  F.  Paxton  :  2d  Va.,  Capt. 
J.  Q.  A.  Nad.iilwns.h;  4th  Va.,  Lieut.-Col.  R.  D.  Gard- 
ner (w),  Maj.  William  Terry;  5th  Va.,  Lieut.-Col.  H. 
J.  Williams;  27tli  Va.,  Lieut.-Col.  .lames  K.Edmoudson  ; 
33d  Va..  Col.  Edwin  (J.  L(>e.  Brigade  loss  :  k.  3  ;  w,  44  ; 
in,  1  =  48.  Seamd  Brigade,  Br\g.-Gon.  Jolin  R.  Jones; 
2l8t  Va., ;  42d  Va., ;'48th  Va., ;  1st  Va. 


Battalion, .    Brigade  loss :  k,  3  ;  w,  34  =  37.    Third 

Brigade,  Col.  E.  T.  H.  Warren :  47th  Ala.,  Capt.  James 
M.  Campbell;  48th  Ala.,  Capt.  C.  B.  St.  John  ;  10th  Va., 
Capt.  W.  B.Yancey;  23d  Va.,  Capt.  A.  J.  Richardson; 
37th  Va.,  Col.  T.  V.  Williams.  Brigade  loss  :  w,  9.  Fourth 
Brigade,  Col.  Edmund  Pendleton:  1st  La.,  Lieut.-Col. 
M.  Nolan;  2d  La.,  Maj.  M.  A.  Grogan ;  lOth  La.,  Maj. 
John  M.  Legett;  14th  La.,  Capt.  H.  M.  Verlander;  15th 
La.,  Lieut.-Col.  McG.  Goodwyn.  Brigade  loss:  k,  2;  w, 
35=37.  Artillery,  Capt.  J.  B.  Brockenbrough :  Va.  Bat- 
tery (Carpenter's),  Lieut.  George  McKendree;  Va.  Bat- 
tery (Danville  Art'y),  Capt.  George  W.  Wooding  (w) ;  Va. 
Battery  (Hani])den  Art'y),  Capt.  William  H.  Cii.skie ;  Va. 
Battery  (Lee  Art'y),  Lieut.  C.  W.  Statham  ;  Va.  Battery 
(Lusk's).  Artillery  los.s  :  k,  2;  w,  48;  in,  1  =  51. 
RESERVE  ARTILLERY,^  Brig.-Gen.  W.  N.  Pendleton. 

Broun' s  Battalion,  Col.  J.  Thompson  Brown:  Va.  Bat- 
tery, Capt.  James  V.  Brooke ;  Va.  Battery  (Powhatan 
Art'y),  Capt.  Willis  J.  Dance;  Va.  Battery  iSalem  Art'y, 

Hupp's), ;  Va.  Battery  (Rockl)ridge  Arfy).  Capt. 

William  T.  Poague;  Va.  Battery  (3(1  Howitzers),  Lieut. 
James  Utz  (k) ;  Va.  Battery,  Capt.  David  Wat.son.  Bat- 
talion loss:  k,  10;  w,  26  =  36.  Sumter  ( Ga.)  Battalion, 
Lieut.-Col.  Allen  S.  Cutts :  Co.  A,  Capt.  H.  M.  Ross ;  Co.  B. 
Capt.  George  M.  Patterson  ;  Co.  C,  Capt.  John  Lane,  y el- 
son's  Battalion,  Miij.  William  Nelson:  Va.  Battery  (Am- 
herst Art'y),  Capt.  Thomas  J.  Kirkpatriek  ;  Va.  Battery 
(Fluvanna  Art'y»,  Capt.  John  L.  Massie;  Ga.  Battery, 
Capt.  John  Milledge,  Jr.  Miscellaneous  Batteries  (assign- 
ments not  indicated) :  Ga.  Battery  (Ella's),  Lieut.  W.  F. 
Anderson;  Va.  Battery  (Hanover  Art'y),  Capt.  George 
W.  Nelson. 
CAVALRY,  M:ij.-Gen.  James  E.  B.  Stuart. 

First  Brigade  (a  detachment  was  on  a  raid  to  the  rear 
of  the  Union  army),  Brig.-Gen.  Wade  Hampton  :  Ist  N.  C, 
Col.  L.  8.  Baker;  1st  8.  C,  Col.  J.  L.  Beach  ;  2d  S.  C.  Col. 
M.  C.  Butler;  Cobb  (Ga.)  Legion,  Lieut.-Col.  P.  M.  B. 
Y'oung;  Phillips's  (Ga.)  Legion,  Lieut.-Col.  William  W. 
Rich.  Second  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Fitzhugh  Lee :  1st 
Va.,  Col.  James  H.  Drake;  2d  Va.,  Col.  Thomas  T.  Mun- 
ford;  3d  Va.,  Col.  T.  H.  Owen ;  4th  Va.,  Col.  AVilliams  C. 

Wickham;  5th  Va. .    Third  Brigade,  Brig.-(;en.  W. 

H.  F.  Lee :  2d  N.  C,  Col.  S.  Williams ;  9th  Va.,  Col.  R.  L. 
T.  Beale;  10th  Va.,  Col.  J.  Lucius  Davis;  13th  Va..  Col. 
J.  R.  Chambliss,  Jr.;  15th  Va..  Col.  William  B.  Ball. 
Brigade  loss:  w,  7.  Artillery,  Maj.  John  Pelham :  Va. 
Battery,  Capt.  James  Breathed ;  Va.  Battery,  Capt.  R. 
P.  Chew;  S.  C.  Battery,  Capt.  J.  F.  Hart;  Va.  Battery, 
Capt.  M.  W.  Henry  ;  Va.  Battery,  Capt.  M.  N.  Moorman. 
Artillery  loss  :  k,  3 ;  w,  22  =  25. 

Total  Confederate  loss:  Idlled,  608;  wounded,  4116; 
captured  or  missing,  653=  5377. 

The  "present  for  duty"  in  Lee's  army  (including  all  of 
Stuart's  cavalry),  as  shown  by  his  retui-u  for  December 
10th,  was  78,513.  To  arrive  at  Lee's  effective  strength  in 
the  battle  (not  ofticially  stated)  there  should  be  dedn»-ted 
the  usual  proitortion  of  noiwombatants.  the  detaclunent 
of  Hampton's  cavalry  brigade,  on  a  mid  to  the  north  of 
the  Rappahannock,  and  the  cavalry  lirigade  of  W.  E. 
Tones  serving  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  Acconliiic  to 
the  estimate  of  Mr.  Thomas  White,  as  given  in  Taylor's 
"Four  Years  with  General  Lee"  (p.  l.^<8i.  this  was  .">8.500of 
all  arms.  Colonel  Tuvlor  (p.  81)  says :  "  Less  than  20.000 
Confederate  troops  (about  one-fourth  of  th«>  army  under 
General  Lee)  were  actively  engaged."— Editoks. 


i^  Majors  Gariiett,  Ilaniilton,  and  T.  J.  Paw,  .Jr..  ar»>  nieiitioiicti  in  the  n-porta  as  coininun.liiitr  artillery  battalion,-;,  but 
the  compo-sition  of  their  coniinanils  is  not  givou.— Editoks. 


A  BIT   OF   PARTISAN    SEEVICE. 


BY  JOHN   S.    MOSBY,  COLONEL,    C.  S.  A. 


BEFORE  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Run  I  had  en- 
listed as  a  private  in  a  company  of  Confed- 
erate cavalry  of  which  William  E.  Jones,  a  West 
Point  officer,  was  the  captain,  and  that  had  been 
assigned  to  the  1st  Virginia  regiment  of  cav- 
alry, commanded  by  Colonel  J.  E.  B.  Stuart.  We 
joined  Stuart  at  Bunker  Hill,  a  small  village  on 
the  pike  leading  from  Winchester,  where  Greneral 
Johnston  had  his  headquarters,  to  Martinsburg, 
where  Patterson  with  his  army  was  lying.  Stuart 
was  watching  Patterson.  In  a  few  days  Patterson 
advanced  and  took  possession  of  our  camp,  and 
our  regiment  retired  tow^ard  Winchester.  Here 
I  took  my  first  lessons  in  war.  Patterson  had 
no  cavalry  except  a  battalion  of  regulars,  and 
we  had  no  artillery;  so  he  contented  himself 
with  throwing  an  occasional  shell  at  us,  and  we 
got  out  of  the  way  of  them  as  fast  as  we  could. 
One  day  we  were  lying  down  in  a  large  open  field 
holding  our  horses  when  a  battery  suddenly  ap- 
peared upon  a  hill  about  a  mile  off  and  opened  on 
us.  I  saw  a  shell  burst  within  a  few  yards  of 
Captain  Jones,  who  coolly  ordered  us  to  mount 
and  fall  into  line.  I  do  not  think  I  was  so  naueh 
frightened  at  any  time  after  that.  Stuart  sent  one 
company  of  cavalry  down  toward  Charlestown  to 
observe  Patterson,  and  with  the  remainder  of  his 
regiment  started  for  Manassas  and  took  part  in  that 
battle.  I  served  also  with  Stuart  on  the  Peninsula 
and  in  the  Antietara  campaign. 

When  the  year  18G3  arrived  Fredericksburg  had 
been  fought,  and  the  two  armies,  in  winter  quarters, 
were  confronting  each  other  on  the  Rappahannock. 
Both  sides  sought  rest ;  the  pickets  on  the  opposite 
banks  of  the  river  had  ceased  firing  and  gone  to 
swapping  coffee  and  tobacco.  The  cavalry  had 
been  sent  to  the  rear  to  forage.  But  "  quiet  to  quick 


bosoms  is  a  hell."  I  did  not  want  to  rust  away  my 
life  in  camp,  so  I  asked  Stuart  to  give  me  a  detail 
of  men  to  go  over  to  Loudoun  County,  where  I 
thought  I  could  make  things  lively  during  the  win- 
ter months.  Always  full  of  enterprise,  Stuart 
readily  assented,  and  I  started  off  on  my  career  as 
a  partisan.  At  the  time  I  had  no  idea  of  organiz- 
ing an  independent  command,  but  expected  to 
return  to  Stuart  when  the  campaign  opened  in  the 
spring.  I  was  indifferent  to  rank,  and  would  have 
been  as  contented  to  be  a  lieutenant  as  a  colonel. 
I  was  somewhat  familiar  with  the  country  where 
I  began  operations,  having  picketed  there  the  year 
before.  The  lines  of  the  troops  attached  to  the 
defenses  of  Washington  extended  from  about 
Occoquan,  on  the  lower  Potomac,  through  Centre- 
ville,  in  Fairfax  County,  to  the  Falls  of  the  upper 
Potomac,  and  thence  as  far  vpest  as  Harper's  Ferry. 
This  was  a  long  line  to  defend,  and  before  I  went 
there  had  not  been  closely  guarded.  I  began  on 
the  picket-lines ;  my  attacks  were  generally  in  the 
night-time,  and  usually  the  surprise  compensated 
for  the  disparity  in  numbers.  They  would  be  re- 
peated the  next,  and  often  during  the  same  night 
at  a  different  point,  and  this  created  a  vastly  ex- 
aggerated idea  of  my  foi-ce.  Some  conception  may 
be  formed  of  the  alarm  it  produced  from  a  fact 
stated  by  General  Hooker,  that  in  the  spring  of 
]  863  the  planks  on  Chain  Bridge  were  taken  up 
every  night  to  keep  me  out  of  Washington.  At 
that  time  I  could  not  muster  over  twenty  men.  A 
small  force  moving  with  celerity  and  threatening 
many  points  on  a  line  can  neutralize  a  hundred 
times  its  own  number.  The  line  must  be  stronger  at 
every  point  than  the  attacking  force,  else  it  is 
broken.  At  that  time  Hooker  asked  that  the  cav- 
alry division  belonging  to  the  defenses  of  Wash- 


A  BIT  OF  PARTISAN  SERVICE. 


149 


ington  be  sent  to  the  front  to  reenforee  Pleason- 
tou  when  he  crossed  the  Eappahannock  to  engage 
Stuart  in  the  great  cavalry  combat  of  June  9th.  ^  It 
was  refused  on  the  ground  that  it  was  necessary  to 
keep  it  where  it  was,  in  order  to  protect  the  commu- 
nication between  the  arm  j^  and  Washington.  Afew 
days  before  that  fight  we  struck  the  railroad  within 
two  miles  of  this  cavalry  camp,  and  captured  and 
burned  a  train  of  supplies  going  up  to  Pleasonton. 
The  3000  men  who  came  after  me  could  not  run  any 
faster  than  the  twenty  with  me.  We  vanished  like 
the  children  of  the  mist,  and  the  major-general  who 
pursued  reported  that  we  had  been  annihilated. 
But  within  less  than  a  week  I  pulled  myself  to- 
gether again,  crossed  the  Potomac  about  twelve 
miles  above  Washington,  and  captured  the  cavalry 
camp  near  Seneca. 

I  recur  now  to  the  time  when  I  first  arrived  in 
the  country  which  became  the  theater  of  the 
partisan  war  which  I  carried  on  until  the  surrender 
at  Appomattox.  As  I  have  said,  the  line  of  out- 
posts belonging  to  the  defenses  of  Washington 
formed  the  arc  of  a  circle  extending  from  the 
upper  to  the  lower  Potomac.  The  troops  had  been 
having  an  easy,  lazy  life,  which  was  described  in 
the  stereotj'ped  message  sent  every  night  to  the 
Northern  press,  "All  quiet  along  the  Potomac." 
I  saw  that  here  was  a  bountiful  harvest  to  be 
gathered,  and  that  the  reapers  were  fevT^.  I  gave 
constant  employment  to  the  Union  troops,  and  they 
no  longer  led  a  life  of  drowsy  indolence.  I  procured 
some  guides  who  kuew  every  path  of  the  countrj', 
and  with  the  aid  of  friendly  citizens  found  out 
where  every  picket  was  posted.  A  certain  major- 
general  came  after  me  with  a  division  of  cavalry 
and  a  battery  of  artillery.  After  shelling  the  woods 
in  every  direction  so  as  to  be  sure  of  my  extermi- 
nation, and  destroying  many  bats  and  owls,  he  took 
off  as  prisoners  all  the  old  men  he  could  find.  Ho 
had  the  idea  that  I  was  a  myth  and  that  these  old 
farmers  were  the  raiders.  One  old  man  appealed 
to  his  crutch  to  show  the  physical  impossibility  of 
his  being  a  guerrilla.  But  the  major-general  was 
inexorable.  He  returned  with  his  prizes  to  camp, 
but  I  was  there  almost  a^  soon  as  he  was. 

In  the  month  of  February,  1803,  Brigadier-Gen- 
eral E.  H.  Stoughton  was  in  commend  of  the  troops 
in  front  of  Washington,  with  his  headquarters  at 
Fairfax  Court  House.  There  was  a  considerable 
body  also  at  Centreville,  and  a  cavalry  brigade  was 
encamped  on  the  pike  leading  from  that  place  to 
Fairfax  Court  House,  under  command  of  Colonel 
Percy  Wyndham.  Stoughton  was  a  West  Point 
officer,  and  had  served  with  distinction  under 
McClellan  on  the  Peninsula.  Wyndham  was  an 
Englishman  sei-ving  as  Colonel  of  the  1st  New 
Jersey  Cavalry.  The  year  before  he  had  started 
up  the  Shenandoah  Valley  to  bag  Ashby.  but  the 
performance  did  not  come  up  to  the  manifesto  ;  in 
their  first  encounter  Asliby  bagged  him.  He  was 
now  given  a  chance  to  redeem  liis  reputation.  My 
attacks  on  his  linos  had  been  incessant  and  very 
annoying.  He  struck  blindly  around  like  the  Cyclojis 
in  his  cave,  but  nobody  was  hurt.     The  metliodical 


tactics  he  had  learned  in  European  wars  were  of  no 
more  use  to  him  than  a  suit  of  armor  of  the  Middle 
Ages.  My  men  would  dart  down  on  his  outposts 
like  a  hawk  on  its  prey  ;  but  when  Wyndham  came 
up  in  solid  column  the  partisans  had  gone.  In  his 
vexation  he  sent  me  word  that  1  was  a  horse-thief; 
to  which  I  replied  that  all  the  horses  I  had  stolen 
had  had  riders,  and  the  riders  had  had  sabers 
and  pistols. 

While  operating  against  the  outposts  it  had  been 
my  custom  to  examine  my  prisoners  separately, 
and  in  this  way  I  learned  all  the  interior  arrange- 
ments of  their  camps.  I  was  then  meditating  a 
bolder  enterprise  than  I  had  ever  undertaken,  but 
had  commimicated  it  to  no  one.  This  was  to  pene- 
trate the  outer  lines,  and  go  right  up  to  their  head- 
quarters and  carry  off  the  general  commanding 
and  Colonel  Wyndham.  It  looked  extremely 
hazardous  to  attempt  it;  but  as  nothing  of  the 
sort  ever  had  been  done,  I  calculated  there  would 
be  no  precaution  to  prevent  it.  I  was  right.  While 
I  was  maturing  my  plan  I  received  aid  from  an 
unexpected  source.  One  day  a  deserter,  named 
Ames,  wearing  the  stripes  of  a  sergeant,  came  to  me 
from  a  New  York  cavalry  regiment  of  WjTidham's 
brigade.  The  Emancipation  Proclamation  which 
had  been  put  in  operation  was  the  reason  he 
gave  for  deserting  the  cause  of  the  Union,  but  I 
always  suspected  that  it  was  some  personal  wrong 
he  had  suffered.  He  seemed  to  be  animated  by  the 
most  vindictive  hatred  for  his  former  comrades.  I 
felt  an  instinctive  confidence  in  his  sincerity  which 
he  never  betrayed.  After  I  had  thoroughly  tested 
his  fidelity  I  made  him  a  lieutenant.  He  served 
with  me  until  he  was  killed  in  October,  180-4. 

I  questioned  Ames  closely  about  the  location  of 
the  camps  and  outposts,  and  he  confirmed  the 
knowledge  I  had  pro\'iously  obtained.  I  deter- 
mined first  to  take  him  on  a  trial-trip  down  into 
Fairfax  County.  There  was  a  cavalry  post  at  a 
certain  school-house,  and  I  started  with  Ames  one 
afternoon  to  attack  it.  A  deep  snow  was  on  the 
ground,  and  it  was  raining  and  sleeting.  About 
two  weeks  before,  I  had  captured  the  same  post, 
but  I  thought  they  would  not  expect  me  back  so 
soon.  To  satisfy  my  men  I  did  not  let  Ames  carry 
any  arms,  for  they  all  were  certain  that  lu^  had  been 
sent  to  decoy  me  into  a  trap.  The  soldiers  in  the 
Union  camps  slept  soundly  that  night,  for  they 
felt  sure  that  nothing  but  a  wild  animal  would  be 
abroad  in  such  weather.  I  stopped  wlien  I  got 
near  the  place  I  intended  to  attack,  to  make  an 
inqiiiry  of  a  farmer  who  lived  near  there  as  to  the 
number  of  men  on  the  ])ost.  I  called  him  out  of 
bed.  He  came  to  the  door  in  his  night-dress,  and 
the  first  thing  he  asked  was,  "  How  many  men  Imve 
you?"  I  said,  "Seventeen."  "How  many,"  I 
asked,  "are  at  the  ])icket-post  ?"  "One hundred." 
lie  answered.  "T  liavo  boon  down  there  this  even- 
ing. You  are  certainly  not  going  to  attack  thom 
with  so  few  menf"  "  Yes,"  I  replied  ;  "it  is  so 
dark  they  can't  see  us,  and  will  think  I  have  got  a 
hundred  too."  Contrary  to  my  usual  practice,  I 
went  straight  along  the  road.    Wo  got  close  on  the 


)  At  Rruiidy  ."Station.— Editoks. 


I50 


A  BIT  OF  PARTISAN  SERVICE. 


vedette,  who  challenged  us,  fired,  and  started  into 
camp  at  full  speed.  We  dashed  on  as  close  to 
his  heels  as  the  witches  were  on  Tam  O'Shanter's. 
The  men  were  asleep  in  the  school-house  and  their 
horses  were  tied  with  halters  to  the  trees.  If  they 
had  staid  inside  they  could  easily  have  driven  us 


COLONEL  JOHN    8.   M08BT,    C.  S.   A. 
FROM    A    PHOTOORAl'II. 

f)ff  with  their  carbines.  But  every  man  ran  for  his 
horse,  and  we  were  just  in  time  to  scatter  them. 
We  got  all  the  horses,  but  most  of  the  men  escaped 
in  the  darkness.  In  the  charge,  Ames  rode  by 
my  side.  We  got  off  safe  with  our  booty  and 
prisoners.  After  daybreak,  Colonel  Wyndham 
followed  at  full  speed  for  twenty  miles  on  our 


track.  All  that  he  did  was  to  go  back  to  camp 
with  a  lot  of  broken  down  horses.  Ames,  like  the 
saints,  had  been  tried  by  tii'e ;  he  was  never 
doubted  afterward.  The  time  had  now  come  for 
me  to  take  a  bolder  flight  and  execute  my  plan  of 
making  a  raid  on  headquarters. 

It  was  on  the  afternoon  of  March  7th,  1863,  that  I 
started  from  Aldie  with  29  men  on  this  expedition. 
Ames  was  the  only  one  who  knew  its  object.  It  was 
pitch-dark  before  we  got  near  the  cavalry  pickets  at 
Chantilly.  We  passed  in  between  them  and  Centre- 
ville.  Here  a  good  point  in  the  game  was  won,  for 
once  inside  the  Union  lines  we  would  be  mistaken  for 
their  own  men.  By  an  accident  one-half  of  my  com- 
mand got  separated  in  the  dark  from  the  other,  and 
it  was  nearly  an  hoxu*  before  I  could  find  them.  We 
passed  along  close  by  the  camp-fires,  but  the  senti- 
nels took  us  for  a  scouting  party  of  their  cavalry.  I 
had  felt  very  cold  in  the  early  part  of  the  night, 
but  my  blood  gi-ew  warmer  as  I  got  farther  in  the 
lines,  and  the  chill  passed  away.  I  had  no  reputa- 
tion to  lose  by  failure  but  much  to  gain  by  suc- 
cess. I  remembered,  too,  the  motto  that  Ixion  in 
heaven  wrote  in  Minerva's  album — "Adventures 
are  to  the  adventurous."  We  sti-uck  the  road  lead- 
ing from  Fairfax  Court  House  to  the  railroad  sta- 
tion and  then  went  on  to  the  village.  There  were  a 
few  guards  about,  but  they  did  not  suspect  us  until 
they  saw  a  pistol  pointed  at  them.  Of  course  they 
surrendered.  Some  refused  to  believe  we  were 
Confederates  after  we  told  them  who  we  wei*e.  A 
few  sentinels  hailed  us  with  the  formula,  "  Who 
comes  there?"  and  were  answered,  "5th  New 
York  Cavalry."  It  was  past  midnight,  and  it  was 
necessary  to  do  our  work  quickly  if  it  was  to  be 
done  at  all.  The  first  thing  I  did  was  to  detail 
squads  of  men  to  gather  prisoners  and  horses. 
I  was  more  anxious  to  catch  Wyndham  than  any 
one  else ;  so  I  sent  Ames,  with  a  detachment,  after 
him.  But  for  once  fortime  had  been  propitious 
to  him.  Ho  had  gone  down  to  Washington  that 
evening.  Ames  got  two  of  his  staff  and  his  imi- 
form,  and  brought  them  to  me.  One  of  these  offi- 
cers was  Captain  Barker,  of  the  5th  New  York 
Cavalry,  who  had  been  Ames's  captain.  Ames 
brought  him  to  me  as  a  trophy,  and  seemed  to  feel 
a  malicious  pride  in  introducing  him.  I  had  sent 
another  party  to  the  house  where  Lieut. -Col.  Kobert 
Johnstone,  commanding  the  cavalry  brigade,  was 
sleeping.  In  some  manner  he  had  heard  the  alarm 
and  had  slipped  out  through  the  back-way  into  the 
garden  in  his  night-clothes.  His  wife  met  my  men 
like  a  lioness  at  the  door.  I  was  gi-eatly  disap- 
pointed in  not  getting  Wyndham.  The  capture  of 
his  staff-officers  and  fine  horses  was  not  an  equiva- 
lent for  the  loss  of  the  chief.  The  other  details  did 
their  work  rapidly,  and  soon  collected  at  oiir  rendez- 
vous in  the  court-yard  a  large  number  of  prisoners 
and  fine  steeds.  The  prisoners  seemed  to  be  utterly 
dumfounded.  About  this  time  Joe  Nelson  rode  up 
to  me  with  a  prisoner  who  said  he  belonged  to  the 
guard  at  General  Stoughton's  headquarters,  and 
with  a  party  of  five  or  six  I  immediately  went  there. 
We  dismounted,  and  with  a  loud  rap  on  the  front 
door  awoke  the  inmates.  An  upper  window  was 
raised  and  some  one  called  out,  "Who  is  there  ?" 


A  BIT  OF  PARTISAN  SERVICE. 


I5« 


The  answer  was,  "  We  have  a  dispatch  for  General 
Stoughton."  An  officer  (Lieutenant  Prentiss)  came 
to  the  front  door  to  get  it.  I  caught  hold  of  his 
shirt  and  whispered  my  name  in  his  ear,  and  told 
him  to  lead  me  to  the  general's  room.  Eesistauee 
was  useless,  and  he  did  so.  A  light  was  struck, 
and  before  us  lay  the  sleeping  general.  He  quickly 
raised  himself  in  bed  and  asked  what  this  meant.  I 
said,  "General,  get  up  —  dress  quick  —  you  are  a 
prisoner."  "  What ! "  exclaimed  the  indignant  gen- 
eral. "  My  name  is  Mosby ;  Stuart's  cavalry  are  in 
possession  of  this  place,  and  General  Jackson  holds 
Centreville."  "IsFitz  Leehere?"  "Yes."  "Then 
take  me  to  him;  we  were  classmates."  "Very 
well;  but  dress  quick."  Two  of  my  men  assisted 
him  to  put  on  his  clothes.  My  motive  in  deceiving 
him  in  regard  to  the  amount  of  my  force  was  to 
deprive  him  of  all  hope  of  rescue.  I  was  in  a  most 
critical  situation,  for  in  addition  to  several  thousand 
troops  in  the  surrounding  camps,  a  considerable 
number  were  quartered  in  the  houses  in  the  village. 
If  there  had  been  the  least  concert  among  them 
they  could  easily  have  driven  us  out ;  but,  although 
we  remained  there  an  hour,  not  a  shot  was  fii'ed ; 
as  soon  as  our  presence  became  known  each  man 
tried  to  save  himself.  Stoughton  did  not  delay  a 
moment,  for  he  had  no  idea  how  few  of  us  there 
were.  A  couple  of  men  had  been  left  to  hold  our 
horses  while  we  were  in  the  house.  One  of  these, 
George  Whitescarver,  surrounded  and  captured  a 
guard  of  six  men  sleeping  in  a  tent.  Stoughton's 
horses  all  stood  at  the  door  as  we  came  out,  with 
saddles  and  bridles  on.  Lieutenant  Prentiss 
started,  but  soon  parted  company  with  us.  We 
could  not  see  where  he  went.  When  I  got  to  the 
court-yard  I  found  all  my  different  squads  col- 
lected there  with  their  prisoners  and  spoils.  No 
sign  of  resistance  had  been  shown.  The  prisoners 
outnumbered  us  three  or  four  to  one,  and  each 
was  mounted  and  leading  a  horse.  The  cavalcade 
started  in  an  opposite  direction  from  where  we  ill- 
tended  to  go,  in  order  to  deceive  ourpui-suers.  After 
going  a  few  hundred  yards  we  turned  and  flanked 
the  cavalry  camp,  and  struck  the  pike  to  Centreville. 
Stoughton  soon  discovered  how  few  of  us  there 
were.  I  did  not  allow  him  to  hold  his  bridle-reins, 
but  gave  them  to  one  of  my  men  (Hunter),  who  rode 
beside  him.  Stoughton  remarked,  "  This  is  a  bold 
thing  you  have  done;  but  you  will  certainly  be 
caught;  our  cavalry  will  soon  be  after  you."  "  Per- 
haps so,"  I  said.  It  was  so  dark  that  the  blue 
could  not  be  distinguished  from  the  gray.  Hence 
the  prisoners  all  thought  there  were  at  least  one 
hundred  of  us.  We  lost  many  of  them  before  we 
got  beyond  the  lines.  They  were  all  formed  in  a 
column  of  fours,  and  after  we  got  on  the  pike  I  rode 
some  distance  in  the  rear  wliilo  Hunter,  with 
Stoughton,  was  leading  in  front.  We  went  at  a 
trot  and  the  chances  of  our  escape  were  improving. 
No  one  seemed  to  be  on  our  track,  as  oui*  winding 


about  had  baffled  pursuit.  It  never  entered  the 
head  of  any  one  that  I  would  march  up  the  pike  in 
the  face  of  two  or  three  thousand  troops  at  Centre- 
ville. When  within  a  mile  of  that  place,  and  just 
about  the  break  of  day,  we  came  \i\nni  a  camp-fire 
which  had  e\adently  just  been  deserted.  A  picket 
had  been  posted  there  on  the  evening  before  to  stay 
during  the  night.  The  officer,  thinking  it  unneces- 
sary to  remain  longer,  had  gone  into  camp.  As  we 
had  taken  the  precaution  to  cut  the  telegraph  wires, 
no  news  had  yet  reached  Centreville  of  our  work 
at  the  Com-t  House.  When  I  saw  the  picket-tii-e  on 
the  pike  I  halted  the  column  and  galloped  forward 
to  reconnoiter.  Seeing  that  no  one  was  there, 
I  called  to  Hunter  to  come  on.  It  was  necessary 
to  make  a  circuit  aroimd  Centreville,  and  to  pass 
between  encampments  of  Union  troops  on  both 
sides  of  it.  I  was  certain  to  be  lost  if  I  went  either 
too  far  to  the  left  or  the  right.  Just  as  we  turned 
off  from  the  pike  Captain  Barker  made  a  desperate 
attempt  to  escape.  He  darted  from  the  line,  but 
my  Hungarian  Jake  was  at  his  heels,  and  sent  a 
harmless  shot  after  him  just  as  his  horse  fell  in  a 
ditch.  I  rode  up  to  him  and  inquii-ed  if  he  was 
hurt.  He  said  "No,''  and  Jake  assisted  him  to 
mount.  No  one  else  eared  to  repeat  the  experi- 
ment. We  passed  within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  the 
forts,  and  could  see  the  guns  pointing  through  the 
embrasures  and  hear  the  challenge  of  the  sentinels 
as  they  walked  on  the  parapets.  My  heart  began  to 
beat  with  joy.  The  odds  were  now  rapidly  getting  in 
my  favor.  We  were  soon  on  the  other  side  of  Centre- 
ville. Although  we  could  be  plainly  seen  from  there, 
it  was  probably  supposed  that  we  were  a  scout- 
ing party  of  Federal  cavalry.  When  we  got  to  Cub 
Eun,  it  was  so  swollen  by  the  melting  snows  that 
it  could  not  be  forded.  We  were  still  within  easy 
cannon-shot  of  the  guns  on  the  heights,  and  there 
was  no  time  to  be  lost,  I  acted  on  the  maxim  of 
plucking  the  flower  safety  from  the  nettle  danger, 
and  plunging  into  the  brimming  stream  swam  over. 
The  rest  followed,  Stoughton  being  next  to  me. 
The  first  thing  he  said  as  he  shivered  with  cold  was, 
"This  is  the  first  rough  treatment  I  have  received." 
I  knew  that  no  cavalry  would  ever  swim  after  me, 
LeaAang  Hunter  to  come  on  with  my  men  and  pris- 
oners, I  galloped  on  ah<>ad  with  George  Slater  and 
once  more  got  on  the  i)ike  at  Groveton.  This  was 
the  very  spot  whore,  tlu>  year  before.  Fit/.  John  Por- 
ter had  made  his  disastrous  assault  on  Jackson. 
From  this  hill  I  had  a  view  of  the  pike  seven  miles 
back  to  Centreville.  No  enemy  was  in  pursuit.  I 
was  safe.  Just  then  Hunter  appeared  and  the  sun 
rose.  It  seemed  to  me  that  it  never  shone  with 
such  splendor  before.  I  turned  over  my  jirisoners 
to  Stuart  at  Culpeper  Court  House.  He  was  as 
much  delighted  by  wliat  I  had  done  as  I  was.  and 
published  a  general  order  announcing  it  to  the 
cavalry,  in  which  lie  said  that  it  was  "a  iVat  un- 
paralleled in  the  war." 


I 


STONEMAN'S    RAID    IN    THE    CHANCELLORSVILLE    CAMPAIGN,  i 


THE  original  instructions  to  General  Geoi-ge 
Stoneman  for  the  cooperation  of  the  cavalry 
in  the  Chancellorsville  campaign  directed  him  to 
cross  the  Rappahannock  on  the  13th  of  April,  at 
some  point  west  of  the  Orange  and  Alexandria 
raih-oad,  and  throw  his  whole  force,  excepting  one 
brigade,  between  Lee's  position  on  the  Rappahan- 
nock and  his  base  at  Richmond.  The  object  was 
the  isolation  of  the  enemy  "from  his  supplies, 
eliccking  his  retreat,  and  inflicting  on  him  every 
p()ssil)le  injury  which  will  tend  to  his  discomfiture 
and  defeat."  This  movement  was  delayed  by  heavy 
rains,  and  on  the  28th  of  April  the  instructions 
were  modified.  The  new  plan  was  to  cross  the  Rap- 
pahannock at  the  fords  immediately  north-west 
of  Fredericksburg  on  the  evening  of  the  28th,  or 
the  morning  of  the  29th,  and  move  in  two  columns, 
operating  on  the  lines  of  the  Orange  and  Alexan- 
dria and  the  Richmond  and  Fredericksburg  rail- 
roads toward  Richmond,  The  movements  of  the 
corps  are  given  in  detail  in  the  report  of  General 
Stoneman : 

"  On  April  27tli,  I,  then  beins  at  Warrenton  Junction, 
■with  the  corps  encamped  along  the  Orange  and  Alexan- 
dria railroad,  received  a  telegram  directing  me  with  my 
commanders  to  meet  some  persons  from  headquarters 
Army  of  the  Potomac  at  Morrisville  on  the  following 
(lay  [the  '2Sth]  at  2  P.  M.  Arriving  there  with  my  com- 
ukiikIcis,  I  found  the  comniandiug  general  and  his  staff, 
and  h^ariicd  that  a  portion  of  the  army  was  about  to 
cross  the  Uappahanuock  at  Kelly's  Ford  that  day.  .  .  . 
From  Morrisville  to  where  the  cavalry  corps  lay  was 
thirteen  miles ;  from  there  to  where  some  of  the  extreme 
pickets  were  was  thirteen  more,  so  that  it  was  quite 
late  at  night  before  the  command  was  all  assembled 
and  ready  to  start,  and  owing  to  the  state  of  the  roads, 
the  result  of  the  recent  heavy  rains,  and  the  darkness 
of  the  night,  rendered  doubly  obscure  by  a  dense  fog, 
the  corps  did  not  reach  the  river  imtil  nearly  8  A.  M.  of 
the  29th.  Arriving  at  the  river,  we  found  but  one  ford 
witliin  the  limits  prescribed  in  our  instructions  which 
eoiild  be  passed  over,  and  that  not  by  packed  mules  or 
artillery.  By  dint  of  great  exertion  we  succeeded  In 
getting  all  over  the  river  by  5  p.  M.  I  assembled  the 
division  and  brigade  commanders,  spread  our  maps,  and 
had  a  thorough  understanding  of  what  we  were  to 
do.  .  .  .  Instructions  were  given  to  have  all  the 
packed  mules  and  led  horses  sent  in  the  direction  of 
Gernninna  Mills,  and  to  follow  in  the  rear  of  the  army 
and  remain  with  it  until  we  formed  a  junction  there- 
with, which  we  (xiK'ctcd  \v(mld  be  in  the  vicinity  of 
ItichiMond,  and  for  each  offlcer  and  man  to  take  with 
him  no  more  than  he  could  carry  on  his  horse,  myself 
and  staff  setting  yje  example." 

Averell,  with  three  brigades,  was  to  advance  on 
Culpeper  Court  House,  wliile  Stoneman,  with  three 
brigades  numbering  about  3500,  under  D.  McM. 
Gregg,  was  to  take  the  shorter  roTite  via  Stevensbiirg, 
a  liamlet  7  miles  east  of  Culpeper  Court  House. 
The  operations  the  first  day,  the  29th,  after  cross- 
ing, consisted  in  dri\angin  the  outpostswhieh  were 
encountered  on  both  roads.    The  report  continues : 

"About  9  A.  M.,  April  ;)Oth,  a  staff-officer  of  General 
Averell  overtook  me.  .  .  .  lie  also  handed  me  a  note 
picked  up  by  some  one,  and  sent  me  by  General  Averell, 
and  to  the  following  effect : 

"'[Important.]  llKAnQiiAKTEits.  Cavaluy  Divi.siov,  near 
Brandy  Station,  Va.,  April  '29tli,  186.S.    fOLONF.i.  (^iiamhliss, 


13th  Virginia  Cavalry.  Colonel:  The  major-general  coni- 
maiidiug  directs  me  to  say  that  he  wishes  you  to  get  a  mau 
posted  so  as  to  have  a  view  of  tlie  road  leading  down  on  the 
other  side  to  Kelly's  loid,  and  tind  out  what  kind  of  troops 
marched  down  belniid  \hr  wai^oiis.  The  enemy  liave  made 
a  demonstration  toward  ^ti\  t-iisburg,  but  so  far  it  amounts 
to  nothing.  Tlie  general  is  very  anxious  to  know  where  to 
look  for  Stoneman,  as  we  have  heardnothing  from  him.  Most 
respectfully,  your  obedient  servant,  R.  Channing  PidCE, 
Assistant  Adjutant-General.' 

"  Feeling  eatisfled  that  wo  should  And  Raccoon  Ford 
guarded,  and  that  its  passage  would  be  disputed,  I 
strudv  t  lie  Itapidan  Kiver  about  six  miles  below  ;  crossed 
over  tlu-  portion  of  the  command  under  General  Buford, 
who  .scut  a  iiarty  under  Captain  Peter  Peun  Gaskell,  of  his 
staff,  who,  at  a  dash,  cleared  the  ford  above,  capturing 
an  officer,  Lieutenant  Bourier  [James  Boulware]  of  the 
9th  Virginia  Cavab-y,  and  six  privates  of  the  9th  and  10th 


major-general    GEORGE    STONEMAN. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 

Virginia  Cavalry.  The  rest  of  the  cavalry  and  the  artil- 
lery made  their  escape.  The  main  body  immediately 
crossed  at  tlu'  Raccoon  Ford,  the  rear  getting  over  about 
10  p.  M.  No  tires  liuilt  to-night,  as  we  were  in  plain  view 
from  Clark's  Mountain,  a  few  miles  to  the  south  of  the 
ford,  and  on  the  top  of  which  the  enemy  have  a  signal 
station.  We  learned  here  that  Stuart,  with  Fitzhugh 
Lee's  brigade,  had  that  morning  crossed  at  Somerville 
Ford,  five  miles  above  Raccoon  Ford,  and  had  gone 
toward  Frcdcricksl)nrg,  and  we  thought  it  more  than 
probable  that  wc  should  find  him  on  the  Plank  road  at 
Verdiervillc,  where  \vc  hadto  strike  it  on  our  way  south. 
Orders  were  is-ncil  ti>  be  in  the  saddle  at  2  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  and  we  lax  down  on  the  wet  ground  to  get  a 
couple  of  liours'  sleep.  Two  o'clock  came,  but  the  fog  was 
so  thi(  k  that  it  was  impossible  to  move,  more  particu- 
larly as  we  had  no  guide  to  show  us  the  road.  Daylight 
came,  and  we  pushed  on  ;  struck  the  turnpike ;  found  no 
enemy,  but  saw  by  his  trail  that  he  had  gone  toward 
Fredericksburg.  From  here  I  pushed  Gregg's  division 
on  to  Louisa  Court  House,  on  the  Virginia  Central  Kail- 
road,  where  it  arrived  about  2  A.  M.,  May  2d,  and  imme- 
diately commenced  tearing  up  the  track  of  the  railroad, 
destro.^ing  the  telegraph,  etc.  Buford's  brigade  en- 
camped that  night  on  the  south  bank  of  the  North  Anna. 
About  10  A.  M.,  May  2d,  I  had  the  whole  force  united  at 
Louisa  Court  House.    From  here  I  pushed  a  squadron 


i  See  map,  p.  1.55  of  this  volume,  and  also  p.  164  of  Volume  II.— Editors. 

1-52 


STONEMAN'S  RAID    IN  THE  CHANCELLOKSyiLLE  CAMPAIGN. 


133 


of  the  let  Maine,  under  Captain  Tucker  of  that  regi- 
ment, toward  Gordonsville  to  find  out  the  whereabouts 
of  the  enemy  in  that  direction,  as  we  knew  that  six  or 
seven  trains  had  passed  up  the  evening  previous  loaded 
with  troops.  The  captain  drove  in  thi'ir  i)ickets  upon 
the  main  body,  the  9th  Virginia  Cavalry,  which  in  turn 
attacked  him,  killing  1  man,  wounding  1,  and  captiu'ing 
1  lieutenant  and  23  men.  Captain  Lord,  with  the  1st  U. 
S.  Cavalry,  was  sent  to  Tolcrsvillu  Station,  and  from 
there  to  Fredorickshall  Station,  twelve  miles  from 
Louisa  Court  House.  From  here  a  party  under  Lieuten- 
ant   went  to  the  Xorth  Anna  and  destroyed  Carr's 

Bridge,  which  is  on  the  main  road  leading  from  (Spotsyl- 
vania to  Goochland,  on  the  James  River,  and  is  out;  of 
the  principal  highways.  After  having  dcstr()yc<l  the 
Virginia  Central  railroad  and  telegraph,  burned  the  de- 
pots, water-tanks,  etc.,  for  eighteen  miles,  and  accom- 
plished all  that  time  would  permit,  we  pushed  on  to 
Yanceyville,  on  the  South  Anna,  and  from  there  to 
Thompson's  Cross-roads,  ten  miles  lower  down  the 
river,  where  we  arrived  al>out  10  p.  m..  May  2d. 

"At  this  point  the  James  and  8outh  Anna  rivers  are  less 
than  12  miles  apart,  and  here  I  determined  to  make  the 
most  of  my  35C0  men  in  carrying  out  my  previously  con- 
ceived plan  of  operations.  .  .  .  One  party,  the  1st  New 
Jersej',  under  Colonel  [Percy]  Wyndham,  was  to  strike 
the  James  River  at  Columbia,  at  thejunctionof  the  James 
and  Rivanna  rivers,  to  destroy,  if  possible,  the  large 
canal  aqueduct  over  the  Rivanna,  and  from  thence  pro- 
ceed along  the  canal  in  the  direction  of  Richmond,  doing 
all  the  harm  possilde.  .  .  .  Another  party,  the  2d  New 
York,  Colonel  [Judson]  Kilpatrick,  was  to  push  onto  the 
railroad  bridges  over  the  Chickahominy,  destroy  them 
and  the  telegrnph,  and  oi)erate  in  the  direction  of  Rich- 
mond, foui-  miles  distant  from  the  bridges.  Another  force, 
the  12tli  Illinois  Cavahy,  Colonel  Hasbrouck  Davis,  was 
to  strike  the  t  \vi  >  lailroads  at  or  in  the  vicinity  of  Ashland, 
on  the  Fredernkslnirg,  and  Atlee's,  on  the  Virginia  Cen- 
tral, and  do  all  the  harm  it  could.  Another  party,  the  ist 
Maine  and  1st  Maryland,  with  a  section  of  artillery,  all 
under  General  firegg,  was  to  follow  down  the  South 
Anna  River,  destroy  all  the  road  bridges  thereon,  and, 
if  possible,  th(^  two  railroad  bridges  across  that  river. 
Another  party,  the  5th  U.  S.  Cavalry,  under  Captain 
Drummond,  was  to  follow  this  last  and  see  that  the  de- 
etrnction  was  eomplete.  Captain  Merritt,  with  a  flying 
party  of  the  l-t  Marvlaul,  was  sent  out  to  do  what  he 
thought  he  eould  acidiiiiilish  in  the  way  of  destroying 
bridges,  etc.  These  ditt'erent  parties  all  got  ofl'  by  3  a.  i\i. 
on  the  3d. 

"...  Colonels  Wjnidham,  Kilpatrick,  and  Davis 
were  directed  either  to  return  or  to  push  on  and  bring  up 
at  either  Yorktown  or  (iloiicester  Point.  The  rest  were 
ordered  to  return  to  the  reserve  with  myself.  Colonel 
Wyndham  and  Captain  Lord  returned  the  same  day. 
GeneraKireggand  Captainw  Merritt  and  Drummond  the 
next  day.  Colonels  Kili.atrick  and  Davis  pushed  on 
through  to  (lloucester  Point.  .  .  .  We  remained  at  Shan- 
non's Cross-roads  during  the  4th,  and  on  the  monung  of 
the  .itli  moved  to  Yatieey  ville,  on  the  South  .\nna,  where 
we  were  Joined  by  (ieneral  Oregg,  Colonel  Wyndham, 
and  Captains  Merritt  and  Diumraond,  each  with  his 
command." 

Tlie  operations  of  the  column  under  General 
Avorell  aro  tlius  described  l)y  him  in  a  commu- 
nication to  the  editors  dated  May  11  th,  1  :^S8  : 

"  We  encountered  the  enemy's  cavalry,  two  thousand 
Strong,  imdcr  General  W.  H.  F.  Lee  on  the  morning  of 


the  30th,  and  drove  it  through  Culpeper  Court  House  in 
the  direction  of  Rapidan  Station. 

"  On  the  1st  we  pressed  the  enemy's  cavalry  and 
pushed  our  right  to  within  three  miles  of  Orange  Court 
House  in  an  effort  to  dislodge  the  enemy  from  a  strong 
position  occupied  by  him  on  the  south  hank  of  the  Rapi- 
dan, after  he  had  crossed  and  destroyed  the  bridge. 

"  Whih^  thus  engaged  on  the  morning  of  the  2d  we 
were  recalled  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  at  U.  S.  Ford 
by  orders  from  General  Hooker.  We  reached  Ely's 
Ford  of  the  Rapidan  after  dark  on  the  evening  of  the 
2d,  and  were  fired  upon  by  the  enemy's  infantry  from 
the  opposite  bank.  A  part  of  Mclntosli's  Ijrigade  forded 
the  river,  dismounted,  drove  away  the  enemy,  some  of 
the  13th  North  Carolina,  and  captured  some  prisoners. 
Karly  on  the  morning  of  the  3d  we  crossed  the  Rapi- 
dan and  entered  the  right  of  our  lines. 

"  It  was  found  necessary  to  issue  immediate  orders 
sending  cavalry  to  protect  the  right  and  rear  of  the 
army,  which  had  become  exiiosed  to  danger  from  the 
enemy's  cavalry  set  fi-ee  by  our  recall." 

The  column  with  Stoneman  now  prepared  to  re- 
turn to  the  army.    His  report  continues  : 

"  The  six  days  having  now  expired,  during  which  we 
were  assured  by  the  commanding  general  he  would  cer- 
tainly communicate  with  us,  and  no  communication 
having  been  received,  no  retreating  enemy  having  been 
seen  or  heard  of,  and  no  information  as  to  the  condition 
of  things  in  the  vicinity  of  Frederick.sburg,  except  vague 
rumors  of  our  defeat  ami  capture,  having  been  obtained. 
supplies  for  man  and  beast  beeoming  scarce,  having  ac- 
complished all  that  we  were  sent  to  perfonn,  and  having 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  Ccdonels  Kilpatrick  and 
Davis,  with  their  commands,  had  gone  in  the  direction 
of  Yorktown,  I  determined  to  make  the  best  of  oui-  way 
back  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

"To  take  the  enemy  by  surprise  and  penetrate  his 
coimtry  was  easy  enough ;  to  withdraw  from  it  was  a 
more  difHcult  matter.  We  knew  that  Lee  and  Hampton 
were  to  the  west  of  us.  .  .  .  We  knew  also  that  there 
W!is  a  strong  force  at  and  in  the  vicinity  of  Gordonsville, 
and  heal (1  that  anotlii'r  force  was  at  Louisa  Coui-t  House, 
and  a  small  force  of  infantry  at  Tolersville. 

"After  thinking  the  matter  over.  I  determined  to  .«end 
General  Buford,  with  650  picked  horses  of  his  brigade,  to 
threat<'n  any  force  in  the  vicinity  of  Gordonsville,  and 
induce  Lee  and  IIani[iton  to  believe  that  we  were  going 
to  get  out  l)y  that  way ;  and  another  force,  under  Captain 
Rodenbough,  was  sent  in  the  direction  of  Bowling  Green, 
with  the  view  of  threatening  the  enemy's  communica- 
tion in  that  direction,  and,  under  cover  of  night,  with 
the  main  body,  to  take  the  middle  road  leading  through 
Tolersville,  and  crossing  the  North  Anna  near  the  Vic- 
toria Iron  Works;  from  thence  to  Orange  Springe,  where 
all  were  to  rendezvous  the  next  day. 

"All  our  plans  and  calculations  worked  adminibly, 
and  though  we  had  no  little  difficulty  in  finding  and  fol- 
lowing the  almost  impassable  roads,  owing  to  the  inky 
darkness  of  the  night  and  the  inc.ssant  pouring  of  the 
rain,  the  whole  command  was  asseml>l<d  at  Oningo 
Springs  at  1>  m.  on  the  fith.  Here  we  first  Jtcgan  to  hear 
rumors.  Through  negroes,  of  the  repulse  and  withdrawal 
of  our  army  to  the  north  side  of  the  Rappahannock. 

"After  watering  and  feeding  our  animals,  we  pushed 
on  to  the  riank  road  leading  from  Fredericksburg  to 
Orange  Court  House,  and  from  thence  to  Raccoon  Ford, 
which,  to  onr  great. joy,  we  found  fordable,  and  were  all 
over  safe  by  daylight  on  the  uiorulng  of  the  7th." 

Epitors. 


FIFTH 


THIRD 


ELEVENTH 


CORPS     BADGES    OF    THE    ARMY    OF  THE     POTOMAC    UNDER    HOOKER. 


THE  CHANCELLORSVILLE  CAMPAIGN, 


BY  DARIUS  N.  COUCH,  MAJOR-GENEKAL,  U.  S.  V. 


IN  the  latter  part  of  January,  1863,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  under  Burn- 
side  was  still  occupying  its  old  camps  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rappahan- 
nock, opposite  Fredericksburg.  After  the  failures  under  Burnside  it  was 
evident  that  the  army  must  have  a  new  commander.  For  some  days  there 
had  been  a  rumor  that  Hooker  had  been  fixed  upon  for  the  place,  and  on 
the  26th  of  January  it  was  confirmed.  This  appointment,  undoubtedly, 
gave  very  general  satisfaction  to  the  army,  except  perhaps  to  a  few,  mostly 
superior  officers,  who  had  grown  up  with  it,  and  had  had  abundant  oppor- 
tunities to  study  Hooker's  military  character;  these  believed  that  Mr. 
Lincoln  had  committed  a  grave  error  in  his  selection.  The  army,  from  its 
former  reverses,  had  become  quite  disheartened  and  almost  sulky ;  but  the 
quick,  vigorous  measures  now  adopted  and  carried  out  with  a  firm  hand  had 
a  magical  effect  in  toning  up  where  there  had  been  demoralization  and 
inspiring  confidence  where  there  had  been  mistrust.  Few  changes  were 
made  in  the  heads  of  the  general  staff  departments,  but  for  his  chief -of-staff 
Hooker  applied  for  Brigadier-General  Charles  P.  Stone,  who,  through  some 
untoward  influence  at  Washington,  was  not  given  to  him.  This  was  a 
mistake  of  the  war  dignitaries,  although  the  officer  finally  appointed  to  the 
office,  Major-General  Daniel  Butterfield,  proved  himself  very  efficient.  Burn- 
side's  system  of  dividing  the  army  into  three  grand  divisions  was  set  aside, 
and  the  novelty  was  introduced  of  giving  to  each  army  corps  a  distinct  badge, 
an  idea  which  was  very  popular  with  officers  and  men.  ^ 


}  Roprinted  with  permission  from  the  "Pliiladel- 
pliia  Times." — Editors. 

3i  Tliis  idea  originated  with  General  Butterfield, 
who  not  only  instituted  the  badges,  but  devised 
them  in  detail.  As  organized  by  Hooker  the  First 
Corps  was  commanded  by  Reynolds  ;  the  Second  by 
Couch;  the  Third  by  Sickles;  the  Fifth  by  Meade; 
the  Sixth  by  Sedgwick ;  the  Eleventh  by  Howard ; 
the  Twelfth  by  Slocum,  and  the  cavalry  corps  by 


Stoneman.  In  each  corps  the  badge  of  the  First 
Division  was  red  ;  of  the  Second  Division,  white ;  of 
the  Third  Division,  blue.  After  the  battle  of  Chieka- 
mauga  (Sept.  19th  and  20th,  1863),  the  Eleventh 
and  Twelfth  corps  were  sent  west,  and  on  April 
4th,  18G4,  they  were  consolidated  to  form  the  new 
Twentieth  Corps,  which  retained  the  star  of  the 
Twelfth  for  a  badge.  The  old  Twentieth  lost  its 
designation  Sept.  28th,  18G3.— Editors. 


THE  CHANCELLORSyiLLH  CAMPAIGN. 


155 


Some  few  days  after  Mr.  Liiieoln's  visit  to  the  army  in  April  [see  p.  11!)] 
I  was  again  thrown  with  the  President,  and  it  happened  in  this  wise.  My 
pickets  along  the  river  were  not  only  on  speaking  terms  witli  those  of  the 
enemy  on  the  other  side  of  the  river,  but  covertly  carried  on  quite  a  trade 
in  exchanging  coffee  for  toljacco,  etc.  This  morning  it  was  hallooed  over 
to  our  side :  "  You  have  taken  Charleston,"  which  news  was  sent  to  head- 
quarters. Mr.  Lincoln  hearing  of  it  wished  me  to  ^come  up  and  talk  the 
matter  over.  I  went  and  was  ushered  into  a  side  tent,  occupied  only  by  him- 
self and  Hooker.  My  entrance  apparently  interrupted  a  weighty  conversa- 
tion, for  both  were  looking  grave.  The  President's  manner  was  kindly,  while 
the  general,  usually  so  courteous,  forgot  to  be  conventionally  polite.  The 
Charleston  rumor  having  been  briefly  discussed,  Mr.  Lincoln  remarked  that 
it  was  time  for  him  to  leave.  As  he  stepped  toward  the  general,  who  had  risen 
from  his  seat,  as  well  as  myself,  he  said :  "  I  want  to  impress  upon  you  two 
gentlemen  in  your  next  fight," — and  turning  to  me  he  completed  the  sen- 
tence,—  "  put  in  all  of  yom-  men" — in  the  long  run  a  good  military  maxim. 

The  weather  growing  favorable  for  military  operations,  on  April  12th  were 
commenced  those  suggestive  preliminaries  to  all  great  battles,  clearing  out  the 
hospitals,  inspecting  arms,  looking  after  ammunition,  shoeing  animals,  issuing 
provisions,  and  making  every  preparation  necessary  to  an  advance.  The  next 
day,  the  13th,  Stoneman  was  put  in  motion  at  the  head  of  ten  thousand  finely 
equipped  and  well  organized  cavalry  to  ascend  the  Eappahannock  and,  swing- 
ing around,  to  attack  the  Confederate  cavalry  wherever  it  might  be  found, 
and  "  Fight !  fight !  fight !  "     At  the  end  of  two  days'  march  Stoneman  found 


OUTLINK    MAP    OF  TIIK    (  H ANCKI.t.OItSVII.I.K    CAMI'AION. 


156 


THE   CHANCELLORSyiLLE  CAMPAIGN. 


THE    RIGHT  WING    OF    HOOKER'S    ARMY   CROSSING    THE    RAPPAHANNOCK    AT    KELLY'S    FORD. 
FROM    A  WAR-TIME    SKETCH. 

the  river  so  swollen  by  heavy  rains  that  he  was  constrained  to  hold  np,  upon 
which  Hooker  suspended  his  advance  until  the  27th.  This  unexpected  delay 
of  the  cavalry  seemingly  deranged  Hooker's  original  plan  of  campaign.  He 
had  hoped  that  Stoneman  would  have  been  able  to  place  his  horsemen  on  the 
railroad  between  Fredericksburg  and  Eichmond,  by  which  Lee  received  his 
supplies,  and  make  a  wreck  of  the  whole  structure,  compelling  that  general  to 
evacuate  his  stronghold  at  Fredericksburg  and  vicinity  and  fall  back  toward 
Richmond. 

I  estimate  the  grand  total  of  Hooker's  seven  corps  at  about  113,000  men  ready 
for  duty,  although  the  data  from  which  the  conclusion  is  arrived  at  are  not 
strictly  official.  This  estimate  does  not  include  the  cavalry  corps  of  not  less 
than  11,000  duty  men,  nor  the  reserve  artillery,  the  whole  number  of  guns  in 
the  army  being  400.  Lee's  strength  in  and  around  Fredericksburg  was  placed 
at  between  55,000  and  60,000,  not  including  cavalry.  It  is  not  known  if 
Hooker's  information  concerning  the  Confederate  force  was  reliable,  but  Peck, 
operating  in  front  of  Norfolk,  notified  him  that  two  of  Lee's  di\dsions  under 
Long-street  were  on  the  south  side  of  the  James.  The  hour  was,  therefore, 
auspicious  for  Hooker  to  assume  the  offensive,  and  he  seized  it  with  a  boldness 
which  argued  well  for  his  fitness  to  command.  The  aim  was  to  transfer  his 
army  to  the  south  side  of  the  river,  where  it  would  have  a  manoeuvring  footing 
not  confronted  by  intrenched  positions.  On  the  27th  of  April  the  Eleventh 
and  Twelfth  corps  were  set  in  motion  for  Kelly's  Ford,  twenty-five  miles 
up  the  Rappahannock,  where  they  concentrated  on  the  evening  of  the  28th, 
the  Fifth,  by  reason  of  its  shorter  marching  distance,  moving  on  the  28th. 
The  object  of  the  expedition  was  unknown  to  the  corps  commanders  until 
communicated  to  them  after  their  arrival  at  the  ford  by  the  commanding 


THE  CHANCELLOHSyiLLE  CAMPAIGN.  157 

general  in  person.  |  The  Eleventh  Corps  crossed  the  Rappahannock,  fol- 
lowed in  the  morning  by  the  Twelfth  and  Fifth  corps — the  two  former 
striking  for  Grermanna  Ford,  a  crossing  of  the  Rapidau,  the  latter  for  Ely's 
Ford,  lower  down  the  same  stream.  Both  columns,  successfully  effecting 
crossings  with  little  opposition  from  the  enemy's  pickets,  arrived  that- 
evening,  April  30th,  at  the  point  of  concentration,  Chancellorsville.  It  had 
been  a  brilliantly  conceived  and  executed  movement. 

In  order  to  confound  Lee,  orders  were  issued  to  assemble  the  Sixth,  Third, 
and  First  corps  under  Sedgwick  at  Franklin's  Crossing  and  Pollock's  Mill, 
some  three  miles  below  Fredericksburg,  on  the  left,  before  daylight  of  the 
morning  of  the  29th,  and  throw  two  Inidges  across  and  hold  them.  This  was 
done  under  a  severe  fire  of  sharp-shooters.  The  Second  Corps,  two  divisions, 
marched  on  the  28th  for  Banks's  Ford,  four  miles  to  the  right ;  the  other 
division,  Gibbon's,  occupying  Falmouth,  near  the  river-bank,  was  directed  to 
remain  in  its  tents,  as  they  were  in  full  view  of  the  enemy,  who  would  readily 
observe  their  withdrawal.  On  the  29th  the  two  divisions  of  the  Second 
Corps  reached  United  States  Ford,  held  by  the  enemy ;  but  the  advance  of 
the  right  wing  down  the  river  uncovered  it,  whereupon  a  In-idge  of  pontoons 
was  thrown  across  and  the  corps  reached  Chancellorsville  the  same  night  as 
the  Fifth,  Eleventh,  and  Twelfth.  The  same  day,  the  30th,  Sedg^vick  was 
instructed  to  place  a  corps  across  the  river  and  make  a  demonstration  upon 
the  enemy's  right,  below  Fredericksburg,  and  the  Third  Corps  received  orders 
to  join  the  right  wing  at  Chancellorsville,  where  the  commanding  general 
arrived  the  same  evening,  establishing  his  headquarters  at  the  Chancellor 
House,  which,  with  the  adjacent  grounds,  is  Chancellorsville.  All  of  the 
army  lying  there  that  night  were  in  exuberant  spirits  at  the  success  of  their 
general  in  getting  "on  the  other  side"  without  fighting  for  a  position.  As  I 
rode  into  Chancellorsville  that  night  the  general  hilarity  pervading  the  camps 
was  particularly  noticeable ;  the  soldiers,  while  chopping  wood  and  lighting 
fires,  were  singing  merry  songs  and  indulging  in  peppery  camp  jokes. 

Tlie  position  at  Chancellorsville  not  only  took  in  reverse  the  entire  system 
of  the  enemy's  riv^er  defenses,  but  there  were  roads  leading  from  it  directly 
to  his  line  of  communication.  [See  maps,  pp.  155,  158.]  But  in  order  to  gain 
the  advantages  now  in  the  commanding  general's  grasp  he  had  divided  his 
army  into  two  wings,  and  the  enemy,  no  ordinary  enemy,  lay  between  them. 
The  line  of  communication  connecting  the  wings  was  by  way  of  United  States 
Ford  and  twenty  miles  long.  It  was  of  vital  importance  that  the  line  be 
shortened  in  order  to  place  the  wings  within  easy  sui>port  of  each  otlu^-.  Tlio 
possession  of  Banks's  Ford,  foreshadowed  in  the  instructions  given  to  Slocum, 
would  accomplish  all  that  at  present  could  be  wished. 

There  were  three  roads  over  which  the  right  wing  could  move  upon  Fred- 
ericksburg :  the  Orange  turnpike,  from  the  west,  passed  through  Chauceilors- 

4  General  Hooker  sent  for  me  on  the  niglit  of  the  command.     Althouf,'h  antii-ipatinp  the  narrative, 

27th  to  ride  over  to  his  heachiuartcrs,   where  lie  I  may  say  T  tliink  it   was  a  si},Mial   misfortune  to 

explained  to  me,  as  next  in  rank,  his  plan  of  earn-  our  aruis  that   he  diil  not  delay  joiiiiun  tliat  wiuj; 

paign.     Ho  informed  me  tliat,  under  certain  con-  until  tlie  morning'  of  Miiy  1st.  wIkmi  he  would  liavo 

tingeneies,  the  riglit  wing  would  be  placed  at  my  found  Banks's  For.l  in  our  possession.— D.  N.  C. 


THE  CHANCELLORSyiLLE  CAMPAIGN.  159 

ville,  and  was  the  most  direct ;  the  United  States  Ford  road,  crossing  the  f  onner 
at  Chancellorsville,  became  the  Plank  road,  bent  to  the  left  and  united  with  the 
turnpike  five  miles  or  so  from  Chaucellors ville  ;  the  third  road  fell  back  from 
Chancellorsville  toward  the  Rappahannock,  passed  along  by  Banks's  Ford, 
six  miles  distant,  and  continued  to  Fredericksburg.  That  wing  was  ready  for 
the  advance  at  an  early  hour  in  the  morning  of  May  1st,  but  somehow  things 
dragged ;  the  order  defining  the  movement,  instead  of  being  issued  the  pre- 
vious night,  was  not  received  by  the  corps  commanders,  at  least  by  me,  until 
hours  after  light.  Meade  was  finally  pushed  out  on  the  left  over  the  Banks's 
Ford  and  turnpike  roads,  Slocum  and  Howard  on  the  right  along  the  Plank 
road,  the  left  to  be  near  Banks's  Ford  by  2  p.  m.,  the  right  at  the  junction  of 
its  line  of  movement  with  the  turnpike  at  12  m.  No  opposition  was  met, 
excepting  that  the  division  marching  over  the  turnpike  came  upon  the  enemy 
two  or  three  miles  out,  when  the  sound  of  their  guns  was  heard  at  Chancel- 
lorsville, and  Greneral  Hooker  ordered  me  to  take  Hancock's  division  and  pro- 
ceed to  the  support  of  those  engaged.  After  marching  a  mile  and  a  half  or 
so  I  came  upon  Sykes,  who  commanded,  engaged  at  the  time  in  drawing  back 
his  advance  to  the  position  he  then  occupied.  Shortly  after  Hancock's  troops 
had  got  into  a  line  in  front,  an  order  was  received  from  the  commanding  gen- 
eral "  to  withdraw  both  divisions  to  Chancellors\dlle."  Tui-ning  to  the  officers 
around  me,  Hancock,  Sykes,  Warren,  and  others,  I  told  them  what  the  order 
was,  upon  which  they  all  agreed  with  me  that  the  gi-ound  should  not  be  aban- 
doned, because  of  the  open  country  in  front  and  the  commanding  position. 
An  aide.  Major  J.  B.  Burt,  dispatched  to  General  Hooker  to  this  effect,  came 
back  in  half  an  hour  with  positive  orders  to  return.  Nothing  was  to  be  done 
but  carry  out  the  command,  though  Warren  suggested  that  I  should  disobey, 
and  then  he  rode  back  to  see  the  general.  In  the  meantime  Slocum,  on  the 
Plank  road  to  my  right,  had  been  ordered  in,  and  the  enemy's  advance  was 
between  that  road  and  my  right  flank.  Sykes  was  fii'st  to  move  back,  then 
followed  by  Hancock's  regiments  over  the  same  road.  When  all  but  two  of  the 
latter  had  withdrawn,  a  third  order  came  to  me,  brought  by  one  of  the  gen- 
eral's staff:  "  Hold  on  until  5  o'clock."  It  was  then  perhaps  2  p.  m.  Disgusted 
at  the  general's  vacillation  and  vexed  at  receiving  an  order  of  such  tenor,  I 
rephed  with  warmth  unbecoming  in  a  subordinate  :  "  Tell  General  Hooker  he 
is  too  late,  the  enemy  are  already  on  my  right  and  rear.  I  am  in  full  retreat." 
The  position  thus  abandoned  was  high  ground,  more  or  less  open  in  front, 
over  which  an  army  might  move  and  artillery  be  used  advantageously ;  more- 
over, were  it  left  in  the  hands  of  an  enemy,  his  batteries,  established  on  its 
crest  and  slopes,  would  command  the  position  at  Chancellorsville.  Every- 
thing on  the  whole  front  was  ordered  in.  General  Hooker  knew  tliat  Lee 
was  apprised  of  his  presence  on  the  south  side  of  the  river,  and  must  have 
expected  that  his  enemy  would  be  at  least  on  the  lookout  for  an  advance 
upon  Fredericksburg.  But  it  was  of  the  utmost  importance  that  Banks's 
Ford  should  fall  hito  our  liands,  therefore  the  enemy  ouglit  to  liav(^  be(^n 
pressed  until  their  strength  or  weakness  was  developed;  it  would  then  have 
been  time  enough  to  run  away. 


/,   y^^^-r-^^^ 


THE  CHANCELLORSl^ILLE  CAMPAIGN.  i6i 

Mott's  Run,  with  a  considerable  brushy  ravine,  cuts  the  tm-npike  three- 
fourths  of  a  mile  east  of  Chancellorsville.  Two  of  Hancock's  regiments,  under 
Colonel  Nelson  A.  Miles,  subsequently  the  Indian  fighter,  were  directed  to 
occupy  the  ravine.  Continuing  my  way  through  the  woods  toward  Chancel- 
lorsville, I  came  upon  some  of  the  Fifth  Corps  under  arms.  Inquiring  for  their 
commanding  officer,  I  told  him  that  in  fifteen  minutes  he  would  be  attacked. 
Before  finishing  the  sentence  a  volley  of  musketry  was  fired  into  us  from  the 
direction  of  the  Plank  road.  This  was  the  beginning  of  the  battle  of  Chancel- 
lors\alle.  Troops  were  hurried  into  position,  but  the  observer  required  no 
wizard  to  tell  him,  as  they  marched  past,  that  the  high  expectations  which 
had  animated  them  only  a  few  hours  ago  had  given  place  to  disappointment. 
Proceeding  to  the  Chancellor  House,  I  narrated  my  operations  in  front  to 
Hooker,  which  were  seemingly  satisfactory,  as  he  said:  "It  is  all  right. 
Couch,  I  have  got  Lee  just  where  I  want  him ;  he  must  fight  me  on  my  own 
ground."  The  retrograde  movement  had  prepared  me  for  something  of  the 
kind,  but  to  hear  from  his  own  lips  that  the  advantages  gained  by  the  suc- 
cessful marches  of  his  lieutenants  were  to  culminate  in  fighting  a  defensive 
battle  in  that  nest  of  thickets  was  too  much,  and  I  retired  from  his  presence 
with  the  belief  that  my  commanding  general  was  a  whipped  man.  The  army 
was  directed  to  intrench  itself.  At  2  a.  m.  the  corps  commanders  reported  to 
General  Hooker  that  their  positions  could  be  held;  at  least  so  said  Couch, 
Slocum,  and  Howard. 

Until  after  dark  on  May  1st  the  enemy  confined  his  demonstrations  to  find- 
ing out  the  position  of  our  left  with  his  skirmishers.  Then  he  got  some  guns 
upon  the  high  ground  which  we  had  abandoned  as  before  mentioned,  and 
cannonaded  the  left  of  our  line.  There  were  not  many  casualties,  but  that 
day  a  shell  severely  wounded  the  adjutant-general  of  the  Second  Corps,  now 
General  F.  A.  Walker.  Chancellorsville  was  a  strategic  point  to  an  offensive 
or  retreating  army,  as  roads  diverged  from  it  into  every  part  of  Virginia ;  but 
for  a  defensive  position  it  was  bad,  particularly  for  such  an  army  as  Hooker 
had  under  him,  which  prided  itself  upon  its  artillery,  which  was  perhaps  equal 
to  any  in  the  world.  There  were  no  commanding  positions  for  artillery,  and 
but  little  open  country  to  operate  over ;  in  fact,  the  advantages  of  gi'ound  for 
this  arm  were  mainly  with  the  attacking  party. 

During  the  29th  and  30th  the  enemy  lay  at  Fredericksburg  observing 
Sedgwick's  demonstrations  on  the  left,  entirely  unconscious  of  Hooker's  suc- 
cessful crossing  of  the  right  wing,  until  midday  of  the  latter  date,  but  that 
night  Lee  formed  his  plan  of  operations  for  checking  the  farther  advance 
of  the  force  which  had  not  only  turned  the  left  fiank  of  his  river  defenses 
but  was  threatening  his  line  of  communication  with  Kichmond  as  well  as  the 
rear  of  his  center  at  Fredericksburg.  Stonewall  Jackson,  who  was  watching 
Sedgwick,  received  instructions  to  withdraw  his  corps,  march  to  the  left, 
across  the  front  of  Hooker's  intrenched  ]iosition,  until  its  right  Hank  was 
attained,  and  assault  with  his  column  of  -J^,!)!)!)  men,  while  iiis  i-ommanding 
general  would,  with  what  force  he  could  si»are,  guard  the  api>roaches  to 
Fredericksburg. 


1 62 


THE  CHANCELLORSHLLE  CAMPAIGN. 


HOOKER'S    HEADQUARTERS    AT    CHANCELLORSVIIXE,    SATURDAY    MORNING,    MAY    2  —  THE    PICTURE 
FACES    SOUTH.       FROM    A   WAR-TIME    SKETCH. 

On  the  morning  of  May  2d  our  line  had  become  strong  enough  to  resist  a 
front  attack  unless  made  in  great  force ;  the  enemy  had  also  been  hard  at 
work  on  his  front,  particularly  that  section  of  it  between  the  Plank  road  and 
turnpike.  Sedgwick,  the  previous  night,  had  been  ordered  to  send  the  First 
Corps  (Reynolds's)  to  Chancellorsville.  At  7  a.  m.  a  sharp  cannonade  was 
opened  on  our  left,  followed  by  infantry  demonstrations  of  no  particular 
earnestness.  Two  hours  later  the  enemy  were  observed  moving  a  mile  or 
so  to  the  south  and  front  of  the  center,  and  later  the  same  column  was 
reported  to  the  commander  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  by  General  Devens,  whose 
division  was  on  the  extreme  right  flank.  At  9 :  30  a.  m.  a  circular  directed  to 
Generals  Sloeum  and  Howard  called  attention  to  this  movement  and  to  the 
weakness  of  their  flanks.  ^ 

At  11  A.  M.  om'  left  was  furiously  cannonaded  by  their  artillery,  established 
on  the  heights  in  front  of  Mott's  Run,  followed  by  sharp  infantry  firing  on  the 
fronts  of  the  Second  and  Twelfth  corps.  As  time  flew  along  and  no  attack 
came  from  the  enemy  seen  moving  in  front,  Hooker  conceived  that  Lee  was 
retreating  toward  Gordons\alle.  There  was  color  for  this  view,  as  the  main 
road  from  I'redericksburg  to  that  point  diverged  from  the  Plank  road  two 
miles  to  the  left  of  Chancellorsville,  and  passed  along  his  front  at  about  the 
same  distance.  Hooker  therefore  jumped  at  the  conclusion  that  the  enemy's 
army  was  moving  into  the  center  of  Virginia.  But  instead  of  the  hostile 
column  being  on  the  Gordonsville  road  in  retreat,  it  was  Stonewall's  corps  mov- 
ing on  an  interior  neighborhood  road,  about  one  mile  distant,  and  in  search 

i  See  p.  219  for  a  cony  of  this  circular  order.     Maps  showing:  the  positions  of  the  Eleventh  and 
Twelfth  corps  appear  on  pages  191-201. — Editors. 


THE  CHANCELLORSyiLLE  CAMPAIGN.  163 

of  our  right  flank  and  rear.  At  2  p.  m.  I  went  into  the  Chancellor  House,  when 
General  Hooker  greeted  me  with  the  exclamation:  "Lee  is  in  full  retreat 
toward  Gordonsville,  and  I  have  sent  out  Sickles  to  capture  his  artillery." 
I  thought,  without  speaking  it :  "  If  your  conception  is  correct,  it  is  very 
strange  that  only  the  Third  Corps  should  be  sent  in  pursuit."  Sickles 
received  orders  at  1  p.  m.  to  take  two  divisions,  move  to  his  front  and  attack, 
which  he  did,  capturing  some  hundreds  of  prisoners.  The  country  on  the 
front  being  mostly  wooded  enabled  the  enemy  to  conceal  his  movements  and 
at  the  same  time  hold  Sickles  in  check  with  a  rear-guard,  which  made  such 
a  show  of  strength  that  reenforcements  were  called  for  and  furuislied.  In 
the  meantime  Jackson  did  not  for  a  moment  swerve  from  his  pm*pose,  but 
steadily  moved  forward  to  accomplish  what  he  had  undertaken. 

It  was  about  5 :  30  in  the  evening  when  the  head  of  Jackson's  column 
found  itself  on  the  right  and  rear  of  the  army,  which  on  that  flank  consisted 
of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  the  extreme  right  brigade  receiving  its  first  intimation 
of  danger  from  a  volley  of  musketry  fired  into  their  rear,  followed  up  so 
impetuously  that  no  efficient  stand  could  be  made  by  the  brigades  of  the 
corps  that  successively  attempted  to  resist  the  enemy's  charge.  ^Mien 
General  Hooker  found  out  what  that  terrific  roar  on  his  right  flank  meant 
he  quickly  mounted  and  flew  across  the  open  space  to  meet  the  onset,  passing 
on  his  way  stampeded  pack-mules,  officers'  horses,  caissons,  with  men  and 
horses  running  for  their  lives.  Gathering  up  such  troops  as  were  nearest  to 
the  scene  of  action,  Berry's  division  from  the  Third  Corps,  some  from  the 
Twelfth,  Hays's  brigade  of  the  Second,  and  a  portion  of  the  Eleventh,  an 
effectual  stand  was  made.  Pleasonton,  who  was  returning  from  the  front, 
where  he  had  been  operating  with  Sickles  (at  the  time  Jackson  atta(.*ked), 
taking  in  the  state  of  things,  rapidly  moved  his  two  regiments  of  cavalry 
and  a  battery  to  the  head  and  right  flank  of  the  enemy's  advance  columns, 
when,  making  a  charge  and  bringing  up  his  own  guns,  with  others  of  the 
Eleventh  and  Third  Corps,  he  was  enabled  to  punish  them  severely. 

Pickets  had  been  thrown  out  on  Howard's  flank,  but  not  well  to  the  right 
and  rear.  I  suspect  that  the  prime  reason  for  the  surprise  was  that  the 
superior  officers  of  the  right  corps  had  been  put  off  their  guard  by  adopting 
the  conjecture  of  Hooker,  "Lee's  army  is  in  full  retreat  to  Gordonsville,"  as 
well  as  by  expecting  the  enemy  to  attack  precisely  where  ample  preparations 
had  been  made  to  receive  him.  It  can  be  emphatically  stated  that  no  corps 
in  the  army,  surprised  as  the  Eleventh  was  at  this  time,  could  have  held  its 
ground  under  similar  circumstances. 

At  half-past  two  that  afternoon  the  Second  ('orps'  lines  were  assaulted  l>y 
artillery  and  infantry.  Just  previous  to  Jackson's  attack  on  the  right  a 
desperate  effort  was  made  by  Lee's  people  to  carry  the  left  at  Mott's  Kun,  but 
the  men  who  held  it  were  there  to  stay.  Haoker,  desiring  to  know  X\\o  enemy's 
strength  in  front  of  the  Twelfth  Corps,  advanced  Slocum  into  tlic  thicket, 
but  that  officer  found  the  hostile  line  too  well  defench^l  for  him  to  ix-netrate 
it  and  was  forced  to  recall  the  attacking  party.  When  night  ]mt  an  end  to 
the  fighting  of  both  combatants.  Hooker  was  ol)lig<Ml  to  form  a  new  line  for 


164 


THE  CHANCELLORSyiLLE  CAMPAIGN. 

\ 

''"'     '     "''^^/  \  n<  /'„'/,/  ^m%'H  '1:1'  "l"ll\  I 


'  '4 


iXAJIl'LUli    OF   XllL    LLEVE 


his  right  flank  perpendicular  to  the  old  one  and  barely  half  a  mile  to  the 
right  of  Chancellorsville.  Sickles  was  retired,  with  the  two  columns,  from  his 
advanced  position  in  the  afternoon  to  near  where  Pleasonton  had  had  his 
encounter,  before  mentioned,  some  distance  to  the  left  of  the  new  line  of  our 
right  flank  and  close  up  to  the  enemy.  The  situation  was  thought  to  be  a 
very  critical  one  by  Greneral  Hooker,  who  had  simply  a  strong  body  in  front 
of  the  enemy,  but  without  supports,  at  least  near  enough  to  be  used  for 
that  purpose.  At  the  same  time  it  was  a  menace  to  Jackson's  right  wing 
or  flank.  Before  midnight  some  of  the  latter's  enterprising  men  pushed 
forward  and  actually  cut  off  Sickles's  line  of  communication.  When  this 
news  was  carried  to  Hooker  it  caused  him  great  alarm,  and  preparations 
were  at  once  made  to  withdraw  the  whole  front,  leaving  General  Sickles  to 
his  fate ;  but  that  officer  showed  himself  able  to  take  care  of  his  rear,  for  he 
ordered  after  a  little  while  a  column  of  attack,  and  communication  was 
restored  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet. 

The  situation  of  Jackson's  corps  on  the  morning  of  May  3d  was  a  desperate 
one,  its  front  and  right  flank  being  in  the  presence  of  not  far  from  25,000 
men,  with  the  left  flank  subject  to  an  assault  of  30,000,  the  corps  of  Meade  and 
Reynolds,  by  advancing  them  to  the  right,  where  the  thicket  did  not  present 
an  insurmountable  obstacle.  It  only  required  that  Hooker  should  brace 
himself  up  to  take  a  reasonable,  common-sense  view  of  the  state  of  things, 
when  the  success  gained  by  Jackson  would  have  been  turned  into  an  over- 
whelming defeat.  But  Hooker  became  very  despondent.  I  think  that  his 
being  outgeneraled  by  Lee  had  a  good  deal  to  do  with  his  depression.  After 
the  right  flank  had  been  established  on  the  morning  of  the  3d  by  Sickles 


THE  CHANCELLORSniLE  CAMPAIGN.  165 

getting  back  into  position  our  line  was  more  compact,  with  favorable  posi- 
tions for  artillery,  and  the  reserves  were  well  in  hand.  Meade  had  been 
di-awn  in  from  the  left  and  Reynolds  had  arrived  with  the  Fu-st  Corps.  The 
engineers  had  been  directed  on  the  previous  night  to  lay  out  a  new  line,  its 

front  a  half  mile  in  rear  of  Chancellorsville,  with  the  flanks  thrown  back, 

the  right  to  the  Eapidan,  a  little  above  its  junction  with  the  Rappahannock, 
the  left  resting  on  the  latter  river.  The  Eleventh  Corps,  or  at  least  that 
portion  which  formed  line  of  battle,  was  withdrawn  from  the  front  and  sent 
to  the  rear  to  reorganize  and  get  its  scattered  parts  together,  leaving  the  fol- 
lowing troops  in  front :  one  division  of  the  Second  Corps  on  the  left  from 
Mott's  Run  to  Chancellorsville,  the  Twelfth  Corps  holding  the  center  and 
right  flank,  aided  by  the  Third  Corps  and  one  division  of  the  Second  Corps 
(French's),  on  the  same  flank ;  the  whole  number  in  front,  according  to  my 
estimate,  being  37,000  men.  The  Fkst  and  Fifth  corps  in  reserve  num- 
bered 30,000,  and,  placing  the  number  of  reliable  men  in  the  Eleventh  Corps 
at  5000,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  reserves  nearly  equaled  those  in  line  of  battle 
in  front. 

After  the  day's  mishaps  Hooker  judged  that  the  enemy  could  not  have 
spared  so  large  a  force  to  move  around  his  front  without  depleting  the 
defenses  of  Fredericksburg.  Accordingly,  at  9  P.  M.,  an  imperative  order  was 
sent  to  the  commander  of  the  left  wing  to  cross  the  river  at  Fredericksburg, 
march  upon  Chancellorsville,  and  be  in  the  \dcinity  of  the  commanding  gen- 
eral at  daylight.  But  Sedgwick  was  already  across  the  river  and  three  miles 
below  Fredericksburg.  It  was  11  p.  m.,  May  2d,  when  he  got  the  order,  and 
twelve  or  fourteen  miles  had  to  be  marched  over  by  daylight.  The  night  was 
moonlight,  but  any  officer  who  has  had  experience  in  making  night  marches 
with  infantry  will  understand  the  vexatious  delays  occurring  even  when  the 
road  is  clear  ;  but  when,  in  addition,  there  is  an  enemy  in  front,  with  a  line 
of  fortified  heights  to  assault,  the  problem  which  Sedgwick  had  to  solve  will 
be  pronounced  impossible  of  solution.  However,  that  officer  set  his  column 
in  motion  by  flank,  leaving  one  division  that  lay  opposite  the  enemy,  who  were 
in  force  to  his  left.  The  marching  column,  being  continually  hai'assed  by  skir- 
mishers, did  not  arrive  at  Fredericksburg  until  daylight.  The  first  assault 
upon  the  heights  behind  the  town  failed.  Attempts  to  carry  them  by  flank 
movements  met  with  no  success.  Finally  a  second  storming  party  was  organ- 
ized, and  the  series  of  works  were  taken  literally  at  tlie  point  of  the  bayonet, 
though  at  heavy  loss.  It  was  then  11  a.  m.  The  column  immediately  started  for 
Chancellorsville,  being  more  or  less  obstructed  by  the  enemy  until  its  arrival 
near  Salem  Heights,  5  or  6  miles  out,  where  seven  brigades  under  Early,  six 
of  which  had  been  driven  from  the  defenses  of  Fredericksbm-g,  made  a  stand 
in  conjunction  with  supports  sent  from  Lee's  army  before  Chancellorsville. 
This  was  about  the  middle  of  the  afternoon,  when  Sedgwick  in  force  attacked 
the  enemy.  Though  at  first  successful,  he  was  subsequently  com})ell«'d  to 
withdraw  those  in  advance  and  look  to  his  own  safety  by  throwing  his  own 
flanks  so  as  to  cover  Banks's  Foi-d,  the  friendly  proximity  of  which  eventually 
saved  this  wing  from  utter  annihilation. 


1 66 


THE  CHANCELLORS l^ILLE  CAMPAIGN. 


STATING    JACKSON'S    ADVANCE,   SATURDAY    EVENING,    MAT   2,  WITH    ARTILLERY    PLACED    ACROSS 
THE    PLANK    ROAD.     FROM   A   WAR-TIME    SKETCH. 

At  about  5  A.  M.,  May  3d,  fighting  was  begun  at  Chaueellorsville,  when 
the  Third  (Sickles's)  Corps  began  to  retire  to  the  left  of  our  proper  right 
flank,  and  all  of  that  flank  soon  became  fiercely  engaged,  while  the  battle  ran 
along  the  whole  line.  The  enemy's  guns  on  the  heights  to  our  left,  as  well  as 
at  every  point  on  the  line  where  they  could  be  established,  were  vigorously 
used,  while  a  full  division  threw  itself  on  Miles  at  Mott's  Run.  On  the  right 
flank  our  guns  were  well  handled,  those  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  being  conspicu- 
ous, and  the  opposing  lines  of  infantry  operating  in  the  thicket  had  almost 
hand-to-hand  conflicts,  capturing  and  recapturing  prisoners.  The  enemy 
appeared  to  know  wiiat  he  was  about,  for  pressing  the  Third  Corps  vigorously 
he  forced  it  back,  when  he  joined  or  rather  touched  the  left  of  Lee's  main 
body,  making  their  line  continuous  from  left  to  right.  Another  advantage 
gained  by  this  success  was  the  possession  of  an  open  field,  from  which  guns 
covered  the  ground  up  to  the  Chancellor  House.  Upon  the  south  porch  of 
that  mansion  Greneral  Hooker  stood  leaning  against  one  of  its  pillars,  observ- 
ing the  fighting,  looking  anxious  and  much  careworn.  After  the  fighting  had 
commenced  I  doul)t  if  any  orders  were  given  by  him  to  the  commanders  on 
the  field,  unless,  perhaps,  "to  retire  when  out  of  ammunition."  None  were 
received  by  me,  nor  were  there  any  inquiries  as  to  how  the  battle  was  going 
along  my  front.  On  the  right  flank,  where  the  fighting  was  desperate,  the 
engaged  trooj^s  were  governed  by  the  corps  and  division  leaders.  If  the  ear 
of  the  commanding  general  was,  as  he  afterward  stated,  strained  to  catch 
the  sound  of  Sedg\vick's  guns,  it  could  not  have  heard  them  in  the  continuous 
uproar  that  filled  the  air  around  him  ;  but  as  Sedgwick,  who  was  known  as  a 
fighting  officer,  had  not  appeared  at  the  time  set — daylight — nor  for  some 
hours  after,  it  was  conclusive  evidence  that  he  had  met  with  strong  opposi- 
tion, showing  that  all  of  Lee's  army  was  not  at  Chaueellorsville,  so  that  the 


THE  CHANCELLORSyiLLE  CAMPAIGN.  167 

moment  was  favorable  for  Hooker  to  try  his  opponent's  strength  with  every 
available  man.  Moreovei-,  the  left  wing  might  at  that  very  time  be  in  jeopardy, 
therefore  he  was  bound  by  every  patriotic  motive  to  strike  hard  for  its  relief. 
If  he  had  remembered  Mr.  Lincoln's  injunction  ("  Gentlemen,  in  your  next 
fight  put  in  all  of  your  men  "),  the  face  of  the  day  would  have  been  changed 
and  the  field  won  for  the  Union  arms. 

Not  far  from  8:30  a.  m.  the  headquarters  pennants  of  the  Third  and  Twelfth 
corps  suddenly  appeared  from  the  right  in  the  open  field  of  Chancellorsville ; 
then  the  Third  began  to  fall  back,  it  was  repoi'ted,  for  want  of  ammunition, 
followed  by  that  portion  of  the  Twelfth  fighting  on  the  same  flank,  and  the 
division  of  the  Second  Corps  on  its  right.  It  is  not  known  whether  any  efforts 
were  made  to  supply  the  much-needed  ammunition  to  the  Third  as  well  as 
the  Twelfth  Corps,  whose  ammunition  was  nearly  used  up  when  it  retu-ed. 
My  impression  is  that  the  heads  of  the  ordnance,  as  well  as  of  other  impor- 
tant departments,  were  not  taken  into  the  field  during  this  campaign,  which 
was  most  unfortunate,  as  the  commanding  general  had  enough  on  his  mind 
without  charging  it  with  details. 

The  open  field  seized  by  Jackson's  old  corps  after  the  Third  Corps  drew  off 
was  shortly  dotted  with  guns  that  made  splendid  practice  through  an  open- 
ing in  the  wood  upon  the  Chancellor  House,  and  everything  else,  for  that 
matter,  in  that  neighborhood.  Hooker  was  still  at  his  place  on  the  porch, 
with  nothing  between  him  and  Lee's  army  but  Geary's  division  of  the  Twelfth 
and  Hancock's  division  and  a  battery  of  the  Second  Corps.  But  Geary's  right 
was  now  turned,  and  that  flank  was  steadily  being  pressed  back  along  his 
intrenched  line  to  the  junction  of  the  Plank  road  and  the  turnpike,  when  a 
cannon-shot  struck  the  pillar  against  which  Hooker  was  leaning  and  knocked 
him  down.  A  report  flew  around  that  he  was  killed.  I  was  at  the  time  but 
a  few  yards  to  his  left,  and,  dismoimting,  ran  to  the  porch.  The  shattered 
pillar  was  there,  but  I  could  not  find  him  or  any  one  else.  Hurrying  through 
the  house,  finding  no  one,  my  search  was  continued  through  the  back  yard.  All 
the  time  I  was  thinking,  "  If  he  is  killed,  what  shall  I  do  with  this  disjointed 
army!"  Passing  through  the  yard  I  came  upon  him,  to  my  g]-eat  joy,  mounted, 
and  with  his  staff  also  in  their  saddles.  Briefly  congratulating  him  on  his 
escape — it  was  no  time  to  blubber  or  use  soft  expressions — I  went  about  my 
own  business.  This  was  the  last  I  saw  of  my  connnanding  general  in  front.  The 
time,  I  reckon,  was  from  9:15  to  9:30  a.  m.,  I  think  nearer  the  former  than  the 
latter.  He  prol^ably  left  the  field  soon  after  his  hurt,  but  he  neitlit>r  notified 
me  of  his  going  nor  did  he  give  any  orders  to  me  whatever.  Having  some 
little  time  before  this  seen  that  the  last  stand  would  be  about  the  Chancellor 
House,  I  had  sent  to  the  rear  for  some  of  the  Second  Corps  batteries,  whicli 
had  been  ordered  there  by  the  commanding  general,  but  word  came  back  that 
they  were  so  jammed  in  with  other  carriages  that  it  was  imp(^ssible  to  extii- 
cate  them.  General  ]\reade,  heai-ing  of  my  wants,  kindly  sent  forward  the  ^th 
Maine  battery  belonging  to  his  corps.  It  was  posted  in  rear  of  the  Clianct^llor 
House,  where  the  United  States  Ford  road  entin-s  the  thickest.  Witli  sudi 
precision  did  the  artillery  of  Jackson's  old  cori)s  i)lay  ui^on  this  battery  tliat 


THE  CHANCELLORS l^ILLE   CAMPAIGN. 


THE    29th    PENNSYLVANIA    (OF   IvANE'S    BRIGADE,   GEARY'S    DIVISION,   TWEI-FTH    CORPS)    IN    THE    TRENCHES 
UNDER    ARTILLERY    FIRE,    MAY    3. 

all  of  the  officers  and  most  of  the  non-commissioned  officers  and  men  were 
killed  or  wounded.  The  gallant  Kirby,  whose  guns  could  not  be  brought  up, 
was  mortally  wounded  in  the  same  battery  \  of  which  I  had  for  the  time  placed 
him  in  command,  and  my  horse  was  killed  under  me  while  I  was  trying  to 
get  some  men  to  train  a  gun  on  the  flank  of  the  force  then  pushing  Geary's 
division.  The  enemy,  having  30  pieces  in  position  on  our  right,  now  advanced 
some  of  his  guns  to  within  500  or  600  yards  of  the  Chancellor  House,  where 
there  were  only  four  of  Pettit's  Second  Corps  guns  to  oppose  them,  making 
a  target  of  that  building  and  taking  the  right  of  Hancock's  division  in  reverse, 
a  portion  of  which  had  been  withdrawn  from  its  intrenchments  and  thrown 
back  to  the  left  to  meet  the  enemy  should  he  succeed  in  forcing  Mott's  Run. 
This  flank  was  stoutly  held  by  Colonel  Miles,  who,  by  the  bye,  had  been  carried 
off  the  field,  shot  through  the  body.  Lee  by  this  time  knew  well  enough,  if 
he  had  not  known  before,  that  the  game  was  sure  to  fall  into  his  hands,  and 
accordingly  plied  every  gun  and  rifle  that  could  be  brought  to  bear  on  us. 
Still  everything  was  firmly  held  excepting  Geary's  right,  which  was  slowly 
falling  to  pieces,  for  the  enemy  had  his  flank  and  there  was  no  help  for  it. 
Hiding  to  Geary's  left,  I  found  him  there  dismounted,  with  sword  swinging 
over  his  head,  walking  up  and  down,  exposed  to  a  severe  infantry  fire,  when 
he  said :  "  My  division  can't  hold  its  place  ;  what  shall  I  do  ?  "  To  which  I 
replied :  "  I  don't  know,  but  do  as  we  are  doing ;  fight  it  out." 

\  The  5th  Maine  battery,  Capt.  G.  F,  Leppien,  was  the  proper  commander  of  Battery  I,  1st  U.  S. 

belonged  to  the  First  Corps.    Captain  Leppien  and  Artillery,  Second  Corps.   The  5th  Maine  lost  6  men 

Lieutenants  G.  T.  Stevens  and  A.  B.  Twitchell  were  killed  and  19  wounded  ;  43  horses  were  disabled, 

wounded,  Capt.  Leppien  mortally.    Lieut.  E.  Kirby  and  the  guns  were  hauled  off  by  hand.—  Editors. 


THE  CHANCELLORSyiLLE  CAMPAIGN. 


169 


It  was  not  then  too  late  to  save  the  day.  Fifty  pieces  of  artillery,  or  even 
forty,  brought  up  and  run  in  front  and  to  the  right  of  the  Chancellor  House, 
would  have  driven  the  enemy  out  of  the  thicket,  then  forcing  back  Geary's 
right,  and  would  have  neutralized  the  thirty  guns  to  the  right  which  were 
pounding  us  so  hard.  But  it  is  a  waste  of  words  to  write  what  might  have 
been  done.  Hooker  had  made  up  his  mind  to  abandon  the  field,  otherwise  he 
would  not  have  allowed  the  Third  and  part  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  to  leave 
their  ground  for  want  of  ammunition.  A  few  minutes  after  my  inter^dew 
with  Geary  a  staff-officer  from  General  Hooker  rode  up  and  requested  my 
presence  with  that  general.  Turning  to  General  Hancock,  near  by,  I  told 
him  to  take  care  of  things  and  rode  to  the  rear.  The  Chancellor  House  was 
then  burning,  having  been  fired  in  several  places  by  the  enemy's  shells. 

At  the  farther  side  of  an  open  field,  half  a  mile  in  the  rear  of  Chancellors- 
ville,  I  came  upon  a  few  tents  (three  or  four)  pitched,  around  which,  mostly 
dismounted,  were  a  large  number  of  staff-officers.  General  Meade  was  also 
present,  and  perhaps  other  generals.  General  Hooker  was  \ji\\g  down  I 
think  in  a  soldier's  tent  by  himself.  Raising  himself  a  little  as  I  entered,  he 
said :  "  Couch,  I  turn  the  command  of  the  army  over  to  you.  You  will  with- 
draw it  and  place  it  in  the  position  designated  on  this  map,"  as  he  pointed  to 
a  line  traced  on  a  field-sketch.  This  was  perhaps  three-quarters  of  an  horn* 
after  his  hurt.  He  seemed  rather  dull,  but  possessed  of  his  mental  faculties. 
I  do  not  think  that  one  of  those  officers  outside  of  the  tent  knew  what  orders 
I  was  to  receive,  for  on  stepping  out,  which  I  did  immediately  on  getting  my 
instructions,  I  met  Meade  close  by,  looking  inquiringly  as  if  he  expected  that 


SECOND    LINE    UE    LNIUN    UEEENSE    AI'    TUE    JEM. HON   Ul     TUE    ROM>S    TO    ELY 
FORDS.      FROM    A   WAR-TIME    SKETCH. 


170  THE   CHANCELLORSl^ILLE  CAMPAIGN. 

finally  he  would  receive  the  order  for  which  he  had  waited  all  that  long 
morning,  "  to  go  in."  Colonel  N.  H.  Davis  broke  out :  "  We  shall  have  some 
fighting  now."  These  incidents  are  mentioned  to  show  the  temper  of  that 
knot  of  officers.  No  time  was  to  be  lost,  as  only  Hancock's  division  now  held 
Lee's  army.  Dispatching  Major  John  B.  Burt  with  orders  for  the  front  to 
retire,  I  rode  back  to  the  thicket,  accompanied  by  Meade,  and  was  soon 
joined  by  Sickles,  and  after  a  little  while  by  Hooker,  but  he  did  not  interfere 
with  my  dispositions.  Hancock  had  a  close  shave  to  withdraw  in  safety,  his 
line  being  three-fourths  of  a  mile  long,  with  an  exultant  enemy  as  close  in 
as  they  dared,  or  wished,  or  chose  to  be,  firing  and  watching.  But  every- 
thing was  brought  off,  except  five  hundred  men  of  the  Second  Corps  who, 
through  the  negligence  of  a  lieutenant  charged  by  Hancock  with  the 
responsibility  of  retiring  the  force  at  Mott's  Run,  were  taken  prisoners. 
However,  under  the  circumstances,  the  division  was  retired  in  better  shape 
than  one  could  have  anticipated.  General  Sickles  assisted  in  getting  men 
to  draw  off  the  guns  of  the  Maine  battery  before  spoken  of.  General  Meade 
wished  me  to  hold  the  strip  of  thicket  in  rear  of  Chancellorsville,  some  six 
hundred  yards  in  front  of  our  new  line  of  defense.  My  reply  was :  "  I  shall 
not  leave  men  in  this  thicket  to  be  shelled  out  by  Lee's  artillery.  Its  posses- 
sion won't  give  us  any  strength.  Yonder  [pointing  to  the  rear]  is  the  line 
where  the  fighting  is  to  be  done."  Hooker  heard  the  conversation,  but  made 
no  remarks.  Considerable  bodies  of  troops  of  different  corps  that  lay  in 
the  brush  to  the  right  were  brought  within  the  lines,  and  the  battle  of 
Chancellorsville  was  ended.  My  pocket  diary.  May  3d,  has  the  following: 
"  Sickles  opened  at  about  5  a.  m.  Orders  sent  by  me  at  10  for  the  front  to 
retire;  at  12  m.  in  my  new  position  " ;  the  latter  sentence  meaning  that  at  that 
hour  my  corps  was  in  position  on  the  new  or  second  line  of  defense. 

As  to  the  charge  that  the  battle  was  lost  because  the  general  was  intoxicated, 
I  have  always  stated  that  he  probably  abstained  from  the  use  of  ardent  spirits 
when  it  would  have  been  far  better  for  him  to  have  continued  in  his  usual 
habit  in  that  respect.  The  shock  from  being  violently  thrown  to  the  ground, 
together  with  the  physical  exhaustion  resulting  from  loss  of  sleep  and  the 
anxiety  of  mind  incident  to  the  last  six  days  of  the  campaign,  would  tell  on 
any  man.  The  enemy  did  not  press  us  on  the  second  line,  Lee  simply  varying 
the  monotony  of  watching  us  by  an  occasional  cannonade  from  the  left,  a  part 
of  his  army  having  been  sent  to  Salem  Church  to  resist  Sedgwick.  Sedgwick 
had  difficulty  in  maintaining  his  ground,  but  held  his  own  by  hard  fighting 
until  after  midnight.  May  4tli-5th,  when  he  recrossed  at  Banks's  Ford. 

Some  of  the  most  anomalous  occurrences  of  the  war  took  place  in  this 
campaign.  On  the  night  of  May  2d  the  commanding  general,  with  80,000 
men  in  his  wing  of  the  army,  directed  Sedgwick,  with  22,000,  to  march  to  his 
relief.  While  that  officer  was  doing  this  on  the  3d,  and  when  it  would  be 
expected  that  every  effort  would  be  made  by  the  right  wing  to  do  its  part, 
only  one-half  of  it  was  fought  (or  rather  half -fought,  for  its  ammunition  was 
not  replenished),  and  then  the  whole  wing  was  withdrawn  to  a  place  where 
it  could  not  be  hurt,  leaving  Sedgwick  to  take  care  of  himself. 


THE  CHANCELLORSl^ILLE  CAMPAIGN.  171 

At  12  o'clock  on  the  ni^lit  of  the  4th-5th  General  Hooker  assembled  his 
corps  commanders  in  council.  Meade,  Sickles,  Howard,  Reynolds,  and  my- 
self were  present;  Greneral  Slocum,  on  account  of  the  long  distance  from 
his  post,  did  not  arrive  until  after  the  meeting  was  broken  up.  Hooker 
stated  that  his  instructions  compelled  him  to  cover  Washington,  not  to 
jeopardize  the  army,  etc.  It  was  seen  by  the  most  casual  observer  that  he 
had  made  up  his  mind  to  retreat.  We  were  left  by  ourselves  to  consult, 
upon  which  Sickles  made  an  elaborate  argument,  sustaining  the  views  of  the 
commanding  general.  Meade  was  in  favor  of  fighting,  stating  that  he 
doubted  if  we  could  get  off  our  guns.  Howard  was  in  favor  of  fighting, 
qualifying  his  views  by  the  remark  that  our  present  situation  was  due  to  the 
bad  conduct  of  his  corps,  or  words  to  that  effect.  Reynolds,  who  was  lying 
on  the  ground  very  much  fatigued,  was  in  favor  of  an  advance.  I  had 
similar  views  to  those  of  Meade  as  to  getting  off  the  guns,  but  said  I 
"  would  favor  an  advance  if  I  could  designate  the  point  of  attack."  Upon 
collecting  the  suffrages,  Meade,  Reynolds,  and  Howard  voted  squarely  for 
an  advance,  Si(.-kles  and  myself  squarely  no ;  upon  which  Hooker  informed 
the  council  that  he  should  take  upon  himself  the  responsibility  of  retiring  the 
army  to  the  other  side  of  the  river.  As  I  stepped  out  of  the  tent  Reynolds, 
just  behind  me,  broke  out,  "  What  was  the  use  of  calling  us  together  at  this 
time  of  night  when  he  intended  to  retreat  anyhow?" 

On  the  morning  of  May  5th,  corps  commanders  were  ordered  to  cut  roads, 
where  it  was  necessary,  leading  from  theii*  positions  to  the  United  States 
Ford.  During  the  afternoon  there  was  a  very  heavy  rainfall.  In  the  mean- 
time Hooker  had  in  person  crossed  the  river,  but,  as  he  gave  orders  for  the 
various  corps  to  march  at  such  and  such  times  during  the  night,  I  am  not  aware 
that  any  of  his  corps  generals  knew  of  his  departure.  Near  midnight  I  got 
a  note  from  Meade  informing  me  that  General  Hooker  was  on  the  other  side 
of  the  river,  which  had  risen  over  the  bridges,  and  that  communication  was 
cut  off  from  him.  I  immediately  rode  over  to  Hooker's  headquarters  and 
found  that  I  was  in  command  of  the  army,  if  it  had  any  commander.  General 
Hunt,  of  the  artillery,  had  brought  the  information  as  to  the  condition  of  the 
bridges,  and  from  the  reports  there  seemed  to  be  danger  of  losing  them 
entirely.  After  a  short  conference  with  Meade  I  told  him  that  the  recrossing 
would  be  suspended,  and  that  "we  would  stay  where  we  were  and  fight  it 
out,"  returning  to  my  tent  with  the  intention  of  (Mijoying  what  I  had  not  had 
since  the  night  of  the  30tli  ultimo  —  a  good  sleep;  but  at  2  a.  m.,  communi- 
cation liaving  been  reestablished,  I  received  a  sliarp  message  from  Hookei-, 
to  order  the  recrossing  of  the  army  as  he  had  directed,  and  everything  was 
safely  transferred  to  the  north  bank  of  the  Rappahannock. 

In  looking  for  the  causes  of  the  loss  of  ChancellorsvilIt\  tlit»  ]»riin;n-y  ones 
were  tliat  Hooker  expected  Lee  to  fall  1)ack  without  risking  battle.  Finding 
himself  mistaken  he  assumed  the  defensive,  and  was  (mtgentM-aled  and 
became  demomlized  by  the  superior  tactical  boldness  of  the  enemy. 


THE   SUCCESSES  AND    FAILURES  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

BY  ALFRED  PLEASONTON,  BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL,   U.   S.   A. 

IN   the  latter   part  of  April,   1863,  GeDeral   Hooker 
decided  to  undertake  an  offensive  campaign  with 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  against  the  Army  of  North- 
ern Virginia,  under  General  Lee.    At  this  time  the 
two  armies  faced  each  other :  Lee's,  numbering  about 
UMON  cAv*LRv-M*Ns  HAT.  60,000  mcu,  bciug  at  Fredericksburg,  and  the  Army  of 

the  Potomac,  numbering  about  130,000  men,  at  Falmouth,  on  the  north  side 
of  the  Rappahannock  River  opposite  Fredericksburg.  Hooker  directed 
three  corps  of  the  army,  the  First,  the  Third,  and  the  Sixth,  comprising 
59,000  men,  under  the  command  of  General  Sedgwick,  to  cross  the  Rappa- 
hannock River  below  Fredericksburg  and  hold  Lee's  army  in  that  position, 
while  he  himself  moved  secretly  and  with  celerity  three  corps,  the  Fifth, 
the  Eleventh,  and  the  Twelfth,  numbering  42,000  men,  up  the  river,  cross- 
ing it  and  concentrating  them  at  Chancellorsville,  ten  miles  west  of  Fred- 
ericksburg, with  the  purpose  of  moving  down  upon  General  Lee's  army  to 
take  it  in  rear  and  flank — two  divisions  of  the  Second  Corps  being  placed 
to  cover  Banks's  Ford,  the  third  division  being  left  at  Falmouth,  while  a 
brigade  and  battery  were  stationed  at  United  States  Ford  to  facilitate  the 
crossing.  The  Cavalry  Corps,  with  the  exception  of  one  small  brigade 
of  three  regiments  and  a  battery  of  horse  artillery,  which  was  left  under 
my  command  with  the  army,  was  ordered  under  the  command  of  Gen- 
eral Stoneman  to  make  a  raid  in  rear 
of  Lee's  army,  and  destroy  his  railroads 
and  his  communications  with  Richmond.  J 


-=-=ii  j:^-v  \A- 


B^S^-% 


.::s^^j 


PABADE  AT  FALMOUTH  OF  THE  llOTH  PENNSYLVANIA  VOLUNTEERS.  FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 

Tliis  rogiraeiit  (of  N\Tiipple'6  division,  Third  CorpH)  with  the  84th  Pcnnsylv.'iuia  performed  desperate  service  near 
Fairview  on  Sunday  morning,  May  3d,  the  84th  losing  215  men  and  the  llOth  losing  45  men.—  Editors. 


\  This  corps  did  great  service  by  drawing  off  Gen- 
eral Lee's  cavalry,  niulor  General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
to  Brandy  Station  and  Oulpeper,  tlius  depriving 
General  Lee  of  their  services  ;  for  General  Hooker 
moved  the  three  corps  with  him  with  such  celerity 


that  they  passed  between  Stuart  and  Lee's  army, 
and  Stuart  could  not  get  through  to  communicate 
to  Lee  what  was  going  on.  It  will  bo  seen  later  on 
what  a  loss  this  was  to  Lee,  and  what  a  great  ad- 
vantage it  was  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. —  A.  P. 


THE  SUCCESSES  AND  FAILURES  OF  CHANCELLORSHLLE. 


'73 


ABANDONING  THE  WINTER  CAMP  AT  FALMOUTH. 


)M   A  wAit-rnit 


On  the  26tli  of  April  General  Hooker  gave  his  orders  for  the  right  wing  of 
the  army  to  move,  the  Eleventh  and  Twelfth  corps  to  be  followed  by  the 
Fifth  ;  the  Eleventh  and  Twelfth  to  cross  the  Rappahannock  at  Kelly's  Ford, 
and  the  Rapidan  River  at  Germanna  Ford ;  the  Fifth  Corps  marching  from 
Kelly's  Ford  to  Ely's  Ford,  nearer  to  the  mouth  of  the  Rapidan  and  to  Chan- 
cellorsville.  The  left  wing  of  the  army,  under  General  Sedgwick,  was  oi-dered 
to  cross  the  Rappahannock  below  Fredericksburg  on  the  morning  of  the 
29th ;  its  duty  was  to  keep  the  enemy  as  long  as  possible  before  Fredericks- 
burg, to  pursue  him  if  he  attempted  to  fall  back  on  Richmond,  and  to  take 
possession  of  his  works  and  his  line  of  retreat  if  he  marched  upon  Chancellors- 
ville;  in  other  words,  Sedgwick  was  told  to  hold  Lee  at  Fredericksburg  until 
Hooker  could  come  down  upon  him  from  Chancellorsville  and  crush  liini. 

The  right  wing  of  the  army  crossed  Kelly's  Ford  on  the  morning  of  the 
29th,  and  the  Eleventh  and  Twelfth  corps  reached  Germanna  Ford  that 
evening.  I  had  the  advance  of  this  column  with  two  regiments  of  cavalry 
and  a  battery  of  horse  artillery ;  the  third  regiment  of  the  cavalry  brigade  I 
sent  with  the  Fifth  Corps  to  Ely's  Ford.  In  the  afternoon,  at  Germanna 
Ford,  I  surprised  and  captured  a  picket  of  some  fifty  of  Stuart's  cavalry 
soldiei-s.  With  them  was  an  engineer  officer  belonging  to  Stuart's  statf.  On 
searching  the  party,  as  is  done  with  all  prisoners,  I  found  on  this  engineer 
officer  a  very  bulky  volume,  which  proved  to  be  a  diary  tliat  he  had  been 
keeping  throughout  the  war.  I  spent  the  greater  part  of  the  night  in  reading 
it,  in  hopes  of  finding  something  that  would  be  of  advantage  to  us ;  nor  was 
I  disappointed.  This  diary  stated  that  in  the  first  week  in  ^Farch  a  council 
of  war  had  been  held  at  General  Stnart's  luMidcinarters,  which  had  been 
attended  by  Generals  Jackson,  A.  P.  Hill,  Kwell,  and  Stuart.  They  were  in 
conference  over  five  hours,  and  came  to  the  decision  tiiat  the  next  battle 
would  be  at  or  near  Chancellorsville,  and  thai  tliat  i)ositi<»ii  mnsl  be  prepai-ed. 


174 


THE  SUCCESSES  AND  FAILURES  OF  CHANCELLORSyiLLE. 


The  next  day,  the  30th  of  April,  I  moved  on  toward  Chancellorsville,  and 
at  1  o'clock  in  the  day  I  captured  a  courier  or  orderly  from  General  Lee,  who 
had  a  dispatch  from  Lee,  dated  at  Fredericksburg,  noon  of  that  day,  and 
addressed  to  Major-Greneral  McLaws,  stating  that  he  had  just  been  informed 
that  the  enemy  had  concentrated  in  force  near  Chancellorsville,  inquiring 
why  he  had  not  been  kept  advised,  and  saying  that  he  wished  to  see  McLaws 
as  soon  as  possible  at  headquarters.  At  2  o'clock  p.  m.,  one  hour  later,  I 
reported  to  Greneral  Hooker  at  Chancellorsville,  and  submitted  to  him  the 
diary  and  General  Lee's  dispatch,  both  of  which  he  retained,  and  I  suggested 
that  we  had  evidently  surprised  General  Lee  by  our  rapid  movements  across 
the  river,  and,  as  Lee  had  prepared  for  a  battle  at  Chancellorsville,  we  had 
better  anticipate  him  by  moving  on  toward  Fredericksburg.  A  march  of 
three  or  four  miles  would  take  us  out  of  the  woods  into  a  more  open  country, 
where  we  could  form  our  line  of  battle,  and  where  our  artillery  could  be  used 
to  advantage  ;  we  would  then  be  prepared  to  move  on  Fredericksburg  in  the 
morning.  Besides,  such  a  movement  would  enable  us  to  uncover  Banks's 
Ford,  which  would  shorten  our  communication  with  General  Sedgwick  over 
5  miles,  and  bring  us  within  3^  miles  of  Falmouth  by  that  Ford. 

I  was  much  surprised  to  find  that  General  Hooker,  who  up  to  that  time 
had  been  all  vigor,  energy,  and  activity,  received  the  suggestion  as  a  matter 
of  secondary  importance,  and  that  he  considered  the  next  morning  sufficiently 
early  to  move  on  Fredericksburg.  Up  to  that  time  General  Hooker's  strategy 
had  l^een  all  that  could  have  been  desired.  He  had  outflanked  the  enemy 
and  had  surprised  him  by  the  rapidity  of  his  movements.  At  2  o'clock  p.  m., 
on  the  30th  of  April,  General  Hooker  had  ninety  chances  in  his  favor  to  ten 


UNION    TUOOPS    CROSSING    THE    RAPIDAN    AT    ELYS    FORD.       FROM     A    AVAR-TIME    SKETCH. 


THE  SUCCESSES  AND  FAILURES  OF  CHANCELLORSI^ILLE. 


17s 


against  him.  The  very  cavahy  under  Stuart  that  Lee  depended  on  to  keep 
him  ad\dsed  had  been  cut  off  by  the  prompt  action  of  the  army,  and  we  had 
it  over  the  signature  of  Greneral  Lee  himself  that  his  army  had  been  suii3rised. 
General  Hooker  had  it  in  his  power  at  that  time  to  have  cioished  Lee's  army 
and  wound  up  the  war.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  never  had  a  better  oppor- 
tunity, for  more  than  half  its  work  had  been  done  before  a  blow  had  been 
struck,  by  the  brilliancy  of  its  strategy  in  moving  upon  Chancellorsville. 

I  camped  my  command  about  a  mile  from  General  Hooker's  headquarters, 
which  were  at  the  Chancellor  House,  and  such  were  my  misgivings  as  regarded 
the  situation  of  the  army  that  about  dusk  I  called  upon  the  general  again 
and  stated  to  him  our  perilous  position. 

To  the  east,  toward  Fredericksburg,  the  woods  were  thick  for  three  or  four 
miles ;  to  the  south,  toward  Spotsylvania  Court  House,  the  woods  extended 
about  the  same  distance;  to  the  west,  from  Hazel  Grove,  the  same  condition 
of  things  existed;  while  the  country  between  Chancellorsville  and  the  Rappa- 
hannock River,  in  our  rear,  was  rough,  broken,  and  not  at  all  suitable  for  the 
operations  required  of  an  army.  The  position  of  the  army  at  Chancellorsville 
extended  about  three  miles  from  east  to  west  in  the  narrow  clearings,  which 
did  not  afford  sufficient  ground  to  manoeuvre  an  army  of  the  size  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac.  Besides  this,  we  were  ignorant  of  what  might  be  going  on 
outside  of  this  cordon  of  woods,  and  were  giving  the  enemy  every  opportu- 
nity to  take  us  at  a  disadvantage.  Every  instinct  indu(,'ed  me  to  suggest  to 
General  Hooker,  to  relieve  ourselves  from  our  emlmrrassments,  to  send  the 
Eleventh  Corps,  which  was  in  a  miserable  position  in  the  woods,  down  to 
Spotsylvania  Court  House  by  the  Jack  Shop  road,  and  make  the  line  of  battle 
from  Chancellorsville  to  Spotsylvania.  This  proposition  was  not  approved, 
and  I  then  asked  permission  to  send  some  cavalry  to  Spotsylvania,  to  find  out 
what  was  going  on  in  the  open  country  beyond  the  woods.  General  Hooker 
assented  to  this,  and  I  ordered  the  6th  New  York  Cavalry,  under  Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel Duncan  Mc Vicar,  to  proceed  down  the  road  from  Chancellors- 
ville to  Spotsylvania,  ascertain  if  the  enemy  were  anywhere  in  that  vicinity, 
and,  having  done  so,  retui'n  before  daybreak.  This  could  easily  be  done,  as 
the  distance  was  not  more  than  eight  miles.  Colonel  McVicar  executed  his 
orders  in  splendid  style ;  he  went  to  Spotsylvania,  saw  no  enemy,  but  on  his 
return,  it  being  moonlight,  he  found  a  body  of  cavalry  in  liis  front,  barring 
his  passage  to  Chancellorsville.  He  immediately  dej)loyed  his  Regiment,  s(^mo 
three  or  four  hundred  strong,  and  after  a  murdci-ous  lire  from  the  saddle  he 
charged  the  enemy  with  sabers  and  comi>let«>ly  routed  them.  This  force  was 
the  5th  Virginia  Cavalry,  and  with  it  were  (leiuM-al  Stuai-t  and  statV.  They 
scattered  in  every  direction  and  were  ]>ursued  by  the  (ith  New  Yt)rk  Cav- 
alry until  the  2d  Virginia  Regiment,  coming  to  their  assistance,  sto])i)ed  the 
pursuit.  The  fith  New  York  Cavalry  tlien,  unmolested,  returned  to  Chancel- 
lorsville, but  without  tlieii-  brave  conunan<ler,  who  was  killed  in  the  thickest 
of  the  fray. 

This  action  made  a  strong  inqn-ession  on  llie  Confederates,  ;ind  Stuart,  in 
order  to  avoid  another  such  encounter,  started  his  cavah-y  in  the  direction 


176 


THE  SUCCESSES  AND  FAILURES  OF  CHANCELLORSHLLE. 


of  Spotsylvania  Court  House,  but  hw 
rear-guard  threw  the  whole  column 
into  confusion  by  the  cry,  "  The  enemy 
is  upon  us."  Major  von  Borcke,  a  dis- 
tinguished officer,  who  was  on  General 
Stuart's  staff,  and  was  present  on 
this  occasion,  in  describing  it,  says: 
"  Shots  were  fired  at  hazard  in  every 
direction.  The  1st  and  3d  Virginia 
Regiments,  no  longer  recognizing  each 
other,  charge  upon  each  other  mutu- 
ally ;  Stuart's  mounted  men,  generally 
so  brave  and  so  steadfast,  no  longer 
obey  the  orders  of  their  officers,  and 
gallop  off  in  great  disorder.  At  last 
quiet  is  restored,  and  the  brigade  final- 
ly reaches  Spotsylvania  Court  House, 
while  the  small  band  which  has  caused 
so  much  alarm  to  Stuart  was  quietly 
returning  to  Chancellorsville." 

The  next  morning  at  daylight  (Fri- 
day, May  1st)  I  reported  to  General 
Hooker  the  result  "of  this  reconnois- 
sance,  and  he  began  to  realize  the  im- 
portance of  the  information  that  had 
been  conveyed  the  day  before  in  the 
diar}^  of  Stuart's  engineer  officer.  The  6th  New  York  Cavahy  were  only 
able  to  report  that  they  had  cut  their  way  through  a  heavy  body  of  cavalry, 
and  this  by  moonlight ;  they  were  unable  to  say  whether  any  infantry  or 
artillery  were  in  that  direction. 

To  move  the  army  down  on  Fredericksburg  with  an  unknown  force  on  its 
rear  and  flank  was  a  hazardous  experiment.  What  could  have  been  done 
with  safety  the  day  before  now  became  doubtful,  and  it  was  this  uncertainty 
that  paralyzed  the  vigor  and  action  of  General  Hooker  throughout  the  1st  of 
May.  Although  he  started  the  Second,  Fifth,  Twelfth,  and  Third  corps  in 
the  direction  of  Tabernacle  Church  on  the  way  to  Fredericksburg,  the  move- 
ment was  not  of  such  a  character  as  to  bring  success.  Upon  meeting  a  stub- 
born resistance  from  General  Jackson's  forces,  and  fearing  that  if  he  should 
become  deeply  engaged  a  force  from  Spotsylvania  would  take  him  in  the  rear 
and  flank,  he  withdrew  the  army  and  placed  it  in  position  at  Chancellorsville, 
From  that  time  the  whole  situation  was  changed.  Without  striking  a  blow, 
the  army  was  placed  on  the  defensive.  The  golden  moment  had  been  lost, 
and  it  never  appeared  again  to  the  same  extent  afterward — an  illustration 
that  soldiers'  legs  have  as  much  to  do  with  winning  victories  as  theii"  arms. 

General  Lee  knew  that  General  Hooker  had  taken  his  army  back  to  its 
position  at  Chancellors\dlle.     The  Third  Corps  had  already  been  taken  from 


MAJOR-GENERAL    HIRAM     G.    BERRY,     COMMANJ>ING 

SECOND    DIVISION,    THIRD    CORPS,    KILLED    MAY 

3,  1863.      FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


THE  SUCCESSES  AND  FAILURES  OF  CHANCELLORSHLLE.  177 

General  Sedgwick  at  Fredericksburg,  and  at  2  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  May 
2d  the  First  Corps  was  also  ordered  up  to  Chancellors ville,  leaving  Sedgwick 
with  the  Sixth  Corps.  These  movements  did  not  escape  the  attention  of  Gen- 
eral Lee,  so  he  decided  to  assume  the  offensive  and  put  in  operation  the  plan 
which  had  been  suggested  by  Generals  Jackson,  A.  P.  Hill,  Ewell,  and  Stuart 
at  their  council  of  war  in  the  first  week  in  Marcli.  He  left  a  sufficient  force 
at  Fredericksburg  to  watch  Sedgwick,  while  with  the  bulk  of  his  army  he 
moved  on  Chancellorsville,  sending  a  force  under  Generals  Jackson,  A.  P. 
Hill,  and  Stuart,  to  make  a  turning  movement  and  to  attack  the  Union 
forces  in  the  rear  and  right  flank,  and  roll  them  up.  Lee  himself,  in  the 
meantime,  with  the  remainder  of  his  forces,  occupied  the  attention  of 
the  left  and  center  of  Hooker's  ai'my,  to  prevent  any  interference  with 
the  flank  movement.  General  Lee's  strategy  was  the  same  that  Hooker 
had  carried  out  so  successfully  until  he  stopped  at  Chancellorsville.  Lee 
was  equally  successful  in  his  movements,  and  we  will  now  investigate  the 
causes  of  his  failure  to  give  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  a  crushing  blow. 

On  the  2d  day  of  May  the  right  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  the 
Eleventh  Corps,  in  the  woods  near  Dowdall's  Tavern  (Melzi  Chancellor's) ;  the 
Thu'd  Corps  connected  it  with  the  Twelfth  Corps  at  Fairview  and  Chancellors- 
ville, facing  south  toward  the  woods ;  while  the  Second  and  the  Fifth  corps 
were  posted  to  prevent  any  attack  taking  the  position  in  the  rear  and  flank 
from  the  east.  Throughout  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  May,  attacks  w«.n'e  made 
on  different  portions  of  our  line  from  the  east  to  the  west.  These  attacks 
occurred  at  intervals  of  an  hour  or  more,  but  always  farther  to  the  west.  I 
was  satisfied  this  was  done  to  withdraw  oui*  attention  from  the  real  point  of 
attack,  and  I  mentioned  this  to  Hooker,  who  had  become  more  and  more  im- 
pressed with  the  belief  that  the  information  contained  in  the  diary  of  Stuart's 
engineer  officer  was  correct,  and  that  Lee  had  adopted  a  plan  to  carry  it  out. 

In  the  afternoon  of  May  2d  General  Sickles,  commanding  the  Third  Corps, 
sent  in  word  that  the  enemy  were  retreating  toward  Gordonsville,  and  that 
their  wagons  and  artillery  could  be  seen  passing  by  the  Furnace  road  some 
three  miles  to  the  south.  General  Hooker  sent  for  me  on  receiving  this 
report,  and  stated  that  he  was  not  sure  the  enemy  were  retreating;  that  he 
wanted  an  officer  of  experience  in  that  part  of  the  field,  and  that  he  wished  me 
to  take  my  command  there  and  keep  him  promptly  informed  of  everything 
that  was  going  on.  I  asked  him  if  he  considered  me  to  be  under  the  orders  of 
anyone.  He  replied  (piickly,  "You  are  under  my  orders  only;  use  your 
best  judgment  in  doing  whatever  you  think  ought  to  be  done." 

On  arriving  at  Hazel  Grove,  about  one  mile  from  Chancellorsville,  1  found 
that  General  Sickles  was  moving  two  of  the  divisions  of  the  Third  Cori»s  in 
the  direction  of  Catherine  Furnace,  and  shortly  aftei-  ho  became  engaged 
there  with  a  strong  rear-gnard.  Hazel  Grove  was  the  liigliest  ground  in 
the  neighborhood  and  was  the  key  of  our  position,  and  I  saw  that  if  Lee's 
forces  gained  it  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  woidd  be  worst  <m1. 

General  Sickles  wanted  some  cavaliy  to  ])roteet  liis  thinks,  and  1  gave  him 
the  Gth  New  York.     This  left  me  witli*  onlv  the  Sth  and  17th  Pennsylvania 


THE  SUCCESSES  AND  FAILURES  OF  CHANCELLOKS^JLLE.  179 

regiments  and  Martin's  New  York  battery  of  horse  artillery.  I  posted  this 
command  at  the  extreme  west  of  the  clearing,  about  two  hundred  yards 
from  the  woods  in  which  the  Eleventh  Corps  was  encamped.  This  i)osi- 
tion  at  Hazel  Grrove  was  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  in  extent,  running  nearly 
north-east  and  south-west,  but  was  in  no  place  farther  than  two  hundi'ed 
yards  from  the  woods,  and  on  the  south  and  east  it  sloped  off  into  a  marsh 
and  a  creek.  It  commanded  the  position  of  the  army  at  Fairview  and  Chan- 
cellorsville  and  enfiladed  oui*  line.  The  moving  out  to  the  Furnace  of  the 
two  divisions  of  the  Third  Corps  left  a  gap  of  about  a  mile  from  Hazel  Grove 
to  the  right  of  the  Twelfth  Corps.  Shortly  after  General  Sickles  had  been 
engaged  at  the  Furnace,  he  sent  me  word  that  the  enemy  were  gi\ang  way 
and  cavalry  could  be  used  to  advantage  in  pursuit.  Before  moving  my  com- 
mand I  rode  out  to  the  Furnace  to  comprehend  the  situation.  It  was  no  jjlaee 
for  cavalry  to  operate,  and  as  I  could  hear  spattering  shots  going  more  and 
more  toward  the  north-west,  I  was  satisfied  that  the  enemy  were  not  retreat- 
ing. I  hastened  back  to  my  command  at  Hazel  Grove ;  when  I  reached  it, 
the  Eleventh  Corps  to  oui'  rear  and  our  right  was  in  full  flight,  panic-stricken 
beyond  description.  We  faced  about,  having  then  the  marsh  behind  us.  It 
was  an  ugly  marsh,  about  fifty  yards  wide,  and  in  the  stampede  of  the 
Eleventh  Corps,  beef  cattle,  ambulances,  mules,  artiUery,  wagons,  and  horses 
became  stuck  in  the  mud,  and  others  coming  on  crushed  them  down,  so  that 
when  the  fight  was  over  the  pile  of  debris  in  the  marsh  was  manj^  feet  high. 
I  saw  that  something  had  to  be  done,  and  that  very  quickly,  or  the  Ai-my  of 
the  Potomac  would  receive  a  crushing  defeat.  The  two  cavalry  regiments 
were  in  the  saddle,  and  as  I  rode  forward  Major  Keenan  of  the  8th  Pennsyl- 
vania came  out  to  meet  me,  when  I  ordered  him  to  take  the  regiment,  charge 
into  the  woods,  which,  as  we  had  previously  stood,  were  to  our  rear,  and 
hold  the  enemy  in  check  until  I  coidd  get  some  guns  into  position.^  He 
replied,  with  a  smile  at  the  size  of  the  task,  that  he  would  do  it,  and  started 
off  hnniodiately.  Thirty  men,  including  Major  Keenan,  Captain  Arrowsniith, 
and  Adjutant  Haddock,  never  came  back.  I  then  directed  Captain  Martin  to 
bring  his  guns  into  battery,  load  with  double  charges  of  canister,  and  aim  them 
so  that  the  shot  woidd  hit  the  ground  half-way  between  the  guns  and  the  woods. 
I  also  stated  that  I  would  give  the  order  to  fire.  Just  then  a  handsome  young 
lieutenant  of  the  4th  U.  S.  Ai'tillery,  Frank  B.  Crosby  (son  of  a  distinguished 
lawyer  of  New  York  City),  who  was  killed  the  next  day,  galloped  up  and  said, 
"  General,  I  have  a  battery  of  six  guns  ;  where  shall  T  go  ?  wliat  shall  I  do  ? ''  I 
told  him  to  place  his  battery  in  line  on  the  right  of  Martin's  battery,  and  gave 
him  the  same  instructions  I  had  given  Martin  as  to  liow  I  wanted  him  to  serve 
his  guns.  These  2  batteries  gave  me  12  guns,  and  to  obtain  more  I  then 
charged  3  squadi'ons  of  the  17th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry  on  the  stragglers  of 
the  Eleventh  Corps  to  clear  the  gi-onnd,  and  with  the  assistance  of  tlie  rest 
of  the  regiment  succeeded  in  placing  10  more  jiicces  of  artiller\-  in  line. 
The  line  was  then  ready  for  Stonewall  Jackson's  onset.  It  was  dnsk  when 
his  men  swarmed  out  of  the  W(H)ds  for  a  (piarter  of  a  mile  in  our  front 

3^Seo  also  statomcnts  of  Major  Edward  J.  CarpoiittT  ami  others  on  p.  1  ST.— Kditors. 


i8o 


THE  SUCCESSES  AND  FAILURES  OF  C HAN  CELLO  RSi^l LIE. 


(our  rear  teu  minutes  before).  They  came  on  in  line  five  and  six  deep,  with 
but  one  flag — a  Union  flag  dropped  by  the  Eleventh  Corps. 

I  suspected  deception  and  was  ready  for  it.  They  called  out  not  to  shoot, 
they  were  friends ;  at  the  same  time  they  gave  us  a  volley  from  at  least 
five  thousand  muskets.  As  soon  as  I  saw  the  flash  I  gave  the  command 
to  fire,  and  the  whole  line  of  artillery  was  discharged  at  once.  |  It  fairly 
swept  them  from  the  earth ;  before  they  could  recover  themselves  the  line 
of  artillery  had  been  loaded  and  was  ready  for  a  second  attack.  After 
the  second  discharge,  suspecting  that  they  might  play  the  trick  of  having 
their  men  lie  down,  draw  the  fire  of  the  artillery,  then  jump  up  and  charge 
before  the  pieces  could  be  reloaded,  I  poured  in  the  canister  for  about  twenty 
minutes,  and  the  affair  was  over.  \ 

When  the  Eleventh  Corps  was  routed,  the  situation  was  this  :  The  nearest 
infantry  to  me  was  the  right  of  the  Twelfth  Corps,  over  a  mile  off,  and 
engaged  by  the  forces  under  Greneral  Lee,  who  was  trying  to  prevent  them 
from  impeding  the  movements  of  General  Jackson.  The  two  divisions  of  the 
Third  Corps  were  nearly  a  mile  to  the  west,  at  the  Furnace.     Had  Jackson 


4.  Major  Clifford  Thomson,  aide-de-camp  on  Gen- 
eral Pleasonton's  staff,  in  a  letter  written  in  1866 
gives  the  following  account  of  the  fight  at  Hazel 
Grove : 

"  General  Pleasonton  rode  from  gun  to  gun,  directing 
the  gunners  to  aim  low,  not  to  get  excited,  to  make 
every  shot  tell ;  the  staff-ofticers,  catching  their  cue  from 
him,  did  the  same,  and  while  at  lii'st  there  had  beeu  cou- 
siderahle  excitement  and  apprehension  among  us,  it 
soon  quieted  down,  and  every  thought  and  action  was 
directed  to  getting  the  best  service  out  of  those  guns 
that  they  were  capable  of  rendering.  Recovering  from 
the  disorder  into  which  Keenan's  charge  had  thrown 
them,  the  enemy  could  be  seen  forming  line  of  battle 
in  the  edge  of  woods  now  in  oiu'  front.  They  were 
scarcely  two  hundred  yards  distant ;  yet  such  was  the 
gloom  that  they  could  not  be  clearly  distinguished. 
General  Pleasonton  was  about  to  give  the  order  to  fire, 
when  a  sergeant  at  oue  of  the  guns  said : 

'"  (Jciicral,  aren't  those  our  troops?  I  see  our  colors 
in  tlu!  Hue!'  This  was  true,  for  where  he  pointed  our 
colors  could  be  seen  — trophies  picked  upon  the  field. 
General  Pleasonton  turned  to  me  and  said  : 

"  '  Mr.  Thomson,  ride  out  there  and  see  who  those 
people  are.' 

"  For  myself,  I  was  not  at  all  curious  about  '  those 
people,'  being  perfectly  willing  to  wait  till  they  intro- 
duced themselves.  Riding  out  between  our  guns,  I 
galloped  to  within  thirty  or  forty  yards  of  them;  all 
along  the  line  they  cried  out  to  me,  '  Couie  on;  we're 
friends! '  It  was  quite  dark  and  I  (!ould  not  make  out 
their  uniforms,  liut  I  could  hc<;  three  of  our  flags,  and 
these  CMUscd  me  to  liesit;(te;  I  ciinie  to  u  halt,  peering 
into  tlie  darkness  to  uiiike.  sure,  when  a  bullet  whistled 
by  ine,  ;ind  then  came  '  the  rebel  yell.'  The  line  charged 
up  the  liill  toward  our  guns,  and  I  led  it !  Lying  down 
upon  mv  hors(!'s  neck,  I  gave  him  the  si)ur.  and  the  yells 
of  the  '  .Tohnnics '  behind  further  st  iuiulated  him.  so  that 
wo  got  overtlie  ground  in  a  lively  manner.  P.nf  with  the 
report  of  the  first  shot  fired  at  me  (Jeneral  I'leascuiton 
had  opened  fire,  and  those  twenty-two  guns  belche-dforth 
destruction  at  a  fearfully  rapid  rate.  Although  lying 
down  on  my  horse  I  kept  an  eye  on  the  guns  and  guided 
my  horse  between  the  flashes,  and  in  less  time  than  it 
takes  to  tell  it  T  was  on  the  safe  side  of  them.  It  was 
load  and  fire  at  will  for  some  minutes  ;  the  enemy  was 
mowed  down  in  lieaps;  they  could  make  no  headway 
against  such  a  cyclone,  and  ran  back  down  the  slope  to 


the  cover  of  the  woods.  But  still  the  canister  was 
poured  into  them,  and  a  second  attempt  to  charge 
the  guns  failed.  Soon  Sickles's  corps  moved  from  its 
advanced  position  and  interposed  between  us  and  the 
woods  ;  parties  sent  out  over  the  field  which  had  been 
swept  by  our  guns  found  the  dead  and  dying  lying  in 
heaps.  Old  artillery  officers  have  informed  me  that  they 
never  before  heard  such  rapid  firing  as  occurred  at  t  lat 
engagement ;  the  roar  was  a  continuous  one,  and  the 
execution  terrific.  After  it  had  ceased  I  rode  up  to 
General  Pleasonton  and  said : 

"  •  General,  those  people  out  there  are  rebels ! ' 

"  There  was  a  grave  twinkle  in  his  eye  as  he  held  out 
his  hand  and  replied  : 

" '  Thomson,  I  never  expected  to  see  you  again ;  I 
thought  if  they  didn't  kill  you  I  should,  but  that  was  no 
time  to  stop  for  one  man.' 

"  I  should  have  agreed  with  him  more  cordially  if 
that  one  man  had  been  somebody  else.  After  .Sickles 
had  made  his  dispositions  in  our  front,  we  were  Mith- 
drawn  to  get  forage  for  our  horses,  and  our  part  in  the 
battle  of  Chanceliorsville  was  done.  Word  had  gone 
out  through  the  army  that  Pleasonton  and  his  staff 
had  l)een  killed  ;  so,  when  tired,  sleepy,  very  dirty,  and 
extremely  hungry,  we  next  morning  rode  quietly  into 
our  headquarters  camp,  at  the  rear,  we  were  looked 
upon  as  persons  risen  fi-om  the  dead.  One  thing  I  have 
forgotten  to  mention,  and  that  is  that  we  had  virtually 
no  support  for  those  twenty-two  guns  during  the  action. 
There  was  a  portion  of  the  17th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry 
under  the  hill,  but  the  men  were  new  recruits  and  had 
not,  I  beUeve,  been  imder  fire  previous  to  that  occasion. 
Had  the  enemy  succeeded  in  gaining  the  crest  of  the 
knoll,  the  support  would  not  have  made  a  mouthful  for 
a  single  company  of  Jackson's  men.  When  President 
Lincoln  visited  the  army  a  day  or  two  after  this  fight, 
Oent>ral  Pleasonton  chanced  to  caU  at  Hooker's  head- 
quarters, when  that  olflcer  said  : 

" '  Mr.  President,  this  is  General  Pleasonton,  who 
saved  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  the  other  night.' 

"The  President  acknowledged  the  service  in  his 
usual  grateful  manner.  Only  Insjiiration,  or  the  instinct 
of  a  natural  soldier,  could  have  enabled  Pleaso!it(m  to 
accomplisli  s:>  much  in  so  short  a  time  with  so  small  a 
force.  The  fight  at  Hazel  Grove  was  one  of  those  sharp 
and  decisive  actions  pregnant  with  great  results." 

\  See  also  statements  of  Captain  James  F.  Hun- 
tington on  p.  188. —  Editoks. 


THE  SUCCESSES  AND  FAILURES  OF  CHANCELLORSyiLLE.  i8i 

captured  the  position  at  Hazel  Grove,  these  two  divisions  would  have  been 
cut  off  from  the  army.  He  would  have  seen  General  Hooker  and  his  staff' 
getting  what  troops  he  could  to  prevent  the  routed  Eleventh  Corps  from 
demoralizing  the  rest  of  the  army,  and  the  fatal  position  which  that  portion 
of  the  army  occupied  rendered  it  an  easy  task  to  have  crushed  it.  Neither 
the  Second  Corps  nor  the  Twelfth  Corps  was  in  position  to  have  defended 
itself  against  an  attack  by  Jackson  from  Hazel  Grove. 

For  half  an  hour  General  Jackson  had  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  at  his 
mercy.  That  he  halted  to  re-form  his  troops  in  the  woods,  instead  of  forging 
ahead  into  the  clearing,  where  he  could  re- 
form his  troops  more  rapidly,  and  where  he 
could  have  seen  that  he  was  master  of  the 
situation,  turned  out  to  be  one  of  those 
fatahties  by  which  the  most  brilliant  pros- 
pects are  sacrificed.  When  he  advanced 
upon  the  artillery  at  Hazel  Grove  Jackson 
had  another  opportunity  to  win,  if  his  in- 
fantry had  been  properly  handled.  The  fire 
of  his  infantry  was  so  high  it  did  no  harm ; 
they  shoidd  have  been  ordered  to  fire  so  low 
as  to  disable  the  cannoneers  at  the  guns. 
Had  his  infantry  fire  been  as  effective  as 
that   of  our   artillery,  Jackson   would  have    TIkdVr  of'thk^tiViui)  divVsiV.n'of  the 

.       T       ,-,  •,.  "        rm  ,•■,-,  n  THIRD    CORPS,    MORTALLY   WOINDKD   BY 

carried  the  position.  The  artillery  fire  w^as  a  shakp-suootek  on  the  mornin.;  of 
effective  because  I  applied  to  it  that  priii-  may4,i863.  from  a  photograph. 
ciple  of  dynarnics  in  which  the  angle  of  incidence  is  equal  to  the  angle  of 
reflection, — that  is  to  say,  if  the  muzzle  of  a  gun  is  three  feet  from  the  ground 
and  it  is  discharged  so  that  the  shot  will  strike  the  gi'ound  at  a  distance  of 
one  hundred  yards,  it  will  glance  from  the  earth  at  the  same  angle  at  which 
it  struck  it,  and  in  another  one  hundred  yards  will  be  three  feet  from  the 
ground.  I  knew  my  first  volley  must  be  a  crushing  one,  or  Jackson,  Avitli  his 
superior  numbers,  would  charge  across  the  short  distance  which  separated 
us  and  capture  the  artillery  before  the  guns  could  be  reloaded. 

After  the  fight  at  Hazel  Grove  I  sent  into  the  woods  and  captured  a  nnnibcr 
of  Jackson's  men.  I  asked  them  to  what  commarid  they  belonged.  Om^  of 
them  said  to  General  A.  P.  Hill's  corps,  and  added,  "Tliat  was  a  pretty  trick 
you  })layed  us  this  evening."  I  asked  to  what  he  referred.  He  replied,  "  By 
withdrawing  your  infantry,  and  catching  us  on  your  guns," — tlius  sliowiiig 
that  the  flight  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  was  looked  upon  as  a  ruse.  To  my 
question,  if  they  had  suffered  much,  he  said  that  they  had  been  badly  cut 
up;  that  General  Jackson  had  been  badly  wounded;  also  General  A.  W  Hill, 
and  their  chief  of  artillery.  I  asked  how  he  knew  General  Jackson  had  been 
wounded.  He  stated  that  lie  saw  him  when  lie  was  carried  otT  the  field  in  a 
litter.  This  information  I  immediately  rejtorted  to  General  Hooker,  when  lie 
directed  me  to  withdraw  my  command  from  that  ])osition  and  go  into  camp 
on  the  north  side  of  the  Rappahannock  Kiver.     It  was  4  a.  m.  of  the  ;>d  of 


MAJOR-OENKRAL    AMIKI,    W.    WllUlM.E,    COM- 


1 82  THE  SUCCESSES  AND  FAILURES  OF  CHANCELLORS^ILLE. 

May  when  I  moved  from  Hazel  Glrove.  Sickles,  with  the  two  divisions  of 
the  Third  Corps,  reached  Hazel  drove  from  the  Furnace  between  half-past 
nine  and  ten  on  the  night  of  the  2d  of  May.  Some  of  his  troops  had  fighting 
in  the  woods  before  I  left,  but  I  am  unable  to  say  what  was  its  character. 

On  the  morning  of  the  3d  of  May  (Sunday)  General  Stuart  was  in  com- 
mand of  Jackson's  forces,  Jackson  and  A.  P.  Hill  having  been  wounded,  as 
reported  by  the  prisoner  taken  the  night  before.  Stuart  prepared,  with  his 
usual  impetuosity,  to  renew  the  attack  early  that  morning,  and  by  one  of 
those  unfortunate  occm-rences  so  prevalent  during  the  war,  he  caught  the 
Third  CorjDS  in  motion  to  take  up  a  new  position,  connecting  with  the  Twelfth 
Corps  at  Fairview,  and  facing  to  the  west.  This  withdrawal  enabled  Stuart 
to  take  the  position  at  Hazel  Grove  from  which  Jackson  had  been  repulsed 
the  evening  before.  He  saw  its  advantages  at  once,  and,  placing  some  thirty 
pieces  of  artillery  there,  he  enfiladed  the  Twelfth  Corps  at  Fair\4ew  and 
Chancellorsville,  and  punished  the  Third  Corps  severely.  The  Third  Corps 
was  fighting  throughout  the  day  under  great  disadvantages.  To  add  to  the 
embarrassments  of  the  army,  General  Hooker  that  morning  was  disabled  by 
a  concussion,  and  the  army  was  virtually  without  a  head,  the  different  corps 
commanders  fighting  their  commands  on  the  defensive.  Such  extraordinary 
conditions  forced  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  fall  back  from  Chancellors- 
ville and  Fairview,  and  form  a  new  line  of  battle  to  the  north  and  some  dis- 
tance from  Chancellorsville.  This  line  presented  a  front  to  the  enemy  that 
could  not  be  enfiladed  or  turned.  Desultory  fighting,  especially  with  artillery, 
was  kept  up  on  the  4th  of  May ;  but  Hooker's  battle  ended  on  the  3d,  after 
the  army  had  gained  its  new  position. 

It  is  useless  to  speculate  what  General  Hooker  would  have  done  if  he  had 
not  been  disabled.  Up  to  the  evening  of  the  2d  of  May  the  enemy  had 
suffered  severely,  while  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  comparatively  but 
few  killed  and  wounded ;  but  the  unfortunate  circumstances  that  contracted 
the  lines  of  om*  army  enabled  the  enemy  to  inflict  the  severest  punishment 
uj^on  all  the  troops  that  were  engaged.  In  fact,  the  greatest  injury  was 
inflicted  on  the  3d  of  May,  while  the  army  had  no  commander.  Had  the  First 
Corps,  which  had  not  been  engaged,  and  the  Fifth  Corps,  still  fresh,  been 
thrown  into  the  action  in  the  afternoon  of  Sunday,  the  3d  of  May,  when  Lee's 
troops  were  exhausted  from  the  struggle,  they  would  certainly  have  made 
Chancellorsville  what  it  should  have  been, —  a  complete  success.  These  two 
corps  mustered  from  25,000  to  30,000  men.  There  was  no  one  to  order  them 
into  the  fight,  and  a  second  golden  opportunity  was  lost.  The  army  recrossed 
the  Rappahannock  River  on  the  night  of  May  5th,  and  took  up  again  the 
position  at  Falmouth  which  they  had  occupied  before  the  campaign. 


WHEN   STONEWALL  JACKSON   TURNED  OUR  RiaHT. 

BY  JOHN  L.  COLLINS,  8tH  PENNSYLVANIA  CAVALRY. 


ON  the  afternoon  of  May  2d,  18G3,  the  Sth 
Pennsylvania  Cavalry  were  ordered  to  dis- 
mount, slack  saddle-girths,  and  rest  in  the  vicinity 
of  General  Hooker's  headquarters  at  Chancellors- 
ville.  Some  of  the  men  fell  asleep  holding  their 
horses,  some  began  talking  of  the  battle,  while  a 
knot  of  officers,  who  always  improved  such  occa- 
sions in  this  way,  sat  down  to  their  favorite  game 
of  poker.  Suddenly  an  order  from  headquarters 
made  a  complete  change  in  the  scene.  At  the 
word  "Mount!  "  the  sleepers  as  well  as  the  talkers 
sprang  to  their  saddles,  the  gamblers  snatched  up 
their  stakes  and  their  cards,  and  a  regiment  of 
cavalry  took  the  place  of  a  lounging  crowd. 

Passing  to  the  left  of  the  Chancellorsville  House, 
we  crossed  our  line  of  battle  at  the  edge  of  a  wood 
and  came  up  with  a  reconnoitering  party  that  had 
captured  the  23d  Georgia.  We  had  heard  that 
Lee  was  retreating,  and  supposed  that  this  un- 
fortunate regiment  had  been  sacrificed  to  give  the 
main  body  a  chance  to  escape ;  but  while  we  were 
commiserating  the  poor  fellows,  one  of  them  de- 
fiantly said,  "You  may  think  you  have  done  a 
big  thing  just  now,  but  wait  till  Jackson  gets 
round  on  your  right." 

We  laughed  at  his  harmless  bravado,  for  we 
did  not  think  he  would  betray  Jackson's  move  had 
he  known  anything  about  it;  but  while  we  were 
yet  trying  to  get  through  the  thick  wood  the  roar 
of  musketry  and  artillery  on  our  right  confirmed 
his  speech.  We  now  came  back  at  a  gallop  toward 
a  point  between  the  place  where  we  were  rest- 
ing and  the  place  where  the  battle  was  raging. 
As  we  rode  into  an  elevated  clearing,  called 
Hazel  Grove,  the  regiment  (the  Sth  Pennsylvania) 
was  brought  into  line.  We  surmised  a  disaster 
and  neiTously  braced  ourselves  for  the  ordeal,  not 
knowing  whether  we  wore  to  make  an  attack  or 
wait  there  to  receive  one. 

The  roar  of  musketry  was  now  heavier  and 
nearer;  the  vast  woods  between  us  and  Dowdall's 
tavern  seemed  to  shake  with  it.  There  was  no 
time  to  ask  or  to  wonder  what  had  happened,  for 
the  regiment  was  ordered  off  at  a  gallop.  After 
riding  about  three  hundred  yards  we  turned  into  a 
narrow  road  that  promised  to  take  us  into  the  midst 
of  the  enemy.  Half  a  dozen  horsemen  in  cadet 
gray  —  most  likely  a  general's  staff  reconnoitering, 
as  they  did  not  ride  in  ranks  —  were  in  the  road 
ahead  of  us,  and  turned  and  fled  back  to  their 
lines. 

The  word  "Charge!"  was  now  passed  from  tlie 
leading  squadron,  and  sabers  flew  into  the  air  along 
oui'  line ;  but  none  too  soon,  for  we  were  already 
in  tlie  midst  of  the  foe,  and  they  were  ready  for  us. 
The  UTifortunato  scpiailron  tliat  led  caught  all  the 
fire  as  we  dashed  along  t  lie  narrow  lane,  and  we  wlio 
rode  next  it  got  oidy  the  smoke  from  the  enemy's 
guns.  We  could  reach  nothing  as  yet,  and  could 
see  nothing  but  fire  and  smoke.  f<ir  their  line  of 
battle  was  safely  posted  behind  a  thicket  that  lined 


the  left  of  the  road,  while  their  rifles  were  aimed 
through  it. 

It  was  a  long  lane  and  a  hot  lane  to  go  through ; 
but  the  lane  had  a  turn,  and  we  got  to  it  at  last 
when  we  reached  the  Plank  road  and  struck 
Rodes's  division  right  in  the  front.  We  struck  it  as 
a  wave  strikes  a  stately  ship  :  the  ship  is  staggered, 
maybe  thrown  on  her  beam  ends,  but  the  wave  is 
dashed  into  spray,  and  the  ship  sails  on  as  before. 

Major  Keeiian,  who  led  his  battalion  in  the 
charge,  the  captain  in  command  of  the  leading 
squadron,  the  adjutant,  and  a  few  score  of  their 
followers  went  down  at  this  shock  together.  The 
detail  sent  over  to  recover  their  bodies  after  the 
battle  said  that  the  major  had  thirteen  bullets  in 
his  body,  the  adjutant  nine,  and  others  fewer.  It 
was  reported  by  some  who  rode  close  upon  the 
major  that  in  falling  he  shouted,  "To  the  right!  " 
seeing  that  the  impenetrable  masses  on  his  left 
could  not  be  forced,  and  that  there  was  no  way 
out  but  over  the  thinner  lines  on  the  right,  "\r\lien 
turning  at  full  speed,  my  horse  was  killed  and  I 
was  pitched  over  his  neck  on  the  roadside.  Here 
I  parted  company  with  the  regiment.  When  I 
jumped  to  my  feet  I  had  time  to  take  only  one 
glance  at  my  surroimdings.  My  sole  thought  was 
to  escape  capture  or  death.  On  one  side  were 
the  heavy  lines  of  Confederate  infantry  doubled 
and  bent  by  the  charge,  their  officers  trying  to 
recover  their  alignment ;  on  the  other  side  the  sur- 
vivors of  the  leading  squadrons  were  galloping  in 
the  Plank  road,  the  others  breaking  over  the  Con- 
federate skirmish  lines  as  far  back  as  I  could  see 
into  the  woods. 

By  instinct  I  tin-ned  toward  the  woods  on  the 
right  of  the  Plank  road  as  the  best  way  out,  and 
made  a  dash  at  the  lines,  which  had  just  recovered 
from  their  surprise  that  a  cavalry  regiment  should 
have  ridden  over  them,  and  were  firing  after  it. 
They  were  loading  when  I  ran  out  between  them, 
and  when  they  began  to  fire  I  dropped  down  be- 
hind some  trees  that  had  been  cut  to  make  an 
abatis,  or  had  been  shot  down  by  tlie  cannon; 
when  the  volley  was  over  I  jumped  up  and  ran 
as  fast  as  before. 

Tiie  Plank  road,  and  the  woods  that  bordered 
it,  presented  a  scene  of  terror  and  confusion  such 
as  I  had  never  seen  before.  Men  and  animals 
were  dashing  against  one  another  in  wild  dismay 
before  the  line  of  fire  that  came  crackling  and 
crashing  after  them.  The  constantly  approaching 
rattle  of  musketry,  the  crash  of  the  shells  tlirough 
tlio  trees,  seemed  to  come  from  tliree  sides  upon 
the  broken  fragments  of  tlio  Eleventh  Corps  that 
crowded  each  other  on  tlu^  road.  Tlie  horses  of 
the  men  of  my  regiment  who  had  been  shot, 
mingled  with  the  pack-muli>s  tliat  carried  the  am- 
munition of  the  Eleventli  (\irjis.  tore  like  wild 
beasts  through  the  woods.    I  triotl  in  vain  to  catch 


one. 
Tliis 


employment  of  the  mules  for  ammunition 


184 


WHEN  STONEIVALL  JACKSON  TURNED  OUR.  RIGHT. 


MAJOR    PETER    KEENAX,    KILLED    IN    THE    CHARGE    OF 
THE    8th    PENNSYLVANIA    CAVALRY. 

service  was  a  device  of  General  Hooker's,  and  this 
was  the  only  field  where  they  played  their  part. 
Each  mule  carried  four  or  five  boxes  of  spare  am- 
munition, and  being  tied  in  couples,  they  seemed 
easier  to  catch  than  a  horse.  As  a  pair  of  them 
made  for  opposite  sides  of  a  tree,  I  ran  toward  them 
to  get  one,  but  before  I  could  succeed  a  shell  from 
the  direction  of  the  Plank  road  struck  the  tree, 
exploded  the  ammunition,  and  slaughtered  the 
mules. 

T  now  gave  up  hope  of  a  mount,  and  seeing  the 
Confederate  lines  coming  near  me,  tried  to  save 
myself  on  foot.  Once,  when  throwing  myself  down 
to  escape  the  fury  of  the  fire,  I  saw  a  member  of 
my  own  regiment,  whose  horse  also  had  been  shot, 
hiding  in  a  pine  top  that  had  been  cut  down  by  a 
shell.  He  had  thrown  his  arms  away  that  he 
might  run  the  faster,  and  he  begged  me  to  do  the 
same.  This  I  refused  to  do,  and  I  got  in  safely 
with  my  arms,  while  he  was  never  seen  again.  I 
turned  into  the  Plank  road  to  join  the  very  bad 
company  that  came  pouring  in  by  that  route.  More 
than  half  of  the  runaways  had  thrown  their  arms 
away,  and  all  of  them  were  talking  a  language  that 
I  did  not  understand,  but,  by  their  tones,  evidently 
blaming  some  one  for  the  disgrace  and  disaster  that 
had  befallen  their  corps.  They  appeared  to  share 
the  prevailing  confusion  on  that  part  of  the  field, 
where  the  front  and  the  rear  seemed  reversed. 
Yet,  as  misery  loves  company,  I  cast  my  lot  vrith 
them  and  continued  my  flight. 

I  doubt  if  any  of  us  knew  where  we  were  going, 
further  than  that  we  were  fleeing  before  the  pur- 
suing lines  of  the  enemy.  One  of  my  own  com- 
pany, who  was  captured  in  the  cliarge,  afterward 
told  me  that  in  leaping  an  abatis,  he  was  lifted 
from  his  saddle  by  a  vine  and  remained  suspended 
till  made  a  prisoner. 


In  the  very  height  of  the  flight,  we  came  upon 
General  Howard,  who  seemed  to  be  the  only  man 
in  his  own  command  that  was  not  running  at  that 
moment.  He  was  in  the  middle  of  the  road  and 
mounted,  his  maimed  arm  embracing  a  stand  of 
colors  that  some  regiment  had  deserted,  while  with 
his  sound  arm  he  was  gesticulating  to  the  men  to 
make  a  stand  by  their  flag.  ^  With  bared  head  he 
was  pleading  with  his  soldiers,  literally  weeping  as 
he  entreated  the  unheeding  horde.  Under  different 
circumstances  I  should  have  considered  it  my  duty 
to  follow  and  find  my  command,  and  report  for  duty 
with  it.  But  I  could  not  go  past  the  general. 
Maimed  in  his  person  and  sublime  in  his  patri- 
otism, he  seemed  worthy  to  stand  by,  and  out  of 
pure  compliment  to  his  appearance  I  hooked  up 
my  saber  and  fell  into  the  little  line  that  gathered 
about  him.  As  the  front  became  clear,  we  fired 
a  few  shots  at  the  advance  line  of  the  Confeder- 
ates, but  a  fresh  mass  of  fugitives  in  blue  soon 
filled  the  road,  and  we  had  to  stop  firing.  The 
general  now  ordered  us  to  cover  the  whole  line  of 
retreat  so  as  to  let  none  pass,  and  the  oflicers,  in- 
spired by  his  devotion,  ran  in  front  of  their  men, 
drew  their  swords,  and  attempted  to  stop  them. 
As  the  number  constantly  increased,  the  press- 
ure became  greater  upon  the  line  that  blocked 
the  way  ;  but  this  line  was  constantly  reenforced 
by  officers  and  others,  and  offered  some  resistance 
to  the  pressure.  At  last  the  seething,  surging  sea 
of  humanity  broke  over  the  feeble  barrier,  and 
General  Howard  and  his  oflSeers  were  carried 
away  by  main  force  with  the  tide.  Pharaoh  and 
his  chariots  could  have  held  back  the  walls  of  the 
Eed  Sea  as  easily  as  those  officers  could  resist 
this  retreat.  I  started  again  on  my  race  for  life, 
this  time  alone,  and  toward  the  slopes  of  the  Chan- 
cellorsville  plateau,  where  it  seemed  to  me  prob- 
able that  my  regiment  would  re-form  after  the 
charge. 

My  course  was  right-oblique  from  the  road,  and 
I  had  not  gone  far  before  I  saw  lines  that  I  knew 
were  not  retreating.  Their  flags  were  flying,  and 
my  heart  took  a  bound  as  I  beheld  battery  after 
battery  galloping  into  position,  and  regiment  after 
regiment  wheeling  into  line  behind  them.  A  line  of 
battle  showed  itself  at  last ;  the  Third  Corps  had 
come  up  to  stop  the  successful  charge,  and  Jack- 
son's men  would  find  a  difference  between  attack- 
ing the  Third  Corps  in  front  and  the  Eleventh  in 
the  rear.  Seeing  the  guns  unlimber  and  load.  I 
made  my  greatest  effort  at  speed,  but  not  caring 
for  a  few  fugitives,  the  guns  belched  forth  their 
fire  before  I  could  get  in.  However,  I  came  safely 
through,  and  at  last  paused  for  a  long  breath.  While 
congratulating  myself  upon  my  escape,  I  looked 
behind  the  line  of  battle,  and  there  saw  my  own 
regiment  drawn  up  for  a  charge,  the  line  not  so 
long  as  half  an  hour  before  by  one-third,  but  still  as 
shapely  and  resolute  as  ever.  The  horses  were 
blown  and  nervous,  and  the  men  were,  no  doubt, 
a  little  depressed  by  the  rough  usage  they  had 
met  with.  A  horse,  that  had  followed  the  com- 
pany riderless  from  the  charge,  was  given  to  me. 


)  See  Gcucral  Howard's  descriiitioii  on  p.  200.— Editors. 


Pl^HEN  STONtWALL  JACKSON   TURNED  OUR  RIGHT. 


i8s 


ami  my  confidence  and  self-respect  came  back  as 
I  mounted  him,  for  I  was  no  longer  a  fugitive,  but 
a  soldier. 

The  fighting  now  began  in  earnest.  The  splen- 
did divisions  of  Birney,  Berry,  and  Whipple  had  to 
be  met  and  vanquished  before  a  farther  advance 
could  be  made,  and  before  Jackson  could  attain 
the  great  object  of  his 
mai'ch  to  our  rear.  The 
gathering  darkness  was 
favorable  to  the  Con- 
federates, for  th<\\- 
could  get  near  the  gun^ 
before  being  seen;  but 
it  also  added  to  the  tci  - 
ror  of  tlie  batteries 
which  were  discharge 
double-shotted  at  the 
assailants,  and  lit  u 
the  heavens  with  fii 
that  seemed  supernal 


The  slope  was  so  steep  that  a  line  of  battle  could 
be  formed  in  front  of  the  guns  and  a  double  skir- 
mish line  in  front  of  that. 

Oui- regiment  now  moved  up  to  the  guns,  enabling 
us  to  see  better  the  slopes  and  the  woods  when  lit 
up  by  the  fiashes.  Sometimes  darkness  and  still- 
ness would  reign  for  a  few  minutes,  and  we  would 


ural.  Tliu  dusky  liiii'S  I'l'U  luu'k  iiitu  tlic  wumls 
in  disorganized  masses  as  often  as  th(>y  advanced, 
and  the  cheers  of  our  troops  rang  out  at  each  re- 
treat. From  tlie  ))()ldness  and  tiie  freiiuency  of 
the  Confederate  charges  it  was  found  necessary  to 
move  the  infantry  in  front  of  the  guns,  lest  the 
enemy  should  seize  them  before  being  discovered. 

VOL.  HI.     13 


think  till'  h>Mg  day's  lighting  was  over,  but  it  w«>uld 
ircsinlly  breakout  again.  Tlio  steiiltiiy  rush  from 
the  woods  could  bo  heard  tirst,  then  the  sharp 
crack  of  the  skirmishei-'s  ritle.  then  a  yell  and  »i 
louder  nisliing  of  tiicir  lines  nu't  by  tlie  loud  roll 
of  tlie  line  ..f  l.attl.'"s  lire.  As  th.' cheer  of  our 
nu'u  announced  that  the  enemy's  line  was  again 
in  retreat,  the  blaze  of  f.u-ty  or  lifty  cannons  from 
the  right  to  the  left  w«.uM  light  up  the  scene  and 
carry  death  over  the  heads  of  our  men  into  the 
woods  beyon«l. 


i86         THE  CHARGE  OF  THE  EIGHTH  PENNSYLVANIA  CAVALRY. 


At  last  Jackson's  men  paused,  for  they  had  been 
marching  and  fighting  since  morning,  and  human 
nature  could  endure  no  more.  But  they  were  not 
allowed  to  hold  the  ground  they  had  won ;  an  ad- 
vance was  now  ordered  on  our  side,  and  it  was 
made  with  a  vigor  that  avenged  the  discomfiture 
of  our  comrades.  Though  it  was  now  midnight 
the  woods  were  lit  up  with  the  flame  of  the  mus- 
ketry as  the  combatants  came  face  to  face  among 
the  trees,  and  the  battle  began  anew.  The  artil- 
lerists pushed  on  their  guns  by  hand  a  hundred 


yards  behind  the  infantry  line,  and  shook  the 
woods  in  their  depths,  as  they  had  the  hills  to 
their  foundations.  At  last,  at  2  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  we  were  told  to  sleep  on  our  arms.  But 
who  could  sleep  while  counting  the  dead  of  our 
commands  ?  Comrades  were  gone  ;  file-leaders  and 
file-closers  were  gone  ;  officers  of  every  grade  had 
perished.  Stonewall  Jackson  himself  had  gone 
down  in  his  greatest  charge ;  and  his  men  never 
again  fought  as  on  that  day,  nor  came  down  on  our 
flank  with  such  fury. 


THE  CHARaE  OF  THE  EIGHTH  PENNSYLVANIA  CAVALRY.  Z, 

I.     BY  PENNOCK  HUEY,  BREVET  BRIGADIER-GENERAL,  U.  S.  V. 


JUST  as  we  reached  Hazel  Grove,  at  Scott's  Run 
Crossing,  at  half -past  6  o'clock  p.  M.,  May  2d, 
a  staff-officer  rode  up  in  a  state  of  great  excite- 
ment and  reported  to  General  Sickles  that  the 
enemy  had  flanked  General  Howard's  corps,  and 
that  he  had  been  sent  for  a  regiment  of  General 
Pleasonton's  cavalry.  General  Sickles  immediately 
ordered  General  Pleasonton  to  send  a  regiment. 
General  Pleasonton  then  ordered  me  to  report  with 
my  regiment  as  quickly  as  possible  to  General 
Howard,  whom  I  would  probably  find  near  the  old 
Wilderness  church.  There  were  no  other  orders 
given  to  me  or  to  any  officer  of  my  regiment.  4- 

I  found  the  regiment,  standing  to  horse,  on  the  op- 
posite or  north  side  of  Hazel  Grove,  near  the  road. 
The  wood  in  front  was  so  thick  with  underbrush 
that  a  bird  could  scarcely  fly  through  it ;  much  less 
could  a  cavalry  charge  have  been  made.  On  in- 
quiring for  the  adjutant  of  the  regiment,  and  on 
being  informed  by  some  of  the  men  where  he  was, 
I  rode  to  the  poiut  designated  and  found  Major 
Peter  Keeiian,  Captain  William  A.  Dailey,  Adju- 
tant J.  Haseltine  Haddock,  and  Lieutenant  Andrew 
B.  Wells  playing  cards  under  a  tree.  When  I 
ordered  them  to  mount  their  commands  they  were 
all  in  high  spirits  about  the  game,  Keenan  remark- 
ing :  "Major,  you  have  spoiled  a  good  game !  " 

After  mounting  the  regiment  I  rode  off  at  its 
head  in  my  proper  place,  followed  by  four  other 
officers,  all  of  whom  belonged  in  front  except 
Lieutenant  Carpenter,  who  commanded  the  second 
company  of  the  first  squadron,  and  might  properly 
have  been  in  the  rear  of  the  first  company,  where 
he  undoubtedly  would  have  been  had  I  supposed 
there  was  danger  ahead.  The  officers  in  front  were  : 
Major  PennockHuey,  commander  of  the  regiment; 
Major  Peter  Keenan,  commander  of  the  first  bat- 
talion; Captain  Charles  Arrowsmith,  commander 
of  the  first  squadron  ;  Lieutenant  J.  Edward  Car- 
penter, commander  of  the  second  company;  and 
Adjutant  J.  Haseltine  Haddock,  whose  place  was 
with  me  unless  otherwise  ordered.  We  rode  through 
the  wood  toward  the  Plank  road;  there  was  no 
unusual  stir  or  excitement  among  the  men  or  oflfi- 

l3>  Extracted  by  permission  and  coudeused  from  "  A 
True  History  of  the  Cliargc  of  the  8th  Pennsylvania 
Cavalry  at  Chanecllorsville,"  by  rcunock  Huey,  Phila- 
delphia, 1885.— Editors. 


cers  of  the  regiment,  the  impression  being  that  the 
enemy  were  retreating,  and  all  who  had  not  heard 
of  General  Howard's  disaster  felt  happy  with  the 
thought  that  the  battle  was  almost  over.  No  one 
in  the  regiment,  with  the  exception  of  myself,  knew 
where  we  were  going  or  for  what  purpose. 

From  the  information  I  had  received  from  Gen- 
eral Pleasonton,  and  from  hearing  the  aide  make 
his  report  before  I  started,  I  had  no  idea  that  we 
would  meet  the  enemy  till  after  I  had  reported  to 
General  Howard.  Therefore  the  surprise  was  as 
great  to  us  as  to  the  enemy,  as  we  were  entirely 
unprepared,  our  sabers  being  in  their  scabbards. 
When  we  arrived  almost  at  the  Plank  road,  we  dis- 
covered that  we  had  ridden  right  into  the  enemy, 
the  Plank  road  in  our  front  being  occupied  by 
them  in  great  force,  and  that  we  were  completely 
surroimded,  the  woods  at  that  point  being  filled 
with  flankers  of  Jackson's  column,  who  were 
thoroughly  hidden  from  our  view  by  the  thick 
undergrowth.  It  was  here  that  I  gave  the  com- 
mand to  "  draw  sabers  and  charge,''  which  order 
was  repeated  by  Major  Keenan  and  other  officers. 
The  charge  was  led  by  the  five  officers  already 
named,  who  were  riding  at  the  head  of  the  regi- 
ment when  we  left  Hazel  Grove.  On  reaching  the 
Plank  road  it  appeared  to  be  packed  about  as 
closely  with  the  enemy  as  it  possibly  could  be. 

We  turned  to  the  left,  facing  the  Confederate 
column,  the  regiment  crowding  on,  both  men  and 
horses  in  a  perfect  fi'enzy  of  excitement,  which 
nothing  but  death  could  stop.  We  cut  our  way 
through,  trampling  down  all  who  could  not  escape 
us,  and  using  our  sabers  on  all  within  reach,  for  a 
distance  of  about  100  yards,  when  we  received  a 
volley  from  the  enemy,  wliicli  killed  Major  Keenan, 
Captain  Arrowsmith,  and  Adjutant  Haddock,  three 
of  the  noblest  and  most  gallant  officers  of  the  war, 
besides  a  large  number  of  men.  All  three  of  the 
above-named  officers  fell  at  the  same  time  and 
from  the  same  volley,  Major  Keenan  falling  against 
me  and  lighting  on  the  ground  under  my  horse.  A 
few  days  afterward  liis  body  was  found  near  the 
spot  where  he  had  fallen. 

4-  General  Huey  was  at  this  time  Ma,ior  (afterward 
Colonel)  of  the  8th  Pennsylvania  cavalry,  and  was 
the  senior  offlcer  present  with  it.  [See  also  p.  187.]— 
Editors. 


THE  CHARGE  OF  THE  EIGHTH  PENNSYLyANIA  CAK4LRY. 


187 


BY  J.  EDWARD 


CARPENTER,  MAJOR,  8TH  PENNSYLVANIA  CAVALRY.  | 


THERE  was  no  confusion  at  Hazel  Grove  when 
the  regiment  received  its  orders  and  left  that 
place.  No  enemy  was  in  sight.  Indeed,  until  after 
the  8th  Pennsylvania  had  left  the  place  there  was 
not  the  slightest  evidence  that  the  enemy  was  in 
the  immediate  neighborhood,  excepting,  perhaps, 
that  the  musketry-firing  seemed  to  be  drawing 
nearer.  The  charge  of  the  regiment  was  made  on 
the  Plank  road,  about  three-quarters  of  a  mile 
from  where  Pleasonton  was  at  Hazel  Grove,  and 
was  first  'ordered  by  the  commanding  officer  of 
the  regiment  at  the  moment  when  the  emergency 
arose. 

The  writer  of  this,  although  himself  a  participator 
in  the  charge,  was  unable  to  recognize  General 
Pleasonton's  description  of  it  and  the  surround- 
ing scenes  attending  it.  [See  p.  179.]  A  letter 
from  the  writer  to  a  member  of  his  family,  vsTitten 
three  days  after  the  charge,  is  now  before  him. 
From  this  letter  the  following  is  extracted: 

"  We  lost,  however,  I  regret  to  say,  three  gallant  offi- 
cers, Major  Keeuan,  Captain  Arrowsmlth  and  Adjufant 
Haddock.  Major  Huey  and  .  .  .  were  the  only  ones 
who  came  out  from  the  head  of  the  column.  All  the  rest 
were  killed,  wounded,  or  prisoners." 


Wlien  this  letter  was  written  on  the  5th  of  May, 
IS 03,  there  was  no  thought  of  controversy.  It 
was  intended  only  for  the  eye  of  the  person  to 
whom  it  was  written,  with  no  idea  that  it  would  be 
preserved. 

General  Pleasonton's  report  of  the  operations  of 
his  command  at  Chancellorsville,  dated  May  18th, 
18 63,  makes  no  mention  of  Keenan,  but  com- 
mends Huey  as  the  commander  of  the  regiment 
and  indorses  his  report.  In  Major  Huey's  report 
of  the  operations  of  the  8th  Pennsylvania  cavalry, 
dated  May  9th,  1863,  he  states  that  he  was 
ordered  to  report,  with  his  command,  to  General 
Howard,  and  no  mention  is  made  of  any  order 
from  General  Pleasonton  to  charge.  This  report 
was  before  Pleasonton  when  his  own  report  was 
made,  and  no  exception  was  ever  taken  to  it. 
In  Colonel  Thomas  C.  Deviu's  report  of  the  2d 
brigade,  dated  May  12th,  1863,  he  states  that 
the  8th  Pennsylvania  cavalry  was  sent  to  the  sup- 
port of  General  Howard,  and  Major  Huey  is  com- 
plimented as  the  commander  of  the  regiment.  No 
mention  is  made  of  an  order  to  Keenan  to  charge, 
and  Keenan  is  only  referred  to  as  having  gallantly 
fallen. 


III.  BY  ANDREW  B.  WELLS,  CAPTAIN,  CO.  P,  STH  PENNSYLVANIA  CAVALRY.  | 


OUR  regiment,  on  the  second  day  of  May,  1863, 
was  awaiting  orders  in  a  clearing  of  wooded 
country  called  Hazel  Grove.  We  had  been  there 
some  little  time.  Everything  was  quiet  on  the 
front.  The  men  were  gathered  in  groups,  chatting 
and  smoking,  and  the  officers  were  occupied  in 
much  the  same  manner,  wondering  what  would 
turn  up  next. 

About  4  o'clock  I  suggested  a  game  of  draw 
poker.  An  empty  cracker-box,  with  a  blanket 
thrown  over  it,  served  as  a  card-table.  The  party 
playing,  if  I  mistake  not,  was  composed  of  Major 
Keenan,  Adjutant  Haddock,  Captain  Goddard, 
Captain  W.  A.  Daily,  and  myself.  We  had  been 
playing  about  two  hours  —  the  game  was  a  big  one 
and  we  were  all  absorbed  in  it — when,  about  6  P.  M., 
it  was  brought  to  an  abrupt  end  by  the  appearance 
of  a  mounted  officer.  Riding  up  to  where  we  were 
playiTig,  he  asked  in  an  excited  manner :  "  Who  is  in 
command  of  this  regiment  ?  "  Major  Keenan,  who 
was  seated  beside  me,  turned  his  head  and  said,  in 
a  joking  way:  "I  am;  what's  the  trouble?"  Our 
visitor  replied  :  "  General  Howard  wants  a  cavalry 
regiment."  And  before  wo  had  time  to  ask  further 
questions  he  was  off,  and  the  next  moment  we  were 
all  on  our  feet,  and  our  game  was  ended.  I  remem- 
ber it  perfectly  well,  for  I  was  out  of  pocket  on  the 
play.  ^  The  regiment  was  mounted,  I  mountinp:  at 
the  same  time  and  alongside  of  Major  Keenan.  We 
then  moved  out  of  Hazel  Grove  by  twos.  Keenan, 
Haddock,  Arrovvsmith,  Huey,  and  Cai-penter  moved 


out  with  the  first  squadron.  I  remember  distinctly 
seeing  that  group  of  officers,  and  did  not  see  Gen- 
eral Pleasonton  at  the  time. 

I  was  under  the  impression,  and  believe  that  the 
other  officers  also  were,  that  we  were  on  our  road 
to  report  to  General  Howard.  Anyhow,  I  fell  in 
with  the  second  squadron,  Captain  William  A. 
Corrie  being  in  command,  and  he  and  I  rode  to- 
gether at  the  head  of  it.  When  we  passed  out  of 
the  clearing  there  were  no  officers  or  men  on  our 
flank,  all  was  in  order  ahead,  and  the  command 
was  moving  at  a  walk.  The  command  entered 
the  woods  and  was  still  moving  on  a  walk,  when, 
at  the  distance  of  about  one  mile  from  where 
we  had  mounted,  Captain  Corrie  and  myself  saw 
the  first  squadron  take  the  trot,  leaving  a  space 
between  us  of  about  twenty-five  yards.  At  the 
same  time  we  heard  the  command,  "  Draw  sabers," 
and  saw  the  first  squadron  draw  them.  We  then 
heard  the  musketry-firing.  It  was  given  in  con- 
tinuous but  distant  volleys. 

We  of  the  second  squadron  knew  that  our  time 
was  at  liand,  and  Cai>tain  Corrie  gave  the  onler  to 
draw  sabers  and  charge.  Taking  a  trot,  we  found 
that  the  road  took  a  bend  as  we  jiroceedecl.  Wlu-n 
we  turned  the  corner  of  the  wood-road  a  sight  met 
our  eyes  that  it  is  impossible  for  me  to  describe. 
After  charging  over  tlie  dead  men  and  horses  of 
the  first  squadroTi  we  charged  into  .Tnckson's  col- 
umn, and.  as  luck  would  liave  it,  found  them  with 
empty  guns  —  thanks  to  our  poor  comrades  ahead. 


I  Taken  by  pcrraiseion  from  the  "  Philadolpliia  Weekly  Press."  Octolier  13th,  1886.  and  oondonsed.—  Editors*. 
A  Captain  Wells  has  elsewhere  said  that  at  G:JO  by  liis  watdi,  Major  TIncy  rodo  up  and  pave  the  order  to 
mount.—  Editors. 


THE  ARTILLERY  AT  HAZEL  GRO^E. 


The  enemy  were  as  thick  as  bees,  and  we  appeared 
to  be  among  thousands  of  them  in  an  instant. 

After  we  reached  the  Plank  road  we  were  in 
columns  of  foui-s  and  on  the  dead  run,  and  when 
we  struck  the  enemy  there  occurred  a  "jam"  of 
living  and  dead  men,  friends  and  enemies,  and 
horses,  and  the  weight  of  the  rear  of  our  squadron 
broke  us  into  utter  confusion,  so  that  at  the  mo- 
ment every  man  was  for  himself. 

The  third  squadron,  which  Captain  P.  L.  Goddard 
commanded,  was  in  our  rear,  and  came  thundering 
along  after  us,  but  as  to  the  balance  of  the  regi- 
ment I  do  not  know  how  they  came  in  or  got  out. 

The  enemy  wei'e  as  much  surprised  as  we  were, 
and  thought,  no  doubt,  as  they  now  say,  that  the 
whole  cavalry  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
was  charging  them.  I  distinctly  remember  hearing 
a  number  of  them  call  out,  "  I  surrender,  I  sur- 
render." We  did  not  stop  to  take  any  prisoners 
for  fear  of  being  captured  ourselves, —  I  had  been 


caught  once  and  was  just  out  of  Libby  prison  and 
did  not  want  to  be  captm-ed  again, —  but  made  for 
our  lines  as  best  we  could. 

The  whole  affair  was  accidental.  We  were  on 
our  way  to  report  to  General  Howard,  some  three 
miles  from  where  we  were  encamped,  and  the 
country  that  General  Howard's  staff-officer  had 
just  passed  over  in  quest  of  the  cavalry  had  in  the 
meantime  been  crossed  by  Stonewall  Jackson's 
troojjs,  and  in  following  tjae  same  track  we  natu- 
rally ran  into  them.  The  officers  who  were  at  the 
head  of  our  column,  seeing  the  situation,  had  only 
an  instant  to  determine  what  was  to  be  d6ne.  We 
could  not  turn  around  and  get  out  in  the  face  of 
the  enemy,  and  the  only  thing  left  for  us  was  to  go 
through  them,  "  sink  or  swim." 

Can  any  man  who  was  a  soldier  for  one  moment 
imagine  an  officer  deliberately  planning  a  charge 
by  a  regiment  of  cavalry,  strung  out  by  twos  in  a 
eolvmin  half  a  mile  long  in  a  thick  wood  ? 


THE   ARTILLERY  AT   HAZEL  GROVE. 


BY  JAMES   F.   HUNTINGTON,   CAPTAIN,    BATTERY   H,    IST   OHIO   ARTILLERY, 


^rxT'HEN  Jackson's  advance  struck  the  Eleventh 
VV  Corps,  four  batteries  had  been  for  some 
time  waiting  orders  in  the  extensive  clearing 
known  as  Hazel  Grove.  Of  these,  "H,"  1st  Ohio 
Light  Artillery,  and  the  10th  and  11th  New  York 
Independent  Batteries  belonged  to  Whipple's  di- 
vision of  the  Third  Corps.  They  were  left  there 
when  that  division  passed  through  en  route  to  join 
the  force  operating  imder  General  Sickles  near  the 
Furnace.  Later,  Martin's  horse  battery,  with 
Devin's  cavalry  brigade,  arrived  and  took  gi'ound 
on  the  opposite  or  south  side  of  the  field.  When 
the  sound  of  battle  indicated  that  the  enemy  were 
driving  in  the  right  of  the  army,  and  were  ap- 
proaching Hazel  Grove,  the  batteries  of  Whipple's 
division  were  brought  into  position  under  my 
direction,  as  acting  chief  of  artillery.  Although 
the  movement  was  delayed  by  causes  beyond  my 
control  until  its  execution  had  become  exceedingly 
difficult,  our  eighteen  guns  were  established  in 
battery,  ready  to  open  before  the  enemy  fired 
a  shot  or  were  in  a  position  to  do  so.  General 
Pleasonton  seems  to  be  unaware  of  that  fact,  or 
he  would  hardly  have  failed  to  allude  to  it.    It  is, 

f^Jw  reply  to  statements  contained  in  General  Pleas- 
oiitoii'H  paper,  y.  179.— Editors. 

^  (ieiKial  Sickles  says  in  lii8  official  report:  "  I  coa- 
fliled  to  I'lcasoiitou  tlie  direction  of  the  artillery  —  three 
batteries  of  my  reserve  —  Clark's,  Lewis's  |loth  New 
York,  of  Huntington's  command]  andTurnbnll's.  and  his 
own  horse-battery.  .  .  .  The  fugitives  of  tlie  Kleventh 
Corps  swarmed  from  the  woods  and  swept  frantically 
over  the  cleared  fields  in  which  my  artillery  was  parked. 
.  .  .  The  enemy  showing  himself  on  the  plain.  Pleas- 
onton met  the  attack  at  short  range  with  the  well- 
directed  fire  of  twenty-two  pieces  doulih-sliot  fed  with 
canister."    According  to  this  one  of  Huntington's  three 


therefore,  fair  to  presume  that  his  attention  was 
engrossed  by  the  supervision  of  Martin's  battery, 
as  detailed  in  his  paper.  General  Sickles,  on  his 
arrival,  soon  after  the  firing  ceased,  sent  for 
me  and  warmly  expressed  his  approbation  of  the 
manner  in  which  my  command  had  held  the 
ground. ) 

Nothing  on  wheels  from  the  Eleventh  Corps 
passed  through  Hazel  Grove.  The  vehicles  that 
stampeded  through  my  lines  while  in  process  of 
formation  were  forges,  battery-wagons,  ambu- 
lances, etc.,  belonging  to  the  Third  Corps,  left  in 
the  cross-road  leading  to  the  Plank  road,  when 
that  corps  went  out  to  the  Furnace  to  attack  Jack- 
son's column.  So  whatever  else  may  have  formed 
the  components  of  the  remarkable  tumi(lus  de- 
scribed by  General  Pleasonton,  it  certainly  did  not 
contain  the  debris  of  the  Eleventh  Corps.  As  for 
the  tiinudus  itself,  it  escaped  my  observation  when 
I  crossed  the  bog  he  refers  to  on  Sunday  morning 
with  my  battery,  or  what  there  was  left  of  it,  at  the 
pressing  solicitation  of  Archer's  Confederate  bri- 
gade. 

Boston,  October  14th,  188G. 

batteries  (Lewis's  10th  New  York)  was  placed  under 
Pleasonton's  control.  Probably  this  battery,  with  Turn- 
bull's,  Clark's,  and  Martin's,  made  up  the  twenty-two 
guns  mentioned  by  both  Sickles  and  Pleasonton.  Gen- 
eral Hunt,  the  chief  of  artillery  of  the  army,  says :  "  When 
the  Eleventh  Corjis  was  broken  up  and  routed  on  the 
2d,  .  .  .  (4eTieral  Pleasonton  collected  some  batteries 
belonging  to  different  corps  (Martin's  Horse  Artillery, 
Gth  New  York,  six  3-ineh  guns,  Clark's  B,  1st  New 
Jersey,  six  lO-pounders ;  Lewis's  10th  New  York,  six 
light  IS-pounders;  TurnbuU's  F  and  K,  3d  U.  S.,  six  12- 
pounders),  and  with  them  formed  a  large  battery  of 
twenty-four  guns."— Editors. 


RACE    ON     THE     PLANK     ROAD     FOR     RIGHT    OF     WAY,     BETWEEN     THE    NINTH    MASSACHUSETTS     BATTERY    AND    A    BAGGAGE    TRAIN. 

THE   ELEVENTH    CORPS    AT   CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

BY  OLIVER  O.   HOWARD,   MAJOR-GENERAL,  U.  S.   A. 

THE  country  around  Chancellorsville  for  the  most  part  is  a  wilderness, 
with  but  here  and  there  an  opening.  If  we  consult  the  recent  maps  (no 
good  ones  existed  before  the  battle),  we  notice  that  the  two  famous  rivers,  the 
Rapidan  and  the  Eappahannock,  join  at  a  point  due  north  of  Chancellors- 
ville ;  thence  the  Rappahannock  runs  easterly  for  two  miles,  till  suddenly  at 
the  United  States  Ford  it  turns  and  flows  south  for  a  mile  and  a  half,  and 
then,  turning  again,  completes  a  horse-shoe  bend.  Here,  on  the  south  shore, 
was  Greneral  Hooker's  battle-line  on  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  May,  1863. 
Here  his  five  army  corps,  those  of  Meade,  Slocum,  Couch,  Sickles,  and 
Howard,  were  deployed.  The  face  was  toward  the  south,  and  the  ranks 
mainly  occupied  a  ridge  nearly  parallel  with  the  Rapidan.  The  left  touched 
the  high  ground  just  west  of  the  horse-shoe  bend,  while  the  bristling  front, 
fringed  with  skirmishers,  ran  along  the  Mineral  Spring  road,  bent  forward  to 
take  in  the  cross-roads  of  Chancellorsville,  and  then,  stretching  on  westerly 
through  lower  levels,  retired  to  Dowdall's  Tavern.  Just  beyond  Dowdall's 
was  a  slight  backward  hook  in  the  line,  partially  encircling  Talley's  Hill,  a 
sunny  spot  in  the  forest  between  the  Orange  Plank  road  and  the  j^ike.  This 
pike  is  an  old  roadway  which  skirts  the  northern  edge  of  Talley's  farm,  and 
makes  an  angle  of  some  forty  degrees  with  the  Orange  Plank  roatl. 

At  dawn  of  that  eventful  day  General  Hooker  was  at  Chancellorsville. 
Slocum  and  Hancock  were  just  in  his  front,  infantry  and  artillery  deployed 
to  the  right  and  left.  French's  division  was  in  his  rear.  ^Meade  occupied  the 
extreme  left,  and  my  corps,  the  Eleventh,  the  right.  Sickles  connectcil  me 
with  Slocum.  Our  lines  covered  between  five  and  six  miles  of  frontage,  and 
Hooker  was  near  the  middle  point.  The  main  body  of  our  cavalry,  under 
Stoneman,  had  gone  off  on  a  raid  upon  Lee's  communications,  and  the 
remainder  of  the  Army  of  tlie  Potomac  was  under  the  sturdy  Sedgwick, 
beyond  Fredericksbui-g. 

Our  opponents,  under  (Jeneral  l^.l)ei-t  E.  Lee,  the  evening  before,  were 
about  two  miles  distant  towai-d  Fi-edeiicksbuig,  and  thus  between  us  and 
Sedgwick.  Lee  had  immediately  witli  him  the  divisions  of  ^NFcLaws,  Andei-- 
son,  Rodes,  Colston,  and  A.  P.  liill,  besides  some  cavalry  under  Stuart.     He 


190 


THE  ELEVENTH  CORPS  AT  CHANCELLORSyiLLE. 


THE    OLD    CHANCELLOR    HOUSE,    BURNED    DURING    THE    BATTLE.     FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


held,  for  his  hue  of  battle,  a  comparatively  short  front  between  the  Rappa- 
hannock and  the  Catherine  Furnace,  not  exceeding  two  miles  and  a  half  in 
extent.  His  right  wing,  not  far  from  the  river,  was  behind  Mott's  Run,  which 
flows  due  east,  and  his  left  was  deployed  along  the  Catherine  Furnace  road. 

Could  Hooker,  on  the  first  day  of  May,  have  known  Lee's  exact  location, 
he  never  could  have  had  a  better  opportunity  for  taking  the  offensive.  But 
he  did  not  know,  and  after  the  few  troops  advancing  toward  Fredericksburg 
had  met  the  approaching  enemy  he  ordered  all  back  to  the  "  old  position," 
the  Chancellorsville  line,  which  I  have  just  described. 

On  the  preceding  Thursday,  the  last  of  April,  the  three  corps  that  con- 
stituted the  right  wing  of  the  army,  Meade's,  Slocum's,  and  mine,  had  crossed 
from  the  north  to  the  south  side  of  the  Rapidan,  and  by  4  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon had  reached  the  vicinity  of  Chancellorsville,  where  Slocum,  who  was 
the  senior  commander  present,  established  his  headquarters.  I,  approaching 
from  Germanna  Ford,  halted  my  divisions  at  Dowdall's  Tavern  and  encamped 
them  there.  Then  I  rode  along  the  Plank  road  through  the  almost  continuous 
forest  to  the  Chancellorsville  House.  There  I  reported  to  Slocum.  He  said 
that  the  orders  were  for  me  to  cover  the  right  of  the  general  line,  posting  my 
command  near  Dowdall's  Tavern.  He  pointed  to  a  place  on  the  map  marked 
"Mill"  near  there,  on  a  branch  of  Hunting  Run  [see  map,  p.  193],  and  said, 
"  Establish  your  right  there."  General  Slocum  promised,  with  the  Twelfth 
Corps,  to  occupy  the  space  between  his  headquarters  and  Dowdall's  clearing ; 
but,  finding  the  distance  too  great,  one  of  his  division  commanders  sent  me 
word  that  I  must  cover  the  last  three-quarters  of  a  mile  of  the  Plank  road. 


THE  ELEl/ENTH  CORPS  AT  CHANCELLORSl^/LLE. 


191 


POSITION  OF  THEIVj; CORPS 
at  6p.Tn.yray2. 1863. 


SCALE  or  1  MILE 


This  was  done  by  a  brigade  of  General  Steinwehr,  the  commander  of  my  left 
division,  though  with  regret  on  oui'  part,  because  it  required  all  the  corps 
reserves  to  fill  up  that  gap. 

The  so-called  Dowdall's  Tavern  was  at  that  time  the  home  of  Melzi  Chan- 
cellor. He  had  a  large  family,  including  several  gi'own  people.  I  placed  my 
headquarters  at  his  house.  In  front  of  me,  facing  south  along  a  curving 
ridge,  the  right  of  Stein wehr's  division  was  located.  He  had  but  two  brigades. 
Barlow  on  the  Plank  road  and  Buschbeck  on  his  right.  With  them  Stein- 
wehr  covered  a  mile,  lea\ang  but  two  regiments  for  reserve.  These  he  put 
some  two  hundred  yards  to  his  rear,  near  the  little  "Wilderness  Church." 

Next  to  Stein wehr,  toward  our  right,  came  General  Carl  Schurz's  division. 
First  was  Captain  Dilger's  battery.  Dilgcn*  was  one  of  those  handsome, 
hearty,  active  young  men  that 
everybody  liked  to  have  near. 
His  guns  pointed  to  the  south- 
west and  west,  along  the 
Orange  Plank  road.  Next 
was  Krzyzanowski's  brigade, 
about  half  on  the  front  and 
half  in  reserve.  Schurz's  right 
brigade  was  that  of  Schim- 
melfennig,  disposed  in  the 
same  manner,  a  part  deployed 
and  the  remainder  kept  a  few 
hundred  yards  back  for  a  re- 
serve. Schurz's  front  line  of 
infantry  extended  along  the 
old  turnpike  and  faced  to  the 
south-west.  The  right  di\'ision 
of  the  corps  was  commanded 
by  General   Charles   Devens, 

afterward  attorney-general  in  the  cabinet  of  President  Hayes.  Devens 
and  I  together  had  carefully  reconnoitered  both  the  Orange  Plank  road 
and  the  old  tm-npike  for  at  least  three  miles  toward  the  west.  After  this 
reconnoissance  he  established  his  division, —  the  Second  Brigade,  under 
McLean,  next  to  Schurz's  first,  and  then  pushing  out  on  tlie  i)ike  for  half  a 
mile  lie  deployed  the  other,  Gilsa's,  at  right  angles  facing  west,  connecting 
his  two  parts  by  a  thin  skirmish-line.  Colonel  Gilsa's  brigaile  was  afterward 
drawn  back,  still  facing  west  at  right  angles  to  the  line,  so  as  to  make  a  more 
solid  connection,  and  so  that,  constituting,  as  it  did,  the  main  rigiit  tlank, 
the  reserves  of  the  corps  could  be  brought  more  promj^tly  to  its  support, 
by  extending  its  right  to  the  north,  should  an  enemy  by  any  p(^ssible  con- 
tingency get  so  far  around.  A  section  of  Dieckniann's  battery  wliicli  looked 
to  the  west  along  the  old  ])ike  was  located  at  the  angle. 

The  reserve  batteries,  twelve  gims,  wiM-e  put  upon  a  ridge  alneast  of  the 
Uttle  church  and  pointed  toward  the  north-west,  with  a  view  to  sweep  all 


192  THE  ELEl/ENTH  CORPS  AT  CHANCELLORSl^ILLE. 

approaches  to  the  north  of  Gilsa,  firing  np  a  gradually  ascending  slope.  This 
ridge,  where  I  stood  during  the  battle,  was  central,  and,  besides,  enabled  the 
artillerymen  to  enfilade  either  roadway,  or  meet  an  attack  from  south,  west, 
or  north.    Here  epaulments  for  the  batteries  were  constructed,  and  cross- 

intrenchments  for  the  battery  supports 
were  dug,  extending  from  the  little 
church  across  all  the  open  ground  that 
stretched  away  from  the  tavern  to  the 
right  of  Devens's  line. 

To  my  great  comfort.  General  Sickles's 
corps  came  up  on  Friday,  May  1st,  and 
took  from  our  left  Stein wehr's  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile  of  the  Plank  road. 
Thus  he  relieved  from  the  front  line 
Barlow's  large  brigade,  giving  me, 
besides  the  several  division  reserves, 
'    '  -  General   Barlow  with  1500   men   as  a 

DowDALL's  TAVERN,  HOWARD'S  HEADQUARTERS,      gcucral  rcscrvc  for  tlic  corps.     Thcse 
KROH  A  WAR-TIME  PHOTooRAPH.  ^^^.^  masscd  ucar  thc   cross-iutrcnch- 

ments,  and  held  avowedly  to  support  the  batteries  and  protect  General 
Devens's  exposed  right  flank. 

As  to  pickets,  each  division  had  a  good  line  of  them.  My  aide,  Major 
Charles  H.  Howard,  assisted  in  connecting  them  between  divisions,  and  dur- 
ing the  2d  of  May  that  fearless  and  faithful  staff-officer,  Major  E.  Whittlesey, 
rode  the  entire  circuit  of  their  front  to  stimulate  them  to  special  activity. 
Those  of  Devens  were  "thrown  out  at  a  distance  from  a  half-mile  to  a 
mile  and  stretching  well  around  covering  our  right  flank  " ;  J  and  the  picket- 
posts  in  front  on  the  pike  were  over  two  miles  beyond  the  main  line. 

The  nature  of  the  country  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  three  adjoining  farms, 
Dowdall's,  Talley's,  and  Hawkins's,  became  well  known  to  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  in  subsequent  experiences,  never  to  be  forgotten.  It  is  the  terrible 
"  Wilderness  "  where,  later  in  the  war,  so  many  brave  men  fell.  Here  were 
stunted  trees,  such  as  scraggy  oaks,  bushy  firs,  cedars,  and  junipers,  all  entan- 
gled with  a  thick,  almost  impenetral)le  undergrowth,  and  criss-crossed  with  an 
abundance  of  wild  vines.  In  places  all  along  the 

south-west  and  west  front  the  forest  appeared  ^^>^^^ 

impassable,  and  the  skirmishers    could  only     \lj^^A^suJi^>^^^^^^ 
work  their  way  through  with  extreme  difficulty.     ^_y^S^^  /  /"'^a 

To  the  officers  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  tlie    r     '^'^        -  '       '  R 
position  was  never  a  desirable  one.    It  pre- 
sented a  flank  in  the  air.    We  were  more  than 
four  miles  south  from  Ely's  ford,  where  were 
Hooker's  nearest  cavalry  flankers.     In  his  re-  '  ^ 

port  after  the  battle,  General  Schurz  says :  dowdall's  tavern  in  issi. 

^See  General  Devens's  report  of  Chaneellorsville  (''Official  Records,"  Vol.  XXV.,  Part  I., 
p.  632).— O.  O.  H. 


THE  ELEl^ENTH  CORPS  AT  CHANCELLORSl/lLLE. 


'93 


THE   WILDERNESS    CHURCH    (IN    THE    LEFT    MIDDLE-GROUND)    AND    HAWKINS'S    FARM    (ON    THE    RIGHT) 
AS    SEEN    FROM    THE   PLANK  ROAD    IN   FRONT    OF    DOWDALL'8    TAVERN. 

"  Our  right  ought  to  have  been  drawn  back  toward  the  Eapidan,  to  rest  on 
that  river  at  or  near  the  mouth  of  Hunting  Run,  the  corps  al)andouing  so 
much  of  the  Plank  road  as  to  enable  it  to  establish  a  solid  line."  Yes ;  but 
we  were  ordered  to  Dowdall's  Tavern,  and  not  to  the  Eapidan,  three  or  four 
miles  in  our  rear !  And  our  right  was  fixed  for  us  at  the  "  Mill."  It  is  true 
the  mill  no  longer  existed,  but  the  point  required  was  not  doubted.  Again, 
this  position,  which  Schurz  reconnnended  in  his  report  subsequent  to  our 
battle,  was  the  very  one  into  which  Hooker's  whole  army  was  forced  two 
days  afterward.  He  was  so  cramped  by  it  that  he  did  not  dare  to  take  the 
offensive.  In  that  position,  "solid"  and  fortified  as  it  was,  our  army,  out- 
numbering Lee's,  was  so  badly  handled  by  the  enemy  that  Hooker  at  last 
deemed  it  safer  to  return  to  the  north  side  of  the  Rappahannock. 

The  strength  of  Hooker's  five  corps,  and  Reynolds's,  wliich  was  not  far 
behind,  was,  on  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  May,  about  OO,^)!)!)  effectives.  The 
right  corps,  the  Eleventh,  had  in  all,  artillery  and  infantiy,  twi^lve  thousand 
men.  Lee  faced  us  with  five  large  divisions,  having  on  the  spot  alunit  40,000 
rifles,  with  considerable  artillery. 

In  my  youth  my  brother  and  I  had  a  favorite  spot  in  an  upper  field  of  my 
father's  farm  from  wiiicli  we  were  accustomed,  after  the  first  s>nuptoms  of  a 
coming  storm,  to  watch  the  operations  of  the  contending  winds ;  the  sudden 


194 


THE  ELEVENTH  CORPS  AT  CHANCELLORSyiLLE. 


gusts  and  whirlwinds;  the  sideling  swallows  excitedly  seeking  shelter;  the 
swift  and  swifter,  black  and  blacker  clouds,  ever  rising  higher  and  pushing 
their  angry  fronts  toward  us.  As  we  listened  we  heard  the  low  rumbling 
from  afar;  as  the  storm  came  nearer  the  woods  bent  forward  and  shook 
fiercely  their  thick  branches;  the  lightning  zigzagged  in  flashes,  and  the 
deep-bassed  thunder  echoed  more  loudly,  till  there  was  scarcely  an  interval 
between  its  ominous  crashing  discharges.  In  some  such  manner  came  on  that 
battle  of  May  2d  to  the  watchers  at  Dowdall's  Tavern  and  Talley's  farm-house. 
The  first  distant  symptom  occurred  on  the  evening  of  May  1st.  Then  was 
heard  the  sudden  crack  of  rifle-shooting.  It  began  with  Steinwehr's  skir- 
mishers, and  then  passed  on  to  Schurz.  Schimmelfennig  pushed  out  a 
brigade  straightforward  toward  the  south-west  and  received  a  sudden  fire  of 
artillery  from  the  intruders.     They  left  him  and  pushed  on. 

It  was  "  a  rolling  recohnoissance,"  evidently  to  determine,  for  Lee's  and  Jack- 
son's information,  the  position  of  our  flank.  They  probably  had,  however,  some 
more  certain  knowledge,  gained  from  one  or  two  of  the  enterprising  residents 
let  loose  during  that  Friday  by  our  general  forward  movement.  We  forgot 
these  friends  to  Lee  as  we  excitedly  marched  to  Friday's  battle.  When  we 
unexpectedly  came  back,  some  of  these  residents,  with  little  baskets  of  pro- 
visions in  hand,  were  gone  beyond  recall.  I  suspect  that  the  commander  of 
the  "roUing  reconnoissance "  and  the  said  residents  formed  part  of  the 
famous  night  conference  of  Lee  and  Jackson,  where  cracker-boxes  served  as 
seats  and  tables.  G-eneral  Lee  says :  "  It  was  therefore  resolved  to  endeavor 
to  turn  his  right  flank  and  gain  his  rear,  leaving  a  force  in  front  to  hold  him 
in  check  and  conceal  the  movement.    The  execution  of  this  plan  was  intrusted 

to   Lieutenant-General  Jackson   with 
his  three  divisions." 

Jackson's  movement,  with  a  stronger 
indication  of  battle,  began  at  sunrise, 
Rodes,  Colston,  and  A.  P.  Hill,  in  the 
order  named,  following  the  old  road 
by  the  Catherine  Furnace,  there  shov- 
ing off  farther  south  to  get  beyond 
the  sight  of  our  men ;  then  sweeping 
around  by  a  private  road,  well  known 
to  them,  up  to  the  Orange  Plank  road ; 
and  thence  on,  perhaps  a  mile  farther, 
through  the  wild  forest  till  the  old 
turnpike  was  found  and  crossed.  The 
Catherine  Furnace,  nearly  opposite 
Sickles's  right  and  two  and  a  half 
miles  distant,  gave  an  open  reach  and 
fully  exposed  the  moving  column  to 
view.  Except  at  that  point  the  Con- 
federates were  covered  by  woods  and 
by  Stuart's  busy  and  noisy  cavalry. 


THE   WILDERNESS   CHURCH.     FROM    A   WAR-TIME 
PHOTOGRAPH.      SEE    PREVIOUS    PAGE. 


THE  ELEl^ENTH  CORPS  AT  CHANCELLORSl^lLLE. 


193 


>_..-. 


,  ''^'  J 


About  sunrise  at  Dowdall's  I  heard  cheering.  It  Avas  a  hearty  sound,  with 
too  much  bass  in  it  for  that  of  the  enemy's  charge.  It  was  occasioned  l)y 
General  Hooker,  with  Colonel  Comstock  and  a  few  staff-officers,  riding  along 
slowly  and  inspecting  the  lines.  Oeneral  Sickles  says  of  this :  "  It  is  impos- 
sible to  pass  over  without  mention  the  irrepressible  enthusiasm  of  the  troops 
for  Major-General  Hooker,  which  was  evinced  in  hearty  and  prolonged  cheers 
as  he  rode  along  the  lines  of  the  Third,  Eleventh,  and  Twelfth  corps." 

I  was  ready,  mounted,  and  with  my  officei-s  joined  the  ever-increasing  caval- 
cade. Hooker  observed  the  troops  in  position ;  Barlow,  who  filled  the  cross- 
trenches  an  hour  later,  had  not  yet  come  out  of  the  front  line,  so  that  my 
reserves  just  at  that  time  were  small.  Hooker  noticed  the  breastworks, 
unusually  well  built  by  Schurz  and  Devens.  He  passed  to  the  extreme  right, 
and  then  returned  by  the  shortest  route.  As  he  looked  over  the  barricades, 
while  receiving  the  salutes  and  cheers  of  the  men,  ho  said  to  me,  "  How 
strong !     How  strong ! " 

I  still  had  much  extension,  so  that  there  were  gaps  along  Scluirz's  and 
Devens's  fronts.  Colonel  Comstock  spoke  to  me  in  his  quiet  way :  "  General, 
do  close  in  those  spaces  ! " 

I  said,  "The  woods  are  thick  and  entangled;  will  anybody  c*)!!!.'  throui^di 
there  ?  " 

"  Oh,  they  may  !  " 

His  suggestion  was  heeded.  During  the  I'ortMioon  (Jciieral  Sickles  discov- 
ered Jackson's  moving  colu!nn.  It  was  i)assing  toward  Orange  Court  HiMise, 
so  everybody  said.  Sickles  forwarded  all  reports  to  General  Hooker,  who 
now  returned  to  Chancellorsville.     He  tried  to  divine  Jacksi^iV  ])urpose. 

About  midday  Sickles  received  General  Hooker's  orders  to  advance  scnith 
cautiously.     Soon  after,  perhaps  by  2  r.  m.,  there  was  a  stronger  apprehension 


196  THE  ELEl/ENTH  CORPS  AT  CHANCELLORSl/lLLE. 

of  a  conflict,  for  there  was  a  sharp  skirmish  in  the  direction  of  Catherine 
Fiu-nace.  The  rattle  of  musketry  followed ;  then  in  a  little  time  was  heard 
the  booming  of  cannon.  I  sent  the  news  to  every  division  and  said,  "  Be 
ready."  ^  Slocum  went  forward  to  the  aid  of  Sickles,  and  Hancock  was  behind 
him  with  support.  Next,  the  enemy  was  reported  to  be  in  full  retreat. 
General  Hooker  so  telegraphed  to  Sedgwick;  Captain  Moore,  of  his  staff, 
who  had  gone  out  with  Birney  to  see  the  attack  upon  Jackson,  came  hurriedly 
to  me  with  an  order  from  Gleneral  Hooker  for  my  reserve  brigade,  Barlow's. 
Major  Howard  rode  rapidly  to  Sickles,  that  he  might  point  out  exactly 
where  to  locate  the  brigade.  The  major  was  also  to  ascertain  the  nearest 
route,  so  as  to  save  time  and  not  weary  the  men  by  a  circuitous  march. 

It  was  already  past  4.  There  was  much  excitement  among  the  groups  of 
officers  at  the  different  points  of  observation.  We  who  were  at  Dowdall's  had 
been  watching  the  enemy's  cavalry,  which  kept  pushing  through  the  woods 
just  far  enough  to  receive  a  fire,  and  then  withdrawing.  Devens  and  his  bri- 
gade and  regimental  commanders  gathered,  in  various  ways,  all  the  informa- 
tion possible,  while  from  a  high  point  they  obtained  glimpses  of  a  moving 
column  crossing  the  Plank  road  and  apparently  making  off.  I  sent  out  scouts, 
who  returned  with  reports  that  the  enemy  was  not  more  than  three  or  four 
miles  off,  and  in  motion.  Schurz  was  anxious  and,  with  my  approval,  moved 
a  part  of  his  reserves  to  the  north  of  Hawkins's  farm  into  good  position  to 
cover  Devens's  flank.  Devens  held  at  least  two  regiments  well  in  hand,  for  the 
same  purpose,  and  Steinwehr's  whole  division  I  knew  could  just  face  about 
and  defend  the  same  point.  A  few  companies  of  cavalry  came  from  Pleason- 
ton.  I  sent  them  out.  "  Go  out  beyond  my  right ;  go  far,  and  let  me  know 
if  an  assault  is  coming."  All  my  staff,  Asmussen,  Meysenberg,  Whittlesey, 
C.  H.  Howard,  Schofield,  Dessauer,  Stinson,  Schirmer,  and  Hoffmann,  were 
keenly  on  the  alert.  We  had  not  a  very  good  position,  it  is  true,  but  we  did 
expect  to  make  a  good  strong  fight  should  the  enemy  come. 

General  Hooker's  circular  order  to  "  Slocum  and  Howard  "  neither  reached 
me,  nor,  to  my  kaowledge,  Colonel  Meysenberg,  my  adjutant-general.  |  From 
some  confused  notion  it  was  issued  to  "  Slocum  and  Howard,"  when  Slocum 
was  no  longer  within  two  miles  of  me,  and  had  not  been  in  command  of  my 
corps  after  Hooker's  arrival  at  Chancellorsville.  Slocum,  naturally  supposing 
that  I  had  a  copy,  would  not  think  of  forwarding  a  joint  order  to  me  after 
that,  and  certainly  no  such  order  came  to  me.  But  Generals  Devens,  Scliurz, 
and  Stoinwehr,  my  division  commanders,  and  myself  did  precisely  what  we 
should  have  done  had  that  order  come.  The  three  reserve  batteries  were 
put  in  position,  and  the  infantry  reserves  were  held  well  in  hand  for  the  pos- 
sible emergency.    My  aide  had  now  returned  from  Sickles,  near  the  Furnace, 

3^  Devens  states  in  his  official  report  that  at  inter-  in  one  of  the  two  "Letters  Received"  hooks  of 

valsVjetween  11  A.  M.  and  6  :30  p.m.  he  reported  to  Howard's  headquarters.    The  entry  in  Howard's 

corps  headquarters  that  the  enemy  in  force  was  book  appears  to  have  been  made  in  the  latter  part 

threatening  his  front  and  his  right  flank. —  Editors,  of  June.     In  Hooker's  book  a  notation  in  red  ink 

4- See  pp.  219  and  220.     The  original  dispatch  reads,   "Copy   furnished  General  Howard";   and 

is  not  on  file  in  the  War  Records  Office,  but  a  copy  the  inference  is  that  it  was  this  "copy"  that  was 

of  it  exists  in  Hooker's  "Letters  Sent"  book  and  entered  in  Howard's  book  in  June.— Editors. 


THE  ELEVENTH  CORPS  AT  CHANCELLORSl^lLLE. 


197 


and  reported  in  substance  that  he  (Sickles)  was  glad  to  receive  the  help  ;  that 
he  was  abont  to  make  a  grand  attack,  having  been  for  some  time  dri\dug  the 
enemy,  and  expected  soon  a  brilliant  result;  that  he  desired  to  place  my 
reenforcement  upon  his  right  flank  in  the  forward  movement. 

Such  was  the  state  of  things  when,  through  Captain  Moore,  GTeneral  Hooker 
directed  to  Sickles's  attack,  at  the  Furnace,  all  of  my  general  infantry  reserves, 
consisting  of  Barlow's  stanch  brigade.  Steinwehr  and  I,  with  Major  Howard 
as  guide,  went  far  enough  southward  to  see  what  was  to  be  done  with  our 
men,  and  to  see  if  Steinwehr's  di- 
vision, as  was  probable,  must  swing 
in  to  the  left  in  support  of  Sickles's 
promised  attack.  There  was  no  real 
battle  there,  so  we  returned  rapidly 
to  our  post  at  the  tavern  and  dis- 
mounted. 

Meanwhile  the  Confederate  Gen- 
eral Rodes  had  been  reaching  his 
place  in  the  Wilderness.  At  4  p.  m. 
his  men  were  in  position;  the  line 
of  battle  of  his  own  brigade  touched 
the  pike  west  of  us  with  its  right  and 
stretched  away  to  the  north ;  beyond 
his  brigade  came  Iverson's  in  the 
same  line.  On  the  right  of  the  pike 
was  Doles's  brigade,  and  to  his  right 
Colquitt's.  One  hundred  yards  to 
the  rear  was  Trimble's  division  (Col- 
ston commanding),  with  Ramseur  on  the  right  following  Colquitt.  After 
another  interval  followed  the  division  of  A.  P.  Hill.  The  advance  Confeder- 
ate division  had  more  men  in  it  than  there  were  in  the  Eleventh  Corps,  now 
in  position.  Counting  the  ranks  of  this  formidable  column,  beginning  with 
the  enveloping  skirmish  line,  we  find  7,  besides  the  3  ranks  of  file-closers. 
Many  of  them  were  brought  into  a  solid  mass  by  the  entanglements  of  the 
forest,  and  gave  our  men  the  idea  that  battalions  were  formed  in  close 
columns  doubled  on  the  center.  With  as  little  noise  as  possible,  a  little 
after  5  r.  m.,  the  steady  advance  of  the  enemy  began.  Its  first  lively  effects, 
like  a  cloud  of  dust  driven  before  a  coming  shower,  ajipeariMl  in  tlie  startled 
rabbits,  squirrels,  quail,  and  other  game  flying  wildly  hitlier  and  thither  in 
evident  terror,  and  escaping,  where  possible,  into  adjacent  clearings. 

The  foremost  men  of  Doles's  brigade  took  about  half  an  hour  to  strike  our 
advance  picket  on  the  pike.  This  picket,  of  course,  created  no  delay.  Fif- 
teen minutes  later  he  reached  our  skirmishers,  who  seem  to  have  resisted 
effectively  for  a  few  minutes,  for  it  required  a  main  line  to  dislodge  them. 
Doles  says,  conc(U-ning  the  next  check  he  received,  "After  a  resistance  of 
about  ten  minutes  we  drove  him  [Devens]  from  his  ])ositiou  on  the  left  and 
carried  his  battery  of  two  guns,  caissons,  and  hoi'ses/' 


MAJOR-GENERAL  CARL  SCHURZ.     FROM  A  PnOTOGRAPH. 


198  THE  ELEVENTH  CORPS  AT  CHANCELLORSJ/ILLE. 

This  was  the  fire  that  Stein wehr  and  I  heard  shortly  after  our  return  from 
Barlow.  Somebody's  guns  thundered  away  for  a  few  short  minutes,  and  then 
came  the  fitful  rattle  of  musketry;  and  before  I  could  again  get  into  the 
saddle  there  arose  the  ceaseless  roar  of  the  terrible  storm. 

I  sent  out  my  chief-of -staff,  Colonel  Asmussen,  who  was  the  first  officer  to 
mount, — "  The  firing  is  in  front  of  Devens,  go  and  see  if  all  is  in  order  on  the 
extreme  right."  He  instantly  turned  and  galloped  away.  I  mounted  and  set 
off  for  a  prominent  place  in  rear  of  Schm*z's  line,  so  as  to  change  front  to  the 
north-west  of  every  brigade  south-east  of  the  point  of  attack,  if  the  attack 
should  extend  beyond  Devens's  right  flank ;  for  it  was  divined  at  once  that 
the  enemy  was  now  west  of  him.  I  could  see  numbers  of  our  men — not  the 
few  stragglers  that  always  fly  like  chaff  at  the  first  breeze,  but  scores  of 
them — rushing  into  the  opening,  some  with,  arms  and  some  without,  running 
or  falling  before  they  got  behind  the  cover  of  Devens's  reserves,  and  before 
General  Schurz's  waiting  masses  could  deploy  or  charge.  The  noise  and  the 
smoke  filled  the  air  with  excitement,  and  to  add  to  it  Dieckmann's  guns  and 
caissons,  with  battery  men  scattered,  rolled  and  tumbled  like  runaway  wag- 
ons and  carts  in  a  thronged  city.  The  guns  and  the  masses  of  the  right  bri- 
gade struck  the  second  line  of  Devens  before  McLean's  front  had  given  way ; 
and,  more  quickly  than  it  could  be  told,  with  all  the  fury  of  the  wildest  hail- 
storm, everything,  every  sort  of  organization  that  lay  in  the  path  of  the  mad 
current  of  panic-stricken  men,^  had  to  give  way  and  be  broken  into  fragments. 

My  own  horse  seemed  to  catch  the  fury ;  he  sprang  —  he  rose  high  on  his 
hind  legs  and  fell  over,  throwing  me  to  the  ground.  My  aide-de-camp,  Des- 
sauer,  was  struck  by  a  shot  and  killed,  and  for  a  few  moments  I  was  as  help- 
less as  any  of  the  men  who  were  speeding  without  arms  to  the  rear.  But 
faithful  orderlies  helped  me  to  remount.  Schurz  was  still  doing  all  he  could 
to  face  regiments  about  and  send  them  to  Devens's  northern  flank  to  heliD  the 
few  who  still  held  firm.  Devens,  already  badly  wounded,  and  several  officers 
were  doing  similar  work.  I  rode  quickly  to  the  reserve  batteries.  A  staff- 
ofificer  of  Greneral  Hooker,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Joseph  Dickinson,  Assistant 
Adjutant-Genera],  joined  me  there;  my  own  staff  gathered  around  me.  I 
was  eager  to  fill  the  trenches  that  Barlow  would  have  held.  Buschbeck's 
second  line  was  ordered  to  change  front  there„  His  men  kept  thek  ranks, 
but  at  first  they  appeared  slow.    Would  they  never  get  there ! 

Dickinson  said,  "  Oh,  General,  see  those  men  coming  from  that  hill  way  off 
to  the  right,  and  there's  the  enemy  after  them.  Fire,  oh,  fire  at  them ;  you 
may  stop  the  flight ! " 

"  No,  Colonel,"  I  said,  "  I  will  never  fire  on  my  own  men  ! " 

\  Colonel  von  Gilsa's  report  of  the  crisis  is  as  "  The  enemy  iittacked  now  from  the  front  and  rear, 

follows:  find  then  of  conrse  my  brave  hoys  were  obliged  to  fall 

ba(!k,  the  54th  New  York  and  the  right  wing  of  the 

"...    A  patrol  of  the  45th  New  York  regiment  153d  PeunHylviuiia  forciug  their  way  back  through  the 

reported  masses  of  the  enemy  in  au  open  field  opposite  enemy's  skirminliors  in  their  roar.    .    .    .    Retreating  I 

mj^  line.    I  reported  this  fact  at  onee  to  the  division  (^xpe(•ted  surely  to  rally  my  lirigade  behind  our  second 

commander,  and  at  tlu^  sauie  moment  my  skirmishers  line,  formed  by  the  Thli'd  Division,  but  I  did  not  find  the 

were  driven  in  by  ovcrwhclniiug  forces  of  the  enemy.  second  line;  it  was  abandoned  before  we  reached  it." 

The  whole  lino  at  once  litcaiiKMUgaged  furiously,  and  ,.       ^ ,  .„    , 

my  brigade  stood  bravely,  fired  three  times,  and  stood  ^  o»  Gilsa's  brigade  lost  133  killed  and  wounded 

still  until  after  they  had  outflanked  me  on  my  right.  out  of  an  effective  of  1400  men.—  Editors. 


THE  ELEyENTH  CORPS  AT  CHANCELLORSl^ILLE. 


199 


2.  RELICS  OF  THE  DEAD  IN 
THE  WOODS  NEAR  THE 
PLANK   ROAD. 


FROM  PHOTOGRAPHS  TAKEN 
IN  1864. 


As  soon  as  our  men  were  near 
enough  the  batteries  opened,  firing 
at  first  shells  and  then  canister  over 
their  heads.  As  the  attacking  force 
emerged  from  the  forest  and  rushed 
on,  the  men  in  front  would  halt  and 
fire,  and,  while  these  were  reloading, 
another  set  would  run  before  them, 
halt  and  fire,  in  no  regular  line,  but 
in  such  multitudes  that  oui'  men  went 
down  before  them  like  trees  in  a  hur- 
ricane. 

By  extraordinary  efiiort  we  had  filled 
all  our  long  line 
of  cross-intrench- 
ments,  mainly  with 
fragments  of  or- 
ganizations and  in- 
dividual soldiers. 
Many  oflScers  mn- 
ning  away  stojiped 
there  and  did  what 
they  could,  but 
others  shouted, 
"We've  done  all  we 
can,"  and  ran  on.\ 
Schirmer  managed 


the  reserve  artillery 
fairly.     Dilger,  the 
battery  commander 
on  Schurz's  left,  roll- 
ed the  balls  along 
the  Plank  road  and 
shelled    the    wood. 
General  Stoinwchr  was  on  hand,  cool, 
collected,  and  judicious.    Like  Blair  at 
Atlanta,  he  had  made  his  men  (who 
were  south  of  Dowdall's)  spring  to  the 
reverse    side    of    their    intrenchments 
and  be  ready  to  fire  the  instant  it  was 
possibl(\ 

Let  us  pause  here  a  monuMit  and  fol- 
low Doles,  who  led  the  enemy's  attack. 
He  states  that,  after  his  first  success- 

\  General  Sclmrz  states  in  liis  report  that  the  masses 


diieh 


rallietl  liere  were  rporpniiz*'*!  and 


led  forward'two  or  three  times,  but  were  dispersed  by  the  enemy's  flank  lire.- Editors. 


200  THE  ELEVENTH  CORPS  AT  CHANCELLORS^ILLE. 

ful  charge,  "  the  command  moved  forward  at  the  double-quick  to  assault 
the  enemy,  who  had  taken  up  a  strong  position  on  the  crest  of  a  hill  in 
the  open  field."  This  position  was  the  one  on  Hawkins's  farm  where 
Devens's  and  Schm*z's  reserves  began  their  fight.  But  wave  after  wave  of 
Confederate  infantry  came  upon  them,  and  even  their  left  flank  was  unpro- 
tected the  instant  the  runaways  had  passed  it.  To  our  sorrow,  we,  who 
had  eagerly  observed  their  bravery,  saw  these  reserves  also  give  way,  and 
the  hill  and  crest  on  Hawkins's  farm  were  quickly  in  the  hands  of  the  men 
in  gray,  ik 

Doles,  who  must  have  been  a  cool  man  to  see  so  clearly  amid  the  screech- 
ing shells  and  all  the  hot  excitement  of  battle,  says  again :  "  He  "  (meaning 
our  forces  from  Schimmelfennig's  and  Buschbeck's  brigades,  and  perhaps 
part  of  McLean's,  who  had  faced  about  and  had  not  yet  given  way)  "  made  a 
stubborn  resistance  from  behind  a  wattling  fence  on  a  hill  covered  thickly 
with  pines." 

Among  the  stubborn  fighters  at  this  place  was  Major  Jeremiah  Williams. 
The  enemy  was  drawing  near  him.  His  men  fired  with  coolness  and  delib- 
eration. His  right  rested  among  scrubby  bushes  and  saplings,  while  his  left 
was  in  comparatively  open  ground.  The  fire  of  the  approaching  enemy  was 
murderous,  and  almost  whole  platoons  of  our  men  were  falling ;  yet  they  held 
their  ground.  Williams  waited,  rapidly  firing,  till  not  more  than  thirty  paces 
intervened,  and  then  ordered  the  retreat.  Out  of  333  men  and  16  commis- 
sioned officers  in  the  regiment  (the  25th  Ohio),  130,  including  5  officers,  were 
killed  or  wounded.  Major  WiUiams  brought  a  part  of  the  living  to  the  breast- 
works near  me;  the  remainder,  he  says,  were  carried  off  to  the  rear  by  another 
regimental  commander. 

During  the  delays  we  had  thus  far  caused  to  the  first  division  of  our 
enemy,  all  his  rear  lines  had  closed  up,  and  the  broad  mass  began  to 
appear  even  below  me  on  my  left  front  to  the  south  of  Steinwehr's  knoll. 
Then  it  was,  after  we  had  been  fighting  an  hour,  that  Sickles's  and  Pleas- 
onton's  guns  began  to  be  heard,  for  they  had  faced  about  at  Hazel  Grove 
obliquely  toward  the  north-west,  and  were  hurrying  artiUery,  cavalry,  and 
infantry  into  position  to  do  what  they  could  against  the  attack  now  reach- 
ing them. 

I  had  come  to  my  last  practicable  stand.  The  Confederates  were  slowly 
advancing,  firing  as  they  came.  The  twelve  guns  of  Schirmer,  the  corps 
chief  of  artillery,  increased  by  a  part  of  Dilger's  battery,  fired,  at  first  with 
rapidity ;  but  the  battery  men  kept  falling  from  death  and  wounds.  Sud- 
denly, as  if  by  an  order,  when  a  sheet  of  the  enemy's  fire  reached  them,  a 
large  number  of  the  men  in  the  supporting  trenches  vacated  their  positions 
and  went  off. 

No  officers  ever  made  more  strenuous  exertions  than  those  that  my  staff 
and  myself  put  forth  to  stem  the  tide  of  retreat  and  refill  those  trenches, 

_  -^  In  justice  to  the  men  of  Devens's  division  who  first  resisted  Doles  it  shonld  be  stated  that  the  offi- 
cial report  of  the  latter  shows  that  his  column  was  engaged  at  the  outset  by  Union  skirmishers,  and 
"  subjected  to  a  heavy  musketry  fire,  with  grape,  canister,  and  shell."—  Editors. 


THE  ELEI/ENTH  CORPS  AT  CHANCELLORSyiLLE. 


20 1 


EXPLANATION 

Positions  Ercning-  of  May  2 
Second  Positions  of  \ 
FirstVivision  Morning- ) 


Dowdalls»i  Tavern 


:^^5Si'#" 


but  the  panic  was  too  great.  Then 
our  artillery  fire  became  weaker  and 
weaker. 

I  next  ordered  a  retreat  to  the  edge 
of  the  forest  toward  Chancellorsville, 
so  as  to  uncover  Steinwehr's  knoll,  the 
only  spot  yet  fii^mly  held.  The  batter- 
ies, except  four  pieces,  were  drawn  off 
and  hurried  to  the  rear.  The  stand  at 
the  edge  of  the  forest  was  necessarily 
a  short  one. 

General  Steinwehr,  being  now  ex- 
posed from  flank  and  rear,  having 
held  his  place  for  over  an  hour,  drew 
off  his  small  remnants  and  all  moved 
rapidly  through  openings  and  woods, 
through  low  ground  and  swamps,  the 
two  miles  to  the  first  high  land  south 
of  Hooker's  headquarters. 

Captain  Hubert  Dilger  with  Ms  bat- 
tery sturdily  kept  along  the  Plank  road, 
firing  constantly  as  he  retired.  The 
Confederate  masses  rushed  after  us  in 
the  forest  and  along  all  paths  and 
roads  with  triumphant  shouts  and  re- 
doubled firing,  and  so  secured  much 
plunder  and  many  prisoners. 

It  was  after  sundown  and  growing 
dark  when  I  met  General    Hiram  G. 

•Berry,  commanding  a  division  of  the  Third  Corps,  as  I  was  ascending  the 
high  ground  above  named.  "  AVell,  General,  where  now  % "  he  asked.  "  You 
take  the  right  of  this  road  and  I  will  take  the  left  and  try  to  dct'ciid  it,'' 
I  replied. 

Oui'  batteries,  with  many  others,  were  on  the  crest  facing  to  the  rear,  and  as 
soon  as  Steinwehr's  troops  had  cleared  the  way  these  guns  began  a  terril>lo 
cannonade  and  continued  it  into  the  night.  They  fired  into  the  forest,  now 
full  of  Confederates,  all  disorganized  l)y  their  exciting  chase,  and  every  effort 
of  the  enemy  to  advance  in  that  direction  in  the  face  of  the  fire  waseff'ectually 
barred  by  the  artillery  and  supporting  troops. 

Stonewall  Jackson  fell  that  evening  from  bullet-wounds,  in  the  forest  in 
front  of  Berry's  position.  And  here,  on  the  forenoon  of  the  next  day,  May 
3d,  the  gallant  General  Berry  met  his  death.  It  was  here,  to<\  tliat  officers 
of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  tliough  mortified  by  <lefeat,  successfully  rallied  tlu» 
scattered  brigades  and  divisions,  and,  after  shielding  the  battcrii's,  went 
during  the  night  to  replace  the  men  of  the  Fifth  C(>rj)s  and  thereafter 
defend  the  left  of  the  general  line 


POSITIONS    OF    THE 

31)    CORPS,    COVEKIX 


ni    COKI-S    AND    r.VKT    OK    THE 
CHAXCKI.LOKS- 
LATEAU,   MAY  2   AND  3. 


THE  ELEVENTH  CORPS  AT  CHANCELLORSyiLLE. 


Twenty-three  years  ago,  in  my  report  to  General  Hooker,  I  wrote  the  fol- 
lowing : 

"  Now,  as  to  the  causes  of  this  disaster  to  my  corps :  1st.  Though  con- 
stantly threatened  and  apprised  of  the  moving  of  the  enemy,  yet  the  woods 
were  so  dense  that  he  was  able  to  mass  a  large  force,  whose  exact  where- 
abouts j  neither  patrols,  reconnoissances,  nor  scouts  ascertained.  He  suc- 
ceeded in  forming  a  column  opposite  to  and  outflanking  my  right. 

"  2d.  By  the  panic  produced  by  the  enemy's  reverse  fire,  regiments  and 
artillery  were  thrown  suddenly  upon  those  in  position. 

"3d.  The  absence  of  G-eneral  Barlow's  brigade,  which  I  had  previously 
located  in  reserve  and  en  echelon  with  Colonel  von  Gilsa's,  so  as  to  cover  his 
right  flank.     This  was  the  only  general  reserve  I  had." 

Stonewall  Jackson  was  victorious.  Even  his  enemies  praise  him ;  but, 
providentially  for  us,  it  was  the  last  battle  that  he  waged  against  the  Ameri- 
can Union.  For,  in  bold  planning,  in  energy  of  execution,  which  he  had  the 
power  to  diffuse,  in  indefatigable  activity  and  moral  ascendency,  Jackson 
stood  head  and  shoulders  above  his  confreres,  and  after  hit  death  Gleneral 
Lee  could  not  replace  him. 


I  General  Devens's  report  is  very  explicit  upon 
this  point,  and  states  as  follows  : 

"Colonel  von  Gilsa'e  sMrmisliers were,  between  3  and 
4  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  attacked  by  the  skirmishers 
of  the  enemy  with  the  evident  intention  of  feeling  our 
position.  After  this  Colouel  von  Gilsa's  skirmishers 
were  pushed  farther  to  the  front,  and  the  major-general 
commanding  the  corps  again  rode  down  the  line.  After 


his  return  a  company  of  cavalry  was  sent  me  for  the 
purpose  of  making  further  examination  of  the  woods, 
which  examination,  though  not  thoroughly  made,  was 
still  sufficient  to  show  that  the  enemy's  cavalry  were 
deployed  along  the  front  of  my  First  Brigade,  accom- 
panied by  some  pieces  of  horse  artillery.  I  directed  the 
captain  commanding  the  cavalry  to  retuna  and  report 
at  corps  headquarters." 
See  also  note  on  p.  198. —  Editors. 


KESCUING    THE    WOUNDED    ON    SUNDAY,    MAY     ^D,    1  KO.M    THE    UUltMNG    WOODS. 
FROM    A  WAK-TIME    SKETCH. 


STONEWALL  JACKSON'S    LAST   BATTLE. 

BY   THE    REV.   JAMES    POWER    SMITH,    CAPTAIN    AND    ASSISTANT    ADJUTANT-GENERAL.   C.   S.   A. 

T  daybreak  on  the  morning  of  the  29th  of  April,  1863, 
sleeping  in  our  tents  at  corps  headquarters,  near  Hamil- 
ton's Crossing,  we  were  aroused  by  Major  Samuel  Hale,  of 
Early's  staff,  with  the  stirring  news  that  Federal  troops 
were  crossing  the  Rappahannock  on  pontoons  under  cover 
of  a  heavy  fog.  General  Jackson  had  spent  the  night  at 
Mr.  Yerby's  hospitable  mansion  near  by,  where  Mrs.  Jack- 
sTONEWALWACKsoK's  SOU  [hls  sccoud  wlfc]  had  brought  her  infant  child  for  the 
^,  .     T  ^   XT  f  11  •      father  to  see.    He  was  at  once  informed  of  the  news,  and 

Mnjor   Jprt.    Hotclikiss,  _  .... 

who  owns  the  "  oirt  gray   promptly  issued  to  his  division  commanders  orders  to  pre- 

cap,"  writes  that  Jackson  „  .  *.    i  •       t  ,.  t         t  -i  ,i 

wore  it  through  the  vai-  parc  lor  actiou.  At  his  directioii  1  rode  a  mile  across  the 
omi  ulZ^aYcimvlS^t  ^elds  to  amiy  headquarters,  and  finding  General  Robert  E. 
At  Frederick  City,  in  "the   Lec  still  slumbcring  quietlv,  at  the  suggestion  of  Colonel 

Antietam    campaign,    be  o     x  ..  7  00 

bought  a  soft  hat  for  bis  Vcuable,  wliom  I  fouud  Stirring,  I  entered  the  general's 
icksburg,  gave  bini  the  cap   tcut  and  awokc  him.    Tumiug  Ms  feet  out  of  his  cot  he 

as  a  souvenir.- EDITORS.       ^^^  ^^^^^  .^^  ^-^^  ^^  j  ^^^^  j^.^  ^^^  ^.^^^^  ^^.^^^  ^^^  ^^,^^^^ 

Expressing  no  surprise,  he  playfully  said :  "  Well,  I  thought  I  heard  firing, 
and  was  beginning  to  think  it  was  time  some  of  you  young  fellows  were 
coming  to  tell  me  what  it  was  all  about.  Tell  your  good  general  that  I  am 
sm'e  he  knows  what  to  do.     I  will  meet  him  at  the  front  very  soon." 

It  was  Sedgwick  who  had  crossed,  and,  marching  along  the  river  front  to 
impress  us  with  his  numbers,  was  now  intrenching  his  line  on  the  river  road, 
under  cover  of  Federal  batteries  on  the  north  bank. 

All  day  long  we  lay  in  the  old  lines  of  the  action  of  December  preceding, 
watching  the  operation  of  the  enemy.  Nor  did  we  move  through  the  next  day, 
the  30th  of  April.  During  the  forenoon  of  the  29th  General  Lee  had  been 
informed  by  General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart  of  the  movement  in  force  by  General 
Hooker  across  the  Rappahannock  upon  Chancellorsville ;  and  during  the 
night  of  Thursday,  April  3()th,  General  Jackson  withdrew  his  corps,  leaWng 
Early  and  his  division  with  Barksdale's  brigade  to  hold  the  old  lines  from 
Hamilton's  Crossing  along  the  rear  of  Fredericksburg. 

By  the  light  of  a  brilliant  moon,  at  midnight,  that  jiassed  into  an  early 
dawn  of  dense  mist,  the  troops  were  mm-ed,  by  the  Old  ^line  road,  out  of 
sight  of  the  enemj^,  and  al)out  11  a.  m.  of  Friday,  ^lay  1st,  they  readied 
Anderson's  position,  confronting  Hooker's  advance  from  Chancellorsville, 
near  the  Tabernacle  Church  on  the  Plank  road.  To  ihccI  the  whole  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  under  Hooker,  General  Lee  liad  of  all  arms  about  (.)(),0l)0 
men.  General  Longstreet,  with  part  of  his  coqis,  was  absent  below  Peters- 
burg. General  Lee  had  two  divisions  of  Longstreet's  corps,  Anderson's,  and 
McLaws's,  and  Jackson's  corps,  consisting  of  four  divnsions,  A.  P.  Hill's,  D.  H. 
Hill's,  commaiKled  by  Rodes,  Trimble's,  conimande<l  l>y  Colston,  and  Early's; 


204 


STONEIVALL  JACKSON'S  LAST  BATTLE. 


I 


LEI     AND    JACKSON    IN    COUNCIL    ON    THE    NIGHT    OF    MAT    1. 

and  about  170  pieces  of  field-artillery.  The  divisions  of  Anderson  and 
McLaws  had  been  sent  from  Fredericksburg  to  meet  Hooker's  advance  from 
Chancellorsville ;  Anderson  on  Wednesday,  and  McLaws  (except  Barksdale's 
brigade,  left  with  Early)  on  Thursday.  At  the  Tabernacle  Church,  about  four 
miles  east  of  Chancellorsville,  the  opposing  forces  met  and  brisk  skirmishing 
began.  On  Friday,  Jackson,  reaching  Anderson's  position,  took  command  of 
the  Confederate  advance,  and  urged  on  his  skirmish  line  under  Brigadier- 
General  Ramseur  with  great  vigor.  How  the  muskets  rattled  along  a  front 
of  a  mile  or  two,  across  the  unfenced  fields,  and  through  the  woodlands! 
What  spirit  was  imparted  to  the  line,  and  what  cheers  rolled  along  its  length, 
when  Jackson,  and  then  Lee  himself,  appeared  riding  abreast  of  the  line  along 
the  Plank  road !  Slowly  but  steadily  the  line  advanced,  until  at  night-fall  all 
Federal  pickets  and  skirmishers  were  driven  back  upon  the  body  of  Hooker's 
force  at  Chancellorsville. 

Here  we  reached  a  point,  a  mile  and  a  half  from  Hooker's  lines,  where 
a  road  turns  down  to  the  left  toward  the  old  Catherine  Furnace  [see  map, 
p.  158] ;  and  here  at  the  fork  of  the  roads  General  Lee  and  General  Jack- 
son spent  the  night,  resting  on  the  pine  straw,  curtained  only  by  the  close 
shadow  of  the  pine  forest.  A  little  after  night-fall  I  was  sent  by  General 
Lee  upon  an  errand  to  General  A.  P.  Hill,  on  the  old  stone  turnpike  a  mile 
or  two  north ;  and  returning  some  time  later  with  information  of  matters  on 
our  right,  I  found  General  Jackson  retired  to  rest,  and  General  Lee  sleeping  at 


STONEWALL  JACKSON'S  LAST  BATTLE.  •    205 

the  foot  of  a  tree,  covered  with  his  army  cloak.  As  I  aroused  the  sleeper,  he 
slowly  sat  up  on  the  ground  and  said,  "Ah,  Captain,  you  have  retui-ned,  have 
you  ?  Come  here  and  tell  me  what  you  have  learned  on  the  right."  Laying 
his  hand  on  me  he  drew  me  down  by  his  side,  and,  passing  his  arm  around 
my  shoulder,  di-ew  me  near  to  him  in  a  fatherly  way  that  told  of  his  wann 
and  kindly  heart.  When  I  had  related  such  informatiou  as  I  had  secui'ed  for 
him,  he  thanked  me  for  accomplishing  his  commission,  and  then  said  he 
regi-etted  that  the  young  men  about  General  Jackson  had  not  relieved  him 
of  annoyance,  by  finding  a  battery  of  the  enemy  which  had  harassed  our 
advance,  adding  that  the  young  men  of  that  day  were  not  equal  to  what  they 
were  when  he  was  a  young  man.  Seeing  immediately  that  he  was  jesting  and 
disposed  to  rally  me,  as  he  often  did  young  officers,  I  broke  away  from  the 
hold  on  me  which  he  tried  to  retain,  and,  as  he  laughed  heartily  through  the 
stillness  of  the  night,  I  went  off  to  make  a  bed  of  my  saddle-blanket,  and, 
with  my  head  in  my  saddle,  near  my  horse's  feet,  was  soon  wi-apped  in  the 
heavy  slumber  of  a  wearied  soldier. 

Some  time  after  midnight  I  was  awakened  by  the  chill  of  the  early  morn- 
ing hours,  and,  turning  over,  caught  a  glimpse  of  a  little  flame  on  the  slope 
above  me,  and  sitting  up  to  see  what  it  meant,  I  saw,  bending  over  a  scant 
fire  of  twigs,  two  men  seated  on  old  cracker  boxes  and  warming  their  hands 
over  the  little  fire.  I  had  but  to  rub  my  eyes  and  collect  my  wits  to  recog- 
nize the  figures  of  Robert  E.  Lee  and  Stonewall  Jackson.  Who  can  tell  the 
story  of  that  quiet  council  of  war  between  two  sleeping  armies  ?  Nothing 
remains  on  record  to  tell  of  plans  discussed,  and  dangers  weighed,  and  a 
gi-eat  purpose  formed,  Ijut  the  story  of  the  great  day  so  soon  to  follow. 

It  was  broad  daylight,  and  the  thick  beams  of  yellow  sunlight  came  through 
the  pine  branches,  when  some  one  touched  me  rudely  with  his  foot,  saying : 
"  Get  up.  Smith,  the  general  wants  you !  "  As  I  leaped  to  my  feet  the  rhyth- 
mic click  of  the  canteens  of  marching  infantry  caught  my  ear.  Already  in 
motion  !  What  could  it  mean !  In  a  moment  I  was  mounted  and  at  the  side 
of  the  general,  who  sat  on  his  horse  by  the  roadside,  as  the  long  line  of  our 
troops  cheerily,  but  in  silence  as  directed,  poured  down  the  Furnace  road. 
His  cap  was  pulled  low  over  his  eyes,  and,  looking  up  from  under  the  visor, 
with  lips  compressed,  indicating  the  firm  purpose  within,  he  nodded  to  me, 
and  in  brief  and  rapid  utterance,  without  a  superfluous  word,  as  though  all 
were  distinctly  formed  in  his  mind  and  beyond  question,  ho  gave  me  orders 
for  our  wagon  and  ambulance  trains.  From  the  open  fields  in  our  rear,  at 
the  head  of  the  Cathari)in  road,  all  trains  were  to  be  moved  upon  that  road 
to  Todd's  Tavern,  and  tlience  west  l)y  interior  roads,  so  that  our  troops  would 
be  between  them  and  the  enemy  at  Chancellors ville.  ]\[y  (M-ders  having  l)een 
deUvered  and  the  trains  set  in  motion,  I  retui-ned  to  the  site  of  (Uir  niglit's 
bivouac,  to  find  that  General  Jackson  and  his  staff  had  followed  the  march- 
ing column. 

Slow  and  tedious  is  the  advance  of  a  mounted  officer  who  has  to  pass,  in 
narrow  wood  roads  thi-ough  d(Mise  thickets,  the  ])acked  column  of  niareliing 
infantry,  to  be  recognized  all  along  tlie  line  and  good-naturedly  chaffed  by 


^o6   .  STONEiVALL  JACKSON'S  LAST  BATTLE. 

many  a  gay-spirited  fellow:  "Say,  here's  one  of  Old  Jack's  little  boys  let 
him  by,  boys  ! "  m  the  most  patronizing  tone.     "  Have  a  good  breakfast  this 

nTi;/?'Y  •  "  "  ^'^^''  ^''"'^"^  ^P'  ^^  ^^^'^^  ^^t^^  it  for  getting  behind." 
lell  Old  Jack  we're  all  a-comin'."  "Don't  let  him  begin  the  fnss  till  we 
get  thar !  "  And  so  on,  until  about  3  p.  m.,  after  a  ride  of  ten  miles  of  tortuous 
road,  I  found  the  general,  seated  on  a  stump  by  the  Brock  road,  writing  this 
dispatch,  which,  through  the  courtesy  of  the  Virginia  State  Library  is  here 
given  m  f ac-simile  :  ' 


^t^A^ 


7' 


STONEWALL  JACKSON'S  LAST  BATTLE. 


LIEUTENANT-GENERAL    THO:\IAS    .lONATIIAN    JACKSON,    C.    8.    A.      FKOM    A    PIIOTOGRArH 
TAKEN    IN    WINCHESTER,    VA.,    IN    1862. 

The  place  here  mentioned  as  Chancellor's  was  also  known  as  Dowdall's 
Tavern.  It  was  the  farm  of  the  Rev.  Melzi  Chancellor,  two  miles  west  of 
Chancellors\alle,  and  the  Federal  force  found  here  and  at  Talley's,  a  mile 
farther  west,  was  the  Eleventh  Corps,  under  General  Howard.  General  Fitz 
Lee,  with  cavahy  scouts,  had  advanced  until  he  had  ^dew  of  the  jiosition  of 
Howard's  corps,  and  found  them  unsuspicious  of  attack. 

Keaching  the  Orange  Plank  road.  General  Jackson  himself  rode  witli  Fitz 
Lee  to  reconnoiter  the  position  of  Howard,  and  then  sent  the  Stonewall 
l)rigade  of  Virginia  troops,  under  Brigadier-General  Paxton,  to  hold  the 
point  where  the  Germanna  Plank  road  obliquely  enters  the  Orange  road. 
Leading  the  main  column  of  his  force  farther  on  the  Brock  r<iad  to  the  old 
turnpike,  the  head  of  the  column  turned  shari)ly  eastward  toward  Chancel- 
lorsville.  [See  maps,  pp.  I.IH,  191.]  About  a  mile  had  been  i)assed,  when  he 
halted  and  began  the  dis})osition  of  his  force's  to  attack  Howard.  H<^des's 
division,  at  the  head  of  the  column,  was  thrown  into  line  of  l>attle,  with  Col- 
ston's forming  the  second  line  and  A.  P.  Hill's  th<'  third,  while  th.'  artillery 
under  Colonel  Stapleton  Crutchficld  moved  in  colmnii  on  tlu'  road,  or  was 
])arked  in  a  field  on  the  right.  The  wcll-li-aiiicd  skinnishcr^  of  K'odes's 
division,  under  Major  Eugene  Bhu'kfonl,  were  thrown  to  the  tV..ni.  It  must 
have  been  between  5  and  (>  o'clock  in  the  evening,  Satunlay,  May  iM,  when 


208 


ST0NEHC4LL  JACKSON'S  LAST  BATTLE. 


these- dispositions  were  completed.  Upon  his  stout-built,  long-paced  little 
sorrel,  General  Jackson  sat,  with  visor  low  over  his  eyes  and  lips  compressed, 
and  with  his  watch  in  his  hand.  Upon  his  right  sat  Greneral  Robert  E.  Rodes, 
the  very  picture  of  a  soldier,  and  every  inch  all  that  he  appeared.  Upon  the 
right  of  Rodes  sat  Major  Blackford. 

"  Ai-e  you  ready.  General  Rodes  f "  said  Jackson. 
"  Yes,  sir  !  "  said  Rodes,  impatient  for  the  advance. 
"  You  can  go  forward  then,"  said  Jackson. 

A  nod  from  Rodes  was  order  enough  for  Blackford,  and  then  suddenly  the 
woods  rang  with  the  bugle  call,  and  back  came  the  responses  from  bugles  on 
the  right  and  left,  and  the  long  line  of  skirmishers,  through  the  wild  thicket 

of  undergrowth,  sprang 
eagerly  to  their  work, 
followed  promptly  by 
the  quick  steps  of  the 
line  of  battle.  For  a 
moment  all  the  troops 
seemed  buried  in  the 
depths  of  the  gloomy 
forest,  and  then  sudden- 
ly the  echoes  waked  and 
swept  the  country  for 
miles,  never  failing  un- 
til heard  at  the  head- 
quarters of  Hooker  at 
Chancellors\ille  —  the 
wild  "  rebel  yell "  of  the 
long  Confederate  lines. 
Never  was  assault  de- 
livered with  grander 
enthusiasm.  Fresh  from 
the  long  winter's  waiting,  and  confident  from  the  preparation  of  the  spring, 
the  troops  were  in  fine  condition  and  in  high  spii'its.  The  boys  were  all  back 
from  home  or  sick  leave.  "  Old  Jack"  was  there  upon  the  road  in  their  midst ; 
there  could  be  no  mistake  and  no  failure.  And  there  were  Rodes  and  A.  P. 
Hill.  Had  they  not  seen  and  cheered,  as  long  and  as  loud  as  they  were  per- 
mitted, the  gay-hearted  Stuart  and  the  long-bearded  Fitz  Lee  on  his  fiery 
charger?  Was  not  Crutchfield's  array  of  brass  and  iron  "dogs  of  war  "at 
hand,  with  Poague  [Rockbridge  Artillery]  and  Palmer  [1st  Richmond  How- 
itzers, then  under  McCarthy],  and  all  the  rest! 

Alas !  for  Howard  and  his  unformed  lines,  and  his  brigades  with  guns 
stacked,  and  officers  at  dinner  -or  asleep  under  the  trees,  and  butchers  deep 
in  the  blood  of  beeves !  Scattered  through  field  and  forest,  his  men  were  pre- 
paring their  evening  meal.  J  A  little  sliow  of  earth- work  facing  the  south  was 
quickly  taken  by  us  in  reverse  from  the  west.  Flying  battalions  are  not 
^But  see  notes,  pp.  198  ami  202.— Editors. 


ST(JNE\VALL 


SORKKL. 


This  picture  is  from  a  pliotograpli  taken  at  tlie  Maryland  State,  Fair  at 
Hagerstown,  in  1884.  At  that  time  "Old  Sorrel"  was  thought  to  he  about 
thirty-four  years  old.  At  the  fair,  relic-hunters  plucked  away  much  of  liis 
mane  and  tail.—  Editoks. 


STONEIVALL  JACKSON'S  LAST  BATTLE. 


209 


flying  buttresses  for  an  army's 
stability.  Across  Talley's  fields  the 
rout  begins.  Over  at  Hawkins's 
liill,  on  the  north  of  the  road,  Carl 
Schurz  makes  a  stand,  soon  to  be 
driven  into  the  same  hojDeless 
panic.  By  the  quiet  Wilderness 
Church  in  the  vale,  leaving  wound- 
ed and  dead  everywhere,  by  Melzi 
Chancellor's,  on  into  the  deep 
thicket  again,  the  Confederate 
lines  pressed  forward, — now  bro- 
ken and  all  disaligned  by  the  den- 
sity of  bush  that  tears  the  clothes 
away;  now  halting  to  load  and 
deliver  a  volley  upon  some  regi- 
ment or  fragment  of  the  enemy 
that  will  not  move  as  fast  as 
others.  Thus  the  attack  upon 
Hooker's  flank  was  a  grand  suc- 
cess, beyond  the  most  sanguine 
expectation. 

The  writer  of  this  narrative,  an 
aide-de-camp  of  Jackson's,  was 
ordered  to  remain  at  the  point 
where  the  advance  began,  to  be 
a  center  of  communication  be- 
tween the  general  and  the  cavalry  on  the  flanks,  and  to  deliver  orders 
to  detachments  of  artillery  still  moving  up  from  the  rear.  A  fine  black 
charger,  with  elegant  trappings,  deserted  by  his  owner  and  found  tied  to  a 
tree,  became  mine  only  for  that  short  and  eventful  night-fall;  and  about 
8  p.  M.,  in  the  twilight,  thus  comfortably  mounted,  I  gathered  my  couriers 
about  me  and  went  forward  to  find  General  Jackson.  The  storm  of  battle 
had  swept  far  on  to  the  east  and  become  more  and  more  faint  to  the  ear, 
until  silence  came  with  night  over  the  fields  and  woods.  As  I  rode  along 
that  old  turnpike,  passing  scattered  fragments  of  Confederates  looking  for 
their  regiments,  parties  of  prisoners  concentrating  under  guards,  wounded 
men  by  the  roadside  and  under  the  trees  at  Talley's  and  Chancellor's,  1  had 
reached  an  oi)en  field  on  the  right,  a  mile  west  of  Chancellorsville,  when,  in 
the  dusky  twilight,  I  saw  horsemen  near  an  old  cabin  in  the  tield.  Turning 
toward  them,  I  found  Rodes  and  his  staft'  engaged  in  gathering  the  br«)ken 
and  scattered  troops  that  had  swept  the  two  mih's  of  battle-lield.  "Central 
Jackson  is  just  ahead  on  .the  road,  Captain,"  said  li.xNs;  "tell  him  I  will  be 
here  at  this  cabin  if  I  am  wanted."  I  had  not  gone  a  hundred  yards  before  1 
heard  firing,  a  shot  or  two,  and  then  a  conii)any  volle\-  upon  tlie  right  of  the 
road,  and  another  upon  the  l*>t't.     A  few  moments  farther  on   I  met  Captain 


BRIGADIER-GENERAT-    E.     V.    I'AXTON,    CI).M.MAM>1N(.    lilt. 

"STONEWALL"    BRIGADE   OF   COLSTON'S    Iin'ISION, 

KILLED    MAY    3.       FROM    AN    AMBROTYl'E. 


210 


STONEIVALL  JACKSON'S  LAST  BATTLE. 


STONEWALL   JAlKSO> 


>AD    IN    ADVANCE    OF    lllS    LINE    OF    BATTLE. 


Murray  Taylor,  an  aide  of  A.  P.  Hill's,  with  tidings  that  Jackson  and  Hill 
were  wounded,  and  some  around  them  killed,  by  the  tire  of  their  own  men. 
Spurring  my  horse  into  a  sweeping  galloj^,  I  soon  passed  the  Confederate 
line  of  battle,  and,  some  three  or  four  rods  on  its  front,  found  the  general's 
horse  beside  a  pine  sapling  on  the  left,  and  a  rod  beyond  a  little  party  of  men 
caring  for  a  wounded  officer.  The  story  of  the  sad  event  is  briefly  told,  and, 
in  essentials,  very  much  as  it  came  to  me  from  the  lips  of  the  wounded 


STONEWALL  JACKSON'S  LAST  BATTLE. 


general  himself,  and  in  everything  confirmed  and  completed  by  those  who 
were  eye-witnesses  and  near  companions. 

When  Jackson  had  reached  the  point  where  his  line  now  crossed  the  turn- 
pike, scarcely  a  mile  west  of  Chancellors ville,  and  not  half  a  mile  from  a  line 
of  Federal  troops,  he  had  found  his  front  line  unfit  for  the  farther  and  vigor- 
ous advance  he  desired,  by  reason  of  the  irregular  character  of  the  fight- 
ing, now  right,  now  left,  and  because  of  the  dense  thickets,  through  which  it 
was  impossible  to  preserve  alignment.  Division  commanders  found  it  more 
and  more  difficult  as  the  twilight  deepened  to  hold  theii*  broken  brigades 
in  hand.  Eegretting  the  necessity  of 
relieving  the  troops  in  front,  General 
Jackson  had  ordered  A.  P.  Hill's  divis- 
ion, his  third  and  reserve  line,  to  be 
placed  in  front.  "While  this  change  was 
being  effected,  impatient  and  anxious,  the 
general  rode  forward  on  the  turnpike, 
followed  by  two  or  three  of  his  staff  and 
a  number  of  couriers  and  signal  ser- 
geants. He  passed  the  swampy  depres- 
sion and  began  the  ascent  of  the  hill 
toward  Chancellorsville,  when  he  came 
upon  a  line  of  the  Federal  infantry  lying 
on  their  arms.  Fired  at  by  one  or  two 
muskets  (two  musket-balls  from  the  en- 
emy whistled  over  my  head  as  I  came 
to  the  front),  he  turned  and  came  back 
toward  his  line,  upon  the  side  of  the  road 
to  his  left.  As  he  rode  near  to  the  Con- 
federate troops,  just  placed  in  position 
and  ignorant  that  he  was  in  the  front,  the 
left  company  l)egan  firing  to  the  front,  and  two  of  his  party  fell  from  their 
saddles  dead — Captain  Boswell,  of  the  Engineers,  and  Sergeant  Cunlift'o,  of  the 
Signal  Corps.  Spurring  his  horse  across  the  road  to  his  right,  ho  was  mot  by 
a  second  volley  from  the  right  company  of  Pender's  North  Carolina  brigade. 
Under  this  volley,  when  not  two  rods  from  the  troops,  the  general  rooeivod 
three  balls  at  the  same  instant.  One  penetrated  the  palm  of  his  right  hand 
and  was  cut  out  that  night  from  the  l)ack  of  his  hand.  A  second  jiassod 
around  the  wrist  of  the  left  arm  and  out  tlirough  tho  loft  hand.  A  tliinl  ball 
passed  through  the  left  arm  half-way  from  shoulder  to  elbow.  Tho  large  bono 
of  the  upper  arm  was  splintered  to  the  elbow- joint,  and  tlio  wound  bled 
freely.  His  horse  turned  quickly  from  the  fire,  through  tin 
which  swept  the  cap  from  tho  general's  lu^id,  and  scratelie* 
leaving  drops  of  blood  to  stain  his  face.  As  he  lost  liis 
bridlo-roin,  he  reeled  from  the  saddle,  and  was  caught  by  tho 
tain  Wilbourn,  of  tho  Signal  Corps.  Laid  upon  tho  ground,  there  eamo  at  onoe 
to  his  succor  General  A.  P.  Hill  and  members  of  his  staff.   The  writer  roaehcHl 


'%J 


MAJOR-GENERAL 
FROM 


E.    COLSTON, 
■HOTOCRAril. 


k  bushes 
forehead, 
upon   tho 
inns  of  Cap- 


thi 

hi> 

ol,l 


212 


STONEWALL  JACKSON'S  LAST  BATTLE. 


his  side  a  minute  after,  to  find  General  Hill  holding  the  head  and  shoulders 
of  the  wounded  chief.  Cutting  .open  the  coat-sleeve  from  wrist  to  shoulder, 
I  found  the  wound  in  the  upper  arm,  and  with  my  handkerchief  I  bound  the 
arm  above  the  wound  to  stem  the  flow  of  blood.  Couriers  were  sent  for  Dr. 
Hunter  McGuire,  the  surgeon  of  the  corps  and  the  general's  trusted  friend, 
and  for  an  ambulance.  Being  outside  of  our  lines,  it  was  urgent  that  he 
should  be  moved  at  once.  With  difficulty  litter-bearers  were  brought  from  the 
line  near  by,  and  the  general  was  placed  upon  the  litter  and  carefully  raised 

to  the  shoulder,  I  myself  bearing  one 
corner.  A  moment  after,  artillery  from 
the  Federal  side  was  opened  upon  us ; 
gi-eat  broadsides  thundered  over  the 
woods ;  hissing  shells  searched  the  dark 
thickets  through,  and  shrapnels  swept 
the  road  along  which  we  moved.  Two 
or  three  steps  farther,  and  the  litter- 
bearer  at  my  side  was  struck  and  fell, 
but,  as^the  litter  turned.  Major  Wat  kins 
Leigh,  of  Hill's  staff,  happily  caught  it. 
But  the  fright  of  the  men  was  so  great 
that  we  were  obliged  to  lay  the  litter 
and  its  burden  down  upon  the  road. 
As  the  litter-bearers  ran  to  the  cover 
of  the  trees,  I  threw  myself  by  the  gen- 
eral's side  and  held  him  firmly  to  the 
ground  as  he  attempted  to  rise.  Over 
us  swept  the  rapid  fire  of  shot  and 
shell  —  grape-shot  striking  fire  upon 
the  flinty  rock  of  the  road  all  around  us,  and  sweeping  from  their  feet 
horses  and  men  of  the  artillery  just  moved  to  the  front.  Soon  the  firing 
veered  to  the  other  side  of  the  road,  and  I  sprang  to  my  feet,  assisted  the 
general  to  rise,  passed  my  arm  around  him,  and  with  the  wounded  man's 
weight  thrown  heavily  upon  me,  we  forsook  the  road.  Entering  the  woods, 
he  sank  to  the  ground  from  exhaustion,  but  the  litter  was  soon  brought,  and 
again  rallying  a  few  men,  we  essayed  to  carry  him  farther,  when  a  second 
bearer  fell  at  my  side.  This  time,  with  none  to  assist,  the  litter  careened, 
and  the  general  fell  to  the  ground,  with  a  groan  of  deep  pain.  G-reatly 
alarmed,  I  sprang  to  his  head,  and,  lifting  his  head  as  a  stray  beam  of  moon- 
light  came  through  clouds  and  leaves,  he  opened  his  eyes  and  wearily  said : 
"  Never  mind  me.  Captain,  never  mind  me."  Raising  him  again  to  his  feet, 
he  was  accosted  by  Brigadier-General  Pender :  "  Oh,  General,  I  hope  you 
are  not  seriously  wounded.  I  will  have  to  retire  my  troops  to  re-form 
them,  they  are  so  much  broken  by  this  fire."  But  Jackson,  rallying  his 
strength,  with  firm  voice  said:  "You  must  hold  your  gi^ound,  General 
Pender;  you  must  hold  your  ground,  sir!"  and  so  uttered  his  last  com- 
mand on  the  field. 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL   F.    T.    NICHOLL8,    C.   S.   A. 
FROM   A   PHOTOGRAPH. 


STONEWALL  JACKSON'S  LAST  BATTLE. 


213 


(tv^vncellDW-vilU    [y^u^t. 


This  i)icture  is  from  a  photograph  taken  at  a  reunion 
of  Union  and  Confederate  officers  and  soldiers  in  May, 
1884.  The  original  house  (see  p.  190)  was  set  on  fire  by 
Confederate  shells  on  Sunday,  May  3d,  shortly  after 
Hooker  was  injured  while  standing  on  the  porch.    The 


picture  faces  south;  Jackson  attacked  the  Eleventh 
Corps  fiom  the  left  (west)  by  the  Plank  road,  which 
passes  in  front  of  the  Chancellor  House.  The  cross- 
road in  the  foreground  leads  northward  to  Ely's  Ford 
and  United  States  Ford.    See  map,  p.  158.—  Editors. 


Again  we  resorted  to  the  litter,  and  with  difficulty  Lore  it  through  the  l)ush, 
and  then  under  a  hot  fire  along  the  road.  Soon  an  ambulance  was  reached, 
and  stopping  to  seek  some  stimulant  at  Chancellor's  (Dowdall's  Tavern),  we 
were  found  by  Dr.  McGuire,  who  at  once  took  charge  of  the  wounded  man. 
Passing  back  over  the  Imttle-field  of  the  afternoon,  we  reached  the  Wilderness 
store,  and  then,  in  a  field  on  the  north,  the  field-hospital  of  our  eori)s  under 
Dr.  Harvey  Bhxck.  Here  we  found  a  tent  prepared,  and  after  midiiiglit  the  U'ft 
arm  was  amputated  near  the  shoulder,  and  a  ball  taken  from  the  right  hand. 

All  night  long  it  was  mine  to  watch  by  the  suft'erer,  and  keep  him  warmly 
wrapped  and  undisturbed  in  his  sleep.  At  9  a.  m.,  on  the  next  day,  when 
he  aroused,  cannon  firhig  again  filled  the  air,  and  all  the  Sunday  tlirough  the 
fiercer  l)attle  raged,  General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart  commanding  the  Confederates  in 
Jackson's  place.  A  dispatch  was  sent  to  the  conunanding  general  to  announce 
formally  his  disability, —  tidings  General  Lee  had  received  during  the  night 
with  profound  grief.     There  came  back  the  following  note : 

*'  Gknekal  :  I  h.ave  just  received  your  noto.  informinp:  mo  that  you  were  w«)umle(l.  I  t-anuot 
express  my  rej^ret  at  the  occun-ence.  Couhl  I  liavc  direeted  events,  I  shouKl  have  eh«»s»'n.  for 
the  good  of  the  country,  to  have  been  disabk'd  in  your  stead.  T  conirratulate  you  ui>t)n  tlie 
victory  which  is  due  to  youi*  skill  and  energy.    Most  truly  yours,  R.  E.  Lee,  Genek.m.." 


214 


STONEWALL  JACKSON'S  LAST  BATTLE. 


When  this  dispatch  was  handed  to  me  at  the  tent,  and  I  read  it  aloud, 
General  Jackson  turned  his  face  away  and  said,  "  G-eneral  Lee  is  very  kind, 
but  he  should  give  the  praise  to  God." 

The  long  day  was  passed  with  bright  hopes  for  the  wounded  general,  with 
tidings  of  success  on  the  battle-field,  with  sad  news  of  losses,  and  messages 
to  and  from  other  wounded  officers  brought  to  the  same  infirmary. 

On  Monday  the  general  was  carried  in  an  ambulance^  by  way  of  Spotsyl- 
vania Court  House,  to  most  comfortable  lodging  at  Chandler's,  near  Guinea's 
Station,  on  the  Eichmond,  Fredericksburg  and  Potomac  railroad.  And  here, 
against  oui'  hopes,  notwithstanding  the  skill  and  care  of  wise  and  watchful 
surgeons,  attended  day  and  night  by  wife  and  friends,  amid  the  prayers  and 
tears  of  all  the  Southern  land,  thinking  not  of  himself,  but  of  the  cause  he 
loved,  and  for  the  troops  who  had  followed  him  so  well  and  given  him  so 
great  a  name,  our  chief  sank,  day  by  day,  with  symptoms  of  pneumonia  and 
some  pains  of  pleurisy,  until,  at  3  :  15  p.  m.  on  the  quiet  of  the  Sabbath  after- 
noon. May  10th,  1863,  he  raised  himself  from  his  bed,  saying,  "  No,  no,  let  us 
pass  over  the  river,  and  rest  under  the  shade  of  the  trees  " ;  and,  falling  again 
to  his  pillow,  he  passed  away,  "  over  the  river,  where,  in  a  land  where  war- 
fare is  not  known  or  feared,  he  rests  forever  '  under  the  trees.' " 

His  shattered  arm  was  buried  in  the  family  burying-ground  of  the  Ellwood 
place — Major  J.  H.  Lacy's — near  his  last  battle-field. 

His  body  rests,  as  he  himself  asked,  "  in  Lexington,  in  the  Valley  of  Vir- 
ginia." The.  spot  where  he  was  so  fatally  wounded  in  the  shades  of  the 
Wilderness  is  marked  by  a  large  quartz  rock,  placed  there  by  the  care  of 
his  chaplain  and  friend,  the  Rev.  Dr.  B.  F.  Lacy,  and  the  latter's  brother, 
Major  Lacy. 

Others  must  tell  the  story  of  Confederate  victory  at  Chancellorsville.  It 
has  been  mine  only,  as  in  the  movement  of  that  time,  so  with  my  pen  now, 
to  follow  my  general  himself.  Great,  the  world  believes  him  to  have  been  in 
many  elements  of  generalship ;  he  was  greatest  and  noblest  in  that  he  was 
good,  and,  without  a  selfish  thought,  gave  his  talent  and  his  life  to  a  cause 
that,  as  before  the  God  he  so  devoutly  served,  he  deemed  right  and  just. 


STONEWALL  JACKSON'S    GRAVE,    LEXINGTON,   VA.      FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


HOOKER'S   COMMENTS   ON    CHANCELLORSVILLE. 


I 


BY  SAMUEL    P.   BATES,    HIS    LITERARY    EXECUTOR. 

N  October,   1876,  I  accompanied  General  Hooker  to  the  battle-fields 
of  Fredericksburg,  Chancellorsville,  and  Antietam, —  fields  on  which 
he  had  borne  conspicuous  parts.    It  was  the  only 
occasion  on  which  he  visited  them  after  the  battles. 
He  had  previously  placed  in  my  hands  his  official 
papers  and  memoranda  for  the  preparation  of  a  his- 
tory of  the  Battle  of  Chancellorsville,  at  the  same 
time  requesting  me  to  make  this  journey  with  him, 
that   I  might   have  the  advantage  of  a  thorough 
knowledge  of  the  field,  and  of  his  interpretation  of  the  manner  in  which 
the  battle  was  fought.     At  this  period  he  was  partly  paralyzed  from  the 
injury  received  in  the  Chancellorsville  battle,  and  he  could  move  only 
with  great  difficulty  by  the  aid  of  his  valet. 

After  our  arrival  at  Fredericksburg,  General  Hooker  was  the  recipient  of 
many  courteous  attentions  from  the  leading  citizens,  and  at  night  he  was 
serenaded,  when  a  great  crowd  assembled  in  front  of  the  hotel,  to  whose 
repeated  cheers  he  made  a  brief  response,  in  which  he  said  that  he  had  -sdsited 
their  city  but  once  before,  and  although  his  reception  now  was  not  nearly  so 
warm  as  on  that  former  day,  yet  it  was  far  more  agreeable  to  him, —  a  conceit 
which  greatly  pleased  his  hearers. 

Our  drive  over  the  Fredericksburg  field,  which  we  visited  on  the  way, 
was  on  one  of  the  most  perfect  of  autumnal  days,  and  at  every  turn 
fresh  reminiscences  of  that  battle  were  suggested.  As  we  approached  the 
flag-staff  of  the  National  Cemetery,  on  the  hill  adjoining  Marye's  Heights, 
where  more  than  fifteen  thousand  of  the  Union  dead  of  Fredericksburg, 
Chancellorsville,  the  Wilderness,  and  Spotsylvania  are  bnri(Hl,  General 
Hooker  said: 

"I  never  think  of  this  ground  but  with  a  shuddei-.  The  whole  scene  is  indel- 
ibly fixed  in  my  mind,  as  it  appeared  on  that  fatal  day.  Here  on  this  ground 
were  ranged  the  enemy's  cannon,  and  the  heights  farther  to  his  left  were  thickly 
planted  with  pieces;  all  the  infantry  he  could  use  was  disposed  behind  earth- 
works and  stone  walls.  How  this  could  have  been  selected  as  the  point,  above 
all  others,  for  attack,  and  followed  up  mitil  four  whole  divisions  had  l>een 
sacrificed,  I  cannot  comprehend.  As  I  stand  here  to-day,  the  inii)(>ssil)ility 
of  carrying  this  ground  by  direct  assault  is  no  more  ai)parent  than  it  was 
when  I  made  my  observation  preparatory  to  ordering  IIiinii»hreys\s  division 
forward.  But  it  is  evident  that  General  Burnside  never  forgave  nie  for  coun- 
seling him  on  that  occasion  as  I  did,  for  on  January  l2:)d  h«^  drew  ii])  an  order, 
known  as  General  Ord(>rs,  No.  8,  of  his  series,  dishonorably  dismissing  me 
from  the  service,  together  with  thre(>  other  in-oniiiient  gtMieral  ollieers,  at  the 


2i6  HOOKER'S  COMMENTS  ON  CHANCELLORSyiLLE. 

same  time  relieving  five  other  officers  from  duty.  I  was  grossly  maligned  by 
the  press  of  that  day,  and  it  was  generally  beheved  by  the  people  at  the  North 
that  I  had  not  faithfully  supported  General  Burnside  in  this  battle,  and  that 
I  was  aiming  thereby  to  supplant  him.  If  these  brave  men  who  are  sleeping 
here  beneath  our  feet  could  speak,  they  would  bear  testimony  to  my  sincerity 
and  fidelity  to  the  cause  we  were  battling  for ;  and  though  I  have  suffered 
in  silence,  and  my  reputation  has  been  grossly  aspersed,  I  have  rested  in  the 
firm  belief  that  my  conduct  on  that  day  would  be  justified  by  the  American 
people." 

These  Orders,  No.  8,  J  were  prepared  on  the  23d  of  January,  1863,  and  would 
have  been  immediately  promulgated  had  not  General  Burnside  been  coun- 
seled first  to  lay  them  before  President  Lincoln,  of  whom  he  asked  that  they 
be  approved,  as  drawn,  or  that  his  own  resignation  be  accepted.  The  Presi- 
dent refused  to  accept  his  resignation,  but  relieved  him  of  the  command  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  ;  and  so  little  effect  had  the  order  upon  the  mind 
of  Mr.  Lincoln  that  he  decided  to  place  Hooker,  at  whom  the  shaft  was  chiefly 
aimed,  at  the  head  of  the  army.  And  yet  so  strong  a  hold  had  this  unjust 
opinion  on  the  public  mind  that  even  the  President  was  tinctured  with  it, 
and  in  his  remarkable  letter  of  January  26th  to  General  Hooker,  informing 
him  of  his  appointment,  he  said : 

"  I  have  placed  yoii  at  the  head  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Of  course  I  have  done  this 
upon  what  appears  to  me  to  be  sufficient  reasons,  and  yet  I  think  it  best  for  you  to  know  that 
there  are  some  things  in  regard  to  which  I  am  not  quite  satisfied  with  you.  I  beheve  you  to  be 
a  brave  and  skillful  soldier,  which,  of  course,  I  hke.     I  also  believe  you  do  not  mix  poUtics  with 

^Following  is  the  text  of  the  orders:  "Head-  tary  service  of  the  United  States.  (.3.)  Brigadier- 
QUARTERS,  Army  OF  THE  PoTOMAC,  January  23d,  GeneralJohn  Newton,  commanding  Third  Division, 
1863.  General  Orders,  No.  S.  (1.)  General  Sixth  Ai"my  Corps,  and  Brigadier-General  John 
Joseph  Hooker,  major-general  of  volunteers  and  Cochrane,  commanding  First  Brigade,  Third  Di vis- 
brigadier-general,  U.  S.  Army,  having  been  guilty  ion,  Sixth  Army  Corps,  for  going  to  the  President 
of  unjust  and  unnecessary  criticisms  of  the  ac-  of  the  United  States  with  criticisms  upon  the  plans 
tions  of  his  superior  officers,  and  of  the  author-  of  their  commanding  officer,  are,  subject  to  the 
ities,  and  having,  by  the  general  tone  of  his  approval  of  the  President,  dismissed  from  the 
conversation,  endeavored  to  create  distrust  in  the  military  service  of  the  United  States.  (4.)  It 
minds  of  officers  who  have  associated  with  him,  being  evident  that  the  following-named  officers 
and  having,  by  omissions  and  otherwise,  made  re-  can  be  of  no  further  service  to  this  army,  they  are 
ports  and  statements  which  were  calculated  to  hereby  relieved  from  duty,  and  will  report  in 
create  incorrect  impressions,  and  for  habitually  person,  without  delay,  to  the  Adjutant-General, 
speaking  in  disparaging  terms  of  other  officers,  is  U.  S.  Army :  Major-General  W.  B.  Franklin, 
hereby  dismissed  the  service  of  the  United  States  commanding  Left  Grand  Di-\dsion  ;  Major-General 
as  a  man  unfit  to  hold  an  important  commission  W.  F.  Smith,  commanding  Sixth  Coi'ps ;  Briga- 
during  a  crisis  like  the  present,  when  so  much  dier-General  Samuel  D.  Sturgis,  commanding 
patience,  charity,  confidence,  consideration,  and  Second  Division,  Ninth  Corps ;  Brigadier-General 
patriotism  are  duo  from  every  soldier  in  the  field.  Edward  Ferrero,  commanding  Second  Brigade, 
This  order  is  issued  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Second  Division,  Ninth  Army  Corps;  Brigadier- 
President  of  the  United  States.  (2.)  Brigadier-  General  John  Cochrane,  commanding  First  Bri- 
General  W.  T.  H.  Brooks,  commanding  First  Divis-  gade.  Third  Division,  Sixth  Corps  ;  Lieutenant- 
ion,  Sixth  Army  Corps,  for  complaining  of  the  policy  Colonel  J.  H.  Taylor,  Assistant  Adjutant-General, 
of  tlie  Government,  and  for  using  language  tending  Eight  Grand  Division.  By  command  of  Major- 
to  demoralize  his  command,  is,  subject  to  the  ap-  General  A.  E.  Burnside.  Lewis  Eichmond, 
proval  of  the  President,  dismissed  from  the  mill-  Assistant  Adjutant-General."  % 

ijj  In  the  "Official  Records"  the  above  order  is  accom-  prints,  Is  referred  to  in  tlie  correspondence  between 

paiiiod  by  the  following  note  of  explanation:   "This  Hiilh'ck  and  Franklin,  and  in    Burnside's    testimony 

order  wiis  not  approved  by  the  President,  iind  was,  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War." 
therefore,  never  issued.    It   appeared   in   the   public  Ewtoks. 


HOOKER'S  COMMENTS  ON  CHANCELLORSl^ILLE.  217 

your  profession,  in  which  you  are  right.  You  have  confidence  in  yourself,  which  is  a  valuable, 
if  not  an  indispensable,  quaUty.  You  are  ambitious,  which,  within  reasonable  bounds,  does 
good  rather  than  harm  ;  but  I  think  that  during  General  Bumside's  command  of  the  army  you 
have  taken  counsel  of  your  ambition,  and  thwarted  him  as  much  as  you  could,  in  which  you  did 
a  great  wi-ong  to  the  country  and  to  a  most  meritorious  and  honorable  brother  officer.  I  have 
heard,  in  such  way  as  to  believe  it,  of  your  recently  sajing  that  both  the  aiTay  and  the  Gov- 
ernment needed  a  Dictator.  Of  coui'se  it  was  not  for  this,  but  in  spite  of  it,  that  I  have  given 
you  the  command.  Only  those  generals  who  gain  successes  can  set  up  dictators.  What  I  now 
ask  of  you  is  military  success,  and  I  will  risk  the  dictatorship.  The  Government  will  support 
you  to  the  utmost  of  its  abihty,  which  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  it  has  done  and  wiU  do  for 
all  commanders.  I  much  fear  that  the  spirit  which  you  have  aided  to  infuse  into  the  army,  of 
criticising  their  commander  and  withholding  confidence  from  him,  will  now  turn  upon  you. 
I  shall  assist  you  as  far  as  I  can  to  put  it  down.  Neither  you  nor  Napoleon,  if  he  were  alive 
again,  could  get  any  good  out  of  an  army  while  such  a  spirit  prevails  in  it.  And  now  beware 
of  rashness.  Beware  of  rashness,  but  with  energy  and  sleepless  vigilance  go  forward,  and  give 
us  victories." 

The  caution  against  rashness  may  have  been  suggested  to  the  mind  of  Mr. 
Lincoln  by  the  epithet  of  "  Fighting  Joe  Hooker,"  which  the  general  never 
heard  without  expressing  his  deep  regret  that  it  was  ever  applied  to  him. 
"  People  will  think  I  am  a  highwayman  or  a  bandit,"  he  said ;  when  in  fact 
he  was  one  of  the  most  kindly  and  tender-hearted  of  men. 

We  were  accompanied  on  our  ride  to  the  Chancellorsville  field,  some  ten  or 
twelve  miles  above  Fredericksburg,  by  Major  Greorge  E.  Chancellor,  a  son  of 
Melzi  Chancellor,  whose  home  at  the  time  of  the  battle  was  at  Dowdall's 
Tavern,  where  General  Howard  had  his  headquarters.  On  setting  out,  General 
Hooker  suggested  that  we  should  take  some  lunch  along  with  us,  as,  when  he 
was  there  last  there  was  very  little  to  eat  in  all  that  region.  Major  Chancellor 
thought  it  unnecessary,  and,  in  fact,  we  were  feasted  most  sumptuouslj^  at  his 
father's  house. 

Upon  our  arrival  at  the  broad,  open,  rolling  fields  opposite  Banks's  Ford, 
some  three  or  four  miles  up  the  stream,  General  Hooker  exclaimed,  wa\'ing 
his  hand  significantly :  "  Here,  on  this  open  ground,  I  intended  to  fight  my 
battle.  But  the  trouble  was  to  get  my  army  on  it,  as  the  banks  of  the  stream 
are,  as  you  see,  rugged  and  precipitous,  and  the  few  fords  were  strongly  for- 
tified and  guarded  by  the  enemy.  By  making  a  i)owerful  demonstration  in 
front  of  and  below  the  town  of  Fredericksburg  with  a  part  of  my  army,  I 
was  able,  unobserved,  to  withdraw  the  remainder,  and,  marching  nearly  thirty 
miles  up  the  stream,  to  cross  the  Rappahannock  and  the  Rapidan  unoi)posed, 
and  in  four  days'  time  to  arrive  at  Chan(M'llorsville,  within  fivt>  miK>s  of  this 
coveted  ground, ^t — and  all  this  without  General  Lee  having  <liscoveriMl  tliat 
I  had  left  my  position  in  his  front.     So  far,  I  regarded  my  movciiuMit  as  n 

3>Tlie  (lonionstratioiis  began  on  April  21st,  and  the  Seeonil  Corps,  itossimI  11u>  Kappaliainiock  at 

wero  niado  at  inti'i-vals  at  Kelly's  Ford,  Rappahan-  Kelly's  Ford  on  the  'JStli  and  •J'.'tli  by  poiitoon- 

noek  Bridge,  and  Port  Royal.     Tlie  movement  of  bridges,  and  passed  the  Rapidan  l>y  fonling  and 

Sedgwick  below  the  town  was  disclosed  to  Lee  on  by  means  of  pontoons,  arriving  at    Cluiueellors- 

the  29th,  when  the  pontoons  were  laid  and  the  ville  on  the  .SOtii.     The  Third  ('orps.  after  taking 

crossing  took  place  at  the  point  where  Franklin's  part  in  tlie  demonstrations  before  Frederieksburg. 

Left  (Iraiid  Division  crossed  in  December,  1  S(;2.  crossed  tlie  Rapitahannock  at  United  States  Fonl 

Hooker's  flanking  column,  consisting  of  the  Fifth,  and  reached  Cliancellorsville  on  May  1st.  and  was 

Eleventh,  and  Twelfth  corps  and  two  divisions  of  followed  by  the  First  Corps  on  the  2d.— Editors. 

VOL.  III.    15 


2i8  HOOKER'S  COMMENTS  ON  CHANCELLORSf^ILLE. 

great  success.  On  the  morning  of  the  fifth  day  my  army  was  astir,  and 
was  put  in  motion  on  three  Hues  through  the  tangled  forest  (the  Wilder- 
ness) which  covers  the  whole  country  around  Chancellorsville,  and  in  three 
hours'  time  I  would  have  been  in  position  on  these  crests,  and  in  posses- 
sion of  Banks's  Ford,  in  short  and  easy  communication  with  the  other  wing 
of  my  army.  But  at  midnight  General  Lee  had  moved  out  with  his  whole 
army,  and  by  sunrise  was  in  firm  possession  of  Banks's  Ford,  had  thrown  up 
this  line  of  breastworks  which  you  can  still  follow  with  the  eye,  and  it  was 
bristling  with  cannon  from  one  end  to  the  other.  Before  I  had  proceeded 
two  miles  the  heads  of  my  columns,  while  still  upon  the  narrow  roads  in  these 
interminable  forests,  where  it  was  impossible  to  manoeuvi^e  my  forces,  were 
met  by  Jackson  with  a  full  two-thirds  of  the  entire  Confederate  army.  I  had 
no  alternative  but  to  turn  back,  as  I  had  only  a  fragment  of  my  command 
in  hand,  and  take  up  the  position  about  Chancellorsville  which  I  had  occupied 
during  the  night,  as  I  was  being  rapidly  outflanked  upon  my  right,  the  enemy 
having  open  ground  on  which  to  operate. 

"  And  here  again  my  reputation  has  been  attacked  because  I  did  not  under- 
take to  accomplish  an  impossibility,  but  turned  back  at  this  point;  and  every 
history  of  the  war  that  has  been  written  has  soundly  berated  me  because  I 
did  not  fight  here  in  the  forest  with  my  hands  tied  behind  me,  and  allow  my 
army  to  be  sacrificed.  I  have  always  believed  that  impartial  history  would 
vindicate  my  conduct  in  this  emergency." 

Soon  after  leaving  the  open  ground  opposite  Banks's  Ford  we  entered 
the  dense  forest,  or  "  Wilderness,"  which  covers  the  entire  Chancellorsville 
battle-ground, —  "a  dense  forest,"  says  G-eneral  Warren,  "of  not  very 
large  ti'ees,  but  very  difficult  to  get  through ;  mainly  of  scrubby  oak,  what 
they  call  black-jack  there,  so  that  a  man  could  hardly  ride  through  it,  and 
a  man  could  not  march  through  it  very  well  with  musket  in  hand,  unless  he 
trailed  it." 

Every  important  position  was  observed  and  commented  upon  by  the  man 
who  on  those  fierce  battle-days  had  wielded,  on  this  very  ground,  an  army  of 
a  hundred  thousand  men.  On  approaching  the  pine-tree  under  which  Gen- 
erals Lee  and  Jackson  had  planned  the  mode  of  attack,  General  Hooker 
observed :  "  It  was  under  that  tree  that  the  mischief  was  devised  which 
came  near  ruining  my  army.  My  position  at  Chancellorsville  was  a  good 
one  for  this  monotonous  country.  I  felt  confident  when  I  reached  it  that  I 
had  eighty  chances  in  a  hundred  to  win.  To  make  sure  that  everything  was 
firm  and  strong,  very  early  on  the  2d  of  May,  the  first  day  of  the  battle,  I 
rode  along  the  whole  line,  and  personally  examined  every  part,  suggesting 
some  changes  and  counseling  extreme  vigilance.  Upon  my  return  to  head- 
quarters I  was  informed  that  a  continuous  column  of  the  enemy  had  been 
marching  past  my  front  since  early  in  the  morning,  as  of  a  corps  with  all  its 
impedimenta.  This  put  an  entirely  new  phase  upon  the  problem,  and  filled 
me  with  apprehension  for  the  safety  of  my  right  wing,  which  was  posted  to 
meet  a  front  attack  from  the  south,  but  was  in  no  condition  for  a  flank  attack 
from  the  west ;  for  this  marching  of  the  enemy's  corps,  to  my  mind,  meant 


HOOKER'S  COMMENTS  ON  CHANCELLORSyiLLE.  219 

a  flank  movement  upon  my  right.  I  immediately  dictated  a  dispatch  |  to 
*  Generals  Sloeum  and  Howard,'  the  latter  commanding  the  Eleventh  Corps, 
which  stood  upon  the  extreme  right,  saying  that  I  had  good  reason  to  beheve 
that  the  enemy  was  moving  to  our  right,  and  that  they  must  be  ready  to 
meet  an  attack  from  the  west.  This  was  at  9 :  30  in  the  morning.  In  the 
course  of  two  hours  I  got  a  dispatch  from  Greneral  Howard,  saying  that  he 
could  see  a  column  of  the  enemy  moving  westward,  and  that  he  was  taking 
the  precautions  necessary  '  to  resist  an  attack  from  the  west.'  ^  I  had  previ- 
ously put  Williams's  division  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  on  an  interior  line  looking 
westward,  and  had  it  fortified,  so  that  if  Howard  should  give  way,  this  interior 
line  would  be  for  safety,  as  it  afterward  proved  my  salvation. 

"  I  sent  Sickles  to  pierce  this  moving  column  of  the  enemy,  and  made  prepa- 
rations to  flank  the  portion  of  Lee's  army  that  was  still  upon  my  front,  in  the 
direction  of  Fredericksburg,  and,  sweeping  down  in  reverse,  to  destroy  it  if 
possible.  But  a  swamp  intervened  which  had  to  be  corduroyed,  and  a  small 
stream  had  to  be  bridged,  which  consumed  time ;  and  though  Sickles  was 
successful  in  breaking  in  upon  the  enemy's  column  and  making  some  captures, 
yet,  before  he  was  in  position  to  make  his  decisive  attack,  Jackson,  who  had 
led  his  column  by  a  long  circuit,  out  of  sight  and  hearing,  through  the  dense 
forest,  came  in  upon  my  right  flank,  and  by  one  concentrated  blow  of  his 
whole  corps,  some  25,000  men,  had  crushed  and  put  to  flight  almost  the  entire 
corps  of  Howard ;  and  it  was  with  the  utmost  difficulty  that  I  could  lead  up 
my  reserves  to  the  interior  line  of  Williams,  and  bring  Jackson's  victorious 
forces  to  a  halt.  This  failure  of  Howard  to  hold  his  ground  cost  us  om*  posi- 
tion, and  I  was  forced,  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy,  to  take  up  a  new  one. 
Upon  investigation  I  found  that  Howard  had  failed  pi-operly  to  obey  my 
instructions  to  prepare  to  meet  the  enemy  from  the  west."  In  this  connec- 
tion the  following  extracts  from  a  letter  to  Hooker  from  Schurz  (who  sub- 
sequently gave  General  Hooker  leave  to  print  it)  will  be  read  with  interest : 

''  40  W.  32d  St.,  New  York,  April  ^'id,  1S76. 

"  My  Dear  General  :  Yom*  letter  of  the  8tli  inst.  was  forwarded  to  me  from  St.  Louis,  and 
reached  me  here  early  this  mox-ning,  and  I  hasten  to  reply.  I  regret  very  much  that,  my  papei-s 
being  boxed  up,  I  have  no  access  to  a  memorandum  of  tiie  cu'ciunstances  connected  with  the 

I  "  H'dq'rs,  Army  op  the  Potomac,  Chancel-  son  to  suppose  that  the  enemy  is  moving  to  our 
lorsville,  Va.,  May  2d,  18G3,  9:30  a.  m.  Vir-  right.  Please  advance  your  pickets  for  purposes 
cular.  Major-Generals  Slocum  and  Howard  :  of  observation  as  far  as  may  be  safe,  in  order  to 
I  am  directed  by  the  Major-General  coinmandiiig  obtain  timely  information  of  their  approacli.  J. 
to  say  that  the  disposition  you  liave  nuide  of  yoiu-  H.  Van  Alex.  BrigadiiT-Gcncral  ami  Aidc-de- 
corps  has  been  with  a  view  to  a  front  attack  by  the  camp.'"  [Tliis  is  the  dispatdi  wliii-h  Gout'ral  How- 
enemy.  If  he  should  throw  himself  upon  your  ard  states  he  did  not  receive  at  the  time.  See  p. 
flank,  he  wishes  you  to  examine  the  groimd  and  I'JO.  In  the  "Official  Records"  the  wonl circular 
determine  upon  the  position  you  will  take  in  does  not  appear,  and  the  address  is  "  Major-Geu- 
that  event,  in  order  that  you  may  be  prepared  erals  Howard  and  Slocum.''— KniTous.] 
for  him  in  whatever  direction  he  advances.  He  ^  "  IlEADQrARTKRS.  11th  Cori-s.  May  'Jd.  10 
suggests  that  you  have  heavy  reserves  well  in  m.  to  1  1  o'k  [1 1> :  .">(>  a.  M.]  Ma.i.-(;km,.  Hookkk, 
hand  to  meet  this  contingency.  The  right  of  your  Gomd'g  Army.  General:  From  (Wn.  IVvcns's 
lino  does  not  appear  to  be  strong  enough.  No  headquarters  we  can  observe  a  column  of  infantry 
artificial  defenses  worth  naming  have  been  thrown  moving  westward  on  a  road  parallel  with  this  on  a 
up,  and  there  appears  to  be  a  scrtrcitv  of  tnx.i.s  at  riilge  about  1  '...  to  '2  mil.'s  south  of  this.  I  am 
that  point,  and  not,  in  the  general's  opinion,  as  taking  measures  to  resist  an  attack  from  the  west. 
favorably  posted  as  might  be.     We  have  good  rea-  Kespectfully,  O.  O.  Howard.  Maj.-Geu." 


220  HOOKER'S  COMMENTS  ON  CHANCELL0RS1/ILLE. 

battle  of  Chancellorsville,  as  they  came  under  my  observation,  which  memorandum  I  put  on 
paper  shortly  after  that  event.  So  I  have  to  depend  upon  my  memory  in  answering  your  ques- 
tions. According  to  my  recollection,  you  are  mistaken  in  your  impression  that  General  Howard 
put  your  dispatches  and  orders  into  his  pocket  without  communicating  them  to  his  division 
commanders.  About  noon  or  a  Httle  after  on  the  day  of  the  attack  on  the  Eleventh  Corps  I 
was  at  General  Howard's  headquarters,  a  house  on  the  Chancellorsville  road  near  the  center  of 
our  position.  General  Howard,  being  very  tired,  wanted  to  rest  a  little,  and  asked  me  as  next 
in  rank  to  open  dispatches  that  might  arrive  and  to  wake  him  in  case  they  were  of  immediate 
importance.  Shortly  after  a  courier  arrived  with  a  dispatch  from  you  calling  General  Howard's 
attention  to  the  movement  of  the  enemy  toward  our  right  flank,  and  instructing  him  to  take 
precautionary  measures  against  an  attack  from  that  quarter.  I  went  into  General  Howard  at 
once  and  read  it  to  him,  and,  if  I  remember  rightly,  while  we  were  speaking  about  it  another 
courier,  or  one  of  your  young  stafP-officers,  arrived  with  a  second  dispatch  of  virtually  the 
same  purport.  We  went  out  and  discussed  the  matter  on  the  porch  of  the  house.  I  am  not 
sure  whether  General  Steinwehr  was  present  or  not.     .     .     . . 

''  I  have  seen  it  stated  that  my  troops  were  already  gone  when  General  Devens's  division  in 
its  hurried  retreat  reached  my  position.  This  is  utterly  untrue.  Some  of  my  regiments,  which 
had  remained  in  their  old  position,  succeeded  in  wheeling  round  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy  j 
others  were  swept  away,  but  those  whose  front  I  had  changed  during  the  afternoon  in  antici- 
pation of  the  attack  held  their  ground  a  considerable  time  after  the  debris  of  General  Devens's 
division  had  swept  through  our  line.  I  saw  General  Devens,  wounded,  carried  by,  and  he  had 
long  been  ...  in  the  rear  when  we  were  overpowered  and  fell  back  upon  Colonel  BvTSch- 
beck's  position,  where  General  Howard  in  the  meantime  had  been  trying  to  rally  the  routed 
troops.  This  also  you  will  find  in  my  report.  My  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  quite  heavy  : 
if  I  remember  rightly,  about  twenty  per  cent. 

"  I  ought  to  add  that  he  [Genei'al  Howard]  thought  he  could  not  carry  out  as  well  as  he 
desired  your  instruction  to  hold  a  strong  reserve  in  hand,  for  the  reason  that  General  Barlow's 
brigade  of  Steinwehr's  division  had  been  ordered  to  the  support  of  Sickles.  All  the  precaution 
that  was  taken  against  a  flank  attack,  aside  from  what  I  did  without  orders,  was  the  construc- 
tion of  a  small  rifle-pit  across  the  Chancellorsville  road  in  the  rear  of  my  division,  near  the 
house  [Dowdall's  Tavern]  occupied  by  General  Howard  as  headquarters.  ...  Of  coui-se 
this  hasty  note  is  not  written  with  any  expectation  on  my  part  to  see  it  printed  as  part  of  an 
historical  narrative.  It  is  simply  to  give  you  the  information  you  wish  for,  and  which  it  gives 
me  pleasure  to  furnish.  Very  truly  yours,  C.  SCHURZ. 

''  Major-General  Hooker. 

"  P.  S. — Whether  General  Howard  received  on  that  day  any  dispatches  or  instructions  from 
you  subsequent  to  those  mentioned,  I  do  not  know."  "\ 

When  we  arrived  at  the  Chancellor  House  (which  is  all  there  is  of  Chancel- 
lorsville), where  General  Hooker  had  his  headquarters,  and  where  he  received 
the  hurt  that  came  near  proving  mortal.  General  Hooker  said,  "  I  was  stand- 
ing on  this  step  of  the  portico  on  the  Sunday  morning  of  the  3d  of  May,  and 

\  The  following  are  extracts  from  the  official  ground  we  tbeu  occupied,  with  cm-  front  at  right  angles 
report  of  General  Schui-z,  who  shows,  besides,  that     ^^^'^  ^^^  Plank  road,  lining  the  church  grove  and  the 


his  division  made   strenuous  efforts  to  stem  the 
assaults  of  Jackson's  men  : 


border  of  the  woods  east  of  the  open  plain  with  infantry, 
placing  strong  echelons  behind  both  wings,  and  distribut- 
ing the  art  iUery  along  the  front  on  ground  most  favorab 


"In  tlic  coui'sc  of  tlio  forenoon  I  was  informed  that  for  its  action,  especially  on  the  eminence  on  the  right 

large  columns  of  the  enemy  could  be  seen  from  General  and  left  of  DowdaU's  Tavern.    .    .    .    In  the  absence  of 

Devens's  liea(l(iuartcis.  i]io\iiii,M'riim  east  to  west.    .   .    .  orders,  but  becoming  more  and  more  convinced  that  the 

I  (>liser\((l  them  plainly  as  they  moved  on.     I  rode  back  enemy's  attack  would  come  from  the  west  and  fall  ui)OU 

to  your  [(ieucral   Howard's]  lieadciuarters,  and  on  the  our  rigid  an<l  rear,  I  took  it  upon  my  own  i-esponsibility 

way  ordered  Captain  Dil^rer  to  look  for  good  artillery  to  detach   two  regiments  from   the  second  line  of  my 

positions  on  the  field  fronting  west,  as  the  troops  would  Second  Brigade  and  to  place  them  in  a  good  position  on 

in  all   probability  have  to  execute  a  change  of  front.  the  right  and  left  of  Ely's  Ford  road,  west  of  Hawkins's 

Tlie  mattei'  wjis  largely  discussed  at  your  liea(l(|Uiirter8,  farm,  so  as  to  check  tlie  enemy  if  he  should  attack  our 

and  I  entertaine<l  and  expressed  in  our  informal  convor-  extreme  right  and  penetrate  through  the  woods  at  that 

eations  the  opiuiou  that  wc  should  form  upon  the  opeu  point.    This  was  subsequently  approved  by  you.    •    •    • 


HOOKER'S  COMMENTS  ON  CHANCELLORSyiLLE.  221 

was  giving  direction  to  the  battle,  which  was  now  raging  with  great  fury,  the 
cannon-balls  reaching  me  from  both  the  east  and  the  west,  when  a  solid  shot 
struck  the  pillar  near  me,  splitting  it  in  two,  and  throwing  one-half  longitudi- 
nally against  me,  striking  my  whole  right  side,  which  soon  turned  h\dd.  For 
a  few  moments  I  was  senseless,  and  the  report  spread  that  I  had  been  killed. 
But  I  soon  revived,  and,  to  correct  the  misapprehension,  I  insisted  on  being 
lifted  upon  my  horse,  and  rode  back  toward  the  white  house,  which  suljse- 
quently  became  the  center  of  my  new  position.  Just  before  reaching  it,  the 
pain  from  my  hurt  became  so  intense  that  I  was  likely  to  fall,  when  I  was 
assisted  to  dismount,  and  was  laid  upon  a  blanket  spread  out  upon  the  ground, 
and  was  given  some  brandy.  This  revived  me,  and  I  was  assisted  to  remount. 
Scarcely  was  I  off  the  blanket  when  a  solid  shot,  fired  by  the  enemy  at  Hazel 
Grove,  struck  in  the  very  center  of  that  blanket,  where  I  had  a  moment 
before  been  lying,  and  tore  up  the  earth  in  a  savage  way."  As  he  ended 
this  recital  Greneral  Hooker  turned  to  Major  Chancellor,  who  was  standing 
by,  and  said,  "Ah,  Major!  Your  people  were  after  me  with  a  sharp  stick  on 
that  day." 

A  short  distance  from  the  Chancellor  House,  in  the  du-ection  of  Dowdall's 
Tavern,  our  carriage  was  halted,  and,  dismounting,  Major  Chancelh^r  led  us 
a  few  paces  out  of  the  road,  along  a  faint  cart-path,  when  he  said,  "  This  is 
the  place  where  Stonewall  Jackson  received  the  wounds  that  pi'oved  mortal." 
"  I  have  always  been  struck,"  observed  General  Hooker,  "  with  the  last  words 
of  General  Jackson,  evincing  how  completely  he  was  absorbed  in  the  progi-ess 
of  the  battle.  In  his  delirium  he  was  still  upon  the  field,  and  he  cried  out, 
'  Order  A.  P.  Hill  to  prepare  for  action  —  pass  the  infantry  to  the  front 
rapidly  —  tell  Major  Hawks — 'when  he  stopped  with  the  sentence  unfinished. 
After  a  little  his  brow  relaxed,  as  if  from  relief,  and  he  said,  '  Let  us  cross 
over  the  river,  and  rest  under  the  shade  of  the  trees,' —  and  these  were  his 
last  words." 

AiTiving  at  Dowdall's  Tavern,  General  Hooker  pointed  out  the  excellent 
position  here  afforded  for  Howard's  corps  to  have  made  a  stout  defense. 
"  Buschbeck's  brigade  of  that  corps,"  said  he,  "  did  wonders  here,  and  held  the 
whole  impetuous  onset  of  the  enemy  in  check  for  an  hour  or  more,  which 
gave  me  opportunity  to  bring  my  reserves  into  position.  The  loss  of  tliis 
ground  brought  me  into  so  cramped  a  condition  that  I  was  obliged  to  take  up 
a  new  position,  which  I  successfully  accomplished.  I  now  ordered  Stnlgwick, 
who  commanded  the  Sixth  Corps,  the  largest  in  my  army,  some  22,000  men, 

With  those  exceptions,  no  change  was  inailc  in  the  posi-  Corps,  and  the  Eleventh  Corps  for  the  fiiihire  of  the 

tiou  occupied  by  the  corps.    The  losses  suffered  by  my  canipiiijrn.    Preposterous  as  this  Is,  yet  we  Imve  been 

division  in  the  action  of  May  2d  were  very  severe  in  overwhelmed  by  the  army  and  the  pn-ss  with  abus*'  and 

proportion  to  my  whole  effective  force.  I  had  15  officers  insult  beyoiid  measure.     Wc   liavi-  borne  as  niudi  a.s 

killed,  23  wounded,  and  ir>  missing,  and  102  men  killed,  human  nature  can  cnduri'.    I  am  far  from  sayiiiK'that  on 

305  wounded,  and  441  missing'.— total, '.);■.:).  •j^  .  •  •  My  May  2d  everybody  did  Ills  duty  to  tlit>  best  of  his  power, 
whole  loss  amounted  to  about  23  per  cent.    ...     In  "But  one  thinjr  I  will  say.  because  I  know  it :  tlii»«' 

closiuf,'  this  r(i)ort  T  i)cir  li-ave  to  make  on(>  a<lditional  men  ar(>  no  cowanls.    .    .    .    I  have  st-en.  with  my  own 

nMiiark.    The   Klcvciilli  Corps,  and,  by  error  or  malice,  eyes,  troops  who  now  affect    to  look  down    uinm    the 

especially  the  Thinl  Division,  has  been  held  up  to  the  Eleventh  Corps  with  sovcreijrn  contempt  l>ehave  much 

whohMOuntry  as  a  band  of  cowards.     My  division  has  worse  under  circumstances  far  less  trying'.    ..." 
been  miule  responsible  for  the  defeat  of  the  Eleventh  EoiTOKS. 

i^  Tliis  was  the  loss  r.'iuMte.l  l.v  (Ji'ii.nil  Sclmrz.  lint  a  rrcnitly  fvix.-.l  tal.l.'  »UUr  War  n.i.iirtmrnt  show  h  !»offl,-,'r«  niiil  120 
iiu-n  kiUcil,  32  otllccrs  and  4t;i  iii.n  wouikI.mI,  an.l  8  olllccrs  ami  .''.Ml  men  captund  or  lulsstiik'.     a  total  o(  H'JO.-  Kl'iroKU. 


HOOKER'S  COMMENTS  ON  CHANCELLORSyiLLE. 


^-r-^^^^^^.^^^ 
^<. 


EETREAT    OF    THE    UNION    ARMY    ACROSS    THE    RAPPAHANNOCK    AT    UNITED    STATES    FORD. 
FROM    A   WAR-TIME    SKETCH. 

which  had  been  left  to  demonstrate  in  front  of  Fredericksburg,  to  cross  the 
river  and  move  rapidly  up  to  my  left.  The  effect  of  so  heavy  a  body  of  fresh 
troops  coming  in  upon  the  enemy's  flank  I  calculated  would  be  decisive.  But 
Sedgwick  was  dilatory  in  moving,  J  which  gave  the  enemy  time  to  concen- 
trate and  stop  him  before  he  had  moved  over  half  the  distance,  and  I 
consequently  got  no  help  from  him." 

I  ventured  to  ask  why  he  did  not  attack  when  he  found  that  the  enemy  had 
weakened  his  forces  in  the  immediate  front  and  sent  them  away  to  meet  Sedg- 
wick. "  That,"  said  he,  "  would  seem  to  have  been  the  reasonable  thing  to  do. 
But  we  were  in  this  impenetrable  thicket.  All  the  roads  and  opeiiings  lead- 
ing through  it  the  enemy  immediately  fortified  strongly,  and  planted  thickly 
his  artillery  commanding  all  the  avenues,  so  that  with  reduced  numbers  he 
could  easily  hold  his  lines,  shutting  me  in,  and  it  became  utterly  impossible 
to  manoeuvre  my  forces.  My  army  was  not  beaten.  Only  a  part  of  it  had  been 
engaged.  The  First  Corps,  commanded  by  Reynolds,  whom  I  regarded  as  the 
ablest  officer  under  me,  was  fresh  and  ready  and  eager  to  be  brought  into 
action,  as  was  my  whole  army.  But  I  had  been  fully  convinced  of  the  futil- 
ity of  attacking  fortified  positions,  and  I  was  determined  not  to  sacrifice  my 
men  needlessly,  though  it  should  be  at  the  expense  of  my  reputation  as  a  fight- 
ing officer.  We  had  already  had  enough  grievous  experience  in  that  line. 
I  made  frequent  demonstrations  to  induce  the  enemy  to  attack  me,  but  he 
would  not  accept  my  challenge.  Accordingly,  when  the  eight  days'  rations 
with  which  my  army  started  out  were  exhausted,  I  retired  across  the  river. 
Before  doing  so  I  sent  orders  to  General  Sedgwick  to  hold  his  position  near 

^See  statements  in  "Sedgwick  at  Fredericksburg  and  Salem  Heights,"  p.  224.— Editors. 


HOOKER'S  COMMENTS  ON  CHANCELLOKSl^ILLE. 


22} 


Banks's  Ford,  on  the  south  side  of  the  stream,  and  I  would  bring  my  whole 
army  to  his  support ;  but  the  order  failed  to  reach  him  until  he  had  already 
recrossed  the  river.  ^  Could  I  have  had  my  army  on  the  open  grounds  at  that 
point  where  I  could  have  manoeuvred  it  properly,  I  felt  assured  that  I  could 
have  gained  a  decisive  victory.     But  this,  my  last  chance,  was  frustrated."  j 


^  The  "  Official  Records  "  (Vol.  XXV. ,  Part  II. ,  p. 
418)  show  that  Sedgwick  recrossed  the  Rappa- 
hannock in  obedience  to  an  order  from  General 
Hooker,  dated  May  5th,  1  A.  M.,  and  received  by 
Sedgwick  at  2  A.  M.  At  1 :  20  A.  M.  Hooker  sent 
the  following  order  to  Sedgwick  (Ibid.,  p.  419): 
"Yours  received,  saying  you  should  hold  position 
[as  ordered].  Order  to  withdraw  countermanded." 
This  countermand  was  received  by  Sedgwick  at 
3:20  a.  m.,  but  meanwhile  almost  his  entire  com- 
mand had  recrossed  under  the  order  of  1  a.  m. — 
Editors. 

^  The  subjoined  letter  has  been  kindly  fui-nished 
to  us  for  publication  by  Lieutenant  Worth  G.  Ross, 
son  of  the  late  Colonel  Samuel  Ross,  to  whom  it  is 
addressed.  It  is  believed  that  it  had  not  been 
printed  before  its  appearance  in  "The  Century" 
for  April,  1888.— Editors. 

"  Lookout  Valley,  Tenn.,  Fcbruarj^  28th,  1864. 
"  My  Dear  Colonel  :  For  some  reaeou  your  letter  was 
a  long  time  in  reaching  me.  When  the  Eleventh  Corps 
gave  way  on  Saturday,  Berry's  division  and  Hays's 
brigade  were  dispatched  to  seize  and  hold  the  ground 
occupied  by  the  left  of  that  corps.  Berry  double-quicked 
his  men  to  the  point,  but  was  too  late.  The  enemy  were 
already  in  possession.  When  this  was  reported  to  me  I 
directed  my  engineers  to  establish  a  new  Ime,  which 
was  pointed  out  to  them  on  the  map,  and  at  the  same 
time  stated  to  them  that  we  would  probably  have  to 
move  on  it  as  soon  as  the  enemy  opened  on  us  in  the 
morning,  as  his  batteries  would  sweep  the  plain  in 
front  of  the  Chancellorsville  House,  and,  besides,  en- 
filade the  line  held  by  the  Second  and  Twelfth  corps 
nearly  its  entire  length.  Soon  after  these  instructions 
were  given  to  the  engineers,  peremptory  orders  were 
sent  to  0(  in  ral  Sedgwick  to  advance  over  the  Plank 
roadfnmi  Frediri<'kslmrgand  attack  tlieenemy  in  front 
of  the  Second  and  Twelfth  col  i)m  at  daylight.  My  single 
object  in  iK.lding  on  to  the  jiosition  as  long  as  I  did  was 
to  hear  Sedgwick's  guns,  which  I  iiKinicntarily  expected. 


of  course.  General  Warren  had  been  sent  to  guide  him. 
The  orders  reached  him  between  lo  and  11  o'clock,  [he] 
had  but  eight  miles  to  march,  a  l)right  moonlight  night, 
with  only  a  small  force  to  oppose.  Probably  had  he 
marched  as  directed,  not  a  gun  would  have  been  flred. 
With  Lee  in  my  front  and  Jackson  on  my  flank  I  was  un- 
willing to  attempt  to  force  my  way  through  Lee,  espe- 
cially as  the  roads  through  the  forests  would  only  enable 
me  to  present  my  columns  with  narrow  fronts,  which 
the  enemy  could  cut  down  as  fast  as  they  were  exposed. 
I  knew  that  I  could  do  this,  and  I  gave  the  enemy  credit 
for  being  able  to  do  as  much  as  I  could,  but  no  more. 
Had  Sedgwick  come  upon  Lee's  rear,  the  latter  would 
have  found  himself  between  two  armies,  and  would 
doubtless  have  followed  Jackson's  flank  movement, 
which  I  desired,  as  that  would  throw  the  enemy  off  the 
short  road  to  Richmond  and  our  troops  on  it.  I  do  not 
know  that  you  ever  heard  that  I  had  one  and  a  half 
millions  of  rations  .afloat  in  the  Potomac  to  throw  up  the 
Pamunkey  Kiver  in  view  of  this  contingency. 

"  I  recrossed  the  Happahannock.  expecting  to  return 
at  or  near  Franklin's  Crossing,  where  I  had  elbow-room 
[see  p.  74],  and  at  least  an  even  chance  for  being  victo- 
rious, and  so  stated  to  the  President  at  the  time.  Ko 
general  battle  was  fought  at  Chancellorsville.  for  I  was 
unwilling  to  give  battle  with  such  great  odds  again.st 
me.    I  rejoice  that  what  was  not  gained  was  not  lost. 

"  We  lost  no  honors  at  Cliancellors\-ille.  With  all  of  our 
misfortunes  the  enemy's  loss  exceeded  our  own  by  one- 
third.  Of  this  I  have  abundant  evidence  in  the  official 
returns  of  the  enemy's  casualties,  as  they  have  from 
time  to  time  been  published.  [But  see  p.  238.]  If  I  did 
not  cross  the  river  again  it  will  appear  that  it  was  for 
reasons  over  which  I  had  no  control.  The  rains  had 
nothing  to  do  with  our  returning  from  Chancellorsville, 
for  it  had  been  determined  on  in  my  mind  long  before 
the  rain  commenced  falling.  I  do  not  like  to  be  quoted 
as  authority  on  this  subject  until  after  the  offlciiil  report 
is  published,  and  for  the  flattering  terms  in  which  you 
speak  of  me— »io^  erer.  I  hope  that  .vou  and  yours  are 
well.  My  kindest  regards  to  Mrs.  Ross  and  my  beet 
wishes  for  yourself.  Your  friend, 

'•  Joseph  Hookek, 

"  Coloxel  Sami'el  Ross, 

Commanding  Brigade.  Twelfth  Corps." 


rORAQINQ    IN     THE    WILDERNESa. 


I      V 


FEELING    THE    ENEMY.        FROM    *    WAR-TIME    SKETCH. 


SEDGWICK  AT  FREDERICKSBURG  AND  SALEM  HEIGHTS. 

BY   HUNTmGTON    W.   JACKSON,   BREVET    LIEUTENANT-COLONEL,  U.   S.  V. 


FEOM  our  encampment  on  the  Stafford  Heights,  the  bright  camp-fires  of 
the  enemy  and  the  scenes  of  the  terrible  encounters  under  Burnside  were 
daily  presented  to  our  sight  from  December,  1862,  until  the  following  April. 
During  this  period,  with  the  exception  of  a  futile  movement  on  the  right 
known  as  the  "  Mud  March,'  the  army  remained  quiet.  The  pickets  stationed 
on  either  bank  of  the  Rappahannock  were  within  hailing  distance  of  each 
other,  and  dress  and  faces  could  be  easily  distinguished.  By  the  comity  that 
prevailed,  there  was  no  firing  from  either  side.  One  could  ride  or  walk  down 
to  the  banks  of  the  river  with  perfect  security.  Sometimes  "Johnny  Eeb,"  as 
he  was  called,  would  rig  up  a  little  raft,  and,  loading  it  with  tobacco,  start  it 
with  sails  and  rudder  set  for  the  other  shore.  When  the  precious  freight  was 
unloaded,  the  craft,  generously  burdened  with  coffee  and  salt,  would  be  headed 
by  "  Yank "  in  an  opposite  direction,  where  it  would  be  received  with  loud 
expressions  of  thanks.  In  this  and  other  ways  the  asperities  of  the  war  were 
mollified.  As  time  rolled  on  and  the  weather  improved,  arrangements  were 
made  for  an  advance.  The  men  were  well  clothed,  rested,  and  eager  to  move 
again  to  test  the  fortunes  of  war. 

Of  the  several  plans  of  attack.  Hooker  determined  to  march  around  the 
enemy's  left  flank  to  Chancellorsville,  leaving  a  portion  of  the  army  at  Fred- 
ericksburg to  conceal  the  real  movement.  The  army  struck  camp  on  the 
27th  of  April,  and  on  the  30th  Hooker  established  his  headquarters  at  Chan- 
cellorsville. The  same  evening,  in  general  orders,  he  said,  "It  is  with 
heartfelt  satisfaction  the  commanding  general  announces  to  the  army  that 
the  operations  of  the  last  three  days  have  determined  that  our  enemy  must 
either  ingloriously  fly,  or  come  out  from  behind  his  defenses  and  give  us 
battle  on  our  own  ground,  where  certain  destruction  awaits  him."    Hooker 


SEDGWICK  AT  FREDERICKSBURG  AND  SALEM  HEIGHTS.  22^ 

forgot  the  injimction  of  Ahab  to  Benhadad :  "Tell  him,"  he  said,  "Let  not 
him  that  girdeth  on  his  harness  boast  himself  as  he  that  putteth  it  off." 

While  the  right  wing  was  concentrating  at  Chancellorsville,  the  corps  of 
Sedgwick  and  Eeynolds,  after  considerable  opposition,  crossed  the  Rappahan- 
nock on  pontoon-bridges  below  Fredericksburg,  and  by  the  evening  of  the 
30th  were  deployed  on  the  wide  i^lain  where  Franklin's  Left  Grand  Di\'ision 
had  fought  in  the  previous  battle.  Sickles's  corps  was  in  supporting  distance. 
The  position  of  Lee's  army  remained  unchanged  until  the  29th,  when  Lee 
was  informed  that  large  bodies  of  Federals  were  moving  toward  Chancellors- 
ville. It  was  the  first  information  he  had  received  of  Hooker's  movement  on 
his  left,  and  it  is  said  he  was  incensed  at  the  delay  of  the  communication. 
[See  p.  233.]  At  midnight  Anderson's  division  of  Lee's  army  hurriedlj^  moved 
from  Fredericksburg  and  intrenched  about  foui*  or  five  miles  from  Hooker's 
headquarters. 

In  an  address  of  Fitzhugh  Lee  delivered  to  the  Association  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  he  stated :  "  General  Robert  E.  Lee  said  that  Jackson  had 
first  preferred  to  attack  Sedgwick's  corps  in  the  plain  at  Fredericksburg ;  Lee 
told  him  he  felt  it  was  as  impracticable  as  at  the  first  battle  of  Fredericksbm-g ; 
it  was  hard  to  get  at  the  enemy  and  harder  to  get  away,  on  account  of  the 
artillery  on  the  north  bank,  if  we  drove  them  into  the  river ;  but,  said  he  to 
Jackson,  '  If  you  think  it  can  be  done,  I  will  give  you  orders  for  it.'  Jackson 
then  asked  to  be  allowed  to  examine  the  grounds,  and  did  so  during  the  after- 
noon, and  at  night  came  to  Lee  and  said  he  thought  he  (Lee)  was  right ;  it 
would  be  inexpedient  to  attack  them.  'Move  then,'  said  Lee,  'at  dawn 
to-morrow,  up  to  Anderson.' " 

Sickles's  and  Reynolds's  corps  ha\dng  subsequently  been  ordered  to  Chan- 
cellorsville by  Hooker,  Sedgwick  was  left  alone  below  Fredericksburg  with 
about  24,000  men,  the  Sixth  Corps  being  by  several  thousand  the  largest  in 
the  army. 

During  the  evening  of  the  2d  of  May  Hooker  sent  word  to  Sedgwick  "  to 
take  up  his  line  on  the  Chancellorsville  road  and  attack  and  destroy  any 
forces  he  might  meet."  He  also  added  that  "he  (Sedgwick)  would  i)robably 
fall  upon  the  rear  of  Lee's  forces,  and  between  them  they  would  use  Lee  ujt." 
If  Hooker  thought  an  insignificant  force  was  in  Sedgwick's  front,  the  engage- 
ment soon  to  take  place  showed  how  mistaken  he  was.  Sedgwick  received 
the  order  about  11  o'clock  at  night.  He  at  once  advanced  his  command  to 
the  Bowling  Green  road  and  then  marched  ])y  the  right  Hank  toward  Freder- 
icksburg. Newton's  division  was  in  the  advance.  The  night  was  dark  and 
the  road  made  darker  by  the  foliage  of  the  trees  on  either  side.  The  progress 
was  n(»cessarily  slow.  Frequent  short  halts  were  made  while  the  skirmishers 
were  feeling  their  way.  Once,  when  the  halt  was  jirolongt^l  and  nothing 
broke  the  deep  silence  of  the  night  except  an  occasional  shot  followed  by  the 
never-to-be-forgotten  pinfi  of  the  minie-ball.  General  Newton,  who  was  rid- 
ing with  the  third  or  fourth  regiment  from  the  advance,  called  out :  "  Ts  any 
one  of  my  staff  here?"  Those  present  promi)tly  responded,  ;ni<l  1  was 
directed  to  "ride  ahead  and  tell  Colonel  Slialei-  to  brush  away  tho  enemy's 


\k\^r-^/^    m"-  \: 


m?)  ■■•'i*%fl-"_-^^  !  I 


SEDGWICK  AT  FREDERICKSBURG  AND  SALEM  HEIGHTS.  22-, 

pickets."  The  road  was  filled  with  soldiers,  some  lying  down,  others  resting 
on  their  guns,  but  a  passage  was  quickly  cleared.  At  Hazel  Run  Colonel 
Shaler  and  Colonel  Hamblin  were  found  standing  together.  Here  the  enemy 
made  a  determined  resistance.  Their  pickets  were  but  a  few  yards  distant. 
On  the  other  side  of  the  creek  the  road  made  a  sharp  ascent  and  curved  to 
the  right.  In  a  subdued  tone  Colonel  Shaler  said :  "  Colonel  Hamblin,  you 
have  heard  the  order  from  Greneral  Newton  ? "  At  once  Colonel  Hamblin  left. 
In  a  moment  there  was  the  noise  of  hurrying  feet,  the  troops  quickly  disap- 
peared in  the  dark ;  a  shout,  a  bright,  sudden  flash,  a  roll  of  musketry  fol- 
lowed, and  the  road  was  open. 

It  was  the  gi-ay  of  morning  when  the  advance  reached  the  rear  and  left  of 
Fredericksburg.  A  negro  who  came  into  the  lines  reported  the  heights  occu- 
pied and  that  the  enemy  were  cutting  the  canal  to  flood  the  roads.  To  ascer- 
tain whether  this  was  true,  another  delay  was  caused.  No  one  in  the  command 
was  acquainted  with  the  topography  of  the  country,  and  the  advance  was 
compelled  to  move  with  great  caution  through  the  streets  and  in  the  outskirts 
of  the  town.  As  the  morning  dawned,  Marye's  Heights,  the  scene  of  the 
fierce  attacks  under  Burnside  in  the  previous  December,  were  presented  to 
our  view.  Several  regiments  were  speedily  moved  along  the  open  ground  in 
the  rear  of  the  town  toward  the  heights,  and  this  movement  discovered  the 
enemy  in  force  behind  the  famous  stone  wall  at  the  base  of  the  hill.  Lee  had 
left  Early  with  his  division  and  Barksdale's  brigade,  a  force  of  about  ten 
thousand  men,  to  hold  Fredericksburg  Heights.  They  were  protected  by 
strong  works  and  supported  by  well-served  artillery.  It  was  at  once  felt 
that  a  desperate  encounter  was  to  follow,  and  the  recollections  of  the  pre- 
vious disaster  were  by  no  means  inspiriting. 

It  was  Sunday  morning,  the  3d  of  May,  and  the  weather  was  beautiful. 
The  town  was  perfectly  quiet,  many  of  the  inhabitants  had  fled,  not  a  person 
was  to  be  seen  on  the  streets,  and  the  windows  and  blinds  of  the  houses  were 
closed.  The  marks  of  the  fierce  cannonade  to  which  the  place  had  in*e\iously 
been  exposed  were  everywhere  visible. 

As  soon  as  practicable  and  as  secretly  as  possible,  Sedgwick  prepared  to 
attack  the  heights.  Gibbon,  of  the  Second  Corps,  who  had  been  left  on  the 
north  bank,  crossed  shortly  after  Sedgwick  had  captured  the  town  and  moved 
to  the  right,  but  his  advance  was  stopped  by  the  canal  in  front,  ovtu-  which 
it  was  impossible  to  lay  bridges  in  face  of  the  fire  from  the  artillery  and 
infantry  on  the  hill.  Sedgwick  says,  "  Nothing  remained  but  to  carry  the 
works  by  direct  assault."  The  attack  on  Marye's  Heights  was  made  under 
direction  of  Newton.  Two  columns,  each  marching  l)y  fours,  were  formed  on 
the  Plank  and  Telegraph  roads,  and  were  supported  by  a  line  of  infantry  from 
the  Light  Brigade  on  tlie  left,  commanded  by  Colonel  Burnham.  The  I'ight 
column,  under  Colonel  (leorgo  C.  Spear,  was  composed  of  the  (ilst  Pennsyl- 
vania and  the  43d  New  York.  These  two  regiments  belonged  to  the  Light 
Brigade.  This  column  was  supi)orted  by  tlu*  (ITth  New  York  and  SiM  Penn- 
sylvania, under  Colonel  Alexander  Sluiler.  Tlie  left  column  consisted  of  the 
7th  Massachusetts  and  the  36th  New  York,  under  (\)loii»'l  Tlionias  I).  Johns. 


228         SEDGPVICK  AT  FREDERICKSBURG  AND  SALEM  HEIGHTS. 


The  line  of  battle,  commanded  by  Colonel  Hiram  Burnham,  was  composed  of 
the  5th  Wisconsin  (acting  as  skirmishers),  the  6th  Maine,  31st  New  York 
(these  three  regiments  also  belonging  to  the  Light  Brigade),  and  the  23d 
Pennsylvania.  Howe's  division  was  posted  south  of  Hazel  Run,  and  cooper- 
ated handsomely,  capturing  five  guns,  j 

The  order  to  advance  was  given  at  11  o'clock.     Sedgwick  and  Newton  with 
the  deepest  interest  watched  the  attack  from  the  garden  of  a  brick  resi- 
dence situated  on  the  outskirts  of  the  town  and  to  the  left  _ 
of  the  Telegi-aph  road,  which  commanded  a  full  view  of 
the  assault.     The  movements  of  the  enemy  showed 
that  they  were  actively  preparing  to  receive  the  at- 
tack, but  th.^  men  behind  the  stone  wall  were  con- 
cealed from  view.     As  the  left  column  emerged 
from  the  town  and  was  passing  near  Sedgwick 


i^^yiy^^^ 


C  VI  TURK  OF   A  GJ  N   OF  THL   W  ASH- 

ISGION  AKTII  I  LR\,  ON  MARIE'S 

UtlGUTS. 


/«^ 


^ 


-  '  and  N(^wton,  the  enemy's  battery  opened, 
' .! ^  /  and  a  portion  of  a  bursting  shell  struck  and 
J'  f-^  killed  Major  Elihu  J.  Faxon,  of  the  36th  New 
'  York,  while  mounted  and  riding  with  his  com- 
mand, and  wounded  several  others.  There  was  an 
exclamation  of  horror  and  a  momentary  scattering  of 
the  rear  of  the  column,  but  the  men  quickly  closed  up  and  pressed  on. 
Colonel  Spear,  commanding  the  right  column,  was  killed  at  about  the 
same  time.  Both  columns  and  line,  in  light  marching  order,  advanced  at 
double-quick  without  firing  a  shot.  The  enemy  kept  up  an  incessant  artil- 
lery fii'e,  and  the  noise  was  deafening.  Their  musketry  fire  was  reserved 
until  our  men  were  within  easy  range.  Then  a  murderous  storm  of  shot 
from  the  stone  wall,  and  grape  and  canister  from  the  hill,  burst  upon  the 
columns  and  line.  For  a  moment  the  head  of  the  left  column  was  checked 
and  broken.  The  column  on  the  right  was  also  broken.  Colonel  Burn- 
ham's  line  of  blue  on  the  gi*een  field  paused  as  if  to  recover  breath,  and 

\  Brooks's  division  was  posted  along  Deep  Run  Rim  to  guard  against  an  attack  on  the  flank  of  the 
as  far  as  Bernard's  house.  Bartlett's  brigade  of  storming  column,  and  was  sharply  engaged  during 
this  di\ision  held  the  railroad  crossing  at  Deep     the  forenoon. — Editors. 


SEDGWICK  AT  FREDERICKSBURG  AND  SALEM  HEIGHTS.  22() 

slightly  wavered.  Sedgwick  and  Newton  looked  on  with  unconcealed  anx- 
iety, and  turned  to  each  other,  but  remained  silent.  The  suspense  was 
intense.  Was  it  to  be  a  victory  or  a  defeat  f  Was  the  place  a  second  time 
to  be  a  "  slaughter-pen ! "  Was  the  Sixth  Corps  to  be  driven  into  the  river  ? 
Staff-officers,  waving  their  swords  and  hurrahing  to  the  men,  dashed  down 
the  Telegi'aph  road.  A  blinding  rain  of  shot  pierced  the  air.  It  was  more 
than  human  nature  could  face.  The  head  of  the  column  as  it  reached  the 
lowest  part  of  the  decline  near  a  fork  in  the  road  seemed  to  melt  away. 
Many  fell ;  others  bending  low  to  the  earth  hurriedly  sought  shelter  from  the 
undulations  of  ground  and  the  fences  and  the  two  or  three  wooden  structures 
along  the  road.  Out  of  400  comprising  the  7th  Massachusetts,  150  were  killed 
and  wounded.  Colonel  Johns,  commanding,  was  severely  wounded.  Then,  as 
if  moved  by  a  sudden  impulse  and  nerved  for  a  supreme  effort,  both  columns 
and  the  line  in  the  field  simultaneously  sprang  forward.  The  stone  wall  was 
gained  and  the  men  were  quickly  over  it.^  Just  as  my  horse  was  jumj^ing 
through  a  break  in  the  wall  one  of  the  enemy,  standing  slightly  to  the  left 
and  about  a  horse's  length  from  me,  raised  his  gun  and  fired.  The  excitement 
of  the  hour  must  have  unnerved  his  hand,  for  the  ball  zipped  harmlessly  by  to 
my  right.  In  a  second  a  bayonet  was  thrust  into  his  breast  by  one  of  our  men 
on  my  left.  Along  the  wall  a  hand-to-hand  fight  took  place,  and  the  l)ayonet 
and  the  butt  of  the  musket  were  freely  used.  The  brilliant  and  successful 
charge  occupied  perhaps  ten  or  fifteen  minutes,  and  immediately  after  the  wall 
was  carried  the  enemy  became  panic-stricken.  In  the  flight  they  threw  away 
guns,  knapsacks,  pistols,  swords,  and  everything  that  might  retard  their 
speed.  One  thousand  prisoners  were  taken,  besides  several  battle-flags  and 
pieces  of  artillery.  The  commander  of  a  Louisiana  battery  handed  his  saber 
to  Colonel  Thomas  S.  Allen,  of  the  5th  Wisconsin.  This  regiment  out  of  500 
men  lost  123,  and  the  6th  Maine  out  of  about  the  same  numl)er  lost  107  in 
killed  and  wounded.  Over  600  were  killed  and  wounded  in  the  direct  assault 
upon  the  heights,  and  the  loss  to  the  corps  on  the  entire  front  was  about  1000. 
General  G.  K.  Warren,  who  had  arrived  that  morning  with  instructions 
from  headquarters,  said  in  his  telegram  to  Hooker :  "  The  heights  were  car- 
ried splendidly  at  11  A.  m.  by  Newton."  Upon  reaching  the  summit  of  the 
sharp  hill,  after  passing  through  the  extensive  and  well-wooded  grounds  of 

%  A  private  of  Company  F,  7th  Massachusetts,  our  side  in  front  of  the  sunken  road  was  a  pood  stone 

writes  to  the  editors:  vrnW.  even  with  the  level  of  the  field.     In  this  sunken 

road  were  two  Confederate  lines  of  battle,  the  front  lino 

"The  assault  took  place  Sunday,  May  3d,  at  about  11  flriuf?  <>n  our  ehargiuf?  lines  on  the  left  of  the  road  and 
o'cloek  A.  M.,  tlic  7th  Massachusetts  leading  the  loft  col-  the  rear  line  sittinjj  on  their  heels,  with  their  backs 
unm,  the  3(itli  New  York  Volunteers  in  support.  Both  afjainst  the  terrace  wall  at  the  base  of  the  hill  and  rear 
marched  by  the  flank.  Our  conipauy  (F),  leadiuK  the  of  the  road.  About  opposite  the  rijrht  of  our  refrinient 
7th,  consefpiently  caught  the  wholes  body  of  the  first  wns  a  depression  on  llie  hill  made  some  lime.  I  should 
fire  of  the  'Johniues,'  which  they  witlilu>ld  until  we  think,  by  water  from  the  land  aliove,  but  ntiw  grassed 
were  certainly  witliiu  twenty-five  yards.  As  some  of  over;  at  the  head  of  this  depression  was  a  battery 
the  olficcrs  sang  out  '  Retreat,  Retreat.'  tlie  men  began  placed,  I  suppose,  to  rake  the  ravine  or  depressum. 
to  yell  '  Forward  !  don't  go  l)a(k  !  we  sha'n't  get  so  close  Some  one  looked  through  the  board  fence,  and  saw  the 
up  again."  Lleutenaut-Coloncl  Franklin  1*.  Harlow  was  enemy's  fiank.  In  a  moment  the  men  rushed  to  the 
the  man  above  all  otliers  who  held  tlie  men  up  to  tlieir  fence',  and  we  went  tlirouirli  i)ell-mell  riglit  upon  tho 
work,  and  I  have  never  yet  seen  his  name  even  worthily  flankof  tlie  Confederates,  at  the  sanu>  time  giving  them 
mentioned.  .Tust  before  and  in  front  of  the  wall  facing  tin-  contents  of  the  nniskcts  point-blank  without  aim- 
down  tlie  street  is  a  house  standing  in  a  small  jdat,  V-  ing.  The  whole  thing  was  a  surprise;  they  were  not 
shaped,  and  inclosed  by  a  high  board  fence.  This  wall  jirepared  for  anything  from  this  iiuartcr.  as  we  were 
in  our  front  along  the  base  of  the  hill  was  a  rongli  stone  hidden  from  theui,  and  they  from  us,  by  the  house  aud 
wall  forming  the  rear  bank  of  the  suuken  road,  while  on  fence."  EDITORS. 


230 


SEDGIVICK  AT  FREDERICKSBURG  AND  SALEM  HEIGHTS. 


^^.t: 


the  Marye  House,  an  exciting  scene  met  the  eye.  A  single  glance  exhibited 
to  view  the  broad  plateau  alive  with  fleeing  soldiers,  riderless  horses,  and 
artillery  and  wagon  trains  on  a  gallop.  The  writer  hurried  back  to  Sedg- 
wick, who  was  giving  directions  for  Brooks  and  Howe  to  come  up,  and  sug- 
gested that  it  was  a  rare  opportunity  for  the  use  of  cavalry.  With  evident 
regret  Sedgwick  replied  that  he  did  not  have  a  cavalryman.    The  carrying  of 

the  heights  had  completely  divided  the  enemy's 
forces,  throwing  either  flank  with  much  confu- 
sion on  opposite  roads,  and  it  seemed  as  though 
a  regiment  of  cavalry  might  not  only  have  cap- 
tured  many  prisoners, 
guns,  ammunition,  and 
wagons,  but  also  have 
cleared  the  way  for  the 
corps  almost  as  far  as 
the  immediate  rear  of 
Lee's  army  at  Chancel- 
lorsville. 

Newton's  division,  ex- 
hausted by  the  night 
march,  the  weight  of 
several  days'  rations 
and  sixty  rounds  of  am- 
munition, and  by  the 
heat,  fatigue,  and  ex- 
citement of  battle,  were 
allowed  to  halt  for  a 
short  time.  Many  were  soon  asleep,  while  others  made  coffee  and  partook  of 
their  first  meal  that  day. 

Brooks's  division  soon  came  up  from  below  Hazel  Run,  and  took  the 
advance.  Newton  and  Howe  followed.  The  enemy  in  the  meantime  had 
united  their  forces,  and  delayed  the  rapid  advance  by  frequent  stands, 
retiring  successively  from  hill  to  hill,  and  opening  with  artillery.  Eavines 
running  at  right  angles  to  the  main  road  and  the  rolling  character  of  the 
country  were  favorable  for  impeding  the  pursuit,  which  was  continued  for 
three  or  four  miles  until  we  reached  Salem  Church,  an  unpretentious  red-brick 
structure  situated  on  a  ridge  covered  with  dense  woods  and  undergrowth. 
To-day  it  bears  many  scars  of  the  contest  waged  around  it. 

At  this  point  the  enemy  were  in  position  with  four  fresh  brigades  with- 
drawn from  Hooker's  front,  and  prepared  to  contest  any  fai-ther  advance. 
Lee  had  met  with  such  complete  success  in  his  attack  upon  Hooker  that  he 
felt  he  could  well  spare  these  troops  and  not  suffer.  Brooks  on  the  left  of  the 
road  and  Newton  on  the  right  quickly  formed  their  commands  and  made  sev- 
eral gallant  assaults.  The  fight  was  very  severe  in  the  thick  woods,  and  for  a 
time  was  waged  with  varying  success.  The  crest  of  the  woods  and  a  little 
school-house  near  the  church  were  gained,  and  once  it  was  thought  they  could 


SALEM   CHURCH.      FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH  TAKEN    IN   1884. 


The  view  is  from  the  Plank  road.  On  the  left  is  what  remains  of  the  Con- 
federate trenches.  The  bricks  on  the  four  sides  of  the  chtirch  are  spotted 
with  bullet-marks,  and  especially  on  the  line  of  the  upper  windows  toward 
the  road,  showing  that  many  Union  soldiers  aimed  high.  This  church  was  a 
refuge  for  many  Fredericksburg  families  during  Burnside's  battle.— Editors. 


SEDGIVICK  AT  FREDERICKSBURG  AND  SALEM  HEIGHTS.  231 

be  held,  but  the  enemy,  in  superior  numbers,  j^ressed  on,  and  the  ground  and 
the  chm-ch  were  left  in  their  possession.  The  contest  did  not  last  long,  but 
nearly  1500  were  killed  and  wounded.  Bartlett's  brigade,  numbering  less  than 
1500,  lost  580  officers  and  men.     That  night  the  soldiers  slept  on  their  arms. 

It  was  understood  throughout  the  Sixth  Corps  that  as  soon  as  it  should 
become  engaged  with  the  enemy  Hooker  would  immediately  attack  in  his 
front,  and  prevent  any  reenforcements  from  being  sent  against  Sedgwick. 
All  during  that  Sal^bath  day  and  the  next  the  sound  of  Hooker's  guns  were 
eagerly  listened  for.  No  sound  would  have  been  more  welcome.  But  after 
10  o'clock  Sunday  morning  axes  and  spades  were  used  at  ChanceUorsville 
more  than  the  guns.  The  feeling  became  widely  prevalent  that  the  Sixth 
Corps  would  be  compelled  to  take  care  of  itself.  At  first  it  was  cautiously 
whispered  that  Hooker  had  failed,  and  soon  the  worst  was  surmised,  and  it 
was  concluded  that  no  help  could  be  expected  from  him.  His  dash,  prompt- 
ness, and  confidence  as  a  division  and  corps  commander  were  gone. 

Lee  that  night  withdrew  his  troops,  flushed  with  their  brilhant  success, 
from  the  front  of  Hooker,  with  the  exception  of  Jackson's  corps,  and  marched 
against  Sedgwick.  Still  Hooker  remained  inactive ;  with  a  force  greatly  in 
excess  of  the  enemy  in  his  front,  he  made  no  effort  to  relieve  Sedgwick  from 
his  perilous  position.  Works  were  thrown  up  by  the  enemy  along  the  Salem 
Church  ridge,  and  they  extended  their  right  until  on  Monday  morning  Marye's 
Heights  and  Fredericksburg,  won  at  so  gi'eat  a  sacrifice,  were  again  theirs. 

Sedgwick's  position,  as  finally  established,  was  in  the  shape  of  a  horseshoe, 
both  flanks  resting  on  the  river,  the  line  covering  Banks's  Ford.  His  line  of 
battle  was  between  five  and  six  miles  in  length.  Frequent  attempts  had  been 
made,  during  Sunday  morning,  to  communicate  with  Banks's  Ford  and  to 
direct  the  laying  of  pontoon-bridges,  but  for  some  time  roving  bodies  of  cav- 
alry frustrated  this.  The  late  Colonel  Henry  W.  Farrar,  then  on  the  staft'  of 
Sedgwick,  while  carrying  a  message  for  this  purpose,  was  captured  and  taken 
to  Richmond.  The  4th  of  May  dragged  wearily,  skirmishing  continued  all  day, 
the  weather  was  hot,  Sedgwick's  position  was  most  critical,  and  the  keenest 
anxiety  was  felt.  Lee  was  in  our  front  with  a  force  nnicli  larger  than  Sedg- 
wick's then  available  command  of  about  eighteen  thousand  men,  and  an 
attack  was  momentarily  expected,  but  fortunately  Lee  consumed  the  whole 
day  in  establishing  his  lines.  The  greatest  vigilance  and  activity  were  exer- 
cised by  our  men  in  throwing  up  rifle-pits.  Hooktn-  sent  word  to  Sedgwick 
to  look  well  to  the  safety  of  his  corps,  and  either  to  fall  back  upon  Freder- 
icksburg or  recross  at  Banks's  Ford ;  he  also  added  that  he  could  do  nothing 
to  relieve  him,|     Sedgwick  accordingly  intrusted  Newton  with  tlie  arrange- 

4  These    inoiructions    to    Sedgwic-k    were    sent  and  loiniminiintcd  with  him.     Hy  this  louto  ami  the 

throuKh    General   G.   K.  Warren,   Hooker's   chief  United  stat.s  .Min.'  Ford  I  r.-tunu-d  to  lua.hiuart.rs. 

„  .  1111  I  4.      o    1       •   1    *  nfarChaniillorHvillo,  whichlrtaihrdat  11  r  M.  Hound. 

of   engineers,  who  luid  been  sent  to  Sedgwick  to  ^^^  „,^  ,.,.^,„^  ,,j  j,,,.  „^,jjj,,  „,  „„„  ,,„;,„  „„„  ....^  ,i„^.  i„„i 

render  what  assistance  he  might,  and  who  had  f.,ii,.n  hack  from  the  Chanc-lloisvill.- hoiiso about  n  ndh'. 
returned  to  Hooker  on  Sunday  evening.  Warren  After  rt'iM)rliujc  to  the  ^reufral.  and  pettinK  his  ideas,  I 
says:  telegraphed  the  followins  to  Geuernl  Sedgwick  at  inid- 

"  As  soon  as  General  Pedgwlck's  advaiici-  liad  laiiscd     "  *^  ^  • 
the  retreat  of  the  troops  at  Banks's  Ford  |:ilioul  1  i-.  m..  ••  •  i  \\\u\  cvcrytlilnn  snni;  hcri*.    Wo  roiitract«'d  tlio  lino  a 

May  3d],  Oeueral  Beuhani  had  tlirown  a  l)ri<lf;c  acrosa      litth',  ami  npidsod  the  last  Hssault  with  oaso.      (Joiieral 


2J2         SEDGIVICK  AT  FREDERICKSBURG  AND  SALEM  HEIGHTS. 


wt 


THE   ATTACK    ON    SEDGWICK    AT    BANKS'S    FORD,    MONDAY   EVENING,    MAT    4,    AS    SEEN    FROM 
THE    SAND-BAG    BATTERY    NEAR    FALMOUTH.       FROM    A   WAR-TIME    SKETCH. 


ments  for  the  withdrawal.  Newton  quickly  made  himself  acquainted  with 
the  roads  leading  to  Banks's  Ford  and  succeeded  in  establishing  communica- 
tion with  General  Henry  W.  Benham,  who  was  in  charge  of  the  pontoons  at 
that  place. 

At  6  o'clock  in  the  evening  the  enemy  attacked  Brooks  and  Howe  on  the 
center  and  left,  with  the  design  of  cutting  off  the  corps  from  Banks's  Ford. 
Howe  not  only  maintained  his  position  until  night-fall,  but  also  made  several 
counter-charges,  capturing  several  hundred  prisoners.  Brooks  also  held  on 
until  dark,  but  in  retiring  was  closely  pursued  by  the  enemy.  The  whole  corps 
then  successfully  fell  back  to  Banks's  Ford,  and  the  long  and  painful  suspense 
of  the  day  was  over.  The  picket  line  in  front  and  on  the  left  of  Salem  ridge 
was  withdrawn  by  General  David  A.  Russell  in  person.  I  had  been  directed 
to  assist  him.  That  sterling  soldier  dismounted,  moved  along  the  line  saying, 
"Quietly,  men,  quietly;  don't  make  any  noise  " ;  but  the  jingle  of  the  canteens 
and  other  unavoidable  sounds  on  the  evening  air  revealed  the  movement  to 
the  vigilant  enemy,  and  they  followed  closely,  yelling  and  firing  until  the 
double-quick  step  brought  us  to  our  main  column  on  the  march,  about  a  mile 
distant.  Several  of  the  enemy's  scouts  penetrated  almost  to  the  ford  and 
threw  up  rockets  to  mark  our  position.  The  enemy's  artillery  responded  to 
the  signal,  shelling  both  troops  and  bridges,  but  with  little  injury.  During 
the  night  we  recrossed  the  river  and  took  position  to  meet  the  enemy  should 
they,  as  expected  at  the  time,  cross  to  the  north  side  to  renew  their  attack, 
or  attempt  to  destroy  our  depots  for  supplies  near  Fredericksburg.  We 
captured  5  battle-flags  and  15  pieces  of  artillery,  9  of  which  were  brought  off. 
Fourteen  hundred  prisoners  were  taken,  including  many  officers  of  rank. 


Hooker  wiHhes  tlieni  to  attack  liim  to-morrow,  if  tlipy  will. 
Ho  does  not  desire  you  to  attack  again  in  force  unless  he 
attacks  liiin  at  the  same  time.  He  says  3'ou  are  too  far  away 
from  him  to  direct.  Look  well  to  the  safety  of  your  corps, 
and  keep  up  communication  with  General  Benham  at  Banks's 
Ford  and  Fredericksburg.  You  can  go  to  either  place,  if  you 
tliink  best.  To  cross  at  Banks's  Ford  would  Imng  you  in 
supporting  distance  of  the  main  body,  and  would  bo  better 
than  falling  back  to  Fredericksburg.' 


"  This  dispatcli  was  written  at  a  time  when  I  was  ex- 
ceedingly exhausted.  It  did  not  reach  General  Sedg- 
wick till  late  in  the  forenoon  of  the  4th,  so  I  have  been 
told,  and  was  the  only  instruction  lie  received.  The 
enemy  attacked  him  in  strong  force  the  next  day,  and, 
having  resisted  them  till  the  evening,  he  withdrew 
across  the  river  at  Baulis's  Ford." 

Editors. 


LEE'S    KNOWLEDGE   OF   HOOKER'S   MOVEMENTS. 


BY   R,    E.    COLSTON,    MAJOR-GENERAL,    C.  S.  A. 


THE  assertion  that  Hooker's  move  upon  Clian- 
cellorsville  was  a  surprise  to  General  Lee  is 
a  great  mistake.  Every  day  Lee  had  information 
of  Hooker's  movements.  The  following  letter, 
sent  by  Lee  to  Jackson,  and  by  the  latter  to  me, 
has  never  been  out  of  my  possession  since.  It 
shows  the  x-emarkable  intuition  that  enabled 
General  Lee  on  so  many  occasions  to  foresee  and 
pfenetrate  the  intentions  of  his  antagonist.  In  this 
ease  a  demonstration  had  been  made  on  our  ex- 
treme right  at  Poi-t  Royal,  and  without  waiting 
for  orders  I  had  gone  with  a  brigade  and  battery  to 
meet  it.  I  reported  the  facts  to  General  Jackson, 
and  it  is  my  letter  to  him  to  which  Lee  refers : 

"  Headquarters,  A.  N.  Va.,  April  23,  1863.  Lieut.- 
Gen'l  T.  .T.  Jackson,  Com'g  Corps.  Gen'l:  1  have 
received  General  Colston's  letter  of  8}^  o'clock  to-day 
wlilcli  you  forwarded  to  rae.  I  think  from  the  account 
given  me  by  L't-Col.  Smith  of  the  Engineers,  who  was 
at  Port  Royal  yesterday,  of  the  enemy's  operations 
there,  the  day  and  night  previous,  that  his  present  pur- 
pose is  to  draw  our  troops  in  that  direction  while  he 
attempts  a  passage  elsewhere.  I  would  not,  then,  send 
down  more  troops  than  are  actually  necessary.  I  will 
notify  Gen'ls  McLaws  and  Anderson  to  he  on  the  alert, 
for  I  think  that  if  a  real  attempt  is  made  to  cross  the 
river  it  will  be  above  Fredericksbm-g.  Very  respect- 
fully, R.  E.  Lee,  Gen'l." 

The  letter  was  indorsed  by  Jackson,  "Respect- 
fully referred  to  General  Colston  for  his  guidance." 
It  was  also  marked  "confidential,"  and  both  the 
front  and  the  back  of  the  envelope  were  marked 
*'  private,"  so  that  not  even  my  adjutant-general 
should  open  it  in  case  of  my  absence. 

The  Federal  writers  have  wondered  why  Jack- 
son's corps  did  not  complete  its  work  on  the  even- 
ing of  May  2d.  They  do  not  realize  the  condition 
of  our  troops  after  their  successful  charge  on 
Howard.  We  had  forced  our  way  through  brush 
so  dense  that  the  troops  were  nearly  stripped  of 
their  uniforms.  Brigades,  regiments,  and  com- 
panies had  become  so  mixed  that  they  could  not 
be  handled  ;  besides  which  the  darkness  of  even- 
ing was  so  intensified  by  the  shade  of  the  dense 
woods  that  nothing  could  be  seen  a  few  yards  off. 
The  halt  at  that  time  was  not  a  mistake,  but  a 
necessity.  So  far  from  intending  to  stop,  Jackson, 
when  he  was  wounded,  was  hurrying  A.  P.  Hill's 
division  to  the  front  to  take  the  place  of  Rodes's 


and  mine  and  to  continue  the  attack ;  A.  P.  Hill  was 
also  wounded  soon  afterward,  and  the  advance  of 
his  troops  in  the  narrow  road  on  which  alone  they 
could  move  was  checked  by  the  shell  and  canister 
of  twelve  Napoleon  guns,  from  an  elevation  within 
five  hundred  yards.  The  slaughter  and  confusion 
were  greatly  increased  by  this  terrible  fire  in  the 
night,  so  that  the  pause  in  the  attack  was  one  of 
those  fatalities  of  war  that  no  foresight  can  prevent. 

It  was  about  1  o'clock  on  Sunday,  May  3d, 
that  Lee  received  information  that  Early  had  been 
driven  from  Marye's  Heights  and  was  falling  back 
before  Sedgwick.  Jackson's  corps,  which  had 
been  fighting  since  6  o'clock  the  previous  even- 
ing, with  very  little  rest  during  the  night,  renew- 
ing the  conflict  at  daylight,  and  capturing  the 
positions  at  Chancellorsville,  was  much  diminished 
by  casualties  and  much  exhausted  by  fatigue,  hun- 
ger, and  thirst ;  but  it  was  preparing  to  move  upon 
Hooker's  last  line  of  intrenchments,  erected  dui-- 
ing  the  night  on  very  strong  positions.  My  di\is- 
ion  was  in  the  lead  in  line  of  battle.  It  was  then 
that  I  received  an  order  to  report  at  once  in  per- 
son to  General  Lee.  I  found  him  standing  in  a 
small  tent  pitched  by  the  roadside.  His  plain 
gi'ay  sack-coat,  with  only  three  stars  on  the  rolling 
collar,  was,  like  his  face,  well  sprinkled  with  the 
dust  of  the  battle-field.  In  low,  quiet  tones  he 
said  to  me:  "General,  I  wish  you  to  advance 
with  your  division  on  the  United  States  Ford  road. 
I  expect  you  will  meet  with  resistance  before  you 
come  to  the  bend  of  the  road.  I  do  not  want  you 
to  attack  the  enemy's  positions,  but  only  to  feel 
them.  Send  your  engineer  officer  with  skirmishers 
to  the  front  to  reconnoiter  and  report.  Don't 
engage  seriously,  but  keep  the  enemy  in  check  and 
prevent  him  from  advancing." 

I  am  confident  that  these  were  almost  the  exact 
words  of  General  Lee,  to  which  he  added,  "Move 
at  once,"  which  I  did.  I  was  not  a  little  puzzled 
at  the  time  (jiot  knowing  the  situation  at  Fred- 
ericksburg), and  I  wondered  why  we  were  not  to 
continue  our  advance  and  hurl  Hooker  into  the 
river.  Lee  left  the  field  at  Chancellorsville  imme- 
diately after  giving  me  the  above  orders,  and  hast- 
ened to  Early's  support  with  McLaws's  di\ision, 
Mahone's  brigade,  and  other  troops,  and  compelled 
Sedgwick  to  retreat  across  the  Rajipahannock. 


THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  IN  THE  CHANCELLORSVILLE 

CAMPAIGN. 

The  composition,  losses,  and  strength  of  cacli  army  as  hero  stated  give  the  gist  of  all  the  data  obtainable  lu  the  Offlclal 
Records.    K  stands  for  killed;  w  for  wounded  ;  m  w  for  mortally  woiin<le<l :  m  for  captured  or  missing ;  c  for  captured. 


THE   UNION  ARAIY. 

ARMY  OK  THE   POTOMAC-  Miyor-Gcnoral  .Joseph  Hooker. 


Staff  1( 


s:  w.  1. 


rrnrost  Otinrd,  Priir.-Gcn.  Miirscna  R.  Patrick:  93d  N. 
Y.,  C..1.  John  S.  Crocker;  E  mid  I,  C.tli  Pn.  Cav.,  <'ai)t. 
James  Stiur;  Stli  IT.  8.  (G  co's),  Cnpt.  K.  W.  H.  Road; 
Detachment  Regular  Cav.,  Lieut.  Tattnall  Paiildiug. 
Patrick's  Brif/nde,  Col.  William  F.  Rogers  :  B,  Md.  Art'y, 
VOL.  III.    16  2 


Capt.  Alon/.o  Snow;  21st  N  Y.,  Lieut. -Col.  Chester  W. 
Sternberg;  a;<d  N.  Y..  Col.  Henry  C.  Hotnmni :  :r.th  N. 
Y.,  Col.  John  G.  Todd  ;  80tli  N.  Y.  (20th  Militia),  Col. 
Theodore  B.  Gates;  12th  Ohio  Battery,  Cnpt.  Aaron  C. 
Johnson.    Engineer  Brigade,  Brig. -Gen.  Henry  W.  Ben- 


234  THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  IN  THE  C  HAN  CELLO  RSl^ILLE  CAMPAIGN. 


ham:  15th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Clintou  G.  Colgate;  SOth  N.  Y., 
Col.  Charles  B.  Stuart ;  BattaUon  U.  8.  Eugineers,  Capt. 
Chauncey  B.  Reese.  Brigade  loss :  k,  1 ;  w,  6 ;  m,  1  =  8. 
Guards  and  Orderlies,  Oueida  (N.  Y.)  Cav.,  Capt.  Daniel 
P.  Mann. 

ARTILLERY,  Blig.-Gen.  Henry  J.  Hunt.  Artillery  Re- 
serve, Capt.  William  M.  (Graham,  Brig. -Gen.  Robert  O. 
Tyler:  B,  Ist  Conn.,  Lieut.  Albert  F.  Brooker;  M,  Ist 
Conn.,  Capt.  Franklin  A.  Pratt;  5th  N.  Y-.,  Capt.  Elijah 
D.  Taft;  15th  N.  Y.,  Capt.  Patrick  Hart;  29th  N.  Y., 
Lieut.  Gustav  von  Blucher;  30th  N.  Y.,  Capt.  Adolph 
Voegelee  ;  32d  N.  Y.,  Lieut.  George  Gaston;  K,  Ist  U.  8., 
Lieut.  Lorenzo  Thomas,  Jr. ;  C,  3d  U.  8.,  Lieut.  Henry 
Meinell;  G,  4th  U.  8.,  Lieut.  Marcus  P.  Miller;  K,  5th  U. 
S.,  Lieut.  David  H.  Kinzie;  C,  32d  Mass.,  Capt.  Josiah  C. 
Fuller.  Tnti)i  (iiKtrd,  1st  N.  J.  (7  co's),  Col.  WiUiam 
Birney,  Capt.  Kubtrt  S.  Johnston. 

FIR8T  ARMY  CORPS.  Maj.-Geu.  John  F.  Reynolds. 
Escort:  L,  Ist  Me.  Cav.,  Capt.  Constautine  Taylor. 
FIRST  Divisiox,  Brig.-Gon.  Jiinus  S.  Wadsworth. 

First  Brigade,  Col.  Walter  Phelps,  Jr. :  22d  N.  Y.,  Maj. 
Thomas  J.  8troug;  24th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Samuel  R.  Beardsley ; 
SOth  N.  Y.,  Col.  Wm.  M.  Searing ;  84th  N.  Y.  (14th  Militia), 
Col.  Edward  B.  Fowler.  Brigade  loss:  w,  37.  Second 
Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Lysander  Cutler:  7th  Ind.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Ira  G.  Grover;  76th  N.  Y.,  Col.  William  P.  Wain- 
wright;  95th  N.  Y.,  Col.  George  H.  Biddle;  147th  N.  Y., 
Col.  John  G.  Butler;  56th  Pa.,  Col.  J.  William  Hofmann. 
Brigade  loss:  k,  3;  w,  25;  m,  5  =  33.  Third  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  Gabriel  R.  Paul :  22d  N.  J.,  Col.  Abraham  G. 
Demarest;  29th  N.  J.,  Col.  William  R.  Taylor  ;  30th  N. 
J.,  Col.  John  J.  Cladek  ;  31st  N.  J.,  Lieut.-Col.  Robert  R. 
Honeyman  ;  137th  Pa.,  Col.  Joseph  B.  Kiddoo.  Brigade 
loss:  k,  1;  w,  15  =  16.  Fourth  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Sol- 
omon Meredith :  19th  Ind.,  C(»l.  Samuel  J.  Williams ; 
24th  Mich.,  Col.  Henry  A.  Morrow;  2d  Wis.,  Col.  Lucius 
Fairchild;  6th  Wis.,  Col.  Edward  S.  Bragg;  7th  Wis., 
Col.  William  W.  Robiuson.  Brigade  loss :  k,  11 ;  w,  46 ; 
m,  3  =60.  Artilleri/,  Capt.  John  A.  Reynolds :  Ist  N.  H.. 
Capt.  Frederick  M.  Edgell;  L,  Ist  N.  Y.,  Capt.  John  A. 
Reynolds ;  B,  4th  U.  S.,  Lieut.  James  Stewart.  Artillery 
loss:  w,  9;  m,  2  =  11. 
SECOND  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gcu.  John  C.  Robinson. 

First  Brigade,  Col.  Adrian  R.  Root;  16th  Me.,  Col. 
Charles  W.  Tildeu ;  94th  N.  Y.,  Capt.  Samuel  A.  Motfett ; 
104th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Gilbert  G.  Prey;  107th  Pa.,  Col.  Thomas 
F.  McCoy.  Brigade  loss  :  w,  5.  Second  Brigade,  Brig.- 
Gen.  Henry  Baxter:  12th  Mass.,  Col.  James  L.  Bates; 
26th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Gilbert  8.  Jennings ;  90th  Pa.,  Col. 
Peter  Lyle ;  136th  Pa.,  Col.  Thomas  M.  Ba ync.  Brigade 
loss  :  k,  1 ;  w,  16  ;  m,  5  =22.  Thinl  Brigade,  Col.  Samuel 
H.  Leonard:  13th  Mass.,  Lieut.-Col.  N.  Walter  Batchel- 
der ;  83d N.  Y.  (9tli  Militia).  Lieut.-Col.  Joseph  A.  Moesch; 
97tli  N.  Y.,  Col.  Cluirlis  Wluclock  ;  11th  Pa.,  Col.  Richard 
Coulter;  88th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  Louis  Wagner.  Brigade 
loss:  k,  2;  w,  13  ;  m,  1  =16.  Artillcrg,  Capt.  Dunbar  R. 
Ran.som:  2d  Me.,  Capt.  James  A.  Hall;  5th  Me.,  Capt. 
George  F.  Leppien  (w),  Lieut.  Ednnind  Kirby  (m  w), 
Lieut.  Greenleaf  T.  Stevens ;  C,  Pa..  C■.^^t.  James  Thomp- 
son ;  C,  5th  U.  8.,  Capt.  Dunbar  R.  Ransom.  Artillery 
loss  :  k,  7  ;  w,  25  =  32. 
THIRD  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gei).  Abner  Doubleday. 

First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Thomas  A.  Rowley :  12l8t 
Pa.,  Col.  Chapman  Biddle;  135th  Pa.,  Col.  James  R. 
Porter ;  142d  Pa.,  Col.  Robert  P.  Cummins ;  151st  Pa.,  Col. 
Harrison  Allen.  Brigade  loss:  k,  1 ;  w,  12;  m,  36  =  49. 
Second  Brigade,  Col.  Roy  Stone  :  143d  Pa.,  Col.  Ednmnd 
L.  Dana;  149th  Pa.,  Lient.-Col.  M^alton  Dwight;  1.50th 
Pa.,  Col.  Langhonie  Wister.  Brigade  loss :  w,  3.  Artil- 
lery, Maj.  EzraW.  Matthews:  B,  1st  Pa.,  Capt.  James 
H.  Cooper;  F,  Ist  Pa.,  Lieut.  R.  Bruce  Ricketts;  G,  Ist 
Pa.,  Capt.  Frank  P.  Amsdeu.  Artillery  loss:  w,  9  :  m, 
2  =  11. 

SECOND  ARMY  CORPS,  Ma,i.-Gen.  Darius  N.  Couch. 
Staff  loss  :  w,  1. 

Escort,  D  and  K,  6th  N.  \  Cav.,  Capt.  Riley  Johnson. 
Lobs  :  w,  2. 


FIRST  DIVISION,  Maj. -Gen.  Wrnfleld  8.  Hancock. 

First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  John  C.  Caldwell:  5th  N. 
H.,  Col.  Edward  E.  Cross,^  Lieut.-Col.  Charles  E.  Hap- 
good;  61st  N.  Y.,  Col.  Nelson  A.  Miles  (w),  Lieut.-Col. 
K.  Oscar  Broady  ;  81st  Pa.,  CoL  H.  Boyd  Me  Keen  (w)  ; 
148th  Pa.,  Col.  James  A.  Beaver  (w),  Mari.  George  A. 
Fairlamb.  Brigade  loss:  k,  36;  w,  196;  m,  46  =  278. 
Second  Brigade,  Bi'ig.-Gen.  Thomas  F.Meagher:  28th 
Mass.,  Col.  Richard  Byrnes;  63d  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Rich- 
ard C.  Bentley ;  69th  N.  Y.,  Capt.  James  E.  McGee ; 
88th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Patrick  Kelly  ;  116th  Pa.  (battalion), 
Maj.  St.  Clair  A.  MulhoUand.  Brigade  loss:  k,  8;  w, 
63 ;  m,  31  =  102.  Third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Samuel  K. 
Zook :  52d  N.  Y.,  Col.  Paul  Frank,  Lieut.-Col.  Charles 
G.  Freudenberg;  57th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  ALford  B. 
Chapman;  66th  N.  Y.,3^  Col.  Orlando  H.  Morris;  140th 
Pa.,  Col.  Richards  P.  Roberts.  Brigade  loss:  k,  13;  w, 
97;  m,  78  =  188.  Fourth  Brigade,  Col.  John  R.  Brooke: 
27th  Conn.,  Col.  Richard  8.  Bostwick ;  2d  Del.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  David  L.  Strieker ;  64th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Daniel  G.  Bing- 
ham ;  53dPa.,  Lieut.-Col.  Richards  McMichael ;  145th  Pa., 
Col.  Hiram  L.Brown.  Brigade  loss:  k,  19;  w,  64;  m, 
446  =  529.  Artillery,  Capt.  Rufus  D.  Pettit :  B,  1st  N.  Y., 
Capt.  Rufus  D.  Pettit ;  C,  4th  U.  8.,  Lieut.  Evan  Thomas. 
Artillery  loss :  k,  2 ;  w,  25  =  27. 
SECOND  DIVISION,  Blig.-Gen.  John  Gibbon. 

First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Alfred  Sully,  Col.  Henry  W. 
Hudson,  Col.  Byron  Laflin  :  19th  Me.,  Col.  Francis 
E.  Heath;  l.5th  Mass.,  Maj.  George  C.  JosUu;  1st 
Minn.,  Lieut.-Col.  WiUiam  Colvill,  Jr. ;  34th  N.  Y.,  Col. 
Byron  Laflin,  Lieut.-Col.  John  Beverly;  82d  N.  Y. 
(2d  Militia),  Col.  Henry  W.  Hudson,  Lieut.-Col.  James 
Huston.  Brigade  loss:  w,  16;  m,  4=20.  Second 
Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Joshua  T.  Owen:  69th  Pa.,  Col. 
Dennis  O'Kane;  71st  Pa.,  Col.  Richard  P.  Smith;  72d 
Pa.,  Col.  De  Witt  C.  Baxter  ;  106th  Pa.,  Col.  Turner 
G.  Morehead.  Third  Brigade,  Col.  Norman  J.  Hall :  19th 
Mass.,  Lieut.-Col.  Arthur  F.  Devereux;  20th  Mass., 
Lieut.-Col.  George  N.  Macy;  7th  Mich.,  Capt.  Amos  E. 
Steele,  Jr.  ;  42d  N.  Y.,  Col.  James  E.  Mallon  ;  59th  N.  Y., 
Lieut.-Col.  Max  A.  Thoman;  127th  Pa.,  Col.  WiUiam  W. 
Jennings.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  3  ;  w,  56;  m,  8  =67.  Artil- 
lery :  A,  1st  R,  I.,  Capt.  WUliam  A.  Arnold ;  B,  Ist  R. 
I.,  Lieut.  T.  Fred.  Brown.  Sharp-shooters:  Ist  Co. 
Mass.,  Capt.  WilUam  Plumer. 
THIRD  DIVISION,  Maj.-Geu.  WiUiam  H.  French. 

First  Brigade,  Col.  Samuel  8.  CarroU:  14th  Ind.,  Col. 
John  Coons ;  24th  N.  J.,  Col.  William  B.  Robertson ;  28th 
N.  J.,  Lieut.-Col.  John  A.  WUdrick  (c),  Maj.  Samuel  K. 
Wilson;  4th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  Leonard  W.  Carpenter; 
8th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  Franklin  Sawyer ;  7th  \V.  Va.,  Col. 
Joseph  Snider,  Lieut.-Col.  Jonathan  H.  Lockwood.  Bii- 
gade  loss:  k,  29;  w,  182;  m,  57  =  268.  Second  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  William  Hays  (e).  Col.  Charles  J.  Powers: 
14th  Conn.,  Maj.  Theodore  G.  EUis ;  12th  N.  J.,  Col.  J. 
Howard  Willets  (w),  Maj.  John  T.  Hill ;  108th  N.  Y.,  Col. 
Charles  J.  Powers,  Lieut.-Col.  Francis  E.  Pierce;  130th 
Pa.,  Col.  Le\a  Maish  (w),  Maj.  Joseph  8.  Jenkins.  Bri- 
gade loss:  k,  26;  w,  242;  m,  61  =  319.  Thii-d  Brigade, 
Col.  John  D.  MacGregor,  Col.  Charles  Albright:  Ist 
Del.,  Col.  Thomas  A.  Smyth  ;  4th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Will- 
iam Jameson;  132d  Pa.,  CoL  Charles  Albright,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Joseph  E.  Shreve.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  8 ;  w,  80 ;  m, 
11=99.  Artillery:  G,  1st  N.  Y.,  Lieut.  Nelson  Ames; 
G,  Ist  R.  I.,  Capt.  George  W.  Adams.  Artillery  loss: 
k.  5;  w,  18  =  23. 

ARTILLERY  RESERVE:  I,  1st  U.  8.,  Lieut.  Edmund 
Kirby  (m  w  while  commanding  5th  Maine  BatterjO  ;  A, 
4tli  U.  8.,  Lieut.  Alonzo  H.  Cushing.  Artillery  loss :  w,  2. 

THIRD  ARMY  CORPS,  Maj.-Gen.  Daniel  E.  Sickles. 
Staff  loss  :  w,  1. 

FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Geu.  David  B.  Birney.    Staff  loss  : 
w.  2. 

First  Brigade,  Brig.-Geu.  Charles  K.  Graham,  Col. 
Thomas  W.  Egan :  57th  Pa.,  Col.  Peter  Sides;  63d  Pa., 
Lieut.-Col.  William  S.  Kirkwood  (m  w),  Capt.  James  F. 
Ryan;  68th  Pa.,  Col.  Andrew  H.  Tippin;  105th  Pa.,  Col. 


i  In  tfinitorary  coiniiiaiul  of 
■^  Served  temporarily  with  tl 


force  con-sisting  of  the  5th  N.  H.,  88th  N.  Y.,  and  Slst  Pa. 
>  First  Brigade. 


THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  IN  THE  CHANCELLORSWILLE  CAMPAIGN.  2y^ 


Amor  A.  McKuight  (b),  Lieut.-Col.  Calviu  A.  Craig  ;  114th 
Pa..  Col.  Charles  H.  T,  CoUis,  Lieut.-Col.  Frederick  F.  Ca- 
vada;  14l8tPa.,  Col.  Ileury  J.  Madill.  IJii-udeloss:  k,72; 
w,  490;  m,  194=756.  Second  lirii/di/c,  ]!rif;.-Geu.  J.  II. 
Hobart  Ward:  20th  Ind.,  Col.  Jolm  Whe.kr;  3d  Me., 
Col.  Moses  B.  Lakeman;  4th  Me.,  Col.  Klijah  Walker; 
38th  N.  Y.,  Col.  P.  Regis  de  Trobriand;  40th  N.  Y.,  Col. 
Thomas  W.  Egan ;  99th  Pa.,  Col.  Asher  8.  Leidy.  Bri- 
gade loss:  k,  11;  w,  124;  m,  113=248.  Third  Brigade, 
Col.  Samuel  B.  Haymau :  17th  Me.,  Lieut.-Col.  Charles  B. 
Merrill,  Col.  Thomas  A.  Roberts ;  3d  Mich.,  Col.  Byron  K. 
Pierce  (w),  Lieut.-Col.  Edwiu  S.  Pierce;  5th  Mich., 
Lieut.-Col.  Edward  T.  Sherlock  (k),  Ma^j.  Johu  Pulford; 
IstN.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Francis  L.  Lelaud ;  37th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Gilbert  Riordau.  Brigade  loss:  k,  30;  w,  283;  m, 
253=566.  Ariillery,  Capt.  A.  Judson  Clark:  2d  N.  J., 
Lieut.  Robert  Sims ;  E,  Ist  R.  I.,  Lieut.  Pardon  8.  Jas- 
tram ;  F  and  K,  3d  U.  S.,  Lieut.  John  G.  Turnbiill.  Artil- 
lery loss  :  k,  6 ;  w,  26 ;  m,  3  =  35. 

SECOND  DIVISION,  Maj.-Geu.  Hiram  G.  Berry  (k),  Brig.- 
Gen.  Joseph  B.  Carr.    Staff  loss:  k,  1. 

First  Briijdde,  Brig.-Gen.  Joseph  B.  Carr,  CoL  William 
Blaisdell :  Ist  Mass.,  Col.  Napoleon  B.  McLaughlen  ;  11th 
Mass.,  Col.  William  Blaisdell,  Lieut.-Col.  Porter  D.  Tripp ; 
16th  Mass..  Li.  iit.-Col.  Waldo  Merriam  ;  11th  N.  J.,  Col. 
Robert  McAllister:  2Gth  I'a.,  Col.  Benjamin  C.  Tilgliman 
(w),  Miy.  Robert  L.  Bodiin-.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  52;  w,  387; 
m,  65=  504.  Second  liriymlc,  Brig.-Gen.  Joseph  W.  Re- 
vere, Col.  J.  Egbert  Farimiti :  70th  N.  Y.,  Col.  J.Egbert 
Farnum,  Lieut.-Col.  Thomas  Holt ;  7l8t  N.  Y.,  Col.  Henry 
L.  Potter;  72d  N.  Y.,  Col.  William  O.  Stevens  (k),  Maj. 
John  Leonard;  73d  N.  Y.,  Maj.  Michael  W.  Burns;  74th 
N.Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  William  H.  Lounsbury  (w),  Capt.  Henry 
M.  AUes  (w),  Capt.  Francis  E.  Tyler;  120th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  CorneliusD.  W(Htl)rook.  Brigade  loss:  k,  26;  w,  160; 
m,  131  =  317.  Third  Brigade.  Brig.-Gen.  Gershom  Mott 
(w),  Col.  William  J.  Sewell:  5th  N.  J.,  Col.  William  J. 
Sewell,  Maj.  Ashabel  W.  Angel  (w),  Capt.  Virgil  M. 
Healy;  6th  N.  J.,  Col.  George  C.  Burling  (w),  Lieut.- 
Col.  Stephen  R.  Gilkyson ;  7th  N.  J.,  Col.  Louis  R.  Fran- 
cine,  Lieut.-Col.  Francis  Price;  8th  N.  J.,  Col.  John 
Ramsey  (w),  Capt.  John  G.  Langston ;  2d  N.  Y.,  Col.  Sid- 
ney W.  Park  (w),  Lieut.-Col.  William  A.  Olm.sted;  115th 
Pa.,  Col.  Francis  A.  Lancaster  (k),  Maj.  John  P.  Dunne. 
Brigade  loss :  k,  57 ;  w,  422 ;  m,  48  =  527.  Ariillery,  Capt. 
Thomas  W.  Osborn:  D,  1st  N.  Y.,  Lieut.  George  B.  Wins- 
low;  4th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.  George  F.  Barstow,  Lieut.  William 
T.  McLean;  II,  1st  U.  8.,  Lieut.  Ju.stin  E.  Dimick  (m  w), 
Lieut.  James  A.  Sanderson ;  K,  4th  U.  8.,  Lieut.  Francis 
W.  Seeley.  Artillery  loss :  k,  12 ;  w,  68  =  80. 
TiiiUD  DIVISION,  Mi\i.-Gen.  Amiel  W.  Whipple  (m  w), 
Brig.-(;(  II.  Cliarles  K.  Graham.    Staff  loss:  w,  1. 

First  Brigade,  Col.  Emlen  Franklin :  86th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Barna  .1.  Chapin  (k),  Capt.  Jacob  H.  Lansing;  124th 
N.  Y.,  Col.  A.  Van  Ilorue  Ellis;  122d  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  Ed- 
ward McGovern.  Brigade  lose :  k,  47  ;  w,  304;  m,  32  =  383. 
Second  Brigade,  Col.  Samuel  M.  Bowman:  12th  N.  H., 
Col.  Joseph  H.  Potter  (w) ;  84th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  Milton 
Opp ;  110th  Pa,  Col.  James  Crowther  (k),  Maj.  David  M. 
Jones  (w  and  c).  Brigade  loss:  k,  51;  w,  290;  m,  236  = 
577.  Third  Brigade.  Col.  Hiram  Berdan :  Ist  U.  S.  Siiarp- 
shooters,  Lieut.-Col.  (aspai-Trepp  ;  2d  U.  8.  Sharp-shoot- 
ers, Miy.  Homer  U.  Stoiigliton.  Brigade  loss:  k,  11 ;  w, 
61 ;  m,  12=84.  Artilleri/,  Capt.  Albert  A.  von  Putlkam- 
mer,  Capt.  James  F.  Huntington  :  10th  N.  Y.,  Lieut. 
Samuel  Lewis;  lltli  N.  Y.,  Lieut.  John  E.  Burton;  II,  1st 
Ohio,  Capt.  James  F.  Huntington.  Artillery  loss:  k,  2  ; 
w,  26;  m,  9  =  37. 

FIFTH  ARMY  CORPS,  M:\1.-Gen.  George  G.  Meade. 
FiKST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Charles  Griffln. 

First  llrigade,  Brig.-Gen.  James  Barnes  :  2d  Me.,  Col. 
Ot^orge  Variiev;  18th  Mass..  Col.  Josej)!!  Hayes;  22d 
Mass.,  Col.  William  S.  Tilton ;  2d  Co.  .Mass.  Sharp-shoot- 
ers, Lieut.  Kobrrt  Siiiitli;  Ist  Mi.li.,  Col.  Ira  C.  Abbott; 
13tli  N.  V.  (battalion),  Capt.  William  Downey;  25tli  N. 
Y.,  Col.  Charhs  A.  John.son;  list li  Pa  ,  Col.  Charles  M. 
Prevost.  Brigade  loss:  k,  4;  w,  40;  m,  4=48.  Second 
Brigade.  Col.  James  McQuade,  C«d.  Jacob  B.  Sweitzer: 
9th  Mass.,  Col.  Patrick  R.  (iuiney  ;  32d  Mass.,  Lieut.-Col. 
Luther  Stephenson ;  4th  Mich.,  Col.  Harrison  H.  Jeffords ; 


14th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Thomas  M.  Davies;  62d  Pa.,  Col. 
Jacob  B.  Sweitzer,  Lieut.-Col.  James  C.  Hull.  Brigade 
loss  :  k,  9 ;  w,  46 ;  m,  7  =  62.  Third  Brigade,  Col.  Thomas 
B.  W.  Stockton :  20th  Me.,  Lieut.-Col.  Joshua  L.  Cham- 
berlain ;  Brady's  Co.  Mich.  Sharp-shooters ;  16th  Mich., 
Lieut.-Col.  Norval  E.  Welch;  12th  N.  Y.,  Capt.  William 
Huson;  17th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Nelson  B.  Bartram ;  44th 
N.  Y.,  Col.  James  C.  Rice;  83d  Pa.,  Col.  Strong  Vincent. 
Brigade  loss:  k,  2;  w,  18=20.  .Ir/iV/en/,  Capt.  Augustus 
P.  Martin:  3d  Mass.,  Capt.  Augustus  P.  Martin;  5th 
Mass.,  Capt.  Charles  A.  PhiUips ;  C,  1st  R.  I.,  Capt  Rich- 
ard Waterman;  D.  5th  U.  S.,  Lieut.  Charles  E.  Hazlctt. 
Artillery  loss :  k,  2  ;  w,  4 ;  m,  2  =  8. 
SECOND  DIVISION,  Maj.-Geu.  George  Sykes. 

First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Romeyn  B.  Ayres:  3d  U.  8. 
(6  co's),  Capt.  John  D.  Wilkins;  4th  U.  S.  (4  co's),  Capt. 
Hiram  Dryer ;  12th  U.  S.  (5  co's  1st  Battalion  and  3  co's 
2d  Battalion),  Maj.  Richard  S.  Smith ;  14th  U.  S.  (6  co's  let 
Battalion  and  2  co's  2d  Battalion),  Capt.  Jonathan  B. 
Hagar.  Brigade  loss:  k,  4;  w,  17;  m,  30  =  51.  Second 
Brigade,  Col.  Sidney  Burbauk :  2d  U.  S.  (5  co's).  Capt. 
Salem  8.  Marsh  (k),  Capt.  Samuel  A.  McKee;  6th  U.  S.  (5 
co's),  Capt.  Le\i  C.  Bootes ;  7th  U.  8.  (4  co's),  Capt.  David 
P.  Hancock;  10th  U.  8.  (3  co's).  Lieut.  Edward  G.  Bush; 
11th  U.  S.  (6  co's  1st  Battalion  and  2  co's  2d  Battalion), 
Miy.  De  L.  Floyd-Jones;  17th  U.  S.  (5  co's  1st  Battalion 
and  2  co's  2d  Battalion),  Maj.  George  L.  Andrews.  Bri- 
gade loss;  k,  17  ;  w,  108;  m,  22  =147.  Third  Brigade, Col. 
Patrick  H.  O'Rorke:  5th  N.  Y.,  ('ol.  Cleveland  Winslow  ; 
140th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Louis  Ernst ;  146th  N.  Y.,  Col. 
Kenner  Garrard.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  4 ;  w,  29 :  m,  :J8  =  71. 
ArtiUerg,  Capt.  Stephen  II.  Weed:  L,  1st  Ohio,  Capt. 
Frank  C.  Gibbs;  I,  5th  U.  S.,  Lieut.  Malbone  F.  Watson. 
Artillery  loss  :  k,  2 ;  w.  13  ;  m,  1  =  16. 
THIRD  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gcu.  Andrew  A.  Humphreys. 

First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Erastus  B.  Tyler:  9l8t  Pa., 
Col.  Edgar  M.  Gregory  (w),  Lieut.-Col.  Joseph  H.  Sinex; 
126th  Pa.,  Lieut.-CoL  David  W.  Rowe  (w) ;  129th  Pa.,  Col. 
Jacob  G.  Frlck;  134th  Pa.,  Col.  Edward  O'Brien.  Bri- 
gade loss  :  k,  21 ;  w,  166  ;  m,  53  =  240.  Second  Brigade, 
Col.  Peter  H.  Allabach :  123d  Pa.,  Col.  Johu  B.  Clark ; 
131st  Pa.,  Miy.  Robert  W.  Patton  ;  133d  P:i.,  Col.  Frank- 
lin B.  Speakmau ;  155th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  John  H.  Cain. 
Brigade  loss:  k,  4;  w,  31;  m,  2  =  37.  ArtiUerg,  Capt. 
Alanson  M.  Randol:  C,  1st  N.  Y.,  Capt.  Almont  Barnes; 
E  and  G,  1st  U.  8.,  Capt.  Alan.sou  M.  Randol. 

SIXTH  ARMY  CORPS,  Miy.-Gen.  John  Sedgwick. 
Staff  loss,  w,  1 ;  m,  1  =  2. 

Escort:  Maj.  Hugh  M.  Janeway :  L,  1st  N.  J.  Cav., 
Lieut.  Voorhees  Dj'e;  H,  1st  Pa.  Cav.,  Capt.  William  8. 
Craft. 

FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gcn.  William  T.  H.  Brooks.  Staff 
loss :  w,  1. 
Provost  Guard:  A,  C,  and  H,  4th  N.  J.,  Capt.  Charles 
Ewing.  Loss:  w,  1.  First  Brigade,  Col.  Henry  W. 
Brown  (w),  Col.  William  II.  Penrose,  Col.  Sanniel  L. 
Buck  (w).  Col.  William  II.  Penrose:  1st  N.  J.,  Col. 
Mark  W.  Collet  (k),  Lieut.-Col.  William  Henry.  Jr.; 
2dN.  J..  Col.  Samuel  L.  Buck,  Lieut.-Col.  Churl,  s  Wi-i- 
becke;  3d  N.  J..  Miij.  J.  W.  II.  Stickney ;  15th  N.  J..  Col. 
William  II.  Penrose,  Lieut.-Col.  Edward  L.  Campbell; 
23d  N.  J.,  Col.  E.  Burd  <^;rubl).  Brigade  loss:  k,  66;  w, 
359;  m,  86  =  511.  Second  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Joseph  J. 
Bartlett:  6th  Me.,  Col.  Clark  S.  Edwjirds ;  I6ili  N.  Y., 
Col..Toel  J.  Seiiver ;  27th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Alexander  I).  Adams ; 
121st  N.  Y.,  Col.  Emory  Upton  ;  '.KJth  Pa..  Miy.  William  H. 
Lessig.  Brigade  loss  :  k.  101 ;  w.  368 ;  m.  143  =  Ol.'.  Th ird 
Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  David  \.  Russell:  18th  N.  Y..  Col. 
Georire  R.  Myers;  32d  N.  Y..  Col.  Francis  E  Pinto;  49th 
Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  Thomas  M.  Hulings;  '.tsth  Pa.,  C.d.  Gus- 
tavus  W.  Town  (k).  Lieut.-Col.  Elisha  Hall  (k).  Capt. 
Theodore  H.  McCalla  :  119th  Pa..  Col.  Peter  C.  Ellmaker. 
Brigade  l.iss :  k.  3.''.:  w.  197:  m.  136=36.'*.  Ariillery, 
Miy.  John  A.  Tomiikius:  1st  Ma.ss..  Capt.  Williiim  II. 
McCartiiiv;  1st  N.  J..  Lieut.  Augustln  N.  Parsons:  .V, 
Md..  Cai)t'.  Jinnes  H.  Rigby ;  I).  2d  V.  S..  Lieut.  Edward 
B.  Willislon.  Artillery  loss:  k.  2;  w.  fi  =  7. 
Si-.roND  DIVISION.  Brig.-Gen.  .Vlbton  P.  Howe. 

Second  Brigade,  Col.  Lewis  A.  (Jrant:  26th  N.  J..  Col. 
Andrew  J.  Morrison.  Lieut.  Col.  Edward  Martindale;  2d 


236  THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  IN  THE  CHANCELLORSVILLE  CAMPAIGN. 


Vt.,  Col.  Jaiues  H.  Walbridge  ;  3d  Vt.,  Col.  Thomas  O. 
Seaver,  Lieut.-Col.  Samuel  E.  Pingree;  4tli  Vt.,  Col. 
Charles  B.  Stoughton ;  5th  Vt.,  Lieut.-Col.  Johu  R. 
Lewis;  6th Vt.,  Col.  Elisha  L.  Barney.  Brigade  loss: 
k,  39;  w,  295;  m,  97  =  431.  Third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen. 
Thomas  H.  Neill;  7th  Me.,  Lieut.-Col.  Selden  Connor; 
2l8t  N.  J.,  Col.  Gilliam  Van  Houten  (m  w),  Lieut.-Col. 
Isaac  8.  Mettler;  20th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Ern.st  von  Vegesack; 
33d  N.  Y.,  Col.  Robert  F.  Taylor ;  49th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Daniel 

B.  Bid  well;  77th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Winsor  B.  French. 
Brigade  lo.ss  :  k,  52 ;  w,  394 ;  m,  404  =  850.  Artillery,  Maj. 
J.  Watts  de  Peyster:  Ist  N.  Y.,  Capt.  Andrew  Cowan; 
F,  5th  U.  S.,  Lieut.  Leonard  Martin.  Artillery  loss:  w, 
8;  m,  1=9. 

THIRD  DIVISION,  Maj. -Gen.  John  Newton. 

First  Brigade,  Col.  Alexander  Shaler :  65th  N.  Y.,  Lieut. 
Col.  Joseph  E.  Hamblin ;  67th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Nelson  Cross; 
122d  N.  Y.,  Col.  Silas  Titus;  23d  Pa.,  Col.  John  Ely;  82d 
Pa.,  Mfij.  Lsaae  C.  Bassett.  Brigade  loss:  k,  7;  w,  86; 
m,  67  =  160.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  William  H.  Browne  (w), 
Col.  Henry  L.  Eustis :  7th  Mass.,  Col.  Thomas  D.  Johns 
(w),  Lieut.-Col.  Franklin  P.  Harlow;  10th  Mass.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Joseph  B.  Parsons ;  37th  Mass.,  Col.  Oliver  Edwards ; 
36th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  James  J.  Walsh;  2d  R.  I.,  Col. 
Horatio  Rogers,  Jr.  Brigade  loss:  k,  42;  w,  21%;  m, 
22  =  342.  Third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Frank  Wheaton : 
62d  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Theodore  B.  Hamilton;  93d  Pa., 
Capt.  John  S.  Long;  98th  Pa.,  Col.  John  F.  Ballier  (w), 
Lieut.-Col.  George  Wynkoop;  102d  Pa.,  Col.  Joseph  M. 
Kinkead;  I39th  Pa.,  Col.  Frederick  H.  Collier.  Brigade 
loss:  k,  48;  w,  237;  m,  200=485.  Artillery,  Capt.  Jere- 
miah McCarthy :  C  and  D,  1st  Pa.,  Capt.  Jeremiah  Mc- 
Carthy; G,  2d  U.  8.,  Lieut.  John  H.  Butler.  Artillery 
loss :  k,  1 ;  w,  4 ;  m,  4  =  9. 

LIGHT  DIVISION,  Col.  Hiram  Burnham  :  6th  Me.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Benjamin  F.  Harris ;  31st  N.  Y.,  Col.  Frank  Jones ; 
43d  N.  Y.,  Col.  Benjamin  F.  Baker;  6l8t  Pa.,  Col.  George 

C.  Spear  (k),  Maj.  George  W.  Dawson;  5th  Wis.,  Col. 
Thomas  S.  Allen;  3d  N.  Y.  Battery,  Lieut.  William  A. 
Ham.    Division  loss  :  k,  94  ;  w,  404 ;  m,  310  =  808. 

ELEVENTH  ARMY  CORPS,  Maj. -Gen.  OUver  O. 
Howard. 

Escort :  I  and  K,  1st  Ind.  Cav.,  Capt.  Abram  Sharra. 

FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.   Charles   Devens,  Jr.   (w), 

Brig.-Gen.  Nathaniel  C.  McLean.    StaflFloss  :  w,  1. 

First  Brigade,  Col.  Leopold  von  Gilsa :  41st  N.  Y.,  Maj. 
Detleo  von  Einsiedel ;  45th  N.  Y.,  Col.  George  von  Ams- 
berg;  54th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Charles  Ashby,  Maj.  Stephen 
Kovacs;  153d  Pa.,  Col.  Charles  Glanz,  Lieut.-Col.  Jacob 
Dachrodt.  Brigade  loss :  k,  16 ;  w,  117  ;  m,  131  =  264. 
Second  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Nathaniel  C.  McLean,  Col. 
Johu  C.  Lee :  17th  Conn.,  Col.  William  H.  Noble  (w),  Maj. 
Allen  G.  Brady ;  25th  Ohio,  Col.  William  P.  Richardson 
(w),  Maj.  Jeremiah  Williams;  55th  Ohio,  Col.  John  C. 
Lee,  Lieut.-Col.  Charles  B.  Gam  bee;  75th  Ohio,  Col. 
Robert  Reily  (k),  Capt.  Benjamin  Morgan ;  107th  Ohio, 
Col.  Seraphim  Meyer  (w),  Lieut.-Col.  Charles  Mueller. 
Brigade  loss :  k,  45  ;  w,  348 ;  m,  299  =  692.  Unattached, 
8th  N.  Y.  (1  CO.),  Lieut.  Herman  Rosenki-anz,  Artillery  : 
13th  N.Y.,  Capt.  Julius  Dieckmanu.  Artillery  loss :  w, 
11;  m,2  =  l3. 
SECOND  DIVISION,  BriiT.-Gcn.  Adolph  von  Steinwchr. 

First  Iiri:/(id(\  Col.  A(lol])lius  Biiscli))fck  :  29th  N.  Y., 
Lieut.-Col.  Louis  Hartniann  (w),  Maj.  Alex,  von  Schlucm- 
bach;  154th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Patrick  H.  Jones  (w),  Lieut.-Col. 
Henry  C.  Loomis ;  27th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  Lorcnz  Cantador ; 
73d  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  William  Moore  (w).  Brigade  loss: 
k,  26;  w,  229;  m,  228=483.  Second  Brigade.  Brig.-Gen. 
Francis  C.  Barlow:  33d  Mass.,  Col.  Adin  P..  Underwood; 
134th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Charles  R.  Coster;  liiCth  N.  Y.,  Col. 
James  Wood,  Jr. ;  73d  Ohio,  Col.  Orlaud  Smith.  Brigade 
loss:  w,  9;  m,  14=23.  Artillery:  T,  1st  N.  Y.,  Capt. 
Michael  Wiedrich.  Artillery  loss :  k,  1 ;  w,  10 ;  m,  2  =  13. 
THIRD  DIVISION,  Mf^.-f  !eii.  Carl  Schurz.    StaflFloss  :  m",  1. 

First  JiHgade,  Brig.-G.ii.  Alexander  SchinMiiclfciinig: 
82d  ni..  Col.  Frederick  Heckcr  (w),  Maj.  Ferdinand  IT. 
Rolshauseu  (w),  Capt.  Jacob  La.salle;  Osth  N.  Y.,  Col. 


Gotthilf  Bourry ;  157th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Philip  P.  Brown,  Jr. ; 
61st  Ohio.  Col.  Stephen  J.  McGroarty ;  74th  Pa.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Adolph  von  Hartung.  Brigade  loss:  k,  84;  w,  215; 
m,  120  =  419.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  W.  Krzyzanowski : 
58th N.  Y.,  Capt.  Frederick  Braun  (k),  Capt.  Emil  Koenig; 
119th  N.  Y.,  Col.  EUas  Peissner  (k),  Lieut.-Col.  John  T. 
Lockman;  75th  Pa.,  Col.  Francis  Mahler;  26th  Wis.,  Col. 
William  H.  Jacobs.  Brigade  loss:  k,  36;  w,  219;  m, 
153  =  408.  TJnattnehed,  82d  Ohio,  Col.  James  S.  Robinson. 
Loss:  k,  8;  w,  48;  m,  25  =  81.  Artillery:  1,  1st  Ohio, 
Capt.  Hubert  Dilger.    Artillery  loss :  k,  1 ;  w,  10  =  11. 

RESERVE  ARTILLERY,  Licut.-Col.  Louis  Schiruier:  2d 
N.  Y.,  Capt.  Hermann  Jahn ;  K,  1st  Ohio,  Capt.  William 
L.  De  Beck ;  C,  1st  W.  Va.,  Capt.  Wallace  Hill.  Reserve 
artillery  loss  :  w,  3. 

TWELFTH  ARMY  CORPS,  Maj.-Gen.  Henry  W.  Slo- 
cum.    Staff  loss :  w,  1. 

Provost  Ouard :  10th  Me.  (battalion),  Capt.  John  D. 
Beardsley.    Loss :  w,  2 ;  m,  1  =  3. 

FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Alpheus  S.  Williams.    Staff 
loss :  m,  1. 

First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Joseph  F.  Kuipe :  5th  Conn,, 
Col.  Warren  W.  Packer  (c),  Lieut.-Col.  James  A.  Betts, 
Maj.  David  F.  Lane ;  28th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Elliott  W. 
Cook  (c),  Maj.  Theophilus  Fitzgerald;  46th  Pa.,  Maj. 
Cyrus  Strous  (k),  Capt.  Ed.  L.  Witman ;  128th  Pa.,  Col. 
Joseph  A.  Matthews  (c),  Maj.  Cephas  W.  Dyer.  Brigade 
loss :  k,  5 ;  w,  53 ;  in,  394  =  452.  Second  Brigade,  Col. 
Samuel  Ross :  20th  Conn.,  Lieut.-Col.  William  B.  Woos- 
ter  (c),  Maj.  Philo  B.  Buckingham;  3d  Md.,  Lieut.-Col. 
Gilbert  P.  Robinson ;  123d  N.  Y.,  Col.  Archibald  L.  Mc- 
Dougall;  145th  N.  Y.,  Col.  E.  Livingston  Price  (w),Capt, 
George  W.  Reid.  Brigade  loss:  k,  42;  w,  253;  m, 
204  =  499.  Third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Thomas  H.  Ruger : 
27th  Ind.,  Col.  Silas  Colgrove  (w) ;  2d  Mass.,  Col.  Sanuiel 
M.  Quincy;  13th,  N.  J.,  Col.  Ezra  A.  Carman,  Maj.  John 
Grimes  (w),  Capt.  George  A.  Beardsley;  107th  N.  Y., 
Col.  Alexanders.  Diveu;  3d  Wis.,  Col.  William  Ilawley. 
Brigade  loss  :  k,  81 ;  w,  465 ;  m,  68  =  614.  ^1  rlillcn/.  Capt. 
Robert  H.  Fitzhugh:  K,  1st  N.  Y.,  Lieut.  Edward  L. 
Bailey;  M,  1st  N.  Y.,  Lieut.  Charles  E.  Winegar  (c), 
Lieut.  John  D.  Woodbury;  F,  4th  U.  S.,  Lieut.  Franklin 
B.  Crosby  (k),  Lieut.  Edward  D.  Muhlenberg.  Artillery 
loss  :  k,  7 ;  w,  30 ;  m,  9  =  46. 
SECOND  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gcu.  John  W.  Geary. 

First  Brigade,  Col.  Charles  Candy :  5th  Ohio,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Robert  L.  Kilpatrick  (w),  Matj.  Henry  E.  Symmes; 
7th  Ohio,  Col.  William  R.  Creighton;  29th  Ohio,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Thomas  Clark ;  66th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  Eugene  Pow- 
ell ;  28th  Pa., Maj.  Lansford  F.  Chapman  (k),  Capt.  Conrad 
U.  Meyer;  147th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  Alio  Pardee,  Jr.  Bri- 
gade loss :  k,  58 ;  w,  314 ;  m,  151  =  523.  Second  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  Thomas  L.  Kane :  29th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  Will- 
iam Rickards,  Jr. ;  109th  Pa.,  Col.  Henry  J.  Stainrook 
(k),  Capt.  John  Young,  Jr. ;  111th  Pa.,  Col.  George  A. 
Cobham,  Jr.;  124th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  Simon  Litzenberg; 
125tli  Pa.,  Col.  Jacob  Higgins.  Brigade  loss :  k,  16 ;  w,  90, 
m,  33  =  139.  Third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  George  8.  Greene : 
60th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  John  C.  O.  Redingtcm  ;  78th  N.  Y., 
Maj.  Henry  R.  Stagg,  Capt.  William  H.  Raiulall ;  102d  N. 
Y.,  Col.  James  C.  Lane ;  137th  N.  Y..  Col.  David  Ireland; 
149th  N.  Y.,  Maj.  Abel  G.  Cook  (w),  Capt.  Oliver  T.  May, 
Lieut.-Col.  Koert  S.  Van  Voorhis.  Brigade  loss:  k,  49; 
\v,  219 ;  m,  260  =  528.    Artillery,  Capt.  Joseph  M.  Knap : 

E,  Pa.,  Lieut.  Charles  Atwell  (w),  Lieut.  James  D.  McGiU; 

F,  Pa.,  Capt.  Robert  B.  Hampton  (k),  Lieut.  James  P. 
Fleming.    Artillery  loss  :  k,  3 ;  w,  15  =  18. 

CAVALRY  CORPS,  4-  Brig.-Gen.  George  Stoneman. 
FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Alfred  Pleasonton. 

First  lirigadr.  Col.  Benjamin  F.  Davis;  8th 111., Lieut.- 
Col.  David  R.  Clendenin;  3d  Ind.,  Col.  George  IT.  Chap- 
man; 8th  N.  Y.. ;  9th  N.  Y.,  Col.  William  Sackett. 

Brigade  loss:  k,  1;  w.  8;  m,  22  =  31.  Second  Brigade, 
Col.  Thomas  C.  Dovin  :  L,  1st  Mich.,  Lieut.  John  K. 
Truax  ;  (Uli  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Duncan  McVicar  (k),  Capt. 
William  E.  Beardsley;  8th  Pa.,  Maj.  Pennock  Huey; 
17th  Pa.,   Col.  Josiah  H.  Kellogg;  6th  N.  Y.  Battery, 


4  The  Second  and  Third  Divisions,  First  llrigado,  First  Division,  and  the  Regul.ar  Reserve  Brigade,  with  Robertson's 
and  Tiilball's  batteries,  ou  the  "  Stouemau  Raid." 


THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  IN  THE  CHANCELLORSyiLLE  CAMPAIGN.  237 


Lieut.  Joseph  W.  Martin.    Brigade  loss:  k,12;  w,54;  ni, 

134  =  200. 

SECOND  DIVISION,  Brig-Gen.  William  W.  Averell. 

First  Brigade,  Col.  Horace  B.  Sargent:  Ist  Mass., 
Lieut.-Col.  Greely  S.  Curtis;  4th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Louis  P. 
DiCesuola;  6th  Ohio,  Ma,j.  Benjamin  C.  Stanhope;  let 
R.  I.,  Lieut.-Col.  John  L.  Thompson.  Brigade  loss:  w, 
6;  m,  2  =  8.  Second  Brij/dde,  Col.  John  B.  Mcintosh  :  3d 
Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  Edward  S.  Jones;  4th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col. 
William  E.  Doster:  16th  Pa.,  Lieut.-CoL  Lorenzo  D. 
Rogers.  Artillery  :  A,  2d  U.  S.,  Capt.  John  C.  Tidball. 
THIRD  DIVISION,  Brig.-Geu.  David  McM.  Gregg. 

First  Brigade,  Col.  Judson  Kilpatriek:  Ist  Me.,  C(d. 
Calvin  S.  Douty;  2d  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Henry  E.  Davies, 
Jr. ;  10th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  William  Irvine.  Brigade 
loss  :  k,  1 ;  w,  1 ;  m,  24  =  26.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  Percy 
Wyndham  :  12th  111.,  Lieut.-Col.  Hasbrouck  Davis ;  Ist 
Md.,  Lieut.-Col.  James  M.  Deems  ;  Ist  N.  J.,  Lieut.-Col. 
Virgil  Brodrick;  Ist  Pa.,  Col.  John  P.  Taylor.  Brigade 
loss:  k,  2;  w,  3;  m,  40  =  45.  Reserve  Cavalry  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  John  Buford:  6th  Pa.,  Maj.  Robert  Morris, 
Jr. ;  IstU.  S.,  Capt.  R.  S.  C.  Lord;  2dU.  S.,  Maj.  Charles  J. 
Whiting;  5th  U.  S.,  Capt.  James  E.  Harrison;  6th  U.  S., 
Capt.  George  C.  Cram.  Brigade  loss :  k,  1 ;  w,  3 ;  m, 
75  =  79.  Artillery,  Capt.  James  M.  Robertson  :  B  and  L, 
2d  U,  S.,  Lieut.  Albert  O.  Vincent;  M,  2d  U.  S.,  Lieut. 
Robert  Clarke;  E,  4th  U.  8.,  Lieut.  Samuel  8.  Elder. 


The  casualties  in  the  Union  forces  during  the  campaign 
were  as  follows : 


s 

1 

It 

(iemiaiina  Ford  April  29 

1 

2 

19 

4 
.1 

3 

1082 
493 

4 

18 

144 

1 
3 

\l 

6849 

2710 

"36 

24 

4214 

1497 

5 

Fiaiiklin'.>i   Crossing,    April    29  — 

Frt/Jnii!?lVN'  f'ros8ingV'Ai)rii"'29  — 

st"i.nrHMVr">l^tia,'Ai)V.29  — Mayli 
Old  Wiiu. MM  ss  Tavern,  April  30.. 

20 

172 

150 

2 

3 

Sp.itsvlvaiiia  r.  U.,  AprU  30 

Kapi.ian  Slati.iii,  May  1 

CliaiiccUc.isvnie.May  1-6 

FrLdtiick.sbuig,   or    Marye's   and 
Salem  Heights,  May  3,4 

51 

39 

12,145 

4,700 

Grand  total 

1606 

9762 

5919 

17,287 

According  to  the  returns  for  April  30, 1863  ("Ottieial 
Records,"  Vol.  XXV.,  Pt.  II.,  p.  320),  the  eflfective 
strength  of  Hooker's  army  was.  in  round  numbers,  about 
130,000,  distributed  as  follows:  Infantry,  111,000;  cavalry, 
11,000 ;  and  artillery,  8000,  with  404  pieces  of  the  latter  arm. 


THE    CONFEDERATE   ARMY. 
ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA.—  General  Robert  E.  Lee. 


FIRST  ARMY  CORPS.  I 
MfLAWS's  DIVISION,  Majj.-Gen.  Lafayette  McLaws. 

Wofford's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  W.    T.   Woflord:   16th 

Ga., ;  \  18th  Ga., ;  24th  Ga., ;  Cobb's 

(Ga.)  Legion, ;  Phillips's  (Ga.)  Legion, .  Bri- 
gade loss  :  k,  74  ;  w,  479 ;  m,  9  =  562.  Semmes's  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  Paul  J.  Semmes :  10th  Ga.,  Lieut.-Col.  W.  C. 
Holt;  50th  Ga.,  Lieut.-Col.  F.  Kearse;  51st  Ga.,  Col.  W. 
M.  Slaughter  (ki,  Lieut.-C(d.  Edward  Ball  (w) ;  53d  Ga., 
Col.  James  P.  Siuims.  Brigade  loss :  k,  85  ;  w,  492  ;  m,  26 
=  603.  Kershaw's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Joseph  B.  Ker- 
shaw: 2d  8.  C,  Col.  John  D.  Kennedy;  3d  S.  C,  Maj. 
R.  C.  Maflfett;  7th  8.  C,  Col.  Elbert  Bland;  8th  S.  C, 
Col.  John  W.  Henagan;  15th  S.  C,  Lieut.-Col.  Joseph 
F.  Gist;  3d  8.  C.  Battalion,  Lieut.-Col.  W.  G.  Rice. 
Brigade  loss:  k,  12;  w,  90;  m,  2  =  104.  Barksdale's 
Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  William  Barksdale  :  13th  Miss.,  Col. 
J.  W.  Carter;  17th  Miss.,  Col.  W.  D.  Holder;  18th  Miss., 
CoL  Thomas  M.  Griffin;  2l8t  Miss.,  Col.  B.  G.  Hum- 
phreys. Brigade  loss:  k,  43  ;  w,  208;  m,  341  =  592.  Artil- 
lery, Col.  Henry  C.  Cabell:  (ia.  Battery  (Troup  Art'y), 
Capt.  H.  H.  Carlton  ;  Ga.  Battery,  Capt.  John  C.  Fraser ; 
Va.  Battery  (ist  Howitzers),  ("apt.  E.  S.  McCarthy;  N. 
(;.  Battery,  Cai»t.  B.  C.  Manly.  Artillery  loss :  k,  5 ;  w, 
21 ;  m,  2  =  28. 
ANDERSON'S  DIVISION,  Miy  -Gcn.  Richard  H.  Anderson. 

Wilcox's  Brigade,  Brig.-Geu.  Cadmus  M.  Wilcox  :  8th 
Ala.,  Col.  Y.  L.  Royston  (w),  Licut.-Col.  H.  A.  Herbert; 
9th  Ala.,  Miy.  J.  H.  J.  Williams;  10th  Ala.,  Col.  William 
II.  Forney;  11th'  Ala.,  Col.  ,L  C.  C.  Sanders;  14th  Ala., 
Col.  L.  Pinckard  (w).  Brigade  loss :  k,  72 ;  w,  372  ;  m,  91 
=.53.-..  yVright's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  A.  R.  Wright:  3d 
Ga.,  Mixj.  J.  F.  Joncis  (w),  Capt.  C.  H.  Andrews;  22d  (^a., 
Lieut.-Col.  J.  Wasden ;  48th  Ga.,  Lieut.-Col.  R.  W.  Cars- 
well;  2d  Ga.  Battalion,  MiU-  George  W.  Ross.  Brigade 
loss:  k,  25;  w,  271=296.  Mahone's  Brigade,  Brig.-{Jen. 
William  Mahone:  6th  Va.,  Col.  George  T.  Rogers;  12th 
Va.,  Li('Ut.-Col.  E.  M.  Feild;  Ifith  Va..  Licut.-Col.  R.  O. 
Whitehead;  41st  Va.,  Col.  William  A.  Parham;  61st  Va., 
CoL  V.  D.  (Jroner.  Brigade  h)8s:  k,  24;  w,  134;  m,  97  = 
255.  Posey's  Brigade,  Brig.-Geu.  Carnot  Posey:  12th 
Miss..  Lieut.-Col.  M.  B.  Harris  (w),  Miijl.  S.  B.  Thomas; 


16th  Miss.,  Col.  Samuel  E.  Baker;  19th Miss.,  Col.  N.  H. 
Harris;  48th  Miss.,  Col.  Joseph  M.  Jayne  (w).  Brigade 
loss:  k,  41;  w,  184;  m,  65  =  290.  Ferry's  Brigade,  Brig.- 
Gen.  E.  A.  Perry  :  2d  Fla., ;  5th  Fla., ;  8th  Fla., 

.  Brigade  loss:  k,  21 ;  w%88=109.  Artillery,  lAeut.- 

Col.  J.  J.  Garnett :  Va.  Battery,  Capt.  C.  R.  Grandy ;  Va. 
Battery  (Lewis's),  Lieut.  Nathan  Penick;  La.  Battery, 
Capt.  Victor  Maurin;  Va.  Battery,  Capt.  Joseph  D. 
Moore.    Artillery  loss :  k,  1 ;  w,  13  =  14. 

ARTILLERY   RESERVE. 

Alexander's  Battalion,  Col.  E.  P.  Alexander :  Va.  Bat- 
tery (Eubank's);  Va.  Battery  (Jordan's);  La.  Battery 
(Moody's) ;  Va.  Battery  (Parker's) ;  S.  C.  Battery 
(Rhett's) ;  Va.  Battery  (Woolfolk's).  Battalion  loss:  k, 
6;  w,  35;  m,  21=62.  Washington  (La.)  Artillery,  Col.  J. 
B.Walton:  1st  Co.  (Squires's);  2d  Co.  (Richardson'si ;  3d 
Co.  (Miller's) ;  4th  Co.  (Eshlemau's).  Battalion  loss:  k, 
4;  w,  8;  m,  33  =  4.5. 

SECOND  ARMY  CORPS,  Lieut.-Gen.  Thomas  J.  Jack- 
son (m  w),  Miy.-(;en.  Ambrose  P.  Hill  (w),  Brig.-Geu.  R. 
E.  Rodes,  Maj.-Gen.  James  E.  B.  Stuart.  Staflf  loss :  k, 
2 ;  w,  3  =  5. 

LIGHT  DIVISION.  Miy.-Gen.  Ambrose  P.  Hill,  Brig.-Gen. 
Henry  Heth  (w),  Brig.-Gen.  William  D.  Pender 
(w),  Brig.-Gen.  James  J.  Archer.  Staff  lose:  k,  2; 
w,  2  =  4. 

Heth's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Henry  Heth.  Col.  J.  M. 
Brockenbrongh :  40th  Va..  Col.  J.  M.  Broekenbrough, 
Lieut.-Col.  F.  W.  Cox  (w),  Capt.  T  E.  Belts;  47th  Va.. 
Col.  Rol)ert  M.  Mayo;  5.5th  Va.Col.  Francis  Mallory  (k), 
Lieut.-Col.  William  S.  Christian  (wi,  MiO-  A.  D.  Saunders 
(k).  Lieut.  R.  L.  Williams.  Maj.  Evan  Rice :  22d  Va.  Bat- 
talion, Lieut.-Col.  E.  P.  Tayloc.  Brigade  loss  :  k.  33;  w, 
270  =  303.  Thoinass  Brigade,  Britx.-Ciou.  E.  L.Thomas: 
14th  Ga..  Col.  R.  W.  F(dsom  :  35th  Ga..  Capt.  John  Duke; 
45th  Ga.,  Lieut.-Col.  W.  L.  (Jdce;  49th  Ga..  Ma.).  8.  T. 
Player.  Brigade  loss:  k.  21:  w.  1,'-.6=177.  Lanes  Bri- 
gade, Brig.-Oon.  James  H.  Lane :  7th  N.  C.  Col.  E.  G. 
Haywood  (w»,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  L.  Hill  (k).  Maj.  William  L. 
Davi<lsoii  (w),  Capt.  N.  A.  Pool:  ISth  N.  C.  C<d  Thomas 
J.  Purdie  (k).  Lieut.-Col.  Forney  (Jeorge  (w),  Miv).  John 
D.  Barry  ;  28th  N.  C.  Col.  8.  D.  Lowe.  Capt.  Edward  F. 


id   lMckctt'8  divisions  ami    DoarinK's  and  Henry's  nrtillory  battalions. 


ji  l.icnit.-Ocn.  .Tames  Longstrcct,  with   Hi 
absent  in  Sdutli-eastern  Virffiiiia. 

•V  Thp  (lash  iiKlicato.s  tliat  th»^  mime  of  the  commanding  ollieer  lias  not  been  foiiuil  lu  the  "  Ulllclal  Record8."-EI>ITOKS. 


238    THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  IN  THE  CHANCELLORSyiLLE  CAMPAIGN. 


Lovill;  33(1  N.  C,  Col.  Clark  M.  Avery  (w),  Capt.  Joseph 
H.  Saunders ;  37tli  N.  C,  Col.  W.  M.  Barbour  (w).  Bri- 
gade loss:  k,  161;  w,  626;  m,  122  =  909.  McGowarVs  BH- 
ffade,  Brig.-Gen.  Samuel  Mc<Jowan  (w),  Col.  O.  E. 
Edwards  (w),  Col.  Abner  Perrin,  Col.  D.  H.  Hamilton : 
1st  S.  C.  (Prov.  Army),  Col.  D.  H.  Hamilton,  Capt.  W.  P. 
Shooter;  1st  S.  C.  Rifles,  Col.  James  M.  Perrin  (m  w), 

Lieut.-Col.  F.  E.  Harrison;  12th  S.  C, ;  13th  S.  C, 

Col.  O.  E.  Edwards,  Lieut.-Col.  B.  T.  Brockman ;  14th  S. 
C,  Col.  Abner  Perrin.  Brigade  loss:  k,  46;  w, 402;  m, 
7  =  455.  Archer's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  James  J.  Archer, 
Col.  B.  D.  Fry :  13th  Ala.,  Col.  B.  D.  Fry ;  5th  Ala.  Bat- 
talion, Capt.  S.  D.  Stewart  (k),  Capt.  A.  N.  Porter;  1st 
Tenn.  (Prov.  Army),  Lieut.-Col.  N.  J.  George;  7th  Tenn., 
Lleut.-Col.  John  A.Fite ;  14th Tenn.,  Col.William  McComb 
(w),  Capt.  R.  C.  Wilson.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  44;  w,  305;  m, 
16  =  365.  Pender's  Brigade,  Brig.  Gen.  W.  D.  Pender: 
13th  N.  C,  CoL  Alfred  M.  Scales  (w),  Lieut.-Col.  J.  H. 
Hyman;  IGth  N.  C,  CoL  John  8.  McElroy  (w),  Lieut.- 
Col.  William  A.  Stowe  (w) ;  22d  N.  C,  Lieut.-Col.  Chris.  C. 

Cole  (k) ;  34lh  N.  C, ;  38th  N.  C,  Lieut.-Col.  John 

Ashford.  Brigade  loss:  k,  116;  w,  567;  m,  68  =  751. 
Artillery,  Col.  R.  L.  Walker,  Maj.  William  J.  Pegram :  S. 

C,  Battery,  Capt.  E.  B.  Brunson ;  Va.  Battery  (Cren- 
shaw's), Lieut.  John  H.  Chamberlayne ;  Va.  Battery, 
Capt.  Greenlee  Davidson  (m  w) ;  Va.  Battery,  Lieut. 
Joseph  McGraw;  Va.  Battery,  Capt.  E.  A.  Marye. 
Artillery  loss  :  k,  5 ;  w,  28  =  33. 

D.  H.  HILL'S  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  R.  E.  Rodes,  Brig.-Gen. 

8.  D.  Ramseur. 
Rodes's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  R.  E.  Rodes,  Col.  E.  A. 
O'Neal  (w).  Col.  J.  M.  Hall :  3d  Ala.,  Capt.  M.  F.  Bon- 
ham  ;  5th  Ala.,  Col.  J.  M.  Hall,  Lieut.-Col.  E.  L.  Hob.son 
(w),  Capt.  W.  T.  Rufus  (m  w),  Capt.  T.  M.  Riley;  6th 
Ala.,  Col.  James  N.  Lightfoot;  12th  Ala.,  Col.  Samuel 

B.  Pickeus  ;  26th  Ala.,  Col.  E.  A.  O'Neal,  Lieut.-Col.  John 
S.  Garvin  (w),  Lieut.  M.  J.  Taylor.  Brigade  loss:  k,  90; 
w,  538;  m,  188  =  816.  Colquitt's  Brigade,  Brig.-Geu.  A. 
H.  Colquitt :  6th  Ga.,  Col.  John  T.  Lofton  ;  19th  Ga.,  Col. 
A.  J.  Hutchins;  23d  Ga.,  Col.  Emory  F.  Best;  27th  Ga., 
Col.  C.  T.  Zachry  ;  28th  Ga.,  Col.  Tully  Graybill.  Brigade 
loss:  k,  9;  w,  128;  m,  312  =  449.  Ramscnr's  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  S.  D.  Ramseur  (w).  Col.  F.  M.  Parker:  2dN.  C, 
Col.  W.  R.  Cox  (w) ;  4th  N.  C,  Col.  Bryan  Grimes;  14th 
N.  C,  CoL  R.  T.  Bennett;  30th  N.  C,  Col.  F.  M.  Parker. 
Brigade  loss :  k,  151 ;  w,  529 ;  m,  108  =  788.  Dolcs's  Bri- 
gade, Brig.-Gen.  George  Doles :  4th  Ga.,  Col.  Philip 
Cook  (w),  Lieut.-Col.  D.  R.  E.  Winn;  12th  Ga.,  Col. 
Edward  Willis;  21st  Ga.,  Col.  J.  T.  Mercer;  44th  Ga., 
Col.  J.  B.  Estes.  Brigade  loss :  k,  66 ;  w,  343 ;  m,  28  =  437. 
Iverson's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Alfred  Iverson :    5th  N. 

C,  Col.  Thomas  M.  Garrett  (w),  Lieut.-Col.  J.  W.  Lea 
(w),  Maj.  William  J.  Hill  (w),  Capt.  S.  B.  West;. 12th  N. 
C,  Maj.  D.  P.  Rowe  (k),  Lieut.-Col.  R.  D.  Johnston  ;  20th 
N.  C,  CoL  T.  F.  Toon  (w),  Lieut.-Col.  Nelson  Slough  ;  23d 
N.  C,  CoL  D.  H.  Christie.  Brigade  loss:  k,  67 ;  w,  330; 
m,  73  =  470.  Arlillcry,  Lieut.-Col.  T.  H.  Carter:  Ala. 
Battery,  Capt.  William  J.  Reese ;  Va.  Battery,  Capt.  W. 
P.  Carter;  Va.  Battery,  Capt.  C.  W.  Fry;  Va.  Battery, 
Capt.  R.  C.  M.  Page.  Artillery  loss  :  k,  9;  m,  37=46. 
EARLY'S  DIVISION,  Maj.-Geu.  Jubal  A.  Early. 

Gorrfow'sB/vV/af/e,  Brig.-Gen.  John  B.Gordon:  13th  Ga., 

;  26th  Ga., ;  31st  Ga., ;  38th  Ga., ; 

60th  Ga., ;  61st  Ga..  .     Brigade  loss  :  k,  16  ; 

w,  145  =  161.     Hoke's   Brigade,    Brig.-Gen.    Robert   F. 

Hoke  (w) :  6th  N.  C, ;  21st  N.  C, ;  54th  N. 

C, ;  57th  N.  C, ;  1st  N.  C.  Battalion . 

Brigade   loss  :    If,  35 ;    w,  195  =  230.      Smith's   Brigade, 

Brig.-Gen.  William  Smith  :   13th  Va., ;    49th  Va., 

;  52d  Va., ;  58th  Va.,  Col.  F.  H.  Board.    Bri- 

«cade  loss:  k,  11 ;  w,  75=  86.    Hays's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen. 

Harry  T.  Hays:  5th  La., ;  6th  La., ;  7th  La., 

;  8th  La., ;  9th  La., .    Brigade  loss  :  k, 

63;  w,  306=369.  Artillery,  Lieut.-Col.  R.  S.  Andrews: 
Md.  Battery  (Brown's) ;  Va.  Battery  (Carpenter's) ;  Md. 
Battery  (Dciment's) ;  Va.  Battery  (Raiue'e).  Artillery 
loss  (not  reported). 


TRIMBLE'S  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  R.  E.  Colston. 

First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  E.  F.  Paxton  (k),  Col.  J.  H.  S. 
Funk  :  2d  Va.,  Col.  J.  Q.  A.  Nadenbousch;  4th  Va.,  Maj. 
William  Terry ;  5th  Va.,  Col.  J.  H.  S.  Funk,  Lieut.-Col. 
H.  J.  Williams;  27th  Va.,  Col.  J.  K.  Edmondson  (w), 
Lieut.-Col.  D.  M.  Shriver;  33d  Va.,  Col.  A.  Spengler. 
Brigade  loss  :  k,  54 ;  w,  430;  m,  9  =493  Second  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  J.  R.  Jones,  Col.  T.  S.  Garuett  (k).  Col.  A.  S. 
Vandeventer :  21st  Va.,  Capt.  John  B.  Moseley  ;  42d  Va., 
Lieut.-Col.  R.  W.  Withei-s ;  44th  Va.,  Maj.  N.  Cobb,  Capt. 
Thomas  R.  Buckner ;  48th  Va.,  Col.  T.  8.  Garnett,  Maj. 
Oscar  White;  50th  Va.,  Col.  A.  S.  Vandeventer,  Maj.  L. 
J.  Perkins.  Capt.  Frank  W.  Kelly.  Brigade  loss:  k,  52; 
w,  420  =  472.  Third  Brigadf  (Colston's),  Col.  E.  T.  H.War- 
ren (w),  Col.  T.  ^'.  Williams  (w),  Lieut.-Col.  S.  D.  Thru.s- 
ton  (w),  Lieut.-Col.  H.  A.  Brown  :  1st  N.  C,  Col.  J.  A. 
McDowell  (w) ;  3d  N.  C,  Lieut.-Col.  S.D.  Thruston  ;  10th 
Va.,  Col.  E.  T.  H.  Warren,  Lieut.-Col.  S.  T.  Walker  (k), 
Maj.  Joshua  Stover  (k),  Capt.  A.  H.  Sraals;  23d  Va., 
Lieut.-Col.  Simeon  T.  Walton ;  37th  Va.,  Col.  T.  V.  Will- 
iams. Brigade  loss  :  k,  128;  w,  594;  m,  80  =  802.  Fourth 
Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  F.  T.  Nicholls  (w),  Col.  J.  M.  Will- 
iams :  Ist  La.,  Capt.  E.  D.  Willett ;  2d  La.,  Col.  J.  M.  Will- 
iams, Lieut.-Col.  R.  E.  Burke;  10th  La.,  Lieut.-Col.  John 
M.  Legett  (k);  14th  La.,  Lieut.-Col.  D.  Zable;  15th  La., 
Capt.  William  C.  Michie.  Brigade  loss  :  k,  47 ;  w,  266  ; 
m,  10  =  323.  Artillery,  Lieut.-Col.  H.  P.  Jones:  Va. 
Battery,  Capt.  J.  McD.  Carrington ;  Va.  Battery 
(Gai-ber's),  Lieut.  Alexander  H.  Fultz;  Va.  Battery, 
Capt.  W.  A.  Tanner ;  La.  Battery,  Capt.  C.  Thompson. 
Artillery  loss  (not  reported). 

ARTILLERY  RESERVE,  Col.  8.  ClUtchfleld. 

Brown's  Battalion,  Col.  J.  Thomp.son  Brown  :  Va.  Bat- 
tery (Brooke's) ;  Va.  Battery  (Dance's) ;  Va.  Battery 
(Graham's) ;  Va.  Battery  (Hupp's) ;  Va.  Battery 
(Smith's) ;  Va.  Battery  (Watson's).  Battalion  loss  (not 
reported).  Mcintosh's  Battalion,  Maj.  D.  G.  Mcintosh: 
Ala.  Battery  (Hurt's) ,  Va.  Battery  (Johnson's) ;  Va. 
Battery  (Lusk's) ;  Va.  Battery  (Wooding's).  Battalion 
loss  (not  reported). 

RESERVE  ARTILLERY,  Brig  -Gen.  WilUam  N.  Pen- 
dleton. Sumter  (Ga.)  Battalion,  Lieut.-Col.  A.  S.  Cutis: 
Battery  A  (Ross's) ;  Battery  B  (Patterson's) ;  Battery  C 
(Wingfleld's).  Battalion  loss :  w,  3.  Nelson's  Battalion, 
Lieut.-Col.  William  Nelson :  Va.  Battery  (Kirkpatrick's) ; 
Va.  Battery  (Massie's) ;  Ga.  Battery  (Milledge's).  Bat- 
talion loss  (not  rejiorted). 

CAVALRY,  Maj.-Geu.  James  E.  B.  Stuart. 

Second   Brigade,   Brig.-Gen.  Fitzhugh  Lee :    1st  Va., 

;  2d  Va., ;  3d  Va.,  Col.  Thomas  H.  Owen  ;  4th 

Va.,  Col.  Williams  C.  Wlckham.  Brigade  loss :  k,  4 ;  w, 
7  =  11.  Third  Brigade  (engaged  in  resistiug  "  the  Stone- 
man  raid"),  Brig.-Gen.  W.  H.  F.  Lee:  2d  N.  C,  Lieut.- 
Col.  William  H.  Payne;  5th  Va.,  Col.  Thomas  L.  Rosser ; 

9th  Va.,  Col.  R.  L.  T.  Beale;  10th  Va., ;  13th  Va., 

Col.  John  R.  Chambliss,  Jr. ;  15th  Va.,  .    Brigade 

loss  (not  reported).  Horse  Artillery,  Maj.  R.  F.  Beck- 
ham :  Va.  Battery,  Capt.  M.  N.  Moorman  ;  Va.  Battery, 
Capt.  James  Breathed ;  Va.  Battery,  Capt.  William  M, 
McGregor.    Horse  Artillery  loss:  k,  4;  w,  6  =  10. 

The  total  loss  of  the  Confedeiate  Army,  based  mainly 
upon  the  reports  of  brigade  and  division  commanders, 
aggregated  1649  killed,  9106  wounded,  and  1708  captured 
or  missing  =  12,463. 

The  return  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  for  March 
31st,  1863  ("  Official  Records,"  Vol.  XXV.,  Pt.  II.,  p.  696), 
shows  an  "  effective  total  "  of  all  arms  of  57,112.  To  this 
number  there  should  be  added  the  net  increase  during 
the  mouth  of  April,  a  period  of  "  rest  and  recruiting,"  of 
perhaps  3000,  and  say  l.''iOO  for  the  reserve  artillery  of 
Jackson's  corps,  not  reported  on  the  return  for  March. 
This  ad<litioii  gives  a  total  of  61,612.  Then,  deducting 
Hampton's  brigade  of  cav.alry,  recruiting  south  of  the 
James  River,  and  numbering,  perhaps,  1600,  the  effective 
force  of  Lee's  Army  on  the  Rappahannock  may  be 
estimated  at  not  less  than  60,000,  with  probably  170 
pieces  of  artillery. 


PHOTOGRAPH. 


HOOKER'S  APPOINTMENT   AND  REMOVAL. 


BY   CHARLES   P.    BENJAMIN.  I 


~YT"rHEN,  after  the  Mud  March  J^  that  succeeded 
VV  the  disaster  of  Fredericksburg,  General 
Burnside,  in  a  fit  of  humiliation,  telegraphed  to 
Washington  requesting,  for  the  second  time,  to  be 
relieved,  the  question  of  his  successor  was  already 
being  considered  as  a  probability.  Though  stung 
by  the  loud  call  that  went  up  for  McClellan  from 
the  army  that  had  twice  met  disaster  after  part- 
ing with  him,  the  cabinet  were  not  shaken  in  the 
conclusion  that  McClellan  must  not  be  restored,  for 
the  jocund  Seward,  equally  with  the  patient  Lin- 
coln, drew  the  line  at  a  military  dictatorship,  such 
as  would  be  virtually  implied  by  a  second  restora- 
tion, under  such  pressure.  But  while  firm,  the 
authorities  were  circumspect,  and  concluded  that 
it  would  not  be  prudent  to  increase  the  tension 
between  themselves  and  a  possible  praetorian 
camp  by  sending  an  outsider  to  take  the  com- 
mand from  Burnside.  Subject  to  this  conclusion. 
General  Ilalleck  and  Secretary  Stanton  favored  the 
transfer  of  Rosecrans,  for  whom  McClellan  might 


be  expected  to  say  a  good  word  to  supplement  his 
inherent  strength  as  a  repeatedly  victorious  com- 
mander; but  it  was  then  thought  injudicious  to 
put  another  Western  man  in  command. 

The  choice  being  narrowed  to  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  a  process  of  exclusion  began.  Franklin 
was  under  a  cloud  [see  note,  p.  21 G]  and  was  con- 
sidered out  of  the  question ;  Sumner  had  many 
qualifications,  but  his  age  and  growing  feebleness 
were  beyond  remedy ;  Couch  was  a  possible  second, 
and  still  more  likely  third  choice  ;  and,  briefly,  the 
selection  was  found  to  lie  among  Hooker,  Reynolds, 
and  Meade.  4-  The  first-named  had  a  strong  popu- 
lar lead,  but  General  Halleck,  backed  by  the 
Secretary  of  War,  contended  that  there  were  rea- 
sons of  an  imperative  character  why  he  should  not 
be  intrusted  with  an  independent  command  of  so 
high  a  degree  of  responsibility.  Stress  was  laid 
upon  the  fact  that  in  the  dispositions  for  the  attack 
on  Marye's  Heights,  General  Burnside,  who  at  that 
time  could  have  had  no  valid  motive  for  jealousy 


^  The  writer  of  tliis  paper  oconpiorl  responsible  and 
conti(l(iiti;il  piiKitidiis  at  the  licadciuartcrs  of  the  Army 
of  tlie  Potomac  ami  in  tlic  War  Di  paitmeiit.— Kditors. 
3>  In  liiHofliiial  report  of  t  lie  liaiipiiliaimoek  eanipaigu, 
General  IJurnside  sayn  :  "I  made  four  diHtinct  attempts, 
between  November "'.)tli,  I.SC'J,  and  .Tanuary  ■Jr.tli,  1H63. 
The  llrst  failed  for  want  of  pontooim;  the  Hceond  was 
the  battle  of  FrederiekHlmrfr;  the  third  was  stopped  by 
the  I'resident ;  and  the  fourtli  wa8  defeatecl  by  the  elc- 
jnents  or  other  eanses.  After  the  Inst  attempt  to  move 
I  was,  on  January  '25th,  18GU,  relieved  of  th(>  eonmiand  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomae."  The  fourth  attempt  men- 
tioned by  General  Burnside  has  passed  into  history  as 
the  "Mud  March."  The  phm  was  to  move  Franklin's 
two  corps,  or  the  L(>ft  Grand  Division,  to  Banks's  Ford, 
where  Franklin  was  to  cross  and  seize,  the  heijrhts  on 
the  river  road  north  of  the  Orange  Turnpike.  Franklin 
was  to  be  supported  by  Hooker  and  Sumner,  with  the 
Ceutcr  and  Right  Grand  Divisions.  Franklin  and 
Hooker  marched  from  their  camps  and  bivouacked 
near  Banks's  Ford  on  Jauuarv  20th :  but  a  rata  storiu  set 


in  that  evening:  makluj?  the  roads  impassable  for  pon- 
toon wagons,  and  after  several  attempts  to  haul  the 
boats  to  the  river  by  hand  the  movement  was  aban- 
doned. The  artillery  and  wagons  became  mired,  and 
the  army,  with  all  of  its  necessary  material,  was  In 
fact  foot-fast  in  the  soft,  clayey  soil  that  abounds  in 
that  rtgion.  In  a  dejected  mood  the  army  splashed 
back  to  Its  old  camps  around  Falmouth.    See  also  p. 

118.—  EDITOR.S. 

1 1  have  been  told  recently,  on  hearsay  testimouy, 
that  Sedgwick  was  sounded  and  said  ho  ought  not  to  be 
apiiointed  lieeause  he  was  a  McClellan  nnin.  I  never 
heard  that  Sedgwick  was  ever  proposed  as  suectssor  to 
Burnside.  and  I  cannot  believe  it,  knowing  the  /i»i- 
itrd  though  warm  reganl  of  .'Secretary  Stanton  for  him. 
Stanton  always  spoke  of  Sedgwick  as  a  bravi>,  thorough- 
going soldier,  who  staiil  in  camp,  gave  Washington  a 
wide  berlh,  ami  did  not  intrigue  against  his  superiors; 
but  I  never  heard  him  attribute  to  Sedgwick  such  high 
(luallties  for  a  great  couumiud  as  ho  imputed  to  eome 
other  olllcere  of  that  army.— C.  F.  B. 


240 


HOOKER'S  APPOINTMENT  AND  REMOVAL. 


of  Hooker,  had  intrusted  him  with  no  important 
part,  although  he  was  present  on  the  field  and  of 
equal  rank  with  Sumner  and  Franklin,  to  whom  the 
active  duties  of  the  battle  were  assigned.  President 
Lincoln  apparently  yielded  to  the  views  of  those  in 
charge  of  the  military  department  of  affairs,  and 
thereupon  Halleck  confidentially  inquired  of  Rey- 
nolds if  he  was  prepared  to  accept  the  command. 
Reynolds  replied  that  he  expected  to  obey  all  lawful 
orders  coming  to  his  hands,  but  as  the  communi- 
cation seemed  to  imply  the  possession  of  an  option 
in  himself,  he  deemed  it  his  duty  to  say  frankly 
that  he  could  not  accept  the  command  in  a  volun- 
tary sense,  unless  a  liberty  of  action  should  be 
guaranteed  to  him  considerably  beyond  any  which 
he  had  reason  to  expect.  He  was  thereupon 
dropped,  and  the  choice  further  and  finally  re- 
stricted to  Hooker  and  Meade,  with  the  chances  a 
hundred  to  one  in  favor  of  the  latter  by  reason  of 
the  fixed  conviction  of  the  Secretary  of  War  that  the 
former  ought  not  to  be  chosen  in  any  contingency. 
Stanton  knew  that  there  were  two  Hookers  in  the 
same  man.  He  knew  one  as  an  excellent  officer, 
mentally  strong,  clever  and  tireless,  and  charming 
(almost  magnetic)  in  address.  It  was  the  other 
Hooker  on  whom  he  wished  to  take  no  chances. 

Hooker  and  Meade  were  in  camp,  attending  to 
such  military  duties  as  the  lull  of  action  gave  oc- 
casion for,  neither  having  taste  nor  talent  for 
intrigue,  each  aware  that  "something"  was  afoot, 
but  both  supposing  that  the  ferment  concerned 
Hooker  and  Reynolds,  and,  possibly,  some  third 
man  beyond  the  lines  of  the  army.  But  there 
were  men  about  Hooker  who  believed  in,  and 
hoped  to  rise  with  him,  and  who,  at  all  events, 
could  afford  to  take  the  chances  of  success  or  fail- 
ure with  him ;  and  these  men  were  rich  in  personal 
and  external  resources  of  the  kinds  needed  for  the 
combination  of  political,  financial,  and  social  forces 
to  a  common  end.  By  their  exertions,  such  influ- 
ences had  been  busy  for  Hooker  ever  since  the 
recent  battle,  greatly  aided  by  the  unselfish  labor 
of  earnest  men  who  believed  that  Hooker's  military 
reputation  (the  pugnacious  disposition  implied  in 
his  popular  cognomen  of  "  Fighting  Joe")  and  his 
freedom  from  suspicion  of  undue  attachment  to  the 
fortunes  of  General  MeClellan,  pointed  him  out  as 
the  man  for  the  occasion  by  the  unerring  processes 
of  natural  selection.  The  attitude  and  character 
of  the  Secretary  of  War,  however,  justified  nothing 
but  despair  until  connection  was  made  with  a 
powerful  faction  which  had  for  its  object  the  ele- 
vation of  Mr.  Chase  to  the  Presidency  at  the  end  of 
Mr.  Lincoln's  term.  Making  every  allowance  for 
the  strengtli  and  availability  of  Mr.  Chase,  as 
against  Mr.  Lincoln  or  any  other  civilian  candi- 
date, his  friends  did  not  conceal  from  themselves 
that  the  general  who  should  conquer  the  rebellion 
would  have  the  disposal  of  the  next  Presidency, 
and  they  were  on  the  lookout  for  the  right  mili- 
tary alliance  when  they  came  into  communication 
with  Hooker's  friends  and  received  their  assur- 
ances that,  if  it  should  bo  his  good  fortune  to 
bring  the  war  to  a  successful  close,  nothing  could 
possibly  induce  him  to  accept  other  than  military 
honors  in   recognition   of   his   services.     General 


Hooker  thereupon  became  the  candidate  of  Mr. 
Chase's  friends.  Hooker  probably  knew  of  these 
dickerings.  Certainly  Stanton  did,  through  a  friend 
in  Chase's  own  circle. 

As  soon  as  Burnside's  tenure  of  the  command 
had  become  a  question  rather  of  hours  than  of 
days,  new  efforts  were  made  to  win  over  the  Sec- 
retary of  War,  but  necessarily  without  avail,  be- 
cause, apart  from  any  personal  considerations  that 
may  have  had  place  in  his  mind,  he  had  certain  con- 
victions on  the  subject  of  a  kind  that  strong  men 
never  abandon  when  once  formed.  At  this  critical 
moment  the  needed  impulse  in  the  direction  of 
Hooker  was  supplied  by  a  person  of  commanding 
influence  in  the  councils  of  the  Administration, 
and  Mr.  Lincoln  directed  the  appointment  to  be 
made.     [See  Lincoln's  letter  to  Hooker,  p.  216.] 

Mr.  Stanton's  first  conclusion  was  that  he  should 
resign  ;  his  second,  that  duty  to  his  chief  and  the 
public  forbade  his  doing  so  ;  his  third,  that  Hooker 
must  be  loyally  supported  so  long  as  there  was  the 
least  chance  of  his  doing  anything  with  the  army 
placed  in  his  keeping.  This  latter  resolution  he 
faithfully  kept,  and  General  Hooker,  who  soon 
had  occasion  to  know  the  facts  connected  with 
his  appointment,  was  both  surprised  and  touched 
by  the  generoiis  conduct  of  his  lately  implacable 
opponent. 

Mr.  Chase  found  his  situation  as  sponsor  for  the 
new  commander  embarrassing.  As  a  member  of 
the  cabinet  he  could  freely  express  his  views  with 
reference  to  any  military  question  coming  up  for 
cabinet  discussion,  and  upon  any  matter  introduced 
to  him  by  the  President  he  had  fair  opportunity  of 
making  a  desired  impression;  but  further  than 
this  he  could  not  directly  go  without  disclosing  a 
personal  interest  inconsistent  with  his  place  and 
duty.  Yet  the  cirisumstances  connected  with  the 
appointment  of  Hooker  made  it  imperatively  neces- 
sary that  the  influence  of  Mr.  Chase  should  be 
exerted  in  respect  of  matters  that  could  not  for- 
mally come  to  him  for  consideration,  although, 
on  the  other  hand,  they  could  not  safely  be  in- 
trusted wholly  to  the  keeping  of  a  suspicious  and 
probably  hostile  War  Department.  Fortunately 
for  the  perplexed  statesman,  the  influence  that 
had  proved  sovereign  when  the  balance  had  hung 
in  suspense  between  Hooker  and  Meade  was  safely 
and  wholly  at  his  service,  and,  being  again  resorted 
to,  provided  a  modus  Vivendi  so  long  as  one  was 
needed.  Out  of  all  these  anomalies  a  correspond- 
ence resulted  between  Mr.  Chase  and  General 
Hooker,  the  publication  of  which  is  historically 
indispensable  to  the  saying  of  the  final  word  on 
the  leading  events  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  administration. 

When  General  Hooker  telegraphed  to  Washing- 
ton that  he  had  brought  his  army  back  to  the  north 
side  of  the  river,  because  he  could  not  find  room 
for  it  to  fight  at  Chancellorsville,  President  Lin- 
coln gi-asped  General  Halleck  and  started  for  the 
front  post-haste.  He  would  likewise  have  taken 
the  Secretary  of  War,  in  his  anxiety,  but  for  the 
obvious  indelicacy  of  the  latter's  appearance  before 
Hooker  at  such  a  moment.  Mr.  Lincoln  went  back 
to  Wasliington  that  night,  enjoining  upon  Halleck 
to  remain  till   he   knew    "everything."    Halleck 


HOOKER'S  APPOINTMENT  AND  REMOVAL. 


241 


was  a  keen  lawyer,  and  the  reluctant  generals  and 
staff-officers  had  but  poor  success  in  stopping  any- 
where short  of  the  whole  truth.  When  he  got 
back  to  his  post,  a  conference  of  the  President  and 
Secretary  of  War  with  himself  was  held  at  the 
War  Department,  whereat  it  was  concluded  that 
both  the  cheek  at  Ohancellorsville  and  the  retreat 
were  inexcusable,  and  that  Hooker  must  not  be  in- 
trusted with  the  conduct  of  another  battle.  Hal- 
leck  had  brought  a  message  from  Hooker  to  the 
effect  that  as  he  had  never  sought  the  command, 
he  could  resign  it  without  embarrassment,  and 
would  be  only  too  happy  if,  in  the  new  arrange- 
ment, he  could  have  the  command  of  his  old 
division  and  so  keep  in  active  service. 

The  friends  of  Mr.  Chase  considered  that  the 
fortunes  of  their  leader  were  too  much  bound  up 
with  Hooker  to  permit  of  the  latter's  ignominious 
removal  and,  although  the  President  had  learned 
much  that  he  did  not  dream  of  at  the  time  he 
parted  company  with  the  War  Department  in  the 
matter  of  appointing  a  successor  to  Burnside,  the 
Treasury  faction  had  grown  so  powerful  that  he 
could  not  consent  to  a  rupture  with  it,  and  a  tem- 
porizing policy  was  adopted  all  around,  which 
General  Couch,  commander  of  the  Second  Corps, 
all  unconsciously,  nearly  spoiled  by  contemptu- 
ously refusing  to  serve  any  longer  under  Hooker, 
despite  an  abject  appeal  to  him  by  Hooker  not  to 
leave  the  army.  ^ 

General  Lee's  invasion  of  Pennsylvania  broke 
up  the  nearly  intolerable  situation,  and  Hooker's 
diligent  and  skillful  management  of  his  army 
rapidly  brought  matters  back  to  the  hopefiil  state 


they  were  in  before  the  late  battle.  \  But  Mr.  Stan- 
ton was  determined  that  the  deliberate  decision 
of  the  council  of  war,  held  after  Halleck's  return 
from  the  front,  should  not  be  set  aside,  and  he 
was  now  the  master  of  the  situation.  Hooker  was 
so  full  of  hope  and  energy  that  severe  measiu-es 
had  to  be  resorted  to  in  order  to  wring  from  him 
that  tender  of  resignation  deemed  to  be  necessary 
to  enable  his  supporters  at  Washington  to  keep  on 
outward  terms  with  the  Administration.  When  it 
did  come,  the  impending  battle  was  evidently  so 
close  at  hand  that  the  Secretary  of  War  was  seized 
with  the  fear  that,  either  by  accident  or  design, 
the  change  of  command  to  General  Meade  would 
not  be  effected  in  time  to  avoid  the  very  contin- 
gency aimed  at  by  the  change.  At  the  last  mo- 
ment, the  President  too  became  alarmed,  and 
there  was  another  conference  at  the  Department 
to  settle  the  means  of  insuring  the  transfer. 

Duplicate  copies  of  the  President's  order,  chang- 
ing the  command,  were  made,  authenticated  by  the 
signature  of  the  adjutant-general  and  addressed, 
severally,  to  Generals  Hooker  and  Meade.  General 
James  A.  Hardie,  chief  of  the  staff  of  the  Secretary 
of  War,  and  a  personal  friend  of  both  the  officers 
concerned,  was  then  called  into  the  conference 
room  and  directed  to  start  at  once  for  Frederick 
City  and,  without  disclosing  his  presence  or  busi- 
ness, make  his  way  to  General  Meade  and  give 
him  to  understand  that  the  order  for  him  to  as- 
sume the  command  of  the  army  immediately  was 
intended  to  be  as  unquestionable  and  peremptory 
as  any  that  a  soldier  could  receive.  He  was 
then,  as  the  representative  of  the  President,  to 


i  General  F.  A.  Walker  says  in  his  "History  of  the 
Second  Army  Corps"  (pp.  253-255)  : 

"  One  of  the  results  of  tlie  Chancellorsville  campaign  was  a 
change  in  the  command  of  the  Second  Corps.  General  Couch 
had  felt  outraged  in  every  nerve  and  fiher  of  his  being  hy 
th(!  conduct  of  General  Hooker  from  the  1st  to  the  5th  of 
May.   .  .  . 

"  Not  that  General  Ooucli  was  alone  in  this  feeling,  which 
was  sliaivd  hy  iic:itly  :ill  llir  ronuiiiiiKlris  of  the  army  ;  butat 
om-i'  hi^  mil  iiTi-  :is  ;i  mail  and  liis  imsitinii  as  I  lie  senior  corps 
Cdimuaiidi'i  iiiaili-  liiiii  |prriiliaii.\-  I  lie  .siMikcsiiiMn  in  tlie  rep- 
I'esciitaliniisaiHl  i  I'liiiinst  ranees  add  nsscd  lo  Ciiiei-al  Hooker, 
.  .  .  and  when  consulted  by  I'lesident  Lineeln  on  the  22d  of 
May  lie  adviseil  that  lieneral  Meade  Nlii>uld  be  jdaced  in  coni- 
nian.l,  stating  that  be  liiiiiselt  windd  have  great  pleasure  in 
serving  under  that  ollieei,  tlicinu:b  senior  to  him.  To  the  sug- 
gestion of  his  own  sm  1 1  >sion  to  the  command  General  Couch 
returned  a  firm  and  sineeic  negative.  .  .  . 

"  In  this  sjiirit  [having  lost  confidence  in  ITooker],  with 
pain  inexi)re88ible,  Gener.al  Couch  asked  to  be  relieved  from 
further  service  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac."— EDITORS. 

\  On  the  5th  of  Juno  Ocner:il  Hooker  sent  to  the 
rrcsidcnt  .a  longdisputcli,  to  wliic  li  'S\v.  Lincoln  replied 
on  tll(^  sanio  day.  These  coiniminic.ition.s  throw  an 
interesting  liglit  on  Hooker's  relations  with  the  Ad- 
iiiiHistiation.  Afterstating  his  suspicion  that  Lee  was 
about   to  undertake  tin  aggressive  nioveniont,  Hooker 


■alb 


tlie  utmost  iiioniptitude,  I  ilesir.>  that  I  may  be  infornii 
early  as  practicable  of  the  \iews  of  the  Government  com 
ing  this  army.  Uiuler  instructions  fioin  the  major-ger 
commanding  the  army,  dated  January  .SI  st,  I  am  lustrueti 
'  keep  in  view  always  thi'  importance  of  cov<>riug  Wasliiii 
and  llarpei's  Feny.  either  directly  or  by  so  opeialinir  : 
be  atile  lo  i)iiiiisli  any  force  of  I  he  enemy  sent  against  th 
In  the  eviMit  tlie  enemy  should  move,  as  I  almost  autici 
he  will,  the  h.^ad  of  his  cofumn  will  probaldy  be  he: 
toward  the  Potomac,  via  Gordonsville  or  Ciilpeper,    w 


eral 
•dto 
,'ton 


the  rear  will  rest  on  Fredericksburg.  After  giving  the 
suliject  my  best  reflection,  I  am  of  opinion  that  it  is  my  duty 
to  pitch  into  his  rear,  although  in  so  doing  the  head  of  his 
column  maj'  reach  Warrenton  before  I  can  return.  Will  it  be 
within  the  spirit  of  ray  instructions  to  do  sol  In  view  of 
these  contemplated  movements  of  the  enem.v.  I  cannot  too 
forcibly  impress  upon  the  mind  of  His  hLxcellency,  the  Presi- 
dent, tlie  iiiiissity  of  having  one  connnander  for  all  of  the 
trooi)8  whose  operations  can  have  an  intluence  on  those  of 
I.ee's  army.  Under  the  piesent  system,  all  independent  com- 
manders are  in  ignorance  of  the  movements  of  the  others ;  at 
least  sucli  is  my  situation.  I  trust  that  I  nujj"  not  be  con- 
sidered in  the  way  to  this  arrangement,  as  it  is  a  jtosition  I 
do  not  desire,  and  only  suggest  it,  as  I  feel  the  necessity  for 
concert  as  well  as  vigorous  action.  It  is  necessary  for  me 
to  say  this  nuich  that  my  motives  may  not  be  misunderstood. 
JOSKl'll  lIOOKlcil,  Major-General." 

President  Lincoln's  reply  is  as  follows : 

"  WASHIXr.TON,   June  5th.  1863,  -I  l'.  M.  —  MAJOK-GE-NERAL 

HooKicu :  Yours  of  to  day  was  received  an  liour  ago.  So 
much  of  professional  military  skill  Is  requisite  to  answer  It 
that  I  have  turned  the  task  over  to  General  Halleck.  He 
])romi8es  to  jierform  it  with  his  utmost  care.  I  linve  but  one 
idea  w  Inch  I  think  worth  sugsrestlng  to  you,  and  that  is,  in 
case  you  liud  I.ee  coming  to  the  noitli  of  tlie  Itappalianiiock, 
I  would  by  no  means  cro.ss  to  the  siuith  of  it.  If  lie  should 
leave  a  rear  force  at  Fredcrick.sliurg,  tempting  you  to  fall 
upon  it,  it  would  fight  in  iiitrenchments  and  have  you  at  dis- 
advantage, and  so,  man  for  nuui,  worst  you  at  that  point, 
while  his  nniin  f<uce  would  In  some  way  be  petting  an  advan- 
tage of  yon  noitliward.  In  one  word,  I  would  not  take  any 
risk  of  being  «'ntangl.d  upon  the  river,  like  an  ox  Jumped 
half  over  a  fence,  and  liable  to  be  torn  by  dogs  fnint  and  rear 
without  a  fair  chance  to  gore  one  way  or  kick  the  other.  If 
I.ee  would  come  to  my  shle  of  the  river,  I  would  keep  on  the 
same  side  and  light  him  or  act  on  the  defense,  according  as 
niU'Iit  be  my  estiiiiati"  ef  his  strengtti  relatively  to  my  own. 
Hut  tliese  are  mere  suguestlons,  which  I  desire  to  be  con- 
trolled by  the  Judgment  of  yourself  and  General  Halleck.  A. 
LlNCOLH."-  EDITORS. 


242 


HOOKER  'S  APPOINTMENT  AND   REMOVAL. 


MAJOR-GENERAL    GEORGE    G.    MEADE.     FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


take  General  Meade  to  the  headquarters  of  General 
Hooker  and  transfer  the  command  from  the  latter 
to  the  former.  General  Hardie  manifested  some 
reluctance  to  doing  his  appointed  task  in  the  pre- 
scribed manner,  but  Mr.  Stanton  sententiously 
remarked  tliat  in  this  case  the  manner  was  of  the 
substance  of  the  matter,  to  which  Mr.  Lincoln 
added  that  he  would  take  the  responsibility  upon 
himself  for  any  wound  to  the  feelings  of  the  two 
generals,  or  of  the  bearer  of  the  order.  General 
Hardie  was  supplied  with  passes  and  orders  to 
facilitate  his  progress,  and  with  money  to  buy  his 
way  through  to  his  destination  if  delayed  or  ob- 
structed on  the  road.  If  compelied  by  the  immi- 
nency  of  capture  by  Stuart's  raiders  to  destroy  liis 
papers,  and  he  could  still  make  his  way  through, 
he  was  to  deliver  verbally  the  order  for  the  chang- 
ing of  the  command  and  supervise  its  execution. 


General  Hardie,  in  civilian's  dress,  reached  Fred- 
erick in  safety,  and  by  diligent  inquiry  ascertained 
the  whereabouts  of  General  Meade's  headquar- 
ters, several  miles  from  town.  By  some  oversight 
at  headquarters,  no  governor  or  provost-marshal 
had  been  appointed  for  the  town,  and  the  streets 
and  all  the  roads  leading  to  the  camps  were 
thronged  with  boisterous  soldiers,  more  or  less 
filled  with  Maryland  whisky,  and  many  of  them 
ripe  for  rudeness  or  mischief.  By  liberal  use  of 
money  he  at  last  obtained  a  buggy  and  a  driver 
who  knew  the  roads;  but  his  progress  through 
straggling  parties  of  soldiers  and  trains  of  wagons 
was  so  slow,  and  he  was  so  often  obliged  to  appeal 
to  officers  to  secure  passage  and  safety  from  one 
stage  to  another,  that  the  night  was  far  spent  when 
he  reached  General  Meade's  headquarters  and, 
after  some  wrangling,  penetrated  to  his  tent. 


HOOKER  'S  APPOINTMENT  AND  REMOVAL. 


243 


Meade  was  asleep,  and  when  awakened  was  con- 
founded by  the  sight  of  an  officer  from  the  War 
Department  standing  over  him.  He  afterward 
said  that,  in  his  semi-stupor,  his  first  thought  was 
that  he  was  to  be  taken  to  Washington  in  arrest, 
though  no  reason  occurred  to  him  why  he  should 
be.  When  he  realized  the  state  of  affairs  he  became 
much  agitated,  protesting  against  being  placed 
in  command  of  an  army  that  was  looking  toward 
Reynolds  as  the  successor,  if  Hooker  should  be 
displaced ;  referring  to  the  personal  friendship  be- 
tween Eeynolds  and  himself,  which  would  make 
the  President's  order  an  instrument  of  injustice  to 
both;  urging  the  lieaviness  of  the  responsibility 
so  suddenly  placed  upon  him  in  presence  of  the 
enemy  and  when  he  was  totally  ignorant  of  the 
positions  and  dispositions  of  the  army  he  was  to 
take  in  charge ;  and  strenuously  objecting  to  the 
requirement  that  he  should  go  to  Hooker's  head- 
quarters to  take  over  the  command  without  being 
sent  for  by  the  commanding  general,  as  MeClellan 
had  sent  for  Burnside  «^  and  Burnside  for  Hooker. 
Meade  proposed  to  Hardie  that  he  should  tele- 
graph to  Stanton  to  be  relieved  from  taking  the 
command,  but  Hardie  told  him  that  in  the  council 
it  had  been  assumed  that  he  would  wish  to  be  ex- 
cused, that  he  would  prefer  Eeynolds  first  and 
anybody  else  but  himself  afterward,  and  that  he 
might  even  deem  it  too  late  to  displace  Hooker ; 
but  that,  notwithstanding,  it  had  been  determined 
that  Hooker  should  be  relieved,  and  by  Meade 
alone,  and  that  it  should  be  done  immediately 
upon  Hardie's  arrival.  It  was  a  mental  relief  to 
the  stern  Secretary  of  War,  when  General  Meade's 
spontaneous  utterances  were  reported  to  him,  to 
note  that  he  had  uttered  no  protest  against  Hook- 
er's being  relieved  of  the  command,  even  in  what 
might  almost  be  called  the  presence  of  the  enemy. 
This  silence  on  the  part  of  a  man  so  regardless 
of  himself,  so  regardful  of  others,  Mr.  Stanton 
accepted  as  being,  in  itself,  his  complete  vindica- 
tion. 

After  taking  General  Hardie's  opinion,  as  a  pro- 
fessional soldier,  that  he  had  no  lawful  disci'etion 
to  vary  from  tho  orders  given,  horses  and  an  escort 
were  ordered  out  and  the  party  proceeded  to  gen- 
eral lieadquarters,  some  miles  distant,  j  Hardie 
undertook  to  break  the  news  to  Hooker,  who  did 
not  need  to  he  told  anything  after  seeing  who  his 
visitors  were.  It  was  a  bitter  moment  to  all,  for 
Hooker  had  construed  favorably  the  delay  in  re- 
sponding to  his  tender  of  resignation,  and  could 
not  wholly  mask  the  revulsion  of  feeling.  General 
Butterfield,  the  cliief  of  staff,  between  whom  and 
General  Meade  much  coldness  existed,  was  called 
in,  and  the  four  officers  set  themselves  earnestly  to 
work  to  do  the  state  some  service  by  honestly 
transferring  the  command  and  all  that  could  help 


to  make  it  available  for  good.  During  the  inter- 
view Meade  unguardedly  expressed  himself  as 
shocked  at  the  scattered  condition  of  the  ai-my, 
and  Hooker  retorted  with  feeling.  Tension  was 
somewhat  eased  by  Meade's  insisting  upon  being 
regarded  as  a  guest  at  headquarters  while  General 
Hooker  was  present,  and  by  his  requesting  General 
Butterfield,  upon  public  gi'ounds,  not  to  exercise 
his  privilege  of  withdrawing  with  his  chief;  but 
Hooker's  chagrin  and  Meade's  overstrung  nerves 
made  the  lengthy  but  indispensable  conference 
rather  trying  to  the  whole  party. 

When  Eeynolds  heard  the  news,  he  dressed  him- 
self with  scrupulous  care  and,  handsomely  attended, 
rode  to  headquarters  to  pay  his  respects  to  the  new 
commander.  Meade,  who  looked  like  a  wagon- 
master  in  the  marching  clothes  he  had  hurriedly 
slipped  on  when  awakened  in  his  tent,  understood 
the  motive  of  the  act,  and  after  the  exchange  of 
salutations  all  around,  he  took  Eeynolds  by  the  arm, 
and,  leading  him  aside,  told  him  how  surprising, 
imperative,  and  unwelcome  were  the  orders  he  had 
received  ;  how  much  he  would  have  preferred  the 
choice  to  have  fallen  on  Eeynolds  ;  how  anxious  he 
had  been  to  see  Eeynolds  and  tell  him  these  things, 
and  how  helpless  he  should  hold  himself  to  be  did 
he  not  feel  that  Eeynolds  would  give  liim  the  ear- 
nest support  that  he  would  have  given  to  Eey- 
nolds in  a  like  situation.  Eej'uolds  answered  that, 
in  his  opinion,  the  command  had  fallen  where  it 
belonged,  that  he  was  glad  that  such  a  weight  of 
responsibility  had  not  come  upon  him,  and  that 
Meade  might  count  upon  the  best  support  he  could 
give  him.  Meade  then  commimicated  to  Eeynolds 
all  that  he  had  learned  from  Hooker  and  Butterfield 
concerning  the  movements  and  positions  of  the 
two  armies,  and  hastily  concerted  with  him  a  plan 
of  cooperation  which  resulted  in  the  figliting  of 
the  battle  of  Gettysburg  upon  ground  selected  by 
Eeynolds. 

During  the  afternoon  the  consultations  were 
ended,  and,  with  the  aid  of  the  representative  of 
the  War  Department,  the  two  generals  drew  up  the 
orders  that  were  to  announce  formally  the  change 
of  command.  In  the  evening,  standing  in  front  of 
the  commanding  general's  tent.  General  Hooker 
took  leave  of  the  officers,  soldiers,  and  civilians 
attached  to  headquarters,  ami,  amid  many  a  "  God 
bless  you.  General ! "  got  into  the  s]u-ing  wagon 
that  was  to  convey  him  and  General  Hardie  to  the 
railroad  station,  the  former  01  route  to  Baltimore, 
the  latter  to  Washington.  When  all  was  ready  for 
the  start,  the  throng  about  tlie  vehicle  respectfully 
drew  back  as  IMeade  a]iproaclied  with  uiu»overed 
head;  the  two  men  took  each  other  by  the  hand, 
some  words  passed  between  them  in  a  low  tone, 
the  wagon  moved  off,  and  Meade  walked  silently 
into  the  tent  just  vacated  by  his  predecessor. 


■j^r  Moadc  was  mlHtaken  in  thinking  that  McCldlan  had  sent  for  Burnside  when  tho  conniiand  wns  turned 
over  to  him.  — ('.  F.  H. 

)  Hardie  told  me  that  Meade  at  last  said,  half  playfully,  "Well,  I've  been  tried  and  coudennied  wiilnml  a 
lioarliig,  and  I  suppose  I  shall  have  to  go  to  cxocutiou."— C.  F.  B. 


UNION     CAVALR' 


LEE'S  INVASION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 


BY  JAMES   LONGSTREET,   LIEUTENANT-GENERAL,   C.  S.  A. 


ONE  night  in  the  spring  of  1863  I  was  sitting  in  my  tent  opposite  Suffolk, 
Virginia,  when  there  came  in  a  slender,  wiry  fellow  about  five  feet  eight, 
with  hazel  eyes,  dark  hair  and  complexion,  and  brown  beard.  He  wore  a 
citizen's  suit  of  dark  material,  and  except  for  his  stooping  shoulders  was  well 
formed  and  evidently  a  man  of  great  activity.  He  handed  me  a  note  from 
Mr.  Seddon,  Secretary  of  War.  That  was  my  first  meeting  with  the  famous 
scout,  Harrison,  who  in  his  unpretending  citizen's  dress  passed  unmolested 
from  right  to  left  through  the  Federal  army,  visited  Washington  City,  ate 
and  drank  with  the  Federal  officers,  and  Joined  me  at  Chambersburg  with 
information  more  accurate  than  a  force  of  cavalry  could  have  secured. 

AVhile  my  command  was  at  Suffolk,  engaged  in  collecting  supplies  from 
the  eastern  coasts  of  Virginia  and  North  Carolina,  General  Burnside  was 
relieved  and  Greneral  Hooker  put  in  command  of  the  Federal  Army  of  the 
Potomac.  G-eneral  Lee  was  not  expecting  Hooker  to  move  so  early,  and  gave 
me  no  warning  until  the  Federals  moved  out  to  turn  his  left  by  Chancellors- 
ville.  He  then  sent  urgent  demand  for  me,  but  it  so  happened  that  all  my 
trains  were  down  on  the  eastern  coasts,  and  I  could  not  move  my  troops  with- 
out leaving  the  trains  to  the  enemy.  I  made  haste  to  get  them  back  as  quickly 
as  possible,  and  the  moment  we  got  them  within  our  lines  I  pulled  up  from 
around  Suffolk,  and,  recrossing  the  Blackwater,  started  back  on  my  march  to 
join  General  Lee  at  Fredericksburg.  Before  we  got  to  Richmond,  however, 
we  received  dispatches  announcing  the  Confederate  success.  But  with  these 
tidings  of  victory  came  the  sad  intelligence  that  General  Stonewall  Jackson 
was  seriously  wounded,  a  piece  of  news  that  cast  a  deep  gloom  over  the  army. 

On  the  9th  of  May  I  joined  General  Lee  at  his  headquarters  at  Fredericks- 
burg. At  our  first  meeting  we  had  very  little  conversation ;  General  Lee 
merely  stated  that  he  had  had  a  severe  battle,  and  the  army  had  been  very 
much  broken  up.    He  regarded  the  wound  accidently  inflicted  on  Jackson  as 


LEE'S  INl^ASION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA.  245 

a  terrible  calamity.  Although  we  felt  the  immediate  loss  of  Jackson's  services, 
it  was  supposed  he  would  rally  and  get  well.  He  lingered  for  several  days, 
one  day  reported  better  and  the  next  worse,  until  at  last  he  was  taken  from 
us  to  the  shades  of  Paradise.  The  shock  was  a  very  severe  one  to  men  and 
officers,  but  the  full  extent  of  our  loss  was  not  felt  until  the  remains  of  the 
beloved  general  had  been  sent  home.  The  dark  clouds  of  the  future  then 
began  to  lower  above  the  Confederates. 

General  Lee  at  that  time  was  confronted  by  two  problems :  one,  the  finding 
a  successor  for  Jackson,  another,  the  future  movements  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia.  After  considering  the  matter  fully  he  decided  to  reorgan- 
ize his  army,  making  three  corps  instead  of  two.  I  was  in  command  of  the 
First  Corps,  and  he  seemed  anxious  to  have  a  second  and  third  corps  under 
the  command  of  Virginians.  To  do  so  was  to  overlook  the  claims  of  other 
generals  who  had  been  active  and  very  efficient  in  the  service.  He  selected 
General  Ewell  to  command  the  Second,  and  General  A.  P.  Hill  for  the  Third 
Corps.  General  Ewell  was  entitled  to  command  by  reason  of  his  rank, 
services,  and  ability.  Next  in  rank  was  a  North  Carolinian,  General  D.  H. 
Hill,  and  next  a  Georgian,  General  Lafayette  McLaws,  against  whom  was 
the  objection  that  they  were  not  Virginians.  J 

In  reorganizing  his  army.  General  Lee  impaired  to  some  extent  the  morale 
of  his  troops,  but  the  First  Corps,  dismembered  as  it  was,  still  considered 
itself,  with  fair  opportunities,  invincible,  and  was  ready  for  any  move  war- 
ranted by  good  judgment. 

While  General  Lee  was  reorganizing  his  army  he  was  also  arranging  the 
new  campaign.  Grant  had  laid  siege  to  Vicksburg,  and  Johnston  was  concen- 
trating at  Jackson  to  drive  him  away.  Rosecrans  was  in  Tennessee  and  Bragg 
was  in  front  of  him.  The  force  Johnston  was  concentrating  at  Jackson  gave 
us  no  hope  that  he  would  have  sufficient  strength  to  make  any  impression 
upon  Grant,  and  even  if  he  could.  Grant  was  in  position  to  reenforce  rapidly 
and  could  supply  his  army  with  greater  facility.  Vicksburg  was  doomed 
unless  we  could  offer  relief  by  strategic  move.  I  proposed  to  send  a  force 
through  east  Tennessee  to  join  Bragg  and  also  to  have  Johnston  sent  to  join 
him,  thus  concentrating  a  large  force  to  move  against  Rosecrans,  crush  out  his 

^General  D.  H.  Hill  was  the  superior  of  General  of  18G2  was  the  crowning  point  in  the  captiu-e 

A.  P.   Hill  in   rank,  skill,  judgment,  and   distin-  of  Harper's  Ferry  with  its  garrison  and  suiiplies. 

guishcd  services.     He  had  served  with  the  army  in  With   Maryland   Heights   in  our   hands   ilarpor's 

Virginia,  on  the  Peninsula  in  the  battles  of  Will-  Ferry  was  untenable.    Without  Maryland  Heights 

iamsburg.    Seven    Pines,    and    the    Seven    Days'  in  our  possession  Jackson's  forces  on  tlie  south  siile 

battles  arouiul  Richmond.     In  the  Maryland  cam-  of   the  Potomac  could  not  have  taken  the  jiost. 

jtaign  he  made  the  batth*  of  South  Mountain  alone  At  Frederioksl)urg   McLaws   held   the  ground   at 

from  morning  till  late  in  the  afternoon,  with  five  Marye's  Hill  with  r>()0()  nu'u  (his  own  and  Kan- 

tiiousaud  against  a  large  part  of  McClellan's  army,  som's  division)  against  40, 000,  and  put  more  than 

[See  foot-note.  Vol.    II.,  p.   oTS.]     He  also  bore  double  his  defending  forces  hors  di   cotnlxit,  tlnis 

the  brunt  of  the  battle  of  Shaiiisburg.     He  came,  making,  for  his  numbers,  the  best  battle  of  tlie  war. 

however,  not  from  Virginia  but  from  North  Caro-  Gemual  McLaws  was  not  in  vigorous  health,  how- 

lina,  and  liad  Just  been  detailed  for  service  in  that  ever,  and  was  left  to  command  his  division  in  the 

State.  campaign.    He  called  on  G(>neral  Lee  to  knowwliy 

Next    in    rank   after   General    D.    IT.    Hill  was  liis  claims  had  bi-en  overlooked,  but  T  do  not  know 

General  Tiafayette  Mcliaws,  who  had  served  with  that  Lee  gave  him  satisfact(M-y  reasons.— J.  L. 

us   continuously  from    tlie   Peninsular  cami)aign.  See  Colonel  William   Allan's  comments,  to  fol- 

His  attack  on  Maryland  Heights  in  the  campaign  low.— Editors. 


246 


LEE'S  INVASION  Of  PENNSYLVANIA. 


MAP   OF   THE    GETTYSBURG   CAMPAIGN. 


army,  and  march 
against  Cincinnati.  x4^ 
That,  I  thought,  was 
the  only  way  we  had  to 
reheve  Vicksburg.  General 
Lee  admitted  the  force  of  my 
proposition,  but  finally  stated  that 
he  preferred  to  organize  a  camj^aign 
into  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania,  hoping  thereby  to  draw  the  Federal  troops 
from  the  southern  points  they  occupied.  After  discussing  the  matter  with 
him  for  several  days,  I  found  his  mind  made  up  not  to  allow  any  of  his  troops 
to  go  west.  I  then  accepted  his  proposition  to  make  a  campaign  into  Pennsyl- 
vania, provided  it  should  be  offensive  in  strategy  but  defensive  in  tactics,  for- 
cing the  Federal  army  to  give  us  battle  when  we  were  in  strong  position  and 
ready  to  receive  them.  One  mistake  of  the  Confederacy  was  in  pitting  force 
against  force.    The  only  hope  we  had  was  to  outgeneral  the  Federals.    We 


LEE'S  INl/ASION  OF  PENNSYLl^ANlA. 


^47 

were  all  hopeful  aud  tlie  army  was  in 
good  condition,  but  the  war  had  ad- 
vanced far  enough  for  us  to  see  that  a 
mere  victory  without  decided  fruits  was 
a  luxury  we  could  not   afford.     Our 
numbers  were  less  than  the  Federal 
forces,  and  our  resom^ces  were  limited 
while  theirs  were  not.    The  time  had 
come  when  it  was  imperative  that  the 
skill  of  generals  and  the  strategy  and 
tactics  of  war  should  take  the  place  of 
muscle  against  muscle.     Om-  purpose 
should  have  been  to  impair  the  morale 
of  the  Federal  army  and  shake  North- 
ern confidence  in  the  Federal  leaders. 
We   talked  on  that  line   from  day  to 
day,  and  General  Lee,  accepting  it  as  a 
good  military  view,  adopted  it  as  the 
key-note  of  the  campaign.    I  suggested 
that  we  should  have  all  the  details  and 
purposes  so  well  arranged  and  so  im- 
pressed upon  our  minds  that  when  the 
critical  moment  should  come,  we  could 
refer  to  our  calmer  moments  and  know 
we  were  carrying  out  our  original  plans. 
I  stated  to  General  Lee  that  if  he  would 
allow  me  to  handle  my  corps  so  as  to 
receive  the  attack  of  the  Federal  army, 
I  would  beat  it  off  without  calling  on 
him  for  help  except  to  guard  my  right 
and  left,  and  called  his  attention  to  the 
battle  of  Fredericksbm-g  as  an  instance 
of   defensive  warfare,   where  we  had 
thrown  not  more  than   five  thousand 
troops  into  the  fight  and   had   beaten 
off  two-thirds  of  the  Federal  army  ^itli 
great  loss  to  them  and  slioht  loss  to  my 
own  troops.     I  also  called  his  attention 
to  Napoleon's  instructions  to  Marmont 
at  the  head  of  an  invading  army. 

A  few  days  before  we  were  \\\u\\  to 
move  General  Lee  sent  for  (Jeneral 
Ewell  to  receive  his  orders.  1  was  jires- 
ent  at  the  time  and  remarked  that  if  we 
were  ever  g(nng  to  make  an  oft'ensive 
battle  it  should  be  done  south  of   the 


FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH    TAKEN     AFTER    THE     WAR. 


GENERAL   ROBERT    E.    LEE. 


LEE'S  INVASION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA.  249 

Potomac  —  adding  that  we  might  have  an  opportunity  to  cross  the  Rappa- 
hannock near  Culpeper  Court  House  and  make  a  battle  there,  I  made  this 
suggestion  in  order  to  bring  about  a  discussion  which  I  thought  would  give 
Ewell  a  better  idea  of  the  plan  of  operations.  My  remark  had  the  desired 
effect  and  we  talked  over  the  possibilities  of  a  battle  south  of  the  Potomac. 
The  enemy  would  be  on  our  right  flank  while  we  were  moving  north.  Ewell's 
corps  was  to  move  in  advance  to  Culpeper  Court  House,  mine  to  follow,  and 
the  cavalry  was  to  move  along  on  our  right  flank  to  the  east  of  us.  Thus, 
by  threatening  his  rear  we  could  draw  Hooker  from  his  position  on  Stafford 
Heights  opposite  Fredericksburg.  Our  movements  at  the  beginning  of  the 
campaign  were  necessarily  slow  in  order  that  we  might  be  sure  of  having 
the  proper  effect  on  Hooker. 

Ewell  was  started  off  to  the  valley  of  Virginia  to  cross  the  mountains  and 
move  in  the  direction  of  Winchester,  which  was  occupied  by  considerable 
forces  under  Milroy.  I  was  moving  at  the  same  time  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge 
with  Stuart's  cavalry  on  my  right  so  as  to  occupy  the  gaps  from  Asliby  on  to 
Harper's  Ferry.  Ewell,  moving  on  through  the  valley,  captured  troops  and 
supplies  at  Winchester,  and  passed  through  Martinsburg  and  Williamsport 
into  Maryland.  As  I  moved  along  the  eastern  slope  of  the  Blue  Ridge  we 
heard  from  day  to  day  of  the  movements  of  Hooker's  army,  and  that  he  had 
finally  abandoned  his  position  on  Stafford  Heights,  and  was  moving  up  the 
Potomac  in  the  direction  of  Washington.  Upon  receipt  of  that  information, 
A.  P.  Hill  was  ordered  to  draw  off  from  Fredericksburg  and  follow  the  move- 
ments of  General  Ewell,  but  to  cross  the  Potomac  at  Shepherdstown.  When 
Hill  with  his  troops  and  well-supplied  trains  had  passed  my  rear,  I  was 
ordered  to  withdraw  from  the  Blue  Ridge,  pass  over  to  the  west  of  the  Shen- 
andoah and  follow  the  movements  of  the  other  troops,  only  to  cross  the 
Potomac  at  Williamsport.  I  ordered  General  Stuart,  whom  I  considered 
under  my  command,  to  occupy  the  gaps  with  a  part  of  his  cavalry  and  to 
follow  with  his  main  force  on  my  right,  to  cross  the  Potomac  at  Shepherds- 
town,  and  move  on  my  right  flank.  Upon  giving  him  this  order,  he  informed 
me  that  he  had  authority  from  General  Lee  to  occupy  the  gaps  with  a  part  of 
his  cavalry,  and  to  follow  the  Federal  army  with  the  remainder.  At  the 
same  time  he  expressed  his  purpose  of  crossing  the  river  east  of  the  Blue 
Ridge  and  trying  to  make  way  around  the  right  of  the  Federal  army ;  so  I 
moved  my  troops  independent  of  the  cavalry,  and,  following  my  orders, 
crossed  at  Williamsport,  came  up  with  A.  P.  Hill  in  ^rarylaiid,  and  moved 
on  thence  to  Cliaml)ers])urg. 

Before  we  left  Fredericksburg  for  the  eampaign  into  ^laryland  and  Penn- 
sylvania, I  called  up  my  scout,  Harrison,  and,  giving  him  all  the  gold  he 
thought  he  would  need,  told  him  to  go  to  Washington  City  and  remain  there 
until  he  was  in  possession  of  information  which  he  knew  would  be  of  value 
to  us,  and  directed  that  he  should  then  make  his  way  back  to  me  and  report. 
As  he  was  leaving,  he  asked  where  he  would  find  me.  That  was  information 
I  did  not  care  to  impart  to  a  man  who  was  going  directly  to  the  Federal  capi- 
tal.    I  answered  that  my  command  was  large  enough  to  be  found  without 

VOL.  III.    17 


250 


LEE'S  INl^ASION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 


CONFEDERATES    AT   A    FORD. 


difficulty.  We  had  reached  Chambersburg  on  the  27th  of  June  and  were 
remaining  there  to  give  the  troops  rest,  when  my  scout  straggled  into  the 
lines  on  the  night  of  June  28th.  He  told  me  he  had  been  to  Washington 
and  had  spent  his  gold  freely,  drinking  in  the  saloons  and  getting  upon  con- 
fidential terms  with  army  officers.  In  that  way  he  had  formed  a  pretty  good 
idea  of  the  general  movements  of  the  Federal  army  and  the  preparation 
to  give  us  battle.  The  moment  he  heard  Hooker  had  started  across  the 
Potomac  he  set  out  to  find  me.  He  fell  in  with  the  Federal  army  before 
reaching  Frederick — his  plan  being  to  walk  at  night  and  stop  during  the 
day  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  troops.  He  said  there  were  three  corps  near 
Frederick  when  he  passed  there,  one  to  the  right  and  one  to  the  left,  but  he 
did  not  succeed  in  getting  the  position  of  the  other.  This  information  proved 
more  accurate  than  we  could  have  expected  if  we  had  been  relying  upon 
our  cavalry.  I  sent  the  scout  to  report  to  General  Lee,  who  was  near,  and 
suggested  in  my  note  that  it  might  be  well  for  us  to  begin  to  look  to  the 
east  of  the  Blue  Ridge.  Meade  was  then  in  command  of  the  Federal  army. 
Hooker  having  been  relieved. 

The  two  armies  were  then  near  each  other,  the  Confederates  being  north 
and  west  of  Gettysburg,  and  the  Federals  south  and  south-east  of  that  memo- 
rable field.  On  the  30th  of  June  we  turned  our  faces  toward  our  enemy  and 
marched  upon  Gettysburg.     The  Third  Corps,  under  Hill,  moved  out  first 


THE  CONFEDERATE  CAVALRY  IN  THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN.    2si 

and  my  commaud  followed.  We  then  fonnd  ourselves  in  a  very  unusual 
condition :  we  w^ere  almost  in  the  immediate  presence  of  the  enemy  with  our 
cavalry  gone.  Stuart  was  undertaking  another  wild  ride  around  the  Federal 
army.  We  knew  nothing  of  Meade's  movements  further  then  the  report  my 
scout  had  made.  We  did  not  know,  except  by  surmise,  when  or  where  to 
expect  to  find  Meade,  nor  whether  he  was  lying  in  wait  or  advancing.  The 
Confederates  moved  down  the  Gettysbm-g  road  on  June  30th,  encountered 
the  Federals  on  July  1st,  and  a  severe  engagement  followed.  The  Federals 
were  driven  entirely  from  the  field  and  forced  back  through  the  streets  of 
Gettysburg  to  Cemetery  Hill,  which  had  been  previously  selected  as  a  Federal 
rallying-point  and  w^as  occupied  by  a  reserve  force  of  the  Eleventh  Corps. 

THE  CONFEDERATE  CAVALRY  IN  THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN. 


I.     BY  JOHN   S.    MOSBY,    COLONEL,    C.  S.  A. 


IT  is  generally  agreed  by  Southern  writers  that 
the  battle  of  Gettysburg  was  the  result  of  an 
accidental  collision  of  armies.  General  Lee  in 
effect  says  in  his  report  of  the  campaign  that  his 
failure  was  due  to  his  ignorance  of  the  movements 
of  the  enemy  ;  and  the  absence  of  a  portion  of  the 
cavalry  under  Stuart,  or  rather  its  separation  from 
the  army,  is  assigned  as  the  primary  cause  of  its 
failui-e  by  General  Long,  the  biographer  of  Lee,  and 
by  General  Longstreet.  Both  ignore  the  fact  that 
Stuart  left  with  General  Lee,  under  command  of 
General  Beverly  H.  Robertson,  a  larger  body  of 
cavalry  than  he  took  with  him.  General  Long 
charges  that  Stuart's  expedition  around  Hooker  was 
made  either  from  "  a  misapprehension  of  orders  or 
love  of  the  eclat  of  a  bold  raid"  (which,  of  course, 
implies  disobedience) ;  and  General  Longstreet, 
while  admitting  that  Stuart  may  have  acted  by 
authority  of  Lee,  says  that  it  was  undertaken 
against  his  own  orders,  which  were  to  cross  the 
Potomac  at  Shepherdstown,  west  of  the  Blue 
Ridge. 

That  General  Lee  was  greatly  embarrassed  by 
want  of  intelligence  of  the  movements  of  the  enemy 
was  not  due  to  the  lack  of  cavalry  ;  and  Stuart  is 
not  responsible  for  the  inefficient  manner  in  which 
Lee  was  served. 

When  it  was  determined  that  Stuart  should  take 
three  brigades  of  cavalry  to  join  Ewell  on  the  Sus- 
quehaTina  and  leave  his  other  two  to  perform  out- 
post duty  for  the  army  in  Virginia,  General  Lee 

•jfV  "  HEADQtlAnTERS,  MlI.I.WOOD,  JunC  22(1,  1863,  7  v.  M. 

Major-Genek  \L  J.  E.  T5.  Stdaut,  roiimiaiidiiiK  Cavalry. 
(iENERAL:  Gf-ncFiil  Lci!  Imsincliiscdto  iiic  tliiH  letter  for 
you  to  bo  forwarded  to  you  provided  you  can  lie  spared 
from  my  front,  uud  i)rovided  T  think  you  can  move  ueross 
the  Potomac  withoni  (linch)sinj,' our  ]>lan8.  HoHpoaksof 
yoni- leaving  ('(■(»  JIuiicwell  (iap  and  passinfr  by  the  rear 
of  the  enemy.  If  you  can  ixv\  tlirouRh  by  that  route,  I 
tliink  tlntt  you  will  he  less  likely  to  indicate  what  our 
l)lans  are  than  if  you  should  cross  by  passitifj:  to  our 
rear.  I  forward  the  letter  of  instructions  with  these 
suKRCstions.  Please  advise  me  of  the  condition  of  alTairs 
before  you  leave,  and  order  Gent  ral  Hampton  —  whom  I 
suppose  you  will  leave  here  iu  command— to  repent  to 
me  at  Millwood  cither  by  letter  or  In  person,  as  may  be 


was  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  with  the  corps  of 
Hill  and  Longstreet.  The  latter  was  holding  the 
gaps  and  Stuart  was  guarding  the  approaches  to 
them  east  of  the  ridge.  Hence  Stuart  came  imder 
Longstreet's  orders.  Hooker's  headquarters  were 
in  Fairfax,  with  his  army  spread  out  like  a  fan — 
his  left  being  at  Thoroughfare  Gap  and  his  right 
on  the  Potomac  at  Leesburg.  On  returning  from 
a  scout,  I  reported  to  Stuart  the  scattered  condition 
of  Hooker's  corps,  and  he  determined,  with  the  ap- 
proval of  General  Lee,  to  pass  around,  or  rather 
through,  them,  as  the  shortest  route  to  Ewell. 
There  was  an  opportunity  besides  to  inflict  much 
damage  and  to  cut  off  communication  between 
Washington  and  the  North. 

I  have  lately  discovered  documents  in  the  ar- 
chives of  the  War  Department  that  set  at  rest  the 
question  of  Stuart's  alleged  disobedience  of  orders, 
and  show  that  General  Longstreet  then  approved  a 
plan  which  he  now  condemns  as  "  a  wild  ride  around 
the  Federal  army."  He  directed  Stuart  to  pass 
around  the  rear  of  the  oiemi/ in  preference  to  cross- 
ing west  of  the  ridge,  in  order  to  prevent  disclos- 
ing our  designs. -jiV 

IJnder  date  of  June  22d,  7:30  P.  M.,  he  writes 
to  General  Lee  :  "  I  have  forwarded  your  letter  to 
General  Stuart,  witli  the  suggestion  that  he  jxiss 
by  the  enemifs  rearii  he  thinks  he  may  get  through." 

Up  to  the  morning  of  June  25th  it  was  per- 
fectly practicable  for  Stuart  to  have  done  so.  In 
accordance  witli  Lee's   and   Longstreet's  instruc- 

niost  aRreeable  to  him.  Most  respectfully.  J.  Long- 
street,  Lieutenant-Geueral.— N.  B.  I  think  that  y<uir 
passuKC  of  the  Potomac  by  our  rear  at  the  jircseiit  mo- 
ment will  iu  a  measure  disclose  our  jilans.  You  liad 
better  not  leave  us,  thereftire,  unless  you  can  take  the 
proi)osed  route  in  rear  of  the  enemy.  J.  Longstreet. 
Lieutenant-General." 

"  irEAngrARTEiJs,  22d  .Tune,  isc.3.  Ma.ior-C.kneral  J. 
E.  W.  STiAiiT,  Counnandin>r(\ivalry.  GKVEitAL:  I  have 
Just  received  your  note  of  7  :  4r>  this  morninjr  to  Genenil 
Loiijrstreet.  I  jndfic  the  efforts  of  the  enemy  yestenlay 
were  to  arrest  our  |)ro>rress  and  ascertain  our  where- 
abouts. Pciimps  he  is  satisfied  Do  you  know  where 
he  is  and  what  he  is  doliijr  f  I  fear  he  will  steal  a  nuiroh 
ou  us  and  get  across  the  Potomac  before  we  are  aware. 


2^2  THE  CONFEDERATE  CAyALRY  IN  THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN. 


tions  Stuart  withdi-ew  from  the  front  on  the  even- 
ing of  the  24th  to  pass  around  Hooker,  leaving 
Eobertson  about  Middleburg  with  3000  cavalry 
and  2  batteries  of  artillery  to  observe  the  enemy. 
Stuart's  success  depended  upon  preserving  the 
status  quo  of  the  Federal  army  until  he  could  get 
through  it.  Hooker  was  on  the  defensive  loaiting  for 
his  adversary  to  move.  It  did  not  seem  to  occur  to 
General  Longstreet  that  the  march  of  the  infantry 
down  the  Shenandoah  Valley  would  disclose  all  to 
the  enemy  that  the  cavalry  would  have  done.  It 
was  no  fault  of  Stuart's  that  he  was  foiled  by 
events  which  he  could  not  control.  When  on  the 
morning  of  the  25th  he  reached  Hooker's  rear, 
he  found  his  whole  army  moving  to  the  Potomac 
and  all  the  roads  occupied  by  his  troops.  This 
compelled  a  wide  detour,  and  instead*  of  cross- 
ing the  river  in  advance  of  the  enemy,  as  he  had 
expected,  he  was  two  days  behind  him.  Thus  all 
communication  was  broken  with  Generals  Lee 
and  Ewell.  The  march  of  Hill's  and  Longstreet's 
corps  on  the  day  before  had  been  in  full  view  of 
the  signal  stations  on  Maryland  Heights  and  was 
telegi-aphed  to  Hooker,  who  made  a  correspond- 
ing movement. 

On  the  morning  of  June  26th  the  enemy  disap- 
peared from  Eobertson's  front  and  crossed  the 
Potomac.  In  that  event  his  instructions  from 
Stuart  were,  "to  watch  the  enemy  and  harass  his 
rear  —  to  cross  the  Potomac  and  follow  the  army, 
keeping  on  its  right  and  rear,"  and  to  "  report  any- 
thing of  importance  to  Lieutenant-General  Long- 
street,  with  whose  position  you  will  communicate 
by  relays  through  Charlestown." 

Robertson  retired  to  the  mountain  gaps  and  re- 
mained until  the  afternoon  of  the  29th,  when  he 
was  recalled  to  the  army  by  a  courier  from  General 
Lee.  At  night  on  the  2Sth  General  Lee  heard, 
through  a  scout  at  Chambersburg,  of  Hooker's 
advance.  As  no  information  of  it  had  come  from 
the  cavalry  he  had  left  in  Hooker's  front  in  Vir- 
ginia, he  thought  that  Hooker  was  still  there.     He 


immediately  issued  an  order  for  the  concentration 
at  Gettysburg,  and  sent  for  Eobertson's  command, 
that  had  been  left,  he  says,  to  hold  the  mountain 
passes,  "as  long  as  the  enemy  remained  south  of  the 
Putomac."  It  had  staid  there  three  days  after 
they  had  gone.  As  Stuart  had  been  ordered  to 
Ewell  on  the  Susquehanna,  it  could  not  have  been 
expected  that  he  should  also  watch  Hooker  on  the 
Potomac.  Stuart's  instructions  to  divide  the 
cavalry  and  take  three  brigades  with  him  to  Ewell, 
on  the  Susquehanna,  were  perernptory ;  he  was 
only  given  discretion  as  to  the jjoint  of  crossing  the 
Potomac.  It  was  therefore  immaterial,  so  far  as 
giving  information  to  Lee  was  concerned,  wliether 
he  crossed  east  or  west  of  the  ridge.  In  either  event 
they  would  have  been  separated  and  out  of  com- 
munication with  each  other.  Lee  must  then  have 
relied  on  Robertson  or  nobody  to  watch  Hooker. 

Instead  of  keeping  on  the  right  of  the  army  and 
in  close  contact  with  the  enemy,  as  Stuart  had 
ordered,  Robertson's  command  marched  on  the  left 
by  Martinsburg  and  did  not  reach  the  battle-field. 
The  rear-guard  of  the  Federal  army  moving  into 
Pennsylvania  crossed  the  Potomac  on  June  26th, 
east  of  the  Blue  Ridge ;  Robertson  crossed  at 
Williamsport,  about  twenty-five  miles  to  the  tccst 
of  it,  on  July  1st,  the  day  the  fighting  began  at 
Gettysburg.  When  General  Lee  crossed  the  Poto- 
mac, he  left  General  Robertson  between  him  and  the 
enemy.  By  July  3d  Robertson  had  so  manceuvred 
that  Lee  was  between  him  and  the  enemy.  Stuart 
had  ridden  around  General  Hooker  while  Robertson 
was  riding  around  General  Lee.  If,  in  accordance 
with  Stuart's  instructions,  Robertson  had  promptly 
followed  on  the  right  of  the  army  when  the  enemy 
left,  Lee's  forces  would  have  been  concentrated 
and  ready  for  attack ;  a  defensive  battle  would 
have  been  fought,  and  Gettysburg  might  have 
been  to  Southern  hearts  something  more  than  a 

"  Glorious  Held  of  grief." 

Washington,  Feb.  9tli,  1887. 


If  you  find  that  he  is  moving  northward,  and  that  two 
brigades  can  guard  the  Blue  Ridge  and  take  care  of  your 
rear,  you  can  move  with  the  other  three  into  Maryland 
and  take  position  on  General  Ewell's  right,  place  your- 
self in  commuuication  with  liim,  guard  his  flank  and 
keep  him  iufonncil  of  the  enemy's  movements,  and  col- 
lect all  the  nuiiplicH  you  can  for  the  use  of  the  army. 
One  cohiiiiii  of  (icnciul  Kwell's  army  will  probably  move 
toward  the  SiiH((iii'liiuiiia  by  the  EniujitsJiurg  route,  an- 
other l.y  Cliiiiiil.cishiiri;-.  Accounts  from  liim  last  night 
Statclliiit  tlicrc  was  no  enemy  west  of  Frederiektown. 
A  cavalry  force  (about  one  liuiidredi  guarded  the  Mono- 
cacy  l)ridge,  which  was  l)arri(aded.  You  will,  of  course, 
take  charge  of  Jenkins's  brigade  and  give  him  necessary 
instructions.  All  supplies  taken  in  Maryland  nuistbcbv 
authorized  staflf-ofheers  for  their  respective  departments, 
by  no  one  else.  They  will  be  paid  for  or  receipts  forthe 
same  given  to  the  owners.  I  will  send  you  a  general 
order  on  this  subject,  which  I  wish  you  to  see  is  strictly 
complied  with.  I  am,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient 
servant,  R.  E.  Lee,  General." 

On   the  following  day  General  Lee   wrote   as   fol- 
lows : 

"  HK  ADQUARTERS,  ArMT  OF  NOKTHERN  VIRGINIA ,  JunC 

23d,  1863, 5  P.  M.  Major-General  J.  E.  B.  SrnART,  Com- 
manding Cavalry.  Gi:neral  :  Your  notes  of  9  and  10 :  30 
a.  M.  to-day  have  Just  been  received.    .    ,    .    If  General 


Hooker's  army  remains  inactive  you  can  leave  two  bri- 
gades to  watch  him  and  withdraw  with  the  three  others, 
but  should  he  not  appear  to  be  moving  northward,  I 
think  you  had  better  withdraw  this  side  of  the  mountain 
to-morrow  night,  cross  at  Shepherdstown  next  day,  and 
move  over  to  Frederiektown.  You  will,  however,  be 
able  to  judge  whether  you  can  pass  around  their  army 
without  hindrance,  doing  them  all  the  damage  you  can, 
and  cross  the  river  east  of  the  mountains.  In  either 
case,  after  crossing  the  river,  you  must  move  on  and  feel 
the  right  of  Ewell's  troops,  collecting  information,  pro- 
visions, etc.  Give  instructions  to  the  commander  of  the 
brigades  left  behind  to  watch  the  flank  and  rear  of  the 
army  and  (in  event  of  the  enemy  h'ax  ing  their  front)  re- 
tire from  tile  mountains  west  of  the  Shenandoah,  leaving 
suflicient  i>iekets  to  guard  the  passes,  and luinging every- 
thing clean  along  the  valley,  closing  upon  the  rear  of  the 
army.  As  regards  the  movements  of  the  two  brigades 
of  tlie  eneniy  moving  toward  Warrenton,  the  commander 
of  the  brigades  to  be  left  in  the  mountains  nnist  do  what 
he  can  to  counteract  them;  but  I  think  the  sooner  you 
cross  into  I\rar>  laud,  after  to-morrow,  the  better.  The 
mov<'ments  of  Kwell's  corps  are  as  stated  in  my  former 
letter.  Hill's  hist  division  will  reach  the  Potomac  to- 
day, and  Longstreet  will  follow  to-morrow.  Be  watchful 
and  circumspect  in  all  your  movements.  I  am  very  re- 
spectfully and  truly  yours,  K.  E.  Lee,  General."— J.  8.  M. 


THE  CONFEDERATE  CAK4LRY  IN  THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN.   2s 


II.     BY    BEVERLY    H.     ROBERTSON,     BRIGADIER-GENERAL,     C. 


Colonel  John  S.  Mosby  has  seen  proper  to  make 
mention  of  my  command  in  the  cavalry  of  the  Ai-my 
of  Northern  Virginia  during  the  Gettysburg  cam- 
paign, and  as  a  means  of  defending  General  J.  E. 
B.  Stuart  from  an  imaginary  attack,  has  misrepre- 
sented a  portion  of  General  Stuart's  cavalry. 
Colonel  Mosby  knows  very  little  of  Stuart's  char- 
acter if  he  supposes  that  so  true  a  soldier  would 
have  silently  passed  over  such  disobedience  of 
orders  as  Colonel  Mosby  imputes  to  me.  The  fact 
that  Colonel  Mosby  has  "lately  discovered  docu- 
ments in  the  archives  "  at  Wasliington,  which  are 
to  "  set  at  rest"  something  that  has  not  been  set 
in  motion,  will  not  excuse  him  for  attempting  in 
1887  to  prove  by  argument  that  in  1863  Stuart 
did  not  know  whether  I  had  obeyed  his  orders  in 
the  Gettysburg  campaign. 

The  orders  left  with  me  by  General  Stuart,  dated 
June  2-ith,  were  exactly  obeyed  by  me,  to  his  en- 
tire satisfaction  as  well  as  to  that  of  General  K. 
E.  Lee.  These  orders  embraced  the  duty  of  hold- 
ing Ashby's  and  Snicker's  gaps,  to  prevent  Hooker 
from  interrupting  the  march  of  Lee's  army;  and 
"  in  case  of  a  move  by  the  enemy  on  Warrenton," 
to  counteract  it  if  possible.  I  was  also  ordered 
when  I  withdrew  from  the  gaps  to  "  withdraw  to  the 
west  side  of  the  Shenandoah,"  to  cross  the  Poto- 
mac where  Lee  crossed,  and  to  "  follow  the  army, 
keeping  on  its  right  and  rear."  The  full  text  of 
my  orders  was  as  follows  : 

"Headquarters,  Cavalry  Division,  Army  North- 
ern Virginia,  June  24tli,  1863.  Brigadier-General 
B.  H.  Robertson,  Commanding  Cavalry.  General: 
Your  own  and  (iciicral  Jones's  brigades  will  cover  the 
front  of  AhIiIiv'h  and  Snicker's  Gaps,  yourself,  as  senior 
offlccr,  lieinjr  in  coinniand. 

"  Your  ol).j('(t  will !)('  to  watch  the  enemy,  deceive  him 
as  to  our  designs,  and  liaraHS  his  rear  if  you  find  he  is 
retiring.  B('  always  on  tlie  alert;  let  nothing  escape 
your  observation,  and  miss  no  opportunity  which  oflfers 
to  damage  tlie  enemy. 

"  After  tile  eiK^my  has  moved  beyond  your  reach,  leave 
SunieieTit  pickets  in  the  mountains  and  withdraw  to  the 
west  side  of  the  Shenandoah  and  place  a  strong  and 
reliable  picket  to  watch  the  enemy  at  Harper's  Ferry, 
cross  tlie  Potomac  and  follow  the  army,  keeping  on  its 
right  and  rear. 

"  As  long  as  the  enemy  remains  in  your  front,  in  force, 
unless  otherwise  ord(>red  by  General  R.  E.  Lee,  Lieu- 
tenant-General  LoTigstreet,  or  myself,  hold  the  gaps 
with  a  line  of  jiickets  reaching  across  the  Shenandoah 
by  Charlestown  to  the  Potomac. 

"If,  in  the  contingency  mentioned,  you  withdraw, 
sweep  the  valley  clear  of  what  pertains  to  the  army  and 
cross  the  Potomac  at  the  different  points  crossed  by  It. 

"You  will  instruct  (ieneral  .Tones  from  time  to  timeas 
the  movements  jndgress,  or  events  may  require,  and 
report  anythiii-  of  importance  to  Lieutenant-General 
Longstrcet,  with  whose  j)osition  you  will  communicate 
by  relays  throngh  Cliarlestown. 

"  I  send  instrnctioMs  for  (General  Jones,  which  ]dense 
lead.    Avail  yourself  of  every  means  in  your  power  to 


increase  the  efficiency  of  your  command  and  keep  it  up 
to  the  highest  number  possible.  Particular  attention 
will  be  paid  to  shoeing  horses,  and  to  marching  off  of  the 
turnpikes. 

"  In  case  of  an  advance  of  the  enemy  you  will  offer 
such  resistance  as  will  be  justifiable  to  check  him  and 
discover  his  intentions,  and  if  possible  you  will  prevent 
him  from  gaining  possession  of  the  gaps.  In  case  of  a 
move  by  the  enemy  upon  Watrenton,  you  w  ill  counter- 
act it  as  much  as  you  can,  compatible  with  previous  in- 
structions. 

"  You  wiU  have  with  the  two  brigades  two  batteries 
of  horse-artiUery.  Very  respectfully,  your  obeilient 
servant,  J.  E.  B,  Stuart,  Major-General  Commanding. 

"  Do  not  change  your  present  line  of  pickets  until  day- 
light to-morrow  morning  unless  compelled  to  do  so." 

The  only  road  by  which  the  orders  (which  par- 
ticularly specified  the  avoidance  of  "turnpikes" 
on  account  of  the  difficulty  and  delay  of  shoeing 
horses)  could  be  complied  with,  carried  my  com- 
mand to  Martinsburg ;  at  which  place,  and  not  in 
the  gaps  of  the  mountains,  as  Colonel  Mosby  insin- 
uates, a  courier  from  General  Lee  met  me.  My 
command  was  hiu-ried  from  there  to  Chambers- 
burg,  and  thence  by  forced  march,  on  the  night  of 
July  2d,  to  Cashtovra,  where  it  arrived  at  about  10 
A.  M.  on  July  3d.  Ascertaining  at  Cashto^vn  that 
General  Pleasonton  was  moving  from  Emmits- 
burg  directly  on  the  baggage  and  ammunition 
trains  of  General  Lee's  army,  which  were  exposed 
to  his  attack  without  defense  of  any  kind,  I  pressed 
forward  with  my  command  and  intercepted  the 
advance  of  General  Pleasonton,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Major  Samuel  H.  Starr.  A  severe  and 
gallant  fight  was  made  at  Fairfield,  in  which  Major 
StaiT  of  the  6th  United  States  Eegular  Cavalry 
was  wounded  and  captured  with  a  large  portion  of 
his  staff,  while  his  regiment  was  severely  damaged. 
Adjutant  John  Allan  and  three  others  of  the  6th 
Virginia  Cavalry  were  killed,  19  were  wounded, 
and  5  were  reported  missing. 

That  fight  at  Fairfield,  on  the  last  day  of  the  fight- 
ing at  Gettysburg,  refutes  the  imputation  intended 
by  Colonel  Mosby  to  be  conveyed  in  his  remark 
that  my  command  "  did  not  reach  the  battle-field.'' 

From  that  fight  at  Fairfield  I  was  ordered  by 
General  R.  E.  Lee  to  cover  his  wagon  trains,  and 
in  obeying  the  same  my  command  was  engaged  in 
repeated  skirmishes,  particularly  at  Funkstown  and 
Hagerstown,  after  which  it  returned  to  Virginia  — 
tlie  last  command  that  recrossed  the  Potonuic. 

If  there  existed  tlie  least  gi-ound  for  Colonel 
Mosby's  statements,  there  would  be  found  among 
the  rei)orts  of  general  officers  some  reference  to  the 
imi>uted  dereliction  of  duty  on  my  part.  As  no 
such  reference  is  made,  and  no  imputation  of  dis- 
obedience of  orders  is  there  intimated,  it  may  bo 
assumed  that  neither  Stuart  nor  Lee  had  any 
reason  to  complain  of  my  command. 


THE    FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


BY  HENRY  J.   HUNT,   BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL,   U.  S.  A.,   CHIEF  OF  ARTILLERY  OF  THE 
ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

THE  battles  of  Fredericksburg  and  Chancellorsville  raised  the  confidence 
of  the  Confederate  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  to  such  a  height  as  to 
cause  its  subordinate  officers  and  soldiers  to  believe  that,  as  opposed  to  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  they  were  equal  to  any  demand  that  could  be  made 
upon  them.  Their  belief  in  the  superiority  of  the  Southerner  to  the  Northerner 
as  a  fighter  was  no  longer,  as  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  a  mere  provincial 
conceit,  for  it  was  now  supported  by  signal  successes  in  the  field.  On  each 
of  these  two  occasions  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  been  recently  reorganized 
under  a  new  general,  presumably  abler  than  his  predecessor  and  possessing 
the  confidence  of  the  War  Department,  and  the  results  were  crowning  victories 
for  the  Confederates.  Yet  at  Fredericksburg  defeat  was  not  owing  to  any 
lack  of  fighting  qualities  on  the  part  of  the  Federal  soldiers,  but  rather  to 
defective  leadership. 

At  Chancellorsville  both  qualities  were  called  in  question.  In  none  of  the 
previous  battles  between  these  armies  had  the  disparity  of  numbers  been  so 
gi-eat.  The  Federal  general  had  taken  the  initiative,  his  plan  of  operations 
was  excellent,  and  his  troops  were  eager  for  battle.  The  Confederates  could 
at  first  oppose  but  a  portion  of  their  inferior  force  to  the  attack  of  greatly 
superior  numl)ers,  and  the  boast  of  the  Federal  commander,  that "  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  was  the  legitimate  property  of  tlie  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac," seemed  in  a  fair  way  to  be  justified,  when  at  first  contact  tho  advan- 
tages already  gained  were  thrown  away  by  the  assumption  of  a  timid, 
defensive  attitude.  Lee's  bold  offensive,  which  followed  immediately  on  this 
exhibition  of  weakness,  the  consequent  rout  of  a  Federal  army-c(^ri)s,  and  the 
subsecpient  retreat  of  the  whole  army,  a  hirge  portion  of  wliicli  had  not  been 
engaged,  confirnu'd  the  exultant  Confederates  in  tlieir  conviction  —  Avliich 
now  became  an  article  of  faith  — that  both  in  combat  and  in  generalshiit  the 
superiority  of  the  Southerner  was  fully  eslal^lished.     The  Fedei-al  soldiers 


2^6  THE  FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 

returned  from  Chancellorsville  to  their  camps  on  the  northern  bank  of  the 
Eappahannock,  mortified  and  incensed  at  finding  themselves,  through  no 
fault  of  their  own,  in  the  condition  of  having  in  an  offensive  campaign  lost 
the  battle  without  fighting,  except  when  the  enemy  forced  it  upon  them. 

Yet  in  this  battle  the  Northern  soldier  fought  well.  Under  the  circum- 
stances no  men  could  have  withstood  such  a  sudden  attack  as  that  made  by 
"  Stonewall "  Jackson  on  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  Eleventh  Corps ;  but  as 
soon  as  Jackson  encountered  troops  in  condition  for  action,  his  pursuit  was 
checked  and  he  was  brought  to  a  stand.  The  panic  did  not  extend  beyond 
the  routed  corps,  nor  to  all  of  that,  for  its  artillery  and  so  much  of  its  infantry 
as  could  form  a  proper  line  did  their  duty,  and  the  army,  far  from  being 
"  demoralized "  by  this  mishap,  simply  ridiculed  the  corps  which,  from  its 
supposed  want  of  vigilance,  had  allowed  itself  to  be  surprised  in  a  position  in 
which  it  could  not  fight.  The  surprise  itself  was  not  the  fault  of  the  troops, 
and  in  subsequent  battles  the  corps  redeemed  its  reputation.  Both  armies 
were  composed  in  the  main  of  Americans,  and  there  was  little  more  difference 
between  their  men  than  might  be  found  between  those  of  either  army  at 
different  periods,  or  under  varying  circumstances  ;  for  although  high  bounties 
had  already  brought  into  the  Federal  ranks  an  inferior  element  which  swelled 
the  muster-rolls  and  the  number  of  stragglers,  "bounty  jumping  "J  had  not 
as  yet  become  a  regular  business. 

The  morale  of  the  Confederate  army  was,  however,  much  higher  at  this 
time  than  that  of  its  adversary.  It  was  composed  of  men  not  less  patriotic, 
many  of  whom  had  gone  into  the  war  with  reluctance,  but  who  now  felt  that 
they  were  defending  their  homes.  They  were  by  this  time  nearly  all  veterans, 
led  by  ofiicers  having  the  confidence  of  their  Grovernment,  which  took  pains 
to  inspire  its  soldiers  with  the  same  feeling.  Their  successes  were  extolled  and 
magnified,  their  reverses  palliated  or  ignored.  Exaggerations  as  to  the  rela- 
tive numbers  of  the  troops  had  been  common  enough  on  both  sides,  but  those 
indulged  in  at  the  South  had  been  echoed,  sometimes  suggested,  in  the  North 
by  a  portion  of  the  press  and  people,  so  that  friends  and  enemies  united  in 
inspiring  in  the  Confederate  soldier  a  belief  in  himself  and  a  contempt  for  his 
enemy.  In  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  it  was  different ;  the  proportion  of  vet- 
erans was  much  smaller;  a  cessation  of  recruiting  at  the  vei'y  beginning  of 
active  operations,  when  men  were  easily  obtainable  to  supply  losses  in  exist- 
ing regiments,  had  been  followed,  as  emergencies  arose,  by  new  levies,  for  short 
periods  of  service,  and  in  new  organizations  which  could  not  readily  be  assim- 
ilated by  older  troops.  Moreover,  there  were  special  difficulties.  The  Army 
of  the  Potomac  was  not  in  favor  at  the  War  Department.  Earely,  if  ever,  had 
it  heard  a  word  of  official  commendation  after  a  success,  or  of  sympathy  or 
encouragement  after  a  defeat.  From  the  very  beginning  its  camps  had  been 
filled  with  imputations  and  charges  against  its  leaders,  who  were  accused  on 
the  streets,  by  the  press,  in  Congress,  and  even  in  the  War  Department  itself, 
and  after  victories  as  well  as  after  defeats,  not  only  of  incapacity  or  miscon- 

\  This  term  was  applied  to  the  practice  of  enlisting  and  seciiring  bounty  money,  and  then,  either 
deserting  outright,  or  shirking  the  serious  work  of  the  field.— Editors. 


THE  FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


2S7 


duct,  but  sometimes  of  "  tlisloyalty " 
to  theii-  superiors,  civil  and  militai-y, 
and  even  to  the  cause  for  which  they 
fought.  These  accusations  were  fol- 
lowed or  accompanied  by  frequent 
changes  of  commanders  of  the  army, 
of  army-corps,  and  even  of  di\dsions. 
Under  such  circumstances,  but  little 
confidence  could  be  felt  by  the  troops, 
either  in  the  wisdom  of  a  war  office 
which  seemed  to  change  its  favorites 
with  the  caprice  of  a  coquette,  or  in 
the  capacity  of  new  generals  who  fol- 
lowed each  other  in  such  rapid  succes- 
sion. But  it  is  due  to  that  patient  and 
sorely  tried  army,  to  say  that  the  spirit 
of  both  officers  and  men  was  of  the 
best,  and  their  devotion  to  duty  uncon- 
querable. The  army  itself  had  origin- 
ally been  so  admirably  disciplined  and 
tempered,  that  there  always  remained 
to  it  a  firm  self-reliance  and  a  stern 
sense  of  duty  and  of  honor  that  was 
proof  against  its  many  discourage- 
ments. In  battle  it  always  acquitted 
itself  well  and  displayed  the  highest 
soldierly  qualities,  no  matter  who  com- 
manded it  or  whence  he  came.  Chan- 
cellorsville  furnishes  no  exception  to 
this  assertion,  nor  e\adence  of  inferi- 
ority of  the  Northern  to  the  Southern 
soldier,  but  it  does  fm-nish  striking 
illustrations  of  Napoleon's  well-known 
a  man  is  everything." 
Gimeral  Lee,  who  felt  gi-eat  confidence  in  his  own  troops,  and  overrated  the 
effects  of  successive  reverses  on  the  Federal  soldiers,  now  resolved  to  assume 
the  offensive,  for  he  knew  that  to  remain  on  the  defensive  would  in  the  end 
force  him  back  on  Eichmond.  He  determined,  therefore,  in  case  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  could  not  be  brought  to  action  under  favorable  circumstances 
in  Virginia,  to  transfer,  if  permitted,  the  field  of  optM-ations  to  Northern  soil, 
where  a  victory  promptly  followed  up  might  give  him  possession  of  Baltimore 
or  Washington,  and  perhaps  h^d  to  the  recognition  of  the  Confederacy  by 
foreign  i)Owers.  The  valley  of  the  Shenandoah  offerc'd  a  safe  line  of  o})ei-a- 
tions;  the  Federal  troops  occupying  it  were  rather  a  bait  than  an  oltstacle, 
and  to  capture  or  destroy  them  seemed  (juite  ]H-acticabl(»  to  one  wlio  controlled 
absolutely  all  Confederate  troops  within  the  sphere  of  his  operations.     The 


L\L    MKADE    IX    THE    FIKLD. 
ROM    A    I'lIOTOGUAl'H. 


saying,  "  In  war  men  are  nothin< 


2^8  THE  FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 

sharp  lesson  ho  had  administered  the  previous  year  had  not  been  heeded  by 
the  Federal  War  Office ;  an  opportunity  now  offered  to  repeat  it,  and  he  took 
his  measures  accordingly.  In  case  his  Government  would  not  consent  to  a 
bolder  offensive,  he  could  at  least  clear  the  valley  of  Virginia  of  the  enemy, — a 
distinct  operation,  yet  a  necessary  preliminary  to  an  invasion  of  the  North. 
This  work  was  assigned  to  Lieutenant-General  Ewell,  an  able  officer,  in  every 
way  qualified  for  such  an  enterprise. 

In  anticipation  of  the  new  campaign,  Lee's  army  was  strengthened  and 
reorganized  into  three  army-corps  of  three  divisions  each.  Each  division  con- 
sisted of  four  brigades,  except  Rodes's  and  Anderson's,  which  had  five  each, 
and  Pickett's,  which  had  three  at  Gettysburg, —  in  all,  thirty-seven  infantry 
brigades.  The  cavahy  were  the  select  troops  of  the  Confederacy.  Officers 
and  men  had  been  accustomed  all  theii'  lives  to  the  use  of  horses  and  arms, 
"  and  to  the  very  end  the  best  blood  in  the  land  rode  after  Stuart,  Hampton, 
and  the  Lees."  They  were  now  organized  as  a  division,  under  Major-General 
J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  consisting  of  the  six  brigades  of  Hampton,  Robertson,  Fitz- 
hugh  Lee,  Jenkins,  W.  E.  Jones,  and  W.  H.  F.  Lee,  and  six  batteries  of  horse- 
artillery  under  Major  R.  F.  Beckham.  To  these  should  be  added  Imboden's 
command,  a  strong  brigade  of  over  2000  effective  horsemen  and  a  battery  of 
horse-artillery,  which  had  been  operating  in  the  mountain  country  and  was 
now  near  Staunton,  awaiting  orders.  The  artillery  had  recently  received  an 
excellent  organization  under  its  commandant-in-chief,  General  Pendleton.  It 
consisted,  besides  the  horse-artillery,  of  fifteen  so-called  "  battalions,"  each  of 
four  batteries,  with  one  lieutenant-colonel  and  a  major.  To  each  army-corps 
were  attached  five  battalions,  one  for  each  division  and  two  as  a  reserve,  the 
whole  under  a  colonel  as  chief  of  artillery.  The  total  number  of  batteries  was  69, 
of  guns  287,  of  which  30  were  with  the  ca  -  ahy.  With  few  exceptions  the  bat- 
teries were  of  four  guns  each.  The  army  w£  s  commanded  by  a  full  general,  each 
army-corps,  except  the  artillery,  by  a  lieutenant-general,  each  division  by  a 
major-general,  each  brigade,  except  two,  by  brigadier-generals.  Nearly  all  these 
officers  were  veterans  of  proved  ability  and  many  had  served  in  the  Mexican  war. 

In  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  the  discharge  of  58  regiments  had  reduced 
its  strength  since  Chancellorsville  by  25,000  effectives,  partly  replaced  by  5 
brigades  numbering  less  than  12,000  men.  At  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  the  7 
army-corps  consisted  of  19  infiintry  divisions,  7  of  which  had  2  brigades,  11 
had  3,  and  1  had  4;  in  all  51  brigades.  [See  lists  of  organizations  and  com- 
manders in  "  The  Opposing  Forces  in  the  Gettysburg  Campaign,"  to  follow.] 
The  army  and  army-corps  were  commanded  by  major-generals,  the  divisions 
by  3  major-generals  and  16  brigadier-generals,  the  infantry  brigades  by  22 
brigadier-generals  and  29  colonels.  The  average  strength  of  army-corps 
and  divisions  was  about  half  that  of  the  Confederates,  a  fact  that  should  be 
kept  in  mind,  or  the  terms  will  be  misleading.  The  cavalry  had  been  raised 
under  disadvantages.  Men  accustomed  to  the  use  of  both  horses  and  arms 
were  comparatively  few  in  the  North  and  required  training  in  everything 
that  was  necessary  to  make  a  trooper.  The  theater  of  war  was  not  considered 
favorable  for  cavalry,  and  it  was  distributed  to  the  various  headquarters  for 


THE  FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG.  2'-,g 

escort  duty,  guards,  and  orderlies.  It  was  not  until  1863  that  it  was  united 
under  General  Pleasonton  in  a  corps  consisting  of  three  weak  divisions, 
Buford's,  D.  McM.  Gregg's,  and  DufSe's,  afterward  consolidated  into  two, 
Stahel's  cavalry,  which  joined  at  Frederick,  June  28th,  becoming  the  third 
division.  The  corps  was  then  organized  as  follows  :  First  Division,  Buford : 
brigades.  Gamble,  Devin,  Merritt ;  Second  Division,  Gregg :  Ijrigades,  Mcin- 
tosh, Huey,  J.  Irvin  Gregg;  Thii-d  Division,  Kilpatrick:  brigades,  Farns- 
worth,  Custer.  The  divisions  and  three  of  the  brigades  were  commanded 
by  brigadier-generals,  the  other  five  brigades  by  colonels.  To  the  cavalry 
were  attached  Robertson's  and  Tidball's  brigades  of  horse-artillery.  Under 
excellent  chiefs  and  the  spirit  created  by  its  new  organization,  the  Federal 
cavalry  soon  rivaled  that  of  the  Confederates. 

The  field-artillery  was  in  an  unsatisfactory  condition.  The  high  reputation 
it  had  gained  in  Mexico  was  followed  by  the  active  and  persistent  hostility 
of  the  War  Department,  which  almost  immediately  dismounted  three-fourths 
of  its  authorized  batteries.  Congress  in  1853  made  special  provision  for 
remounting  them  as  schools  of  instruction  for  the  whole  arm,  a  duty  which 
the  War  Department  on  shallow  pretexts  evaded.  Again  in  1861  Congress 
amply  provided  for  the  proper  organization  and  command  of  the  artillery  in 
the  field,  but  as  there  was  no  chief  nor  special  administration  for  the  arm, 
and  no  regulations  for  its  government,  its  organization,  control,  and  direction 
were  left  to  the  fancies  of  the  various  army  commanders.  General  officers 
were  practically  denied  it,  and  in  1862  the  War  Department  announced  in 
orders  that  field-officers  of  artillery  were  an  unnecessary  expense  and  their 
muster  into  service  forbidden.  Promotion  necessai'ily  ceased,  and  such 
able  artillerists  as  Hays,  DeRussy,  Getty,  Gibbon,  Griffin,  and  Ayres  could 
only  receive  promotion  by  transfer  to  the  infantry  or  cavahy.  No  adequate 
measures  were  taken  for  the  supply  of  recruits,  and  the  batteries  were  fre- 
quently dependent  on  the  troops  to  which  they  were  attached  for  men  enough 
to  work  their  guns  in  battle.  For  battery-draft  they  were  often  glad  to  get  the 
refuse  horses  after  the  ambulance  and  quartermasters'  trains  were  sui>plied. 
Still,  many  of  the  batteries  attained  a  high  degree  of  excellence,  due  mainly 
to  the  self-sacrifice,  courage,  and  intelligence  of  their  own  officers  and  men. 

On  taking  command  of  the  army,  General  Hooker  had  transferred  the 
military  command  of  the  artillery  to  his  own  headquarters,  to  be  resumed  by 
the  chief  of  artillery  only  under  specific  orders  and  for  special  occasions, 
which  resulted  in  such  mismanagement  and  confusion  at  Chancellorsville 
that  he  consented  to  organize  the  artillery  into  brigades.  This  was  a  deeided 
ijHjH'ovement,  which  would  have  been  greater  if  the  brigade  commanders  had 
held  adequate  rank.  As  it  was,  there  was  no  artillery  eommandaiit-in-eliief 
for  months  before  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  and  of  the  14  l)rigades  4  wei-e 
commanded  by  field-offic(n'S,  9  by  cai)tains,  and  1  by  a  licnitenaiit,  taken  from 
their  l)atteries  for  the  pur})ose.  The  number  of  field-batteries  at  ( Jeltysl>nig 
was  65,  of  guns  370,  of  which  212  were  with  th(>  infantry,  50  with  tin-  cavalry, 
108  in  the  reserve.  Tlie  disadvantages  under  wliich  the  artillery  labored  all 
through  the  war,  from  want  of  proi»er  regulations,  suitervision,  and  command 


FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


MAJOK-GENERAI,    JOHN    F.    KKYNOLDS. 

The  iiiiifonii  iH  that  of  a  llcldoflkcr  in  tho  regular  army.    Early  iu  the  war  (Jcueral  Reynolds  was  promoted  from 

Captain  m  the  3d  Artillery  to  Lieuteuaiit-Colouel  of  the  14th  United  States  Infantry,  and  was  made 

Brigadier-General  of  Volunteers  iu  September,  1861.— Editoks. 


THE  FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG.  261 

were  simply  disgraceful  to  our  army  administration  from  the  close  of  the 
Mexican  to  that  of  the  Civil  war,  and  caused  an  unnecessary  expenditure  of 
both  blood  and  treasure. 

It  will  be  perceived  by  comparison  that  the  organization  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  was  at  this  period  in  every  way  inferior  to  that  of  its  adversary. 
The  army-corps  and  divisions  were  too  numerous  and  too  weak.  They 
required  too  many  commanders  and  staffs,  and  this  imposed  unnecessary 
burdens  on  the  general-in-chief,  who  was  often  compelled  to  place  several 
army-corps  under  the  commander  of  one  of  them,  thus  reproducing  the  much- 
abused  "  grand  divisions  "  of  Burnside,  under  every  possiole  disadvantage. 
Had  the  number  of  infantry  corps  been  reduced  to  four  at  most,  and  tlie 
divisions  to  twelve,  the  army  would  have  been  more  manageable  and  better 
commanded,  and  the  artillery,  without  any  loss,  but  rather  a  gain  of  efficiency, 
would  have  been  reduced  by  a  dozen  or  fifteen  batteiies. 

Eaely  in  June  Lee's  army  began  to  move,  and  by  the  8th  Longstreet's  and 
Swell's  corps  had  joined  Stuart's  cavalry  at  Culpeper.  A.  P.  Hill's  corps  was 
left  in  observation  at  Fredericksburg ;  and  so  skillfully  were  tlie  changes  con- 
cealed that  Hooker,  believing  that  all  the  enemy's  infantry  were  still  near 
that  town,  ordered  Pleasonton  to  beat  up  Stuart's  camps  at  Culpeper,  and 
get  information  as  to  the  enemy's  position  and  proposed  movements.  For 
these  purposes  he  gave  Pleasonton  two  small  brigades  of  infantry,  3000  men 
under  Grenerals  Ames  and  Russell,  which  carried  his  total  force  to  10,981. 
They  were  echeloned  along  the  railroad,  which  crosses  the  river  at  Rappa- 
hannock Station,  and  runs  thence  ten  miles  to  Culpeper.  [See  map,  p.  55.] 
Aljout  midway  is  Brandy  Station  a  few  hundred  yards  north  of  which  is 
Fleetwood  Hill.  Dividing  his  force  equally,  Pleasonton  ordered  Buford  and 
Ames  to  cross  at  Beverly  Ford,  and  Gregg,  Duffie,  and  Russell  at  Kelly's 
Ford.  All  were  to  march  to  Brandy  Station,  Duffie  being  thrown  out  to 
Stevensburg,  seven  miles  east  of  Culpeper,  to  watch  the  Fredericksburg  road. 
Then  the  whole  force  was  to  move  on  Culpeper.  On  the  8th,  General  Lee, 
having  sent  Jenkins's  bi-igade  as  Ewell's  advance  into  the  valley,  reviewed 
the  other  5  brigades  of  Stuart,  10,292  combatants,  on  the  plains  near  Brandy 
Station.  After  the  review  they  were  distributed  in  the  neighborhood  with 
a  view  to  crossing  the  Rappahannock  on  the  9th,  Stuart  establishing  his 
headquarters  at  Fleetwood.  Accident  had  thus  disposed  his  forces  in  the 
most  favorable  manner  to  meet  Pleasonton's  converging  movements. 

At  daybreak  Buford  crossed  and  drove  the  enemy's  pickets  from  the  ford 
back  to  the  main  body,  near  St.  James's  church.  Stuart,  on  the  first  rejiort 
of  the  crossing,  sent  Robertson's  brigade  toward  Kelly's  to  watch  that  ford, 
and  Colonel  M.  C.  Butler's  2d  South  Carolina  to  Brandy  Station.  He  hinisrU' 
took  the  command  at  the  church,  where  lie  was  attacked  by  Buford.  At 
Brandy  Station  W.  H.  F.  Leo  was  wounded,  and  Colonel  Chambliss  took 
command  of  his  brigade.  ^Meantime  Gregg  had  crossed  at  Kelly's  Ford,  and 
Duffie,  leading,  took  a  southerly  road,  by  wliich  he  missed  Robertson's  brigade. 
Learning  that  Duffie's  advance  had  reached  Stevensburg  and  that  Buford 


262 


THE  FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


These  maps  and  the  others  relating  to  the  canipaiiru  and  battle  of  Gettyslniis  are  rompilatione  liy  Abner  Doulileday , 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  8.  A.,  from  the  offlt-ial  reports  of  the  conunandera  on  both  sides,  and  from  the  maps 

t)f  Colonel  John  B.  Bachelder,  which  were  purchased  by  Congress  for  the  War  Department.— Editors. 

was  heavily  engaged,  Gregg  pushed  direct  for  Brandy  Station,  sending  orders 
to  Duffie  to  follow  his  movement.  Stuart,  notified  of  his  approach,  had  sent 
in  haste  some  artillery  and  two  of  Jones's  regiments  to  Fleetwood,  and 
Colonel  Butler  started  at  once  for  Stevensburg,  followed  soon  after  by  Wick- 
ham's  tith  Virginia.     On  their  approach  two  squadrons  of  the  6th  Ohio,  in 


THE  FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG.  263 

occupation  of  the  place,  fell  back  skirniisliing.  Duffie  sent  two  regiments 
to  their  aid,  and  after  a  severe  action,  mainly  with  the  2d  South  Carolina, 
reoceupied  the  village.  In  this  action  Colonel  Butler  lost  a  leg,  and  his 
lieutenant-colonel,  Hampton,  was  killed. 

On  Gregg's  arrival  near  Brandy  Station  the  enemy  appeared  to  be  in  large 
force,  with  artillery,  on  and  about  Fleetwood  Hill.  He  promptly  ordered  an 
attack;  the  hill  was  carried,  and  the  two  regiments  sent  by  Stuart  were 
driven  back.  Buford  now  attacked  vigorously  and  gained  ground  steadily, 
for  Stuart  had  to  reenforce  his  troops  at  Fleetwood  from  the  church.  In  the 
struggles  that  followed,  the  hill  several  times  changed  masters ;  but  as  Duffie 
did  not  make  his  appearance,  Grregg  was  finally  overmatched  and  withdi-ew, 
leaving  three  of  his  guns,  two  of  them  disabled,  in  the  enemy's  hands,  nearly 
all  of  their  horses  being  killed  and  most  of  their  cannoneers  liors  de  combat. 
There  were  some  demonstrations  of  pursuit,  but  the  approach  of  Buford's 
reserve  brigade  stopped  them.  Duffie  finally  came  up  and  Gregg  reported 
to  Pleasonton,  informing  him  of  the  approach  of  Confederate  infantry  from 
Culpeper.  Pleasonton,  who  had  captured  some  important  dispatches  and 
orders,  now  considered  his  mission  accomplished,  and  ordered  a  withdrawal 
of  his  whole  command.  This  was  effected  leism^ely  and  without  molestation. 
Gregg  recrossed  at  Rappahannock  Station,  Buford  at  Beverly  Ford,  and  at 
sunset  the  river  again  flowed  between  the  opposing  forces.  Stuart  reports 
his  losses  at  485,  of  whom  301  were  killed  or  wounded.  Pleasonton  reports 
an  aggregate  loss  (exclusive  of  Duffie's,  w^hich  would  not  exceed  25)  of  907, 
of  whom  421  were  killed  or  wounded.  In  nearly  all  the  previous  so-called 
"  cavalry  "  actions,  the  troops  had  fought  as  dismounted  dragoons.  This  was 
in  the  main  a  true  cavalry  battle,  and  enabled  the  Federals  to  dispute  the 
superiority  hitherto  claimed  by,  and  conceded  to,  the  Confederate  cavalry.  In 
this  respect  the  affair  was  an  important  one.  It  did  not,  however,  delay  Lee's 
designs  on  the  valley ;  he  had  already  sent  Imboden  toward  Cumberland  to 
destroy  the  railroad  and  canal  from  that  place  to  Martinsburg. 

Milroy's  Federal  division,  about  9000  strong,  occupied  Winchester,  with 
McReynolds's  brigade  in  observation  at  Berrj^-ille.  Kelley's  di^^sion  of  about 
10,000  men  was  at  Harper's  Ferry,  with  a  detachment  of  1200  infantry  and  a 
battery  under  Colonel  B.  F.  Smith  at  Martinsburg.  On  the  night  of  June 
nth,  Milroy  received  instructions  to  join  Kelley,  but,  reporting  that  he  could 
hold  Winchester,  w^as  authorized  to  remain  there.  Ewell,  leaving  Brandy 
Station  June  10th,  reached  Cedarville  ria  Chester  Gap  on  the  evening  of  the 
12th,  whence  he  detached  Jenkins  and  Rodes  to  captiu-e  McReynolds,  who,  dis- 
covering their  approach,  withdrew  to  Winchester.  They  tlien  pushed  on  to 
Martinsburg,  and  on  the  14th  drove  out  the  garrison.  Smith's  infantry  crossed 
the  Potomac  at  Shepherdstown,  and  made  its  way  to  Maryland  Heights;  his 
artillery  retreated  by  the  Williamsport  i-oad,  was  i>ursued,  and  lost  five  guns. 

Meanwhile  Ewell,  with  Early's  and  Edward  Johnson's  divisions,  marched 
direct  on  Winchester.  Arriving  in  the  neighborhood  on  the  evtMiing  of  the 
13th,  he  ordered  Early  on  the  14th  to  leave  a  brigade  in  (J)S(M-vation  on  the 
south  of  the  town,  move  his  main  force  under  cover  of  the  hills  to  the  north- 


works  which  commanded  the  main 
fort.  He  also  ordered  Johnson  to 
deploy  his  division  on  the 
east  of  the  town,  so  as 
to  divert  attention  from 
Early.  This  was  so  suc- 
cessfully done  that  the 
latter  placed,  unperceived, 
twenty  guns  and  an  as- 
saulting column  in  posi- 
tion, and  at  6  p.  m.,  by  a 
sudden  attack,  carried  the 
outworks,  driving  the  gar- 
risons into  the  body  of 
the  place.  This  capture 
was  a  complete  surprise, 
and  Milroy  called  a  coun- 
cil of  war,  which  decided 
on  an  immediate  retreat, 
abandoning  the  artillery 
and  wagons.  Ewell  had 
anticipated  this,  and  or- 
dered Johnson  to  occupy 
with  a  brigade  a  position 
on  the  Martinsburg  pike, 
north  of  Winchester.  The 
retreat      commenced      at 


THE  FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG.  26s 

2  A.  M.  of  the  15th,  and  after  proceeding  three  or  four  miles,  the  advance 
encountered  Johnson's  troops,  attacked  \igorously,  and  at  first  successfully, 
but,  the  enemy  receiving  reenforcements,  a  hard  fight  ensued  in  which  the 
Federals  lost  heavily.  The  retreat  was  then  continued ;  the  troops  separated 
in  the  darkness,  one  portion  reaching  Harper's  Ferry,  another  crossing  the 
Potomac  at  Hancock.  On  the  15th  Ewell  crossed  the  river,  occupied  Hagers- 
town  and  Sharpsburg,  and  sent  Jenkins's  cavahy  to  Chambersbui^g  to  collect 
supplies.  On  the  17th  the  garrison  of  Harper's  Ferry  was  removed  to  Mary- 
land Heights,  and  the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah  was  cleared  of  Federal  troops. 
In  these  brilliant  operations  Oeneral  Lee  claims  for  Ewell  the  capture  of  4000 
prisoners  and  small-arms,  28  pieces  of  artillery,  11  colors,  300  loaded  wagons, 
as  many  horses,  and  a  considerable  quantity  of  stores  of  all  descrij^tions,  the 
entire  Confederate  loss,  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  being  269. 

These  operations  indicate  on  the  part  of  General  Lee  either  contempt  for 
his  opponent,  or  a  belief  that  the  chronic  terror  of  the  War  Department  for 
the  safety  of  Washington  could  be  safely  relied  upon  to  paralyze  his  move- 
ments,—  or  both.  On  no  other  reasonable  hypothesis  can  we  account  for  his 
stretching  his  army  from  Fredericksburg  to  Williamsport,  with  his  enemy 
concentrated  on  one  flank,  and  on  the  shortest  road  to  Kichmond. 

General  Hooker's  instructions  were  to  keep  always  in  view  the  safety  of 
Washington  and  Harper's  Ferry,  and  this  necessarily  subordinated  his  opera- 
tions to  those  of  the  enemy.  On  June  5th  he  reported  that  in  case  Lee  moved 
via  Culpeper  toward  the  Potomac  with  his  main  body,  leaving  a  corps  at  Fred- 
ericksburg, he  should  consider  it  his  duty  to  attack  the  latter,  and  asked  if  that 
would  be  within  the  spirit  of  his  instructions.  In  reply  he  was  warned  against 
such  a  course,  and  its  dangers  to  Washington  and  Harper's  Ferry  were  pointed 
out.  On  June  10th,  learning  that  Lee  was  in  motion,  and  that  there  were  but 
few  troops  in  Richmond,  he  proposed  an  immediate  march  on  that  place,  from 
which,  after  capturing  it,  he  could  send  the  disposable  part  of  his  force  to  any 
threatened  point  north  of  the  Potomac,  and  was  informed  that  Lee's  army,  and 
not  Richmond,  was  his  true  objective.  Had  he  taken  Richmond,  Peck's  large 
force  at  Suffolk  and  Keyes's  10,000  men  \  in  the  Peninsula  might  have  been 
utilized,  and  Hooker's  whole  army  set  free  for  operations  against  Lee. 

As  yet  an  invasion  of  the  North  had  not  been  definitely  fixed  upon.  On 
June  8th,  the  day  before  the  engagement  at  Brandy  Station,  Lee,  in  a  c()nti- 
dential  letter  to  Mr.  Seddon,  Confederate  Secretary  of  War,  stated  that  he  was 
aware  of  the  hazard  of  taking  th*^  aggressive,  yet  nothing  was  to  be  gained 
by  remaining  on  the  defensive ;  still,  if  tlu^  (lei)artnient  thought  it  better  to  do 
so,  he  would  adopt  that  course.  ^Ir.  Seddon  replied,  June  10th,  the  date  of 
Hooker's  proposal  to  march  on  Richmond,  concurring  in  General  Lee's  views. 

^  The  forces  referred  to  consisted  (January  1st,  the  Fourth  Corps.      Both   wore   included   in   the 

18(5;^)  of  three  brigades  and  some  uuassigued  com-  DcpiirtiMcnt  of  Vir^jinia,  commanded  by  Ueneral 

mands  at  Suffolk,  under  General  John  J.  Peck,  and  .lolin  A.  Dix,  with  headquarters  at  Fort  Monroe, 
two  brigades,  and  three  cavalry  commands  — also         Wliilr   Lee  was  invading  the  North  an  expedi- 

unassigned,    stationed    at   Yoridown,    (ilouccst.r  i  ion  was  si-iit  by  (Jeneral  Dix    from  White  House 

Point,    and    Williamsburg,    un<ler   (u-neral    K.    D.  to  the    South    Anna    Ix'ivcr   an. I   Hottom's  Hridge 

Keyes.     The  troops  under  Peck  belonged  to  the  to   destroy    Lee's   communications    and   threaten 

Seventh  Corps.     Keyes's  command  was  known  as  Kichmond.— Editors. 
VOL.  III.    X8 


REFERENCES. 

Confederate.  Union, 

■■■■       Infantry.  ■         f 


Longbtreet's  C'ps.L. 
Ewell's  Corps,  ...  E. 
A.  P.  Hill's  C'ps..H. 
Stuart's  Cavalry S. 


Note.— lu  fonsidorins  tlic  comparative  value  of  Get-  general  by  Point  of  Rocks,   Fairfield,  aiul  OaHlitowu; 

rt  ivf "  T^  WestiniiiKter  (luliin.l  Pipe  Creek)  to  Lee  and  there  should  be  represented  on  the  maps  the  lesser 

and  Meade,  the  maps,  al.ox  .■,  slu.iild  make  more  of  the  range  called  Parr's  Ridge,  east  of  Pipe  Creek,  at  the  foot 

inountam  ridge,  west  of  the  Mouocacy,  and  defined  in  of  which  lie  Westminster  and  Manchester.- Editors. 


THE   FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


267 


He  considered  aggressive  action  indispensable,  that  "  all  attendant  risks  and 
sacrifices  must  be  incurred,"  and  adds,  "  I  have  not  hesitated,  in  cooperating 
with  your  plans,  to  leave  this  city  almost  defenseless."  General  Lee  now 
had  full  liberty  of  action,  with  the  assured  support  of  his  Government, —  an 
immense  advantage  over  an  opponent  who  had  neither. 

As  soon  as  Hooker  learned  from  Pleasonton  that  a  large  infantry  force  was  at 
Culpeper,  he  extended  his  right  up  the  Eappahannock,  and  when  informed  of 
Ewell's  move  toward  the  valley,  being  forbidden  to  attack  A.  P.  Hill  at  Fred- 
ericksburg or  to  spoil  Lee's  plans  by  marching  to  Richmond,  he  moved  his 
army,  on  the  night  of  June  13th,  toward  the  line  of  the  Orange  and  Alexandria 
Railroad,  and  occupied  Thoroughfare  Gap  in  advance  of  it.  On  the  15th  Long- 
street  left  Culpeper,  keeping  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge  and  so  covering  its  gaps. 
Hill  left  Fredericksburg  on  the  14th,  and  reached  Shepherdstown  via  Chester 
Gap  on  the  23d.  Stuart's  cavalry  had  been  thrown  out  on  Longstreet's  right  to 
occupy  the  passes  of  the  Bull  Run  mountains  and  watch  Hooker's  army.  On 
the  17th  he  encountered, 
near  Aldie,  a  portion  of 
Pleasonton's  command ;  a 
fierce  fight  ensued,  which 
left  the  Federals  in  pos- 
session of  the  field.  During 
the  four  following  days 
there  was  a  succession  of 
cavalry  combats ;  those  of 
the  19th  near  Middleburg, 
and  of  the  21st  near  Up- 
perville,  were  especially 
well  contested,  and  re- 
sulted in  the  retreat  of 
Stuart  through  Ashby's 
Gap.  Longstreet  had  al- 
ready withdrawn  through 
the  gaps  and  followed  Hill 
to  the  Potomac.  Imboden,  his  work  of  destruction  completed,  had  taken  post 
at  Hancock.  Longstreet  and  Hill  crossed  the  Potomac  on  the  24th  and  25th 
and  directed  their  march  on  Chambersburg  and  Fayetteville,  arriving  on  the 
27th.  Stuart  had  been  directed  to  guard  the  mountain  passes  until  the  Fed- 
eral army  crossed  the  river,  and,  according  to  General  Lee's  report,  "  to  lose 
no  time  in  placing  his  command  on  the  right  of  our  [Confederate]  column  as 
soon  as  he  should  perceive  the  enemy  moving  northward,"  in  order  to  watch 
and  report  his  movements.  According  to  Stuart's  report,  he  was  authorized 
to  cross  between  the  Federal  army  and  Wasliington,  and  directed  after  cross- 
ing to  proceed  with  all  dispatch  to  join  Eariy  in  Pennsylvania. 

General  Lee  so  far  had  l)een  completely  successful ;  his  army  was  exultant, 
and  he  lost  no  time  in  availing  himself  of  his  advantages.  On  the  21st  he 
ordered  Ewell  to  take  possession  of  Harrisburg;  and  on  tlie  22d  EwrlPs  whole 


PENNSYLVANIA    COLLEGE,   GETTTSBCRG.       FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 

The  cupola  was  first  used  by  Union  officers,  and  then  by  Confeder- 
ate, as  a  station  for  observation  and  signals.  Daring  the  withdrawal 
of  the  First  and  Eleventh  corps  throu^'h  the  town  to  Cemetery  Hill, 
there  was  hard  tlghting  in  the  college  gi-ounds.-  Editors. 


268 


THE    FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


corps  was  on  the  march,  Rodes's  and  Johnson's  divisions  via  Chambersburg 
to  Carlisle,  which  they  reached  on  the  27th,  and  Early  via  Grreenwood  and 
Gettysburg  to  York,  with  orders  from  Ewell  to  break  up  the  Northern  Cen- 
tral Raih'oad,  destroy  the  bridge  across  the  Susquehanna  at  Wrights ville,  and 
then  rejoin  the  main  body  at  Carlisle.  Early  entered  York  on  the  28th,  and 
sent  Gordon's  brigade,  not  to  destroy  but  to  secure  possession  of  the  bridge, 
which  would  enable  him  to  operate  upon  Harrisburg  from  the  rear ;  but  a 
small  militia  force  under  Colonel  Frick,  retreating  from  Wrightsville  across 
the  bridge,  after  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  destroy  one  of  its  spans,  set  fire 
to  and  entirely  destroyed  that  fine  structure,  Gordon's  troops  giving  then-  aid 
to  the  citizens  to  save  the  town  from  the  flames.  On  the  29th  Ewell  received 
orders  from  General  Lee  to  rejoin  the  army  at  Cashtown ;  the  next  evening, 

30th,  his  reserve  artil- 
lery and  trains,  with 
Johnson's  division  as 
an  escort,  were  near 
Chambersburg,  and 
Ewell  with  Early's  and 
Rodes's,  near  Heidlers- 
burg.  Thus  suddenly 
ended  Ewell's    Harris- 


TIIK    LUTHERAN   SEMINARY.       THE    UPPER    PICTURE    FROM    A   WARTIME    PHOTOGRAPH. 

Both  pictures  show  the  face  of  the  seminary  toward  the  town,  and  in  the  right-hand  view  is  seen  the  Cliambers- 

l)urg  Pike.    On  the  tirst  day,  Buford  and  Reynolds  used  the  cupola  for  observations ;  thereafter  it 

was  the  chief  signal-station  and  observatory  for  the  Confederates  —  Editors. 

burg  expedition.  One  object  was  to  collect  supplies,  and  contributions  were  ac- 
cordingly levied.  Much  damage  was  done  to  roads  and  bridges,  but  the  prompt 
advance  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  made  this  useless  to  the  Confederates. 

Before  committing  his  army  to  an  invasion  of  the  North,  General  Lee 
recommended  the  proper  steps  to  cover  and  support  it.  In  a  letter  of  June 
23d,  addressed  to  President  Davis,  he  states  that  the  season  was  so  far 
advanced  as  to  stop  further  Federal  operations  on  the  Southern  coast,  and 
that  Confederate  troops  in  that  country  and  elsewhere  were  now  disposable. 
He  proposed,  therefore,  that  an  army  should  as  soon  as  possible  be  organized 
at  Culpeper,  as  "  the  well-known  anxiety  of  the  Northern  Government  for  the 
safety  of  its  capital  would  induce  it  to  retain  a  large  force  for  its  defense,  and 
thus  relieve  the  opposition  to  our  advance";  and  suggested  that  General 
Beauregard  be  placed  in  command,  "  as  his  presence  would  give  magnitude 


THE    FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG.  269 


GETTYSBURG    FROJI    OAK    HILL.      FROM    A    PIIOTOGRAI'II. 

Oak  Hill  is  a  mile  nortb-wcst  of  Gettyslmrg,  and  the  view  bcre  is  Hoiitli-cast,  sliowiuj?  Stovcns  ITiill  (named  after 

Tliaddeiis  Stevens),  the  prei)ar;itoiy  department  of  the  Pennsylvama College,  on  the  left ;  then  ('iilp'n  Hill ; 

then  Pennsylvania  College,  and,  to  the  right  of  its  cupola,  the  ooservatory  on  Cemetery  Hill. 

even  to  a  small  demoustratioii."  On  the  25tli  he  wi'ote  twice  to  Mr.  Da\as 
urging  the  same  views.  The  proposition  embarrassed  Mr.  Davis,  who  could 
not  see  how,  with  the  few  troops  under  his  hand,  it  could  be  carried  out.  In 
fact,  although  General  Lee  had  pointed  out  the  means,  the  proposition  came 
too  late,  as  the  decisive  battle  took  place  much  earlier  than  was  expected. 
This  correspondence,  however,  with  that  between  Lee  and  Mr.  Seddon,  shows 
that  Hooker's  project  to  capture  Richmond  by  a  coup-de-main  was  feasible. 
It  was  not  now  a  question  of  "  swapping  queens."  Washington  was  safe,  being 
well  fortified  and  sufficiently  garrisoned,  or  with  available  troops  within  reach, 
witliout  drawing  on  Hooker ;  and  to  take  Richmond  and  scatter  the  Confedei-- 
ate  Government  was  the  surest  way  to  ruin  Lee's  army — "  his  true  objective.'' 

On  the  first  appearance  of  danger  of  invasion,  Pennsylvania's  vigilant 
governor,  Curtin,  warned  the  people  of  the  State  and  called  out  the  militia. 
General  Couch  was  sent  to  Harrisburg  to  organize  and  command  them,  but 
disbelief  in  the  danger  —  due  to  previous  false  alarms  —  caused  delays  until 
the  fugitives  from  Milroy's  command,  followed  by  Jenkins's  cavalry,  roused 
the  country.  Defensive  works  were  then  thrown  up  at  Harrisburg  and  else- 
where, and  local  forces  were  raised  and  moved  toward  the  enemy. 

Early  in  June  Hooker  represented  in  strong  terms  the  iTecessity  of  having 
one  commander  for  all  the  troops  whose  operations  would  have  an  influence 
on  those  of  Lee's  army,  and  in  reply  was  informed  by  Halleck  that  any  move- 
iiKMits  he  might  suggest  for  other  commands  than  his  own  would  be  ordered 
(/■  prarfirdldr.  Misunderstandings  and  confusion  naturally  resulted,  and 
authority  was  given  Hooker  from  time  to  time  to  exercise  control  over  the 
troops  of  Ileiiitzelnian,  commanding  the  Department  of  Washington,  and  of 
Schenck,  conunanding  the  Middle  Department,  followed,  June  24th,  by  orders 
specifically  placing  the  troops  in  Harper's  Ferry  and  its  vicinity  at  his  disposal. 

Disregarding  Ewell's  movements.  Hooker  conformed  his  own  to  those  of 
the  enemy's  maui  body,  and  crossed  the  Potomac  at  P^dwards's  Ferry  on  tlie 
2r)th  and  2r)th  of  June.  On  the  27th  three  army-cor]>s  undtM-  R(\vnol(ls  ocen- 
pied  iVriddletown  and  the  South  ]\rountain  ]>asses.  The  Twelfth  ('or])s  was 
near  Harper's  Ferry,  and  the  three  other  cori)s  at  or  uoiiv  Freclerick.  Hooker 
now  ordered  the  Twelfth  Corps  to  march  early  on  the  28th  to  Harper's  Ferry, 


THE    FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


GENERAL    LEE'S    HEADQUARTERS    ON    THE    CHAMBERSBURG    PIKE. 
FROM    A    WAR-TIME    PHOTOGRAPH. 


there  to  be  joined  by  its 
garrison  from  Maryland 
Heights,  in  order  to  cnt 
Lee's  communications  with 
Virginia,  and  in  conjunction 
with  Reynolds  to  operate 
on  his  rear.  General  Hal- 
leck,  however,  objected  to 
the  abandonment  of  the 
Heights,  notwithstanding 
Hooker's  representations 
that  the  position  was  ut- 
terly useless  for  any  pur- 
pose ;  whereupon  Hooker 
abandoned  his  jiroject,  and 
finding  now  that  he  was 
"  not  allowed  to  manoeuvre  his  own  army  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy," 
asked  to  be  relieved  from  his  command.  He  had  encountered  some  of  the 
difficulties  which  had  beset  a  predecessor  whom  he  had  himself  mercilessly 
criticised,  and  promptly  succumbed  to  them.  His  request  was  complied 
with,  and  Major-General  George  G.  Meade  was  appointed  his  successor,  this 
being  the  fifth  change  of  commanders  of  the  army  in  front  of  Washington  in 
ten  months.  Meade  was  an  excellent  officer  of  long  service,  who  had  always 
proved  equal  to  his  position,  whether  as  a  specialist  or  a  commander  of  troops. 
Many  welcomed  his  advent — some  regretted  Hooker's  departure.  All  thought 
the  time  for  the  change  unfortunate,  but  accepted  loyally,  as  that  army  ever 
did,  the  leader  designated  by  the  President,  and  gave  Meade  their  hearty  sup- 
port. He  was  succeeded  in  the  command  of  the  Fifth  Corps  by  Major-Gen- 
eral  George  Sykes,  a  veteran  of  the  Mexican  war  and  a  distinguished  soldier. 
When  General  Meade  assumed  command,  June  28th,  the  best  information 
placed  Longsti'eet  at  Chambersburg,  A.  P.  Hill  between  that  place  and  Cash- 
town,  and  Ewell  in  occupation  of  Carlisle,  York,  and  the  country  between 
them,  threatening  Harrisburg.  Unacquainted  with  Hooker's  plans  and  views 
[see  p.  248],  he  determined  at  once  to  move  on  the  main  line  from  Frederick 
to  Harrisburg,  extending  his  wings  as  far  as  compatible  with  a  ready  concen- 
tration, in  order  to  force  Lee  to  battle  before  he  could  cross  the  Susquehanna. 
With  this  view  he  spent  the  day  in  ascertaining  the  i30sition  of  his  army,  and 
brought  up  his  cavalry,  Buford  to  his  left,  Gregg  to  his  right,  and  Kilpatrick 
to  the  front.  Directing  French  to  occupy  Frederick  with  seven  thousand 
men  of  the  garrison  of  Harper's  Ferry,  he  put  his  army  in  motion  early  on 
the  morning  of  the  29th.  Kilpatrick  reached  Littlestown  that  night ;  and 
on  the  morning  of  the  SOtli  the  rear  of  his  division,  while  passing  through 
Hanover,  was  attacked  by  a  portion  of  Stuart's  cavalry.  Stuart,  availing 
himself  of  the  disci-etion  allowed  him,  had  left  Robertson's  and  Jones's 
brigades  to  guard  the  passes  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  on  the  night  of  the  24th, 
with  those  of  Hampton,  Fitzhugli  Lee,  and  Chambliss,  had  started  to  move 


THE    FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


271 


round  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  pass  between  it  and  Centre ville  into  ^lary- 
land,  and  so  rejoin  Lee ;  but  the  movements  of  that  army  forced  him  so  far 
east  that  he  was  compelled  to  ford  the  Potomac  near  Seneca  [20  miles 
above  Washington],  on  the  night  of  the  27th.  Next  morning,  learning  that 
Hooker  had  already  crossed  the  river,  he  marched  north  by  Eockville,  where 
he  captured  a  wagon  train.  Paroling  his  prisoners  and  taking  the  train  with 
him,  he  pushed  on — through  Westminster,  where  he  had  a  sharp  action 
with  a  squadron  of  Delaware  horse — to  Union  Mills,  and  encamped  there  on 
the  29th.  During  the  night,  he  learn(  d  that  the  Federal  army  was  still  be- 
tween him  and  Lee  on  its  march  north, 
and  his  scouts  reported  its  cavalry  in 
strong  force  at  Littlestown,  barring  his 
direct  road  to  Grettysbui'g ;  wherefore, 
on  the  morning  of  the  30th  he  moved 
across  country  to  Hanover,  Chambliss 
in  front  and  Hampton  in  rear  of  his 
long  train  of  two  hundred  wagons,  with 
Fitzhugh  Lee  well  out  on  his  left  flank. 
About  10  A.  M.  Chambliss,  reaching  Han- 
over, found  Kilpatrick  passing  through 
the  town  and  attacked  him,  but  was 
driven  out  before  Hampton  or  Lee  could 
come  to  his  support.  Stuart's  men  and 
horses  were  now  nearly  worn  out ;  he  was 
encumbered  with  a  large  captured  train ; 
a  junction  with  some  part  of  Lee's  army 
was  a  necessity,  and  he  made  a  inght 
march  for  York,  only  to  learn  that  Early 
had  left  the  day  before.  Pushing  on  to  Carlisle,  he  found  that  Ewell  was 
gone,  and  the  place  occupied  by  a  militia  force  under  General  W.  F.  Smith.  | 
His  demand  of  a  surrender  was  refused ;  he  threw  a  few  shells  into  the  town 
and  burned  the  (lovernment  barracks.  That  niglit  he  learned  that  Lee's  army 
was  concentrating  at  Gettysburg,  and  left  for  that  plact^  next  day.  Thus 
ended  a  raid  which  gTeatly  embarrassed  Lee,  and  by  wliicli  the  services  of 
three  cavalry  brigades  were,  in  the  critical  period  of  the  canii)aign,  exchanged 
for  a  few  hundred  prisoners  and  a  wagon  train. 

Hearing  nothing  from  Stuart,  and  therefore  believing  tliat  Hooker  was  still 
soutli  of  tlie  Potomac,  Lee,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  2Sth,  ordered  Longstreet 
and  A.  P.  Hill  to  join  Ewell  at  Harrisl)urg;  but  late  that  night  one  of  Long- 
street's  scouts  came  in  and  reported  that  the  Federal  army  had  crossed  the 
river,  that  Meade  had  relieved  Hooker  and  was  at  Frederick.  Lee  thereui>on 
changed  the  rendezvous  of  his  army  to  Cashtown,  which  i)lace  Hetli  reached 
on  the  29tli.  Next  day  Heth  sent  Pettigrew's  brigad(>  on  to  Gettysburg, 
nine  miles,  to  in'ocuro  a  supply  of   shoes.     Nearing  tliis   ])hice,    Pettigivw 


NOIJTH-EABT  CUKNEK  uF    XUE    MU'HEUM)N    \S  ouUb, 

WHERE  GENERAL   REYNOLDS  WAS  KILLED. 

FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


I  General  Smith  eoimimmlod  tl 


e  First  Divisi 
tlie  ].i()t.M'ti(i 


IV,, 
r  I  la 


irtment  »)f  the  Susiiuehaii 
•rislmrij.— EiHTOKS. 


la,  and  was  eliarjjed 


272 


THE   FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


discovered  the  advance  of  a 
large  Federal  force  and  re- 
turned to  Cashtown.  Hill 
immediately  notified  Generals 
Lee  and  Ewell,  informing  the 
latter  that  he  would  advance 
next  morning  on  G-ettysburg. 
Buford,  sending  Merritt's  brigade  to  Mechanicstown  as  guard  to  his  trains, 
had  early  on  the  morning  of  the  29th  crossed  into  and  moved  up  the  Cumber- 
land valley  via  Boonsboro'  and  Fairfield  Avitli  those  of  Gamble  and  Devin, 
and  on  the  afternoon  of  Tuesday,  June  30th,  under  instructions  from  Pleason- 
ton,  entered  Gettysburg,  Pettigrew's  brigade  withdrawing  on  his  approach. 

From  Gettysburg,  near  the  eastern  base  of  the  Green  Eidge,  and  covering 
all  the  upper  passes  into  the  Cumberland  valley,  good  roads  lead  to  all  im- 
porcant  points  between  the  Susquehanna  and  the  Potomac.  It  is  therefore 
an  important  strategic  position.  On  the  west  of  the  town,  distant  nearly  half 
a  mile,  there  is  a  somewhat  elevated  ridge  running  north  and  south,  on  which 
stands  th(!  "  Lutheran  Seminary."  This  ridge  is  covered  with  open  woods 
through  its  whole  length,  and  is  terminated  nearly  a  mile  and  a  half  north  of 
the  seminary  by  a  commanding  knoll,  bare  on  its  southern  side,  called  Oak 
Hill.  From  this  ridge  the  ground  slopes  gradually  to  the  west,  and  again 
rising  forms  another  ridge  about  500  yards  from  the  first,  upon  which,  nearly 
opposite  the  seminary,  stand  McPherson's  farm  buildings.  The  second  ridge 
is  wider,  smoother,  and  lower  than  tlu^  first,  and  Oak  Hill,  their  intersection, 


THE   FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


273 


has  a  clear  view  of  the  slopes  of  both  ridges  and  of  the  valley  between  them. 
West  of  MePherson's  ridge  Willoughby  Run  flows  south  into  Marsh  Creek. 
South  of  the  farm  buildings  and  directly  opposite  the  seminary,  a  wood 
borders  the  run  for  about  300  yards,  and  stretches  back  to  the  summit  of  Me- 
Pherson's ridge.  From  the  town  two  roads  run :  one  south-west  to  Hagers- 
town  via  Fairfield,  the  other  north-westerly  to  Chaml)ersburg  via  Cashtown, 
The  seminary  is  midway  between  them,  about  300  yards  from  each.  Parallel 
to  and  150  yards  north  of  the  Chambersburg  pike,  is  the  bed  of  an  unfinished 
railroad,  with  deep  cuttings  through  the  two  ridges.  Directly  nortli  of  the 
town  the  country  is  compai-atively  flat  and  open:  on  the  east  of  it.  Rock 
Creek  flows  south. 
On  the  south,  and 
overlooking  it,  is  a 
ridge  of  bold,  high 
ground,  terminated 
on  the  west  by  Cem- 
etery Hill  and  on 
the  east  by  Culp's 
Hill,  which,  bending 
to  the  south,  ex- 
tends half  a  mile  or 
more  and  terminates 
in  low  grounds  near 
Spangler's  Spring. 
Culp's  Hill  is  steep  • 
toward  the  east,  is 
well  wooded,  and 
its  eastern  base  is 
washed  by  Rock 
Cre(;k. 

Impressed  by  the  importance  of  the  position,  Buford,  expecting  the  eai'ly 
return  of  the  enemy  in  force,  assigned  to  Devin's  brigade  the  country  north, 
and  to  Gamble's  that  west  of  the  town ;  sent  out  scouting  parties  on  all  the 
roads  to  collect  information,  and  reported  the  condition  of  aft'au's  to  Reynolds. 
His  pickets  extended  from  below  the  Fairfield  road,  along  the  eastern  bank  of 
Willoughby  Run,  to  the  raih'oad  cut,  then  easterly  some  1500  yards  north  of 
tlu^  town,  to  a  wooded  hillock  near  Rock  Creek. 

On  the  night  of  June  30th  Meade's  headquarters  and  the  Artillery  hN>s(>rve 
were  at  Taneytown  ;  the  First  Corps  at  Marsh  Run,  the  Eleventh  at  Kinmits- 
Inirg,  Third  at  Bridgeport,  Twelfth  at  Littlestown,  Second  at  rniont(nvn, 
Fifth  at  Union  Mills,  Sixth  and  Gregg's  cavalry  at  :\ranchester,  Kilpatrick's  at 
Hanover.  A  glance  at  the  map  [p.  '20()]  will  show  at  what  disadvantage  .Mt^ade's 
army  was  now  placed.  Lee's  whole  army  was  uearing  Gettysburg,  while 
Meade's  was  scattered  over  a  wide  region  to  the  east  and  south  of  that  tcnvn. 

Meade  was  now  convinced  that  all  designs  on  the  Susquehanna  lia<l  been 
abandoned;  but  as  Lee's  cori)S  were  repoi-ted  as  occuiiying  tlu'  country  from 


^"^x 


COMtULUVTl     1)1   M)    ON    THI     1 II  I  I)    OJ     THI      lilt'!!     I)V\ 
Fi;OM    A    PHOTOGUAPIl. 


274 


THE    FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


XnSIION   DEAD    WEST    OF    THE    SEMINAR  T.      FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 

Chambersburg  to  Carlisle,  he  ordered,  for  the  next  day's  moves,  the  First  and 
Eleventh  corps  to  Gettysburg,  under  Reynolds,  the  Thu^d  to  Emmitsbm-g, 
the  Second  to  Taneytown,  the  Fifth  to  Hanover,  and  the  Twelfth  to  Two 
Taverns,  directing  Slocum  to  take  commahd  of  the  Fifth  in  addition  to  his 
own.  The  Sixth  Corps  was  left  at  Manchester,  thirty- four  miles  from  Grettys- 
burg,  to  await  orders.  But  Meade,  while  conforming  to  the  current  of  Lee's 
movement,  was  not  merely  drifting.  The  same  afternoon  he  directed  the 
chiefs  of  engineers  and  artillery  to  select  a  held  of  battle  on  which  his  army 
might  be  concentrated,  whatever  Lee's  lines  of  approach,  whether  by  Harris- 
burg  or  Gettysburg, — indicating  the  general  line  of  Pipe  Creek  as  a  suitable 
locality.  Carefully  drawn  instructions  were  sent  to  the  corps  commanders 
as  to  the  occupation  of  this  line,  should  it  be  ordered ;  but  it  was  added  that 
developments  might  cause  the  offensive  to  be  assumed  from  present  positions. 
These  orders  were  afterward  cited  as  indicating  General  Meade's  intention 
not  to  fight  at  Gettysburg.  They  were,  under  any  circumstances,  wise  and 
proper  orders,  and  it  would  probably  have  been  better  had  he  concentrated 
his  army  behind  Pipe  Creek  rather  than  at  Gettysburg ;  but  events  finally 
controlled  th(^  actions  of  both  leaders. 

At  8  A.  M.,  July  1st,  Biiford's  scouts  reported  Hetli's  advance  on  the  Cash- 
town  road,  %  when  Gamble's  brigade  formed  on  McPherson's  Ridge,  from  the 


1^  The  opening  of  tlie  battle  on  the  Chambersburg 
road,  on  July  1st,  is  thus  described  by  Captain 
Newel  Cheney,  of  tlie  0th  N.  Y.  Cavalry,  in  a  paper 
prepared  for  the  Gettysburg  Monument  Commission 
of  New  York : 

"Colonel  William  Sackctt,  coiiiiniiiKlinjr  flio  9th  N.  Y. 
Cavalry,  was  brigade  ortleer  of  tho  dtiy  and  in  I'harsc  i)f 


the  brigade  picket-line  made  up  of  details  from  each 
regiment  of  Devln's  brigade  (0th  N.  Y..  fith  N.  Y.,  4th  N. 
Y.,  and  17th  Pa.)  the  nii;lit  of  June  aotli.  and  extending 
from  the  Houth  side  of  tlie  Clianiberubnig  road,  on  the 
cant  side  of  Willoughby  I'.uii,  northerly  iind  (>Mst\v;irdly 
across  the  Mummnshnig,  <':irliKle.  ;nid  Ilarrinbiirg 
roads.  He  had  his  he;id(ni;nters  on  the  Chambersburg 
road,  near  the  Lutheran  Sendnary.  The  advanced 
picket  put  on  the  Chambersbm-g  road  near  Willougbby 


THE    FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


■13 


Fairfield  road  to  the  railroad  cut ;  one  section  of  Calef  s  battery  A,  2d  United 
States,  near  the  left  of  his  line,  the  other  two  across  the  Chambersburg  or 
Cashtown  pike.  De\dn  formed  his  disposable  squadrons  from  Gamble's  right 
toward  Oak  Hill,  from  which  he  had  afterward  to  transfer  them  to  the  north 
of  the  town  to  meet  Ewell.  As  Heth  advanced,  he  threw  Archer's  brigade 
to  the  right,  Davis's  to  the  left  of  the  Cashtown  pike,  with  Pettigi-ew's  and 
Brockenbrough's  brigades  in  support.     The  Confederates  advanced  skirmish- 


^^^^^''i^'^k    ^      ^^,' 


'=«>"S<^.^  ^(B 


UNION    DEAD    NEAR    MTHERSON'S    WOODS.       FROM    A    rilOTOGHAril. 


Run  consisted  of  a  coritoiiil  and  tliice  men,  relieved 
every  two  hours,  with  orders  not  to  fire  ou  any  one  ap- 
proachiiif?  from  the  front,  but  to  notify  the  pickets  in 
each  directiim  and  the  reserve.  No  one  approaclied 
from  the  fi-ont  until  da>  liirlit  next  nioiiiinf^,  July  Ist, 
wlien  Corporal  Alphonsc  Ilod^cs,  of  Company  F,  9th  N. 
Y.  Cavalry,  was  on  tliis  iio>t  with  thnc  men.  At  day- 
light he  saw  men  approaching  along  the  road,  nearly 
a  nnle  away,  across  Willoughliy  Run.  Acting  on  his 
orders,  he  immediately  sent  his  men  to  ncttify  the  line 
and  the  reserve,  while  he  advanced  across  the  Mnw  till 
near  eiutugh  to  see  that  those  approaching  were  the 
enemy,  when  he  turned  back,  and  as  he  did  so  the  enemy 
flred  at  him.  Ho  retired  to  the  Run,  and  from  behind 
the  abutments  of  the  bridge  tired  several  shots  l)ack  at 
the  enemy.  These  are  supposed  to  be  the  lirst  shots 
flred  Ifom  onrside  on  the  morning  of  July  1st  at  (tcttys- 
))nrg,  and  occurred  about  5 :  ,30  a.  m.,  as  near  as  Hodges 
can  remember.  Wlicn  lu^  fell  back  from  the  bridge  to 
the  higher  ground,  he  found  Colonel  Saekett  liad  formed 
a  skirmish-line  of  the  whole  of  his  picket  force,  which, 
as  I  have  said,  emisisted  of  <letaehments  from  the  dif- 
ferent regiments  of  the  (l)i'viii's)  brigade.  Here  the 
advance  of  the  enemy  was  llrst  serionsly  disi>u(ed  by 
thisHkirmish-line,  which  they  held  till  after  Hall's  bat- 
tery (2d  Maine)  came  up  and  took  position  on  the  right 
of  the  Chambersburg  road  in  rear  of  this  skirmish  line 
and  tired.  .  .  .  The  First  IJrii^ade  of  Ibiford's  division 
(Colonel  (iamblc'si  eonung  up  on  the  left  of  the  road, 
the  line  of  I  he  Second  lUigade.  still  under  connuand  of 
Colonel  Saekett,  moved  larther  to  the  ri'.'ht  aiul  occu- 
pied the  line  from  the  Cliumbersbiirg  road  to  \Ur  Mum- 
masburg  road.     That  portion  of  the  9th  Cavalry  whi<  li 


had  remained  in  camp  received  orders  to  water  their 
horses  by  squadrons  in  Rock  Creek  about  7  a.  si.  As 
soon  as  they  had  watered,  they  saddled  up  and  itro- 
ceeded  out  on  the  Mummasburg  road  to  the  skinnish- 
lino  ou  Oak  Ridge.  The  ttrst  squadron,  under  Captain 
Ilanley  (afterward  Lieutenant-Colonel),  was  the  first 
to  reach  the  line,  and  he  innnediately  ordered  Lieu- 
tenant A.  C.  Robertson  (afterward  Captain)  with  twenty 
men  to  advance  down  the  road  into  the  woods,  where 
lu^  found  the  enemy's  line  near  the  residence  of  N. 
Hotlnian.  Finding  the  enemy  had  a  strong  line,  he 
retired  to  :i  position  a  little  back  of  the  nsidence  of  J. 
Forney,  fnun  Ixhind  which  soiin*  of  the  ciu-niy  were 
tiring  at  him.  He  dismounted  his  men  and  drove 
the  enemy  from  behind  Forney's  buildings,  then  fell 
back  to  the  stone  wall  ou  the  ridge,  where  the  balaiu-e 
of  the  regiment  were  formed  dismounted.  Here  the 
reginunt  held  their  ground  for  some  tin)e  while  the 
enemy  apiunached  ou  their  hands  and  knees  tlirough 
th(>  whi'at-tield  in  front.  Daniel  C<u-nlsh.  of  Company 
F,  getting  sight  of  a  rebel  not  far  away  in  tin-  tlcld.  tired 
and  kille.l  liim.  The  regiment  cheere<l.  ami  tlie  enemy, 
eviihntly  thinking  our  men  would  charge  <ui  them, 
hastily  willulrew  out  of  tlie  wheat-llehl.  As  they  fell 
back  one  man  stop)>ed  lieluml  a  tree  in  tin-  field  near  the 
road,  ami  Perry  NMclnds,  of  Company  I',  advanced  and 
captured  him.  This  is  sai.l  to  be  the  tirst  prisoner  cajv 
turcd.  He  was  immediately  taken  to  Ibifttnl's  hca<l- 
quarters,  and  gave  the  tlr«f  iufornnilion  we  received 
from  the  enemy's  side.  It  was  dnrinj;  this  skinnish  that 
Cvrns  \V.  James.  Comi)any  (i,  '.Mh  N.  Y.  Cavalry,  was 
killed  by  a  rebel  bullet,  and  he  is  said  to  have  been  tlio 
Ilrsi  man  killed  th.it  UKuniug  on  our  .-idc."— KUITOKS. 


276 


THE    FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


ing  heavily  with  Buford's  dismounted 
troopers.  Calef's  battery,  engaging 
double  the  number  of  its  own  guns, 
was  served  with  an  efficiency  worthy 
of  its  former  reputation  as  "Dun- 
can's battery"  in  the  Mexican  war, 
and  so  enabled  the  cavalry  to  hold 
their  long  line  for  two  hours.  When 
Buford's  report  of  the  enemy's  advance 
reached  Reynolds,  the  latter,  ordering 
Doubleday  and  Howard  to  follow,  has- 
tened toward  Gettysburg  with  Wads- 
worth's  small  division  (two  brigades, 
Meredith's  and  Cutler's)  and  Hall's  2d 
Maine  battery.  As  he  approached  he 
heard  the  sound  of  battle,  and  direct- 
ing the  troops  to  cross  the  fields  to- 
ward the  firing,  galloped  himself  to 
the  seminary,  met  Buford  there,  and 
both  rode  to  the  front,  where  the  cav- 
alry, dismounted,  were  gallantly  hold- 
ing their  ground  against  heavy  odds. 
After  viewing  the  field,  he  sent  back  to 
hasten  up  Howard,  and  as  the  enemy's 
main  line  was  now  advancing  to  the 
attack,  directed  Doubleday,  who  had 
arrived  in  advance  of  his  division,  to 
look  to  the  Fairfield  road,  sent  Cutler 
with  three  of  his  five  regiments  north  of  the  railroad  cut,  posted  the  other 
two  under  Colonel  Fowler,  of  the  14th  New  York,  south  of  the  pike,  and 
replaced  Calef's  battery  by  Hall's,  thus  relieving  the  cavalry.     Cutler's  line 

lets  were  flyiug  thicker  aud  faster,  and  we  hugged  the 
grouud  about  as  close  as  we  could.  Burns  got  behind  a 
tree  and  surprised  us  all  by  not  tnlcing  a  d(>ul)U'-(ini(kto 
the  rear.  He  was  as  calm  and  cdllt'ctcd  as  any  vt'tcran 
on  the  ground.  We  soon  had  orders  to  get  up  and  move 
about  a  hundred  yards  to  the  light,  when  wo  were  en- 
gaged in  one  of  the  most  stubborn  contests  I  ever  ex- 
perienced. Foot  l)y  foot  we  were  driven  back  to  a  point 
near  the  sfmimiry,  where  we  made  a  stand,  but  were 
linally  driven  through  the  town  to  Cemetery  Eidge.  I 
never  saw  .lolm  IJni'ns  after  oiU'  movement  to  the  right, 
when  we  left  him  behind  his  tree,  and  only  Icnow  that 
he  was  true  blue  and  grit  to  the  backbone,  aud  fought 
until  he  was  three  times  wounded." 


JOHN    L.  BURNS,    "THE    OLD   HERO  OF   GETTYSBURG.' 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH    TAKEN    SOON   AFTER 
THE    BATTLE. 


^  I  have  seen  it  stated  in  an  account  of  Burns, 
that  he  was  an  old  regular  soldier  who  had  served 
in  the  Florida  war. —  H.  J.  H. 

Sergeant  George  Eustice,  of  Company  Y,  7th  Wis- 
eonsin  Volunteers,  in  a  letter  from  Gilroy,  Santa 
Clara  County,  California,  gives  this  account  of  John 
Burns's  action  in  the  ranks  of  that  regiment : 

"  It  nmst  have  been  about  noon  when  I  saw  a  little 
old  man  coming  uj)  in  the  rear  of  Company  F.  In  regard 
to  tlie  peculiarities  of  his  dress,  I  remember  he  wore 
a  swallow-tailed  coat  with  smooth  brass  buttons.  He 
had  a  rifle  on  his  shoulder.  We  boys  began  to  poke  fun 
at  him  as  soon  as  he  came  amongst  us, .as  we  thought 
no  civilian  in  liis  senses  would  show  liims.ir  hi  such  a 
place.  Finding  that  he  had  really  c(mie  to  light  I  wanted 
to  put  a  cartridge-box  on  him  to  make  liim  look  like  a 
soldier,  telling  him  he  could  not  light  without  one. 
Slapping  his  pantaloons-i.ocket,  he,  replied,  •  I  can  get 
my  hands  in  here  quicker  than  in  a  box.  I'm  m)t  used 
to  them  new-fangled  things.'  [n  answer  to  the  (piestion 
what  possessed  liim  to  <(nue  out  there  at  such  a  tinu'.  he 
replied  that  the  rebels  had  either  driven  away  or  milked 
his  cows,  and  that  he  was  going  to  be  even  with  them. 
About  this  time  the  enemy  began  to  advance.    Bul- 


lu  his  official  report,  General  Doubleday  says  : 

"Mythanks  an>  specially  ilue  to  a  citizen  of  (iettys- 
burg  named  .lolin  r.iuiis,  who,  although  over  scNfiity 
years  of  ngv,  shouldcicd  his  musket  aud  ottered  his  serv- 
ices to  Colonel  Wister,  loOlh  Pennsylvania  Voliiuteeis. 
Colonel  Wister  advised  him  to  fight  in  the  woods,  as 
there  was  more  shelter  there ;  but  he  preferred  to  join 
our  line  of  skirmishers  in  the  open  fields.  When  the 
troops  retired,  he  fought  with  the  Iron  Brigade  [Mere- 
dith's]. He  was  wounded  in  three  places."— EDITOIiS, 


THE    FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


ni 


was  hardly  formed  when  it  was  struck  Ijy  Davis's  Confederate  brigade  on  its 
front  and  right  flank,  whereupon  Wadsworth,  to  save  it,  ordered  it  to  fall  back 
to  Seminary  Ridge.  This  order  not  reaching  the  147th  New  York,  its  gallant 
major,  Harney,  held  that  regiment  to  its  position  until,  having  lost  half  its 
numbers,  the  order  to  retire  was  repeated.  Hall's  battery  was  now  imperiled, 
and  it  withdrew  by  sections,  fighting  at  close  canister  range  and  suffering 
severely.  Fowler  thereupon  changed  his  front  to  face  Davis's  Ijrigade,  which 
held  the  cut,  and  with  Dawes's  6th  Wisconsin — sent  l)y  Doubleday  to  aid 

the   147th  New  York  —  charged  and    .. — — ^ 

drove  Davis  from  the  field.     The  Con-     |  ! 

federate    brigade    suffered    severely,  j 

losing  all    its   field-officers  but    two,  -. 

and  a  large  proportion  of  its  men 
killed  and  captured,  being  disabled 
for  further  effective  service  that  day. 
In  the  meantime  Archer's  Confeder- 
ate brigade  had  occupied  McPherson's 
wood,  and  as  the  regiments  of  Mere- 
dith's "  Iron  Brigade "  came  up,  they 
were  sent  forward  by  Doubleday,  who 
fully  recognized  the  importance  of  the 
position,  to  dislodge  Archer.  At  the 
entrance  of  the  wood  they  found  Rey- 
nolds in  person,  and,  animated  by  his 
presence,  rushed  to  the  charge,  struck 
successive  heavy  blows,  outflanked  and 
turned  the  enemy's  right,  captured 
General  Archer  and  a  large  portion  of 
his  'brigade,  and  pursued  the  remain- 
der across  Willoughby   Run.    Wads- 

w^orth's  small  division  had  thus  won    , 

decided    successes     against    superior  ma.io,;  ,.i  m  km  mm  i,  i..  i  m  u.,^. 

numbers,  but  it  was  at  ginevous  cost  '"""  '^  "">""-i'^"'- 

to  the  army  and  the  country,  for  Re3niold8,  while  directing  the  operations, 
was  killed  in  the  wood  by  a  sharp-shooter.  It  was  not,  howevin-,  until  by  his 
promptitude  and  gallantry  he  had  determined  the  decisive  field  of  the  war, 
and  had  opened  brilliantly  a  battle  which  required  three  days  of  hard  fight- 
ing to  close  with  a  victory.  To  him  may  be  applied  in  a  wider  sense  than  in 
its  original  one,  Napier's  happy  eulogium  on  Ridge:  "No  man  died  on  that 
field  witli  more  glory  than  he,  yet  many  died,  and  tliere  was  much  glory.'' 

After  the  rei)ulse  of  Davis  and  Archei-,  Ileth's  division  was  formed  in  line 
mostly  south  of  the  Cashtown  i)ike,  with  Pender's  in  second  line,  Pegram's 
and  Mcintosh's  artillery  (nine  batteries)  occnjn'ing  all  the  eomnianding  ])osi- 
tions  west  of  Willoughby  Run.  Doubleday  ici'stablished  his  former  lines, 
Meredith  holding  McPherson's  wood.  Soon  after,  Rowley's  and  Ixol.inson's 
divisions  \two  brigades  each)  and  the  foui-  i-emainiiig  battei-ies  of  the  corps 


278 


THE    FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


AS8ADLT    OF    BK 


The  line  of  the  stone  barn  was  held  by  Stone's  bri- 
gade, Pennsylvania  Bucktails  (Doubleday's  division),  its 
right  resting  on  the  Chambersburg  pike  (the  left  of  the 


picture)  and  its  left  on  the  McPherson  woods,  where  a 
part  of  Archer's  Confederate  brigade  of  Heth's  division 
was  captiu-ed  by  Meredith's  brigade.— Editors. 

arrived.  Rowley's  division  was  thrown  forward,  Stone's  brigade  to  the  inter- 
val between  Meredith  and  Cutler,  and  Biddle's  with  Cooper's  battery  to 
occupy  the  ridge  between  the  wood  and  the  Fairfield  road.  Reynolds's  bat- 
tery replaced  HaU's,  and  Calef  s  rejoined  Gamble's  cavalry,  now  in  reserve. 
Robinson's  division  was  halted  near  the  base  of  Seminary  Ridge.  By  this 
time,  near  noon.  General  Howard  arrived,  assumed  command,  and  directed 
General  Hchurz,  commanding  the  Eleventh  Corps,  to  prolong  Doubleday's 
line  toward  Oak  Hill  with  Schimmelfennig's  and  Barlow's  divisions  and  three 
batteries,  and  to  post  Steinwehr's  division  and  two  batteries  on  Cemetery 
Hill,  as  a  rallying-point.  By  1  o'clock,  when  this  corps  was  arriving,  Buford 
had  reported  Ewell's  approach  by  the  Heidlersburg  road,  and  Howard  called 
on  Sickles  at  Emmitsburg  and  Slocum  at  Two  Taverns  for  aid,  to  which 
both  these  officers  promptly  responded.  It  was  now  no  longer  a  question  of 
prolonging  Doubleday's  line,  but  of  protecting  it  against  Ewell  whilst  engaged 
in  front  with  Hill.  Schurz's  two  divisions,  hardly  6000  effectives,  accordingly 
formed  line  on  the  open  plain  half  a  mile  north  of  the  town.  They  were  too 
weak  to  cover  the  ground,  and  a  wide  interval  was  left  between  the  two  corps, 
covered  only  by  the  fire  of  Dilger's  and  Wheeler's  batteries  (ten  guns)  posted 
behind  it. 

Tliat  morning,  whilst  on  the  march  to  Cashtown,  Ewell  received  Hill's 
notice  that  his  corps  was  advancing  to  Gettysburg,  upon  which  he  turned 


THE   FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


279 


the  heads  of  his  own  columns  to  that  jDoint.  Reporting  the  change  by  a 
staff-officer  to  General  Lee,  Ewell  was  instructed  that  if  the  Federals  w^ere  in 
force  at  Gettysburg  a  general  battle  was  not  to  be  brought  on  until  the  rest 
of  the  army  was  up.  Approaching  Gettysburg,  Kodes,  gTiided  by  the  sounds 
of  battle,  followed  the  prolongation  of  Seminary  Ridge ;  Iverson's,  Daniel's, 
and  Ramseur's  brigades  on  the  western,  O'Neal's  and  Doles's  on  the  eastern 
slope.  Ewell,  recognizing  the  importance  of  Oak  Hill,  ordered  it  to  be  occu- 
pied by  Carter's  artillery  battalion,  which  immediately  opened  on  both  the 
Federal  corps,  enfilading  Doubleday's  line.     This  caused  Wadsworth  again  to 

withdraw  Cutler  to  Seminary 
Ridge,  and  Reynolds's  battery 
was  posted  near  McPherson's 
house,  under  partial  cover. 
^tr>nA  thf^refore  placed  two 
of  hife  three  regiments  on  the 
Casht(n\n  pike,  so  as  to  face 
( )dk  Hill.  This  left  an  inter- 
val lK't\\e(  n  Stone  and  Cutler, 
tbiough  ^^hlcll  Cooper  and 
Reynolds  could  fire  with  ef- 
fect, and  gave  to  these  hues 
a  cross-fire  on  troops  entering 


\^h^ 


.^^^^\^^ 


L_    _.    -.. 


lUNHDEU^n      DrVD    (  ATIIUJH)    H 
UUKI  \I      M  AU     Till       M   I  HI  USON 
>\0<)U>      I  KOM  1  IIOTOGR^l  IIS 


tlic  angle  between  tln'm. 
Robinson  now  sent  his  two 
brig<ides  to  stiengthcn  (^it- 
lei's  light.  Th(\v  took  i)0^t 
behind  the  stone  A\cdls  of  a 
field,  Paul's  biigad(»  tacmg 
\A  est,  Baxter's  1101  tli.  Rodes, 
regarding  this  advance  as  a 
menace,  gave  orders  at  2: 30 
1'.  M.   to   attack.     Iverson, 


i'^^i^^fi&- 


^f^^^^j-^ '  ^^ 


-    < 


>5^^'>~^''to  :;' 


sw<'eping  round  to  his  h^ft, 

engaged  Paul,  who  prolonged  ( -utler's  liiH\  .-iiid  O'Neal  at  lacked  P.axter.  The 
repulse  of  O'Neal  soon  enabled  Baxtei-  to  (uiii  upon  Ivei-son.  Cutler  also 
attacked  him  in  fiank,  and  after  losing  500  men  killed  and  wcmnded,  ',\  of 
Iverson's  regiments  surrendered.  General  Robinson  reports  the  capture  of 
1000  prisoners  and  3  colors;  GeiuM-al  Paul  was  severely  wounded,  losing  both 
eyes.  Meanwhile  Daniel's  brigad«^  advanced  din^'tly  on  Stone,  who  main- 
tained his  lines  against  this  attack  and  also  Brockenbnuiglrs,  of  IlilTs  corps, 


THE   FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


281 


but  was  soon  severely  wounded.  Colonel  Wister,  who  succeeded  him,  met 
the  same  fate,  and  Colonel  Dana  took  command  of  the  brigade.  Ramsem-, 
who  followed  Daniel,  by  a  conversion  to  the  left,  now  faced  Robinson  and 
Cutler  with  his  own  brigade,  the  remnant  of  Iverson's,  and  one  regiment  of 
O'Neal's,  his  right  connecting  with  Daniel's  left,  and  the  fighting  became  hot. 
East  of  the  ridge,  Doles's  brigade  had  been  held  m  observation,  but  about 
3:30  p.  M.,  on  the  advance  of  Early,  he  sent  his  skirmishers  forward  and 
drove  those  of  Devin — who  had  gallantly  held  the  enemy's  advance  in  check 
with  his  dismounted  troopers — from  their  line  and  its  hillock  on  Rock  Creek. 
Barlow,  considering  this  an  eligible  position  for  his  own  right,  advanced 
his  division,  supported  by  Wilkeson's  battery,  and  seized  it.  This  made  it 
necessary  for  Scliurz  to  advance  a  brigade  of  JSchimmelfennig's  division 
to  connect  with  Barlow,  thus  lengthening  his  already  too  extended  line. 

The  arrival  of  Early's  division  had  by  this  time  brought  an  overwhelming 
force  on  the  tlank  and  rear  of  the  Eleventh  Corps.  On  the  east  of  Rock 
Creek,  Jones's  artillery  battalion,  within  easy  range,  enfiladed  its  whole  line 
and  took  it  in  reverse,  while  the  brigades  of  Gordon,  Hays,  and  Avery  in  line, 
with  Smith's  in  reserve,  advanced  about  4  p.  m.  upon  Barlow's  position.  Doles, 
of  Rodes's  division,  connecting  with  Gordon.  An  obstinate  and  bloody  con- 
test ensued,  in  which  Barlow  was  desperately  wounded,  Wilkeson  killed,  and 
the  whole  corps  forced  back  to  its  original  line,  on  which,  with  the  aid  of 
Coster's  brigade  and  Heckman's  battery,  drawn  from  Cemetery  Hill,  Schurz 
endeavored  to  rally  it  and  cover  the  town.  The  fighting  here  was  well  sus- 
tained, but  the  Confederate  force  was  overpowering  in  numbers,  and  the 
troops  retreated  to  Cemetery  Hill,  Ewell  entering  the  town  about  4:30  p.m. 
These  retrograde  movements  had  uncovered  the  flank  of  the  First  Corps  and 
made  its  right  untenable. 

Meanwhile,  that  corps  had  been  heavily  engaged  along  its  whole  line ;  for, 
on  the  approach  of  Rodes,  Hill  attacked  with  both  his  divisions.  There  were 
thus  opposed  to  the  single  disconnected  Federal  line  south  of  the  Cashtown 
])ike  two  solid  Confederate  ones  which  outflanked  their  left  a  quart I'r  of  a 
mile  or  more.  Biddle's  small  connnand,  less  than  a  thousand  men,  after  a 
severe  contest,  was  gradually  forced  back.  In  McPherson's  wood  and  beyond, 
Meredith's  and  Dana's  brigades  repeatedly  repulsed  their  assailants,  but  as 
Biddle's  retirement  uncovered  their  left,  they  too  fell  back  to  successive  i>osi- 
tions  from  which  they  inflicted  heavy  losses,  until  finally  all  three  reached  the 

Note  TO  Cut,  p.  2S0. —  The  death  of  Lieiiten-  not   remain,  direeted   two  batteries   of  his  eoni- 

ant  Bayard  Wilkeson,  who  coininanded  Battery  (t,  mand  to  train  every  ^\n\  npon  him.    Wilkeson  was 

Fourth  U.  S.  Artillery,  was  one  of  the  most  heroie  brought  to  the  ground,  desju-rately  wounded,  and 

episodes  of  tlie  fight.     He  was  but  nineteen  years  his  horse  was  killed.    He  wasearried  by  theConfi-d- 

old  and  was  the  son  of  Samuel  Wilkeson,  who,  as  erates  to  the  Alms  House  (or  dragged  himself  there 

e()rns].on(lriit  of  the  "New-York  Times,"  was  at  —the  aeeonnts  dilTer).  where  he  died  that   night. 

Meade's    hciuhiuarters   during   the    figlit.     Young  Just   before   he  exjiired,  it    is  said,  he  jtsked  for 

Wilkeson,  by  his  fearless  demeanor,  held  his  bat-  water;  a  eanteen  was  brought  to  him;  as  he  took 

tery  in  an  exposed  position  on  the  Union  right.  it  n  wounded  soldier  lying  next  to  him  begged.  "For 

General  John   B.  Cordon,  finding  it  impossil)l(>  to  (Jod's  sake  give  me  some!"     He  jiassed  the  ean- 

advauce   his  Confederate  division   in   the  face  of  teen  untouch. 'd  to  the  man,  who  drank  every  drop 

Wilkeson's  fire,  and  realizing  that  if  the  olViccr  on  it  .•ontainc.l.    Wilkeson  smiled  on  the  man,  turned 

the  horse  eould  be  disposed  of  the  I.altcry  would  slightly,  and  expired— Kl>iTol{S. 
VOL.  111.    m 


282 


THE   FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


Note. —Edward  Johnson's  Confederate  division  (upper  riglit-liand  coiner)  did  not  reaclitbe  position  assigned 
them  on  this  map  until  after  sunset  or  about  diisli  of  July  Ist.    See  p.  2'!4.—  Editors. 


foot  of  Seminary  Ridge,  where  Colonel  Wainwright,  commanding  the  corps 
artillery,  had  planted  twelve  guns  south  of  the  Cashtown  pike,  with  Stewart's 
battery,  manned  in  part  by  men  of  the  Iron  Brigade,  north  of  it.  Buford  had 
already  thrown  half  of  Gamble's  dismounted  men  south  of  the  Fairfield  road. 
Heth's  division  had  suffered  so  severely  that  Pender's  had  passed  to  its  front, 
thus  bringing  fresh  troops  to  bear  on  the  exhausted  Federal  line. 

It  was  about  4  p.  m.  when  the  whole  Confederate  line  advanced  to  the  final 
attack.  On  their  right  Gamble  held  Lane's  brigade  for  some  time  in  check, 
Perrin's  and  Scales's  suffered  severely,  and  Scales's  was  broken  up,  for  Stewart, 
swinging  half  his  guns,  under  Lieutenant  Davison,  upon  the  Cashtown  pike, 
raked  it.  The  whole  corps  being  now  heavily  pressed  and  its  right  uncovered, 
Doubleday  gave  the  order  to  fall  back  to  Cemetery  Hill,  which  was  effected  in 


THE   FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG.  283 


^-'-.''^^ 


THE   LINE    OF   DEFP:NSK    AT    THE    CEMETKKY    GATEHOUSE.      FROM    A    PnoTOCKAPH. 

comparatively  good  order,  the  rear,  covered  by  the  7th  Wisconsin,  turning 
when  necessary  to  check  pursuit.  Colonel  Wainwright,  mistaking  the  order, 
had  clung  with  his  artillery  to  Seminary  Hill,  until,  seeing  the  infantry  retreat- 
ing to  the  town,  he  moved  his  batteries  down  the  Cashtown  pike  until  lai)ped 
on  both  sides  by  the  enemy's  skirmishers,  at  close  range,  when  they  were 
compelled  to  abandon  one  gun  on  the  road,  all  its  horses  being  killed.  The 
Eleventh  Corps  also  left  a  disabled  gun  on  the  field.  Of  the  troops  who 
passed  through  the  town,  many,  principally  men  of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  got 
entangled  in  the  streets,  lost  their  way,  and  were  captured. 

On  ascending  Cemetery  Hill,  the  retreating  troops  found  Steinwehr's 
division  in  position  covered  by  stone  fences  on  the  slopes,  and  occupying  by 
their  skirmishers  the  houses  in  front  of  their  line.  As  they  arrived  they 
were  formed,  the  Eleventh  Corps  on  the  right,  the  First  Corps  on  the  left  of 
Steinwehr.  As  the  batteries  came  up,  they  were  well  posted  by  Colonels 
Wainwright  and  Osborn,  and  soon  a  formidable  array  of  artillery  was  ready 
to  cover  with  its  fire  all  the  approaches.  Buford  assembled  his  command  on 
the  plain  west  of  Cemetery  Hill,  covering  the  left  fiank  and  presenting  a  firm 
front  to  any  attempt  at  pursuit.  The  First  Corps  found  a  small  reenfoi-ce- 
ment  awaiting  it,  in  the  7tli  Indiana,  part  of  the  train  escort,  which  brought 
up  nearly  five  hundred  fresh  men.  Wadsworth  met  them  and  led  them  to 
Culp's  Hill,  where,  under  direction  of  Captain  Pattison  of  that  regiment,  a  defen- 
sive line  was  marked  out.  Their  brigade  (Cutler's)  soon  joined  them ;  wood 
and  stone  were  i)lentiful,  and  soon  the  right  of  the  line  was  solidly  established. 

Nor  was  there  wanting  other  assurance  to  the  men  who  had  fought  so  long 
that  their  sacrifices  had  not  been  in  vain.  As  they  reached  tlu^  hill  they  w«'re 
received  by  Greneral  Hancock,  who  arrived  just  as  they  were  coining  u])  froin 
the  town,  under  orders  from  General  Meade  to  assume  the  comniand.  His 
person  was  well  known;  his  presence  inspireil  confidence,  and  it  implitd  also 
the  near  approach  of  his  army-corps.     He  ordered  Wadsworth  at   once  to 


284 


INCIDENTS  OF  THE  FIRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


Gulp's  Hill  to  secure  that  important  position,  and  aided  by  Howard,  by  War- 
ren who  had  also  just  arrived  from  headquarters,  and  by  others,  a  strong 
line,  well  flanked,  was  soon  formed. 

General  Lee,  who  from  Seminary  Hill  had  witnessed  the  final  attack,  sent 
Colonel  Long,  of  his  staff,  a  competent  officer  of  sound  judgment,  to  examine 
the  position,  and  directed  Ewell  to  carry  it  if  practicable,  renewing,  however, 
his  previous  warning  to  avoid  bringing  on  a  general  engagement  until  the 
army  was  all  up.  Both  Ewell,  who  was  making  some  preparations  with  a 
view  to  attack,  and  Long  found  the  position  a  formidable  one,  strongly  occu- 
pied and  not  accessible  to  artillery  fire.  Ewell's  men  were  indeed  in  no  con- 
dition for  an  immediate  assault.  Of  Rodes's  eight  thousand,  nearly  three 
thousand  were  liors  de  combat.  Early  had  lost  over  five  hundred,  and  had 
but  two  brigades  disposable,  the  other  two  having  been  sent  on  the  report  of 
the  advance  of  Federal  troops,  probably  the  Twelfth  Corps,  then  near  by,  to 
watch  the  York  road.  Hill's  two  divisions  had  been  very  roughly  handled, 
and  had  lost  heavily,  and  he  withdrew  them  to  Seminary  Hill  as  Ewell 
entered  the  town,  leaving  the  latter  with  not  more  than  eight  thousand  men 
to  secure  the  town  and  the  prisoners.  Ewell's  absent  division  (Edward  John- 
son's) was  expected  soon,  but  it  did  not  arrive  until  near  sunset,  when  the 
Twelfth  Corps  and  Stannard's  Vermont  brigade  were  also  up,  and  the  Third 
Corps  was  arriving.  In  fact  an  assault  by  the  Confederates  was  not  prac- 
ticable before  5 :  30  p.  m.,  and  after  that  the  position  was  perfectly  secure. 
For  the  first  time  that  day  the  Federals  had  the  advantage  of  position,  and 
sufficient  troops  and  artillery  to  occupy  it,  and  Ewell  would  not  have  been 
justified  in  attacking  without  the  positive  orders  of  Lee,  who  was  present, 
and  wisely  abstained  from  giving  them.     [Continuation  on  page  290.] 


INCIDENTS    OF    THE    FIRST    DAY    AT    GETTYSBUEG.  ^ 

BY    E.     P.     HALSTEAD,     BREVET-MAJOR    AND    ASSISTANT    ADJUTANT-GENERAL,    U.    S.    V.. 

where  General  Buford,  with  a  small  division  of 
cavalry,  was  contending  against  Heth's  division 
of  infantry  and  vastly  superior  numbers. 

The  First  Corps  moved  promptly,  covered  a  dis- 
tance of  nearly  eight  miles,  and  the  First'Division, 
commanded  by  General  Wadsworth,  reached  the 
field  about  10  o'clock  in  the  forenoon. 

In  returning  for  the  Second  and  Third  divisions 
I  met  John  Burns  in  the  field  east  of  the  Seminary, 
with  an  old  musket  on  his  shoulder  and  a  powder- 
horn  in  his  pocket,  hurrying  to  the  front,  looking 
terribly  earnest.  When  near  me  he  inquired, 
"Which  way  are  the  rebels?  Where  are  our 
troops  ?  "  I  informed  him  that  they  were  just  in 
front,  that  he  would  soon  overtake  them.  He  then 
said,  with  much  enthusiasm,  "  I  know  how  to  fight, 
I  have  fit  before ! " 

Wadsworth's  division  was  immediately  engaged, 
Q100N  after  daylight  on  July  1st,  General  Rey-  except  the  Sixth  Wisconsin,  held  in  reserve  by 
^^  nolds,  then  at  Marsh  Run,  gave  orders  to  General  Doubleday's  orders.  General  Robinson 
move  with   all  possible   dispatch   to   Gettysburg,      and  General  Rowley  were  soon  up  with  their  divi- 

\  From  a  paper  read  before  the  District  of  Columbia  Commandery  of  the  Loyal  Legion,  Mareb  2d,  1887.— Editors. 


COUNTING    THE 


INCIDENTS  OF  THE  FiRST  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


2S5 


sious  and  hotly  engaged,  the  former  on  the  right  of 
the  line,  extending  to  near  the  Mummasburg  road, 
and  the  latter  in  the  center  between  Meredith's 
and  Cutler's  brigades  of  Wadsworth's  division. 

The  advantages  of  position  were,  perhaps,  favor- 
able to  us,  but  in  numbers  the  enemy  was  vastly 
superior.  We  had  6  brigades,  numbering,  with  the 
artillery  assigned  to  duty  with  us,  8200  men,  and 
we  maintained  our  position  for  six  hours  and  a  half 
against  General  A.  P.  Hill's  corps  of  13  brigades. 
General  Archer  and  most  of  his  brigade  were 
captm-ed  early  in  the  day  by  Meredith's  "Iron 
Brigade."  He  evidently  had  expected  an  easy 
"  walk  over,"  judging  from  his  disappointed  man- 
ner after  he  was  captured.  A  guard  brought  him 
back  to  General  Doubleday,  who,  in  a  very  cor- 
dial manner, — they  having  been  cadets  at  West 
Point  together, —  said:  "Good-morning,  Archer! 
How  are  you  1  I  am  glad  to  see  you ! "  General 
Archer  replied:  "Well,  I  am  not  glad  to  see  you, 

by  a  sight ! "    Very  soon  after  this   episode 

the  6th  Wisconsin,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Dawes,  made  a  successful  charge,  resulting  in 
the  capture  of  a  force  of  the  enemy  in  the  rail- 
road cut  north  of  the  Cashtown  road,  and  a  little 
later  General  Baxter  captured  nearly  all  of  Iver- 
son's  [Confederate]  brigade. 

About  2  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  the  Eleventh 
Corps  reached  the  field  and  formed  in  line  of  battle 
at  about  a  right  angle  to  the  general  line  of  the  First 
Corps,  but  did  not  connect  with  its  right  by  several 
hundred  yards,  so  that  both  flanks  were  in  the  air. 
When  Ewell's  troops  approached  from  Carlisle 
and  York  they  struck  the  Eleventh  Corps  in  front 
and  on  both  flanks  almost  simultaneously.  The  re- 
sult was  an  easy  victory  to  the  enemy,  giving  them 
possession  of  Gettysburg  before  the  First  Corps  had 
ceased  fighting  or  had  left  its  position  west  of  the 
Seminary.  Thus  the  First  Corps  was  enveloped 
on  its  right  and  rear  and  was  contending  against 
vastly  superior  numbers  in  its  front. 

About  4  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  General  Doublo- 
d;iy  sent  me  to  General  Howard  for  reenforeements 
and  orders.  I  found  llio  latter  in  the  cemetery 
near  the  gate.  He  looked  the  i)icture  of  despair. 
On  receipt  of  the  message  he  replied:  "Tell 
General  Doubleday  that  I  have  no  reenforeements 
to  send  him.  I  have  only  one  regiment  in  reserve." 
I  then  asked  if  he  had  any  orders  to  give,  and 
called  his  attention  to  the  enemy  then  advancing 
in  line  of  battle  overlapping  our  left  by  nearly 
lialf  a  mile.  He  looked  in  that  direction  and  re- 
])lied  rather  sharply  :  "  Tlioso  are  notliing  but  rail 
fences,  sir!  "  I  said  :  "  Ibegyour])ar(lon,  General ; 
if  you  will  take  my  glass  yoii  will  see  something 
besides  rail  fences."  Turning  to  a  staff-officer,  he 
bade  him  take  the  glass  and  see  what  it  was.  Tlie 
officer  looked,  and  in  an  instant  lowered  tlie  glass, 
saying:  "General,  those  are  long  lines  of  the 
enemy ! "  General  Howard  then  turned  to  me  and 
said:  "Go  to  General  Buford,  give  him  my  com- 
j)liments,  and  tell  him  to  go  to  General  Double- 
day's  support."     When  asked  where  General  l?u- 


ford  could  be  found,  he  replied :  "  I  don't  know !  I 
think  he  is  over  this  way,"  pointing  toward  the 
east. 

After  riding  in  that  direction  as  far  as  I  deemed 
it  wise  or  prudent,  I  returned  to  where  General 
Howard  sat,  just  as  General  Hancock  approached 
at  a  swinging  gallop.  When  near  General  Howard, 
who  was  then  alone,  he  saluted,  and  with  great 
animation,  as  if  there  was  no  time  for  ceremony, 
said  General  Meade  had  sent  him  forward  to  take 
command  of  the  three  corps.  General  Howard  re- 
plied that  he  was  the  senior.  General  Hancock  said  : 
"  I  am  aware  of  that.  General,  but  I  have  written 
orders  in  my  pocket  from  General  Meade,  which  I 
will  show  you  if  you  wish  to  see  them."  General 
Howard  said:  "No;  I  do  not  doubt  your  word, 
General  Hancock,  but  you  can  give  no  orders  here 
while  I  am  here."  Hancock  replied  :  "  Very  well. 
General  Howard,  I  will  second  any  order  that  you 
have  to  give,  but  General  Meade  has  also  directed 
me  to  select  a  field  on  which  to  fight  this  battle  in 
rear  of  Pipe  Creek."  Then,  easting  one  glance  from 
Gulp's  Hill  to  Round  Top,  he  continued:  "But  I 
think  this  the  strongest  position  by  nature  upon 
which  to  fight  a  battle  that  I  ever  saw,  and  if  it 
meets  your  approbation  I  will  select  this  as  the 
battle-field."  General  Howard  responded:  "I 
think  it  a  very  strong  position.  General  Hancock ; 
a  very  strong  position  !  "  "  Very  well,  sir,  I  select 
this  as  the  battle-field."  General  Hancock  im- 
mediately turned  away  to  rectify  our  lines. 

There  was  no  person  present  besides  myself 
when  the  conversation  took  place  between  Howard 
and  Hancock.  A  number  of  years  since  I  reminded 
General  Hancock  of  that  fact  and  what  I  had  lieard 
pass  between  them.  He  said  that  what  I  have 
repeated  here  was  true,  and  requested  a  written 
statement,  which  I  subsequently  furnished  him. 

When  I  left  General  Howard  to  return  to  the 
front,  I  discovered  General  Buford's  cavalry  only 
a  little  to  the  west  of  the  cemetery  and  delivered 
the  order  I  had  received  from  General  Howard. 
Buford  rose  in  his  stirrups  upon  his  tiptoes  and 
exclaimed:  "  What  does  he  think  I  can  do  against 
those  long  lines  of  the  enemy  out  there  ?  "  "I  don't 
know  anything  about  that,  General ;  those  are 
General  Howard's  orders."  "Very  well,"  said  he, 
"I  will  see  what  I  can  do,"  and,  like  the  true 
soldier  that  he  was,  ho  moved  his  command  out  in 
plain  Niew  of  the  enemy  and  formed  for  the  charge. 
The  eneraj%  seeing  the  movement,  formed  s(piares 
in  echelon,  which  delayed  them  and  materially 
aided  in  the  escape  of  the  First  Corps,  if  it  <lid  not 
save  a  large  ])ortion  of  tiie  remnant  from  caiiture. 
The  formation  of  s(iuaresliy  the  enemy  tliat  day  has 
been  doubted  by  nearly  every  one  with  whom  I 
have  conversed  upon  tlie  subject,  and  not  until  tlie 
meeting  of  the  survivors  of  the  First  Corps  at 
Gettysburg,  in  May,  ISS,".,  was  I  able  to  satisfy 
Colonel  Hachelder,  who  has  made  a  stiidy  of  that 
battle,  of  the  correctness  of  my  statement,  and 
only  then  after  it  had  been  corroborated  by  two  of 
Huford's  officers  wlm  were  in  the  engagt-nient. 


/t: 


^^u^c^ 


HANCOCK   AND   HOWARD    IN    THE    FIRST    DAY'S    FIGHT. 


I.     FROM    GENERAL    HANCOCK'S    OFFICIAL    REPORT. 


General  Hancock's  report  bears  no  date  except 
1863,  but  a  supplemental  report,  by  way  of  cor- 
rection, dated  October  24th,  shows  that  the  paper 
was  written  prior  to  that  time,  and  during  his 
convalescence  from  the  wound  received  near  the 
end  of  the  battle.  There  are  passages  in  the  report 
which  show  a  determination  on  the  part  of  Meade 
to  fight  at  Pipe  Creek.     General  Hancock  says  : 

"  On  the  morning  of  July  let  the  command  marched 
to  Taneytown,  going  into  bivouac  about  11  a.  m.  I  then 
proceeded  in  person  to  General  Meade's  lieadquarters, 
and,  on  reporting  to  Mm,  was  informed  as  to  his  inten- 
tion with  reference  to  giving  battle  to  the  enemy,  the 
orders  for  preparatory  movements  being  then  ready  for 
issue.  A  few  minutes  before  1  p.  M.  I  received  orders 
to  proceed  in  person  to  the  front  and  assume  command 
of  the  First,  Third,  and  Eleventh  corps,  in  consequence 
of  the  death  of  Major-General  Reynolds.  Having  been 
fully  informed  by  the  major-general  commanding  as  to 
his  intentions,  I  was  instructed  by  him  to  give  the 
necessary  directions  upon  my  arrival  at  the  front  for 
the  movement  of  troops  and  trains  to  the  rear  toward 
the  line  of  battle  he  had  selected,  should  I  deem  it  ex- 
pedient to  do  so.  If  the  ground  was  suitable,  and  cir- 
cumstances made  it  wise,  I  was  directed  to  establish 
the  line  of  battle  at  Gettysburg.  .  .  .  At  3  p.  m.  I 
arrived  at  Gettysburg  and  assumed  the  command.  At 
this  time  the  First  and  Ek-vciitli  corps  were  retiring 
through  the  town,  closely  puisucd  by  the  enemy.  The 
cavalry  of  General  Bnford  was  occupying  a  firm  position 
on  tlie  plain  to  tlic  left  of  (icltyslniru^,  covciiug  the  rear 
of  the  retreating  corps.  Tlie  Tliird  Corps  had  not  yet 
arrived  from  Ennuitsburg.  Orders  were  at  once  given 
to  establish  a  line  of  battle  on  Cemetery  Hill,  with  skir- 
mishers occupying  that  part  of  the  town  immediately 
in  our  front.  The  position  just  on  the  southern  edge  of 
Gettysburg,  overlooking  the  town  and  commanding  the 


Emmitsburg  and  Taneytown  roads  and  the  Baltimore 
turnpike,  was  already  partially  occupied  on  my  arrival 
by  direction  of  Major-lJeneral  Howard.  Siome  difficulty 
was  experienced  in  forniinj;  the  troops  of  the  Eleventh 
Corps,  but  by  vigorous  eflorts  a  sufficiently  formidable 
line  was  established  to  deter  the  enemy  from  any  serious 
assault  on  the  position.  They  pushed  forward  a  line 
of  battle  for  a  short  distance  cast  of  the  Baltimore 
turnpike,  but  it  was  easily  checked  by  the  Are  of  our 
artillery.  In  forming  the  lines,  I  received  material 
assistance  from  Major-General  Howard,  Brigadier-Gen- 
erals Warren  and  Buford,  and  officers  of  General  How- 
ard's command.  .  .  .  The  trains  of  all  the  troops 
under  my  conunand  were  ordered  to  the  rear,  that  they 
might  not  interfere  with  any  movement  of  troops  that 
might  be  directed  by  the  miijor-general  commanding. 
My  aide.  Major  Mitchell,  was  then  sent  to  General 
Meade  to  inform  him  of  the  state  of  affairs,  and  to  say 
that  I  would  hold  the  position  until  night.  Shortly 
after,  I  addressed  a  communication  to  the  major-general 
commanding,  sending  it  by  Captain  Parker,  of  my  staff, 
giving  in  detail  the  information  in  my  possession,  and 
informing  him  that  the  position  at  Gettysburg  was  a 
very  strong  one,  having  for  its  disadvantage  that  it 
might  be  easily  turned,  and  leaving  to  him  tlie  respon- 
sibility whether  the  battle  should  be  fought  at  Gettys- 
burg or  at  a  place  first  selected  by  him.  Between  5 
and  6  o'clock,  my  disiiositious  having  been  completed, 
Major-General  Slocum  arrived  on  the  tield,  and,  consid- 
ering that  my  functions  had  ceased,  I  transferred  the 
command  to  him.  The  head  of  the  Third  Corps  ap- 
peared in  sight  shortly  afterward,  on  the  Emmitsburg 
road. 

"About  dark  I  started  for  the  headquarters  of  the 
army,  still  at  Taneytown,  thirteen  miles  distant,  and 
reported  in  person  to  General  Meade.  I  tlu-n  ascer- 
tained that  he  had  already  given  orders  for  the  corps 
in  the  rear  to  atlvance  at  once  to  Gettjsburg,  and  was 
about  proceeding  there  in  person." 


II.     FROM    GENERAL    HOWARD'S    OFFICIAL    REPORT. 


General  Howard's  detailed  report  is  dated  Au- 
gust 31st,  18G3,  and  speaks  specifically  of  the 
course  of  events  after  he  took  command  on  the 
morning  of  the  First  Daj''s  battle.     He  says: 

"Just  at  sunset  [June  30th]  I  received  a  request  from 
General  Reynolds,  commanding  First  Corps,  to  meet 
him  at  his  lieadiiuartcrs  (at  Marsh  Run,  midway  between 
Emmitslinr^'  and  ( iett  \sl)ui;i|.  He  then  showed  me  the 
orders  from  your  liead([uaiter8  placing  him  in  command 
of  the  First,  Eh-ventli,  and  Third  corps;  also  the  cir- 
culars of  the  commamling  general  dated  June  30th, 
together  with  a  confidentiiil  communication.  The  pur- 
p(U't  of  these  papers  was  that  a  general  engageiuent  was 
innuincmt,  the  issues  involved  inunense,  and  all  com- 
manders urged  to  extraordinary  exertions.  Geuei'al 
Reynolds  and  I  consulted  together,  comparing  notes  and 
information  until  a  late  hour.  I  tlien  I'cturned  to  Em- 
mitsl)urK.  A  circular  from  your  liead(iuarters,  of  June 
3()tli,  retiuired  corps  eonunanders  to  bold  their  com- 
mands in  readiness  to  move  at  a  moment's  notice.  .  .  • 
At  8  A.  M.  I.Iuly  1st]  orders  were  received  from  him 
[R(\ynolds]  directing  the  corps  to  march  to  (Jettysltuig. 
.  .  .  As  soon  as  the  cori)S  was  set  in  motion,  F  i)uslied 
on  with  my  staff  by  the  direct  road,  and  when  within 
two  miles  of  (!cttysl)urg  received  word  from  (JeiuMul 
Reynolds,  pointini;  out  llie  place  where  I  was  to  en- 
cami) ;  but,  on  approaching  tlie  town,  lieavy  artillery 
firing  was  heard.  P'or  some  little  time  T  endeavored, 
by  sendiui;  in  dilVereiit  (liiections.  to  llnd  General 
Reynolds,  in  order  to  report  to  him  in  person.  In  tlic 
meantime  f  went  totlietopola  liiirli  liuildiiigiii  (iettys 
burg  facing  westward.     I  saw  tiring  beyond  Seminary 


Ridge  and  not  far  from  the  seminary.  Toward  the  right 
masses  of  cavalry  were  drawn  up  in  order,  to  the  east  of 
the  ridge  and  to  the  north-east  of  the  town.  A  portion 
of  the  First  Corps,  of  General  Wadsworth's  command, 
was  between  me  and  the  seminary,  taking  position  near 
the  railroad.  Another  division  of  this  corps  was  moving 
by  the  flank  with  considerable  rapidity,  along  the  ridge 
and  in  a  north-easterly  direction.  I  had  studied  the 
position  a  few  moments,  when  a  report  reached  nie  that 
General  Reynolds  was  wounded.  At  tirst  I  hojied  his 
wound  might  be  slight,  and  that  he  would  continue  to 
command;  but  in  a  short  time  I  was  undeceived.  His 
aide-de-camp.  Major  [William]  Riddle,  brought  the  sad 
tiding  of  his  death.  This  was  about  11 :  30  a.  m.  Prior 
to  this  the  general  had  sent  me  orders  to  move  up  at 
double-(piick,  for  he  was  severely  engaged.  On  hearingof 
the  death  of  General  Reynidds,  I  assumed  command  of 
tlie  left  will}.',  instructing  tieneral  Pcliurz  to  take  com- 
mand of  the  Eleventh  Corps.  After  an  examination  of  the 
general  features  of  the  country,  T  came  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  only  tenable  iiosition  for  my  limited  force  was 
tlie  ridge  to  the  south-east  of  GettysbiirK'.  now  so  well 
known  as  Cemetery  Ridge.  The  highest  point  at  the 
eenietery  connnanded  every  eminence  within  easy 
range.  The  slopes  toward  the  west  and  south  were 
gradual,  and  coidd  lie  eomplet.ly  swept  by  artillery. 
To  tlie  north,  the  rid^re  was  broken  l>y  a  ravin.-  running 
transv.-rscly.  1  at  once  established  my  headcpiartcrs 
near  the  cemetery  and  on  the  hiu'liest  )>oint  north  of  the 
Baltimore  i.ike.  Here  General  S<linr/.  joined  me  Iteforo 
12  M..  when  1  in«tnicted  him  to  make  the  foUowing  dis- 
positions of  the  Eleventh  Corps.  Learning  from  Gen- 
eral Doulileday,  commanding  the  First  Corjis,  that  his 


288 


HANCOCK  AND  HOIVARD  IN   THE  FIRST  DAY'S  FIGHT. 


right  was  hard  pressed,  and  receiving  continued  assur- 
ance that  bis  left  was  safe  and  pushing  the  enemy  back, 
I  ordered  the  First  and  Third  divisions  of  the  Eleventh 
Corps  to  seize  and  hold  a  prominent  height  [Oak  Hill, 
which  they  did  not  reach —the  Confederates  getting 
there  first.— Editors]  on  the  right  of  the  Cashtown  road 
and  on  the  prolongation  of  Seminary  Ridge,  each  di- 
vision to  have  a  battery  of  artillery,  the  other  three 
batteries,  supported  by  General  Steinwehr's  division 
(Second),  to  be  put  in  position  near  me  on  Cemetery  Hill. 

"About  12 :  30  [p.  M.]  General  Buford  sent  me  word  that 
the  enemy  was  massing  between  the  York  and  Harris- 
burg  roads,  to  the  north  of  Gettysburg,  some  throe  or 
four  miles  from  the  town.  Quite  a  large  number  of 
prisoners  had  already  been  taken  by  the  First  Corps. 
They  reported  that  we  were  engaging  Hill's  corps,  or  a 
portion  of  it,  and  that  an  aide  of  General  Longstreet 
had  arrived,  stating  that  he  would  be  up  with  one 
division  in  a  short  time.  About  this  time  the  head 
of  column  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  entered  and  passed 
through  the  town,  moving  forward  rapidly  toward  the 
position  ordered.  The  news  of  E well's  advance  from 
the  direction  of  York  was  confirmed  by  reports  from 
General  Schurz,  General  Buford,  and  Major  Charles  H. 
Howard,  my  aide-de-camp,  who  had  been  sent  in  that 
direction  to  reconnoiter.  I  therefore  ordered  General 
Schurz  to  halt  his  command,  to  prevent  his  right  flank 
being  turned,  but  to  push  forward  a  thick  line  of  skir- 
mishers to  seize  the  point  first  indicated  [Oak  Hill|,  as 
a  relief  and  support  to  the  First  Corps.  Meanwhile 
word  was  sent  to  General  Sickles,  commanding  Third 
Corps,  and  General  Slocum,  commanding  Twelfth,  in- 
forming them  of  the  situation  of  affairs,  with  a  request 
that  General  Sickles  forward  my  dispatch  to  General 
Meade.  General  Sickles  was  at  that  time,  abovit  1  p.  m., 
near  Emmitsburg,  and  General  Slocum  reported  to  be 
near  Two  Taverns,  distant  between  four  and  five  miles 
from  Gettysburg.  At  2  p.  m.  a  report  of  the  state  of 
things  as  then  existing  was  sent  to  General  Meade  di- 
rectly. About  this  time  I  left  my  chief-of-staflf  to  exe- 
cute orders,  and  went  to  the  First  Corps.  I  found 
General  Doubleday  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  beyond 
the  seminary.  His  Third  Division  was  drawn  up  to  his 
front  and  left,  facing  toward  the  north-west,  making  a 
large  angle  with  the  ridge.  The  artillery  of  this  division 
was  engaging  the  enemy  at  this  time.  His  First  Division 
(Wadsworth's)  was  located  a  little  to  the  right  of  the 
railroad,  and  his  Second  Division  (Robinson's)  on  Wads- 
worth's  right.  The  First  Corps,  in  this  position,  made  a 
right  angle  with  the  Eleventh  Corps,  the  vertex  being 
near  the  Muramasburg  road.  The  cavalry  of  General 
Buford  was  located  mainly  upon  the  flanks.  Aftei-  in- 
specting the  position  of  the  First  Corps,  and  examining 
the  topography  of  that  part  of  the  field,  I  returned  to 
my  former  position  at  the  cemetery.  About  this  time 
(2 :  45  p.  M.)  the  enemy  showed  himself  In  force  in  front 
of  the  Eleventh  Corps.  His  batteries  could  be  distinctly 
seen  on  a  prominent  slope  between  the  Mummasburg 
and  the  Hariisldirg  roads.  From  this  point  he  opened 
fire  upon  the  Klevfuth  Corps,  and  also  more  or  less  en- 
filading Robinson's  division  of  the  First  Corps.  The 
batteries  attached  to  the  First  and  Third  divisions. 
Eleventh  Corps,  immediately  replied,  and  with  evident 
effect.  One  battf^ry  of  the  enemy,  a  little  more  than  a 
mile  north  from  the  cemetery,  near  the  Harrisburg 
road,  could  be  distinctly  seen,  and  as  I  had  a  battery  of 
3-inch  rifled  guns,  under  Wiedrich,  near  my  position,  I 
directed  him  to  lire,  jirovidcd  IkmoviM  rcacli  the  ciicniy. 

He  did  so,  but   his  shells   lor  tlic  st  j.ait  fell  siiort. 

Soon  after  complaint  canic  lliat  tli<-.v  readied  no  farther 
than  our  own  cavalry;  liowcvcr,  T  never  lieard  thatany 
ofour  ownmen  w<iv  killed  or  \vomi(le(l))y  thisflre.  The 
reason  of  this  irre.-ularily  was  the  poorquality  of  the 
anninniiti(m  there  used.  Subsequently  these  guns  did 
most  e\'<-ellent  service. 

"  I  now  sent  again  to  General  Slocum,  st.-iting  that  my 
right  flank  was  attacked  and  askin;,'^  liini  if  he  was  mov- 
ing up,  and  stating  that  I  was  in  danger  of  being  tinned 
and  driven  back.  Before  this  my  aide-de-eaiiip,  Caiitain 
[Edward  P.]  Pearson,  had  been  sent  to  General  Sickles, 


requesting  htm  to  move  up  to  Gettysburg  as  rapidly  as 
possible.  Owing  to  difficulty  in  finding  General  Sickles's 
headquarters,  this  message  was  not  delivered  until 
3:30  p.  M. 

At  3 :  20  p.  M.  the  enemy  renewed  his  attack  upon  the 
First  Corps,  hotly  pressing  the  Fu'st  and  Second  divis- 
ions. Earnest  requests  were  made  upon  me  for  reen- 
forcements,  and  General  Schurz,  who  was  engaged  with 
a  force  of  the  enemy  much  larger  than  his  own,  asked 
for  a  brigade  to  be  placed  en  echelon  on  his  right.  I  had 
then  only  two  small  brigades  in  reserve,  and  had 
already  located  three  regiments  from  these  in  the  edge 
of  the  town  and  to  the  north,  and  I  felt  sure  that  I  must 
hold  the  point  where  I  was  as  an  ultimate  resort. 
Therefore  I  at  first  replied  that  I  could  not  spare  any 
troops,  but  did  afterward  permit  General  Steinwehr  to 
push  out  Colonel  Coster's  brigade  beyond  the  town,  to 
cover  the  retreat.  General  Buford  was  requested  to 
support  the  center,  near  the  right  of  the  First  Corps,  as 
well  as  he  could  with  his  cavalry.  A  third  battery  was 
sent  to  the  front,  and  put  in  position  near  the  Third  Di- 
vision, Eleventh  Corps.  At  3 :  45  p.  m.  Generals  Double- 
day  and  Wadsworth  besought  me  for  reenforcements. 
I  directed  General  Schurz,  if  he  could  spare  one  regi- 
ment or  more,  to  send  it  to  reeuforce  General  Wads- 
worth,  and  several  times  sent  urgent  requests  to 
General  Slocum  to  come  to  my  assistance.  To  every 
application  for  reenforcements,  I  replied,  "  Holdout,  if 
possible,  a  while  longer,  for  I  am  expecting  General 
Slocum  every  moment."  At  this  time  General  Double- 
day's  left  was  turned,  and  troops  of  the  enemy  appeared 
far  outflanking  him,  and  the  enemy  were  also  extending 
beyond  my  right  flank.  About  4  p.  m.  I  sent  word  to 
General  Doubleday  that,  if  he  could  not  hold  out  longer, 
he  must  fall  back,  fighting,  to  Cemetery  Hill  and  on  the 
left  of  the  Baltimore  pike;  also  a  request  to  General 
Buford  to  make  a  show  of  force  opposite  the  enemy's 
right,  which  he  immediately  did.  I  now  dispatched 
Major  Howard,  my  aide-de-camp,  to  General  Slocum,  to 
inform  him  of  the  state  of  affairs,  requesting  him  to  send 
one  of  his  divisions  to  the  left,  the  other  to  the  right  of 
Gettysburg,  and  that  he  would  come  in  person  to  Ceme- 
tery Hill.  He  met  the  general  on  the  Baltimore  pike, 
about  a  mile  from  Gettysburg,  who  replied  that  he  had 
already  ordered  a  division  to  the  right,  and  that  he 
would  send  another  to  cover  the  left,  as  requested,  but 
that  he  did  not  wish  to  come  up  in  person  to  the  front 
and  take  the  responsibility  of  that  fight.  In  justice  to 
General  Slocum,  I  desire  to  say  that  he  afterward  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  that  it  was  against  the  wish  of  the 
commanding  general  to  bring  on  a  general  engagement 
at  that  point. 

"  At  4 :  10  p.  M.,  finding  that  I  could  hold  out  no  longer, 
and  that  the  troops  were  already  giving  way,  I  sent  a 
positive  order  to  the  commanders  of  the  First  and  Elev- 
enth corps  to  fall  back  gradually,  disputing  every  inch 
of  ground,  and  to  form  near  my  position,  the  Eleventh 
Corps  on  the  right  and  the  First  Corps  on  the  left  of  the 
Baltimore  pike.  General  Stein^\  elir's  di\isi(in  of  the 
Eleventh  Corps  and  the  batteri<'s  which  he  was  support- 
ing were  so  disposed  as  to  check  the  enemy  attempting 
to  come  through  the  town,  or  to  approach  upon  the  right 
or  left  of  Gettysburg.  The  movement  ordered  was  exe- 
cuted, though  with  considerable  confusion,  on  account 
of  the  First  and  Eleventh  corps  coming  together  in  the 
town. 

"  At  4  :  30  p.  II.  the  columns  reached  Cemetery  Hill,  the 
enemy  iiressini;  h  iid.  He  made  a  single  attempt  to  turn 
our  rigid,  as<i'iidin;:  tlie  sIoi)e  north-east  (d'  (iettysliurg, 
but  his  line  was  instantly  broken  by  Wiedi-iidfs  I'.attery, 
in  position  on  the  lu'ights.  (ieneral  Hancock  came  to 
me  about  this  time  and  said  (Jeneral  INIeade  liad  sent 
him  on  hearing  the  state  of  attairs;  that  he  liad  given 
him  his  instructions  wliih>  UTider  the  impression  tliat  he 
was  my  seiiior.  W(>  au:reed  at  once  that  that  was  no 
time  for  talkinsx,  and  that  (ieiieral  Hancock  sliould  fur- 
ther arrange  the  troo])s  and  place  the  liatteries  upon  the 
left  of  the  Baltimore  pike,  while  I  shonhl  take  the  right 
of  the  same.  In  a  very  short  tinu^  we  i)ut  the  troops  in 
position,  as  I  had  previously  directed,  excepting  that 


CITIZENS  OF  GETTYSBURG  IN   THE  UNION   ARMY. 


General  Wadsworth's  division  was  sent  to  occupy  a 
height  to  the  right  and  rear  of  our  position.  In  passing 
thi-ough  the  town  we  lost  many  prisoners,  but  the  enemy, 
perceiving  the  strength  of  oui-  position  on  the  heights, 
made  no  further  attempts  to  renew  the  engagement  that 
evening. 

"  About  7  P.  M.  Generals  Slocum  and  Sickles  arrived  at 
the  cemeterj'.  A  formal  ordt-r  was  at  the  same  time  put 
into  my  hands  plariug  (iciicnil  Hancock  in  coniniand  of 
the  left  wiug.  But  (icucral  siocmii  being  prcHcnt,  and 
senior,  I  turned  the  command  over  to  him,  and  rcKiimed 
the  direct  command  of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  whereupon 
General  Hancock  repaired  to  the  headtxuarters  of  Gen- 
eral Meade.  The  eventful  day  was  over.  The  First  and 
Eleventli  corps,  numbering  less  than  eighteen  thousand 
men,  n(ibl.\  aided  by  Buford's  division  of  cavalry,  had 
engaged  and  held  in  check  nearly  double  their  numbers 
from  10  in  the  niorninir  until  7  in  the  evening.  They  gave 
way,  it  is  true,  after  liard  tigliting,  yet  tln'y  secured  and 
held  the  remarkai lie  position  which,  under  the  able  gen- 
eralship of  the  commander  of  this  army,  contributed  to 
the  grand  results  of  July  2d  and  3d." 

In  a  letter  to  President  Lincoln,  dated  Near  Ber- 
lin, July  18th,  1863  ("Official  Records,"  Vol. 
XXVIL,  p.  700),  General  Howard  says: 

"  The  successful  issue  of  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  was 
due  mainly  to  the  energetic  operations  of  our  present 


commanding  general  prior  to  the  engagement,  and  to 
the  manner  in  which  he  handled  his  troops  on  the  field. 
The  reserves  have  never  before  during  this  war  been 
thrown  in  at  just  the  right  moment.  In  many  cases 
when  points  were  just  being  carried  by  the  enemy,  a 
regiment  or  brigade  appeared  to  stop  his  progress  and 
hurl  him  back.  Moreover,  I  have  never  seen  a  more 
hearty  cooperation  on  the  part  of  general  officers  as 
since  General  Meade  took  command." 

In  a  resolution  dated  January  2Sth,  ISGi,  the 
thanks  of  Congress  were  tendered  to  General 
Joseph  Hooker  and  his  army  for  the  movement 
covering  Washington  and  Baltimore;  "and  to 
Major-Gen ei'al  George  G.  Meade,  Major-General 
Oliver  O.  Howard,  and  the  officers  and  sokliers  of 
that  army,  for  the  skill  and  heroic  valor  which,  at 
Gettysburg,  repulsed,  defeated,  and  drove  back, 
broken  and  dispirited,  beyond  the  Rappahannock, 
the  veteran  army  of  the  Rebellion."  On  May 
30th,  1866,  the  thanks  of  Congress  were  given 
to  Major-General  W.  S.  Hancock,  "for  his  gal- 
lant, meritorious,  and  conspicuous  share  in  that 
great  and  decisive  victory"  —  meaning  Gettys- 
burg. Editors. 


CITIZENS  OF  GETTYSBURG  IN  THE  UNION  ARMY. 

BY   H.    M.    M.    RICHARDS,    COMPANY  A,    26TH    PENNSYLVANIA   MILITIA. 


TT^OR  twenty-three  jears  we  have  heard  it  asserted 
-0  that  the  people  of  Gettysbui-g  were  lacking  in 
patriotism  because  they  did  not  spring  to  arms  en 
masse,  and  assist  in  repelling  the  invaders.  In  The 
Century  for  November,  1886,  Charles  F.  Weakley 
is  mentioned,  in  addition  to  old  John  Burns,  as  one 
who  volunteered ;  but  these  are  not  all. 

Upon  the  first  indication  of  an  invasion  of  Penn- 
sylvania, the  26th  Regiment,  P.  V.  M.,  was  organ- 
ized and  mustered  into  the  United  States  service 
at  Harrisburg,  under  the  command  of  Colonel 
W.  W.  Jennings  of  that  city.  Company  A  of  this 
regiment,  to  which  I  belonged,  was  composed  of 
students  from  the  Lutheran  Theological  Seminary 
and  the  Pennsylvania  College  of  Gettysburg,  and 
of  citizens  of  the  town ;  one  other  company  came 
from  Hanover,  but  a  few  miles  distant. 

On  Jime  23d  we  left  Harrisburg  for  Gettysburg, 
to  be  used,  I  believe,  as  riflemen  among  the  hills 
near  Cashtown.  A  railroad  accident  prevented 
this  plan  from  being  carried  into  effect,  and  kept 
lis  from  reaching  Gettysburg  until  the  26th,  by 
which  time  General  Early  had  reached  Cashtown. 
In  accordance  witli  orders  received  from  Major 
Granville  O.  Haller,  4-  in  command  of  the  post,  we 
were  marched  out  on  tlie  Chambersburgpike  at  10 
A.  M.,  June  2()th,  for  a  distance  of  about  three  and 
a  half  miles,  accompanied  by  Major  Robert  Bell, 
will)  commanded  a  troop  of  liorse,  also  raiseil,  I 
understand,  in  Gettysburg.  Having  halted,  our 
colonel,  accompanied  by  Major  Bell,  rode  to  the 
brow  of  an  elevation  distant  several  hundred  yanls, 

i  A<'ting  aide-(h'-caniit  to  (ieneral  Concli,  command 


and  there  saw  General  Early's  troops  a  few  miles 
distant.  Early  says  in  his  report :  "  I  sent  General 
Gordon  with  his  brigade  and  White's  battalion  of 
cavalry  on  the  pike  through  Cashtown  toward  Get- 
tysburg, and  moved  with  tlie  rest  of  tlie  command 
to  the  left  through  Hilltown  to  Mnmnuisburg.  The 
object  of  this  movement  was  for  Gordon  to  amuse 
and  skirmish  with  the  enemy  while  I  should  get 
on  his  flank  and  rear  so  as  to  capture  his  whole 
force."  We,  a  few  htmdred  men  at  the  most,  were 
in  the  toils ;  what  should  be  done  ?  We  would 
gladly  have  marched  to  join  the  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac, imder  Meade^  but  where  was  it?  Our 
colonel,  left  to  his  own  resources,  wisely  decided 
to  make  an  effort  to  return  to  Harrisburg,  and  im- 
mediately struck  off  from  the  i>ike,  the  Confeder- 
ates capturing  many  of  our  j-ear-guard  after  a  slmrp 
skirmish,  and  sending  their  cavalry  in  pursuit  of 
us.  These  latter  overtook  us  in  the  afternoon  at 
Witmer's  house,  about  four  and  a  half  miles  from 
Gettysburg  on  the  Carlisle  road,  where  after  an 
engagement  they  were  repulsed  with  some  loss. 
After  many  vicissitudes,  we  linally  reached  Harris- 
burg, having  marched  r.-l  out  of  (!0  consecutive 
hours,  with  a  loss  of  some  200  men. 

It  should  be  added  that  Gettysburg,  small  town 
as  it  was,  had  already  furnished  its  tjuota  to  the 
army.  Moreover,  on  the  tirst  (hiy  of  the  battle 
hundreds  of  the  unfortunate  men  of  Reynolds's  },',il- 
lant  corps  were  .secreted,  sheltered,  let!,  and  aided 
in  every  way  by  the  men  and  women  of  the  town. 

UiCAniNG,  Pa.,  NovemlM>r2d.  ISST.. 


ini;  111.'  l)e 


)f  the  Sus(iuehai 


■^ms 


W^-Jc^W^^^^^j^::; 


^^^Sr 


BATTERY    ON    THE     FIRST 


THE   SECOND    DAY  AT  GETTYSBURGJ 

BY  HENRY  J.  HUNT,  BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL,  IT.  S.  A.,  CHIEF  OF  ARTILLERY  A.  P. 

ON  June  30th,  at  Taneytown,  General  Meade  received  information  that  the 
enemy  was  advancing  on  Gettysburg,  and  corps  commanders  were  at 
once  instructed  to  hold  their  commands  in  readiness  to  march  against  him. 
The  next  day,  July  1st,  Meade  wrote  to  Reynolds  that  telegraphic  intelligence 
from  Couch,  and  the  movements  reported  by  Buford,  indicated  a  concentra- 
tion of  the  enemy's  army  either  at  Chambersburg  or  at  some  point  on  a  line 
drawn  from  that  place  through  Heidlersburg  to  York.  Under  these  circum- 
stances, Meade  informed  Reynolds  that  he  had  not  yet  decided  whether  it 
was  his  best  policy  to  move  to  attack  before  he  knew  more  definitely  Lee's 
point  of  concentration.  He  seems,  however,  soon  to  have  determined  not  to 
advance  until  the  movements  or  position  of  the  enemy  gave  strong  assurance 
of  success,  and  if  the  enemy  took  the  offensive,  to  withdraw  his  own  army 
from  its  actual  positions  and  form  line  of  battle  behind  Pipe  Creek,  between 
Middleburg  and  Manchester.  The  considerations  probably  moving  him  to 
this  are  not  difficult  to  divine.  Examination  of  the  maps  [see  page  266]  will 
show  that  such  a  line  would  cover  Baltimore  and  Washington  in  all  direc- 
tions from  which  Lee  could  advance,  and  that  Westminster,  his  base,  would 
be  immediately  behind  him,  with  short  railroad  communication  to  Baltimore. 
It  would,  moreover,  save  much  hard  marching,  and  restore  to  the  ranks  the 
thousands  of  stragglers  who  did  not  reach  Gettysburg  in  time  for  the  battle. 
From  Westminster — which  is  in  Parr's  Ridge,  the  eastern  boundaiy  of  the 
valley  of  the  Monocacy — good  roads  led  in  all  directions,  and  gave  the  place 
the  same  strategic  value  for  Meade  that  Gettysburg  had  for  Lee.  The  new 
line  could  not  be  turned  by  Lee  without  imminent  danger  to  his  own  army, 
nor  could  he  afford  to  advance  upon  Baltimore  or  Washington,  leaving  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  intact  behind  and  so  near  him;  —  that  would  be  to 
invite  the  fate  of  Burgoyne.  Meade,  then,  could  safely  select  a  good  "  offen- 
sive-defensive line"  behind  Pipe  Creek  and  establish  himself  there,  with 
perfect  liberty  of  action  in  all  directions.     Without  magazines  or  assured 

^  Contimied  from  page  284. 


THE  SECOND  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG.  291 

communications,  Lee  would  have  to  scatter  his  army  more  or  less  in  order  to 
subsist  it,  and  so  expose  it  to  Meade;  or  else  keep  it  united,  and  so  starve 
it,  a  course  which  Meade  could  compel  by  simple  demonstrations.  There 
would  then  be  but  two  courses  for  Lee, — either  to  attack  Meade  in  his  chosen 
position  or  to  retreat  without  a  battle.  The  latter,  neither  the  temper  of 
■  his  army  nor  that  of  his  Government  would  probably  permit.  In  case  of  a 
defeat  Meade's  line  of  retreat  would  be  comparatively  short,  and  easily  cov- 
ered, whilst  Lee's  would  be  for  two  marches  through  an  ojjen  country  before 
he  could  gain  the  mountain  passes.  As  Meade  believed  Lee's  army  to  be  at  least 
equal  to  his  own,  all  the  elements  of  the  problem  were  in  favor  of  the  Pipe 
Creek  line.  But  Meade's  orders  for  July  1st,  drawing  his  corps  toward  the 
threatened  flank,  carried  Reynolds  to  Gettysburg,  and  Buford's  report  has- 
tened this  movement.  Reynolds,  who  probably  never  received  the  Pipe  Creek 
circular,  was  eager  for  the  conflict,  and  his  collision  with  Heth  assuming  the 
dimensions  of  a  battle,  caused  an  immediate  concentration  of  both  armies  at 
Gettysljurg.  Prior  to  this,  the  assembling  of  Meade's  army  behind  Pipe 
Creek  would  have  been  easy,  and  all  fears  of  injuring  thereby  the  morale  of 
his  troops  were  idle ;  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  of  "  sterner  stuff  "  than 
that  implies.  The  battle  of  July  1st  changed  the  situation.  Overpowered  by 
numbers,  the  First  and  Eleventh  corps  had,  after  hard  fighting  and  inflicting 
as  well  as  incurring  heavy  losses,  been  forced  back  to  their  reserve,  on  Ceme- 
tery Hill,  which  they  still  held.  To  have  withdrawn  them  now  would  have 
been  a  retreat,  and  might  have  discouraged  the  Federal,  as  it  certainly  would 
have  elated  the  Confederate  troops;  especially  as  injmious  reports  unjust 
to  both  the  corps  named  had  been  circulated.  It  would  have  been  to  acknowl- 
edge a  defeat  when  there  was  no  defeat.  Meade  therefore  resolved  to  fight 
at  Getty sbui'g.  An  ominous  dispatch  from  General  Halleck  to  Meade,  that 
afternoon,  suggesting  that  whilst  his  tactical  arrangements  were  good,  his 
strategy  was  at  fault,  that  he  was  too  far  east,  that  Lee  might  attemi)t  to 
turn  his  left,  and  that  Frederick  was  preferable  as  a  base  to  Westminster, 
may  have  confirmed  Meade  in  this  decision. 

In  pursuance  of  his  instructions,  I  had  that  morning  (July  1st)  reconnoi- 
tered  the  country  behind  Pipe  Creek  for  a  battle-ground.  On  my  return  I 
found  Geiiei-al  Hancock  at  General  Meade's  tent.  He  informed  me  that  Rey- 
nolds was  killed,  that  a  Ijattle  was  going  on  at  Gettys])urg,  and  that  he  was 
under  orders  to  i)roceed  to  that  place.  His  instructions  were  to  examine  it 
and  the  intermediate  country  for  a  suitable  field,  and  if  his  report  was  favor- 
able the  troops  would  be  ordered  forward.  Before  the  receipt  that  eviMiing  of 
Hancock's  written  report  from  Cemetery  Hill,  which  was  not  very  encoui-aging. 
General  Meade  received  from  others  information  as  to  the  state  of  aftairs  at  the 
front,  set  his  troops  in  motion  toward  Gettysburg,  afterward  urged  them  to 
forced  marches,  and  under  liis  orders  T  gave  the  necessary  instructions  to  the 
Artillery  Reserve  and  T\irk  for  a  battle  there.  The  move  was,  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, a  bold  one,  and  INFeade,  as  we  shall  see,  took  great  risks.  A\  e  lett 
Taneytown  toward  11  v.  m.,  and  reached  (Jeltysbnrg  after  niidniglit.  S(.on 
after.  General  Meade,  accompanied  byGenei-al  llowaid  and  myself,  inspected 


THE  SECOND  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG.  293 

our  lines  so  far  as  then  occupied,  after  which  he  directed  me  to  examine 
them  again  in  the  morning,  and  to  see  that  the  artillery  was  properly  posted. 
He  had  thus  recognized  my  "  command  "  of  the  artillery ;  indeed,  he  did  not 
know  it  had  been  suspended.  I  resumed  it,  therefore,  and  continued  it  to  the 
end  of  the  battle. 

At  the  close  of  July  1st  Johnson's  and  Anderson's  divisions  of  the  Confed- 
erate army  were  up.  Swell's  corps  now  covered  our  front  from  Benner's 
Hill  to  the  Seminary,  his  line  passing  through  the  town — Johnson  on  the 
left,  Early  in  the  center,  Eodes  on  the  right.  Hill's  corps  occupied  Seminary 
Eidge,  and  during  the  next  morning  extended  its  line  from  the  Seminary 
south  nearly  to  the  Peach  Orchard  on  the  Ennnitsburg  road;  Trimble — rice 
Pender,  wounded — on  the  left;  Anderson  on  the  right;  Pettigrew — v'ur  Heth, 
wounded — in  reserve.  Of  Longstreet's  corps,  McLaws's  division  and  Hood's — 
except  Law's  brigade  not  yet  up — camped  that  night  on  Marsh  Creek,  foui* 
miles  from  Gettysburg.  His  Reserve  Artillery  did  not  reach  Gettysbm-g 
until  9  A.  M.  of  the  2d.  Pickett's  division  had  been  left  at  Chambersburg  as 
rear-guard,  and  joined  the  corps  on  the  night  of  the  2d. 

It  had  not  been  General  Lee's  intention  to  deliver  a  general  battle  whilst  so 
far  from  his  base,  unless  attacked,  but  he  now  found  himself  by  the  mere 
force  of  circumstances  committed  to  one.  If  it  must  take  place,  the  sooner 
the  Ijetter.  His  army  was  now  nearly  all  on  the  gi'ound,  and  delay,  whilst  it 
could  not  improve  his  own  position,  would  certainly  better  that  of  his  antag- 
onist. Longstreet,  indeed,  urged  General  Lee  instead  of  attacking  to  turn 
Meade's  left,  and  by  interposing  between  him  and  Washington  and  threaten- 
ing his  communications,  to  force  him  to  attack  the  Confederate  army  in  i>osi- 
tion;  but  General  Lee  probably  saw  that  Meade  would  be  under  no  such 
necessity;  would  have  no  great  difficulty  in  obtaining  supplies,  and — disre- 
garding the  clamor  from  Washington — could  play  a  waiting  game,  which  it 
would  be  impossible  for  Lee  to  maintain  in  the  open  country.  He  could  not 
advance  on  Baltimore  or  Washington  with  Meade  in  his  rear,  nor  could  his 
army  subsist  itself  in  a  hostile  region  which  would  soon  swarm  with  addi- 
tional enemies.  His  communications  could  be  cut  off,  for  his  recommenda- 
tion to  assemble  even  a  small  army  at  Culx)eper  to  cover  tliem  and  aid  him 
had  not  been  complied  with. 

A  battle  was  a  necessity  to  Lee,  and  a  defeat  would  be  more  disastrous  to 
Meade,  and  less  so  to  himself,  at  Gettysburg  than  at  any  point  east  of  it. 
With  the  defiles  of  the  South  Mountain  range  close  in  his  rear,  which  could 
be  easily  held  by  a  small  force,  a  safe  reti-eat  thi-ongh  the  Cumberland  \'allcy 
was  assured,  so  that  his  army,  onc(^  through  these  passes,  would  be  }>racti- 
cally  on  the  banks  of  tln^  Potomac,  at  a  point  already  ])re]»ared  for  crossing. 
Any  position  east  of  Gettysburg  would  deprive  liini  of  these  advantages.  It 
is  more  prol)able  that  General  Lee  was  influenced  hy  cool  caK'ulation  of  this 
nature  than  by  hot  blood,  or  that  the  opening  success  of  a  chance  battle  had 
thrown  him  off  his  balance.  Whatevei-  his  reasons,  he  <lecided  to  accc|»t  the 
gage  of  battle  offered  by  J\lea<le,  and  to  alta<'k  as  soon  as  practicable'.  Kwell 
had  nuide  ai'i-angements  to  lake  iH)ssession  of  Culp's  Hill  in  the  early  morn- 


294 


THE  SECOND  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


GENERAL    MEADE'S    HEADQUARTERS    ON    THE    TANETTOWN    ROAD.     FROM    A    WAR-TIME    PHOTOGRAPH. 


General  Meade  arrived  at  Cemetery  Hill  at  one  o'clock 
in  the  moruins  of  July  2d,  and  after  daylight  estab- 
lislied  his  headquarters  in  a  small  farm-house  on  the 
Taiieytown  road,  little  more  than  an  eighth  of  a  mile 
east  of  Hancock's  line  of  hattle,  which  was  the  Union 
center.    In  the  afternoon  of  July  2d,  headquarters  be- 


came the  target  of  a  heavy  artillery  Are  which  caused  a 
scattering  of  officers  and  stall's  and  the  headquarters 
signal  corps.  During  the  terrific  cannonade  which  pre- 
ceded Pickett's  charge  on  July  3d,  Meade's  headquarters 
received  a  still  greater  storm  of  shot  and  shell,  with  the 
same  result.--  Editors. 


ing,  and  his  troops  were  under  arms  for  the  purpose  by  the  time  General 
Meade  had  finished  the  moonhght  inspection  of  his  lines,  when  it  was  ascer- 
tained by  a  reconnoitering  party  sent  out  by  Johnson,  that  the  hill  was  occu- 
pied, and  its  defenders  on  the  alert ;  and  further,  from  a  captured  dispatch 
from  General  Sykes  to  General  Slocum,  that  the  Fifth  Corps  was  on  the  Han- 
over road  only  four  miles  off,  and  would  march  at  4  A.  M.  for  Gulp's  Hill. 
Johnson  thereupon  deferred  his  attack  and  awaited  Swell's  instructions. 

General  Lee  had,  however,  during  the  night  determined  to  attack  the  Fed- 
eral left  with  Longstreet's  corps,  and  now  instructed  Ewell,  as  soon  as  he 
heard  Longstreet's  guns,  to  make  a  diversion  in  his  favor,  to  be  converted,  if 
opportunity  offered,  into  a  real  attack. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  July  2d,  when  nearly  all  the  Confederate  army  had 
reached  Gettysburg  or  its  immediate  vicinity,  a  large  portion  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  was  still  on  the  road.  The  Second  Corps  and  Sykes,  with  two 
divisions  of  the  Fifth,  arrived  about  7  a.  m.,  Crawford's  division  not  joining 
until  noon;  Loekwood's  brigade — two  regiments  from  Baltimore — at  8;  De 
Troln-iaiid's  and  Burliiig's  brigades  of  the  Third  Corps,  from  Emmitsburg, 
at  9,  and  the  Artillery  Reserve  and  its  large  ammunition  trains  from  Taney- 
town  at  10:30  a.  m.  Sedgwick's  Sixth  Corps,  the  largest  in  the  army,  after  a 
long  night  march  from  Manchester,  thirty-four  miles  distant,  reached  Rock 
Creek  at  4  p.  m.  The  rapidity  with  which  the  army  was  assembled  was 
creditable  to  it  and  to  its  commander.     The  heat  was  oppressive,  the  long 


THE  ShCOND  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG.  -2^^ 

marches,  especially  the  night  marches,  were  trying  and  had  caused  much 
straggling. 

All  this  morning  Meade  was  busily  engaged  personally  or  by  his  staff  in 
rectifying  his  lines,  assigning  positions  to  the  commands  as  they  came  up, 
watching  the  enemy,  and  studying  the  field,  parts  of  which  we  have  described 
in  general  terms.  We  now  refer  the  reader  to  the  map  [p.  299]  to  aid  our 
further  description  of  some  necessary  even  if  tedious  details.  Near  the 
western  base  of  Cemetery  Hill  is  Ziegler's  Grove.  From  this  gi-ove  the  dis- 
tance nearly  due  south  to  the  base  of  Little  Round  Top  is  a  mile  and  a  half. 
A  well-defined  ridge  known  as  Cemetery  Ridge  follows  this  line  from  Zieglci-'s 
for  900  yards  to  another  small  grove,  or  clump  of  trees,  where  it  turns  sharply 
to  the  east  for  200  yards,  then  turns  south  again,  and  continues  in  a  direct 
line  toward  Round  Top,  for  700  yards,  to  George  Weikert's.  So  far  the  ridge 
is  smooth  and  open,  in  full  \iew  of  Seminary  Ridge  opposite,  and  distant 
from  1400  to  1600  yards.  At  Weikert's,  this  ridge  is  lost  in  a  large  body  of 
rocks,  hills,  and  woods,  lying  athwart  the  direct  line  to  Round  Top,  and 
forcing  a  Ijend  to  the  east  in  the  Taney  town  road.  This  rough  space  also 
stretches  for  a  quarter  of  a  mile  or  more  tvcst  of  this  direct  line,  toward  Plum 
Run.  Toward  the  south  it  sinks  into  low  marshy  gi^ound  which  reaches  to  the 
base  of  Little  Round  Top,  half  a  mile  or  more  from  George  Weikert's.  The 
west  side  of  this  broken  ground  was  wooded  through  its  whole  extent  from 
north  to  south.  Between  this  wood  and  Plum  Run  is  an  open  cleared  space 
300  yards  wide — a  continuation  of  the  oj^en  country  in  front  of  Cemetery 
Ridge  ;  Plum  Run  flows  south-easterly  toward  Little  Round  Top,  then  makes 
a  bend  to  the  south-west,  where  it  receives  a  small  stream  or  "branch"  from 
Seminary  Ridge.  In  the  angle  between  these  streams  is  Devil's  Den,  a  bold, 
rocky  height,  steep  on  its  eastern  face,  and  prolonged  as  a  ridge  to  the  west. 
It  is  500  yards  due  west  of  Little  Round  Top,  and  100  feet  lower.  The  north- 
ern extremity  is  composed  of  huge  rocks  and  bowlders,  forming  innumerable 
crevices  and  holes,  from  the  largest  of  which  the  hill  derives  its  name.  Plum 
Run  valley  is  here  marshy  but  strewn  with  similar  bowlders,  and  the  sloi)es  of 
the  Round  Tops  are  covered  with  them.  These  afforded  lurking-places  for  a 
multitude  of  Confederate  sharp-shooters  whom,  from  the  difficulties  of  the 
ground,  it  was  impossible  to  dislodge,  and  who  were  opposed  by  similar 
methods  on  our  part ;  so  that  at  the  close  of  the  battle  these  hiding-places, 
and  especially  the  "  Den  "  itself,  were  filled  with  dead  and  wounded  men. 
This  kind  of  warfjii-e  was  specially  destructive  to  Hazlett's  battery  on  Round 
Top,  as  the  cannoneei-s  had  to  expose  themselves  in  firing,  and  in  one  case 
three  were  shot  in  quick  succession,  before  the  fourth  succeeded  in  discharg- 
ing the  piece.  A  cross-road  connecting  the  Tam^vtown  and  Emmitsburg 
roads  runs  along  the  nortliern  base  of  Devil's  Den.  Fi-oni  its  Plum  Run 
crossing  to  the  Peach  Orchard  is  1100  yards.  For  the  first  400  yaivls  of  this 
distance,  there  is  a  wood  on  the  north  and  a  wheat-licld  on  the  south  of  the 
road,  beyond  which  the  road  continues  for  700  yards  to  tlu^  Ennnitsburg  road 
along  Devil's  Den  ridge,  which  sloju's  on  the  north  to  Plum  l\uii,  on  the  south 
to  Plum  Branch.     From  Ziegler's  Gi-ove  the  Eininitsbui-g  i-oa.l   runs  diago- 


296 


THE  SECOND  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


nally  across  the  interval 
between  Cemetery  and 
Seminary  ridges,  cross- 
ing the  latter  two  miles 
from  Ziegier's  Grove. 
From  Peach  Orchard 
to  Ziegier's  is  nearly  a 
mile  and  a  half.  For 
half  a  mile  the  road 
runs  along  a  ridge  at 
right  angles  to  that 
of  Devil's  Den,  which 
slopes  back  to  Plum 
Run.  The  angle  at  the 
Peach  Orchard  is  thus 
formed  by  the  inter- 
section of  two  bold 
ridges,  one  from  Devil's 
Den,  the  other  along 
the  Emmitsburg  road. 
It  is  distant  about  600 
yards  from  the  wood 
which  skirts  the  whole 
length  of  Seminary 
Ridge  and  covers  the 
movement  of  troops 
between  it  and  Wil- 
loughby  Run,  half  a 
mile  beyond.  South  of 
the  Round  Top  and  Devil's  Den  ridge  the  country  is  open,  and  the  pi-incii)al 
obstacles  to  free  movement  are  the  fences  —  generally  of  stone  —  which  sur- 
round the  numerous  fields. 

As  our  troops  came  up  they  were  assigned  to  places  on  the  line:  the 
Twelfth  Corps,  General  A.  S.  Williams, —  vice  Slocum,  commanding  the  right 
wing, —  to  Culp's  Hill,  on  Wadsworth's  right ;  Second  Corps  to  Cemetery 
Ridge  —  Hays's  and  Giljbon's  divisions,  from  Ziegier's  to  the  clump  of  trees, 
('aldwell's  to  the  short  ridge  to  its  left  and  rear.  This  ridge  had  been  occu- 
pied by  the  Third  Corps,  which  was  now  directed  to  jjrolong  Caldwell's  line  to 
Round  Top,  relieving  Geary's  division,  which  had  been  stationed  during  the 
night  on  the  extreme  left,  with  two  regiments  at  the  base  of  Little  Round 
Top.  The  Fifth  Corps  was  placed  in  reserve  near  the  Rock  Creek  crossing  of 
the  Baltimore  pike ;  the  Artillery  Reserve  and  its  large  trains  were  parked  in 
a  central  position  on  a  cross-road  from  the  Baltimore  pike  to  the  Taney  town 
road ;  Buford's  cavalry,  except  Merritt's  brigade  (then  at  Emmitslnu'g),  was 
near  Round  Top,  from  which  point  it  was  ordered  that  morning  to  West- 
minster, thus  uncovering  our  left  flank;   Kilpatrick's  and  Gregg's  divisions 


CiENliUAL    UAMl^L    li.    .SICKLI 


WAK-XIMK    IHtJluGUAPH. 


THE  SECOND  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG.  297 

were  well  out  on  the  right  flank,  from  whieh,  after  a  brush  with  Stuart  on 
the  evening  of  the  '2d,  Kilpatrick  was  sent  next  morning  to  replace  Buford, 
Merritt  being  also  ordered  up  to  our  left. 

The  morning  was  a  busy  and  in  some  respects  an  anxious  one;  it  was 
believed  that  the  whole  Confederate  army  was  assembled,  that  it  was  equal 
if  not  superior  to  our  own  in  numbers,  and  that  the  battle  would  commence 
before  our  troops  were  up.  There  was  a  gap  in  Sloeum's  line  awaiting  a 
division  of  infantry,  and  as  some  demonstrations  of  Ewell  about  daylight  indi- 
cated an  immediate  attack  at  that  point,  I  had  to  draw  batteries  from  othca* 
parts  of  the  line  —  for  the  Artillery  Reserve  was  just  then  starting  from 
Taneytown  —  to  cover  it  until  it  could  be  properly  filled.  Still  there  was  no 
hostile  movement  of  the  enemy,  and  General  Meade  directed  Slocum  to  hold 
himself  in  readiness  to  attack  Ewell  with  the  Fifth  and  Twelfth,  so  soon  as 
the  Sixth  Corps  should  arrive.  After  an  examination  Slocum  reported  the 
ground  as  unfavorable,  in  which  Warren  concurred  and  advised  against  an 
attack  there.  The  project  was  then  abandoned,  and  Meade  postponed  all 
oifensive  operations  until  the  enemy's  intentions  should  be  more  clearly  devel- 
oped. In  the  meantime  he  took  precautionary  measures.  It  was  clearly  now 
to  his  advantage  to  fight  the  battle  where  he  was,  and  he  had  some  apprehen- 
sion that  Lee  would  attempt  to  turn  his  flank  and  threaten  his  communi- 
cations,— just  what  Longstreet  had  been  advisiug.  In  this  case  it  might  be 
necessary  to  fall  back  to  the  Pipe  Creek  line,  if  possil)le,  or  else  to  follow 
Lee's  movement  into  the  open  country.  In  either  case,  or  in  that  of  a  foi'ced 
withdrawal,  prudence  dictated  that  arrangements  should  be  made  in  advance, 
and  General  Meade  gave  instructions  for  examining  the  roads  and  commu- 
nications, and  to  draw  up  an  order  of  movement,  which  General  Butterfield, 
the  chief-of-statf,  seems  to  have  considered  an  order  absolute  for  the  with- 
drawal of  the  army  without  a  battle. 

These  instructions  must  have  been  given  early  in  the  morning,  for  G(^neral 
Butterfield  states  that  it  was  on  his  arrival  from  Taneytown,  whicli  place  he 
left  at  daylight.  An  order  was  drawn  up  accordingly,  given  to  the  adjutant- 
general,  and  perhaps  prepared  for  issue  in  case  of  necessity  to  corj^s  com- 
manders ;  but  it  was  not  recorded  nor  issued,  nor  even  a  copy  of  it  preserved. 
General  Meade  declared  that  he  never  contemplated  the  issue  of  such  an 
order  unless  contingencies  made  it  necessary ;  an<l  his  acts  and  dispatclies 
during  the  day  were  in  accordance  with  his  statement.  There  is  one  circum- 
stance pertaining  to  my  own  duties  which  to  my  mind  is  conchisivi^  and  I 
relates  it  because  it  may  have  conti-ibuted  to  tlie  idea  that  GeiuM-al  Meade 
iiiteii(l<'(l  to  withdraw  from  Gettysl)ui-g.  He  caiiie  1<»  me  lliat  uioniiiiu-  bcfoi-.' 
the  Artillery  Reserve  had  arrived,  and,  tlierd'oi-c,  about  the  time  lliat  the 
ordiT  was  in  course  of  preparation,  and  int'oniieil  iiie  that  one  of  the  army 
cori)S  had  left  its  whole  artillery  ammunition  train  l)ehiii<l  it,  an«i  that  otliers 
were  also  deficient,  notwithstanding  liis  orders  on  that  subject,  llr  was  very 
much  disturlxMl,  and  feared  that,  taking  into  account  the  hirge  exjuMiditure 
of  the  ])rece(ling  day  l)y  the  First  and  Fl(>venth  ('ori)s,  there  would  not  be 
sufficient  to  carry  us  through  the  battle.     This  was  not  the  lirst  nor  the  last 

VOL.  111.    '.'O 


THE  SECOND  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


299 


MAP  16.    777#7^^ 

sitions  July  2d,    ^^VV       /        %> 


Positions  July 

ABOUT   3:30    P.  M.         K^  ^W  ^T^^-'X^''", 


time  that  I  was  callod  upon  to  moot  doficioiu-i.^s  uiidor  such  oiivumstaiicos,  aud 
I  was,  therofore,  proi)ar(Mi  for  this,  haviii<j:  dii'ootod  Gonoral  Tyl(M-,  commajid- 
in^  tlio  Artillery  Rosoi-vo,  whatever  else  h«^  mi^-ht  leave  behind,  to  l)i-iiii,^  up 
every  round  of  ammunition  in  liis  trains,  and  I  know  ho  would  not  fairme. 
Moreover,  I  had  proAnously,  on  my  own  responsibility,  ami  uidviiown  to  (J(Mi- 
eral  Hooker,  formed  a  special  ammunition  eolumn  attadied  to  the  Ai-tilloiy 
Reserve,  carrying  twenty  rounds  per  gun,  over  aud  above  the  authorized 


300 


THE  SECOND  DAY  AT  .GETTYSBURG. 


I 


amount,  for  every  guu  iu  the  army,  in  order  to  meet  such  emergencies.  I 
was,  therefore,  able  to  assure  General  Meade  that  there  would  be  enough 
ammunition  for  the  battle,  but  none  for  idle  cannonades,  the  besetting  sin  of 
some  of  our  commanders.  He  was  much  relieved,  and  expressed  his  satis- 
faction. Now,  had  he  had  at  this  time  any  intention  of  withdrawing  the 
army,  the  first  thing  to  get  rid  of  would  have  been  this  Artillery  Reserve  and 
its  large  trains,  which  were  then  blocking  the  roads  in  our  rear ;  and  he 
would  surely  have  told  me  of  it. 

Still,  with  the  exception  of  occasional  cannonading,  and  some  skirmishing 
near  the  Peach  Orchard,  the  quiet  remained  unbroken,  although  Lee  had 

determined  upon  an 
early  attack  on  our 
left.  He  says  in  his  de- 
tailed I'eport  that  our 
line  extended  "  upon 
the  high  ground  along 
the  Emmitsburg  road, 
with     a     steep     ridge 


^•J 


[Oemetery]  in  rear, 
which  was  also  occu- 
pied"; and  in  a  previ- 
ous "(mtline"  report  he 
says :  "In  front  of  Gen- 
eral Longstreet  the  en- 
emy held  a  position  [the 
salient  angle;  at  the 
Peach  Orchard  ]  from 
whicli,  if  he  could  be 
driven,  it  was  thought 
our  artillery  could  be 
used  to  advantage  in 
assailing  the  more  elevated  ground  beyond,  and  thus  enable  us  to  gain  the 
crest  of  the  ridge."  It  would  a})pear  from  this  that  General  Lee  mistook  the 
few  troops  on  the  Peach  Orchard  ridgo  in  the  morning  for  our  main  line,  and 
that  by  taking  it  and  sweeping  up  the  Emmitsburg  road  under  cover  of  his 
l)attories,  ho  expected  to  "  roll  up  "  our  lines  to  Cemetery  Hill.  That  would 
be  an  "  oblique  order  of  battle,"  in  which  the  attacking  line,  formed  obliquely 
to  its  opponent,  marches  directly  forward,  constantly  breaking  in  the  end  of 
his  enemy's  line  and  gaining  his  rear.  General  Longstreet  was  ordered  to 
form  the  divisions  of  Hood  and  McLaws  on  Anderson's  right,  so  as  to  envelop 
our  left  and  drive  it  in.    These  divisions  were  only  three  miles  off  at  day- 


UNION     EREASTWORKS    ON    LITTLE    ROUND    TOP  —  BIG    ROUND    TOP    IN 
THE    DISTANCE.      FROM    WAR-TIME    PHOTOGRAPHS. 


THE  SECOND  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG.  301 

light,  and  moved  early,  but  there  was  great  delay  iu  forming  them  for 
battle,  owing  principally  to  the  absence  of  Law's  brigade,  for  which  it  would 
have  been  well  to  substitute  Anderson's  fresh  division,  which  could  have 
been  replaced  by  Pettigrew's,  then  in  reserve.  There  seems  to  have  been 
no  good  reason  why  the  attack  should  not  have  been  made  by  8  or  9  a.  m. 
at  the  latest  (but  see  p.  351),  when  the  Federal  Third  Corps  was  not  yet  all 
up,  nor  Crawford's  division,  nor  the  Artillery  Reserve,  nor  the  Sixth  Corps, 
and  our  lines  were  still  very  incomplete.  This  is  one  of  the  cheap  criticisms 
after  all  the  facts  on  both  sides  are  known ;  but  it  is  apt  for  its  purpose, 
as  it  shows  how  great  a  risk  Meade  took  in  abandoning  his  Pipe  Creek 
line  for  Gettysburg  on  the  chances  of  Lee's  army  not  yet  being  assem1)led ; 
and  also,  that  there  was  no  lack  of  boldness  and  decision  on  Meade's  part. 
Indeed,  his  com'se,  from  the  hour  that  he  took  command,  had  been  marked 
by  these  qualities. 

A  suggestive  incident  is  worth  recording  here.  In  the  course  of  my  inspec- 
tion of  the  lines  that  morning,  while  passing  along  Culp's  Hill,  I  found  the 
men  hard  at  work  intrenching,  and  in  such  fine  spirits  as  at  once  to  attract 
attention.  One  of  them  finally  drojjped  his  work,  and,  approaching  me,  in- 
quired if  the  reports  just  received  were  true.  On  asking  what  he  referred 
to,  he  replied  that  twice  word  had  been  passed  along  the  line  that  General 
McClellan  had  been  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  army,  and  the  second 
time  it  was  added  that  he  was  on  the  way  to  the  field  and  might  soon  be 
expected.  He  continued,  "  The  boys  are  all  jubilant  over  it,  for  they  know 
that  if  he  takes  command  everything  will  go  right."  I  have  been  told  recently 
by  the  commander  of  a  Fifth  Corps  battery  that  during  the  forced  march  of 
the  preceding  night  the  same  report  ran  through  that  corps,  excited  great 
enthusiasm  amongst  the  men,  and  renewed  their  vigor.  It  was  i)robably 
from  this  corps — just  arrived — that  the  report  had  spread  along  the  line.  | 

On  my  return  to  headquarters  from  this  inspection  Greneral  Meade  told  me 
that  General  Sickles,  then  with  him,  wished  me  to  examine  a  new  line,  as  he 
thought  that  assigned  to  him  was  not  a  good  one,  especially  that  he  could  not 
use  his  artillery  there.  I  had  been  as  far  as  Round  Toj)  that  morning,  and 
had  noticed  the  unfavorable  character  of  the  ground,  and,  therefore,  I  accom- 
panied Sickles  direct  to  the  Peach  Oirhard,  wlieiv  he  i)<)inted  out  the  ridges, 
already  described,  as  his  proposed  line.  They  commanded  all  the  ground 
Ix^hind,  as  well  as  in  front  of  them,  and  togi'ther  C(^nstitnte(l  a  favoiable 
position  for  the  enemy  to  hold.  This  was  one  good  reason  foi-  our  taking 
possession  of  it.  It  would,  it  is  true,  in  our  hands  present  a  saHent  angle, 
which  generally  exposes  both  its  sides  to  enfilade  fires;  but  here  the  ridg(»s 
W(n-e  so  high  that  eaidi  would  serve  as  a  "  traverse  "  for  the  other,  and  i-eduee 
that  evil  to  a  mininium.     On  the  other  hand  it  would  so  greatly  lengthen 

4Li(Miten!Uit  O.  S.  Bam-tt,  in  a  painphli-t  skotdi  nunc   riding'  aloii^r.   saying'.  '  Hoys.  kf.«p  uji  pvod 

of  tho"01il  Fourtli  Michif?au  Iiil'antry "  [Dt-troit,  eouraf:i>.   .McCk'llaii   is  in   oonnuaiul  of  tlio  army 

1S8S],  rolates  a  similar  occurrence  iu  the  Second  affain.'     Instantly  tlu>  space  aliove  was  fille.l  witl» 

Corps.    He  says:  lli,>  hats  ami  cajis  of  the  >;ralilio<i  sdl.liers.     .    .    . 

"Wo  arrived  at  Hanover,  Pennsylvania,  on  tin-  I  knew  this  was  untrue  myself.  Init  it  served  it8 

afternoou   of  July  1st.    .    .    .    Au   aide-de-camp  purpose,  as  intondeil."—Ki)lTORs. 


302 


THE  SECOND  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


oui-  line — which  in  any  case  must  rest  on  Eound  Top,  and  connect  with  the 
left  of  the  Second  Corps— as  to  require  a  larger  force  than  the  Third  Corps 
alone  to  hold  it,  and  it  would  be  difficult  to  occupy  and  strengthen  the  angle 
if  the  enemy  already  held  the  wood  in  its  front.  At  my  instance  Greneral 
Sickles  ordered  a  reconnoissance  to  ascertain  if  the  wood  was  occupied. 

About  this  time  a  cannonade  was  opened  on  Cemetery  Hill,  which  indicated 
an  attack  there,  and  as  I  had  examined  the  Emmitsburg  Ridge,  I  said  I 

would  not  await  the  result  of  the  recon- 
noissance but  return  to  headquarters 
by  way  of  Round  Top,  and  examine 
that  part  of  the  proposed  line.  As  I 
was  leaving.  General  Sickles  asked  me 
if  he  should  move  forward  his  corps. 
I  answered,  "Not  on  my  authority; 
I  will  report  to  General  Meade  for  his 
instructions."  I  had  not  reached  the 
wheat-field  when  a  sharp  rattle  of 
musketry  showed  that  the  enemy  held 
the  wood  in  front  of  the  Peach  Or- 
chard angle. 
"%.  As  I  rode  back  a  view  from  that 

direction   showed  how  much  farther 
Peach  Orchard  was  to  the  front  of  the 

COLONEL  KDWAKI)    K.    TltOSS,    COMMANDING  THE    FIRST  .  ,     „  , 

BRIGADE  OK  CALDWELL'S  DIVISION,  KILLED  NEAR       du'cct  liue  thau  it  appcarcd  irom  the 
DEVIL'S  DEN,  JULY  2.  EuoM  A  PHOTOGRAPH.  orchard  itsclf.      lu  fact  thcre  was   a 

third  line  between  them,  which  appeared,  as  seen  from  the  orchard,  to  be  con- 
tinuous with  Cemetery  Ridge,  but  was  nearly  six  hundred  yards  in  front  of  it. 
This  is  the  open  ground  east  of  Plum  Run  already  described,  and  which  may 
be  called  the  Plum  Run  line.  Its  left  where  it  crosses  the  run  abuts  rather  on 
Devil's  Den  than  Round  Top ;  it  was  commanded  by  the  much  higher  Peach 
Orchard  crests,  and  was  therefore  not  an  eligible  line  to  occupy,  although  it 
became  of  importance  during  the  battle. 

As  to  the  other  two  lines,  the  choice  between  them  would  depend  on  cir- 
cumstances. The  direct  short  line  through  the  woods,  and  including  the 
Round  Tops,  could  be  occupied,  intrenched,  and  made  impregnable  to  a  front 
attack.  But,  like  that  of  Culp's  Hill,  it  would  l>e  a  purely  defensive  one,  from 
which,  owing  to  the  nature  of  the  ground  and  the  enemy's  commanding  posi- 
tion on  the  ridges  at  the  angle,  an  advance  in  force  would  be  impracticable. 
The  salient  line  proposed  by  General  Sickles,  although  much  longer,  afforded 
excellent  positions  for  our  artillery ;  its  occupation  would  cramp  the  move- 
ments of  the  enemy,  bring  us  nearer  his  lines,  and  afford  us  facilities  for  tak- 
ing the  offensive.  It  was  in  my  judgment  tactically  the  better  line  of  the  two, 
])r()vided  it  were  strongly  occupied,  for  it  was  the  only  one  on  the  field  from 
which  we  could  have  passed  from  the  defensive  to  the  offensive  with  a  pros- 
pect of  decisive  results.  But  General  Meade  had  not,  until  the  arrival  of 
the  Sixth  Corps,  a  sufficient  number  of  troops  at  his  disposalto  risk  such  an 


THE  SECOND  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG.  303 

extension  of  liis  lines;  it  would  have  required  both  the  Third  and  the  Fifth 
corps,  and  left  him  without  any  reserve.  Had  he  known  that  Lee's  attack 
would  be  postponed  until  -i  p.  m.,  he  might  have  occupied  this  line  in  the 
morning;  but  he  did  not  know  this,  expected  an  attack  at  any  moment,  and, 
in  view  of  the  vast  interests  involved,  adopted  a  defensive  policy,  and 
ordered  the  occupation  of  the  safe  line.  In  taking  risks,  it  would  not  be  for 
his  army  alone,  but  also  for  Philadelphia,  Baltimore,  and  Washington.  Get- 
tysburg was  not  a  good  strategical  position  for  us,  and  the  circumstances 
under  which  our  army  was  assembled  limited  us  tactically  to  a  strictly  defen- 
sive battle.  But  even  a  strictly  defensive  battle  gained  here  would  be,  in  its 
results,  almost  as  valuable  as  an  offensive  one  with  a  brilliant  victory,  since  it 
would  necessarily  be  decisive  as  to  both  the  campaign  and  the  invasion,  and 
its  moral  effect  abroad  and  at  home.  North  and  South,  would  be  of  vast 
importance  in  a  political  as  well  as  a  military  sense.  The  additional  risks  of 
an  offensive  battle  were  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  prospective  gains.  The 
decision  then  to  fight 
a     defensive      rather 


than  an  offensive  bat-        "    _  ~~°~         ■"^^^5^""'^^*^**^^  ~  "^ ' 


■■*-v,^  — .-^  -  ^ 


tie,  to  look  rather  to      -    - '  'i^i^'T^^'^^^^l^MJ!!^^ 
solid  than  to  brilliant 
results,  was  wise. 

After  finishing  my 
examination  I  return- 
ed to  headquarters 
and  briefly  reported  . 
to  Greneral  Meade  that 
the  proposed  line  w^as 
a  good  one  in  itself, 
that  it  offered  favor- 
able   positions    for   ar-  weed's  position  on  mttlk  roind  top.  looking,  in  the  DIKKCTION 

,•11  1         J.         i1        J.        -i.  OF    THE    PEACH    OUCHAHD.       KROM    A    WAR-TIME    SKEjVII. 

tillery,    but    that    its 

relations  to  other  lines  were  such  that  I  could  not  advise  it,  antl  suggested 
that  he  examine  it  himself  before  ordering  its  occupation,  lb'  nod.l.-d 
assent,  and  I  proceeded  to  Cemetery  Hill. 

The  cannonade  there  still  continued;  it  had  l)een  comm<Mi.H'd  by  the  ciieiiiy, 
and  was  accompanied  by  some  moviMnents  of  troops  toward  our  right.  As  s<  .011 
as  I  saw  that  it  would  lead  to  nothing  serious,  I  returned  direct  to  tli.-  IN  a.h 
Orchard,  knowing  that  its  occu])ation  would  recjuire  large  re<'iifi»reements  ot" 
artillery.  I  was  here  met  by  Captain  luindolj)!!,  the  corps  ehi.'f  of  artilh'ry, 
who  informed  me  that  he  had  been  ordered  to  i.hi.-."  his  batteries  on  the  new 
line.  Seeing  Generals  Meade  and  Sickles,  not  far  iA\\  in  eonversation.  an.l 
supposing  that  General  Meade  had  consented  to  the  oeeupat  ion,  1  s.ni  at  on.-e 
to  the  reserve  for  more  artillery,  and  authorized  other  general  ollieeis  to  diaw 
on  the  same  source.  Here,  perhai»s,  I  may  be  allowi'd  to  say  nt  /tassafif  that 
this  large  reserve,  organized  by  the  wise  forethought  of  <ieneral  MeClelhin, 
sometimes  threatened  with  destruction,  and  once  actually  broken  up,  was  often, 


304 


THE  SECOND  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


AT    THE    SIGNAI,    STATION    ON    LITTLE    BOUND    TOP. 
V    f-KKT(  II    MADE    AT    THE    TIME. 


a.s  at  Malveni  Hill,  and  now  at  Gettysburg,  an  invaluable  resource  in  the 
time  of  greatest  need.  When  in  1864,  in  the  Eapidan  campaign,  it  was  "  got 
rid  of,"  it  reconstituted  itself,  without  orders,  and  in  a  few  weeks,  through  the 
necessities  of  the  army,  showing  that  "  principles  vindicate  themselves." 

When  I  arrived  Birney's  division  was  already  posted  on  the  crest,  from 
Devil's  Den  to  the  Peaoh  Orchard,  and  along  the  Emmitsburg  road, 
Ward's  brigade  on  the  left,  Graham's  at  the  angle,  De  Trobriand's  con- 
necting them  by  a  thin  line.  Humphreys's  division  was  on  Graham's  right, 
near  the  Emmitsburg  road,  Carr's  brigade  in  the  front  line,  about  the  Smith 
house,  Brewster's  in  second  line.  Burling's,  with  the  exception  of  Sewell's 
5th  New  Jersey  Regiment,  then  in  skirmish  order  at  the  front,  was  sent  to 
reenforce  Birney.  Seeley's  battery,  at  first  posted  on  the  right,  was  soon 
after  sent  to  the  left  of  the  Smith  house,  and  replaced  on  the  right  by  Turn- 
bull's  from  the  Artillery  Eeserve.  Randolph  had  ordered  Smith's  battery, 
4th  New  York,  to  the  rocky  hill  at  the  Devil's  Den ;  Winslow's  to  the  wdieat- 
field.  He  had  placed  Clark  on  the  crest  looking  south,  and  his  own  ("E," 
1st  Rhode  Island)  near  the  angle,  facing  west.  The  whole  corps  was, 
however,  too  weak  to  cover  the  ground,  and  it  was  too  late  for  Meade  to 
withdraw  it.  Sykes's  Fifth  Corps  had  already  been  ordered  up  and  was 
raomentaiily  expected.  As  soon  as  fire  opened,  which  was  just  as  he  arrived 
on  the  gi'ound,  General  Meade  also  sent  for  Caldwell's  division  from  Cemetery 
Ridge,  and  a  division  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  from  Culp's,  and  soon  after  for 
troops  from  the  Sixth  Corps.  McGilvery's  artilh^ry  brigade  soon  arrived 
from  the  reserve,  and  Bigelow's,  Phillips's,  Hart's,  Ames's,  and  Thompson's 
batteries  had  been  ordered  into  position  on  the  crests,  when  the  enemy  opened 
from  a  long  line  of  guns,  stretching  down  to  the  crossing  of  the  Emmitsburg 
pike.     Smith's  position  at  Devil's  Den  gave  him  a  favorable  oblique  fire  on  a 


THE  SECOND  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


305 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL     STROM;     VINCI  NT,    MORTALLT 

WOUNDED,  JDLV  2,  IN  TUE   STRUGGLE  FOR  THE 

ROUND    TOrS.       FROM   A  riIOTO<:RAPn. 


part  of  this  line,  and  as  he  did  not  reply 
I  proceeded  to  the  Den.  Finding  the 
acclivity  steep  and  rocky,  I  dismounted 
and  tied  my  horse  to  a  tree  before  cross- 
ing the  valley.  My  rank,  brigadier- 
general,  the  command  being  that  of  a 
lieutenant-general,  gave  me  a  very  small 
and  insufficient  staff,  and  even  this  had 
been  recently  cut  down.  The  inspectoi- 
of  artillery,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Warner, 
adjutant -general.  Captain  Craig,  my 
only  aide.  Lieutenant  Bissell,  my  one 
orderly,  and  even  the  flag-bearer  neces- 
sary to  indicate  my  presence  to  those 
seeking  me,  were  busy  conveying  orders 
or  messages,  and  I  was  alone;  a  not 
infrequent  and  an  awkward  thing  for 
a  general  who  had  to  keep  up  commu- 
nications with  every  part  of  a  battle- 
field and  with  the  general-in-chief.  On 
climbing  to  the  summit,  I  found  that 
Smith  had  just  got  his  guns,  one  by 
one,  over  the  rocks  and  chasms,  into  an  excellent  position.  After  pointing 
out  to  me  the  advancing  lines  of  the  enemy,  he  opened,  and  very  effectively. 
Many  guns  were  immediately  turned  on  him,  relieving  so  far  the  rest  of  the 
line.  Telling  him  that  he  would  probably  lose  his  battery,  I  left  to  seek  infan- 
try supports,  very  doubtful  if  I  would  find 
^^^^^^  my  horse,  for  the  storm  of  shell  bursting 

Jii^^^^^k^  over  the  place  w^as  enough  to  drive  any 

/  «^^  animal  wild.   On  reaching  the  foot  of  the 

ifijfr*^^      |ffilfc|,  ^1^^'?  I  ^o\\m\  myself  in  a  i)light  at  once 

^1  JiH*  ludicrous,  painful,  and  dangerous.  A  herd 

of  horned  cattle  had  been  driven  into  tlie 
valley  Ijetween  Devil's  Den  and  Kound 
To}),  from  which  they  could  not  escape. 
A  shell  had  ex]>loded  in  th(>  Ixxly  of  one 
of  tlicni,  teai-ing  it  fo  ]»ic('t's;  others  were 
toi-n  and  wonndcd.  All  wei'c  shfiiijicihil, 
and  were  bellowing  an<l  rushing  in  their 
Icnnr,  lirst  to  one  side  and  then  to  tlie 
,)tlici-,  tocscaiM'llH'sli.'lls  that  were  burst- 
ing over  llicni  and  among  llu'ni.  Cross  I 
must,  and  in  d.ung  so  1  had  my  most  try- 
ing(>xperi('nc('..ftiiat battle-field.  Luckily 
the  ])oor  beasts  wer(>  as  mnch  frighteniMl 
as  I  was,  but  tlu'ir  rage  was  subdurd  by 


r.RK.M)!!  RC.I  M  R\I    '^Tl  I'llI  N  II.  W  I  I  D,  <  OMM  \M 

1\(.  Tin     THIRD   HRK.AKI     <>l      \Mll  sN   I)I\  IMON, 

KM  II  D    iri^    2        I  ROM     \    I  lloKX.RAril 


GfiHTul  Weed  was  i)i(kc(i  otr  liy  sliaip-Hliootfrs  at 

Dovirs  Dcii  soon  alter  ^'.•llill^'  liis  llI•i^'a(ll■  in 

imsitioiion  I.ittic  Uoiiiid Top.— Editors. 


3o6 


THE  SECOND  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


nsiT    "^j-  ff  -^X 


TROSTLE'S    BARN,   THE    SCENE    OF    THE    FIGHTING    BY    BIGELOW'S    NINTH    MASSACHUSETTS    BATTERY. 
FROM    A   WAR-TIME    PHOTOGRAPH. 

terror,  and  they  were  good  enough  to  let  me  pass  through  scot-free,  Imt 
"  badly  demoralized."  However,  my  horse  was  safe,  I  mounted,  and  in  the 
busy  excitement  that  followed  almost  forgot  my  scare. 

It  was  not  until  about  4  p.  m.  that  Longstreet  got  his  two  divisions  into  posi- 
tion in  two  lines,  McLaws's  on  the  right  of  Anderson's  division  of  Hill's  corps, 
and  opposite  the  Peach  Orchard ;  Hood's  on  the  extreme  Confederate  right  and 
crossing  the  Emmitsburg  road.  Hood  had  been  ordered,  keeping  his  left  on 
that  road,  to  break  in  the  end  of  our  line,  supposed  to  be  at  the  orchard;  but 
perceiving  that  our  left  was  "  refused  "  (bent  back  toward  Devil's  Den),  and 
noticing  the  importance  of  Round  Top,  he  suggested  to  Longstreet  that  the 


^  11  fi 


'^j4>Mtfi3^_ 


^c  VF^'  lit 


''^3|^Bte»3sCtei 


-i*ti^ 


^^H^i-w- 


^'^t;:^^:'^. 


TROSTLE'S    HOUSE,    SCENE    OF    THE    FIGHTING    OF    BIGELOVV'S    BATTERY.       FROM    A   WAP^-TIME    PHOTOGRAPH. 


J 


THE  SECOND  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


307 


latter  be  turned  and  attacked  [see  p.  322].  The  reply  was  that  General  Lee's 
orders  were  to  attack  along  the  Emmitsburg  road.  Again  Hood  sent  his  mes- 
sage and  received  the  same  reply,  notwithstanding  which  he  directed  Law's 
brigade  upon  Round  Top,  in  which  movement  a  portion  of  Robertson's  Ijrigade 
joined ;  the  rest  of  the  division  was  thrown  upon  De\irs  Den  and  the  ridge 
between  it  and  the  Peach  Orchard.  The  first  assaults  were  repulsed,  but  after 
hard  fighting,  McLaws's  division  being  also  advanced,  toward  6  o'clock  the 
angle  was  broken  in,  after  a  resolute  defense  and  with  great  loss  on  both  sides. 
In  the  meantime  three  of  Anderson's  brigades  were  advancing  on  Humphreys, 
and  the  latter  received  orders  from  Birney,  now  in  connnand  of  the  corps 
(Sickles  having  been  severely  wounded  soon  after  6  o'clock  near  the  Trostle 
house),  to  throw  back  his  left,  form  an  oblique  line  in  his  rear,  and  connect  ^\ith 
the  right  of  Bii-ney's  division,  then  retiring.  The  junction  was  not  effected,  and 
Humphreys,  greatly  outnumbered,  slowly  and  skillfully  fell  back  to  Cemetery 
Ridge,  Gribbon  sending  two  regiments  and  Brown's  Rhode  Island  battery  to 
his  support.  But  the  enemy  was  strong  and  covered  the  wliole  Second  Corps 
front,  now  greatly  weakened  by  detach- 
ments. Wilcox's,  Perry's,  and  Wright's 
Confederate  brigades  pressed  up  to  the 
ridge,  outflanking  Humphreys's  right 
and  left,  and  Wright  broke  through 
our  line  and  seized  the  guns  in  his 
front,  but  was  soon  driven  out,  and 
not  being  supported  they  all  fell  back, 
aljout  dusk,  under  a  heavy  artillery 
fire. 

As  soon  as  Longstreet's  attack  com- 
menced, Greneral  Warren  was  sent  by 
General  Meade  to  see  to  the  condition  of  the  extreme  left.  The  duty  could 
not  have  been  intrusted  to  better  hands.  Passing  along  the  lines  he  found 
Little  Round  Top,  the  key  of  the  position,  unoccupied  except  ]»y  a  signal 
station.  The  enemy  at  the  time  lay  concealed,  awaiting  the  signal  for  assault, 
when  a  shot  fired  in  their  direction  caused  a  sudden  movement  on  their  jKirt 
which,  by  the  gleam  of  reflected  sunlight  from  their  bayonets,  revealed  tlieir 
long  lines  outflanking  the  position.  Fully  comprehending  the  imminent 
danger,  Warren  sent  to  General  Meade  for  a  division.^  The  enemy  was  already 


MONUMENT    OF     BIGELOWS     NINTH    ;« ASSACHCSETTS 
BATTERY.      IKOM   A   PHOTOC.RAPH    TAKEN   IN  1886. 


I  Before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  theWar 
General  Warren  testified  that  he  went  to  Little 
Round  Top '  *  by  General  Meade's  direction."  In  a  let- 
ter dated  July  mth,  1872,  General  Warren  says: 

"JiiKt  1)(  fore  the  action  bcj?an  iu  eariioKt,  on  July  2(1, 
T  waH  with  (icneral  Moadc,  iioarGcncral  Sickles,  whoso 
troops  seemed  very  1>;i<ll,v  (lisposcd  on  that  part  of  the 
ttdd.  At  uiy  Hu,iii,'»'sti(>n.  (Icnciiil  iMcadc  sent  nie  to 
the  left  to  examine  the  condition  of  nHairs,  and  I  con- 
tiiincd  on  till  f  rc;ichcd  Little  Konnd  Top.  Tlu-re  were 
no  troops  on  It,  and  it  was  used  as  a  siirnal  station.  I 
saw  that  this  was  the  key  of  the  wlude  iM.sition.  anil 
that  our  troops  in  the  woods  in  fn.nt  of  it  could  not  see 
the  Kronnd  in  front  of  them,  so  that  the  enemy  would 
come  uj)on  them  before  tUey  would  bo  aware  of  it.  The 


louK  line  of  woods  on  the  west  side  of  the  Emmitsbur>r 
road  (which  road  was  idoiifr  a  rid>:c)  furnished  an  excel- 
lent place  for  the  enemy  to  form  out  of  8i>:lit,  so  I  n-- 
quested  the  cajttain  of  a  ritle  battery  Just  in  front  of 
Little  Hound  Top  to  lire  a  shot  into  these  woods,  lie 
did  so.  and  as  the  shot  went  whistling'  throu>:h  thenir 
the  souml  <)f  it  i-eached  the  enemy's  troops  and  eausetl 
every  oiu"  to  look  iu  the  direction  of  It.  This  nnition 
revealed  to  me  the  ^'listiidni;  of  v'un-barrels  and  bayo- 
nets of  the  enemy's  line  of  bait h',ahea<ly  formed  and  far 
outllankln^r  the  position  of  any  of  our  troops;  so  that 
the  line  of  his  advance  from  his  r(>;ht  to  Little  Hound 
Top  was  unopposed.  I  have  been  parltenhir  in  tcllin>r 
this,  as  the  discovery  was  intensely  thrilling  to  my  feel 
liitfs,  and  almost  appalllni;.  I  immetllately  sent  a  hastily 
written  dispatch  to  (icneral  Mead*'  to  send  aillvislou  at 


3o8 


THE  SECOND   DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


advaiioiii^  wIkmi,  iioticiiii;-  tlio  a])proaeli  of  tlio  Fifth  Corps,  Warren  rodo  to 

meet  it,  caused  Weed's  and  Vincent's  brigades  and  Hazlett's  battery  to  be 

Ic-iiHt  to  iiic,  luid  Ociiornl  Moadodirootod  tlic  Fifth  Army  us,  and  he  was  aliout  to  fold  np  hin  fln^R  and  witlidraw, 

Corns  to  tako  position  tlii're.    Tho  battle  was  already  but  r(^nlained,  at  my  roqucst,  and  kept  waviiifr  them  in 

l)(■^'inninf?  f o  rufro  at  tlio  Poach  Orchard,  and  boforo  a  dotlance.  Socin;;  troops  ffoinjr  ont  on  the  Po;uh  Orchard 

Bindo  man  reached  Honnd  Top  the  whole  line  of  the  road.  T  rode  down  the  hill,  and  fortnnatcly  met  my  old 

enemy  moved  on  ns  in  sph-ndid  ari-a.\-.  shontinfi  in  the  lirijrade.     General  W<'ed.  commanding  it.  had  already 

most  contldent  tones.    While  I  was  still  all  alone  with  passed  the  point,  and  I  took  the  responsibility  to  de- 

tbcsisiml  oib..!.  ihr  musket-balls  bof;an  to  fly  around  tach  Colonel  O'Rorkc.   tlie  head  of  whose  regimeut  I 


THE  SECOND  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


309 


detached  from  the  latter  and  hurried  them  to  the  summit  [see  p.  298].  The 
passage  of  the  six  guns  through  the  roadless  woods  and  amongst  the  rocks 
was  marvelous.  Under  ordinary  circumstances  it  would  have  been  consid- 
ered an  impossible  feat,  but  the  eager- 
ness of  the  men  to  get  into  action  with 
their  comrades  of  the  infantry,  and  the 
skillful  dri\ang,  Ijrought  them  without 
delay  to  the  very  summit,  where  they 
went  immediately  into  battle.  They 
were  barely  in  time,  for  the  enemy 
were  also  climbing  the  hill.  A  close  and 
bloody  hand-to-hand  struggle  ensued, 
which  left  both  Round  Tojjs  in  our  pos- 
session. Weed  and  Hazlett  were  killed, 
and  Vincent  was  mortally  Avounded  — 
all  young  men  of  great  promise.  Weed 
had  served  with  much  distinction  as 
an  artillerist  in  the  Peninsular,  Second 
Bull  Run,  and  Antietam  campaigns,  had 
become  chief  of  artillery  of  his  army 
corps,  and  at  Chancellorsville  showed 
such  special  aptitude  and  fitness  for  large  artillery  commands  that  he  was 
immediately  promoted  from  captain  to  brigadier-general  and  transferred  to 
the  infantry.  Hazlett  was  killed  whilst 
bending  over  his  former  chief,  to  receive 
his  last  message.  Lieutenant  Ritten- 
house  efficiently  commanded  the  battery 
during  the  remainder  of  the  battle. 

The  enemy,  however,  clung  to  the  woods 
and  i-ocks  at  the  base  of  Round  Toi3,.  car- 
ried Devil's  Den  and  its  woods,  and  cap- 
tured three  of  Smith's  guns,  who,  however, 
effectively  deprived  the  enemy  of  their 
use  by  carrying  off  all  the  implements. 

The  breaking  in  of  the  Peach  Orchard 
angle  exposed  th(^  flanks  of  the  l)atteries 
on  its  crests,  which  retired  firing,  in  order 
to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  infantry.  Many 

''  ■J        Hl{KJAI>IER-r.|-,NKRALSAMCKI.K.ZOOK,  COMMANDING 

guns  of  different  batteries  had  to  be  MbaTi-      thk  tmiki)  mucAnK  ok  cai.dwku/s  division, 

,  o   11  1         1  I-  .        ,        •  Kll.I.i:i>   IN-   Tin:  •' WHKAT-KIKI.D"  JULY  2. 

doiicd  because  01  the  destruction  of  llifii-  ikom  a  moTOGitAm. 


COLONEL    GEORGE    L.   WILLARD,   COMMANDING    TH 

THIRD    BRIGADE    OF    HAYS'S    DIVISION,   KILLED 

ON    JULY   2.      FROM    A   PHOTOGRAPH. 


'TJ 


wtriick.  wlu),  oil  lioariiig  my  few  wonlH  of  oxplniiiition 
iilioiit  tlic  poHitioii,  movod  at  oiiw  to  th«^  hill-toi).  Ahoiit 
tliiH  tiiiu'  First  Liciitciiant  riiarlcH  K.  Hazlett  of  the 
Fifth  Artillery,  with  IiIk  l>;itleiy  of  rilled  eaiiiioii,  arrived. 
H(^  eoinprehended  the  sitnntioii  instantly  and  planted 
a  gtin  on  the  sunnnil  ofthe  hill.  He  spoke  to  the  elleet 
that  thoilirh  he  eniild  do  little  exeention  on  the  enemy 
with  hisf;nns,  he  eoidd  aid  in  i^ivini;  eonll 


infant! 


nd 


ittery 


'  to  th 
iiuene 


linsi    tlu>    position.      Ho 
wa8  wonniU'<l  with  a 


whatever  compared  with  h< 
staid  th.-re  till  he  waw  kill.-d 
niiisK-et-l.all  while  talking:  with  F.ientenant  Hazl.tt  on 
the  hill,  hot  not  seiionsly  :  and.  8e«>iiiK  the  position 
s;ived  while  the  whole  line  to  the  ri^'ht  and  front  of  us 
was  yielding'  and  nulling  away  uniler  f  lu>  enomyV  tire 
and  atlvanee.  I  left  lli«"  hill  to  rejoin  (ieneral  Meado 
near  the  ecnter  »>f  the  tlehl,  where  a  now  erisis  waw  at 
hand."  KniTOKS. 


310 


THE  SECOND  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


horses  and  men;  many  were  hauled 
off  by  hand;  all  the  batteries  lost 
heavily.  Bigelow's  9th  Massachusetts 
made  a  stand  close  by  the  Trostle 
house  in  the  corner  of  the  field 
through  which  he  had  retired  fight- 
ing with  prolonges  fixed.  Although 
already  much  cut  up,  he  was  directed 
by  McGilvery  to  hold  that  point  at  all 
hazards  until  a  line  of  artillery  could 
be  formed  in  front  of  the  wood  be- 
yond Plum  Run ;  that  is,  on  what  we 
have  called  the  "  Plum  Run  line." 
This  line  was  formed  by  collecting  the 
serviceable  batteries,  and  fragments 
of  batteries,  that  were  brought  off, 
with  which,  and  Dow's  Maine  battery 
fresh  from  the  reserve,  the  pursuit 
was  checked.  Finally  some  twenty- 
five  guns  formed  a  solid  mass,  which 
unsupported  by  infantry  held  this 
part  of  the  line,  aided  Greneral  Hum- 
phreys's movements,  and  covered  by 
its  fire  the  abandoned  guns  until  they 
could  be  brought  off,  as  all  were,  ex- 
cept perhaps  one.  When,  after  accom- 
plishing its  purpose,  all  that  was  left 
of  Bigelow's  battery  was  withdrawn, 
it  was  closely  pressed  by  Colonel  Hum- 
phreys's 21st  Mississippi,  the  only 
Confederate  regiment  which  succeed- 
ed in  crossing  the  run.  His  men  had 
entered  the  battery  and  fought  hand- 
to-hand  with  the  cannoneers ;  one  was 
killed  whilst  trying  to  spike  a  gun, 
and  another  knocked  down  with  a 
handspike  whilst  endeavoring  to  drag 
off  a  prisoner.  The  batterj'  went  into 
action  with  10-4  officers  and  men.  Of 
the  four  battery  officers  one  was  killed, 
another  mortally,  and  a  tliii'd,  Captain  Bigelow,  severely  wounded.  Of  7 
sergeants,  2  were  killed  and  4  wounded;  or  a  total  of  28  men,  including 
2  missing ;  and  65  out  of  88  horses  were  killed  or  wounded.  As  the  bat- 
tery had  sacrificed  itself  for  the  safety  of  the  line,  its  work  is  specially 
noticed  as  typical  of  the  service  that  artillery  is  not  infrequently  called  upon 
to  render,  and  did  render  in  other  instances  at  Gettysburg  besides  this  one. 


THE   SECOND  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


3'i 


When  Sickles  was  wounded  General  Meade  directed  Hancock  to  take  com- 
mand of  tlie  Third  as  well  as  his  own  corps,  which  he  again  tm-ned  over  to 
Gibbon.  About  7:15  p.  m,  the  field  was  in  a  critical  condition.  Birney's 
division  was  now  broken  up ;  Humphreys's  was  slowly  falling  back,  under 
cover  of  McGilvery's  guns;  Anderson's  line  was  advancing.  On  its  right, 
Barksdale's  brigade,  except  the  21st  Mississippi,  was  held  in  check  only 
by  McGilvery's  artiUery,  to  whose  support  Hancock  now  brought  up  Wil- 
lard's  brigade  of  the  Second  Corps.  Placing  the  39th  New  York  in  reserve, 
Willard  with  his 
other  three  regi- 
ments charged 
Barksdale's  bri- 
gade and  drove 
it  back  nearly  to 
the  Emmitsburg 
road,  when  he  was 
himself  repulsed 
by  a  heavy  artil- 
lery and  infantry 
fire,  and  fell  back 
to  his  former 
position  near  the 
som-ces  of  Plum 
Run.  In  this  af- 
fair Willard  was 
killed  and  Barks- 
dale  mortally  wounded.  Meanwhile  the  21st  Mississippi  crossed  the  run  from 
the  neighborhood  of  the  Trostle  house,  and  drove  out  the  men  of  Watson's 
battery  ("  I,"  5th  United  States),  on  the  extreme  left  of  McGilvery's  line,  but 
was  in  turn  driven  oif  by  the  39th  New  York,  led  by  Lieutenant  Peeples  of 
the  battery,  musket  in  liand,  who  thus  recovered  his  guns,  Watson  l)eing 
severely  wounded. 

Birney's  division  once  broken,  it  was  difficult  to  stem  the  tide  of  defeat. 
Hood's  and  McLaws's  divisions — excepting  Barksdale's  brigade — compassed 
the  Devil's  Den  and  its  woods,  and  as  the  Federal  reenforcements  from  other 
corps  came  piecemeal,  they  were  beaten  in  detail  until  by  successive  accre- 
tions they  greatly  outnumbered  their  opponents,  who  had  all  the  advantages 
of  position,  when  the  latter  in  turn  retired,  but  were  not  inirsued.  This 
fighting  was  confined  almost  whoU}"  to  the  woods  and  wheat-fiekl  between 
the  Peach  Orchard  and  Little  Round  Top,  and  the  gi*eat  number  of  brigade 
and  regimental  commanders,  as  well  as  of  inferior  officers  and  soldiers,  killed 
and  wounded  on  both  sides,  bears  testimony  to  its  close  and  desperate  char- 
acter. General  Meade  was  on  the  ground  active  in  bringing  u]>  and  jintting 
in  reenforcements,  and  in  doing  so  had  his  horse  shot  under  him.  At  the 
close  of  the  day  tlie  Confederates  held  the  base  of  the  Round  Toi>s,  Devil's 
Den,  its  woods,  and  the  Emmitsburg  road,  with  sku'mishers  thrown  out  as 


EARLY'S  CHARGE  ON  THE  EVENING  OF  JULY  2  UPON  EAST  CEMETERY  HILL. 


312 


THE  SECOND  DAY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


CONFEDERATE    SKIRMISHERS    AT    THE    FOOT    OF    GULP'S    HILL. 


far  as  the  Trostle  house ;  the  Federals  had  the  two  Round  Tops,  the  Pkim  Run 
line,  and  Cemetery  Ridge.  During  the  night  the  Plum  Run  line,  except  the 
wood  on  its  left  front  (occupied  by  McCandless's  brigade,  Crawford's  division, 
his  other  brigade  being  on  Big  Round  Top),  was  abandoned ;  the  Third  Corps 
was  massed  to  the  left  and  rear  of  Caldwell's  division,  which  had  reoccupied 
its  short  ridge,  with  McGilvery's  artillery  on  its  crest.  The  Fifth  Corps 
remained  on  and  about  Round  Top,  and  a  division  [Ruger's]  which  had  been 
detached  from  the  Twelfth  Corps  returned  to  Culp's  Hill. 

When  Longstreet's  guns  were  heard,  Ewell  opened  a  cannonade,  which  after 
an  hour's  firing  was  overpowered  by  the  Federal  artillery  on  Cemetery  Hill. 
Johnson's  division  then  advanced,  and  found  only  one  brigade —  Grreene's — of 
the  Twelfth  Corps  in  position,  the  others  having  been  sent  to  the  aid  of 
Sickles  at  the  Peach  Orchard.  Greene  fought  with  skill  and  determination 
for  two  or  three  hours,  and,  reenforced  by  seven  or  eight  hundred  men  of 
the  First  and  Eleventh  corps,  succeeded  in  holding  his  own  intrenchments, 
the  enemy  taking  possession  of  the  abandoned  works  of  Geary  and  Ruger. 
This  brought  Johnson's  troops  near  the  Baltimore  pike,  but  the  darkness 
prevented  their  seeing  or  profiting  by  the  advantage  then  within  their  reach. 
When  Ruger's  division  returned  from  Round  Top,  and  Geary's  from  Rock 
Creek,  they  found  Johnson  in  possession  of  their  intrenchments,  and  imme- 
diately prepared  to  drive  him  out  at  daylight. 

It  had  been  ordered  that  when  Johnson  engaged  Culp's  Hill,  Early  and 
Rodes  should  assault  Cemetery  Hill.  Early's  attack  was  made  with  great 
spirit,  by  Hoke's  and  Avery's  brigades,  Gordon's  being  in  reserve ;  the  hill  was 
ascended  through  the  wide  ravine  between  Cemetery  and  Culp's  hills,  a  line 
of  infantry  on  the  slopes  was  broken,  and  Wiedrich's  Eleventh  Corps  and 
Ricketts's  reserve  batteries  near  the  brow  of  the  hill  were  overrun ;  but  the 


THE  COUNCL  OF  IVAR  ON   THE  SECOND  DAY. 


3>3 


excellent  position  of  Stevens's  12-pounders  at  the  head  of  the  ravine,  which 
enaljled  him  to  sweep  it,  the  arrival  of  Carroll's  brigade  sent  unasked  by  Han- 
cock,—  a  happy  inspiration,  as  this  line  had  been  weakened  to  send  supports 
both  to  Greene  and  Sickles, —  and  the  failui-e  of  Rodes  to  cooperate  with  Early, 
caused  the  attack  to  miscarry.  The  cannoneers  of  the  two  batteries,  so  sum- 
marily ousted,  rallied  and  recovered  their  guns  by  a  vigorous  attack  —  with 
pistols  by  those  who  had  them,  by  others  with  handspikes,  rammers,  stones, 
and  even  fence-rails  —  the  "  Dutchmen  "  showing  that  they  were  in  no  way 
inferior  to  their  "Yankee"  comrades,  who  had  been  taunting  them  ever  since 
Chancellorsville.  After  an  hour's  desperate  fighting  the  enemy  was  driven  out 
with  heavy  loss,  Avery  being  among  the  killed.  At  the  close  of  this  second 
day  a  consultation  of  corps  commanders  was  held  at  Meade's  headquarters. 
I  was  not  present,  although  summoned,  but  was  informed  that  the  vote  was 
unanimous  to  hold  our  lines  and  to  await  an  attack  for  at  least  one  day  before 
taking  the  offensive,  and  Meade  so  decided.     [Continuation  on  p.  3G9.] 


THE    COUNCIL   OF   WAR  ON    THE    SECOND    DAY  J 

BY    JOHN    GIBBON,    MAJOK-GENERAL,    U.  S.  V. 


SOON  after  all  firing  had  ceased  a  staff-officer 
from  ai'my  headquarters  met  General  Hancock 
and  myself  and  summoned  us  both  to  General 
Meade's  headquarters,  where  a  coimcil  was  to  be 
held.  We  at  once  proceeded  there,  and  soon  after 
our  arrival  all  the  corps  commanders  were  assem- 
bled in  the  little  front  room  of  the  Liester  House  — 
Newton,  who  had  been  assigned  to  the  command 
of  the  First  Corps  over  Doubleday,  his  senior; 
Hancock,  Second;  Birney,  Third;  Sykes,  Fifth; 
Sedgwick,  who  had  arrived  during  the  day  with 
the  Sixth,  after  a  long  march  from  Manchester ; 
Howard,  Eleventh;  and  Slocum,  Twelfth,  besides 
General  Meade,  General  Butterfield,  chief  of  staff; 
Warren,  chief  of  engineers;  A.  S.  Williams,  Twelfth 
Coi'ps,  and  myself,  Second.  It  will  be  seen  that 
two  corps  were  doubly  represented,  the  Second  by 
Hancock  and  myself,  and  the  Twelfth  by  Slocum 
and  Williams.  These  twelve  were  all  assembled  in 
a  little  room  not  more  tlian  ten  or  twelve  feet  square, 
with  a  bed  in  one  corner,  a  small  table  on  one  side, 
and  a  chair  or  two.  Of  course  all  could  not  sit 
down  ;  soino  did,  some  lounged  on  the  bed,  and 
some  stood  uj),  while  Warren,  tired  out  and  suffer- 
ing from  a  wound  in  thcs  neck,  where  a  piece  of 
shell  had  struck  him*  lay  down  in  the  corner  of  the 
room  and  went  sound  asleep,  and  I  don't  think 
heard  any  of  the  proceedings. 

The  discussion  was  at  first  very  informal  and  in  the 
shape  of  conversation,  during  which  each  one  made 
comments  on  the  fight  and  told  what  ho  knew  of 
the  condition  of  affairs.  In  the  course  of  this  dis- 
cussion Newton  expressed  the  opinion  tliat  "this 
was  no  place  to  fight  a  battle  in."  General  Newton 
was  an  officer  of  engineers  (since  chief-engineer  of 
the  army),  and  was  rated  by  me,  and  I  supi)ose 
most  others,  very  highly  as  a  soldier.  The  asser- 
tion, therefore,  coming  from  such  a  source,  rather 


startled  me,  and  I  eagerly  asked  what  his  objections 
to  the  position  were.  The  objections  he  stated,  as 
I  recollect  them,  related  to  some  minor  details  of 
the  line,  of  which  I  knew  nothing  except  so  far  as 
my  own  front  was  concerned,  and  with  those  I  was 
satisfied;  but  the  prevailing  impression  seemed  to 
be  that  the  place  for  the  battle  had  been  in  a 
measure  selected  for  us.  Here  we  are;  now  what 
is  the  best  thing  to  do  ?  It  soon  became  evident 
that  everybody  was  in  favor  of  remaining  where 
we  were  and  giving  battle  there.  General  Meade 
himself  said  very  little,  except  now  and  then  to 
make  some  comment,  but  I  cannot  recall  that  he 
expressed  any  decided  opinion  upon  any  point,  ])re- 
ferring  apparently  to  listen  to  the  conversation. 
After  the  discussion  had  lasted  some  time.  Butter- 
field  suggested  that  it  would,  perhaps,  be  well  to 
formulate  the  question  to  be  asked,  and  General 
Meade  assenting  he  took  a  piece  of  pa]>er,  on  which 
he  had  been  making  some  memoranda,  and  wrote 
down  a  question ;  when  lie  had  done  he  read  it  off 
and  formally  proposed  it  to  the  council. 

I  had  never  been  a  member  of  a  council  of  war 
before  (nor  have  I  been  since)  and  did  not  feel  very 
confident  I  was  properly  a  member  of  this  one ;  but 
I  had  engaged  in  the  discussion,  and  found  myself 
(Warren  being  asleep)  the  junior  member  in  it. 
By  the  custom  of  war  the  junior  member  votes  first, 
as  on  courts-martial ;  and  when  Butterfield  read  off 
his  question,  the  substance  of  which  was,  ''Sliould 
tlie  army  remain  in  its  present  position  or  take  up 
some  otlier?''  lie  addressed  liiinself  first  to  mo  for 
an  answer.  To  say  ''  Stay  and  fight  "  was  to  ignore 
tlieobjcH'tions  matleby  (M'lieral  Newton,  and  I  tliere- 
fore  answered  somewhat  in  this  way:  "Remain 
here,  and  make  siidi  correction  in  our  jnisition  as 
may  bo  deemed  necessary,  but  take  no  stoj)  which 
even  looks  like  retreat."    The  (iuestit>n  was  put  to 


^  Takon  by  poniiissiou  from  the ' 
vol..  III.    -Jl 


•Uihidclphla  Weekly  Tress  "  of  July  6tli,  1887,  and  condcueod.—  EorroRa 


314 


THE  20TH  MAINE  AT  LITTLE  ROUND   TOP. 


each  member  and  his  answer  taken  clown,  and  when 
it  came  to  Newton,  who  was  the  first  in  rank,  he 
voted  in  pretty  much  the  same  way  as  I  did,  and  we 
had  some  playful  sparring  as  to  whether  he  agreed 
with  me  or  I  with  him ;  the  rest  voted  to  remain. 

The  next  question  written  by  Butterfield  was, 
'*  Should  the  army  attack  or  wait  tlie  attack  of  the 
enemy?"  I  voted  not  to  attack,  and  all  the  others 
voted  substantially  the  same  way ;  and  on  the  third 
question,  "How  long  shall  we  wait?"  I  voted, 
"  Until  Lee  moved."  The  answers  to  this  last 
question  showed  the  only  material  variation  in  the 
opinion  of  the  members. 

When  the  voting  was  over  General  Meade  said 
quietly,  but  decidedly,  "  Such  then  is  the  decision  " ; 
and  certainly  he  said  nothing  which  produced  a 
doubt  in  my  mind  as  to  his  being  perfectly  in  accord 
with  the  members  of  the  council. 

In  ISSl  (eighteen  years  after  the  battle)  I  was 
shown  in  Philadelphia,  by  General  Meade's  son 
[Colonel  George  Meade],  a  paper  found  amongst 
General  Meade's  effects  after  his  death.  It  was 
folded,  and  on  the  outside  of  one  end  was  written, 
in  his  well-known  handwriting,  in  ink,  "Minutes 
of  Council,  July  2d,  '63."  On  opening  it,  the  follow- 
ing was  found  written  in  pencil  in  a  handwriting 
[General  Daniel  Butterfield's]  unknown  to  me : 

Minutes  of  Cottncil,  July  2d,  1863. 

Page  1,  Questions  asked : 

1.  Under  existing  circumstances  is  it  advisable  for 
this  army  to  remain  lu  its  present  position,  or  to  retire 
to  another  iir:inr  its  base  of  supplies? 

2.  It  beini:  dileiinined  to  reiiiaiii  in  present  position, 
shall  the  :u)ii.\  aitaek  or  wait  tlie  attack  of  the  enemy? 

3.  It  we  wait  attack,  how  long? 
Page  2,  Replies. 

Gibbon :  1.  Correct  position  of  the  array,  but  would 
not  retreat.  2.  In  no  condition  to  attack, 
in  his  opinion.    3.  Until  he  moves. 

Williams :     1.  Stay.    2.  Wait  attack.    3.  One  day. 

Biruey :  Same  as  General  Williams. 

Sykes: 

Newton :     1.  Correct  position  of  the  army ,  but  would  not 
retreat.    2.  By  all  means  not  attack.    3. 
If  we  wait  it  will  give  them  a  chance  to 
cut  our  line. 
Page  3. 

Howard:  1.  Remain.  2.  Wait  attack  until  4  p.  M.  to- 
morrow. 3.  If  don't  attack,  attack  them. 

3>  The  words  in  italics,  noted  as  illegible  in  the  "  Offi- 
cial Records,"  have  been  deciphered  on  a  careful  exam- 
ination of  the  original  document  deposited  by  Colonel 
(ieorge  Meade  with  the  Penn.  Hist.  Society.— Editors. 


Hancock  :     1.  Rectify  position  without  moving  so  as  to 

give  up  Held.    2.  Not  attack  unless  our 

communications  are  cut.    3.  Can't  wait 

long;  can't  be  idle. 

Sedgwick:   1.  Remain.     [2.]   and  wait  attack.     [3.]  At 

least  one  day. 
Slocum  :  Stay  and  flght  it  out. 

[On  the  back,  or  first  page  of  the  sheet] : 
Slocum  stay  and  flght  it  out.  Newton  thinks  it  a  bad 
position ;  Hancock  puzzled  about  practicability  of  retir- 
ing ;  thinks  by  holding  on  invitiuff  i^  to  mass  forces  and 
attack.  Howard  favor  of  not  retiring.  Birney  duu't 
know.  Third  Corps  used  up  and  not  in  good  condition  to 
fight.  Sedgwick  doubtful  ivhether  we  ouijlit  to  ntlacl^-.  3> 
Effective  strength  about  9000, 12,500,  9000,  6000,  8500,  COOO, 
7000.    Total,  58,000. 

[Endorsement :] 
Minutes   of   Council,  held  Thursday,  p.  m.,  July  2d, 
1863.     D.  B.,  M.  G.,  c.  of  s.  [Daniel  Buttertield,   Major- 
General,  Chief  of  Staff]. 

The  memoranda  at  the  bottom  of  the  paper  were 
doubtless  made  while  the  discussion  was  going  on, 
and  the  numbers  at  the  foot  refer  probably  to  the 
effective  strength  of  each  corps.  \. 

Several  times  during  the  sitting  of  the  council 
reports  were  brought  to  General  Meade,  and  now 
and  then  we  could  hear  heavy  firing  going  on  over 
on  the  right  of  our  line.  I  took  occasion  before 
leaving  to  say  to  General  Meade  that  his  staff-offi- 
cer had  regularly  summoned  me  as  a  corps  cona- 
mander  to  the  council,  although  I  had  some  doubts 
about  being  present.  He  answered,  pleasantly, 
"  That  is  all  right.     I  wanted  you  here." 

Before  I  left  the  house  Meade  made  a  remark  to 
me  which  surprised  m-e  a  good  deal,  especially  when 
I  look  back  upon  the  occurrence  of  the  next  day. 
By  a  reference  to  the  votes  in  council  it  will  be 
seen  that  the  majority  of  the  members  were  in 
favor  of  acting  on  the  defensive  and  awaiting  the 
action  of  Lee.  In  referring  to  the  matter,  just  as 
the  council  broke  up,  Meade  said  to  me,  "  If  Lee 
attacks  to-morrow,  it  will  be  in  yourfrontJ'^  I  asked 
him  why  he  thought  so,  and  he  replied,  "Because 
he  has  made  attacks  on  both  our  flanks  and  failed, 
and  if  he  concludes  to  try  it  again  it  will  be  on  our 
center."  I  expressed  the  hope  that  he  would,  and 
told  General  Meade,  with  confidence,  that  if  he  did 
we  would  defeat  him. 

I A  careful  study  of  the  original  suggests  that 
these  notes  "  at  the  bottom  "  (on  tire  back)  were  made 
before  the  questions  were  formulated.    See  p.  313. 

Editors. 


THE    20th    MAINE   AT   LITTLE   EOUND   TOP.  ^ 

BY    H.    S.    MELCHER,     20TH    MAINE    REGIMENT. 


riiHE  Confederate  force  designated  to  take  pos- 
J-  session  of  Little  Round  Top  appears  to  have 
been  Robertson's  brigade,  consisting  of  the  1st, 
4th,  and  5th  Texas  and  the  3d  Arkansas;  and 
Law's  brigade,  consisting  of  the  4th,  44th,  4Sth, 
47th,  and  15th  Alabama,  both  of  Hood's  division. 
Tlie  former  was  to  assault  in  front,  while  Law's 
brigade  was  to  attack  in  the  rear  of  the  hill  [see 
p.  318];  but  Robertson,  finding  he  could  not  cover 
the  entire  front  with   his   brigade,  detached  the 

i  Condensed  from  the  "  Lincoln  Comity  News,' 


44th,  48th,  and  4th  Alabama  from  Law's  brigade 
about  the  time  they  arrived  at  the  foot  of  Round 
Top  in  their  advance  and  connected  them  with 
Robertson's  line,  then  well  in  front  of  Little  Round 
Top.  This  left  the  47th  and  15th  Alabama  to 
carry  out  the  flanking  movement  alone,  which  they 
did,  passing  up  the  southern  side  of  Round  Top, 
and  halting  some  ten  minutes  on  the  crest  for  rest. 
This  halt  proved  fatal  to  the  success  of  their  un- 
dertaking, as  it  enabled  our  brigade  (Vincent's) 

Waldoboro,  Maine,  March  ISth,  1885.— Editoks. 


THE  146TH  MEIV  YORK  AT  LITTLE  ROUND   TOP. 


315 


to  reach  Little  Rouud  Top  iu  time  to  resist  their 
advance.  \ 

Resuniiug  their  march,  these  two  regiments 
passed  down  the  north-easterly  side  of  Eound  Top 
and  advanced  across  the  wooded  depression  be- 
tween the  hills  to  charge  up  the  rear  of  Little 
Eound  Top  and  sweep  off  Vincent's  brigade,  then 
fiercely  engaged  with  Robertson's  Texans  and  the 
three  regiments  of  Law's  brigade  that  had  been 
assigned  to  his  command,  who  were  trying  to  get 
possession  from  the  front.  But  just  here  these 
two  Alabama  regiments  met  the  20th  Maine, 
which  was  the  left  regiment  of  Vincent's  brigade, 
and  also  the  left  of  the  whole  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
and,  to  conform  to  the  crest  of  the  hill,  was  bent 
back  at  about  right  angles  with  the  line  of  the  rest 
of  the  brigade.  This  was  fortimate,  for  in  their  ad- 
vance the  47th  Alabama,  commanded  by  Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel Bulger,  struck  our  regiment  squarely 
in  front  and  opened  a  murderous  fire  on  our  un- 
protected line,  as  we  had  just  got  into  position, 
and  had  no  time  to  throw  up  breastworks.  At 
the  same  time  the  15th  Alabama,  commanded  by 
Colonel  William  C.  Gates,  numbering  644  men  and 
42  officers,  moved  around  to  attack  us  in  flank  and 
real*.  Our  colonel,  Chamberlain,  met  this  movement 
by  putting  the  right  wing  of  the  regiment  into 
single  rank  to  resist  the  47th,  and  bent  back  the 
five  left  companies  of  the  regiment  at  a  right  angle. 

Our  regiment  numbered  358  men,  but  as  Com- 
pany B,  numbering  50  men,  had  been  sent  out  to 
"protect  our  flank,"  we  had  308  men  in  line  to 
resist  the  furious  assault  of  these  two  strong  regi- 

"X  Vincent's  hrigarte  appears  to  have  been  sent  by 
General  Sykes  to  occupy  the  position  to  the  left,  or 
southward,  of  Little  Rouud  Top,  between  it  and  Round 
Ti)j>,  about  the  sauie  time  that  Colonel  O'Rorke  with  the 


nients,  outnumbering  us  more  than  3  to  1.  The 
conflict  was  fierce,  but  necessarily  brief,  as  it  was 
a  question  of  only  a  short  time  when  every  man 
must  fall  before  the  superior  tire  of  our  enemy. 

WTien  130  of  our  brave  officers  and  men  had 
been  shot  down  where  they  stood,  and  only  178 
remained, —  hardly  more  than  a  strong  skii-mish 
line,— and  each  man  had  fu-ed  the  GO  roimds  of 
cartridges  he  carried  into  the  fight,  and  the  sur- 
vivors were  using  from  the  cartridge-boxes  of  their 
fallen  comrades,  the  time  had  come  when  it  must 
be  decided  whether  we  should  fall  back  and  give  up 
this  key  to  the  whole  field  of  Gettysburg,  or  charge 
and  try  and  throw  off  this  foe.  Colonel  Chamber- 
lain gave  the  order  to  "fix  bayonets,"  and  almost 
before  he  could  say  "  charge  !  "the  regiment  leaped 
down  the  hill  and  closed  in  with  the  foe,  whom  we 
found  behind  every  rock  and  tree.  Surprised  and 
overwhelmed,  most  of  them  threw  down  their  arms 
and  surrendered. 

Some  fought  till  they  were  slain  ;  the  others  ran 
"like  a  herd  of  wild  cattle,"  as  Colonel  Gates  him- 
self expressed  it.  In  their  flight  they  were  met  by 
Company  B,  Captain  Morrill,  which  we  supposed 
had  been  captured,  but  now  attacked  so  vigorously 
that  over  one  hundred  of  the  fugitives  were  com- 
pelled to  surrender. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Bulger,  commanding  the 
47th,  was  wounded,  and  fell  into  our  hands,  with 
over  three  hundred  prisoners  and  all  the  wounded. 

The  20th  Maine  returned  with  its  jirisoners  to 
the  original  position,  and  staid  there  until  ordered 
forward  in  the  early  evening  to  Round  Top. 

140th  New  York  and  Hazlett's  battery,  the  advance  of 
Weed's  brigade,  at  the  call  of  Warren  was  hastening 
up  the  northern  slope  of  Little  Round  Top  to  seize  the 
crest.—  Editohs. 


THE    146th    new  YORK  AT    LITTLE   ROUND    TOP. 

BY    JAMES    G.     GRINDLAY,    BREVET    BRIGADIER-GENERAL,    U.    S.    V. 


IN  ' '  The  Century  "  for  Decem- 
ber, 1886  [see  p.  298  of  this 
volume],  in  the  illustration, 
"View  from  the  position  of 
Hazlett's  battery  on  Little 
Round  Top,"  it  is  stated,"  the 
monument  marks  the  position 
of  the  91st  Pennsylvania  of 
Weed's  brigade."  I  beg  to 
say  that  the  location  of  the 
monument  is  exactly  where 
the  headquarters  of  tho  146th 
New  York  Volunteers  were 
established  and  maintained 
UNIFORM  OF  THE  14ATH  NEW  durliig  tlic  battlo  of  Gettvs- 
YORK  REGIMENT.  hxw'i;.      Wo(m1's  brlgado  com- 

prised the  140th  and  146th  New  York  and  tho 
9  1st  and  155th  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  and 
they  formed  the  lino  of  battle  on  Little  Round 
Top  in  the  order  as  named  from  left  to  right. 

The  Big  Rock  stands  upon  the  summit  of  Little 
Round  Top,  and  was  the  headquarters  of  the  1  4(5th 
New  York,  Colonel  Keiiner  Garrard,  and  also 
brigade  headquarters,  when  Colonel  Garrard  suc- 
ceeded General  Weed  in  command  when  the  latter 


was  killed.  The  146th  New  York  occupied  the 
ground  immediately  in  front  of  the  Big  Rock, 
and  the  center  and  colors  of  our  regiment  were 
opposite  the  rock  —  the  91st  being  on  our  right,  as 
before  stated;  and  the  extreme  left  of  the  91st 
Pennsylvania  was  at  least  one  hundred  ijards  to  the 
right  of  tho  rock.  I  am  confirmed  in  tliis  state- 
ment by  correspondence  with  brother  officers, 
among  others  Major  C.  K.  Dutton,  of  New  York 
City,  wlio  writes  me  :  "  Your  statement  of  the  posi- 
tion of  146th  is  correct.  One  tiling  /  do  know, 
viz.,  that  my  company  (H)  was  to  the  right  of  tho 
rock,  and  several  companies  of  tlie  reginunit  on  the 
right  of  my  company  before  the  91st  Pei\nsylvania 
came  in  line.  Jenkins,  Armstrong,  and  myself  had 
our  ])osition  a  hundred  feet  to  (he  rigid  of  tlie  rock." 
The  writer  commanded  the  color  company,  and 
liis  memory  is  refrosiied  from  tlie  fact  that  at  the 
rtumion  of  tho  regiment  at  Rome,  N.  Y.,  August 
6th  last,  the  subject  was  fully  discussed  and  steps 
taken  to  erect  a  monument  to  mark  the  jiosition, 
also  l>y  a  recent  examination  of  the  niajjs  and 
photographs  of  tlie  field  of  battle  at  the  residence 
of  General  Sickles  by  a  coniniittee  of  our  regiment. 
Utica,  X.  Y.,  Dec.  2Gth.  1886. 


THE  BREASTWORKS  AT   GULP'S  HILL. 


I.    BY    JESSE    H.    JONES,     CAPTAIN,     60TH    N.   Y.  V. 


THE  Second  Division  of  the  Twelfth  Corps 
camped  on  the  night  of  the  first  day  under  the 
shadow  of  Little  Round  Top.  About  G  o'clock  the 
next  morning  it  was  marched  over  from  that  point, 
which  was  then  the  extreme  left  of  our  line,  and 
posted  on  Gulp's  Hill,  its  loft  forming  a  right  angle 
with  the  right  of  General  Wadsworth's  division  of 
the  First  Corps.  Our  brigade,  commanded  by 
Brigadier-General  George  S.  Greene  and  compris- 
ing five  New  York  regiments,  the  00th,  78th, 
102d,  137th,  and  149th,  was  on  the  left  of  the 
division,  and  our  regiment,  the  60th,  was  on  the 
left  of  the  brigade.  This  regiment  was  largely 
composed  of  men  accustomed  to  woodcraft,  and 
they  fell  to  woi'k  to  construct  log  breastworks 
with  unaccustomed  heartiness.  All  instinctively 
felt  that  a  life-and-death  struggle  was  impending, 
and  that  every  help  should  be  used.  Gulp's  Hill 
was  covered  with  woods ;  so  all  the  materials 
needful  were  at  our  disposal.  Right  and  left  the 
men  felled  the  trees,  and  blocked  them  up  into 
a  close  log  fence.  Piles  of  cord  wood  which  lay 
near  by  were  quickly  appropi-iated.  The  sticks, 
set  slanting  on  end  against  the  outer  face  of  the 
logs,  made  excellent  battening.  All  along  the  rest 
of  the  line  of  the  corps  a  similar  defense  was  con- 
structed. Fortunate  regiments,  which  had  spades 
and  picks,  strengthened  their  work  with  earth. 
By  10  o'clock  it  was  finished. 

At  6  o'clock  in  the  evening  General  Meade,  find- 
ing himself  hard  pressed  on  the  left,  and  deeming 
an  attack  on  the  right  wing  improbable  at  so  late 
an  hour,  called  for  the  Twelfth  Corps.  Our  brigade 
was  detailed  to  remain  and  hold  the  lines  of  the 
corps.  Word  was  brought  from  the  ofiicer  in 
charge  of  our  pickets  that  the  enemy  was  advan- 
cing in  heavy  force  in  line  of  battle,  and,  with  all 
possible  celerity,  such  dispositions  as  the  case  ad- 
mitted of  were  made.  The  brigade  was  strung  out 
into  a  thin  line  of  separate  men  as  far  along  the 
breastworks  as  it  would  reach.  The  intention  was 
to  place  the  men  an  arm's-length  apart,  but,  by  the 
time  the  left  of  the  brigade  had  fairly  undoubled 
files,  the  enemy  was  too  near  to  allow  of  further 
arrangements  being  made. 

In  a  short  time  the  woods  were  all  flecked  with 
the  flashes  from  the  muskets  of  our  skirmishers. 
Down  iji  tlie  hollow  there,  at  the  foot  of  the  slope, 
you  could  catch  a  glimpse  now  and  then,  by  the 
blaze  of  the  powder,  of  our  brave  boys  as  they 
sprang  from  tree  to  tree,  and  sent  back  defiance  to 

Ht  On  the  2r)th  of  Fohnmry,  18G4,  General  Meade  made 
the  following  substitution  in  his  offlcial  report : 

"The  dotachniciit  of  so  larRe  a  portion  of  tlio Twelfth 
Corps,  with  its  tonipornry  coniinaiulcr,  BriKiidicr- 
(iciitTiil  A.  S.  Williams,  loft  the  (l.fcuNc  of  (lie  line  i)r('- 
viously  held  to  the  remaining  brigade  of  the  Second 
Division,  commanded  by  Rrigadier-General  Greene, 
who  held  the  left  of  the  Twelfth  Corps,  now  become 
the  extreme  right  of  the  army.  The  enemy,  perceiving 
the  withdrawal  of  our  troops,  advanced  and  attacked 
General  Greeno  with  great  vigor,  who,  making  a  gallant 


the  advancing  foe.  With  desperation  they  clung  to 
each  covering.  For  half  an  hour  they  obstructed 
the  enemy's  approach. 

The  men  restrained  their  nervous  fingers;  the 
hostile  guns  flamed  out  against  us  not  fifteen 
yards  in  front.  Our  men  from  the  front  were 
tumbling  over  the  breastwork,  and  for  a  breath- 
less moment  those  behind  the  breastwork  waited. 
Then  out  into  the  night  like  chain-lightning  leaped 
the  zigzag  line  of  fire.  Now  was  the  value  of 
breastworks  apparent,  for,  protected  by  these, 
few  of  our  men  were  hit,  and  feeling  a  sense  of 
security,  we  worked  with  corresponding  energy. 
Without  breastworks  our  line  would  have  been 
swept  away  in  an  instant  by  the  hailstorm  of 
bullets  and  the  flood  of  men.  The  enemy  worked 
still  farther  around  to  our  right,  entered  the 
breastwork  beyond  our  line,  and  crumpled  up 
and  drove  back,  a  short  distance,  our  extreme 
right  regiment.  They  advanced  a  little  way,  but 
were  checked  by  the  fire  of  a  couple  of  small 
regiments  borrowed  for  the  emergency  from  Gen- 
eral Wadsworth,  and  placed  in  echelon. 

General  Meade  hardly  mentioned  this  affair  at 
the  breastworks  in  his  original  report  of  the  bat- 
tle, and  those  who  were  there  think  justice  has 
never  been  done  in  the  caae,'^  and  that  what 
was  there  achieved  has  never  been  adequately 
apprehended  and  stated  by  any  writer. 

The  left  of  our  brigade  was  only  about  eighty 
rods  from  the  Baltimore  turnpike,  while  the  right 
was  somewhat  nearer.  There  were  no  supports. 
All  the  force  that  there  was  to  stay  the  onset  was 
that  one  thin  line.  Had  the  breastworks  not  been 
built,  and  had  there  been  only  the  thin  line  of  our 
unprotected  brigade,  that  line  must  have  been 
swept  away  like  leaves  before  the  wind,  l)y  the  on- 
coming of  so  heavy  a  mass  of  troops,  and  the  pike 
would  have  been  reached  by  the  enemy.  Once 
on  the  pike,  the  Confederate  commander  would 
have  been  full  in  the  rear  of  one-third  of  our  army, 
firmly  planted  on  the  middle  of  the  chord  of  the 
are  upon  which  that  portion  was  posted.  What 
the  effect  must  have  been  it  is  not  needful  to  de- 
scribe. The  least  disaster  would  have  sufficed  to 
force  us  from  the  field. 

During  the  night  our  commanders  brought  back 
the  remainder  of  the  corps,  and,  stumbling  upon 
the  enemy's  pickets,  found  out  what  had  taken 
place,  something  of  which  until  that  moment  they 
had  been  entirely  unaware. 

defense,  and  Ix'ing  soon  ree'n forced  by  portions  of  the 
First  and  Eleventli  corps,  contiguous  to  him.  succeeded 
in  repulsing  all  tlie  etTorts  of  the  eneujy  to  dislodge 
him." 

Also,  on  the  same  day.  in  reply  to  a  letter  from  Gen- 
eral Slocum  on  the  subject.  General  Meade  wrote  in 
part: 

"  I  am  willing  to  admit  that,  if  my  attention  had  been 
called  to  the  services  of  Greene's  Brigade  in  the  pointed 
manner  it  now  is,  I  would  have  given  it  credit  for  this 
special  service."  Editors. 


THE  BREASTH^OKKS  AT  GULP'S  HILL. 


3'7 


II.  BY  GEORGK  S.  GUEENE,  BREVET-MAJOR-GENERAL,  U. 


V. 


THE  breastworks  on  Gulp's  Hill  referred  to  in 
the  foregoing  article  were  constructed  under 
my  immediate  direction.  Orders  were  given  to 
throw  up  breastworks  as  soon  as  the  troops  came 
on  the  line.  The  approximate  shape  of  the  line  at 
first  held  by  the  entire  corps  and  afterward  by  my 
single  brigade  was  this  : 
Wadsworth. 


When  Meade  ordered  the  whole  of  the  Twelfth 
Corps  from  Gulp's  Hill  to  reenforce  his  left,  Slocum 
ordered  my  brigade  to  remain  and  "  occupy  the 
breastworks  thrown  up  by  the  corps."  The  rest 
of  the  corps  moved  off  just  before  dusk  (about 
7  P.  M.)  I  immediately  extended  my  men  to  the 
right  to  comply  with  the  order  as  far  as  possible. 
Ireland's  regiment  (the  137tli  N.  Y. ),  which  was 
on  my  right,  occupied  the  intrenchments  vacated 
by  Kane's  brigade,  his  left  at  h,  and  a  regiment 
from  Howard's  corps  was  placed  on  Ireland's  right. 
This  regiment,  without  being  specially  attacked, 
was  marched  to  the  rear  by  its  colonel,  when 
an  attack  upon  it  was  imminently  probable,  much 
to  the  disgust  of  his  men,  as  reported.  As  soon 
as  I  received  orders  to  occupy  the  intrenchments, 
I  applied  to  Wadsworth  and  received  two  regi- 
ments, which  were  placed  in  rear  of  my  right, 
behind  the  points  b  and  d,  but  sufficiently  in  the 
rear  to  support  any  part  of  the  line. 

The  movement  of  the  137th  Regiment  had 
hardly  been  made  when  the  regiment  on  picket 
was  driven  in  by  a  vigorous  attack  by  Johnson's 
division  of  Ewell's  corps,  which  was  continued  with 
great  perseverance.  The  enemy  finally  extended 
their  left  to  cover  Ireland's  right,  which  had  been 
left  in  the  air  by  the  desertion  of  the  Pennsyl- 
vania regiment  from  Howard's  corps.  Ireland 
was  forced  back  and  rallied  his  regiment  behind 
the  traverse,  J>  d,  which  had  been  built  to  protect 
my  right,  and  which  now  served  its  purpose.  As 
soon  as  Ireland's  movement  was  seen —  or,  rather, 
heard,  for  it  was  dark  —  I  brought  up  the  reserve, 
which  checked  any  further  advance  of  the  enemy  on 
the  right.  Very  soon  after  this  movement,  Kane, 
with  his  brigade,  arrived  and  took  post  on  the 
right  of  my  reserve,  and  the  enemy  ceased  their  at- 
tacks, after  about  three  hours' continuous  fighting. 

As  the  troops  marched  out,  (ieneral  Kane 
followcMl  the  First  Briga<le  of  the  Second  Division 
toward  the  left.  When  the  column  arrived  at 
the  Baltimore  pike  the  First  Division  followed  the 
staff-officer  sent  to  coiuluct  it  toward  the  left. 
The  Second  Division  niarchfd  down  the  pike  to 
the  rear.     Kane,  hearing  tlic  iiring  on  my  posi- 


tion, inquired  as  to  their  destination,  and,  not 
being  satisfied,  took  the  responsibility  of  return- 
ing to  the  fight,  and  immediately  countermarched; 
as  he  came  near  the  position  which  had  been 
occupied  by  the  First  Division,  the  enemy's  pickets 
fired  on  him,  and  this  being  heard  by  me,  I  sent 
an  officer  to  conduct  Kane  in  by  the  safer  route 
of  the  turnpike.  He  arrived  about  10  o'clock 
p.  M.,  just  after  the  enemy  had  been  repulsed 
on  my  right.  His  presence  tended  to  render 
the  enemy  cautious,  and  they  rested  on  their 
arms  till  morning.  The  First  Brigade  (Candy's) 
of  the  Second  Division  arrived  at  Gulp's  Hill 
about  1  A.  M.,  long  after  the  fighting  had  ceased. 
General  Williams,  who  commanded  the  Twelfth 
Corps,  and  General  Slocum,  who  commanded  the 
right  wing,  having  been  advised  of  the  enemy's 
position,  the  artillery  was  placed  in  position  be- 
fore daylight,  and  after  a  heavy  bombardment,  the 
infantry,  by  a  gallant  and  successful  cliarge,  drove 
the  enemy  from  the  position  they  had  occupied  in 
the  night  in  the  lines  of  the  First  Division. 

The  attack  on  my  front,  on  the  morning  of  the  3d 
of  July,  was  renewed  by  Johnson's  division  simul- 
taneously with  our  attack  on  the  enemy  in  our 
lines  on  our  right,  and  was  conducted  with  the 
utmost  vigor.  The  greater  part  of  their  heavy 
losses  were  sustained  within  a  few  yards  of  our 
breastworks.  His  adjutant.  Major  Watkins  Leigh 
persisted  in  riding  up  to  the  very  front  of  our 
lines,  pushing  his  men  to  an  assault  on  my  works, 
where  both  horse  and  rider  were  killed,  pierced 
simultaneously  with  several  bullets.  About  fifty 
of  the  men  got  too  near  to  our  lines  to  retreat,  and 
threw  down  their  arms,  ran  up  close  to  our  works, 
threw  up  their  handkerchiefs  or  white  rags,  and 
were  allowed  to  come  unarmed  into  our  lines. 
Shaler's  and  Candy's  brigades  were  sent  to  our 
support  and  took  part  in  the  defense  of  our  lines 
on  the  morning  of  July  3d.  By  10  a.  m.  the 
fighting  ceased,  and  at  1  p.  M.  the  enemy  had  dis- 
appeared from  our  front,  and  our  men  went  to 
Rock  Greek  for  water. 

Of  the  disastrous  consequences  to  the  Union 
army,  had  Lee  succeeded  in  penetrating  our  lines 
and  placing  himself  square  across  the  Baltimore 
pike  in  rear  of  the  center  and  right  wing  of  the 
entire  army,  tliere  can  be  no  question.  Fortu- 
nately it  was  averted  by  the  steady  and  deter- 
mined courage  of  the  five  New  York  regiments 
above  named.  The  assailants  were  Johnson's 
division  of  Ewell's  (Second)  Corps,  consisting  of 
twenty-two  regiments,  organized  into  four  bri- 
gades—  Steuart's.  Nicholls's,  Jones's,  and  Walker's 
—  the  last  being  the  famous  "Stonewall  Brigade," 
first  commanded  by  Stonewall  Jackson. 

To  the  discernment  of  GeTieral  Slocum,  who 
saw  the  danger  to  which  the  army  would  be 
ex]»osed  by  the  movement  ordered,  and  who 
took  the  responsibility  of  nnulifying  tlie  oniers 
which  he  hatl  received,  is  due  the  lionor  of  hav- 
ing saved  the  army  from  a  great  an<l  perhaps 
fatal  disaster. 


OSE    QUARTERS    ON    THE     FIRST     DAY    AT    GETTYSBURG. 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  "ROUND  TOP.' 


i;y  i:.  m.  law,  major-general,  c 


^/rORE  has  been  written  concerning  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  than  any 
-^J~  other  "  passage  of  arms  "  between  the  Federal  and  Confederate  troops 
during  the  civil  war.  The  engagement  of  the  1st  of  July,  brought  on  by 
accident,  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates  at  least,  in  which  two  corps  of  the 
Federal  army  under  General  Reynolds  were  defeated  and  driven  through 
Gettysburg  by  portions  of  Hill's  and  Ewell's  corps,  has  been  often  and  fully 
described  Ijy  the  officers  on  both  sides.  Ewell's  attack  on  the  Federal  right 
in  tlie  vicinity  of  Culp's  Hill  on  the  2d  of  July,  and  Longstreet's  advance 
u]jon  the  Federal  left  on  the  same  day,  so  far  as  relates  to  one  division  of  the 
latter's  command  (McLaws's),  have  been  detailed  with  equal  minuteness  by 
those  engaged.  The  magnificent  charge  of  Pickett's  division  on  the  Federal 
center  on  the  third  day  has  been  the  theme  of  a  host  of  writers  who  deemed 
it  an  honor  to  have  stood  in  the  lines  of  blue  by  which  that  charge  was 
repelled,  and  those  who,  on  the  other  hand,  thought  it  no  less  an  honor  to 
have  shared  the  fortunes  of  the  torn  and  shattered  columns  of  gray  which 
only  failed  to  accomplish  impossibilities. 

But  concerning  the  operations  of  Lee's  extreme  right  wing,  extending  to 
the  foot  of  Round  Top,  little  or  nothing  has  been  written  on  the  Confed- 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  "ROUND   TOP."  319 

erate  side.  This  part  of  the  line  was  held  by  Hood's  division  of  Longstreet's 
corps,  and  was  really  the  key  to  the  whole  position  of  Gettysburg.  Here  some 
of  the  most  stubborn  fighting  of  that  desperate  battle  was  done,  and  here  a 
determined  effort  of  the  Federal  cavalry  to  I'eaeh  the  right  rear  of  the  Con- 
federate army  on  the  3d  of  July  was  frustrated  —  an  attempt  which,  if  success- 
ful, must  have  resulted  disastrously  to  that  army. 

The  meagerness  of  the  details  of  the  operations  referred  to  may  be  accounted 
for  by  the  fact  that  General  Longstreet  personally  superintended  the  left  of 
his  line,  consisting  of  McLaws's  division  of  his  own  corps,  supported  by  R. 
H.  Anderson's  division  of  Hill's  corps,  and  hence  knew  comparatively  little 
from  personal  observation  of  the  movements  of  Hood's  division ;  and,  also, 
that  General  Hood  was  wounded  early  in  the  engagement  on  the  2d  of  July, 
and,  relinquishing  the  command  of  the  division,  could  not  report  its  subse- 
quent operations.  As  senior  brigadier,  I  succeeded  to  the  command  of  Hood's 
division,  and  directed  its  movements  during  the  engagements  of  the  2d  and 
3d  of  July.  But  owing  to  the  active  and  constant  movements  of  our  army 
for  some  weeks  after  the  battle,  I  was  only  able  to  obtain  the  reports  of  bri- 
gade commanders  a  very  short  time  previous  to  being  ordered  to  the  army 
of  General  Bragg  at  Chickamauga.  This  prevented  me  from  making  a  report 
at  the  time,  and  it  was  afterward  neglected. 

The  facts  stated  in  tliis  i^aper  are  therefore  many  of  them  published  for  the 
first  time.  It  remains  for  the  impartial  reader  to  decide  whether  they  do  not 
constitute  an  imjiortant  part  of  the  history  of  the  most  memorable  battle  of  the 
war ;  for  Gettysburg  was  the  turning-point  in  the  great  struggle.  Together 
with  the  fall  of  Vicksburg,  which  occurred  simultaneously  with  the  retreat  of 
Lee' s  army  toward  the  Potomac,  it  inspired  the  armies  and  people  of  the  North 
with  fresh  courage  and  stimulated  anew  the  hopes  of  ultimate  success  which 
were  visibly  flagging  under  an  almost  uninterrupted  series  of  reverses  to  the 
Federal  arms  in  Virginia,  extending  over  a  period  of  nearly  two  years.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  was  at  Gettysburg  that  the  right  arm  of  the  South  was 
broken,  and  it  must  always  stand  out  in  Confederate  annals  as  in  the  his- 
tory of  a  brave  and  kindi*ed  people  stands 

"  Flodden's  fatal  field, 
Where  shivered  was  fair  Scothiiid's  spear, 
And  broken  was  her  shield." 

When  the  fight  l)egan  at  Gettysburg  on  the  1st  of  July,  three  brigades  of 
Hood's  division  were  at  Greenwood  on  the  Chambersbnrg  voad  and  on  the 
west  side  of  South  Mountain.  My  own  brigade,  with  BachnuursT)attery,  was 
at  New  Guilford,  some  miles  south  of  Greenwood,  watching  oiw  riglit  tlank. 
At  3  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  iJd,  under  orders  IVoin  (uMicral  Long- 
street,  I  moved  as  rapidly  as  possible  toward  Gettysbui-g,  and  an-ivt'd  there 
shortly  before  noon,  having  marched  the  intci-vciiiiig  dislaiicc  of  t  wciil y-four 
miles  in  that  time.  On  my  arrival  I  found  tlie  otlier  brigades  of  Hood's  di- 
vision resting  about  a  mile  from  tlie  town,  on  the  Chambcrsburg  road.  In  a 
sliort  time  after  my  brigade  came  up,  tlic  division  was  moved  to  our  rigid 
(south),  traversing  the  angle  between  the  Chambersbnrg  and  Emmitsburg 


320 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  "ROUND   TOP." 


roads,  following  McLaws,  who  was  in  advance.  Pickett's  division  had  not 
yet  come  up.  We  moved  very  slowly,  with  frequent  halts  and  deflections 
from  the  direct  course  —  the  latter  being  necessary  to  conceal  our  move- 
ments from  the  Federal  signal  station  on  Little  Round  Top. 

At  length,  after  many  vexatious  delays,.  Hood's  division  was  pushed  for- 
ward until  it  uncovered  McLaws,  and  soon  reached  the  Emmitsburg  road  in 
front  of  Round  Tojj.     Here  our  line  of  battle  was  formed  at  an  acute  angle 

with  the  road,  the  right  being  in  ad- 
vance of  it,  between  the  road  and 
the  mountain,  and  the  left  extending 
across  and  in  rear  of  the  road.  The 
formation  was  in  two  lines,  Law's 
Alabama  and  Robertson's  Texas  bri- 
gades in  front,  supported,  at  a  distance 
of  about  200  yards,  by  the  Georgia 
brigades  of  Benning  and  Gr.  T.  Ander- 
son. McLaws's  division  extended  the 
line  to  our  left,  with  a  similar  forma- 
tion. The  Artillery  Battalion,  com- 
posed of  Reiliy's,  Latham's,  Garden's, 
and  Bachman's  batteries,  twenty  guns 
in  all,  were  disposed  at  advantageous 
points  upon  the  ridge  occupied  l)y  the 
line  of  infantry.  There  were  no  signs 
of  Federal  cavalry  or  troops  of  any 
kind  on  our  right.  As  a  precautionary 
measure,  however,  a  regiment  was  detached  from  Anderson's  brigade  and 
stationed  at  Kern's  house,  half  a  mile  down  the  road  toward  Emmitsbm*g. 

It  was  now  past  4  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  and  our  troops  were  in  position 
for  the  attack.  The  flank  movement  by  which  they  came  into  position  is 
rcfei-red  to  in  the  following  dispatch  from  the  Federal  signal  station  on  Little 
Round  Top :  "  To  General  Meade — 4  o'clock  p.  m.  The  only  infantry  of  the 
enemy  visi])le  is  on  the  extreme  [Federal]  left;  it  has  been  moving  toward 
Emmitsburg."  It  will  thus  be  seen  that  the  movement,  in  spite  of  our  pre- 
cautions, was  not  unobserved. 

The  Confederate  line  of  battle  occupied  a  ridge,  partly  wooded,  with  [i 
valley  intervening  between  it  and  the  heights  held  by  the  Federal  troops  in 
front.  The  position  occupied  by  the  Federal  left  wing  in  front  of  us  was  now 
fully  disclosed  to  view,  and  it  was  certainly  one  of  the  most  formidable  it  had 
ever  been  the  fortunes  of  any  troops  to  confront.  Round  Top  rose  like  a  huge 
scMitincl  guai-ding  the  Federal  left  flank,  while  the  si)urs  and  ridges  trending 
r)ff  to  the  north  of  it  afforded  unrivaled  positions  for  the  use  of  artillery. 
The  puffs  of  smoke  rising  at  intervals  along  the  line  of  hills,  as  the  Federal 
batteries  fired  upon  such  portions  of  our  line  as  became  exposed  to  view, 
clearly  showed  that  these  advantages  had  not  been  neglected.  The  thick 
woods  which  in  great  part  covered  the  sides  of  Round  Top  and  the  adjacent 


BREVET    MAJOR-GKNERAL    HENRY    J.    HUNT,    CHIEF   OF 

ARTILLERY    OF  THE    ARMY    OF  THE    POTOMAC. 

FROM    A   PHOTOGRAPH. 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  "ROU\D   TOP."  321 

hills  concealed  from  view  the  rugged  nature  of  the  gr(niiid,  which  increased 
fourfold  the  difficulties  of  the  attack. 

How  far  up  the  slope  of  Round  Top  the  Federal  left  extended  we  could  not 
tell,  as  the  woods  effectually  concealed  from  view  everything  in  that  quarter. 

In  order  to  gain  information  upon  this  important  point,  I  sent  out  a  detail  of 
six  picked  men  as  scouts,  with  instructions  to  move  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  the 
summit  of  Round  Top,  making  a  detour  to  their  right,  and  "feeling"  down 
from  that  point,  to  locate  the  left  of  the  Federal  line.  The  entire  absence  of 
Federal  cavalry  on  our  right,  as  well  as  other  indications  leading  to  the  same 
conclusion,  convinced  me  that  the  Federals,  relying  upon  the  protection  of 
the  mountain,  considered  their  flank  secure;  that  it  was  therefore  their  most 
vulnerable  point.  Impressed  with  this  view,  1  further  instructed  the  scouts 
when  they  reached  the  summit  to  observe  carefully  the  state  of  affairs  on  the 
other  sid(^,  and  to  send  a  "  runner  "  back  to  me  with  such  intelligence  as  they 
might  be  able  to  gain.  They  moved  off  at  a  trot.  A  few  moments  after  they 
had  started,  I  saw  in  the  valley,  some  distance  to  our  right,  several  dark  fig- 
ures moving  across  the  fields  from  the  rear  of  Round  Top  in  the  direction  of 
the  Emmitsburg  road.  These  on  being  captured  proved  to  be  Federal  sol- 
diers, who  seemed  sm*prised  at  our  sudden  appearance  in  that  quarter,  and 
who,  on  being  questioned,  stated  that  they  had  surgeons'  certificates  and  were 
"  going  to  the  rear."  They  indicated  "  the  rear"  by  pointing  toward  Emmits- 
burg, and  in  reply  to  the  question  where  they  came  from,  they  said  from  the 
"medical  train  behind  the  mountain" — referring  to  Round  Toj).  They  also 
stated  that  the  medical  and  ordnance  trains  "  around  the  mountain  "  were 
insecurely  guarded,  no  attack  being  expected  at  that  point ;  and  that  the 
other  side  of  the  mountain  could  be  easily  reached  by  a  good  farm  road,  along 
which  they  had  just  traveled,  the  distance  being  a  little  more  than  a  mile. 
On  my  way  to  convey  this  information  to  General  Hood,  I  met  a  messenger 
from  my  scouts,  who  had  reached  the  crest  of  Round  Top.  He  reported  that 
there  was  no  Federal  force  on  the  summit,  and  confirmed  in  every  particular 
the  statements  of  the  prisoners  I  had  just  captured.  If  there  had  previously 
been  any  question  in  regard  to  the  poli(?y  of  a  front  attack,  there  now  remained 
not  a  sliadow  of  doubt  that  our  true  j^o'uit  (Vappui  was  Round  Top,  from 
which  the  C  confederate  right  wing  could  be  extended  toward,  the  Taney  town 
and  Baltimore  roads,  on  the  Federal  k'ft  and  rear. 

I  found  (lenei-al  Hood  on  the  ridge  where  his  line  had  l)e('n  formed,  com- 
municated to  him  the  information  I  had  ol)taine(l,  and  i>ointe(l  out  the  ease 
with  which  a  movement  by  the  right  flank  miglit  be  niatlc.  He  coincided 
fully  in  my  views,  but  said  that  his  orders  were  positive  to  attack  in  front, 
as  soon  as  the  left  of  the  corps  should  get  into  position.  1  theret'ore  entered 
a  foi-mal  pi'otest  against  a  dii-ect  attack,  on  the  grounds:  1.  'IMiat  the  great 
natural  strength  of  the  enemy's  i)osition  in  oui-  fi-ont  rendered  the  i-esult  of  a 
direct  assault  extremely  uncertain.  2.  That,  even  if  successful,  the  victory 
would  be  purchased  at  too  great  a  saci-ifice  of  life,  and  our  trooi)s  would  be  in 
no  condition  to  improve  it.  3.  That  a  front  attack  was  unnecessary, —  the 
occupation  of  Round  Top  during  the  night  by  moving  ui)on  it  from  the  stmth, 


322  THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  "ROUND   TOP." 

and  the  extension  of  our  right  wing  from  that  point  across  the  enemy's  left 
and  rear,  being  not  only  practicable,  but  easy.  4.  That  such  a  movement 
would  compel  a  change  of  front  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  the  abandonment 
of  his  strong  position  on  the  heights,  and  force  him  to  attack  us  in  position. 

General  Hood  called  up  Captain  Hamilton,  of  his  staff,  and  requested  me 
to  repeat  the  protest  to  him,  and  the  grounds  on  which  it  was  made.  He 
then  directed  Captain  Hamilton  to  find  General  Longstreet  as  quickly  as  pos- 
sil)le  and  deliver  the  protest,  and  to  say  to  him  that  he  (Hood)  indorsed  it 
fully.  Hamilton  rode  off  at  once,  but  in  about  ten  minutes  returned,  accom- 
panied by  a  staff-officer  of  General  Longstreet,  who  said  to  General  Hood,  in 
my  hearing,  "  General  Longstreet  orders  that  you  begin  the  attack  at  once." 
Hood  turned  to  me  and  merely  said,  "You  hear  the  order!"  I  at  once 
moved  my  brigade  to  the  assault.  I  do  not  know  whether  the  protest  ever 
reached  General  Lee.  From  the  brief  interval  that  elapsed  between  the  time 
it  was  sent  to  General  Longstreet  and  the  receipt  of  the  order  to  begin  the 
attack,  I  am  inclined  to  think  it  did  not.  General  Longstreet  has  since  said 
that  he  repeatedly  advised  against  a  front  attack  and  suggested  a  movement 
by  our  right  flank.  He  may  have  thought,  after  the  rejection  of  this  advice 
by  General  Lee,  that  it  was  useless  to  press  the  matter  further. 

Just  here  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  was  lost  to  the  Confederate  arms.  It  is 
useless  to  speculate  upon  the  turn  affairs  might  have  taken  if  the  Confeder- 
ate cavalry  had  been  in  communication  with  the  rest  of  the  army,  and  if 
General  Stuart  had  kept  General  Lee  informed,  as  he  should  have  done,  of 
the  movements  of  the  Federal  army.  In  considering  the  causes  of  the  Con- 
federate failure  on  that  particular  field,  we  must  take  the  situation  just  as  we 
find  it.  And  the  situation  was  as  foUows :  The  advance  of  the  two  armies 
encountered  each  other  on  the  1st  of  July.  An  engagement  ensued  in  which 
the  Confederates  were  victorious.  The  Federal  troops  retired  through  Gettys- 
])urg  and  took  position  along  the  height  east  of  the  town — a  position  which, 
if  properly  defended,  was  practicably  impregnable  to  a  direct  attack. 

The  whole  matter  then  resolves  itself  into  this:  General  Lee  failed  at 
Gettysburg  on  the  2d  and  3d  of  July  because  he  made  his  attack  precisely 
where  his  enemy  wanted  him  to  make  it  and  was  most  fully  prepared  to 
receive  it.  Even  had  he  succeeded  in  driving  the  Federal  army  from  its 
strong  position  by  a  general  and  simultaneous  assault  along  the  whole  front 
(which  was  the  only  possible  chance  of  success  in  that  direction),  he  would 
have  found  his  army  in  very  much  the  same  condition  in  which  Pyrrhus 
found  his,  when,  after  driving  the  Romans  from  the  field  of  Asculum,  he 
exclaimed,  "Another  such  victory,  and  I  am  undone!" 

The  failure  of  General  Ewell  to  seize  Cemetery  Hill  and  adjacent  posi- 
tions, on  the  evening  of  July  1st,  has  been  frequently  assigned  as  one  of  the 
causes  of  our  loss  of  the  battle.  It  is  very  doubtful  whether  General  Ewell 
could  have  occupied  those  heights  had  he  made  the  attempt,  for  General 
Pleasonton  has  asserted  very  positively  that,  on  the  night  of  the  1st  of  July, 
"  we  [the  Federals]  had  more  troops  in  position  than  Lee."  And  General  Lee 
qualified  his  instructions  to  General  Ewell  to  seize  the  heights  by  the  words 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  "ROUND   TOP."  ^2? 

"if  practicable."     Under  the  circumstances,  the  fact  that  General  Ewell  did 
not  seize  them  is  very  strong  presumptive  evidence  that  it  was  not  practical )le. 

The  two  armies  being  face  to  face  on  the  2d  of  Jul}^,  and  setting  aside  all 
question  of  a  retreat  by  either,  General  Lee's  alternative  of  a  direct  attack  was 
a  movement  by  his  right  flank  to  the  Federal  left  and  rear.  The  first  prom- 
ised nothing  but  desperate  fighting,  heavy  loss,  and  probable  failure.  The 
second  certainly  promised  nothing  worse,  with  theproba])ilities  all  in  favor  of 
a  "fair  field  and  a  free  fight,"  and  that  was  all  his  army  asked.  Referring  to 
this  suggested  movement  upon  the  Federal  left  flank.  General  Pleasonton, 

who   commanded  ^ --^- 

the  Federal  cav-  v'^^       ^^.'^  -  ''         "" -^ 

airy  at  that  time,   j  ^^  A  | 

has         expressed   \  ^4  _  _ 

the  opinion  that  i  '^^^.<— -'  Al  "^^^^^^^^ 

it    was     imj)rac-  [-  "''-'"  -'  / 

ticable,   and    has  \      '  v  '         [  i' 

stated         furtlier    .^     ^'^''i^'^'^A  ,''t 

that  he  "  had  two  pi :-.,.,'  |  ^  [  -yim 

divisions  of  cav-  ttf^J'^'"'       \%  -.  :x>^f^»''^0'^'' 

airy,  one  in  rear  &W    ^(j/,^     ^  i  ;    --^MwW^^^ 

of     the     Federal  |t    '       ^^  ^^  -    -^^--  ---■'    r^   l.     ^i^-f^  ^^.  ^k/jC 

})()sition  and  one    , 

on     Lee's     right 

flank,"  to  prevent  *=^        ^  -    \\^^J,^ 

it.    If  the  cavalry  "^^^  "^   ^~-  ^^-  ,<^ 

had    been    there,  the  i^TuuGGLK  for  devil's  den  (looking  toward  the  confederate 

as  he  states,  they  ""'^^*-  ^«^*'  ^  war-time  sketch. 

would  not  have  amounted  to  even  a  single  "  ounce  of  prevention,"  as  far  as 

the  movements  of  our  infantry  were  concerned.     But  if  tliei-e  was  a  division, 

or  even  a  single  picket-post  of  cavalry,  either  Federal  or  Confederate,  on  our 

right  flank,  at  any  time  on  the  2d  of  July,  it  was  kept  most  persistentlj'  out 

of  sight,  as  my  scouts,  who  were  sent  out  in  all  directions,  failed  to  find  it. 

Our  order  of  attack  —  issued  as  soon  as  the  two  divisions  of  Longstreet's 
corps  came  into  position  on  the  line  already  described  —  was,  that  the  move- 
ment should  begin  on  the  right,  my  brigade  on  that  flank  leading,  the  other 
commands  taking  it  up  successively  toward  tlu^  left.  It  was  near  5  o'clock 
r.  M.  when  we  advanced  to  the  attack.  The  artilhn-y  on  both  sides  had  been 
warmly  engaged  for  about  fifteen  minutes,  and  continued  to  fire  hcaxil}-  until 
we  became  engaged  with  the  Federal  infantry,  when  th(>  Gonfedci-atr  batter- 
ies ceased  firing  to  avoid  injury  t<>  our  own  troops,  who  wci-c  then,  b»r  the 
most  part,  concealed  by  the  woods  about  the  base  of  l\ound  Top  ajul  the 
si)urs  to  the  north  of  it.  General  Hood  was  severely  wounded  in  tlic  arm  by 
a  shot  from  the  Federal  artillery  as  we  moved  into  action. 

Advancing  rapidly  across  the  vjillcy  which  separated  the  opposinu'  lines. — 
all  the  time  under  a  heavy  fire  from  the  batteries, —  our  iVont  line  struck  the 
enemy's  skirmishers  posted  along  the  farther  (>(lge  of  the  valley.     Brushing 


324  THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  "ROUND   TOP." 

these  quickly  away,  we  soon  came  upon  their  first  Hne  of  battle,  running 
along  the  lower  slopes  of  the  hills  known  as  Devil's  Den,  to  our  left  of  Round 
Top,  and  separated  from  the  latter  by  Plum  Run  valley.  The  fighting  soon 
became  close  and  severe.  Exposed  to  the  artillery  fire  from  the  heights  in 
front  and  on  our  left,  as  well  as  to  the  musketry  of  the  infantry,  it  required 
all  the  courage  and  steadiness  of  the  veterans  who  composed  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  —  whose  spirit  was  never  higher  than  then  —  to  face  the 
storm.  Not  one  moment  was  lost.  With  rapidly  thinning  ranks  the  gray  line 
swept  on,  until  the  blue  line  in  front  wavered,  broke,  and  seemed  to  dissolve 
in  the  woods  and  rocks  on  the  mountain-side.  The  advance  continued  steadily, 
the  center  of  the  division  moving  directly  upon  the  guns  on  the  hill  adjoining 
Devil's  Den  on  the  north,  from  which  we  had  been  suffering  so  severely.  In 
order  to  secure  my  i-ight  flank,  I  extended  it  well  up  on  the  side  of  Round 
Top,  and  my  brigade,  in  closing  to  the  right,  left  a  considerable  interval 
between  its  left  and  the  right  of  the  Texas  brigade  of  Robertson.  Into  this 
interval  I  threw  Benning's  Georgia  brigade,  which  had  up  to  that  time  occu- 
pied the  second  line.  At  the  same  time  seeing  a  heavy  Federal  force  on 
Robertson's  left,  and  no  Confederate  troops  having  come  up  to  extend  our 
line  in  that  direction,  Anderson's  Georgia  brigade,  till  then  also  in  the  second 
line,  was  thrown  out  on  that  flank. 

Thus  disposed,  the  division  continued  to  move  forward,  encountering,  as  it 
ascended  the  heights  around  the  battery  on  the  spur  and  to  the  right  and  left 
of  it,  a  most  determined  resistance  from  the  Federal  troops,  who  seemed  to 
be  continually  reenforced.  The  ground  was  rough  and  difficult,  broken  by 
rocks  and  l)owlders,  which  rendered  an  orderly  advance  impossible.  Some- 
times the  Federals  would  hold  one  side  of  the  huge  bowlders  on  the  slope 
until  the  Confederates  occupied  the  other.  In  some  cases  my  men,  with 
reckless  daring,  mounted  to  the  top  of  the  large  rocks  in  order  to  get  a 
better  view  and  to  deliver  their  fire  with  greater  effect.  One  of  these.  Ser- 
geant Barbee  of  the  Texas  brigade,  having  reached  a  rock  a  little  in  advance 
of  the  line,  stood  erect  on  the  top  of  it,  loading  and  firing  as  coolly  as  if 
unconscious  of  danger,  while  the  air  around  him  w^as  fairly  swarming  with 
bullets.  He  soon  fell  helpless  from  several  wounds ;  but  he  held  his  rock, 
lying  upon  the  top  of  it  until  the  litter-bearers  carried  him  off. 

In  less  than  an  hour  from  the  time  we  advanced  to  the  attack,  the  hill  by 
Devil's. Den  opposite  our  center  was  taken,  with  three  pieces  of  the  artillery 
that  had  occupied  it.  The  i-emaining  piece  was  run  down  the  opposite  slope 
by  the  gunners,  and  escaped  capture. 

In  the  meantime  my  brigade,  on  the  right,  had  swept  over  the  northern 
slope  of  Round  Top,  cleared  it  of  the  enemy,  and  then,  making  a  partial 
change  of  front  to  the  left,  advanced  upon  Little  Round  Top,  which  lay  in 
rear  of  the  spur  on  which  the  battery  had  been  taken.  This  change  of  direc- 
tion soon  exposed  it  to  a  flank  attack  on  the  right  by  fresh  troops  (Vincent's 
brigade),  rendering  it  necessary  to  retire  it  to  the  general  line. 

Wliile  our  center  and  right  wing  were  engaged  as  I  have  described,  Ander- 
son's l)rigade,  on  the  left,  was  subjected  to  great  annoyance  and  loss  by 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  "ROUND   TOP." 


325 


movements  of  the  enemy  upon  its  left  flank,  l)eing  frequently  compelled  to 
change  the  front  of  the  regiments  on  that  flank  to  rej)el  attacks  from  that 
lUrection. 

Up  to  this  time  I  had  seen  nothing  of  McLaws's  division,  which  was  to 
have  extended  our  left  and  to  have  moved  to  the  attack  at  the  same  time,  I 
therefore  halted  my  line,  which  had  become  broken  and  disorganized  by  the 
roughness  of  the  ground  over  which  it  had  been  fighting,  and  placing  it  in  as 
advantageous  a  position  as  possible  for  receiving  any  attack  that  the  Federals 


THE  "RLAITGIITER  TEX "    AT  THE   RASE    AND  ON  THE   1,1 


)!'   IITTI  E  KOUNn  TOP.      FROM    PHOTOGRArHS. 


might  be  disposed  to  make,  I  hurried  back  to  tlu^  ridge  from  which  we  had 
originally  advanced.  I  found  McLaws  still  in  position  there,  his  troops 
suffering  considera])ly  fi'om  a  severe  fire  of  artillery  from  the  opposite  hills.  I 
was  informed  by  General  Kershaw,  who  held  the  right  of  tliis  division,  tliat 
although  he  understood  tlie  general  instructions  that  the  forward  ni()vement 
was  to  be  taken  up  from  the  right,  he  had  not  yet  received  the  order  to  move, 
from  his  division  commander.  I  pointed  out  the  position  of  TI<M)d's  division, 
and  urged  the  necessity  of  immediate  support  on  its  left.  (iciicral  Kershaw 
requested  me  to  designate  the  point  on  which  his  riglil  llaiik  sliould  b<> 
directed,  and  promptly  moved  to  the  attack,  the  nKn-cMuent  being  lak.n  up 
by  the  whoh^  division. 

When  Hood's  division  (ii-st  attacked,  (Jeneral  :\lcade,  ahinned  for  th.^  safety 
of  his  left  wing,  and  donbtU>ss  fully  alive  to  the  iini)ortan<'e  of  holding  so 
vital  a  point  as  Bound  Top  and  its  adjacent  sjmrs,  commenced  sending  reen- 
t'orcements  to  the  threatened  points.      We  encountered  some  of  these  in  our 


^26  THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  "ROUND   TOP." 

first  advance,  and  others  were  arriving  as  McLaws  came  up  on  our  left.  In 
its  advance  this  division  extended  from  the  "Peach  Orchard"  near  the 
Emraitsburg  road,  on  its  left,  to  the  "  Wheat-field "  north  of  the  hill  on 
which  we  had  captured  the  Federal  battery,  where  its  right  wing  connected 
with  my  left.  As  McLaws  advanced,  we  again  moved  forward  on  his 
right,  and  the  fighting  continued  in  "see-saw"  style — first  one  side  and 
then  the  other  gaining  ground  or  losing  it,  with  small  advantage  to  either, 
until  dark. 

At  the  close  of  the  engagement  Hood's  division  held  the  hill  where  tlie 
battery  had  been  taken  and  the- ridge  to  its  left — our  right  extending  across 
Devil's  Den  and  well  up  on  the  north-western  slope  of  Round  Top.  During 
the  night  this  line  was  strengthened  by  the  construction  of  a  breastwork  of 
the  loose  stones  that  abounded  all  along  the  positions  occupied  by  the  troops, 
and  the  light  of  the  next  morning  disclosed  the  fact  that  the  Federal  troops 
in  front  of  us  had  improved  their  time  in  the  same  way.  In  fact,  all  through 
the  night  we  could  hear  them  at  work  as  the  rocks  were  dropped  in  place  on 
the  works,  and  no  donbt  they  heard  us  just  as  distinctly,  while  we  were 
engaged  in  the  same  life-preserving  operation. 

Though  the  losses  had  been  severe  on  both  sides,  comparatively  few  pris- 
oners had  been  taken.  But  early  in  the  night,  in  the  confusion  resulting 
from  the  fight  over  such  rugged  ground,  and  the  darkness  of  the  wooded 
mountain-side,  men  of  both  armies,  in  search  of  their  commands,  occasion- 
ally wandered  into  the  opposing  picket-lines  and  were  captured.  Many  of  the 
Federal  wounded  were  left  in  our  lines  on  the  ground  from  which  their  troops 
had  been  forced  back,  and  some  of  ours  remained  in  their  hands  in  the  most 
advanced  positions  which  we  had  reached  and  had  been  compelled  to  abandon. 
Among  these  latter  was  Colonel  Powell  of  the  5th  Texas  regiment,  who  was 
shot  through  the  body  and  afterward  died.  Powell  was  a  stout,  portly  man, 
witli  a  full  beard,  resembling,  in  many  respects,  General  Longstreet,  and  the 
fii'st  impression  of  his  captors  was  that  they  had  taken  that  officer.  Indeed, 
it  was  asserted  positively  by  some  of  the  prisoners  we  picked  up  during  the 
night  that  Longstreet  was  badly  wounded  and  a  prisoner  in  their  hands, 
and  they  obstinately  refused  to  credit  our  statements  to  the  contrary. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  3d  two  of  my  batteries,  Latham's  and  Garden's, 
were  sent  to  Colonel  (afterward  General)  E.  P.  Alexander,  who  commanded 
our  artillery  in  the  center,  to  assist  in  the  cannonade  of  the  Federal  position 
south  of  Cemetery  Hill,  preparatory  to  the  assault  of  General  Pickett's 
division  at  that  point;  and  about  9  o'clock  a.  m.  General  Longstreet  came 
o\'er  to  my  position  on  the  right,  and  instructed  me  to  be  ready  to  renew  the 
attack  on  our  front.  Under  the  circumstances  that  then  existed,  such  an 
attack  would  have  been  simply  madness.  I  have  already  described  the  dif- 
ficult iiature  of  the  ground  in  our  front.  These  difficulties  were  greatly 
increased  by  extemporized  breastworks  of  rock  all  along  the  Federal  line, 
which  afforded  good  protection  for  their  infantry,  and  were  fully  manned  by 
a  force  much  superior  to  our  own.  On  the  other  hand,  we  had  been  weak- 
ened in  the  desperate  attack  of  the  preceding  evening  by  losses  amounting  to 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  "ROUND   TOP."  327 

one-fourth  of  the  whole  force  carried  into  action.  More  than  two  thousand 
officers  and  men  of  our  division  had  been  killed  and  wounded,  among  them 
Generals  G.  T.  Anderson  and  J.  B.  Robertson,  and  about  one-half  of  the 
field-officers  of  the  various  regiments.  McLaws's  division,  on  our  left,  had 
suffered  nearly  as  severely.  General  Barksdale  of  that  division  being  killed 
and  General  Semmes  mortally  wounded. 

The  cannonade  in  the  center  soon  began,  and  presented  one  of  the  most 
magnificent  battle-scenes  witnessed  during  the  war.  Looking  up  the  valley 
toward  Gettysburg,  the  hills  on  either  side  were  capped  with  crowns  of  flame 
and  smoke,  as  300  guns,  about  equally  divided  between  the  two  ridges,  vomited 
their  iron  hail  upon  each  other.  Dense  clouds  of  smoke  settled  over  the  valley, 
through  which  the  shells  went  hissing  and  screaming  on  their  errand  ot 
death.  Numbers  of  these  from  opposite  directions  exploded  midway  over 
the  valley,  apparently  with  venomous  impatience,  as  they  met  each  other 
in  mid-air,  lighting  up  the  clouds  with  their  snake-like  flashes. 

While  this  grand  artillery  duel  was  progressing,  and  before  our  infantry 
had  moved  to  the  attack,  a  new  danger  threatened  us  on  the  right.  This  was 
the  appearance  of  Kilpatrick's  division  of  cavalry,  which  moved  up  on  that 
flank  and  commenced  massing  in  the  body  of  timber  which  extended  from 
the  base  of  Round  Top  westward  toward  Kern's  house,  on  the  Emmitsburg 
road.  Reilly's  and  Bachman's  batteries  were  ordered  to  change  front  to  the 
right  so  as  to  bear  upon  this  position,  and  at  once  opened  fire  upon  the  cav- 
alry, which  retired  beyond  the  wood  and  out  of  sight.  In  order  to  protect 
my  flank  more  fully,  I  withdrew  the  1st  Texas  regiment  of  Robertson's  bri- 
gade from  the  main  line,  and  placed  it  in  position  midway  between  Round 
Top  and  the  Emmitsburg  road,  with  skirmishers  extending  from  its  left  and 
connecting  at  right  angles  with  the  extreme  right  of  the  main  line  on  the 
slope  of  the  mountain.  I  also  detached  the  7tli  and  8th  Georgia  regiments  of 
Anderson's  brigade,  and  sent  them  to  the  support  of  the  9th,  wliich  had  l^een 
stationed  at  Kern's  house.  About  the  time  these  dispositions  were  com- 
pleted. Colonel  Black,  of  the  1st  South  Carolina  Cavalry,  reported  to  me  with 
about  100  men  who  had  been  gathered  up  from  the  medical  trains,  most  of 
tli(3m  partly  disabled  and  only  a  part  mounted,  and  with  three  guns  of  Hart's 
battery  of  horse  artillery.  Hart's  guns  w(M'e  stationed  on  tlie  Emmitsburg 
road,  and  the  cavalry  extended  the  right  flank  l)eyond  that  road.  This  new 
flanking  line  was  formed  at  right  angles  to  tlie  main  line,  and  crossed  the 
Emmitsburg  road  near  Kei'n's  house. 

One  brigade  of  the  Federal  cavalry  (Merritt's)  moved  across  tlie  road  and 
d(5ployed  a  strong  line  of  dismounted  skirmishers  in  front  of  Colonel  Black's 
command,  which  was  too  weak  to  offer  any  effectual  resistance.  Hai-t's  guns, 
however,  were  well  handled,  and  did  good  sei'vice  as  long  as  the  enemy 
i-emain(?d  in  reach  of  them.  To  meet  this  flanking  movement,  I  had  to  extend 
the  7th  and  8th  Georgia  n^giments  to  the  right,  and  heavy  skirmishing  con- 
tinued as  the  lines  developed,  with  occasional  efl'orts  of  the  Federals  to  break 
through,  until  about  half-past  three  o'clock  i\  m.,  wIumi  my  two  regiments 
were  stretched  out  to  a  bare  line  of  skirmishers. 


32i 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  "ROUND    TOP." 


It  is  not  an  easy  task  to  operate  against  cavalry  with  infantry  alone,  on  an 
extended  line,  and  in  an  open  country  where  the  former,  capable  of  moving 
much  more  rapidly,  can  choose  its  own  points  of  attack  and  can  elude  the 
blows  of  its  necessarily  more  tardy  adversary.  But  Merritt's  brigade  was 
now  dismounted  and  deployed  as  skirmishers,  and  I  lost  no  time  in  taking 

advantage  of  this  tem- 
. -;::^^.  '  "r  ,      porary  equality   as   to 
'  ::-  '.  the  means  of  locomo- 

tion. Detaching  the  two 
remaining  regiments 
of  Anderson's  brigade 
(11th  and  59th  Georgia) 
from  the  main  line,  I 
moved  them  rapidly  to 
our  extreme  right,  now 
about  a  mile  from 
Kern's  house,  attacked 
Merritt's  reserve,  and 
then,  changing  front  to 
the  left,  struck  his  skir- 
mish-line "  on  its  end  " 
and  "  doubled  it  up " 
as  far  as  the  Emmits- 
burg  road.  This  re- 
duced my  front  to  manageable  dimensions  and  left  some  force  at  my  disposal 
to  meet  any  concentrated  attack  that  the  cavalry  might  make. 

I  had  just  returned  to  the  position  occupied  by  our  artillery,  which  was  in 
the  angle  formed  by  the  main  and  flanking  lines,  when  Farnsworth's  cavalry 
brigade  charged  the  line  held  by  the  1st  Texas  regiment.  It  was  impossible 
to  use  our  artillery  to  any  advantage  owing  to  the  "  close  quarters "  of  the 
attacking  cavalry  with  our  own  men  —  the  leading  squadrons  forcing  their 
horses  up  to  the  very  muzzles  of  the  rifles  of  our  infantry.  That  portion  of 
the  cavalry  which  covered  the  front  of  the  1st  Texas  regiment  was  hand- 
somely repulsed ;  but  the  1st  Vermont  regiment,  forming  the  Federal  right 
wing,  overlapped  the  1st  Texas  on  its  left,  and,  striking  the  skirmish-line  only, 
rode  tlu'ough  it  into  the  open  valley  in  rear  of  our  main  line  on  the  spurs  of 
Koiind  Top.  When  I  flrst  became  satisfied,  through  information  from  the 
Texas  skirmishers,  tliat  Farnsworth's  brigade  was  massing  in  their  front,  the 
9tli  (Icoi-gia  regiment  was  ordered  from  Kern's  house  to  the  support  of  the 
batteries,  the  former  position  being  now  safe,  as  tlie  other  four  regiments  of 
Anderson's  brigade  were  concentrated  near  that  point.  Hearing  the  firing 
and  knowing  its  cause,  the  9th  Georgia  came  up  at  a  run,  just  as  the  1st  Ver- 
mont Cavalry  rode  tlirough  our  skirmish-line,  led  by  General  Farnsworth  in 
person.  Instead  of  moving  directly  upon  our  l)atteries,  the  cavalry  directed 
its  course  up  the  valley  toward  Gettysl)urg,  passing  l)etween  the  position  of 
our  artillery  and  our  main  line.     AVatching  tlie  direction  they  had  taken,  I 


DEAD    CONFEDERATE    SHARP-SHOOTER    IN    THE    DEVIL'S    DEN. 
FROM   A    I'HOTOGRAl'H. 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  "ROUND   TOP. 


329 


sent  Lieutenant  Wade,  of  my  staff,  rapidly  across  the  valley  in  advance  of 
them,  with  orders  to  detach  the  first  regiment  he  should  come  to  on  the  main 
line  and  send  it  down  on  a  run  to  "  head  them  off"  in  that  direction.  He  was 
also  ordered  to  follow  the  line  to  the  extreme  riglit  and  direct  Colonel  Gates 
(15th  Alabama)  to  strengthen  his  flanking  skirniish-line  and  to  close  up  the 
gap  on  the  left  of  the  1st  Texas  where  the  cavalry  had  broken  in. 

Farnsworth  and  his  cavalry  in  the  meantime  were  riding  in  gallant  style, 
with  drawn  sabers  and  unopposed,  up  the  valley.  As  they  a])proached  Sly- 
der's  house,  and  as  I  stood  intently  watch- 
ing them,  I  saw  a  ragged  Confederate 
battle-flag  fluttering  among  the  trees  at 
the  foot  of  the  opposite  ridge,  and  the  men 
with  it  soon  after  appeared,  running  out 
into  the  open  ground  on  the  farther  side 
of  the  valley.  It  was  the  4th  Alabama 
regiment,  Law's  brigade,  which  had  been 
taken  from  the  main  line  and  sent  down 
by  Lieutenant  Wade.  The  men  opened 
fire  as  they  ran.  The  course  of  the  cav- 
alry was  abruptly  checked  and  saddles 
were  rapidly  emptied.  Recoiling  from  this 
fire,  they  turned  to  their  left  and  rear,  aud 
directed  their  course  up  the  hill  toward 
the  position  occupied  by  our  batteries. 
Bachman's  battery  promptly  changed 
front  to  its  left,  so  as  to  face  the  ap- 
proaching cavalry,  and,  together  with  its  infantry  sujiports,  opened  a  wither- 
ing fire  at  close  range.  Tui'ning  again  to  their  left,  Farnsworth  and  the  few 
of  his  men  who  remained  in  their  saddles  directed  their  course  toward  the 
2)()int  where  they  had  originally  broken  in,  having  described  by  this  time 
almost  a  complete  circle.  But  the  gap  where  they  had  entered  was  now 
closed,  and  receiving  another  fire  from  that  point,  they  again  turned  to  the 
left  and  took  refuge  in  the  woods  near  the  base  of  Round  Top.  When  the 
last  turn  to  the  left  was  made,  about  half  a  dozen  of  their  number  separated 
from  the  main  body  and  escaped  by  "running  the  gauntlet"  to  the  right  of 
the  1st  Texas  regiment.  Farnsworth,  with  his  little  handful  of  gallant 
followers,  rode  upon  the  skii-misli-line  of  the  15th  Alal)ama  regimtMit,  and, 
pistol  in  hand,  called  upon  Lieutenant  Adi'iaii,  win.  coinniandcd  tlic  line,  to 
surrender.  The  skirmisliei'S  in  return  fired  ui)()n  him,  killing  his  horse  and 
wounding  Farnsworth  in  several  places.     [See  p.  303.] 

General  Longstreet,  aware  of  the  danger  that  tlii-eat(Mu> 
attack  of  Kilpatrick's  division,  came  over  lo  my  i»<>siti(>ii  I 
and  expressed  his  satisfaction  at  tlie  ri^sult  and  the  jn 
conduct  of  the  troops  engaged.     AV 
the   evening  before,  and  witli    1in«> 
General  Kilpatrick  on  our  right  Hank.     It  seemed  to  us  on  the  Confederate 

VOL.  III.    23 


BRIGADIER-GKNKRAL  WILLIAM    N.    PENDLETON, 

C.   S.   A.,    LEE'S    CHIEF    OF   ARTILLERY. 

FROM    A    THOTOGRAPH. 


<»nr  riglit  tVoni  the 
lie  ill  the  afternoon 
•mi»tness  and  good 
had  all  day  held  our  fi-ont  line,  gained 
^  drawn  from  tliat    line   had   n^pulsed 


330 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR.  "ROUND   TOP." 


5 


right  that  there  was  at  least  one  little  spot  of  "silver  liuing"inthe  cloud 
that  hung  so  darkly  over  the  field  of  Gettysburg  after  the  disastrous  charge 
of  Pickett. 

Late  in  the  afternoon  of  July  3d  I  was  ordered  to  withdraw  the  division 
from  the  lines  it  had  held  since  the  evening  of  the  2d  to  the  ridge  near 
the  Emmitsburg  road,  from  which  it  had  advanced  to  the  attack  on  that 
day.     McLaws's  division,  which  had  held  the  line  to  our  left  during  the 

day,  retired  first,  and  I  ordered  my 
brigade  commanders  to  take  up  the 
movement  from  left  to  right.  The 
courier  who  delivered  the  order  to  Gen- 
eral Benning  holding  the  left  of  the 
division,  in  designating  the  position 
to  which  he  was  to  retire,  pointed  to 
the  line  McLaws  had  just  abandoned. 
Benning,  supposing  that  McLaws  had 
been  moved  for  the  purpose  of  reen- 
forcing  our  line  on  some  other  part  of 
the  field,  dispatched  Colonel  DuBose 
with  the  15th  Georgia  regiment  in 
that  direction.  McCandless's  Federal 
brigade  had,  in  the  meantime,  ad- 
vanced to  the  ground  previously  held 
by  McLaws,  and  attacked  the  15th 
Georgia  when  it  attempted  to  take  up 
that  position.  Colonel  DuBose  made  a 
gallant  but  fruitless  attempt  to  hold 
his  ground,  expecting  support  from  the  other  regiments  of  his  brigade. 
Being  attacked  in  front  and  on  both  flanks  by  McCandless's  brigade,  reen- 
forced  by  Nevin's,  he  was  driven  back  with  considerable  loss.  He  retired 
from  one  position  to  another,  fighting  as  he  retreated,  and  finally  succeeded 
in  extricating  his  regiment  and  rejoining  his  brigade.  The  loss  of  the  15th 
Georgia  in  this  affair  was  very  heavy,  including  101  prisoners,  besides  the 
killed  and  wounded.  In  the  meantime  General  Benning,  having  received 
a  second  order  to  retire,  withdrew  the  remainder  of  his  brigade  without  loss. 
The  other  brigades  were  quietly  withdrawn,  the  Federals  making  no  advance. 
We  remained  in  our  new  position  across  the  Emmitsburg  road  until  near 
daylight  on  the  5th,  when  we  took  up  our  march  with  the  rest  of  the  army 
toward  Fairfield  Gap  and  the  Potomac. 


MAJOR-GENEHAL    J.    B.    KERSHAW,    C.   S.   A. 
FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 


^-'^^^^ 


DEVIL'S    DEN,     FACING    LITTLE    ROUND    TOP. 


KERSHAW'S    BRIGADF.    AT  GHTTYSBURG. 

BY    J.    B.    KERSHAW,   MAJOR-GENERAL,   C.   B.   A. 

llyFY  biigade,  composed  of  South  Carolinians,  J  constituted,  with  Semmes's, 
XtX  Wofford's,  and  Barksdale's  brigades,  the  division  of  Major-General 
Lafayette  McLaws,  and  that,  with  the  divisions  of  Pickett  and  Hood,  formed 
the  First  Corps  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  known  as  Lougstreet's. 

About  sunset  on  the  1st  of  July  we  reached  the  top  of  the  range  of  hills 
overlooking  Gettysburg,  from  which  could  be  seen  and  heard  the  smoke  and 
din  of  battle,  then  raging  in  the  distance.  We  encamped  about  midnight  two 
miles  from  Gettysburg,  on  the  left  of  the  Chaml)ersburg  pike.  On  the  2d  we 
were  up  and  ready  to  move  at  4  a.  m.,  in  obedience  to  orders,  but,  owing,  as 
we  understood  at  the  time,  to  the  occupancy  of  the  road  by  trains  of  the 
Second  Corps,  Ewell's,  did  not  march  until  about  sunrise.  With  only  a  slight 
detention  from  trains  in  the  way,  we  reached  the  high  grounds  near  Gettys- 
burg, and  moved  to  the  right  of  the  Third  Corps,  Kiu'shaw's  brigade  being 
at  the  head  of  the  column,  which  was  halted  at  the  end  of  the  lane  leading  to 
the  Black  Horse  Tavern,  situated  some  five  hundred  yards  to  our  right.  We 
lay  there  awaiting  orders  until  noon,  or  an  hour  after.  This  position  com- 
manded a  view  of  the  Emmitsburg  road  about  Kern's  house,  and  during  the 
morning  a  large  body  of  troops,  with  flankers  out  in  our  direction,  passed 
over  that  point  and  joined  the  Federal  army.  At  length.  General  McLaws 
ordered  me  to  move  by  a  flank  to  the  rear,  get  under  the  cover  of  the  hill, 
and  move  along  the  bank  of  Marsh  Creek  toward  the  en(Mny,  taking  care  to 
keex-)  out  of  their  view.  In  executing  this  order,  we  i»assed  tlu>  Bhick  Horse 
Tavern  and  followed  the  road  leading  from  tliat  })oint  toward  the  Emmits- 
burg pike,  until  tlie  head  of  column  reached  a.  ]»oint  whei-e  llic  i-oad  ]>assed 
over  the  top  of  a  hill,  from  which  our  nioveiiicut  would  have  lieeii  plainly 
visible  from  tlie  Feih'ral  signal  station  <»ii  l.itlle  iv*..uii(l  Top.  Here  we  were 
halted  by  General  McLaws  in  person,  while  he  and  <ieiiei-al  L..iigstreet  rode 
forward  to  reconnoiter.  Very  soon  those  gentlemen  returned,  both  mani- 
festing considerable  irritation,  as  T  thought.     General  McLaws  ordered  me 

J  The  2d,  3d,  7tli,  Stli  and  ir.th  Soutli  Ciiruliiia  rr^Miiu'iits,  aii.l  tlio  M  South  (.'arolina 
Battalion.— Editors. 


332  KEKSHAIV'S  BILGADE  AT  GETTYSBURG. 

to  countermarch,  and  in  doing  so  we  passed  Hood's  division,  which  had  been 
following  us.  We  moved  back  to  the  place  where  we  had  rested  during  the 
morning,  and  thence  by  a  country  road  to  Willoughby  Run,  then  dry,  and 
down  that  to  the  school-house  beyond  Pitzer's.  There  we  turned  to  the  left 
through  the  lane,  moving  directly  toward  Little  Round  Top.  General  Long- 
street  here  commanded  me  to  advance  with  my  brigade  and  attack  the 
enemy  at  the  Peach  Orchard,  which  lay  a  little  to  the  left  of  my  line  of 
march,  some  six  hundred  yards  from  us.  I  was  directed  to  turn  the  flank  of 
that  position,  extend  my  line  along  the  road  we  were  then  in  beyond  the 
Emiiiitsburg  ])iko,  with  my  loft  resting  on  that  road.     At  the  same  time  a 

battery  of  artillery  was  moved  along- 
side of  the  column,  parallel  to  my  line 
of  march.  At  3  p.  m.  the  head  of  my 
column  emerged  from  the  woods,  and 
came  into  the  open  field  in  front  of 
the  stone  wall  which  extends  along  by 
Flaherty's  farm,  and  to  the  east  past 
Snyder's.  Here  we  were  in  full  view  of 
the  Federal  position.  Their  main  line 
appeared  to  extend  from  Little  Round 
Top,  where  their  signal  flags  were  fly- 
ing, until  it  was  lost  to  sight  far  away 
to  the  left.  An  advanced  line  occupied 
the  Peach  Orchard,  heavily  supported 
by  artillery,  and  extended  from  that 
point  toward  our  left  along  the  Emmits- 
burg  road.  The  intervening  ground  was 
occupied  by  open  fields,  intersijersed 
and  divided  by  stone  walls.  The  position  just  here  seemed  almost  impreg- 
nable. I  immediately  formed  line  of  battle  along  the  stone  wall  just  men- 
tioned, my  left  resting  about  Flaherty's  house,  and  my  right  near  Snyder's. 
This  was  done  under  cover  of  my  skirmishers,  who  engaged  those  of  the 
enemy  near  the  Emmitsburg  road.  In  the  meantime  I  examined  the 
position  of  the  Federals  with  some  care.  I  found  them  in  superior  force, 
strongly  posted  in  the  Peach  Orchard,  which  bristled  with  artillery,  with  a 
main  line  of  battle  in  their  rear,  apparently  intrenched,  and  extending  to, 
if  not  upon,  Little  Round  Top,  far  beyond  the  point  at  which  their  left  had 
been  supposed  to  rest.  To  carry  out  my  instructions  would  have  been,  if 
successful  in  driving  the  enemy  from  the  Peach  Orcliard,  to  present  my  own 
right  Hank  and  I'ear  to  a  large  portion  of  the  enemy's  main  line  of  battle.  I 
therefore  placed  my  command  in  position  under  \\\q  cover  of  the  stone  wall, 
antl  communicated  the  condition  of  matters  to  Major-General  McLaws.  The 
division  was  then  formed  on  this  line,  Semmes's  brigade  two  hundred  yards 
in  rear  and  supporting  Kershaw's;  Barksdale's  on  the  left  of  Kershaw's,  with 
Wofford's  in  Barksdale's  rear  supporting  him.  Cabell's  battalion  of  artillery 
was  placed  along  the  wall  to  Kershaw's  right,  and  the  15tli  South  Carolina 


MA.TOU-dKNKKAI.    1,.     M.     I,.V\V,   < 
1  UOM    A    rilOTUGIiAFH. 


KERSHAIV'S  BRIGADE  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


333 


regiment,  Colonel  de 
Saussure,  was  tlirown  to 
their  right  to  support 
them  on  that  flank. 

In  the  meantime  Gren- 
eral  Hood's  division  was 
moving  in  our  rear  to 
the  right,  to  gain  the 
enemy's  left  flank,  and 
I  was  directed  to  com- 
mence the  attack  as 
soon  as  General  Hood 
became  engaged,  swing- 
ing around  toward  the 
Peach  Orchard,  and  at 
the  same  time  estab- 
lishing connection  with 
Hood  on  my  right,  and 
cooperating  with  him. 
It  was  understood  that 
he  was  to  sweep  down 
the  Federal  lines  in  a 
direction  perpendicular 
to  our  line  of  battle. 
I  was  informed  that 
Barksdale  would  move 
with  me  and  conform  to  my  movement;  that  Semmes  would  follow  me, 
and  Woft'ord  follow  Barksdale,  These  instructions  I  received  in  sundry  mes- 
sages from  General  Longstreet  and  General  McLaws,  and  in  part  by  personal 
communication  with  them.  In  my  center-front  was  a  stone  farm-house 
[supposed  to  be  Rose's],  with  a  barn  also  of  stone.  These  buildings  were 
about  five  hundred  yards  from  our  position,  and  on  a  line  with  the  crest  of 
the  Peach  Orchard  hill. 

The  Federal  infantry  was  posted  along  the  front  of  the  orchard,  and  also 
on  the  face  looking  toward  Rose's.  Six  of  their  batteries  were  in  position, 
three  at  the  on^hard  near  the  crest  of  the  hill,  and  the  others  about  two  hun- 
dred yards  in  rear,  extending  in  the  direction  of  Little  Round  T(^p.  Behind 
Rose's  was  a  morass,  and,  on  the  right  of  that,  a  stone  wall  running  parallel 
with  our  line,  some  two  hundred  yards  from  Rose's.  Beyond  the  morass  was 
a  stony  hill,  covered  with  heavy  timber  and  thick  undergrowth,  interspersed 
with  bowlders  and  large  fragments  of  rock,  extending  some  distance  toward 
the  Federal  main  line,  and  in  the  dirivtion  of  Round  To}),  an<l  to  our  left 
and  in  rear  of  the  orchard  and  the  battiM'ies  posted  tliere.  Beyond  the  stone 
wall  last  mentioned,  and  to  the  right  of  the  stony  hill,  was  a  dense  forest 
extending  far  to  the  right.  From  the  morass  a  small  stream  ran  into  this 
wood  and  along  the  base  of  the  mountain.      Bt'twciMi  tlic  stony  hill  and 


MAJOR-GENEKAL    LAFAYETTE    SULAWS,    C.   S.    A.       FROM   A  PHOTOGRAPH. 


334 


KERSHAW S  BRIGADE  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


ROUND    TOPS. 


PEACH    ORCHARD. 


SICKLES'S    POSITION    AT    THE    I'EACH    ORCHARD,    VIEWED    FROM    THE    EMMITSBURG    ROAD,   LOOKING    SOUTH. 

This  and  tlie  other  ontlino  sketches  were  made  in  1885  by  C.  W.  Reed,  of  Bigelow's  9th  Mass.  Battery. 

the  forest  was  an  interval  of  about  one  hundred  yards,  only  sparsely 
covered  with  a  scrubby  undergrowth,  through  which  a  narrow  road  led 
in  the  direction  of  the  mountain.  Looking  down  this  road  from  Rose's 
a  large  wheat-field  was  seen.  In  rear  of  the  wheat-field,  and  between 
that  and  the  mountain,  there  was  a  heavy  force  of  Federals,  posted  in  line 
behind  a  stone  wall.  Under  my  instructions  I  determined  to  move  upon 
the  stony  hill,  so  as  to  strike  it  with  my  center,  and  thus  attack  the  orchard 
on  its  left  rear.  About  4  o'clock  I  received  the  order  to  move,  at  a  signal 
from  Cabell's  artillery.  They  were  to  fire  for  some  minutes,  then  pause, 
and  then  fire  three  guns  in  rapid  succession.  At  this  I  was  to  move 
without  further  orders.  I  communicated  these  ■  instructions  to  the  com- 
manders of  each  of  the  regiments  in  my  command,  directing  them  to  con- 
vey them  to  the  company  officers.  They  were  told,  at  the  signal,  to  order 
the  men  to  leap  the  wall  without  further  orders,  and  to  align  the  troops  in 
front  of  it.  Accordingly,  at  the  signal,  the  men  leaped  over  the  wall  and 
were  promptly  aligned ;  the  word  was  given,  and  the  brigade  moved  otf  at  the 
word,  with  great  steadiness  and  precision,  followed  by  Semmes  with  equal 
promptness.  General  Longstreet  accompanied  me  in  this  advance  on  foot, 
as  far  as  the  Emmitsburg  road.  All  the  field  and  staff  officers  were  dis- 
mounted on  account  of  the  many  obstacles  in  the  way.  When  we  were 
about  the  Emmitsburg  road,  I  heard  Barksdale's  drums  beat  the  assembly, 
and  knew  then  that  I  should  have  no  immediate  support  on  my  left,  about 
to  be  squarely  presented  to  the  heavy  force  of  infantry  and  artillery  at  and 


ROSE'S    HOUSE. 


THE   "  WHEAT-FIELD,"   LOOKING    TOWARD    KERSHAW'S    POSITION    IN    FRONT    OP    ROSE'S    HOUSE. 


KERSHAIV'S   BKIGADH  AT  GETTYSBUKG.  j,y^ 


PEACH    ORCHARD, 


IE    KMMITSHIRG    RoAD. 


in  rear  of  the  Peach  Orchard.  The  2d  and  8th  South  Carolina  regiments 
and  James's  (Third)  battalion  constituted  the  left  wing  of  the  brigade,  and 
were  then  moving  majestically  across  the  fields  to  the  left  of  the  lane  leading 
to  Eose's,  with  the  steadiness  of  troops  on  parade.  They  were  ordered  to 
change  direction  to  the  left,  and  attack  the  batteries  in  rear  of  the  Peach 
Orchard,  and  accordingly  moved  rapidly  on  that  point.  In  order  to  aid  this 
attack,  the  direction  of  the  3(1  and  7th  regiments  was  changed  to  the  left,  so 
as  to  occupy  the  stony  hill  and  wood.  After  passing  the  buildings  at  Rose's, 
the  charge  of  the  left  wing  was  no  longer  visible  from  my  position ;  but  the 
movement  was  reported  to  have  been  magnificently  conducted  until  the  can- 
noneers had  left  their  guns  and  the  caissons  were  mo^dng  off,  when  the  order 
was  given  to  "  move  hy  the  rif/Jd  flank,''^  by  some  unauthorized  person,  and 
was  immediately  obeyed  by  the  men.  The  Federals  returned  to  their  guns 
and  opened  on  these  doomed  regiments  a  raking  fire  of  grape  and  canister,  at 
short  distance,  which  proved  most  disastrous,  and  for  a  time  destroyed  their 
usefulness.  Hundreds  of  the  bravest  and  best  men  of  Carolina  fell,  victims 
of  this  fatal  blunder.  While  this  tragedy  was  being  enacted,  the  3d  and 
7th  regiments  were  conducted  rapidly  to  the  stony  hill.  In  consequence  of 
the  obstructions  in  the  way,  the  7th  Regiment  had  lapped  the  3d  a  few  paces, 
and  when  they  reached  the  cover  of  the  stony  hill  I  halted  the  line  at  the 
edge  of  the  wood  for  a  moment,  and  ordered  the  7tli  to  move  l»y  the  right 
flank  to  uncover  the  3d  Regiment,  which  was  i^romi)tly  done.     It  was,  no 


EACH    ORCHARD. 


—^-  "-  »"S"  ~* 


SIOKLliS'S    ANGLE    AT    TIIK    1KA<  II    OIUIIAIII),    A8    8KEN    KHOM    TIIK    UOAK    I.I  AKINii     ll{i>M    Till: 
WIlEAT-l-li;!.!)    TO    TIIK    rKACII    (HiCII AI!I>. 


336  KERSHAW'S  BRIGADE  AT  GETTYSBURG. 

doubt,  this  movement,  observed  by  some  one  from  the  left,  that  led  to  the 
teiTi})le  mistake  which  cost  so  dearly. 

The  moment  the  line  was  rectified  the  7th  and  3d  regiments  advanced  into 
the  wood  and  occupied  the  stony  hill,  the  left  of  the  3d  Regiment  swinging 
around  and  attacking  the  batteries  to  the  left  of  that  position,  which,  for  the 
reasons  already  stated,  had  resumed  their  fire.  Very  soon  a  heavy  column 
moved  in  two  lines  of  battle  across  the  wheat-field  to  attack  my  position  in 
such  manner  as  to  take  the  7th  Regiment  in  flank  on  the  right.  The  right 
wing  of  this  regiment  was  then  thrown  back  to  meet  this  attack,  under  the 
command  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Bland.  I  then  hurried  in  person  to  Greneral 
Semmes,  then  150  yards  in  my  right  rear,  to  bring  him  up  to  meet  the 
attack  on  my  right,  and  also  to  bring  forward  my  right  regiment,  the  15th, 
commanded  by  Colonel  W.  D.  de  Saussure,  which,  separated  from  the  bri- 
gade by  the  artillery  at  the  time  of  the  advance,  was  cut  ofi!  by  Semmes's 
brigade.  In  the  act  of  leading  his  regiment,  this  gallant  and  accomplished 
commander  of  the  15th  had  just  fallen  when  I  reached  it.  He  fell  some  paces 
in  front  of  the  line,  with  sword  drawn,  leading  the  advance. 

General  Semmes  promptly  responded  to  my  call,  and  put  his  brigade  in 
motion  toward  the  right,  preparatory  to  moving  to  the  front.  While  his 
troops  were  moving  he  fell,  mortally  wounded.  Returning  to  the  7th  Regi- 
ment, I  reached  it  just  as  the  advancing  column  of  Federals  had  arrived  at  a 
point  some  two  hundred  yards  off,  whence  they  poured  into  us  a  volley  from 
their  whole  line,  and  advanced  to  the  charge.  They  were  handsomely  received 
and  entertained  by  this  veteran  regiment,  which  long  kept  them  at  bay  in 
its  front.  One  regiment  of  Semmes's  brigade  came  at  a  double-quick  as  far 
as  the  ravine  in  our  rear,  and  checked  the  advance  of  the  Federals  in  their 
front.  There  was  still  an  interval  of  a  hundred  yards,  or  thereabout,  between 
this  regiment  and  the  right  of  the  7th,  and  into  this  the  enemy  was  forcing 
his  way,  causing  my  right  to  swing  back  more  and  more  ;  still  fighting,  at  a 
distance  not  exceeding  thirty  paces,  until  the  two  wings  of  the  regiment 
were  nearly  doubled  on  each  other.  ^ 

About  this  time,  the  fire  of  the  battery  on  my  left  having  ceased,  I  sent  for 
the  2d  South  (^arolina  regiment  to  come  to  the  right.  Before  I  could  hear 
anything  of  them  the  enemy  had  swung  around  and  lapped  my  whole  line  at 
close  quarters,  and  the  fighting  was  general  and  desperate  all  along  the  line, 
and  so  continued  for  some  time.  These  men  were  brave  veterans  who  had 
fought  from  Bull  Run  to  Gettysburg,  and  knew  the  strength  of  their  position, 
and  so  held  it  as  long  as  it  was  tenable.  The  7th  Regiment  finally  gave  way, 
and  I  directed  Colonel  Aiken  to  re-form  it  at  the  stone  wall  about  Rose's.  I 
passed  to  th(;  3d  Regiment,  then  hotly  engaged  on  the  crest  of  the  hill,  and 
gradually  swung  back  its  right  as  tlie  enemy  made  progress  around  that 
flank.  Semmes's  advanced  regiment  had  given  way.  One  of  his  regiments 
hud  mingled  with  the  3d,  and  amid  rocks  and  trees,  within  a  few  feet  of  each 
other,  those  brave  men,  Confederates  and  Federals,  maintained  a  desperate 

^  The  Uuion  force  engaged  in  this  movement  consisted  of  De  Trobriand's  brigade  (Biruey's 
division)  of  the  Third  Corps.— Editors. 


KERSHAIVS  BRIGADE  AT  GETTYSBURG.  337 

conflict.  The  enemy  eonkl  make  no  progress  in  front,  but  slowly  extended 
around  my  right.  Separated  from  view  of  my  left,  of  which  I  could  hear 
nothing,  all  my  staff  being  with  that  wing,  the  position  of  the  15th  Regiment 
being  wholly  unknown,  the  7th  having  retreated,  and  nothing  being  heard 
of  the  other  troops  of  the  division,  I  feared  the  brave  men  around  me  would 
be  surrounded  by  the  large  force  of  the  enemy  constantly  increasing  in  mmi 
bers  and  all  the  while  gradually  enveloping  us.  In  order  to  avoid  such  a 
catastrophe,  I  ordered  a  retreat  to  the  buildings  at  Eose's.  On  emerging 
from  the  wood  as  I  followed  the  retreat,  I  saw  Wofford  riding  at  the  head  of 
his  fine  brigade,  then  coming  in,  his  left  being  in  the  Peach  Orchard,  which 
was  then  clear  of  the  enemy.  His  movement  was  such  as  to  strike  the 
stony  hill  on  the  left,  and  thus  turn  the  flank  of  the  troops  that  had  diiven 
us  from  that  position.  On  his  approach  the  enemy  retreated  across  the  wheat- 
field,  where,  with  the  regiments  of  my  left  wing,  Wofford  attacked  with  great 
effect,  driving  the  Federals  upon  and  near  to  Little  Round  Top.  I  now 
ascertained  that  Barksdale  had  advanced  upon  the  Peach  Orchard  after  I  had 
become  engaged ;  that  he  had  cleared  that  position  with  the  assistance  of  my 
8th  South  Carolina  regiment,  driving  all  before  him,  and,  ha\'ing  advanced 
far  beyond  that  point,  until  enveloped  by  suj)erior  forces,  had  fallen  mortally 
wounded,  and  been  left  in  the  Federals'  hands.  He  had  passed  too  far  to  my 
left  to  afford  me  any  relief  except  in  silencing  the  batteries  that  had  so  cruelly 
punished  my  left.  When  Barksdale  passed  to  the  left,  the  regiments  of  my 
left  wing  moved  up  into  the  wood  on  the  left  of  the  stony  hill,  and  maintained 
that  position  against  heavy  odds,  until  the  advance  of  Wofford's  brigade. 

When  the  enemy  fell  back  from  the  stony  hill  on  General  Wofford's  advance, 
the  15th  South  Carolina  and  a  portion  of  Semmes's  brigade  followed  them 
and  joined  Wofford  in  his  attack  upon  the  retreating  column.  I  ralUed  the 
remahider  of  my  brigade  and  Semmes's  at  Rose's,  with  the  assistance  of 
Colonel  Sorrel  of  Longstreet's  staff",  and  advanced  with  them  to  the  support 
of  Wofford,  taking  position  at  the  stone  wall  overlooking  the  forest  to  the  right 
of  Rose's  house,  some  two  hundred  yards  in  front.  Finding  that  Wofford's 
men  were  coming  out,  I  retained  them  at  that  point  to  cheek  any  attempt  of 
the  enemy  to  follow.  It  was  now  near  nightfall,  and  the  operations  of  the 
day  were  over.  That  night  we  occupied  the  ground  over  which  we  had 
fought,  with  my  left  at  the  Peach  Orchard,  on  the  hill,  and  gathered  tlie  dead 
and  wounded — a  long  list  of  brave  and  efficient  officers  and  men.  Captain 
Cunningham's  company  of  the  2d  Regiment  was  reported  to  have  gone  into 
action  with  forty  men,  of  whom  but  four  remained  unhurt  to  bm-y  then* 
fallen  comrades.  My  losses  exceeded  GOO  men  kilhnl  and  wounded,— abinit 
one-half  the  force  engaged. 

A  ghmce  at  the  map  [see  pp.  209,  :]08]  showing  tlie  positions  occupied  by 
the  troops  on  the  2d  of  July,  will  r«n'«'al  the  remarkable  fact  tliat  the  stony 
hill  and  wood  occupied  by  this  brigade  and  ])art  of  Semmes's  was  assailed 
or  defended  by  the  Federal  brigades  of  De  Trobriand,  Sweitz(>r,  Tilton,  and 
Zook,  of  the  divisions  of  Birney,  Barnes,  and  Caldwell,  and  of  the  Second, 
Third,  and  Fifth  corps.     Nowhen*  have  I  found  any  more  forcible  evidence 


338  KERSHAW'S  BHIGADE  AT  GETTYSBURG. 

of  the  nature  and   magnitude   of    this  struggle   by  McLaws's  and  Hood's 
divisions  than  is  contained  in  General  Meade's,  report.    He  says : 

"  About  3  p.  M.  I  rode  out  to  the  extreme  left.  .  .  .  Haviug  found  Major-General  Sickles,  I 
was  explaining  to  bini  that  he  was  too  far  in  the  advance,  and  discussing  with  him  the  propriety 
of  withdrawing,  when  the  enemy  opened  upon  him  with  several  batteries,  in  his  front  and 
flank,  and  immediately  brought  forward  columns  of  infantry  and  made  a  vigorous  assault.  The 
Third  Corps  sustained  the  shock  most  heroically.  Troops  from  the  Second  Corps  were  imme- 
diately sent  by  Major-General  Hancock  to  cover  the  right  flank  of  the  Third  Corps,  and  soon 
after  the  assault  commenced  the  Fifth  Corps  most  fortunately  arrived  and  took  position  on 
the  left  of  the  Third,  Major-General  Sykes,  commanding,  immediately  sending  a  force  to  occupy 
Round  Top  Ridge,  where  a  most  furious  contest  was  maintained,  the  enemy  making  desperate 
but  unsuccessful  efforts  to  secure  it.  Notwithstanding  the  stubborn  resistance  of  the  Thii-d 
Corps  under  Major-General  Birney  (Major-General  Sickles  having  been  wounded  early  in  the 
action),  superiority  in  numbers  of  corps  of  the  enemy  enabling  him  to  outflank  its  advance 
position,  General  Birney  was  compelled  to  fall  back  and  re-form  behind  the  line  originally 
designed  to  be  held. 

''In  the  meantime,  perceiving  the  great  exertions  of  the  enemy,  the  Sixth  Coi-ps,  Major- 
General  Sedgwick,  and  part  of  the  First  Coi"ps  to  the  command  of  which  I  had  assigned  Major- 
General  Newton,  particularly  Lockwood's  Maryland  Brigade,  with  detachments  from  the  Second 
Corjjs,  were  all  brought  up  at  different  periods,  and  succeeded,  together  with  a  gallant  resist- 
ance of  the  Fifth  Corps,  in  checking  and  finally  repulsing  the  assault  of  the  enemy,  who  retired 
in  confusion  and  disorder  about  sunset,  and  ceased  any  fiirther  efforts  on  our  extreme  left."  | 

These  mighty  shocks  of  contending  armies  were  sustained,  on  our  part,  by 
two  divisions  of  infantry  numberiug,  with  the  artillery,  not  more  than  10,000, 
or  at  the  highest  estimate  13,000  men. 

Kershaw's  brigade  remained  unemployed  during  the  3d  of  July,  in  the  posi- 
tion it  held  the  evening  before,  along  the  stony  hill  and  wood.  It  will  be 
evident  to  the  reader  that  the  causes  of  the  failure  of  the  operations  here 
described  to  achieve  greater  results,  may  be  reduced  to  one,  to  wit :  the  want 
of  simultaneous  movement  and  cooperation  between  the  troops  employed.  A 
careful  examination  of  all  that  has  been  written  of  that  eventful  series  of  bat- 
tles will  show  that  this  was  the  cause  of  all  the  failures.  Every  attack  was 
magnificent  and  successful,  but  failed  in  the  end  for  the  want  of  cooperation 
between  corps,  divisions,  brigades,  and,  in  some  instances,  regiments  of  the 
same  brigade.  The  want  of  cooperation,  or,  as  the  Comte  de  Paris  terms 
it,  the  want  of  "  coordination,"  caused  the  loss  of  Grettysburg  to  the  Con- 
federates. It  will  be  seen,  too,  that  there  was  no  loss  of  time  on  the  part 
of  McLaws's  division,  from  the  day  it  left  Culpeper  to  that  of  its  arrival  at 
Gettysburg.  If  any  ensued  after  that,  it  was  due  to  circumstances  wholly 
unknown  to  the  writer.  Certainly,  the  loss  of  time,  if  any,  would  not  have  lost 
the  fight,  if  there  had  been  perfect  cooperation  of  all  the  troops.  But,  except 
to  vindicate  the  truth,  it  is  vain  to  inquire  into  the  causes  of  our  failure. 

4  In  a  supplementary  report,  General  Meade  amended  this  paragraph  so  as  to  inehide  the  First  Divisior 
of  the  Twelfth  Corps.     Lockwood's  brigade  belonged  to  the  Twelfth  Corps,  unattached. — Editors. 


THE    LAST    CONFEDERATE  GUN    AT    GETTYSBURG  — ON    LONGSTREET'S    RIGHT,    OPPOSITE    ROUNO   TOP. 

LEE'S  RIGHT  WING  AT  GETTYSBURG. 

BY  JAMES  LONG8TREET,  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL,  C.  8.  A. 

GETTYSBURG  lies  partly  between  Seminary  Eidge  on  the  west  and 
Cemetery  Eidge  on  the  south-east,  a  distance  of  about  fourteen  huudi*ed 
yards  dividing  the  crests  of  the  two  ridges.  As  General  Lee  rode  to  the 
summit  of  Seminary  Eidge  and  looked  down  upon  the  town  he  saw  the  Fed- 
erals in  full  retreat  and  concentrating  on  the  rock-ribbed  hill  that  served  as 
a  burying-ground  for  the  city.  He  sent  orders  to  Ewell  to  follow  up  the  suc- 
cess if  he  found  it  practicable  and  to  occupy  the  hill  on  which  the  enemy  was 
concentrating.  As  the  order  was  not  positive,  but  left  discretion  with  Gen- 
eral Ewell,  the  latter  thought  it  better  to  give  his  troops  a  little  rest  and  wait 
for  more  definite  instructions.  I  was  following  Hill's  Corps  as  fast  as 
possible,  and  as  sbon  as  I  got  possession  of  the  road  went  rapidly  forward  to 
join  General  Lee. .  I  found  him  on  the  summit  of  Seminary  Eidge  watching 
the  enemy  concentrate  on  the  opposite  hill.  He  pointed  out  their  j^osition  to 
me.  I  took  my  glasses  and  made  as  careful  a  survey  as  I  could  from  that 
point.    After  five  or  ten  minutes  I  turned  to  General  Lee  and  said : 

"  If  we  could  have  chosen  a  point  to  meet  our  plans  of  operation,  I  do  not 
think  we  could  have  found  a  better  one  than  that  upon  which  they  are  now 
concentrating.  All  we  have  to  do  is  to  throw  our  army  around  by  their  left, 
and  we  shall  interpose  between  the  Federal  army  and  Washington.  We  can 
get  a  strong  position  and  wait,  and  if  they  fail  to  attack  us  we  shall  Jiave 
everything  in  condition  to  move  back  to-morrow  night  in  the  direction  of 
Washington,  selecting  beforehand  a  good  position  into  which  we  can  place  our 
troops  to  receive  battle  next  day.  Finding  our  object  is  Washingti>n  or  that 
army,  tlie  Federals  will  be  sure  to  attack  us.  When  they  attack,  we  shall 
beat  them,  as  we  jn-oposed  to  do  })efore  we  left  Fredericksburg,  and  the  i^rol)- 
abilities  are  that  the  fruits  of  our  success  will  be  great." 

"No,"  said  General  Lee;  "the  enemy  is  thcr.',  an<l  I  am  going  l.>  attack 
him  there." 

I  suggested  that  such  a  move  as  1  proposed  would  give  us  control  of  the 
roads  leadnig  to  Washington  and   lialtinioiv,  and  reminded  General  Lee  of 


340 


LEES  RIGHT  IVING  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


LUTHKKAN  CHURCH    ON    OHAMBERSBUKG    STREET, 

GETTYSBURG,    USED    AS    A    HOSPITAL. 

FROM    A   PHOTOGRAPH. 


oui*  original  plans.  If  we  had  fallen 
behind  Meade  and  had  insisted  on 
staying  between  him  and  Washing- 
ton, he  would  have  been  compelled  to 
attack  and  would  have  been  badly 
beaten.  General  Lee  answered,  "  No ; 
they  are  there  in  position,  and  I  am 
going  to  whip  them  or  they  are  going 
to  whip  me."  I  saw  he  was  in  no 
frame  of  mind  to  listen  to  further  ar- 
gument at  that  time,  so  I  did  not  push 
the  matter,  but  determined  to  renew 
the  subject  the  next  morning.  It  was 
then  about  5  o'clock  in  the  afternoon. 
On  the  morning  of  the  2d  I  joined 
General  Lee  and  again  proposed  the 
move  to  Meade's  left  and  rear.  He 
was  still  unwilling  to  consider  the 
proposition,  but  soon  left  me  and  rode 
off  to  see  General  Ewell  and  to  exam- 
ine the  ground  on  our  left  with  a  view 
to  making  the  attack  at  that  point. 
After  making  the  examination  and 
talking  to  General  Ewell,  he  determined  to  make  the  attack  by  the  right, 
and,  returning  to  where  I  was,  announced  his  intention  of  so  doing.  His 
engineer  officers  had  been  along  the  line  far  enough  to  find  a  road  by  which 
the  troops  could  move  and  be  concealed  from  the  Federal  signal  stations. 

About  11  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  2d  he  ordered  the  march,  and  put 
it  under  the  conduct  of  his  engineer  officers,  so  as  to  be  assured  that  the  troops 
would  move  by  the  best  route  and  encounter  the  least  delay  in  reaching  the 
position  designated  by  him  for  the  attack  on  the  Federal  left,  at  the  same 
time  concealing  the  movements  then  under  orders  from  view  of  the  Federals. 
McLaws's  division  was  in  advance,  with  Hood  following.  After  marching 
some  distance  there  was  a  delay  in  front,  and  I  rode  forward  to  ascertain  the 
cause,  when  it  was  reported  to  me  that  part  of  the  road  just  in  advance  of 
us  was  in  plain  view  of  the  Federal  signal  station  on  Round  Top.  To  avoid 
that  point  the  direction  of  the  troops  was  changed.  Again  I  found  there  was 
some  delay,  and  ordering  Hood's  division,  then  in  the  rear,  to  move  on  and 
doul)le  with  the  division  in  front,  so  as  to  save  as  much  time  as  possible,  I 
went  forward  again  to  see  the  cause  of  the  delay.  It  seemed  there  was  doubt 
again  a])out  the  men  being  concealed,  when  I  stated  that  I  could  see  the  sig- 
nal station,  and  there  was  no  reason  why  they  could  not  see  us.  It  seemed 
to  me  useless,  therefore,  to  delay  the  troops  any  longer  with  the  idea  of  con- 
cealing the  movement,  and  the  two  divisions  advanced.  As  the  line  was 
deployed  I  rode  along  from  left  to  right,  examining  the  Federal  position  and 
putting  my  troops  in  the  best  position  we  could  find.    General  Lee  at  the 


LEE'S  RIGHT  IVJNG  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


MI 


BRIGADIhR  i.LM  K^I     I   VLI     ^EMMES,    C.   S.   A. 

M()KTVIL\     ^\OL\DlI),    JILT   2. 

FKOM  A  PUOTOGKAPH. 


same  time  gave  orders  for  the  attack  to  be  made  by  my  right  —  following  up 
the  direction  of  the  Emmitsbm-g  road  toward  the  Cemetery  Ridge,  holding 
Hood's  left  as  well  as  could  be  toward  the  Emmitsburg  road,  McLaws  to  fol- 
low the  movements  of  Hood,  attacking 
at  the  Peach  Orchard  the  Federal  Third 
Corps,  with  a  part  of  R.  H.  Anderson's 
division  following  the  movements  of  Mc- 
Laws to  guard  his  left  flank.  As  soon  as 
the  troops  were  in  position,  and  we  could 
find  the  points  against  which  we  should 
march  and  give  the  guiding  points,  the 
advance  was  ordered  —  at  half-past  3 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  The  attack  was 
made  in  splendid  style  by  both  divisions, 
and  the  Federal  line  was  broken  by  the 
first  impact.  They  retired,  many  of  them, 
in  the  direction  of  Round  Top  behind 
l»owlders  and  fences,  which  gave  them 
shelter,  and  where  they  received  reen- 
forcements. 

This  was  an  unequal  battle.  General 
Lee's  orders  had  been  that  when  my  ad- 
vance was  made,  the  Second  Corps  (Ewell),  on  his  left,  should  move  and  make 
a  simultaneous  attack;  that  the  Third  Corps  (Hill)  should  watch  closely  and 
engage  so  as  to  prevent  heavy  massing  in  front  of  me.     Ewell  made  no  move 

at  all  until  about  8  o'clock  at  night, 
after  the  heat  of  the  battle  was  over, 
his  line  having  been  broken  by  a  call 
for  one  of  his  brigades  to  go  else- 
where. Hill  made  no  move  whatever, 
save  of  the  brigades  of  his  right  di- 
vision that  were  covering  our  left. 

When  the  battle  of  the  2d  was  over, 
General  Lee  pronounced  it  a  success, 
as  we  were  in  possession  of  ground 
from  which  we  had  driven  the  Feder- 
als and  had  taken  several  field-pieces. 
Tlie  conflict  liad  been  tierce  and 
blootly,  and  my  troo[>s  had  driven 
back  heavy  colunuis  and  had  encount- 
ered a  force  thr(>e  or  four  times  Www 
number,  I  but  we  had  aceoinplislied 
little  toward  victorious  rt'sults.  Our 
success  of  the  first  day  had  led  us  into 

Meade's  report  shows  that  all  of  the  Third  and  parts  of  the  Seooiul.  Fifth.  Sixth,  un-l  Twelfth 
corps  were  eugaged  in  the  second  day's  fight.— Editors. 


EKir.ADIKU-GENERAL   WILLIAM    HAUK8DALE,    C.   8 
WOUNDED    JULY    2.    DIED   JULY    3. 
FROM    A    IMIOTOGRArir. 


J  General 


342 


LEE'S  RIGHT  IVING  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


battle  on  the  2d,  and  the  battle  on  the  2d  was  to  lead  us  into  the  terrible  and 
hopeless  slaughter  on  the  3d. 

On  the  night  of  the  2d  I  sent  to  our  extreme  right  to  make  a  little  recon- 
noissance  in  that  du-ection,  thinking  General  Lee  might  yet  conclude  to  move 
around  the  Federal  left.  The  morning  of  the  3d  broke  clear  and  indicated 
a  day  on  which  operations  would  not  be  interrupted  by  the  elements.  The 
Confederate  forces  still  occupied  Seminary  Eidge,  while  the  Federals  occu- 
pied the  range  stretching  from  Eound  Top  to  Cemetery  Hill  and  around 
Culp's  Hill.     The  position  of  the  Federals  was  quite  strong,  and  the  battle  of 

the  2d  had  con- 
centrated them 
so  that  I  consid- 
ered an  attack 
from  the  front 
more  hazardous 
than  the  battle 
on  the  2d  had 
been.  The  Fed- 
erals were  con- 
centrated, while 
om*  troops  were 
stretched  out  in 
a  long,  broken — 


...^ 


DKAl)    IN   Tlin   "  WHEAT-UI  LD"  GATIII  RH)    TOR 
BIRI\I.      FROM    PHOTOGRAPH^. 


and  thus  a  weak  —  line.  However,  Greneral  Lee  hoped  to  break  through  the 
Federal  line  and  drive  them  off.  I  was  disappointed  when  he  came  to  me  on 
the  morning  of  the  3d  and  directed  that  I  should  renew  the  attack  against 
Cemetery  Hill,  probably  the  strongest  point  of  the  Federal  line.  For  that  pur- 
pose he  had  already  ordered  up  Pickett's  division,  which  had  been  left  at 
Chambersljurg  to  guard  our  supply  trains.  In  the  meantime  the  Federals  had 
placed  batteries  on  Round  Top,  in  position  to  make  a  raking  fire  against  troops 
attacking  the  Federal  front.  Meade  knew  that  if  the  battle  was  renewed  it 
would  be  virtually  over  the  same  ground  as  my  battle  of  the  2d.  I  stated  to 
General  Lee  that  I  had  been  examining  the  ground  over  to  the  right,  and 
was  much  inclined  to  think  the  best  thing  was  to  move  to  the  Federal  left. 

"  No,"  he  said ;-  "  I  am  going  to  take  them  where  they  are  on  Cemetery  Hill. 
I  want  you  to  take  Pickett's  division  and  make  the  attack.    I  will  reenforce 


LEE'S  RIGHT  IVING  AT  GETTYSBURG.  343 

you  hy  two  divisions  [Ilctli's  under  IVttigrcw  and  IN'iidci-'s  under  Trindile] 
of  the  Third  Corps." 

"  That  will  give  me  fifteen  thousand  men,"  I  replied.  "  I  have  Ijeen  a  sol- 
dier, I  may  say,  from  the  ranks  up  to  the  position  I  now  hold.  I  have  been  in 
pretty  much  all  kinds  of  skirmishes,  from  those  of  two  or  three  soldiers  up 
to  those  of  an  army  corps,  and  I  think  I  can  safely  say  there  never  was  a 
body  of  fifteen  thousand  men  who  could  make  that  attack  successfully." 

The  general  seemed  a  little  impatient  at  my  remarks,  so  I  said  nothing 
more.  As  he  showed  no  indication  of  changing  his  plan,  I  went  to  work  at 
once  to  arrange  my  troops  for  the  attack.  Pickett  was  put  in  position  and 
received  directions  for  the  line  of  his  advance  as  indicated  by  General  Lee. 
The  divisions  of  the  Third  Corps  were  arranged  along  his  left  with  orders  to 
take  up  the  line  of  march,  as  Pickett  passed  before  them,  in  short  echelon. 
We  were  to  open  with  our  batteries,  and  Pickett  was  to  move  out  as  soon  as 
we  silenced  the  Federal  batteries.  The  artillery  combat  was  to  begin  with 
the  rapid  discharge  of  two  field-pieces  as  our  signal.  As  soon  as  the  orders 
were  communicated  along  the  line,  I  sent  Colonel  E.  P.  Alexander  (who  was 
commanding  a  battalion  of  artillery  and  who  had  been  an  engineer  officer) 
to  select  carefully  a  point  from  which  he  could  observe  the  effect  of  om*  bat- 
teries. When  he  could  discover  the  enemy's  batteries  silenced  or  crippled,  he 
should  give  notice  to  General  Pickett,  who  was  ordered,  upon  receipt  of  that 
notice,  to  move  forward  to  the  attack.  When  I  took  Pickett  to  the  crest  of 
Seminary  Ridge  and  explained  where  his  troops  should  l)e  sheltered,  and 
pointed  out  the  direction  General  Lee  wished  him  to  take  and  the  point  of 
the  Federal  line  where  the  assault  was  to  be  made,  ho  seemed  to  appreciate 
the  severity  of  the  contest  upon  which  he  was  about  to  enter,  but  was  quite 
hopeful  of  success.  Upon  receipt  of  notice,  he  was  to  march  over  the  crest 
of  the  hill  down  the  gentle  slope  and  up  the  rise  opposite  the  Federal 
stronghold.  The  distance  was  about  fourteen  hundred  yards,  and  for  most 
of  the  way  the  Federal  batteries  would  have  a  raking  fire  from  Round  Top, 
while  the  sharp-shooters,  artillery,  and  infantry  would  subject  the  assaulting 
column  to  a  terrible  and  destructive  fire.  With  my  knowledge  of  the  situa- 
tion, I  could  see  the  desperate  and  hopeless  nature  of  \\w  charge  and  the 
cruel  slaughter  it  would  cause.  My  heart  was  heavy  when  1  left  Pickett.  1 
rode  once  or  twice  along  the  ground  between  Pickett  and  the  Federals, 
examining  the  ])ositions  and  studying  the  matter  over  in  all  its  jdiases  so  far 
as  we  could  anticij)ate. 

Al)Out  I  o'clock  everything  was  in  readiness.  The  signal  gi.ins  broke  the 
jn-evailing  stillness,  and  immediately  l')0  Confedei'ate  cannon  burst  into  a 
deafening  roar,  which  was  answered  by  a  thill idei- almost  as  gi-eat  fi-oni  the 
Federal  side.  The  gi-eat  artillery  combat  })roceeded.  The  destruction  was, 
of  course,  not  great;  but  the  thunder  on  Seminary  Ridge,  and  the  echo  from 
the  Federal  side,  showed  that  l)oth  command(M-s  were  read\ .  The  armies 
seemed  like  mighty  wild  beasts  growling  at  each  other  and  preparing  f<»r  a 
death  struggle.  For  an  houi-  or  two  the  fire  was  continued,  ant!  met  such 
steady  response  on  the  part  of  the  Federals,  that  it  seemed  less  eftVctive  than 


M4 


LEE'S  RIGHT  IVJNG  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


MAP   i8. 

Positions  July  3d, 

3:15   to    5:30    P.  M. 


K   I    L  P AT  R 


we  liad  anticipated.  1  sent  word  to  Alexander  that  unless  he  could  do  some- 
thing more,  I  would  not  feel  warranted  in  ordering  the  troops  forward.  After 
a  little,  some  of  the  Federal  batteries  ceased  firing,  possibly  to  save  ammuni- 
tion, and  Alexander  thought  the  most  suitable  time  for  the  advance  had 
come.  He  sent  word  to  Pickett,  and  Pickett  rode  to  my  headquarters.  As 
he  came  up  he  asked  if  the  time  for  his  advance  had  come.     I  was  convinced 


LEE'S  RIGHT  IVING  AT  GETTYSBURG.  345 

that  lie  would  be  leading  his  troops  to  needless  slaughter,  and  did  not  speak. 
He  repeated  the  question,  and  without  opening  my  lips  I  ]>owed  in  answer. 
In  a  determined  voice  Pickett  said  :  "  Sir,  I  shall  lead  my  division  forward." 
He  then  remounted  his  horse  and  rode  back  to  his  command.  I  mounted  my 
horse  and  rode  to  a  point  where  I  could  observe  the  troops  as  they  marched 
forward.  Colonel  Alexander  had  set  aside  a  battery  of  seven  guns  to  advance 
with  Pickett,  but  General  Pendleton,  from  whom  they  were  borrowed,  recalled 
them  j  ust  before  the  charge  was  ordered.  Colonel 
Alexander  told  me  of  the  seven  guns  which  had 
been  removeil,  and  that  his  ammunition  was 
so  low  he  could  not  properly  support  the  charge. 
I  ordered  him  to  stop  Pickett  until  the  ammu- 
nition could  be  replenished,  and  he  answered, 
''  There  is  no  ammunition  with  which  to  replen- 
ish." In  the  hurry  he  got  together  such  guns 
as  he  could  to  move  with  Pickett. 

It  has  been  said  that  I  should  have  exercised 
discretion  and  should  not  have  sent  Pickett  on 
his  charge.  It  has  been  urged  that  I  had  exer- 
cised discretion  on  previous  occasions.  It  is 
true  that  at  times  wdien  I  saw  a  certainty  of 

''  MAJOK-GK.NERAI,    WILLIAM     1>.     PEXDEll, 

success  m  another  direction,  I  did  not  follow         wounded  july  2.  died  july  is. 

.,  -.  r,  1     1        ^    il        -  IT  FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH. 

the  orders  ot  my  general,  but  tliat  was  when  he 

was  not  near  and  could  not  see  the  situation  as  it  existed.  Wlien  your  cliief 
is  away,  you  have  a  right  to  exercise  discretion ;  but  if  he  sees  everything 
that  you  see,  you  have  no  right  to  disregard  his  positive  and  repeated  orders. 
I  never  exercised  discretion  after  discussing  with  General  Lee  the  points  of 
his  orders,  and  when,  after  discussion,  he  had  ordered  the  execution  of  his 
policy.  I  had  offered  my  objections  to  Pickett's  battle  and  had  been  over- 
ruled, and  I  was  in  the  immediate  presence  of  the  commanding  general  ^hen 
the  order  was  given  for  Pickett  to  advance.    [See  ]).  355.] 

That  day  at  Gettysburg  was  one  of  the  saddest  oi  my  life.  I  foresaw  what 
my  men  would  meet  and  would  gladly  have  given  up  my  position  rather  than 
share  in  the  responsibilities  of  that  day.  It  was  thus  I  felt  when  Pickett  at 
the  head  of  4900  brave  men  marched  over  the  crest  of  Seminary  Ridge  and 
began  his  descent  of  the  slope.  As  he  passed  me  he  rode  gracefully,  with  his 
jaunty  cap  raked  well  over  on  his  riglit  ear  and  his  long  auburn  locks,  nicely 
dressed,  hanging  almost  to  his  shonldci-s.  He  seemed  rather  a  holiday  soldier 
than  a  general  at  the  head  of  a  colunui  wliich  was  a])out  to  make  one  of  the 
grandest,  most  desperate  assaults  recorded  in  the  annals  of  wars.  Armistead 
and  Garnett,  two  of  his  Imgadiers,  were  vetei-ansof  neaily  a  .luarter  of  a  cen- 
tury's service.  Their  minds  seemed  absoi-bed  in  the  men  behind,  and  in  the 
bloody  work  ])efore  them.  Kemi>er,  the  other  brigadier,  was  younger  but 
had  experienced  many  severe  l»at11es.  He  was  leading  my  old  briirade  that  I 
had  drilh'd  on  :\[anass'as  i>lains  before  the  lirst  battl.'on  that  noted  Ih-ld.  The 
troops  advanced  in  well-closed  ranks  and  with  elastic  step,  their  faei's  lighted 

VOL.  III.    23 


346 


LEE'S  RIGHT  WING  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


\l-'^ 


?.-! 


with  hope.  Before  them  lay  the  gi'ound  over  which  they 
AYere  to  pass  to  the  point  of  attack.  Intervening  were 
several  fences,  a  field  of  corn,  a  little  swale  running 
through  it  and  then  a  rise  from  that  point  to  the  Fed- 
eral stronghold.  As  soon  as  Pickett  passed  the  crest  of 
the  hill,  the  Federals  had  a  clear  view  and  opened  their 
batteries,  and  as  he  descended  the  eastern  slope  of  the 
ridge  his  troops  received  a  fearful  fire  from  the  batteries 
?  -qW   ^"^  in  front  and  from  Round  Top.     The   troops   marched 

yj  '.  '  ^  %  a  steadily,  taking  the  fire  with  great  coolness.  As  soon  as 
:l  ^  {^  .■  -i  i  %  they  passed  my  batteries  I  ordered  my  artillery  to  turn 
their  fire  against  the  batteries  on  our  right  then  raking 
my  lines.  They  did  so,  but  did  not  force  the  Federals  to 
change  the  direction  of  their  fire  and  relieve  our  infan- 
try. As  the  troops  were  about  to  cross  the  swale  I  noticed 
a  considerable  force  of  Federal  infantry  moving  down  as 
though  to  flank  the  left  of  our  line.  I  sent  an  officer  to 
caution  the  division  commanders  to  guard  against  that 
move,  at  the  same  time  sending  another  statf-ofiicer  with 
similar  orders  so  as  to  feel  assured  the  order  would  be 
delivered.  Both  officers  came  back  bringing  their  sad- 
dles, their  horses  having  been  shot  under  them.  After 
crossing  the  swale,  the  troops  kept  the  same  steady  step, 
but  met  a  dreadful  fire  at  the  hands  of  the  Federal  sharp- 
shooters ;  and  as  soon  as  the  field  was  open  the  Federal 
infantry  poured  down  a  terrific  fire  which  was  kept  up 
during  the  entire  assault.  The  slaughter  was  terrible,  the 
enfilade  fire  of  the  batteries  on  Round  Top  being  very 
destructive.  At  times  one  shell  would  knock  down  five 
^  5     or  six  men.     I  dismounted  to  relieve  my  horse  and  was 

L         .  J  o     sitting  on  a  rail  fence  watching  very  closely  the  move- 

jj  >  S     ments  of  the  troops.     Colonel  Fremantle,  who  had  taken 

^1  I  §     a  position  behind  the  Third  Corps  where  he  would  be  out 

i»'  "  "     of  reach  of  fire  and  at  the  same  time  have  a  clear  view 

mi  of  the  field,  became  so  interested  that  he  left  his  position 

^  and  came  with  speed  to  join  me.     Just  as  he  came  up 

behind  me,  Pickett  had  reached  a  point  near  the  Federal 
lines.  A  pause  was  made  to  close  ranks  and  mass  for 
the  final  plunge.  The  troops  on  Pickett's  left,  although 
advancing,  were  evidently  a  little  shaky.  Colonel  Fre- 
mantle, only  observing  the  troops  of  Pickett's  command, 
said  to  me,  "  General,  I  would  not  have  missed  this  for 
anything  in  the  world."  He  believed  it  to  be  a  complete 
success.  I  was  watching  the  troops  supporting  Pickett  and  saw  plainly  they 
could  not  hold  together  ton  minutes  longer.  I  called  his  attention  to  the 
wavering  condition  of  the  two  divisions  of  the  Third  Corps,  and  said  they 


LEE'S  RIGHT  IVING  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


347 


would  not  liold,  that  Pickett 
would  strike  and  be  cruslied  and 
the  attack  would  be  a  failure. 
As  Pickett's  division  concentra- 
ted in  making  the  final  assault, 
Kemper  fell  severely  wounded. 
As  the  division  threw  itself 
against  the  Federal  line  Garnett 
fell  and  expired.  The  Confed- 
erate flag,  was  planted  in  the 
Federal  line,  and  immediately 
Armistead  fell  mortally  wounded 
at  the  feet  of  the  Federal  sol- 
diers. The  wavering  divisions 
then  seemed  appalled,  broke  their 
ranks,  and  retired.  Immediately 
the  Federals  swarmed  around 
Pickett,  attacking  on  all  sides, 
enveloped  and  broke  up  his  com- 
mand, having  killed  and  wound- 
ed more  than  two  thousand  men 
in  about  thirty  minutes.  They 
then  drove  the  fragments  back 

upon  our  lines.    As  they  came  — - 

back    I    fully   expected   to    see         HKn;vi>ii:K.,iM  km u  n.  -  -  . 

*'  ^  KILLKI)    JULY    3.       Fl;i>M     A     nio  I  <>i .  i:  Al'Il. 

Meade  ride  to  the  front  and  lead 

his  forces  to  a  tremendous  counter-charge.  Sending  my  staff-officers  to  assist 
in  collecting  the  fragments  of  my  command,  I  rode  to  my  line  of  batteries, 
knowing  they  were  all  I  had  in  front  of  the  impending  attack,  resolved  to 
drive  it  back  or  sacrifice  my  last  gun  and  man.  The  Federals  were  advancing 
a  line  of  skirmishers  which  I  thought  was  the  advance  of  their  charge.  As 
soon  as  the  line  of  skirmishers  came  within  reach  of  our  guns,  the  batteries 
opened  again  and  their  fire  seemed  to  check  at  once  the  threatened  advance. 
After  keeping  it  up  a  few  minutes  the  line  of  skirmishers  disappeared,  and 
my  mind  was  relieved  of  the  apprehension  that  Mead<^  was  going  to  follow  us. 

General  Lee  came  up  as  our  troops  were  falling  back  and  encouraged  them 
as  well  as  he  could ;  begged  them  to  re-form  their  ranks  and  reorganize  their 
forces,  and  assisted  the  staff-officers  in  l)ringing  them  all  together  again.  It 
was  then  he  used  the  expression  that  has  b«HMi  mentioned  so  often : 

"It  was  all  my  fault;  get  together,  and  let  us  do  the  l)est  we  can  toward 
saving  that  which  is  left  us." 

As  our  troops  were  driven  l)a('k  tVoni  th(>  general  assauh  an  attack  was 
made  on  my  extreme  right  by  several  squadrons  of  cavalry,  which  succeeded 
in  breaking  through  oui-  line  of  ]>ickets.  They  were  met  by  a  counter-move  of 
the  9th  Georgia  and  the  well-directed  fire  of  (/aittain  Hacliman's  battery  and 
driven  back,  the  11th  and  51)th  Georgia  joining  in  the  counter-move. 


€ 


A 


A^' 


LEE'S  RIGHT  WING  AT  GETTYSBURG.  349 

Finding  that  Meade  was  not  going  to  follow  us,  I  prepared  to  withdraw  my 
line  to  a  better  defensive  position.  The  batteries  were  withdrawn  well  over 
Seminary  Ridge,  and  orders  were  sent  to  the  right  for  McLaws's  and  Hood's 
divisions  to  be  withdrawn  to  corresponding  positions.  The  armies  remained 
in  position,  the  Confederates  on  Seminary  Ridge  extending  around  Gettys- 
burg, the  left  also  di'awn  back,  the  Federals  on  Cemetery  Ridge,  until  the 
night  of  the  4th,  when  we  took  up  the  march  in  retreat  for  Virginia. 

That  night,  while  we  were  standing  round  a  little  fire  by  the  roadside, 
General  Lee  said  again  the  defeat  was  all  his  fault.  He  said  to  me  at  another 
time,  "  You  ought  not  to  have  made  that  last  attack."  I  replied,  "  I  had  my 
orders,  and  they  were  of  such  a  nature  there  was  no  escape  from  them." 
During  that  winter,  while  I  was  in  east  Tennessee,  in  a  letter  I  received  from 
him  he  said,  "  If  I  only  had  taken  your  counsel  even  on  the  3d,  and  had  moved 
around  the  Federal  left,  how  different  all  might  have  been." 

The  only  thing  Pickett  said  of  his  charge  was  that  he  was  distressed  at  the 
loss  of  his  command.  He  thought  he  should  have  had  two  of  his  brigades 
that  had  been  left  in  Virginia ;  with  them  he  felt  that  he  would  have  broken 
the  line. 

While  I  was  trying  to  persuade  General  Lee  to  turn  the  Federal  left  on  the 
1st  of  July,  Halleck  telegraphed  Meade  as  follows  : 

''  Washington,  D.  C,  July  1st,  1863. 
*'  The  movements  of  the  enemy  yesterday  indicate  his  intention  to  either  turn  your  left,  or  to 
cover  himself  by  the  South  Mountain  and  occupy  Cumberland  VaUey.     Do  not  let  him  draw 
you  too  far  to  the  east." 

Again  on  the  same  day : 

"  .  .  .  Your  tactical  arrangements  for  battle  seem  good,  so  far  as  I  can  judge  from  my 
knowledge  of  the  character  of  the  country ;  but  in  a  strategic  view,  are  you  not  too  far  east, 
and  may  not  Lee  attempt  to  turn  your  left  and  cut  you  off  from  Frederick  ?  Please  give  your 
full  attention  to  this  suggestion.     ..." 

The  next  day,  just  thirty  minutes  before  my  assault,  General  Meade  tele- 
gi'aphed  General  Halleck  at  3  p.  m.  : 

".  .  .  If  I  find  it  hazardous  to  do  so  [meaning  to  attack],  or  am  satisfied  that  the 
enemy  is  endeavoring  to  move  to  my  rear  and  interpose  between  me  and  Washington,  I  shall 
fall  back  to  my  suppHes  at  Westminster.     ..." 

From  this  we  know  that  the  ground  of  the  Gettysburg  cemetery  could 
have  been  occupied  without  the  loss  of  a  man,  yet  even  at  this  late  day,  some 
of  the  Virginians,  not  satisfied  with  the  sacrifice  already  made,  wish  that  I, 
who  would  and  could  have  saved  every  man  lost  at  Gettysburg,  should  now 
be  shot  to  death. 

If  we  had  made  the  move  around  tlie  Federal  left,  and  taken  a  strong  posi- 
tion, we  should  have  dislodged  Meade  without  a  single  blow ;  but  even  if  we 
had  been  successful  at  Gettysburg,  and  had  driven  the  Federals  out  of  their 
stronghold,  we  should  have  won  a  fruitless  victory,  and  returned  to  Virginia 
conquered  \n('tors.  The  ground  they  occu]iiod  would  have  been  worth  no 
more  to  us  than  the  ground  we  were  on.     What  we  needed  was  a  battle  that 


350 


LEE'S  RIGHT  JVING  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


would  give  us  decided  fruits,  not  ground  that  was  of  no  value.  I  do  not 
think  there  was  any  necessity  for  giving  battle  at  Gettysburg.  All  of  our 
cavalry  was  absent,  and  while  that  has  been  urged  by  some  as  a  reason  why 
the  battle  should  have  been  made  at  once,  to  my  mind  it  was  one  of  the 
strongest  reasons  for  delaying  the  battle  until  everything  was  well  in  hand. 
The  cause  of  the  battle  was  simply  Greneral  Lee's  determination  to  fight  it 
out  from  the  position  in  which  he  was  at  that  time.  He  did  not  feel  that  he 
was  beaten  on  the  second  day,  but  that  he  was  the  victor,  and  still  hoped  he 
would  be  able  to  dislodge  Meade ;  but  he  made  a  mistake  in  sending  such  a 

small  number  of  men  to 
attack  a  formidable  force 
in  a  position  of  great  nat- 
ural strength,  reenforced 
by  such  temporary  shel- 
ter as  could  be  collected 
and  placed  in  position  to 
cover  the  troops.  Lee's 
hope  in  entering  the  cam- 
paign was  that  he  would 
be  in  time  to  make  a  suc- 
cessful battle  north  of  the 
Potomac,  with  such  ad- 
vantages as  to  draw  off 
the  army  at  Vicksburg  as 
well  as  the  Federal  troops 
at  other  points. 

I  do  not  think  the  gen- 
eral effect  of  the  battle 
was  demoralizing,  but  by 
a  singular  coincidence  our 
army  at  Vicksburg  sur- 
rendered to  Grant  on  the 
4th,  while  the  armies  of 
Lee  and  Meade  were  lying  in  front  of  each  other,  each  waiting  a  movement 
on  the  part  of  the  other,  neither  victor,  neither  vanquished.  This  surrender, 
taken  in  connection  with  the  Gettysburg  defeat,  was,  of  course,  very  discour- 
aging to  our  superior  officers,  though  I  do  not  know  that  it  was  felt  as  keenly 
by  the  rank  and  file.  For  myself,  I  felt  that  our  last  hope  was  gone,  and 
that  it  was  now  only  a  question  of  time  with  us.  When,  however,  I  found 
that  Rosecrans  was  moving  down  toward  Georgia  against  General  Bragg,  I 
thought  it  possible  we  might  recover  some  of  our  lost  prospects  by  concentrat- 
ing against  Rosecrans,  destroying  his  army,  and  advancing  through  Kentucky. 
General  Lee  evidently  felt  severely  mortified  and  hurt  at  the  failure,  so  much 
so  that  at  times  he  Avas  inclined  to  listen  to  some  of  those  who  claimed  to  be  his 
friends,  and  to  accept  tlieir  proposition  to  find  a  scapegoat.  He  resisted  them, 
however,  and  seemed  determined  to  leave  the  responsibility  on  his  own  hands. 


MAJOR-GENERAL  GEORGE  E.    PICKETT,   (  .  S.  A.       FROM   A   I'HOTOGKAPH. 


LEE'S  RIGHT  JVING  AT  GETTYSBURG.  351 

For  several  reasons  I  will  take  occasion  here  to  answer  some  serious  charges 
that  have  been  made  against  me  l)y  men  who  claim  to  have  been  the  friends 
of  General  Lee. 

Mr.  Jefferson  Davis,  in  his  "  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government " 
(p.  441,  Vol.  II.),  quotes  from  a  memorial  address  the  old  story  of  the  Eev. 
W.  N.  Pendleton : 

"  The  ground  south-west  of  the  town  was  carefully  examined  by  me  after  the  engagement 
on  July  1st.  Being  found  much  less  difficult  than  the  steep  ascent  fi'onting  the  troops  already 
up,  its  practicable  character  was  reported  to  our  commanding  general.  He  informed  me  that 
he  had  ordered  Longstreet  to  attack  on  that  front  at  sunrise  the  next  morning.  And  he  added 
to  myself,  '  I  want  you  to  be  out  long  before  sunrise,  so  as  to  reexamine  and  save  time.' 

*^  He  also  desired  me  to  communicate  with  General  Longstx'eet  as  well  as  with  himself.  The 
reconnoissance  was  accordingly  made  as  soon  as  it  was  light  enough  on  the  2d,  and  made 
through  a  long  distance  —  in  fact,  very  close  to  what  there  was  of  the  enemy's  line.  No  insu- 
perable difficulty  appearing,  and  the  marching  up  —  far  off,  the  enemy's  reenforcing  columns 
being  seen,  the  extreme  desirableness  of  immediate  attack  there  was  at  once  reported  to  the  com- 
manding general ;  and,  according  to  his  wish,  message  was  also  sent  to  the  intrepid  but  delib- 
erate corps  commander,  whose  sunrise  attack  there  had  been  ordered.  There  was,  however, 
unaccountable  delay.  My  own  messages  went  repeatedly  to  General  Lee,  and  his  I  know  was 
urgently  pressed  on  General  Longstreet  until,  as  I  afterward  learned  from  officers  who  saw 
General  Lee  —  as  I  could  not  at  the  time  —  he  manifested  extreme  displeasure  with  the  tardy 
corps  commander.  That  hard-fighting  soldier,  to  whom  it  had  been  committed  there  to  attack 
early  in  the  day,  did  not  in  person  reach  the  commanding  general  and  with  him  ride  to  a  posi- 
tion whence  to  view  the  ground  and  see  the  enemy's  an'iving  masses,  until  12  o'clock,  and  his 
column  was  not  up  and  ready  for  the  assault  until  4  P.  M,  All  this,  as  it  occurred  under  my 
personal  obsei'vation,  it  is  nothing  short  of  imperative  duty  that  I  should  thus  fairly  state." 

Mr.  Davis  indorses  the  statement  thus : 

"  For  the  reasons  set  forth  by  General  Pendleton,  whose  statement  in  regai'd  to  a  fact  coming 
under  his  personal  observation  none  who  knew  him  will  question,  preparations  for  a  general 
engagement  were  unfortunately  delayed  until  the  afternoon  instead  of  being  made  at  simrise  ; 
then  troops  had  been  concentrated,  and  Round  Top,,  the  (Commanding  position  unoccupied  in 
the  morning,  had  received  the  force  which  inflicted  such  disaster  on  our  assaulting  columns. 
The  question  as  to  the  responsibility  for  this  delay  has  been  so  fully  discussed  in  the  '  Southern 
Historical  Society  Papers '  as  to  reheve  me  fi-om  the  necessity  of  entering  into  it." 

As  General  Pendleton's  lecture  was  the  capital  upon  which  it  was  proposed 
to  draw  fimds  for  a  memorial  church,  it  was  natural,  perhaps,  that  Mr.  Davis 
should,  as  a  sentiment^  claim  the  statements  made  as  beyond  question.  Most 
Virginia  writers  on  this  subject  have  taken  up  and  followed  the  false  scent 
announced  by  General  Pendleton.  Outside  that  State,  I  believe  Mr.  Davis 
and  General  Wilcox  are  the  only  persons  who  do  not  spurn  it  as  false.  Facts 
connected  with  this  battle  have  been  so  distorted  and  misrepresented  tlmi  a 
volume  of  distinct  maps  nuist  be  written  in  order  to  make  a  demonstration, 
to  the  letter,  of  all  its  features. 

General  C.  ^l.  Wilcox,  in  an  artic^le  in  the  number  of  the  "Southern  His- 
torical Soci(^ty  Papers"  for  Sei)t(Mnber,  1S77,  refers  to  the  order  for  early 
attack,  viz. : 

"  It  has  been  asserted  that  General  Longstreet  was  ordered  to  attack  at  dayliglit  or  early  the 
next  morning.  Of  this  I  have  no  knowledge  personally,  but  am  iucliued  to  believe  that  he  was 
so  ordered." 


y^2  LEE'S  RIGHT  IVING  AT  GETTYSBURG. 

But  from  the  official  accduiits  of  Generals  Pendleton  and  Wilcox  |  we  see 
that  the  right  of  Greneral  Lee's  army  was  not  deployed  as  far  as  the  Fairfield 
road  on  the  1st  of  July,  that  Greneral  Pendleton  did  not  pass  beyond  this 
road,  and  only  noted  the  location  of  the  ridge  on  the  right  from  his  position 
on  the  Fairfield  road  especially  as  likely  to  be  important  "  toward  a  flank 
movement."  With  this  idea  in  his  mind  he  leaves  us  to  infer  that  he  left 
our  right  and  moved  over  to  our  left  to  supervise  the  posting  of  artillery 
battalions  just  then  coming  up.  Soon  after  Greneral  Pendleton  passed  from 
about  the  Fairfield  road  to  our  left,  the  division  of  General  R.  H.  Ander- 
son,— of  the  Third  Corps, — led  by  the  brigade  of  General  C.  M.  Wilcox,  filed 
oft'  to  the  right  from  the  Chambersburg  road,  marched  in  an  oblique  direction 
toward  the  Fairfield  road,  where  it  was  halted  for  the  night,  lying  in  bivouac 
till  the  next  day,  the  brigade  of  Wilcox  being  on  picket  or  guard  service 
during  the  night  about  a  mile  farther  to  the  right.  In  the  absence  of  other 
evidence,  one  might  be  at  a  loss  to  know  which  of  these  accounts  was 
intended  in  a  Pickwickian  sense,  but  the  account  of  General  R.  H.  Anderson, 
who  was  guileless  and  truthful,  supports  the  official  reports.  General  A. 
A.  Humphreys  (of  the  other  side),  late  chief  of  the  United  States  Corps  of 
Engineers,  a  man  whose  entire  life  and  service  were  devoted  to  official  accu- 
racy, gives  similar  evidence  in  his  official  report.  | 

All  the  subordinate  reports  on  the  Confederate  side  confirm  the  account 
by  General  Anderson,  while  the  reports  of  subordinate  officers  on  the  Federal 
side  conform  to  that  of  General  Humphreys.  It  is  conclusive  therefore  that 
the  Confederates  occupied  no  ground  east  of  the  Fairfield  road  till  R.  H. 
Anderson's  division  advanced  on  the  morning  of  the  2d  at  10  to  find  its  posi- 
tion on  the  right  of  Hill's  corps,  after  a  clever  fight  between  the  3d  Maine 
and  1st  U.  S.  Sharp-shooters  against  the  lOth  and  lltli  Alabama  regiments. 

When  it  is  remembered  that  my  command  was  at  the  close  of  the  first  day's 
fight  fifteen  to  twenty  miles  west  of  the  field,  that  its  attack  as  ordered  was 
to  be  made  along  the  east  side  of  the  Emmitsburg  road,  that  no  part  of  Gen- 
eral Lee's  army  touched  that  road  till  9  a.  m.  of  the  2d,  that  up  to  that  hour 
it  was  in  possession  of  the  Federals,  and  that  their  troops  had  been  marching 
in  by  that  road  from  early  on  the  1st  till  8  a.  m.  on  the  2d,  it  will  be  seen  that 
General  Pendleton's  reconnoissance  on  the  1st  was  made,  if  made  at  all,  by 
his  passing  through  the  Federal  lines  on  the  afternoon  of  the  1st  and  again 
on  the  morning  of  the  2d. 

General  Wilcox  confesses  want  of  personal  information  of  the  order  for 
daylight  or  early  attack,  but  expresses  his  confidence  that  the  order  was 
given.  That  is,  he,  occupying  our  extreme  right  on  the  1st,  on  picket  at  a 
point  considerably  west  of  the  Emmitsburg  road,  believes  that  General  Lee 
ordered  troops  some  fifteen  or  twenty  miles  off,  and  yet  on  the  march,  to  pass 
his  picket  guard  in  the  night  to  the  point  of  attack,  east  of  the  Emmitsburg 
road,  through  the  Federal  lines,  in  order  to  make  a  daylight  attack  east  of 
the  road.    While  I  am  prepared  to  admit  that  General  Lee  ordered,  at  times, 

i  "  Official  Eecords,"  Vol.  XXVIL,  Part  II.,  pp.  346,  616. 
;  "  Official  Records,"  Vol.  XXVIL,  Part  I.,  p.  529. 


LEE'S  RIGHT  IVfNG  AT  GETTYSBURG.  3 S3 

desperate  battles,  I  cannot  admit  that  lie,  blindfold,  ever  led  or  ordered  his 
next  in  rank,  also  blindfold,  into  night  marches  through  the  enemy's  lines  to 
gain  position  and  make  a  battle  at  daylight  next  morning. 

In  articles  formerly  published  on  this  charge  of  General  Pendleton,  masses 
of  evidence  were  adduced  showing  that  my  column  when  ordered  to  the  right, 
east  of  the  Emmitsburg  road,  was  conducted  by  General  Lee's  engineer  offi- 
cer ;  that  when  halted  under  the  conduct  of  that  officer  I  doubled  the  rear 
division  on  the  leading  one  so  as  to  save  time ;  that  my  arrangements  were 
promptly  made,  and  that  my  attack  was  made  many  hours  before  any  of  our 
other  troops  were  ready  to  obey  their  orders  to  cooperate.  As  I  was  the  only 
one  prepared  for  battle,  I  contended  against  the  Federal  army  throughout  the 
contest  with  two  divisions  and  some  misguided  brigades  sent  to  cover  my  left. 

Colonel  Taylor,  of  General  Lee's  staff,  takes  exception  to  the  delay  in  the 
attack  of  Pickett  on  the  last  day  under  the  impression  that,  had  I  attacked  ear- 
lier and  before  Edward  Johnson  was  driven  from  the  Federal  right,  the  latter 
might  have  held  his  ground  longer  and  to  some  advantage  to  the  Confeder- 
ates. He  seems  to  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  General  Lee,  not  I,  was  com- 
manding our  left  under  Johnson,  and  that  he  alone  could  order  concert  of 
action.  On  the  2d,  notwithstanding  his  orders  to  move  in  concert  with  my 
attack  at  4  p.  m.,  Johnson  did  not  go  in  till  8  at  night,  long  after  my  battle 
was  ended.  Colonel  Taylor  thinks  the  forlorn-hope  should  have  gone  in 
sooner.  The  universal  opinion  now  is  that  it  should  not  have  gone  in  at  all ; 
and,  as  already  stated,  that  was  the  opinion  General  Lee  expressed  soon  after 
the  battle. 

Some  of  our  North  Carolina  troops  seem  to  consider  the  less  conspicuous 
part  given  them  a  reflection  upon  them  as  soldiers  of  true  mettle  and  dash. 
This  sensitiveness  is  not  well  founded.  Every  officer  of  experience  knows 
that  the  best  of  veteran  soldiers,  with  bloody  noses  from  a  fresh  battle,  are 
never  equal  to  those  going  in  fresh  in  their  first  stroke  of  the  ])attle.  Had 
Pickett's  men  gone  through  the  same  experience  as  the  other  troops  on  the 
1st,  they  could  not  have  felt  the  same  zest  for  fighting  that  they  did  coming 
up  fresh  and  feeling  disparaged  that  the  army  had  won  new  laurels  in  their 
absence.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  North  Carolinians  did  as  well  as  any 
soldiers  could  have  done  under  the  circumstances.  I  can  truthfully  attest 
that  the  old  North  State  furnished  as  fine  and  gallant  troojts  as  any  that 
fought  in  the  (>)nfederate  ranks  —  aiid  that  is  saying  as  nuich  as  can  be  said 
for  soldiers.  They  certainly  made  sufficient  sacrifice,  and  tliat  was  all  we  had 
left  to  do  on  that  day. 

During  the  Franco-Prussian  war  I  kept  a  iiiaj)  of  llie  Held  of  operations 
with  colored  pegs,  that  were  iiiov<'(l  fi-oiii  day  t«»  day  to  indicate  the  move- 
ments of  the  two  armies.  Uazaine  iiad  been  di-iveu  to  shelter  at  Met/., 
McMahon  had  been  driven  back  to  the  loiite  leading  tVom  I»aris  to  M.t/  and 
seemed  in  doubt  whethei-  he  woiihl  go  to  Paris  or  to  l»a/aine's  relief.  H(> 
suffered  himself  to  be  forced  north  of  the  i-(.ute  between  these  j.oints.  On 
the  morning  that  the  wires  brought  us  that  inl(.rination,  two  m-  tlnvr  of 
the  French  Creoles  of  New  Orleans  visited  my  office  to  ask  my  views  of  the 


3^4 


THE  CHARGE   OF  PICKETT,   PETTIGREIV,  AND    TRIMBLE. 


movements  then  proceediug.  I  replied,  "  McMahon's  army  will  be  prisoners 
of  war  in  ten  days."  They  were  very  indignant  and  stated  that  I  was  a 
Republican  and  in  sympathy  with  the  Prussians.  My  reply  was  that  I  had 
only  given  them  my  solution  of  a  military  problem.  The  Prussians  were  on 
the  shorter  route  to  Paris  or  to  Metz,  so  that  if  McMahon  should  attempt  to 
move  in  either  direction  the  Prussians,  availing  themselves  of  the  shorter 
lines,  would  interpose  and  force  McMahon  to  attack ;  but  as  he  had  already 
been  so  beaten  and  demoralized,  that  he  could  not  be  expected  to  make  a 
successful  attack  and  would  therefore  be  obliged  to  surrender.  If  he  had 
gone  direct  to  Paris  before  giving  up  his  shorter  route,  it  is  possible  that 
he  could  have  organized  a  succoring  army  for  the  relief  of  Metz. 

Had  we  interposed  between  Meade  and  Washington  our  army  in  almost  as 
successful  prestige  as  was  that  of  the  Prussians,  Meade  would  have  been 
obliged  to  attack  us  wherever  we  might  be  pleased  to  have  him.  He  would 
have  been  badly  beaten  like  the  French,  and  the  result  would  have  been 
similar.  I  do  not  mean  to  say  that  two  governments  would  have  been  per- 
manently established;  for  I  thought  before  the  war,  and  during  its  con- 
tinuance, that  the  people  would  eventually  get  together  again  in  stronger 
bonds  of  friendship  than  those  of  their  first  love. 

THE   CHAEGE    OF   PICKETT,    PETTIGREW,    AND    TRIMBLE.; 


BY    J.    B.   SMITH. 


IN  an  address  delivered  by  Colonel  Andrew  Cowan 
to  his  comrades  at  Gettysburg  on  tlie  3d  of  July, 
1886,  he,  likenearly  every  other  speaker  and  writer, 
ascribes  all  the  praise  of  the  Confederate  charge 
of  the  third  day  to  Pickett's  division.  He  says  : 
"Beyond  the  wall  nothing  but  the  gray-clad  Vir- 
ginians." He  speaks  of  no  other  troops  except 
Pickett's.  Some  writers  have  gone  so  far  as  to  say 
Pickett  made  the  immortal  charge  with  five  thou- 
sand Virginians,  etc.  Pickett's  division  was  fresh, 
not  having  engaged  the  enemy  on  the  first  or 
second  day,  while  the  other  troops  of  the  assault- 
ing body  fought  on  tlie  previous  days  with  un- 
surpassed bravery,  and  some  of  the  brigades  were 
almost  anniliilated. 

The  grand  assaulting  column  was  formed  in 
three  divisions,  and  the  divisions  were  commanded 
and  led  to  the  slaughter  by  Pickett,  Pettigrew, 
and  Trimble. 

General  George  E.  Pickett's  division,  composed 
of  three  brigades  commanded  by  Generals  Ricluird 
B.  Garnett,  Lewis  A.  Armistead,  and  James  L. 
Kemper,  was  4900  strong.  Garnett  fell  during 
the  progress  of  the  charge  while  at  tlie  head  of  his 
column  urging  his  men  on.  Armistead  led  his  men 
through  tlie  terrific  storm  of  liattle  to  the  base  of 
the  Federal  works,  and  there  he  i)laced  his  cap  on 
his  sword  and  scaled  tlie  wall,  ai)i)ealing  to  liis 
troops  to  follow  him.  A  few  of  his  disorganized 
men  imitated  his  heroic  example,  and  died  at  his 
feet.     General  Kemper  was  wounded  in  the  charge. 


General  J.  Johnston  Pettigrew's  command  em- 
braced the  following  brigades :  Archer's  Tennes- 
see brigade,  commanded  by  Colonel  Fry,  of  the 
13th  Alabama;  Pettigrew's  North  Carolina  bri- 
gade, Jo  Davis's  Mississippi  brigade,  and  Broek- 
enbrough's  brigade  of  Virginians,  aggregating  five 
thousand  troops.  All  were  of  Heth's  division  of 
A.  P.  Hill's  corps.  General  Pettigrew  was  wounded 
in  the  charge,  but  he  did  not  quit  the  field,  and  re- 
mained in  command  until  he  fell  at  Falling  Waters. 

I  will  now  notice  the  conduct  of  Archer's  Ten- 
nessee brigade.  It  opened  the  battle  on  the  first 
day  and  lost  its  brave  and  gallant  commander. 
While  leading  his  men  he  was  captured  by  a  flank 
movement  made  by  the  enemy.  The  brigade  suf- 
fered heavy  losses  in  other  ways  on  that  day. 
When  the  grand  assault  was  made  on  the  3d,  the 
1st  and  7th  Tennessee  regiments  made  the  first 
breach  in  the  Federal  works  on  Cemetery  Hill, 
and  they  were  the  only  organized  regiments  that 
entered  into  and  beyond  the  enemy's  walls. 

The  14th  Tennessee,  after  losing  heavily  on  the 
first  day,  went  into  the  grand  charge  with  37;") 
men,  and  planted  its  colors  on  the  stone  wall  and 
left  them  there.  The  heroic  conduct  of  the  1 3th 
Alabama  in  that  awful  and  trying  scene  has  been 
carefully  written  up,  and  the  record  is  in  the  ar- 
chives of  the  Southern  Historical  Society,  in  its 
native  State,  and  will  be  loved  and  admired  as  long 
as  heroism  is  admired.  It  was  Archer's  worn,  tat- 
tered, and  bleeding  brigade  that  fought  the  last 


I  Fn 


tlie  "  BivouiU'  "  of  March,  1887,  and  editorially  revised.— Editoes. 


A  REPLY  TO  GENHRAL  LONGSTREET. 


battle  north  of  tlie  Potomac  —  tho  Imttlp  of  Falling 
Waters —  where  the  lamented  Pettigi-ew  fell. 

Davis's  Mississippi  brigade,  that  fought  so  gal- 
lantly on  the  first  day,  and  crossed  bayonets  with 
the  Iron  Brigade,  had  a  prominent  part  in  the 
grand  charge.  The  L'd  Mississippi  of  that  brigade 
lost  half  of  its  men  on  that  day,  but  was  still  in- 
tact, ready  and  willing  to  fight,  and  its  courage  in 
the  great  charge  has  become  a  matter  of  history. 
Its  battle-flag  is  in  the  possession  of  the  old  color- 
bearer,  who  lives  at  Blossom  Prairie,  Texas,  and 
has  the  names  of  more  than  a  score  of  battles 
stamped  on  it. 


Sc;des'saiiil  iiane'sN<irth  Carolina  brigades,  com- 
manded by  General  Isaac  R.  Trimble,  belonged  to 
General  W.  D.  Pender's  division  of  A.  P.  Hill's 
corps,  and  were  2500  strong.  General  Pender 
was  mortally  wounded  on  the  second  day.  When 
General  Lee  saw  the  men  of  Scales's  brigade,  bleed- 
ing from  wounds  receivetl  on  the  first  day,  he  said, 
"  Many  of  these  poor  fellows  should  go  to  the  rear." 
When  a  brigade  would  tight  under  such  circum- 
stances as  Scales's  did,  it  ought  not  to  be  robbed  of 
its  military  fame.  General  Trimble  was  wounded 
in  the  charge. 
Prairie  Gkove,  Tex. 


A    REPLY   TO  GENERAL    LONGSTREET. 

BY   WILLIAM    ALLAN,    LIEUTENAJIT-COLOXEL,    C.    S.   A. 


GENERAL  Longstreet's  account  of  Gettysburg 
[see  pp.  244,  339]  is  notable  for  its  mistakes 
as  well  as  for  its  attitude  toward  General  Lee  and 
others. 

First.  The  statement  that  General  Lee  passed 
over  more  deserving  officers  from  other  States  in 
order  to  give  the  command  of  his  corps  to  Virgin- 
ians is  an  unworthy  attack  upon  a  man  who  was  as 
singularly  free  from  such  prejudices  as  he  was 
from  self-seeking,  eitlier  during  the  war  or  after  it. 
Lee  said  in  a  letter  to  President  Davis,  October 
2d,  1862,  at  the  close  of  the  Antietam  campaign  : 

"  In  reference  to  commanders  of  corps  witli  the  rank 
of  lieuteuaut-geueral,  of  which  you  request  uiy  opinion, 
1  can  conflftently  recommend  Generals  Longstreet  and 
Jacksoji,  in  this  army.  My  opinion  of  the  merits  of  Gen- 
eral Jackson  has  been  greatly  eulianced  diu-ing  this  ex- 
pedition. II(!  is  true,  honest,  and  bravo;  has  a  single 
eye  to  the  good  of  the  service,  and  spares  no  exertion  to 
accomplish  liis  object.  Next  to  these  two  officers  I  con- 
sider General  A.  P.  Hill  the  best  coniinander  with  nic. 
He  fights  liis  troops  well  and  takes  good  care  of  them. 
At  present  I  do  not  tliiiik  that  more  llian  two  command- 
ers of  corps  are  necessary  for  this  army." 

This  was  Lee's  judgment  after  a  campaign  in 
which  both  the  Hills  and  McLaws  had  served,  and 
long  before  there  was  any  question  of  making 
either  of  them  a  lieutenant-general.  It  would  bo 
about  as  just  to  accuse  Lee  of  undue  partiality  to 
Georgia  in  making  Longstreet  his  senior  lieuten- 
ant, as  it  is  to  accuse  him  of  partiality  to  Virginia 
in  selecting  A.  P.  Hill  rather  than  1).  H.  Hill  or 
McLaws  for  the  command  of  his  Third  Corps. 

Second.  In  regard  to  the  battle  of  Gettysburg: 
The  first  day's  fight  was  brought  on  unexpectedly 
to  Lee.  In  the  absence  of  Stuart  he  was  not  aware 
of  the  ])roximity  of  tho  Federal  army.  The  first 
day's  operations  were  very  successful.  Two  of 
the  seven  infantry  corps  of  the  Federal  army  were 
virtually  demolished,  having  been  defeated  and 
driven  in  disorder  eompb^tely  from  the  field,  leav- 
ing many  killed  and  wounded  and  several  thousand 
prisoners  to  the  victors. 

Third.  It  was  at  the  (dose  of  this  day's  work  that 
General  Lee,  in  view  of  its  results,  and  of  the  in- 
dications it  gave  of  the  position  of  the  Federal 
army,  decided  to  follow  up  the  fight.  General  Long- 
street  advised  a  movement  across  Meade's  front 


to  threaten  his  left  and  rear.  Such  a  movement 
would  have  been  difficult  in  the  absence  of  Stuart; 
it  could  not  have  been  executed  in  the  position 
then  occupied  by  the  army  with  sufficient  prompt- 
ness to  surprise  Meade  ;  and  if  successful  it  simply 
would  have  forced  the  Federal  army  back  to  some 
position  nearer  Baltimore  and. Washington  where 
the  issue  of  battle  was  still  to  be  tried.  General 
Longstreet  begs  the  question  when  he  assumes 
that  Meade  would  then  have  been  obliged  to  attack 
at  a  disadvantage.  General  Lee  decided  that  this 
plan  did  not  promise  as  good  results  as  to  follow 
up  the  partial  victory  already  gained.  More  than 
one-fotirth  of  the  Federal  army  was  beaten.  (Of 
the  First  and  Eleventh  corps  that  had  numbered 
20.031  on  June  30th,  not  .5700  were  in  line  on 
•July  2d.)  That  army  was  not  concentrated,  and 
hours  must  elapse  before  its  full  strength  could  be 
marshaled  for  battle.  The  absent  portions  would 
reach  the  field  jaded  by  forced  marches,  to  meet  the 
depressing  news  of  the  defeat  of  their  comrades. 
Doubt  and  uncertainty  would  prevail,  increased 
perhaps  by  the  fact  that  the  present  Federal  com- 
nuinder  was  so  new  in  his  place.  Lee's  troops  were 
much  more  nearly  up,  only  Pickett's  division  and 
Law's  brigade  being  out  of  reach.  Not  to  press  the 
Union  army  was  to  lose  the  greater  i>art  of  the  ad- 
vantage of  the  first  day's  victory.  The  Federals 
would  soon  recover  from  their  depression  if  not 
pressed,  and  his  own  troops  woidd  be  disappointed. 
Lee  believed  if  he  could  attack  early  on  the  second 
day  he  would  have  but  i)art  of  the  Federal  army 
to  deal  with,  and  that  if  he  could  repeat  his  success 
of  the  first  day  tiie  gain  would  be  great.  He  there- 
fore determined  upon  attack.  On  the  night  of  the 
1st  (not  on  the  forenoon  of  the  2d,  as  General 
Tiongstreet  has  it)  he  decided,  after  a  conference 
with  Ewell  and  his  division  commanders,  to  nuiko 
the  attack  t'arly  next  day  from  his  right  with  Long- 
.street's  two  divisions  that  were  within  reach,  this 
attack  to  be  supported  by  Hill  ami  Ewell.  (See 
Ewell's  antl  Early's  reports :  Early's  paper  in 
"Southern  Historical  Society  Paju>rs,"  Vol.  IV., 
p.  214;  and  Long's  "Memoirs  of  Lee.'") 

Fourth.  General  Longstreet  would  have  us  infer 
that  he  was  not  ord«'red  by  (Jeneral  Lee  to  attack 
earlv  on  the  second  day  ;  but  that  his  memory  is  at 


356 


A  REPLY  TO  GENERAL  LONGSTREET, 


fault  oil  this  point  has  lieeii  abumlaiitly  shown  by 
Generals  Fitz  Lee,  Pendleton,  Early,  Wilcox,  and 
many  others.  No  testimony  on  this  j)oiut  is  more 
direct  and  conclusive  than  that  of  General  A.  L. 
Long,  then  military  secretary  to  General  Lee.  He 
says  in  his  recently  published  "Memoirs  of  E.  E. 
Lee"  (page  277),  that  on  the  evening  of  the  1st, 
■when  General  Lee  had  decided  not  to  renew  the 
attack  on  Cemetery  Hill  that  day,  he  said  (in 
Long's  presence)  to  Longstreet  and  Hill :  "  Gentle- 
men, we  will  attack  the  enemy  in  the  morning  as 
early  as  practicable."  Long  continues:  *'In  the 
conversation  that  succeeded  he  [Lee]  directed 
them  to  make  the  necessary  preparations  and  be 
ready  for  prompt  action  the  next  day."  Long 
shows  plainly  that  General  Lee's  design  was  to  at- 
tack the  troops  in  front  before  the  whole  Federal 
army  could  get  up,  and  he  describes  graphically 
the  impatience  Lee  showed  next  morning,  as  early 
as  9  A.  M.,  at  Longstreet's  delay.  General  Long- 
street  is  wrong,  too,  in  giving  the  impression  that 
his  divisions  were  fifteen  or  twenty  miles  away  on 
the  night  of  the  1st,  for  in  his  official  report  he 
says  that  "McLaws's  division  .  .  .  reached 
Marsh  Creek,  four  miles  from  Gettysburg,  a  little 
after  dark,  and  Hood's  division  [except  Law's  bri- 
gade] got  within  nearly  the  same  distance  of  the 
town  about  12  o'clock  at  night."  Hood  says  he 
was  with  his  staff  "in  front  of  the  heights  of  Get- 
tysburg shortly  after  daybreak  "  on  the  2d,  and  his 
troops  were  close  behind.  Kershaw  (of  McLaws's 
division)  says  in  his  official  report  that  on  the  1st 
of  July  they  "marched  to  a  point  on  the  Gettys- 
burg road  some  two  miles  from  that  place,  going 
into  camp  at  12  P.  M." 

General  Longstreet,  to  explain  his  delay,  be- 
sides the  above  reasons  scrapes  together  a  number 
of  others,—  such  as  the  presence  of  some  Federal 
scouts  and  pickets  west  of  the  Emmitsburg  road, 
the  movement  of  Sickles's  rear-guard  along  that 
road,  the  presence  of  one  of  General  Lee's  engi- 
neers (who  had  been  sent  to  give  information,  not 
to  command  his  corps).  No  time  need  be  wasted 
on  these.  The  fact  is  that  General  Longstreet, 
though  knowing  fully  the  condition  of  things  on 
the  night  of  the  1  st,  knowing  that  Lee  had  decided 
to  attack  that  part  of  the  Federal  army  in  his 
front,  knowing  that  every  hour  strengthened 
Meade  and  diminished  the  chances  of  Confederate 
success,  and  knowing  that  his  corps  was  to  open 
tlie  battle  and  deliver  the  main  assault,  consumed 
the  time  from  daylight  to  nearly  4  P.  M.,  on  July 
2d,  in  moving  his  troops  abotit  four  miles,  over  no 
serious  obstacle,  and  in  getting  them  into  battle. 
Meantime  on  tlie  Federal  side  Hancock's  corps, 
which  had  camped  three  miles  from  Gettysburg, 
reached  the  field  by  G  or  7  A.  m.  ;  Sickles's  two 
brigades  that  had  been  left  at  Emmitsburg  came 
up  by  9  A.  M.  ;  the  rear  of  the  Fifth  Corps  by 
midday,  and  the  Sixth  Corps,  after  a  march  of 


thirty-two  miles  in  thirty  liours,  by  2  P.  M.  Had 
Longstreet  attacked  not  later  than  9  or  10  A.  M., 
as  Lee  certainly  expected,  Sickles's  and  Hancock's 
corps  would  have  been  defeated  before  the  Sixth 
Corps  and  part  of  the  Fifth  arrived.  Little  Eound 
Top  (which,  as  it  was,  the  Fifth  Cor[)S  barely  man- 
aged to  seize  in  time)  would  have  fallen  into  Con- 
federate possession ;  and  even  if  nothing  more  had 
been  done  this  would  have  given  the  field  to  the 
Confederates,  since  the  Federal  line  all  the  way  to 
Cemetery  Hill  was  untenable  with  Round  Top  in 
hostile  hands. 

Fifth.  That  Longstreet's  attack  when  made  was 
poorly  seconded  by  the  other  corps  may  be  true, 
and  thus  another  chance  of  winning  a  complete 
victory  on  July  2d  was  lost,  but  this  does  not 
change  the  fact  that  the  first  and  great  oppor- 
tunity of  that  day  for  the  Confederates  was  lost 
by  Longstreet's  delay. 

Sixth.  Victory  on  the  thii-d  day  was  for  the  Con- 
federates a  far  more  difficult  problem  than  on  the 
second,  but  it  was  still  within  their  reach.  But 
one  need  not  be  surprised  at  the  failure  of  Pickett's 
attack  after  reading  of  the  hesitation,  the  want 
of  confidence  and  hearty  cooperation,  with  which 
"General  Longstreet  directed  it.  Lee  never  in- 
tended that  Pickett,  Pettigrew,  and  Trimble 
should  fight  unsupported  by  the  remainder  of 
the  army.  He  expected  "that  with  proper  eon- 
cert  of  action  ...  we  should  ultimately  suc- 
ceed." (Lee's  report.)  Longstreet  was  directed 
to  use  his  whole  corps,  and  when  he  felt  embar- 
rassed by  the  Federal  forces  on  or  near  the  Eound 
Tops  he  was  given  a  division  and  a  half  from  A. 
P.  Hill's  corps,  with  power  to  call  for  more. 
General  Long  says:  "The  original  intention  of 
General  Lee  was  that  Pickett's  attack  should  be 
supported  by  the  divisions  of  McLaws  and  Hood, 
and  General  Longstreet  was  so  ordered."  ( "  Mem- 
oii's  of  Lee,"  p.  294.  See  also  statements  of 
Colonels  Venable  and  Taylor,  "Foiu'  Years  with 
General  Lee,"  p.  108.)  Lee's  efforts  for  a  con- 
certed attack  were  ineffectual.  Pickett  was  over- 
whelmed not  by  troops  in  front  but  by  those  on 
his  flanks,  especially  by  those  on  his  right  fiauk, 
where  Wilcox  was  sent  forward  too  late  to  be  of 
use,  and  where  he  was  too  weak  to  have  effected 
much  at  best.  Yet  Longstreet  did  not  use  any 
part  of  Hood's  and  McLaws's  divisions  to  support 
Pickett,  or  to  make  a  diversion  in  his  favor,  or  to 
occupy  the  troops  on  his  flank  which  finally  de- 
feated him.  These  divisions  were  practically  idle, 
except  that  one  of  Hood's  brigades  was  occupied 
in  driving  off  the  Federal  cavalry  which  made 
a  dash  on  that  flank.  Longstreet,  in  a  word, 
sent  forward  one-third  of  his  corps  to  the  at- 
tack, but  the  remainder  of  his  troops  did  not 
cooperate.  And  yet  he  reproaches  Lee  for  the 
result ! 

MoDoNOGH,  Md.,  February  16tli,  1887. 


I^^.     \X:. 


CMAROE    OF 

ALEXANDER'S    ARTILLERY. 

SEE    PAGE    3». 


THE  GREAT  CHARGE  AND  ARTILLERY  FIGHTING 
AT  GETTYSBURG. 

BY    E.    PORTER    ALEXANDER,   BRKiADIER-GEXERAL,   C.    S.    A. 

rjlHE  Reserve  Artillery  of  Longstreet's  corps,  in  the  Gettj'sburg  campaign, 
J-  consisted  of  the  Washington  Artillery  of  New  Orleans,  then  under 
Major  Eshleman,  nine  guns,  and  my  own  battalion  of  twenty-six  guns. 
Besides  these,  the  artillery  of  the  corps  comprised  Cabell's,  Henry's,  and 
Bearing's  battalions  of  eighteen  guns  each.  The  latter  battalions  were 
usually  attached,  on  the  march,  respectively  to  McLaws's,  Hood's,  and  Pickett's 
di\dsions  of  infantry. 

On  the  first  of  July,  1863,  the  Reserve  Artillerj^  was  encamped  near  Green- 
wood, and  we  had  no  idea  that  the  gi'eat  battle  of  the  campaign  had  already 
opened  about  eighteen  miles  away.  Early  in  the  night,  however,  rumors 
reached  us  that  Hill's  corps  had  been  heavily  engaged,  and  that  EwelVs  had 
come  to  his  assistance;  that  the  enemy  had  been  driven  some  distance,  but 
had  finally  made  a  stand  in  a  very  strong  position.  These  rumors  were  soon 
followed  by  orders  for  the  artillery  to  march  at  1  o'clock  for  the  front.  There 
was  little  time  for  sleep  before  taking  the  road,  and  I  think  but  few  imi)roved 
even  that  little.  There  was  the  usual  lively  interest,  of  course,  to  hear  of 
the  personal  fortunes  of  friends  in  the  two  corps  which  had  been  engaged. 
Who  was  killed  and  who  safe  ?  Then  there  was  no  one  so  dnll  as  not  to 
apin-eciate  the  tremendous  gravity  to  us  of  the  results  of  the  l)attle  which  tlie 
next  day  was  to  bring.  We  had  ])enetrated  farthm-  into  the  eni>my's  country 
than  ever  l)efore.  Our  only  commnnication  with  onr  arsenals  and  depots  was 
by  an  unguarded  wagon-road  to  Staunton,  Virginia,  al»ont  two  linndrod  milos, 
over  mountains  and  across  unbridged  rivers;  much  of  ii  llirough  a  li<istil.' 
country,  and  all  of  it  liable  to  cavalry  raids  by  Ili(>  cii.'ihn  .  Hut  wo  felt  liuit 
we  were  now,  somehow,  nearer  the  enemy's  he.irt  tiian  we  h;id  ever  been 
before, —  within  easy  reach  of  some  vital  pai-t, —  and  that  a  i»!(»\v  strnek  now 
must  have  many  times  the  ett'eet  it  would  have  if  given  in  N'irginia  against 
only  an  invading  army.     Our  confidence  in   Lee  was,  of  course,  sui)renie. 


and  the  opi)ortun( 


.f  Ewell  t(»  Hill's 

357 


lid  yrave  fresh  confirmation  of 


3^8  THE  GREAT  CHARGE  AND 

the  skill  that  would  direct  our  efforts.  There  seemed  to  be  a  prevalent  feel- 
ing that  fortune  now  favored  us  and  that  victory  or  defeat  now  depended 
solely  on  ourselves. 

Except  in  equipment,  I  think  a  better  army,  better  nerved  up  to  its 
work,  never  marched  upon  a  battle-field.  But  many  of  our  infantry  still 
carried  smooth-bore  muskets,  and  our  artillery  ammunition  was  inferior, 
especially  that  of  the  rifles.  The  Confederacy  did  not  have  the  facilities  for 
mach  nice  work  of  that  sort,  and  we  had  to  take  what  we  could  get  without 
rigid  inspection.  How  our  rifled  batteries  always  envied  our  friends  in  the 
opposition  their  abundant  supply  of  splendid  ammunition  !  For  an  unreliable 
fuse  or  a  rifle-shell  which  "  tumbles  "  sickens  not  only  the  gunner  but  the 
whole  battery,  more  than  "  misfires  "  at  large  game  dishearten  a  sportsman. 
There  is  no  encouragement  to  careful  aiming  when  the  ammunition  fails,  and 
the  men  feel  handicapped.  But  for  all  our  confidence  that  Providence  had 
now  at  last  consented  to  "  come  down  and  take  a  proper  view  of  the  situa- 
tion," as  one  of  our  good  chaplains  used  to  pray,  there  was  a  very  natural 
anxiety  to  know  how  the  enemy  had  fought  the  day  before  at  Gettysburg. 
As  we  met  the  wounded  and  staff-officers  who  had  been  in  the  action,  I 
remember  many  questions  asked  on  that  subject.  There  was  no  great  comfort 
to  be  derived  from  the  answers,  which  were  generally  in  profane  simile. 
Indeed,  I  have  heard  survivors  of  the  war  say  since  that  some  of  the  Federal 
fighting  that  day  equaled  or  surpassed  any  they  ever  saw  from  first  to  last. 

We  marched  quite  steadily,  with  a  good  road  and  a  bright  moon,  until 
about  7  A.  M.  on  the  2d,  when  we  halted  in  a  grassy  open  grove  about  a  mile 
west  of  Seminary  Ridge,  and  fed  and  watered.  Here,  soon  afterward,  I  was 
sent  for  by  General  Longstreet,  and,  riding  forward,  found  him  with  General 
Lee  on  Seminary  Ridge.  Opposite,  about  a  mile  away,  on  Cemetery  Ridge, 
overlooking  the  town,  lay  the  enemy,  their  batteries  making  considerable 
display,  but  their  infantry,  behind  stone  walls  and  ridges,  scarcely  visible. 
In  between  us  were  only  gentle  rolling  slopes  of  pasture  and  wheat-fields, 
with  a  considerable  body  of  woods  to  the  right  and  front.  The  two  Round 
Tops  looked  over  everything,  and  a  signal-flag  was  ^dsible  on  the  highest. 
Instinctively  the  idea  arose,  "  If  we  could  only  take  position  here  and  have 
them  attack  us  through  this  open  ground ! "  But  I  soon  learned  that  we 
were  in  no  such  luck  —  the  boot,  in  fact,  being  upon  the  other  foot. 

It  was  explained  to  me  that  our  corps  was  to  assault  the  enemy's  left  flank, 
and  I  was  directed  to  reconnoiter  it  and  then  to  take  charge  of  all  the  artillery 
of  the  corps  and  direct  it  in  the  attack,  leaving  my  own  battalion  to  the  com- 
mand of  Major  Huger.  I  was  particularly  cautioned,  in  moving  the  artillery, 
to  keep  it  out  of  sight  of  the  signal-station  upon  Round  Top.  J 

^This  su<?f,'ests  the  remark  that    I  have  never  meiits  out  of  their   sight.     That   wretched  little 

understood  why  the  enemy  abandoned  the  use  of  signal-station  upon  Round  Top  that  day  caused 

military  balloons  early  in  18 G3,  after  having  used  one  of  our  divisions  to  lose  over  two  hours,  and 

them   extensively  up   to   that  time.    Even  if  the  probably   delayed  our  assault  nearly  that   long. 

observers  never  saw  anything,  they  would  have  During  that   time   a   Federal   corps  arrived  near 

been  worth  all  they  cost  for  the  annoyance  and  Round  Top  and  became  an  important  factor  in  the 

delays  they  caused  us  in  trying  to  keep  our  move-  action  which  followed.— E.  P.  A. 


ARTILLERY  FIGHTING  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


^39 


CONFEDERATE    ARTILLEKYME.N    AT    UINNEK. 


I  immediately  started  on  my  reconnoissance,  and  in  abont  three  hours  had 
a  good  idea  of  all  tlie  ground,  and  had  Cabell's,  Henry's,  and  my  own  battalions 
parked  near  where  our  infantry  lines  were  to  be  formed  and  the  attack  begim. 
Dearing's  battalion  with  Pickett's  infantry  was  not  yet  up,  and  the  AVashing- 
ton  Artillery  was  left  in  reserve. 

Througli  some  blunder,  part  of  our  infantry  had  been  marched  on  a  road 
that  brought  them  in  siglit  of  Round  Top,  and  instead  of  taking  to  the  fields 
and  hollows,  they  had  been  halted  for  an  hour,  and  tlien  had  ])een  counter- 
marched and  sent  around  by  a  circuitous  road,  via  Black  Horse  Tavern, 
about  five  miles  out  of  the  way,  thereby  losing  at  least  two  hours. 

We  waited  quite  a  time  for  the  infantry,  and  I  think  it  was  about  4  o'clock 
when  at  last  the  word  was  given  for  Hood's  division  to  move  out  and  endeavor 
to  turn  the  enemy's  left,  wdiile  McLaws  awaited  the  development  of  Hood's 
attack,  ready  to  assault  tlie  Peach  Orchard.  Henry's  battaHou  inov.d  out 
with  Hood  and  was  speedily  and  heavily  engaged  ;  Cabell  was  ready  to  supi»ort 
him,  and  at  once  went  into  action  near  Snyder's  hous(\  about  seven  hundred 
yards  from  the  Peach  Orchard. 

The  Federal  artillery  was  ready  for  us  and  in  tlieii-  usual  t'lill  foivc  and  good 
practice.  The  gi-ound  at  Cabell's  position  gav(>  little  ].rotection,  and  he 
suffered  rapidly  in  both  men  and  horses.  To  In-li.  him  I  fan  up  lltig.T  with 
18  guns  of  my  own  26,  to  Warfiel.l's  house,  witliin  :)00  yards  cf  the  \\-aA\ 
Orchard,  and  opened  upon  it.  This  made  lifty-four  guns  in  action,  and  I 
hoped  they  would  crush  that  part  (►f  tlu'  enemy's  line  in  a  very  short  time, 


36o  THE  GREAT  CHARGE  AND 

but  the  fight  was  longer  and  hotter  than  I  expected.  So  accurate  was  the 
enemy's  fire,  that  two  of  my  guns  were  fairly  dismounted,  and  the  loss  of  men 
was  so  great  that  I  had  to  ask  General  Barksdale,  whose  brigade  was  lying 
down  close  behind  in  the  wood,  for  help  to  handle  the  heavy  24-pounder 
howitzers  of  Moody's  battery.  He  gave  me  permission  to  call  for  volunteers, 
and  in  a  minute  I  had  eight  good  fellows,  of  whom,  alas !  we  buried  two  that 
night,  and  sent  to  the  hospital  three  others  mortally  or  severely  wounded. 
At  last  I  sent  for  my  other  two  batteries,  but  before  they  arrived  McLaws's 
division  charged  past  our  guns,  and  the  enemy  deserted  their  line  in  confusion. 
Then  I  believed  that  Providence  was  indeed  "  taking  the  proper  view,"  and 
that  the  war  was  very  nearly  over.  Every  battery  was  limbered  to  the  front, 
and  the  two  batteries  from  the  rear  coming  up,  all  six  charged  in  line  across 
the  plain  and  went  into  action  again  at  the  position  the  enemy  had  deserted. 
I  can  recall  no  more  splendid  sight,  on  a  small  scale, —  and  certainly  no  more 
inspiriting  moment  during  the  war, —  than  that  of  the  charge  of  these  six  bat- 
teries. An  artillerist's  heaven  is  to  follow  the  routed  enemy,  after  a  tough 
resistance,  and  throw  shells  and  canister  into  his  disorganized  and  fleeing 
masses.  Then  the  explosions  of  the  guns  sound  louder  and  more  powerful, 
and  the  very  shouts  of  the  gunners,  ordering  "  Fire  ! "  in  rapid  succession,  thrill 
one's  very  soul.  There  is  no  excitement  on  earth  like  it.  It  is  far  prettier 
shooting  than  at  a  compact,  narrow  line  of  battle,  or  at  another  battery.  Now 
we  saw  our  heaven  just  in  front,  and  were  already  breathing  the  very  air  of 
victory.  Now  we  would  have  our  revenge,  and  make  them  sorry  they  had 
staid  so  long.  Everything  was  in  a  rush.  The  ground  was  generally  good, 
and  pieces  and  caissons  went  at  a  gallop,  some  cannoneers  mounted,  and 
some  running  by  the  sides  — not  in  regular  line,  but  a  general  race  and 
scramljle  to  get  there  first. 

But  we  only  had  a  moderately  good  time  with  Sickles's  retreating  corps 
after  all.  They  fell  back  upon  fresh  troops  in  what  seemed  a  strong  position 
extending  along  the  ridge  north  of  Round  Top.  Hood's  troops  under  Law 
gained  the  slope  of  Little  Eound  Top,  but  were  driven  back  to  its  base.  Our 
infantry  lines  had  become  disjointed  in  the  advance,  and  the  fighting  became 
a  number  of  isolated  combats  between  brigades.  The  artillery  took  part 
wherever  it  could,  firing  at  everything  in  sight,  and  a  sort  of  pell-mell  fighting 
lasted  until  darkness  covered  the  field  and  the  fuses  of  the  flying  shells  looked 
like  little  meteors  in  the  air.  But  then  both  musketry  and  artillery  slackened 
off,  and  by  9  o'clock  the  field  was  silent.  It  was  evident  that  we  had  not 
finished  the  job,  and  would  have  to  make  a  fresh  effort  in  the  morning.  The 
firing  had  hardly  ceased  when  my  faithful  little  darkey,  Charlie,  came  up 
hunting  for  me,  with  a  fresh  horse,  affectionate  congratulations  on  my  safety, 
and,  what  was  equally  acceptable,  something  to  eat.  Negro  servants  hunting 
for  their  masters  were  a  feature  of  the  landscape  that  night.  I  then  found 
General  Longstreet,  learned  what  I  could  of  the  fortunes  of  the  day  on  other 
parts  of  the  field,  and  got  orders  for  the  morning.  They  were,  in  brief,  that 
our  present  position  was  to  be  held  and  the  attack  renewed  as  soon  as  Pickett 
arrived,  and  he  was  expected  early. 


ARTILLERY  FIGHTING  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


361 


There  was  a  great  deal  to  do  meanwhile.  Our  sound  horses  were  to  be  fed 
and  watered,  those  killed  and  disabled  were  to  be  replaced  from  the  wagon- 
teams,  ammunition  must  be  replenished,  and  the  ground  examined  and  posi- 
tions of  batteries  rectified.  But  a  splendid  moon  made  all  comparatively 
easy,  and  greatly  assisted,  too,  in  the  care  of  the  wounded,  many  of  whom, 
both  our  own  and  the  enemy's,  lay  about  among  our  batteries  nearly  all 
night.  About  1  o'clock  I  made  a  little  bed  of  fence-rails,  as  preferable  to  tlic 
trampled  ground  in  the  Peach  Orchard,  and  got  two  hours'  sleep.  At  '.\  I 
began  to  put  the  batteries  in  position  again  and  was  joined  by  the  ^Vash- 
ington  Artillery,  which  had  been  in  reserve  the  day  befon*.  As  daylight 
came  I  found  I  had  placed  about  twenty  guns  so  that  llic  enemy's  batteries 
on  Cemetery  Hill  enfiladed  the  line,  and  I  had  a  ]»aiiic,  abnost,  for  fear  the 
enemy  would  discover  my  blunder  and  open  Ix'foic  I  (-(.uld  rectify  it.  They 
could  not,  perhaps,  see  down  into  the  valley  as  early  as  I  conld  sec  them, 
and  all  was  right  before  they  opened.  They  never  could  liaxc  resisted  the 
temi)tati()n   to  such  pot-shooting.     Api)arently  tt)  feel  us,  tluw  lired  a  t\'w 


shots,  and  hit  one  or 


two  men  aiul  some  horses;  but  we  did  not  respond, 

nininniliyn  foi'  tlie  i-.'.il  work,  and  we  were  grateful  ti> 

ur  gi-ound  bring  vciy  nnfavorable  as  regarded 


wanting  to  save  our 

them  for  their  modci-ation, 

shelter. 

Early  in  the  morning  ( leneral  Lee  came  around,  and  1  was  then  told  that  we 
were  to  assault  (V'nietery  Hill,  which  lay  rather  to  our  left.  Tliis  necessitated 
a  good  many  changes  of  our  i»ositions,  which  the  enemy  did  not  altogether 
approve  of,  and  they  took  occasional  shots  at  us,  though  we  shifted  al»»ut,  as 


^62  THE  GREAT  CHARGE  AND 

inoffensively  as  possible,  and  earefnlly  avoided  getting  into  bunches.  But  we 
stood  it  all  meekly,  and  by  10  o'clock,  Bearing  having  come  up,  we  had 
seventy-five  guns  in  what  was  virtually  one  battery,  so  disposed  as  to  fire 
on  Cemetery  Hill  and  the  batteries  south  of  it,  which  would  have  a  fire  on  our 
advancing  infantry.  Pickett's  division  had  arrived,  and  his  men  were  resting 
and  eating.  Along  Seminary  Ridge,  a  short  distance  to  our  left,  were  sixty- 
three  guns  of  A.  P.  Hill's  corps,  under  Colonel  R.  L.  Walker.  As  their  distance 
was  a  little  too  great  for  effective  howitzer  fire,  Greneral  Pendleton  offered  me 
the  use  of  nine  howitzers  belonging  to  that  corps.  I  accepted  them,  intending 
to  take  them  into  the  charge  with  Pickett ;  so  I  put  them  in  a  hollow  behind  a 
bit  of  wood,  with  no  orders  but  to  wait  there  until  I  sent  for  them.  About 
11,  some  of  Hill's  skirmishers  and  the  enemy's  began  fighting  over  a  barn 
between  the  lines,  and  gradually  his  artillery  and  the  enemy's  took  part,  until 
over  a  hundred  guns  were  engaged,  and  a  tremendous  roar  was  kept  up  for 
quite  a  time.  But  it  gradually  died  out,  and  the  whole  field  became  as 
silent  as  a  churchyard  until  1  o'clock.  The  enemy,  aware  of  the  strength 
of  his  position,  simply  sat  still  and  waited  for  us.  It  had  been  arranged  that 
when  the  infantry  column  was  ready,  Greneral  Longstreet  should  order  two 
guns  fired  by  the  Washington  Artillery.  ^  On  that  signal  all  our  guns  were 
to  open  on  Cemetery  Hill  and  the  ridge  extending  toward  Round  Top,  which 
was  covered  with  batteries.  I  was  to  observe  the  fire  and  give  Pickett  the 
order  to  charge.  I  accordingly  took  position,  about  12,  at  the  most  favor- 
able point,  just  on  the  left  of  the  line  of  guns  and  with  one  of  Pickett's  cou- 
riers with  me.     Soon  after  I  received  the  following  note  from  Longstreet : 

"Colonel:  If  the  artillery  fiv:e  does  not  have  the  effect  to  drive  off  the  enemy  or  greatly 
demoralize  him,  so  as  to  make  onv  efforts  pretty  certain,  I  would  prefer  that  you  should  not 
advise  General  Pickett  to  make  the  charge.  I  shall  rely  a  great  deal  on  your  good  judgment  to 
determine  the  matter,  and  shall  expect  you  to  let  General  Pickett  know  when  the  moment 
offers." 

This  note?  rather  startled  me.  If  that  assault  was  to  be  made  on  General 
Lee's  judgment  it  was  all  right,  but  I  did  not  want  it  made  on  mine.  I  wrote 
back  to  General  Longstreet  to  the  following  effect : 

''  General  :  I  will  only  be  able  to  judge  of  the  effect  of  our  fire  on  the  enemy  by  his  return 
fire,  for  his  infantry  is  but  little  exposed  to  view  and  the  smoke  will  obscure  the  whole  field.  If, 
as  I  infer  from  your  note,  there  is  any  alternative  to  this  attack,  it  should  be  cai'ef  ally  considered 
before  opening  our  fire,  for  it  will  take  all  the  artillery  ammunition  we  have  left  to  test  this  one 
thorouglily,  and,  if  the  result  is  unfavorable,  we  will  have  none  left  for  another  effort.  And 
even  if  this  is  entirely  successful,  it  can  only  be  so  at  a  very  bloody  cost." 

^In   the  "United  Service  Magazine "  for  Au-  rocky  iiiu.    Most  rcsiu'ctfuHy,  j.  loncstuf.kt,  Licnti'iiant- 

gust,    1885,    Lieutenant-Colonel    William   Miller  <i'""i'iai  Coinniaiiai..;,^' 

Owen,  of  the  Washington  Artillery,  says:  "'^^'^  ^^''^^^  *"  ^^■•'  ^^^  signal-suu  \va«  iiuincdiately 

•^  communicated  to  Maijor  Eshlemau,  conniiauding  the 

"Rcturniuf!:  to  the  position  of  the  Washington  Artil-  Washington  Artillery,  and  the  report  of  the  tirst  gun 

lery,  we  all  quietly  awaited  tlic  order  to  open  the  ball.  rang  out  upon  the  still  summer  air.    There  was  a  mo- 

At  1 :  30  p.  M.  a  couru-r  dushcd  up  lu  great  haste,  hold-  nient's  delay  with  the  second  gun,  a  friction-primer 

ing  a  little  slip  of  paper,  torn  evidently  from  a  memo-  having  failed  to  explode.    It  was  but  a  little  space  of 

landum-book.ouwhich.  written  in  pencil  and  addressed  time,  but  a  hundred    lliousnnd    men  were  listening, 

to  Colonel  Walton,  was  the  following :  Finally  a  puflF  of  sniok.'  was  seen  at  the  Peach  Orchard, 

•  HEAiigi'AUTKiis,  Jidy  :J(1,  18(i:{.  Colouel :  Lei  the  batteries  t^ien  came  a  roar  and  a  flasli,  and  138  pieces  of  Coufed- 

011011.    Order /jreat  care  anil  precision  in  tiring.    If  tlie  bat-  erate  artillery  opened  upon  the  enemy's  position,  and 

tei  ies  at  tlie  Poacli  Orchard  cannot  be  nsed  asainst  tlio  point  the  deadly  work  began  with  the  noise  of  the  heaviest 

we  intend  attacking,  let  them  open  on  the  euemy  on  the  thunder."                                                             EDITORS. 


ARTILLERY  FIGHTING  AT  GETTYSBURG.  363 

To  this  presently  came  the  following  reply : 

"  Colonel  :  The  intention  is  to  advance  the  infantry  if  the  ai-tillery  has  the  desired  effect  of 
di'iving  the  enemy's  off,  or  having  other  effect  such  as  to  wan-ant  us  in  making  the  attack. 
When  the  moment  arrives  advise  General  Pickett,  and  of  course  advance  sucli  artillei-y  as  you 
can  use  in  aiding  the  attack." 

I  hardly  knew  whether  this  left  me  discretion  or  not,  but  at  any  rate  it 
seemed  decided  that  the  artillery  must  open.  I  felt  that  if  we  went  that 
far  we  could  not  draw  back,  but  the  infantry  must  go  too.  General  A.  R. 
Wright,  of  Hill's  corps,  was  with  me  looking  at  the  position  when  these 
notes  were  received,  and  we  discussed  them  together.  Wright  said,  "It 
is  not  so  hard  to  go  there  as  it  looks ;  I  was  nearly  there  with  my  brigade 
yesterday.  The  trouble  is  to  stay  there.  The  whole  Yankee  army  is  there 
in  a  bunch." 

I  was  influenced  by  this,  and  somewhat  by  a  sort  of  camp  rumor  which  I 
had  heard  that  morning,  that  General  Lee  had  said  that  he  was  going  to  send 
every  man  he  had  upon  that  hill.  At  any  rate,  I  assumed  that  the  question 
of  supports  had  been  well  considered,  and  that  whatever  was  possible  would 
be  done.  But  before  replying  I  rode  to  see  Pickett,  who  was  with  his  division 
a  short  distance  in  the  rear.  I  did  not  tell  him  my  object,  but  only  tried  to 
guess  how  he  felt  about  the  charge.  He  seemed  very  sanguine,  and  thought 
himself  in  luck  to  have  the  chance.  Then  I  felt  that  I  could  not  make  any 
delay  or  let  the  attack  suffer  by  any  indecision  on  my  part.  And,  that  General 
Longstreet  might  know  my  intention,  I  wrote  him  only  this:  "General: 
When  our  artillery  fire  is  at  its  best,  I  shall  order  Pickett  to  charge." 

Then,  getting  a  little  more  anxious,  I  decided  to  send  for  the  nine  howitzers 
and  take  them  ahead  of  Pickett  up  nearly  to  musket  range,  instead  of  fol- 
lowing close  behind  him  as  at  first  intended;  so  I  sent  a  courier  to  bring 
them  up  in  front  of  the  infantry,  but  under  cover  of  the  wood.  The  courier 
could  not  find  them.  He  was  sent  again,  and  only  retui-ned  after  oiu-  fire 
was  opened,  saying  they  were  gone.  I  afterward  learned  that  General  Pen- 
dleton had  sent  for  a  part  of  them,  and  the  others  had  moved  to  a  neighbor- 
ing hollow  to  get  out  of  the  line  of  the  enemy's  fire  at  one  of  Hill's  Itatteries 
(luring  the  artillery  duel  they  had  had  an  hour  Ijefore. 

At  exactly  1  o'clock  by  my  watch  the  two  signal-guns  were  heard  in 
quick  succession.  In  another  minute  every  gun  was  at  work.  The  enemy 
were  not  slow  in  coming  l)ack  at  us,  and  the  grand  roar  of  nearly  the  wlioh' 
artillery  of  both  armi(^s  l)urst  in  on  the  silence,  tdniost  as  suddenly  as  tlie  full 
notes  of  an  organ  would  (ill  a  cliurch.     [See  j).  )J71.] 

The  artillery  of  Ewell's  corps,  liowever,  took  only  a  small  i»ai-t,  I  hclicxt', 
in  this,  as  they  were  too  far  away  on  the  otiier  side  of  the  town.  Some  of 
them  might  have  done  good  service  from  positions  between  Hill  and  Kwell, 
enfilading  the  batteries  fighting  us.  The  op)>oi-tunity  t.»  <lo  that  was  the 
single  advantage  in  our  having  the  exterior  line,  to  compensate  lor  all  its 
disadvantages.  But  oui-  line  was  so  extended  that  all  of  it-  was  not  well 
studied,  and  the  olficers  of  the  different  cori)s  ha.l  Ui)  opportunity  to  examine 
each  other's  ground  for  chances  to  cooperate. 


)64  THE  GREAT  CHARGE  AND 

The  enemy's  position  seemed  to  have  broken  out  with  guns  everywhere, 
and  from  Round  Top  to  Cemetery  Hill  was  blazing  like  a  volcano.  The  air 
seemed  full  of  missiles  from  every  direction.  The  severity  of  the  fire  may 
be  illustrated  by  the  casualties  in  my  own  battalion  under  Major  Huger. 

Under  my  predecessor,  General  S.  D.  Lee,  the  battalion  had  made  a  repu- 
tation at  the  Second  Manassas  and  also  at  Sharpsburg.  At  the  latter  battle 
it  had  a  peculiarly  hard  time  fighting  infantry  and  superior  metal  nearly  all 
day,  and  losing  about  eighty-five  men  and  sixty  horses.     Sharpsburg  they 

called  "  artillery  hell."  At  Gettysburg  the 
losses  in  the  same  command,  including  the 
infantry  that  volunteered  to  help  serve 
the  guns,  were  1-1:4:  men  and  116  horses, 
nearly  all  by  artillery  fire.  Some  parts  of 
the  Federal  artillery  suffered  in  the  same 
proportion  under  our  fire.  I  heard  of  one 
battery  losing  27  out  of  36  horses  in  10 
minutes. 

Before  the  cannonade  opened  I  had  made 
op  my  mind  to  give  Pickett  the  order  to 
advance  within  fifteen  or  twenty  minutes 
'^P^  '  after  it  began.     But  when  I  looked  at  the 

full  development  of  the  enemy's  batteries, 

and  knew  that  his  infantry  was  generally 

MAJOR-GENEKAL  cAUMus  M.  WILCOX,  c.  s.  A.     protccted  froui  our  firc  by  stone  walls  and 

FROM    A  PHOTOGRAPH.  ^^^^^^     ^j      ^^^      grOUUd,      I      COUld     UOt     briug 

myself  to  give  the  word.  It  seemed  madness  to  launch  infantry  into  that 
fire,  with  nearly  three-quarters  of  a  mile  to  go  at  midday  under  a  July  sun. 
I  let  the  15  minutes  pass,  and  20,  and  25,  hoping  vainly  for  something 
to  turn  up.  Then  I  wrote  to  Pickett :  "  If  you  are  coming  at  all  you  must 
come  at  once,  or  I  cannot  give  you  proper  support;  but  the  enemy's  fire 
has  not  slackened  at  all;  at  least  eighteen  guns  are  still  firing  from  the 
cemetery  itself."  Five  minutes  after  sending  that  message,  the  enemy's 
fire  suddenly  Ijegan  to  slacken,  and  the  guns  in  the  cemetery  limbered  up 
and  vacated  the  position. 

We  Confederates  often  did  such  things  as  that  to  save  our  ammunition  for 
use  against  infantry,  but  I  had  never  before  seen  the  Federals  withdraw  their 
guns  simply  to  save  them  up  for  the  infantry  fight.  So  I  said,  •'  If  he  does 
not  run  fresh  batteries  in  there  in  five  minutes,  this  is  our  fight."  I  looked 
anxiously  with  my  glass,  and  the  five  minutes  passed  without  a  sign  of  life 
on  the  deserted  position,  still  swept  by  our  fire,  and  littered  with  dead  men 
and  horses  and  fragments  of  disabled  carriages.  Then  I  wrote  Pickett, 
urgently:  "For  God's  sake,  come  quick.  The  eighteen  guns  are  gone  ;  come 
quick,  or  my  ammunition  won't  let  me  support  you  properly." 

I  afterward  heard  from  others  what  took  place  with  my  first  note  to  Pickett. 

Pickett  took  it  to  Longstreet,  Longstreet  read  it,  and  said  nothing.  Pickett 
said,  "  General,  shall  I  advance  ? "     Longstreet,  knowing  it  had  to  be,  but 


ARTILLERY  FIGHTING  AT  GETTYSBURG.  365 

unwilling  to  give  tlio  word,  turned  hi.s  face  away.  Pickc^tt  saluted  and  said, 
"  I  am  going  to  move  forward,  sir,"  galloped  off  to  his  division  aii<l  immedi- 
ately put  it  in  motion.  | 

Longstreet,  leaving  his  staff,  came  out  alone  to  where  I  was.  It  was  then 
about  1:40  p.  M.  I  explained  the  situation,  feeling  then  more  hopeful,  but 
afraid  our  artillery  ammunition  might  not  hold  out  for  all  wo  would  want. 
Longstreet  said,  "  Stop  Pickett  immediately  and  replenish  your  amnnmition.'' 
I  explained  that  it  would  take  too  long,  and  the  enemy  would  recover  from 
the  effect  our  fire  was  then  having,  and  we  had,  moreover,  very  little  to 
replenish  with.  Longstreet  said,  "  I  don't  want  to  make  this  attack.  I  would 
stop  it  now  but  that  General  Lee  ordered  it  and  expects  it  to  go  on.  I  don't 
see  how  it  can  succeed." 

I  listened,  but  did  not  dare  offer  a  word.  The  battle  was  lost  if  we  stopped. 
Ammunition  was  far  too  low  to  try  anything  else,  for  we  had  been  fighting 
three  days.  There  was  a  chance,  and  it  was  not  my  part  to  interfere.  While 
Longstreet  was  still  speaking,  Pickett's  division  swept  out  of  the  wood  and 
showed  the  full  length  of  its  gray  ranks  and  shining  bayonets,  as  grand  a 
sight  as  ever  a  man  looked  on.  Joining  it  on  the  left,  Pettigrew  stretched 
farther  than  I  could  see.  Greneral  Dick  Garnett,  just  out  of  the  sick  ambu- 
lance, and  buttoned  up  in  an  old  blue  overcoat,  riding  at  the  head  of  his 
brigade  passed  us  and  saluted  Longstreet.  Garnett  was  a  warm  personal 
friend,  and  we  had  not  met  before  for  months.  We  had  served  on  the  plains 
together  before  the  war.  I  rode  with  him  a  short  distance,  and  then  we 
wished  each  other  luck  and  a  good-bye,  which  was  our  last. 

Then  I  rode  down  the  Ihie  of  guns,  selecting  such  as  had  enough  ammunition 
to  follow  Pickett's  advance,  and  starting  them  after  him  as  fast  as  possible. 
I  got,  I  think,  fifteen  or  eighteen  in  all,  in  a  little  while,  and  went  with  them. 
Meanwhile,  the  infantry  had  no  sooner  debouched  on  the  plain  than  all  the 
enemy's  line,  which  had  been  nearly  silent,  broke  out  again  with  all  its 
batteries.  The  eighteen  guns  were  back  in  the  cemetery,  and  a  storm  of 
shell  began  bursting  over  and  among  our  infantry.  All  of  our  guns  —  silent 
as  the  infantry  passed  between  them  —  reopened  over  their  heads  when  the 
lines  had  got  a  couple  of  hundred  yards  away,  but  the  enemy's  artillery  let 
us  alone  and  fired  only  at  the  infantry.  No  one  could  have  lookeil  at  that 
advance  without  feeling  proud  of  it. 

But,  as  our  supporting  guns  advanced,  we  passed  many  poor,  maiigK'd 
victims  left  in  its  trampled  wake.  ^  A  terrific  infantry  fire  was  now  opened 
u[)on  Pickett,  and  a  considerable  force  of  the  enemy  moved  out  to  attack 
the  right  flank  of  his  line.  Wo  halted,  unlimbered,  and  opened  fire  upon  it. 
Pickett's  men  never  halted,  but  opened  fire  at  close  range,  swarmed  over  the 
fences  and  among  the  enemy's  guns  — were  swallo\v«'d  u])  in  smoke,  and  that 

I  See   General    Lo.igstreet's   statement    on    pi-.  .l..\vn  an.l  looking;  np  at  me.     A  solid  shot  had  CHr- 

:M^4,  IU;").  — Editors.  ried  away  both  jaws  and  his  toii^rue.     I  notieed  the 

i  I  reraeraber  one  with  the  most  iionil.le  woun.l  j.ow.ler  smut  In.m  I  lie  simt  on  I  he  white  skin  aroun.l 

that  I  ever  saw.     We  were  halted  for  a  niom..nt  by  tiie  wound.  He  sat  „,,and  lookedat  me  st.-adily.  and 

a  fence,  and  as  the  men  threw  it  down  forthe  -uns  I  look..d  at  him  until  the  >runs  eould  pass  InM  noth- 

to  pass,  I  saw  in  one  of  the  corners  a  man  sittinj,'  in^r.  of  course,  could  bo  done  for  him.— L.  V.  A. 


366  THE  GREAT  CHARGE  AND 

was  the  last  of  them.  The  coufliet  hardly  seemed  to  last  five  minutes  before 
they  were  melted  away,  and  only  disorganized  stragglers  pursued  by  a  mod- 
erate fire  were  coming  back.  Just  then,  Wilcox's  ]>rigade  passed  by  us,  mov- 
ing to  Pickett's  support.  There  was  no  longer  anything  to  support,  and  with 
the  keenest  pity  at  the  useless  waste  of  life,  I  saw  them  advance.  The  men, 
as  they  passed  us,  looked  bewildered,  as  if  they  wondered  what  they  were 
expected  to  do,  or  why  they  were  there.  However,  they  were  soon  halted 
and  moved  back.  They  suffered  some  losses,  and  we  had  a  few  casualties 
from  canister  sent  at  them  at  rather  long  range. 

From  the  position  of  our  guns  the  sight  of  this  conflict  was  grand  and 
thrilling,  and  we  watched  it  as  men  with  a  life-and-death  interest  in  the 
result.  If  it  should  be  favorable  to  us,  the  war  was  nearly  over  ;  if  against  us, 
we  each  had  the  risks  of  many  battles  yet  to  go  through.  And  the  event 
culminated  with  fearful  rapidity.  Listening  to  the  rolling  crashes  of  mus- 
ketry, it  was  hard  to  realize  that  they  were  made  up  of  single  reports,  and 
that  each  musket-shot  represented  nearly  a  minute  of  a  man's  life  in  that 
storm  of  lead  and  iron.  It  seemed  as  if  100,000  men  were  engaged,  and  that 
human  life  was  being  poured  out  like  water.  As  soon  as  it  appeared  that  the 
assault  had  failed,  we  ceased  firing  in  order  to  save  ammunition  in  case  the 
enemy  should  advance.  But  we  held  our  ground  as  boldly  as  possible,  though 
we  were  entirely  without  support,  and  "very  low  in  ammunition.  The  enemy 
gave  us  an  occasional  shot  for  a  while  and  then,  to  our  great  relief,  let  us  rest. 
About  that  time  General  Lee,  entirely  alone,  rode  up  and  remained  with  me  for 
a  long  time.  He  then  probably  first  appreciated  the  full  extent  of  the  disaster 
as  the  disorganized  stragglers  made  their  way  back  past  us.  The  Comte  de 
Paris,  in  his  excellent  account  of  this  battle,  remarks  that  Lee,  as  a  soldier, 
must  at  this  moment  have  foreseen  Appomattox  —  that  he  must  have  realized 
that  he  could  never  again  muster  so  powerful  an  army,  and  that  for  the 
future  he  could  only  delay,  but  not  avert,  the  failure  of  his  cause.  However 
this  may  be,  it  was  certainly  a  momentous  thing  to  him  to  see  that  superb 
attack  end  in  such  a  bloody  repulse.  But,  whatever  his  emotions,  there  was 
no  trac(?  of  them  in  his  calm  and  self-possessed  beaiing.  I  thought  at  the 
time  his  coming  there  very  imprudent,  and  the  absence  of  all  his  staff-officers 
and  couriers  strange.  It  could  only  have  happened  by  his  express  intention. 
I  have  since  thought  it  possible  that  he  came,  thinking  the  enemy  might  fol- 
low in  pursuit  of  Pickett,  personally  to  rally  stragglers  about  our  guns  and 
make  a  desperate  defense.  He  had  the  instincts  of  a  soldier  within  him 
as  strongly  as  any  man.  Looking  at  Burnside's  dense  columns  swarming 
through  the  fire  of  our  guns  toward  Marye's  Hill  at  Fredericksburg,  he  had 
said :  "  It  is  well  war  is  so  terrible  or  we  would  grow  too  fond  of  it."  No 
soldier  could  have  looked  on  at  Pickett's  charge  and  not  burned  to  be  in  it.  To 
have  a  personal  part  in  a  close  and  desperate  fight  at  that  moment  would,  I 
believe,  have  been  at  heart  a  great  pleasure  to  General  Lee,  and  possibly  he 
was  looking  for  one.  We  were  here  joined  by  Colonel  Fremantle  of  Her 
Majesty's  Coldstream  Guards,  who  was  visiting  our  army.  He  afterward 
published  an  excellent  account  of  the  battle  in  "  Blackwood,"  and  described 


ARTILLERY  FIGHTING  AT  GETTYSBURG.  367 

many  little  incidents  that  took  place  here,  such  as  General  Lee's  encouraging 
the  retreating  stragglers  to  rally  as  soon  as  they  got  back  to  cover,  and  say- 
ing that  the  failure  was  his  fault,  not  theirs.  Colonel  Fremantle  especially 
noticed  that  General  Lee  reproved  an  officer  for  spuning  a  foolish  horse,  and 
advised  him  to  use  only  gentle  measures.  The  officer  was  Lieutenant  F.  M. 
Colston  of  my  staff,  whom  General  Lee  had  requested  to  ride  off  t<j  the  right 
and  try  to  discover  the  cause  of  a  gi^eat  cheering  we  heard  in  the  enemy's 
lines.  We  thought  it  might  mean  an  advance  upon  us,  but  it  proved  to  be 
only  a  greeting  to  some  general  officer  riding  along  the  line. 

That  was  the  end  of  the  battle.  Little  by  little  we  got  some  guns  to  the 
rear  to  replenish  and  refit,  and  get  in  condition  to  fight  again,  and  some  we 
held  boldly  in  advanced  positions  all  along  the  line.  Sharp-shooters  came  out 
and  worried  some  of  the  men,  and  single  guns  would  fire  on  these,  sometimes 
very  rapidly,  and  manage  to  keep  them  back ;  some  parts  of  the  line  had 
not  even  a  picket  in  front.  But  the  enemy's  artillery  generally  let  us  alone, 
and  I  certainly  saw  no  reason  to  disturb  the  entente  cordiale.  Night  came 
very  slowly,  but  came  at  last ;  and  about  10  the  last  gun  was  withdrawn  to 
Willoughby  Run,  whence  we  had  moved  to  the  attack  the  afternoon  before. 

Of  Pickett's  three  brigadiers,  Garnett  and  Armistead  were  killed  and 
Kemper  dangerously  wounded.  Fry,  who  commanded  Pettigrew's  Ijrigade, 
which  adjoined  Garnett  on  the  left,  and  in  the  charge  was  the  brigade  of 
direction  for  the  whole  force,  was  also  left  on  the  field  desperately  wounded. 
Of  all  Pickett's  field-officers  in  the  three  brigades  only  one  major  came  out 
unhurt.  The  men  who  made  the  attack  were  good  enough :  the  only  trouble 
was,  there  were  not  enough  of  them. 

Next  day,  July  4th,  we  took  a  pretty  fciir  position,  except  tliat  it  had  no 
right  flank,  and  awaited  the  enemy,  who  we  thought  would  be  inspired  by  the 
day  to  attack  us.  Meanwhile  the  wounded  and  the  trains  were  started  back 
to  the  Potomac,  and  at  night,  in  a  pouring  rain  and  over  roads  that  were 
almost  gulfs  of  mud,  the  army  followed.  Providence  had  evidently  not  yet 
taken  a  "proper  view  of  the  situation."  We  had  not  finished  the  war,  but 
had  to  go  back  to  Virginia  and  start  afresh.  Yet  the  mnrnlr  of  tlu»  ai-niy 
seemed  not  at  all  affect(Ml.  The  defeat  was  attributed  entirely  to  tlic  j.osition, 
and,  if  anything,  it  rather  gave  to  the  men  confidence  in  what  i)ositi(>n  could 
do  for  them  if  they  had  it  on  their  side.  Had  Meade  attacked  us  at  Downs- 
ville,  where  we  were  stopped  for  several  days  by  high  water  in  the  Poto- 
mac, I  believe  we  should  have  repulsed  him  easily,  barring  exhaustion  of 
ammunition. 

The  retreat  was  a  terriljle  march  for  the  artillery,  crippled  as  wc  wen'  by 
the  loss  of  so  many  horses  in  battle,  and  the  giving  out  of  many  more  on  the 
stony  roads  for  the  lack  of  liorseshoes.  W*'  were  compelled  to  trespass  on 
the  reluctant  liosi)itality  of  tlu^  iKMghboring  fartners,  and  send  S(iuads  in 
every  dii-ection  I0  get  horses.  Wherever  found  tliey  wer«»  t(^  1h»  bouglit, 
whether  the  owner  desired  to  sell  or  not.  Of  cours(>  our  (»nly  money  was 
Confederate  bills,  but  we  explained  to  the  farmers  that  these  would  be  as 
good  as  gi-eenbacks  if  only  they  would   make  their  own  Government  stop 


368  THE  GREAT  CHARGE  AND  ARTILLERY  FIGHTING. 

fighting  us.  Such  transactions  we  called  "  pressing  "  for  short ;  and,  by  the 
way,  we  often  practiced  it  both  at  home  and  abroad,  but  our  own  people  took 
it  more  complacently  than  did  the  "  Dutch  "  farmers  of  Pennsylvania. 

Near  Hagerstown  I  had  an  experience  with  au  old  Dunkard  which  gave  me 
a  high  and  lasting  respect  for  the  people  of  that  faith.  My  scouts  had  had  a 
horse  transaction  with  this  old  gentleman,  and  he  came  to  see  me  about  it. 
He  made  no  complaint,  but  said  it  was  his  only  horse,  and  as  the  scouts  had 
told  him  we  had  some  hoof-sore  horses  we  should  have  to  leave  behind,  he 
came  to  ask  if  I  would  trade  him  one  of  those  for  his  horse,  as  without  one 
his  crop  would  be  lost. 

I  recognized  the  old  man  at  once  as  a  born  gentleman  in  his  delicate 
characterization  of  the  transaction  as  a  trade.  I  was  anxious  to  make 
the  trade  as  square  as  circumstances  would  permit.  So  I  assented  to  his 
taking  a  foot-sore  horse,  and  offered  him  besides  payment  in  Confederate 
money.  This  he  respectfully  but  firmly  declined.  Considering  how  the 
recent  battle  had  gone,  I  waived  argument  on  the  point  of  its  value,  but  tried 
another  suggestion.  I  told  him  that  we  were  in  Maryland  as  the  guests  of 
the  United  States ;  that  after  our  departure  the  Government  would  pay  all 
bills  that  we  left  behind,  and  that  I  would  give  him  an  order  on  the  United 
States  for  the  value  of  his  horse  and  have  it  approved  by  General  Longstreet. 
To  my  surprise  he  declined  this  also.  I  supposed  then  that  he  was  simply 
ignorant  of  the  bonanza. in  a  claim  against  the  Government,  and  I  explained 
that ;  and,  telling  him  that  money  was  no  object  to  us  under  the  circum- 
stances, I  offered  to  include  the  value  of  his  whole  farm.  He  again  said  he 
wanted  nothing  but  the  foot-sore  horse.  Still  anxious  that  the  war  should 
not  grind  this  poor  old  fellow  in  his  poverty,  I  suggested  that  he  take  two  or 
three  foot-sore  horses  which  we  would  have  to  leave  anyhow,  when  we 
marched.  Then  he  said,  "  Well,  sir,  I  am  a  Dunkard,  and  the  rule  of  our 
church  is  an  eye  for  an  eye,  and  a  tooth  for  a  tooth,  and  a  horse  for  a  horse, 
and  I  can't  break  the  rule." 

I  replied  that  the  Lord,  who  made  all  horses,  knew  that  a  good  horse  was 
worth  a  dozen  old  battery  scrubs ;  and  after  some  time  prevailed  on  him  to 
take  two,  by  calling  one  of  them  a  gift.  But  that  night,  about  midnight,  we 
were  awakened  by  approaching  hoofs  and  turned  out  expecting  to  receive 
some  order.  It  was  my  old  Dunkard  leading  one  of  his  foot-sores.  "  Well, 
sir,"  he  said,  "  you  made  it  look  all  right  to  me  to-day  when  you  were  talking ; 
but  after  I  went  to  bed  to-night  I  got  to  thinking  it  all  over,  and  I  don't  think 
I  can  explain  it  to  the  church,  and  I  would  rather  not  try."  With  that  he  tied 
old  foot-sore  to  a  fence,  and  rode  off  abruptly.  Even  at  this  late  day  it  is  a 
r(;li(^f  to  my  conscience  to  tender  to  his  sect  this  recognition  of  their  integrity 
and  honesty,  in  lieu  of  the  extra  horse  which  I  vainly  endeavored  to  throw 
into  the  trade.  Their  virtues  should  commend  them  to  all  financial  institu- 
tions in  search  of  incorruptible  employees. 


96  0